

600 to
681

"Translation of the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1940

852
855

5 July

Telephone calls at 7:30 AM, from both the Director of the Police Bureau and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police. The gist of the story is as follows:

Since secret information was obtained relative to the carrying out from 7:00 AM this morning of a direct action, which had for some time been planned by the MAEDA faction, arrests were begun from 5:30 AM at several rendezvous places in the city. Their proposed objectives were Premier YONAI, Mr. MACHIDA, Count MAKINO, Baron HARADA, Baron ICHIKI, Mr. IKEDA, Admiral OKADA, Mr. YUASA and Household Minister MATSUDAIRA. Besides nine pistols, two hand grenades, thirty swords and thirty beer bottles of benzine, many copies of a prospectus, stating why they were aroused to act, were confiscated.

Went to the office at 10. Former Lord Privy Seal, YUASA proceeded to the Imperial Palace and being received in audience by the Emperor and Empress, expressed his thanks to their Majesties. He was not quite well yet.

Was received in audience at 11:40. I reported on the MAEDA affair and answered various questions put by the Throne. I also stated to His Majesty that their actions were to blame but as to their motives, the administrators must reflect seriously upon them. Withdrew from the Palace at 12:15.

At 1:30 visited the residence of Prince KAYA, who received me in audience.

YUKIKO, accompanied by NOBUO and NORIKO, came up to Tokyo by the train which arrived at Tokyo station at 5:20. It is decided that they are to take rest at AKASAKA for the time being. TSURUKO and EMIKO also returned to Tokyo together with them.

Went to the Palace at 6 P.M. and participated in the court dinner given in honor of the former and the new presidents of the Privy Council, HARA and KONOYE.

After that, exchanged frank opinions with Prince KONOYE in my room regarding the prospect of the campaign to strengthen the new political structure and the measures to be taken in case of a cabinet change. We talked from 7:40 to 8:20, and parted.

7 July (Sunday) Fine

At 9 A.M. MATSUI called on me. Had a talk with him.

At 10:15, visited the Crown Prince's temporary residence and was received in audience by the Crown Prince.

At 11, went to ASAKA with Marquis INOUE and we played golf with Marquis HOSOKAWA.

In the evening, Nobuo visited me. He started for OSAKA tonight.

At 7:30 ABE, Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, visited me, and I heard from him about the situation after the arrest of MAEDA.

At 8:30 PM, Kozo OTA visited me and brought a message from Baron HIRANUMA to the effect that he thought that at this time when rumors of a political change are rife there is no other person so suitable for appointment as Prince KONOYE.

8 July (Monday) Fine

Went to the office at 9 A.M. to accompany the Emperor to HAYAMA.

Vice-War Minister ANAMI called and expressed himself as follows:

"Now when a political change may be unavoidable within the next four or five days, and the military have been perfecting preparations to meet the abrupt changes in the latest world situation, the character of the YOMAI cabinet is not at all suitable for making negotiations with Germany and Italy and it might even cause a fatal delay. The conclusion is that a cabinet change is inevitable in order to face this grave situation. The army unanimously will support Prince KONOYE's candidacy. Upon meeting Prince KONOYE after his return to Tokyo, the War Minister will take the opportunity to submit an important proposal to Premier YOMAI."

Upon my mentioning that the selection of a Foreign Minister would be most difficult, he replied that the Army would leave such a question entirely to Prince KONOYE.

At 10 A.M., the Emperor left the palace and I accompanied him to HAYAMA. In the car on the way, the Chief Aide-de-Camp told me as follows:

"In the Army General Staff Office in recent days, the officers forming the central core have presented their opinions to the leading staff members from the viewpoints of both political and military policies, as they anticipate that the personnel of the present government will never be able to sufficiently cope with the latest world situation. As a result, it is understood that the Chief of the Army General Staff, Prince KANIN, told the War Minister about the matter, and the War Minister has been much concerned about what measures to take. Such being the case, the expression of resolute determination by the War Minister may well depend upon the behavior of the Cabinet itself. And so on"

Received in audience by the Emperor from 1:40 to 2:30. Answered the Imperial questions about Prince KONOYE's new political structure campaign and other matters.

Left the Imperial villa at 3 P.M., and entered my villa at ZUSHI.

16 July

Went to the office at 11 A.M. Telephone call from Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA.

Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA telephoned this morning as follows:

"War Minister HATA met Premier YONAI after 9:00 A.M. this morning and submitted his resignation. When told by the Premier to produce a successor, he replied that an answer may be expected by evening and left. As the Army cannot be expected to produce a successor, the Premier, after calling an extraordinary Cabinet meeting today, will probably have to go to the HAYAMA Imperial villa to submit a mass resignation."

Thereupon, I immediately requested the Grand Chamberlain, Chief Aide-de-Camp and HIROHATA the Lord Steward to Her Majesty the Empress to assemble in my room. I told them of the foregoing matter and we consulted about the Emperor's return trip and other matters. We made a provisional plan but decided to wait for the arrival of the Imperial Household Minister from Tokyo before making the final decision.

Upon the Emperor's return from the sea, was received in audience at 12:10 and reported to the Throne about the above matters.

Was again received in audience at 1:45, fully explained the procedure of selecting the leader of the incoming cabinet, which had previously been studied and decided upon and got his approval. The summary is as follows:

1. The Emperor requested the Lord Privy Seal to ask the President of the Privy Council and the former premiers about the selection of the head of the incoming cabinet and to report their answer after consultation with the Elder Statesman.

The Emperor will at the same time order the Grand Chamberlain to make arrangements to assemble the said personages in the Palace.

2. The Lord Privy Seal will arrange the council of these personages in the Palace and he himself will participate in it.

3. Further, the Lord Privy Seal himself will call on the Elder Statesman or will have the Chief Secretary do so to consult about the matter and report the result to the Throne.

The following information has been received from the Chief Aide-de-Camp: He received a phone call from Vice-Minister ANAMI of the War Ministry, according to whom the state of affairs leading to the Minister's resignation, is as follows: Several days ago a memorandum containing the army's opinion on the present situation was submitted to the Premier, who summoned the War Minister this morning, and telling him that the army's idea was different from that of the present cabinet, asked him bluntly to resign in case of inconvenience. Thereupon the War Minister at once submitted his resignation. As the Premier further asked him to recommend his successor, the Three Chief Officers' Meeting was held from 2:30 P.M. but because of the foregoing situation it was extremely difficult to make any recommendation.

At 2:30 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA arrived from Tokyo. Conferred with him. The ceremony of the Italian Ambassador's presentation of credentials to the Throne has been postponed and it has been decided that the Emperor will return to Tokyo tomorrow accompanied by the Empress.

Premier YONAI came to Hayama from Tokyo at 6:40 P.M. and explained the details of the resignation en bloc. It was about as I have set it down. As a result of the conference of the three Chiefs it was said that although the selection of a successor was not being refused, it was difficult to choose one and no forecast was possible.

Premier YONAI in announcing to the Cabinet his decision in favor of a resignation en bloc did not as was usual in the past call each minister separately to his room and talk to him. Instead he assembled all the members in the cabinet meeting room and stating first that this was not a cabinet meeting, expressed his decision. At this, War Minister HATA scowled, but straightway stood up and made a speech. That is the story.

At this time I communicated to the Premier His Majesty's opinion which I had previously learned and the Premier was deeply moved.

After supper the Premier was received in audience by the Emperor and tendered the resignation.

I was received in audience at 7:40 P.M. and was requested to choose a successor. To this I replied that in response to the order I would request a council of the Senior Statesmen tomorrow in the Palace to discuss the matter.

In the course of my audience with the Emperor, the Emperor told me the circumstances surrounding his summoning of War Minister HATA at the time when the Imperial order for cabinet formation was given to Admiral YONAI.

The Emperor said that he had not shown him any special favor, although there was a gross misunderstanding about the matter. He had been told that KONOYE also was of the opinion that it would be well to question HATA and that YUASA, too, thought that questioning would be all right. He had called HATA and had asked him whether the Army was willing to cooperate with YONAI, to whom he, the Emperor, had given the Imperial order. As HATA had replied that the Army would cooperate, the Emperor had said that that was fine and had not given any orders.

After having received the Emperor's permission, I decided to come back to Tokyo tonight. I left at 8:20 P.M. and stopped at my villa in ZUSHI. After having a short talk there with Mr. KOREMATSU, who had called on me just then, I left for Tokyo by car at 8:45 P.M. Five newspaper cars followed me. I reached home at 10:15 P.M."

KIDO DIARY17 July, Wednesday

Mrs. Keiko SOMA called. After a short talk with her I went to the office at 10. Before 1 o'clock, in response to the invitation telegram from Grand Chamberlain MOMOTAKE, President HARA of the Privy Council and six former Premiers, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, HAYASHI, KONOYE and FIRANUMA, assembled in the West Ante-Chamber of the Palace, and from 1 o'clock a meeting was held in the West No. 2 Room to select the head of the incoming cabinet following the presentation of resignation by Premier YONAI.

The meeting was opened with a speech by Assistant Grand Chamberlain KANROJI, who acting in place of the Grand Chamberlain conveyed His Majesty's opinions and thoughts.

Then I stated to them that I had been told by the Emperor to consult the Elder Statesman about the matter to report the result to the throne; that the meeting had been called today to enable a frank exchange of views on the subject; that the meeting, because of the nature of the matter to be discussed, could not be called a conference, and consequently the decision would not be put to such a formality as voting; and that their informal talk and free and frank exchange of views were requested so as not to leave anything undone regarding the selection of the succeeding premier.

HARA--All I know about the reason for the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet is from the newspapers. If you know the truth I would like to hear about it.

Lord Privy Seal--I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at HAYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favour a political rapprochement with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being separated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence he has come to the point of resigning.

WAKATSUKI: I feel that there is no one fit for the Premier's post at this time except Prince KONOYE. I hope Prince KONOYE will take the field.

HARA: It would be fine if Prince KONOYE took the field.

HIRANUMA, FAYASFI, OKADA: We quite agree with Baron WAKATSUKI's opinion.

Prince KONOYE: In view of the circumstances leading to the general resignation of the YONAI cabinet, the one to take charge of the present situation should be well versed in military affairs with a full understanding of them. As I do not have such ability, and have made no preparations for it, I would like to see someone more fit for the post selected.

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: I have heard that the views of the military leaders are overwhelmingly in favor of Prince KONOYE's taking the field. Besides, there are points in the present actions of the army which may be understood as having been based on the assumption that Prince KONOYE would rise. I do not think that there is any other person fit for the post. I earnestly hope that Prince KONOYE will come forward.

HIRANUMA: It is a bad example that the cabinet should fall on account of the War Minister's resignation, and it is regrettable that we have often had such examples. It should be that a successor would be found and the cabinet be able to continue. However, because in practice the custom has come about of having the three chiefs make the recommendation, such situations as today's arise. It is reasonable that Prince KONOYE is concerned over this point, and I feel sorry for him having to take the field at this time. However, since we cannot find anyone else fit for the post, there is nothing for it but to earnestly ask Prince KONOYE to come forward. Moreover, since we are in this difficult position it is needless to say that every quarter not to speak of ourselves should endeavor to make it easy for the Prince to manage his task.

HIROTA: It seems the China Incident cannot be easily settled if the cabinet is as weak as it has been, and there is no other way but to continue the present state of affairs. Judged from this view-point, it would also be a good thing to have a suitable military man capable of working closely with the Army and Navy. However, there is no such man. Besides, since the military themselves wish it there is no problem about asking Prince KONOYE to take the field.

Lately we have had all kinds of rumours. The Lord Privy Seal must have made quite an investigation of them.

Lord Privy Seal: As I have said before, according to the information we have received, various rumors are prevailing, but generally speaking, there is a strong hope that Prince KONOYE will take the field. Also at this time when the end of the China Incident is gradually approaching, I feel that a large section of the public is of the opinion that there is no suitable person other than Prince KONOYE to form a strong cabinet.

Lord Privy Seal: I can easily see that you generally agree upon Prince KONOYE. After consulting the Elder Statesman, KIDO will report the reply to the throne.

Things took place as I have noted and the meeting was closed at 1:30 p.m. I sent Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA to OKITSU by the 3:00 p.m. train to see Prince SAIONJI. Their Majesties returned from HAYAMA at 5:10 p.m. At 6:36 Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA telephoned me from Prince SAIONJI's villa at OKITSU that as the old prince was not only sick at that time but also knew little of the political situation, he could not take the responsibility of replying to the throne. So I answered that I understood. I was received in audience by His Majesty at 7:00 p.m. I informed Him of the result of the meeting and of Prince SAIONJI's reply. Although Prince SAIONJI's reply to the throne was inevitable because of advanced age, His Majesty in order to show his respect wishes to ask the Elder statesman hereafter also. However, as I felt sorry to see the GENRO pressed for a reply, I asked the Emperor to call Prince KONOYE leaving that matter as it was. His Majesty gladly accepted my request. Accordingly the Emperor had the Grand Chamberlain summon Prince KONOYE by telephone. Again I was received in audience by His Majesty. I reported the details of this afternoon's meeting. At that time the Emperor spoke as follows:

"When War Minister HATA came to HAYAMA today to report to the throne on personnel, he told me what the opinion of the army is. Generally it was the same as that which KIDO had heard from FOMAI yesterday. I told him that this business was very regrettable, but I felt it was one consolation that we could see where the responsibility lay, although there had been up till now many uncertain attitudes. HATA, who was once Chief Aide-de-Camp and who knows how busy I am at such times, was extremely sorry and had tears in his eyes."

I retired from the Imperial presence at 7:40 p.m. On that occasion the Emperor asked me whether he might give KONOYE some advice, it being of a simple matter, which KIDO also had once mentioned. That is, that KONOYE should be prudent especially in the choice of Foreign and Finance Ministers at this time when the situation at home and abroad is grave.

Of course I replied that it would be a good idea to do so.

Prince KONOYE came to the Imperial Palace at eight. After having talked with me for a short time, he went into the Imperial presence and received the Imperial command. I am told that on that occasion the Emperor gave him the foregoing advice. He, after having retired from the Imperial presence, again talked with me. He told me that he would go to the Peers' Club after that on that day and would invite the War and Navy Ministers. He intends to ask the War Minister to select a person who can cooperate with the Navy and the Navy Minister, to choose a person who can cooperate with the Army. He will wait till the selection is made and on the next day or the day following will have the Foreign Minister join them for a full discussion of national defense, diplomacy, cooperation between Army and Navy and the relation between the Supreme Command and the Government. And only after they come to an agreement in their views will he begin selecting the other Cabinet Ministers. He said that he wished to have KOREMATSU as his secretary and asked me to use my influence for that purpose. He left at 8:40.

I was summoned by His Majesty and received in audience at 8:45. I reported on Prince KONOYE's policy in regard to the formation of the cabinet. The Emperor seemed to be satisfied with it. I retired from the Imperial presence at 9:10. I reached home at 9:30. I received a treatment from Doctor WATANABE.

607

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 17 July 1940 24.00 hrs.
Arrival " " " 21.05 hrs.

For General Staff, Army Attache Division

1632.7

No. 697 of 17.7

"1) In accordance with the Cabinet change, forced by the Army, a speedy Japanese transition to a more active anti-English policy is to be expected. I have strictly confidential information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hongkong in the case that it might be necessary.

"2) To 340-46gk there: Senior Attache Admiral Wennecker. Execution is fraught with difficulties as question of military questions such as military policy and war economy in Japan, were heretofore predominantly the business of the army.

VB
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"3) Japanese Army asked through a mediator, if it can count in the future on delivery of captured arms, possibly in settlement for Japanese delivery of raw materials. Reference to Foreign Office W.2548g of May 15th according to which discussion by Wehrmacht Attache's on delivery of implements of war is forbidden.

"4) For O.K.W.WiRu: Re: inquiry 9563/40g of June 6.

"Japanese army ready to deliver; request information re amount. As Nitro-Glycerine and T.N.T. are dangerous to transport as finished products, request information re raw material needs.

"5) Can a visa for Inf/Captain TANAKA for a two-year stay as a student in Germany be obtained? Supplement to Tel. N. 645, July 2nd."

MAZKI.

OTT

Note: Passed on through teletype office to O.K.W.. Secret teleprinter. Tel. Control. 18.7.1940.

/136352/

601

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo	17 July 1940	24.00 hrs.
Arrival	" " "	21.05 hrs.

For General Staff, Army Attache Division

No. 697 of 17.7

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Ideas*
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MAZKI.

OTT

Note: Passed on through teletype office to O.K.W.. Secret teleprinter. Tel. Control. 18.7.1940.

/136352/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 14 July 1940"

14 July Sunday Cloudy

Went to the Imperial Villa at 2 PM in response to the Emperor's request and was received in audience at 2:15. Was asked by the Emperor whether an order (which had been secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of the General Staff, for heavy artillery mobilization for the purposes of the South China campaign) had been fully cleared with the Government. I replied that I would ask the Chief Aide-de-Camp to inquire of the War Minister regarding the liason on this matter, and if the liason had not been sufficient, I myself would ask the Premier.

Left the Emperor then and at once got in touch with the Chief Aide-de-Camp on that matter.

Learned from the Aide-de-Camp that he had heard as follows from the War Minister: At the Four Ministers' Conference on the 12th (which the Finance Minister was specially invited to attend) the results of a careful study were that since in any case any preparations at all would require a month and a half, they had agreed to push preparations. It was decided at a cabinet meeting that a further cabinet decision would be required in actual operations were undertaken. After inquiring by phone as to Foreign Minister ARITA's opinion and receiving the same sort of answer as that from the War Minister, I reported in person to the Emperor to the above effect at four o'clock, and the Emperor was pleased to hear my reply.

At that time the Emperor said one thing and another about the change in the government. He said that he still today had faith in the Yonai Cabinet, and that though a change of Cabinet was inevitable in view of domestic and foreign conditions, he wished to have his feelings conveyed to YONAI. I said that I would arrange to have the Emperor's feelings conveyed to YONAI at the proper time.

Left the Imperial Villa at 4:20, and came home with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA, who had come down from Tokyo. Mr. HARADA of O:SO called on me, and we three talked quietly for a while. Received a call from and was interviewed by Mr. WATANABE, a reporter from the KOKUMIN. After 6 Emiko arrived here. After 7 Tsuruko and the others left for Tokyo.

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Doc. No. 4028D

page. 1

Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo , 18 July 1940

7.20 S

Arrived: 18 " "

14.40 o'clock

No.699 of 18.7

very urgent:

Appendix to telegram of 17th No. 696

MATSUOKA just told me through Admiral GODO confidentially that he accepted position of Foreign Minister and asks for friendly cooperation.

OTT

/136353/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

604

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo: 20 July 1940 5.00 hrs.
Arrival: 20 " " 14.35 " .

No. 708 of 20.7 - Appendix to Telegram No. 699 of July 18th.

X Prince KONOYE is building his government in sections. Up till now, in addition to the appointment of MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister, it is certain that Lieutenant General TOJO has been called as War Minister and Admiral YOSHIDA retained as Navy Minister. Yesterday there was long discussion between them and KONOYE re the fundamentals of future foreign and domestic policies, where, according to a press announcement, KONOYE obtained agreement. Details not yet known, MATSUOKA's appointment was generally approved by the press, as a new orientation of Japanese foreign policy is expected from him with certainty. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI... (1 group garbled) expressed themselves in a similar vein at press interviews.

OTT

/136359/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. P. Cumming

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s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

645

Berlin, 22 July 1940

"The Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy told me today that during the as yet unfinished creation of the New Japanese cabinet, there was an unusual procedure, viz., that before the completion of the cabinet, 4 of its members- Prime Minister KONOYE, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO together with, member of the previous cabinet, Navy Minister YOSHIDA, came together and drew up an authoritative foreign policy program for the future cabinet. These 4 men have the decisive positions in the cabinet. Among other things, their foreign policy program contained a rapprochement with the Axis powers.

WOERMANN "

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4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 2 August 1940 19.55 hours
Arrival " " " 18.55 hours

No. 770 of 2.8

1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far reaching influence in this capacity.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 July 1940"

18 July 1940

Mr. HIROSE came to see me at 9:00 A.M. and talked with me.

I asked Mr. KOREMATSU to come and see me at 9:30 A.M., and I conveyed to him that I was asked by Prince KONOYE to use my influence in urging him to become the Prince's private secretary. As I could not obtain his consent, I promptly telephoned to Prince KONOYE and told him so.

I began work at 10:30.

I was received in audience by His Majesty at 10:40 A.M. and he talked of various things. I finally retired from the Imperial presence at noon.

War Minister HATA came to pay his respects at a little after 2:00.

I was again received in audience this afternoon from 2:25 to 2:50. The Emperor stated that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister and TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA for Inspector-General of the Air Force but that he thought the procedure was wrong, for Prince Konoye was still in the midst of forming a cabinet and had not yet accepted TOJO for the post, and, as he thought that the action was rather over hasty, he had asked the War Minister whether he did not think the action as being out of order.

Being impressed with the reasonableness of the Emperor's opinion after I had left the palace and on the occasion of my talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp, after expressing my idea, I told him that I hoped for liaison by the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent.

Furthermore, the Emperor spoke of the CHUN-KING policy as follows: that the above policy was very hopeful and that information had been received that if CHIANG himself could not come out, he would at least send HOYING-Chin or KUNHSIANG-hsi.

Doc. No. 2137D

Item (1)

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Page 1

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Cabinet Decision of July 26, 1940

Outline of Japan's Basic National Policy

Outline of the Basic National Policy

The world is now on the threshold of a stupendous historic change. New political, economic and cultural orders are in the process of creation on the basis of the growth and devevelopment of several groups of nations. Japan is also faced by a great ordeal unparalleled in history. At this juncture, if we are to carry out a national policy truly in consonance with the lofty ideal on which our nation is founded, it is of the most urgent necessity to effect a fundamental renovation of the government administration along all lines, and to march forward toward the completion of a national defence structure, by surmounting all difficulties. The general principles of the basic national policy have been therefore formulated as follows:

1. Basic Policy

The fundamental aim of Japan's national policy lies in the establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty ideal of Hakko Ichiu on which the Empire is founded. First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center. We will therefore speedily secure for herself an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation and march forward toward the realization of the national policy by mobilizing the total strength of the nation.

2. National Defense and Foreign Policy.

In the light of the new external and internal circumstances of the Empire, we will so amplify armaments as to ensure the execution of national policy on the basis of a state structure for national defense through manifestation of the nation's total strength.

The fundamental aim of Japan's foreign policy at present lies in the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia. Attention will be focussed upon a successful settlement of the China Affair, while, by taking a long-range view of the great world change, constructive and elastic measures will be adopted in order to advance the national fortunes of the Empire.

3. Renovation of the Internal Structure.

The urgent task concerning the country's internal administration is to renovate all branches of the government in accordance with the fundamental principle of the national polity, and to lay down a firm foundation for a national defense state structure. For this purpose, we will aim at the realization of the following items:

- i. In parallel with the renovation of the educational system in full accord with the fundamental principle of the national polity, we will establish national morality which attaches the first importance to the idea of service to the state by rejecting all thoughts of selfishness and material gains. And we will aim at the encouragement of scientific spirit.

ii. We will strive for a coordinated unity of government by setting up a new national political structure.

(a) Organizing the nation anew on the basis of cooperation between government and people, and of service to the state, every man according to his occupation.

(b) Reform of the Diet system so as to conform to the new national political structure.

(c) Creation of a new government service system through fundamental renovation of the administrative methods with a view to effecting unity and expedition.

iii. Establishment of the foundation for a national defense economy on the basis of autonomous construction of the economies of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, with this Empire as the center.

(a) Establishment of Japan's economic self-sufficiency policy, making Japan, Manchoukuo and China as a single unit, and embracing the whole of Greater East Asia.

(b) Execution of a planned economy through cooperation of government and people; especially perfection of a unified control system over production, distribution and consumption of vital commodities.

(c) Establishment of a financial plan aimed at the development of coordinated economic powers; also, strengthening of financial control.

(d) Renovation of the trade policy in line with the new world situation.

(e) Establishment of the measures for self-supply of the nation's daily necessities, especially staple food stuffs.

(f) An epochal expansion of important industries, especially heavy, chemical and machine industries.

(g) An epochal development of science, and rationalization of production.

(h) Improvement and replenishment of transportation and communication facilities in line with the new world situation.

(i) Establishment of a land development plan aimed at the development of the coordinated national strength of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

4. Establishment of the permanent policies for the enhancement of the mental qualities and physical powers of the people which constitutes

the motive force for the execution of national policy, and for the increase of population; and especially fundamental policies for the stabilization and development of agriculture and agricultural communities.

5. A decisive measure will be taken to rectify the inequality of sacrifices on the part of the people, attendant upon the execution of the national policy. Welfare measures will be fully carried out, and the living conditions of the people renovated, so as to ensure a living standard truly befitting a stout-hearted and strong-bodied people capable to survive ten years of trials and hardships and surmount the national crisis.

Item (3)

Decisions Made by the Conference of the Prime
Minister and the Ministers of War, the Navy and
Foreign Affairs on 4 September 1940, and by the
Liaison Conference on 19 September 1940

Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis.

Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis

The trends toward the strengthening of collaboration among Japan, Germany and Italy have lately become very pronounced, and it is believed that now the time is ripe for speedy initiation of conversations among the three countries on this matter. It is accordingly proposed to commence negotiations in accordance with the under-mentioned Basic Principles, with Germany, to start with.

Basic Principles.

1. To make a fundamental agreement among the three countries, in order that they shall mutually cooperate by all possible means in the establishment of a New Order in Europe and in Asia.
2. To carry out consultations among the three countries in as short a period of time as possible in regard to the best means of the abovementioned cooperation.
3. To begin with, publicity will be given, at home and abroad, to the purpose in 1 and 2 above, in the form of a joint declaration of the three countries.

Explanations.

The German Government has specially sent Minister Stahmer to Japan. Although his mission may merely be to prove the situation here, yet the fact is that he enjoys the special confidence of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. At this time, therefore, we had better take a step forward and commence talks for the strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis. In the light of the situation now prevailing in this country and abroad, it is of urgent importance that, to meet the immediate needs of the situation, a joint declaration should be issued on the sense of 1 and 2 under the Basic Principles.

Inasmuch as the proposed declaration is to the effect that the three countries will cooperate by all possible means for the construction of the respective New Orders, Japan should be resolved, if need be, to take any action, including recourse to armed force. In so far as Britain is concerned Germany may not immediately require our armed cooperation. In this event, our main objective will be the United States. The problem of the Soviet Union will also surely claim deliberation. At any rate, unless we are resolved on the employment of armed force, it will be impossible for us to carry on any useful talks with Germany.

The joint declaration mentioned above is preliminary in nature. It should be followed up by negotiations for conclusion of a military agreement. The consultation as to the best means of cooperation, mentioned in 2 under the Basic Principles, signify, in the final analysis, negotiations for military collaboration.

These negotiations are to be conducted in accordance with the Main Principles Governing Negotiations annexed hereto.

Basic Principles concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance.

1. Japan, Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of a New World Order, will arrive at a mutual understanding with respect to support for the establishment and administration of their respective Spheres of Living, and also in regard to cooperation concerning their policies toward Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. (See Appendix 1)

Note:

On the basis of this fundamental understanding, such further agreements as may be necessary will be concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, or between Japan and Germany, and between Japan and Italy.

2. Japan, Germany and Italy will, along with the above-mentioned fundamental understanding, speedily arrive at an understanding with respect to their mutual support and cooperation concerning the China Incident and the European war, by which they are respectively confronted. (See Appendix 2).

3. The negotiations under 1 and 2 above will be conducted in accordance with the Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration in Appendix 3) and on the basis of the Main Principles Governing Negotiations (in Appendix 4).

4. The understandings mentioned above need not necessarily take the form of agreements, but, if Germany and Italy so desire, there is no objection to the conclusion of agreements in this connection.

Appendix 1 - Terms of Political Understanding Forming the Basis for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration.

1. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of a New World Order, for the realization of which they are presently putting forth their efforts, will mutually respect the Japanese Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, and the German and the Italian Sphere of Living in Europe and Africa; and will cooperate by all possible means for the construction of New Orders in the said regions.

2. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually effect close economic cooperation.

With this end in view, they will carry out the preferential mutual interchange of material resources existing in their respective Spheres of Living and the exchange of techniques, and will also accord favorable consideration to the other party's economic activities in their respective Spheres of Living.

3. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union and in inducing the Soviet Union to bring her policy into line with the common ground of the two contracting parties. (In addition, an understanding will also be reached with respect to consultation as to the action to be taken in the event of a danger of either Japan or Germany and Italy entering upon a state of war with the Soviet Union, if, in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy, it turns out that such desire is entertained by the two countries.)

4. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually cooperate in order not to allow the United States to interfere in regions other than the Western Hemisphere and the United States possessions, and also in order to safeguard the political and economic interests of both contracting parties in this connection. Further, in the event of either contracting party entering upon a state of war with the United States, the other contracting party will assist that party by all possible means.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will closely cooperate with respect to the action to be taken in regard to Central and South America.

Note:

The present understanding will be treated as confidential.

Appendix 2 - Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation of Japan and the Two Countries of Germany and Italy in regard to the European War and the China Incident.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, in settling the China Incident and the European War, by which the two contracting parties are respectively confronted, will effect mutual support and cooperation as follows:

Japan will:

- a. Accord as much facility as possible in meeting the desires of Germany and Italy in regard to the acquisition of natural and material resources existing in East Asia, including the the South Seas; and
- b. Cooperate as much as possible in intensifying the pressure upon British influences in East Asia, including the South

Seas; and in facilitating the prosecution of war by Germany and Italy against Britain.

Germany and Italy will

- a. Cooperate as much as possible in regard to the supply of such machinery and similar articles, and in regard to such technical assistance, as may be desired by Japan, and
- b. Give as much political and economic cooperation as possible in the settlement of the China Incident.

Note:

The present understanding will be treated as confidential.

Appendix 3 - Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration.

1. Concerning Japan's Sphere of Living for the construction of a Greater East Asia New Order,

- a. The sphere to be envisaged in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy as Japan's Sphere of Living for the construction of a Greater East Asia New Order will comprise:

The former German Islands under Mandate, French Indo-China and Pacific Islands, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India, etc., with Japan, Manchuria and China as the backbone.

It is understood, however, that the South Seas Region to be indicated by Japan in conducting the negotiations with Germany and Italy will be the region from Burma eastward, including the Dutch East Indies, and New Caledonia northward. It is further understood that India may be recognized, for the immediate purposes as being included in the Sphere of Living of the Soviet Union.

- b. The goal in regard to the Dutch East Indies is to have it in a state of preparedness for independence, but the immediate objective will be to secure recognition of Japan's position of political and economic predominance in that country.

In this connection, if German proposals should be a variance with the above proposition, recognition should still be obtained of Japan's predominant position in the Dutch East Indies through the preferential supply to Japan of natural and material resources existing in that country, through the guarantee of Japan's continuance of the already existing German economic

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undertakings there, and by negotiations of a political nature on other matters in general.

- c. The same principles as in b, above will be followed with respect to French Indo-China.

2. Concerning Japan-German-Italy economic cooperation.

- a. With regard to trade, Japan will supply Germany and Italy with agricultural, forestry and aquatic products of Japan, Manchuria and China, and will also cooperate in supplying Germany and Italy with special mineral products, rubber and other articles of China, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, etc. Germany and Italy, on their part, will supply Japan with such technical assistance, aircraft, machinery, chemical products, etc. as may be required by Japan.

With regard to mutual economic activities, Japan will, especially in China and Manchuria, accord de facto preferential treatment to Germany and Italy, and enable the participation of their technique and equipment

- b. For the above-mentioned purposes, there will be separately concluded an Economic Agreement, a Trade Agreement and a Payments Agreement.

3. Concerning Japan's attitude toward Japan-Germany-Italy cooperation in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States.

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Being destined to be the leader of East Asia in the postwar new order of things wherein it is anticipated that the world will be divided into the four large fields of East Asia, the Soviet Union, Europe and the American Continent, Japan, acting in close collaboration with Germany and Italy which will constitute the guiding force of Europe, will

- a. Restrain the Soviet Union on the east, west and south, and, inducing the Soviet Union so to act as to align with the common ground of Japan, Germany and Italy, endeavor to cause the advance of the Soviet sphere of influence to be oriented toward a direction where the advance has little direct effect upon the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, - a direction such as the Gulf of Persia (it being also possible that, in case of need, Soviet advance toward India may have to be recognized); and,

- b. While peaceful means will be adhered to as far as possible in dealing with the United States, contrive to bring about a posture of things wherein Japan can, as occasion may require, bring pressure to bear upon the United States through political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy in the East Asian and European fields, so that such posture of things can contribute toward the attainment of Japan's aspirations.

In taking these steps, Japan will keep it in mind to make the best of inducing the Soviet Union.

Further, Japan will make use of the immigrant and economic foothold, both of importance, which Germany and Italy presently have in South America, in regard to such steps as Japan may in future take with respect to the United States.

4. Concerning Japan's attitude toward the anti-British cooperation of Japan, Germany and Italy.

- a. Japan will, in the construction of an East Asian New Order, take such steps as the situation may require, in order to eliminate the political and economic interests of Britain in East Asia, including the South Seas.

(Such steps are intended to weaken Britain's position. Fact shows that the policy which Japan is already taking toward Britain in China is automatically producing an effective influence on the war situation in Europe.)

- b. With a view to furthering her cooperation with Germany and Italy in their prosecution of war against Britain, Japan will stand no cooperative effort on her part in meeting the desires of Germany and Italy in regard to the acquisition of natural and material resources existing in East Asia, including the South Seas. Further, Japan will in larger measure cooperate with Germany and Italy in the war against Britain, in respect of the elimination of British interests in East Asia, anti-British demonstrations and propaganda, the support of independence movements in the colonies and dependencies of Britain and other matters.

5. Concerning the possible use of armed force against Britain and the United States, Japan will make decisions independently in accordance with the following principles:

(1) In the event that the China Incident has nearly been settled, Japan will use armed force by taking as favorable an opportunity, as may be afforded by the situation prevailing at home and abroad.

(2) In the event that the China Incident has not yet been settled, it will be Japan's guiding principle to take action within limits short of war. If, however, domestic and foreign conditions take a decidedly favorable turn, or if it is deemed that, irrespective of whether our preparations are complete or not, the development of the international situation permits of no further delay, Japan will resort to armed force.

(3) The "domestic and foreign conditions" signify the European situation, especially the state of adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States' attitude toward us, our preparations for war, and etc., as well as the state of disposal of the China Incident.

Appendix 4 - Main Principles Governing Negotiations.

1. The principal purpose of the negotiations under Paragraph 2, Appendix 1, which is designed to have Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, is to obtain overall recognition of Japan's position of predominance in the whole of East Asia, including the South Seas.

Should, however, Germany and Italy be inclined to make any reservations in regard to any designated areas, Japan will conduct negotiations on each particular matter concerning such areas in pursuance of Paragraph 1, a., and ensuing principles of Appendix 3 (Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), and thus secure recognition of Japan's aspirations in these connections.

2. In the event that Germany and Italy propounds a desire for Japanese military cooperation with them against Britain, Japan is prepared, as a matter of guiding principle, to meet the desire. It will be explained to Germany and Italy, however, that, in view of the existing state of affairs, Japan contemplates taking the courses of action outlined under (1),

(2) and (3) in Paragraph 5, Appendix 4 (Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), with respect to the use of armed force, i.e., participation in the war.

Germany and Italy will be enabled by such explanations to understand Japan's position, and, at the same time, efforts will be made to the end that Germany and Italy will cooperate with us in improving domestic and foreign conditions relating to Japan's entry into the war against Britain and the United States.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kaoru Hayashi, Chief of Archives Section of the Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the attached document, entitled "Documents of Decision on Important National Policies Having Direct Relationship to Outbreak of War, " consisting of pages numbered 2 through 114, was prepared by the Japanese Foreign Office during the period from March to June 1946.

Signed at Tokyo on this

4th day of September, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

I further certify that the changes appearing on pages 2, 3, 22, 32, 74, 96, and 107 were made by myself.

/s/ K. Hayashi

609

St. - S. No. 634

Berlin, August 7, 1940

On 1 August (St. - S. No. 609) the Japanese Ambassador suggested an exchange of points of view with the German Foreign Minister concerning the entire political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet. His two questions at that time were, whether we still consider the Japan-Russia rapprochement as important as formerly, and also whether we desire a sharp or perhaps more moderate turn in the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new cabinet.

Today the Ambassador spoke of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT (Telegraphic Report Tokyo No. 765). In this conversation, according to KURUSU's information, Ambassador OTT had again clearly stated that between Soviet Russia and Germany a conflict can also now be expected in the future. Japan may - if necessary with German help - also arrange its differences with Russia.

The specific point, however, with which KURUSU concerned himself for the longest period of time at his present visit today, was not Japan's relationship to Russia, America, or England, but the new order in the so-called Great East Asia sphere, which Japan is aiming at. Ambassador OTT also touches this subject in his telegraphic report, but KURUSU repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, in the following way: Japan wants to organize the East Asia sphere, including the South Seas, on a broad basis. MATSUOKA mentioned to OTT that Japan wants to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everybody should come to his rights there. Japan for her part would adhere to these three basic principles, but would then expect that no European or American country would violate these principles. The matter concerns itself with ideals, which if correctly understood, lie in the common interest. KURUSU named Japan, Manchukuo, and China as the core of the Great East Axis sphere, for which he used the term East Asia "Axis".

KURUSU went on to say that, though Minister SATO had received the impression of an unchanged friendly German attitude toward Japan here, he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship, and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese plans for the East Asia sphere.

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The Ambassador went so far to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE, in order to adjust their foreign general policy and the corresponding cabinet talks in Tokyo would first have to clearly see how we stand regarding the above. KURUSU did not refer to the desinteressenment on these overseas problems, which we expressed to the Japanese in May of this year, but it was clear - and he obviously spoke under orders from Tokyo - what he was aiming at.

According to the description by KURUSU, OTT did not allow himself any more than I today to be drawn into this field of discussion.

At the end, KURUSU expressed the hope, to be able to discuss these far-reaching problems soon with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Herewith

To the Reich Foreign Minister.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

"Telegraph

"St - S. No. 509

Berlin, 1 August 1940

"The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For his, KURUSU's, own work two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it firmly fixes /its position/. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

"The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspond to his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards USA should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded /of the fact/ that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

"Nevertheless, he, KURUSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the Japanese weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to German wishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, and, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future.

"I had the feeling that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this /intervention/ would not be quite timely according to German opinion.

"The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about / the fact / that this / advice / must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important/as hitherto/ and whether the new Japanese cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.

"Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinion that the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.

"To

The Reichs Foreign Minister

Signed WEISAECKER

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

St. - S. No. 611

By Teletype

(to St. - S.No. 609)

Berlin, 2 August 1940

In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURIOSU's words expressed his hope /aus KURIOSU sprach die Hoffnung/ that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that /Japan/not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.

Hereby /submitted/ to the German Foreign Minister.

(Signed) WEIZSACKER

Copy for:
U.St. - S. Pol.
Dg. Pol.
Ambassador Ritter
Director W.
U. St. - S. Recht
Chef A. O.

1 Copy given to Chef AO

/136386/

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August 2, 1940

AN OUTLINE OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA
AND GERMAN AMBASSADOR OTT

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA invited German Ambassador OTT and they had a conversation between 5 and 6.40 PM on August 1, 1940, the gist of which is as follows:

MATSUOKA: "I informed you the other day that no talking would be necessary between Japan and Germany, nor you and me. My feeling, however, is just as you know, and as I mentioned it the other day, I am neither pro-German nor pro-British, but, so to speak, pro-Japanese. So that I dare to oppose the fact of leaving our destiny to any foreign country or foreigner. But I think that Fuehrer HITLER and Foreign Minister of the Reich must know the fact as well as Your Excellency knows it, that I am one of the proposers and originators of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern pact. Later, when the problem of the Japanese-German Military Alliance occurred, you saw my attitude and I think it is unnecessary to explain neither my feeling nor my standpoint for Germany and Italy repeatedly. As you may find out easily, both the government and the people have inclined to strengthen the power of the Axis, but it is not decided yet in the cabinet council. I cannot persuade Premier KONOE and other members of the cabinet, unless I know at least the outline of Germany's intention or attitude to the thought I embrace before it will be carried out. In other words, I am very anxious to know what the German attitude is on my point of view, or I am sorry to say that I can hardly carry it out."

OTT: "It may be natural but I want to know what Japan is going to do. Without knowing it concretely, I think Berlin can not answer you".

MATSUOKA: "I hate, as you know, to use diplomatic or suggestive terms and I may express my thought freely. Japan is intending to establish a new order of Greater East Asia, as made already public by the Japanese Government, in a circle of Japan, Manchoukuo and China including the South Seas, and wishes the liberation and freedom of all nations and races in the sphere, and thus is planning to increase their mutual and common profit aiming at co-prosperity. Speaking in the other way, I oppose subjugation and exploitation. I object to them even if made by Japan. Of course, some Japanese may be planning to subjugate and exploit these regions, but they are taught to do so by some Europeans and Americans, and so, they are those influenced by America and Europe. I oppose absolutely these means whether they might be done by Japanese or European and American powers. I have determined to resist and dispute if Japan would dare to commit such deeds. There are fairly many Japanese who have the same opinion as mine, that is, to wish all the people to get mutual and common advantages and to attain mutual prosperity. Japan does not refuse to have these regions entered by Europeans and Americans, nor will expel them from the sphere. I believe this very principle will bring immediately a large profit to Americans and Europeans too. You may have some doubt in what I said, surveying the present China Incident superficially, but if enough time is given, Japan will realize surely this idea as well in China."

"Now, as I believe, Japan can manage by herself in what concerns China, and I didn't question Germany about it. But I would like to know what attitude Germany will assume towards the aforecited Japanese ideal or course on the South Seas? What will Germany want to gain in the South Seas? And what does Germany want and what can it do as regards Russo-Japanese relations? As for the American-Japanese relations, I always think the future world civilization will belong to the Pacific civilization in which, I believe, both Japan and America will play great roles, and so the relation between both countries is an important matter affecting a serious influence on tomorrow's human beings. I wish to know what Germany wishes to do toward what she can do and what she requests of America or Japan from this overall viewpoint. But, excepting this for the present, as it is a too large and too distant a problem I want to know what Germany wishes to do towards America and what she can do for the sake of Japan in the present situation in the relation between Japan and America which you well know".

g ea { OTT: "It is quite natural of your opinion, but I want to know, first of all, of your meaning of the bounds of the South Seas".

MATSUOKA: " In my personal opinion, I include as far as Siam for the present in the sphere, but it may be extended by and by in the future according to any change of circumstances."

G { OTT: "This is my personal opinion too. As to the South Seas, Germany has three big viewpoints. Germany is now in the war against Great Britain, but there is a possibility of developing into a war against whole British Empire (war of destroying the British Empire) in the future. The South Seas, for Germany, must be seen from this point of view. This is (1) Germany must consider what should be done for her, with the South Seas, when the war develops to such conditions, (2) just what things and how much should be necessary to be required, (3) after all, the problem depends upon the German attitude of how to settle and how to keep her with Japan and the South Seas. Looking from such a broad standpoint at the war against Britain, the China Incident is simply an incident, isn't it? And I think, too, apart from this worldwide confusion and movement, the China Incident cannot be solved. Don't you think so?"

MATSUOKA: " I think I can agree with the last part of your personal opinions, and once sent a discourse of that fact to a magazine. At present, as you know, most of our people regard the China Incident as one of the most urgent matters to be settled. I, as Foreign Minister, cannot help considering the opinion of our people. The China Incident forms a part of the worldwide confusion indeed. However, it is the grave question for Japan to dispose of."

OTT: " How does Japan intend to settle China?"

MATSUOKA: " To knock CHIANG KAI-SHEK down completely is intended".

(The Ambassador seemed a little startled.)

OTT: "It must be a means: but are there not any possibilities of consulting with CHIANG? I think it is a wise means to consult with him."

MATSUOKA: "I do not entirely refuse to confer with CHIANG, but there is no other means than to knock him down because of the Japanese characteristic viewpoint. I think, at present, he has to be subjugated thoroughly. Of course, means of arms is not the only one. At any rate, however, I believe that Japan, by her power alone, is able to settle the China Incident."

OTT: "But, in managing the China Incident, I think Japan should lay emphasis in taking Soviet-Russia as a reasonably grave problem. From the point of view of Soviet-German relation, Soviet Russia does not seem to be dangerous to Germany any more".

MATSUOKA: "I have also the same perception. Perhaps, one of the important motives, at least, which made HITLER, the "Kampf-fuehrer", determine to intrude like the wind into Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands or to carry out the lightening operation on the field of Flanders, might have been that he had apprehended inconstant movements of STALIN which were unable to be foreseen in the morning how they would be in the evening. (The Ambassador nodded.) When the German Army entered Paris, I thought HITLER conquered STALIN. On that instant, I concluded that Germany needed no longer to worry about the Soviet-Russia."

OTT: "So did I. If Japan wishes, Germany will offer good offices of Japan and the Soviet Russia and I think it is clever to open negotiation between Japan and the Soviet-Russia. As far as I believe, HITLER has no intention to have dispute with the Soviet-Russia and Germany can do without dispute. As for the American problems, Germany does not think the United States would participate in the war. At this moment I hope you would pay special attention to the fact that Germany does not intend to dispute with America in the future, but, rather, wants to come into mutual understanding which is believed to be possible. In short, the German main interests in the Western hemisphere lie in South and Central America. In order to trade with South America and to develop economically, friendly relation must be contracted with the United States. Moreover, trade and other economical relations with the United States herself must be promoted. If the relation of Japan with America (South and North) is the same as that, the interests are also the same as in Germany and Japan must assume the similar attitude toward the United States as Germany does. If such is the case, Germany will be able to offer good offices to Japan to restore and promote close and friendly relationship with America".

MATSUOKA: "As for the United States, South and Central America or Canada, the problem is entirely economic for Japan; especially Japan has recently taken the policy to promote commerce with Central and South America

and wishes to develop enterprises there. Therefore, in this respect, Japan is placed in the same position and has the same idea as Germany. However, in the newspapers these last two or three days there is news stating as if the Americans are in a high passion to participate into the war. What is your opinion about it?

OTT: "Germany has collected authentic information about the United States; so it is groundless that the Americans are in a high passion to participate into the war. Recently President ROOSEVELT has been brought to bay. I think Your Excellency has read the interview of Fuehrer HITLER with WIEGAND; from Germany's point of view, the reason why HITLER has given him an interview was that, as the American people are getting still more opposed to the policy of the President who wishes to have the United States participated into the war and to keep away of the President's policy, HITLER has given an interview to an American pressman with the view of enlarging the gap between the President and American people. The relation between Germany and the United States is not necessarily deteriorated; it will be rather improved.

MATSUOKA: "By the way, regarding your request through Mr. X bearing on (1) transportation of goods through Manchoukuo, Siberia and Soviet Russia to Germany, (2) the earliest settlement of the Germans' damages in China, (3) the control of anti-German articles in newspapers written in English, at today's cabinet council, all the ministers concerned decided to meet your wishes in principle. And so, you needn't to go back to Berlin. However, 'Red Tape' is inevitable in every country and there may be delay in bringing it into effect, and I wish you will understand that. I will manage for myself the items (1) and (2) especiall (1) and, as to (3), my under-officials have entered into consultation with those of other ministers concerned."

Ambassador OTT has brought the German Memorandum bearing on those three cases and handed it over to MATSUOKA and at the same time another memorandum concerning Japanese officials in American continent who hesitate to give certificates to the German nationals who have no connection with German military to repatriate to Germany and asked MATSUOKA to take friendly measures. MATSUOKA replied that he would soon take measures to do his best by conferring with fellow members of the cabinet, especially with the Minister of Communications and also give instruction to the authorities concerned abroad.

Furthermore, in reference to the Italian Mission, Ambassador OTT said: "I am displeased with this Mission, as I firmly believe that it has been sent by Japan to alienate Germany from Italy. It is quite natural that Ambassador SATO, who has been thought unfriendly towards Germany, should not be treated well in Germany, when he dropped in there on his return from Italy". MATSUOKA said that he himself heard such a rumor but he did not believe it and that he laughed it away ridiculous when he heard that rumor. But OTT did not seem to be convinced of MATSUOKA's denial.

MARL
VON
WIEGAND
I.N.S.

And Ambassador OTT said "Since I have arrived here as Ambassador to Japan, what I had felt has been entirely unpleasant. Until now KASUMI-GASEKI has disregarded Germany and never given settlements to the question German Embassy had turned over. For some of them, even a reply has not been given. This may be sufficient reason to be called back home by my government. And you have never given me the chance to see you except on business and I have been treated inferior to British and the United States Ambassadors: I take this for an unendurable insult. In spite of such conditions the German Government has still a little hope in me and has not called me back home till to-day¹.

Furthermore MATSUOKA said to OTT that he told Ambassador HENRI the Japanese request for French Indo-China which is absolutely necessary and urgent matter for the military operations in the borderland of French Indo-China and as he supposed that the French Government might refer this matter to the German Government, he asked OTT to cable to the German Government to persuade the French Government to accept the Japanese request without hesitation in that case, or if not referred, to send the intention of the German Government to the French^h Government.

Ambassador OTT replied that he would soon telegraph so.

Doc. No. 1590A

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1590A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated August 2, 1940, and described as follows: Outline of the conversation on August 1, 1940, between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of September, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS

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Furthermore, in reference to the Italian Mission, Ambassador OTT said: "I am displeased with this Mission, as I firmly believe that it has been sent by Japan to alienate Germany from Italy. It is quite natural that Ambassador SATO, who has been thought unfriendly towards Germany, should not be treated well in Germany, when he dropped in there on his return from Italy". MATSUOKA said that he himself heard such a rumor but he did not believe it and that he laughed it away ridiculous when he heard that rumor. But OTT did not seem to be convinced of MATSUOKA's denial.

And Ambassador OTT said "Since I have arrived here as Ambassador to Japan, what I had felt has been entirely unpleasant. Until now KASUMI-GASEKI has disregarded Germany and never given settlements to the question German Embassy had turned over. For some of them, even a reply has not been given. This may be sufficient reason to be called back home by my government. And you have never given me the chance to see you except on business and I have been treated inferior to British and the United States Ambassadors: I take this for an unendurable insult. In spite of such conditions the German Government has still a little hope in me and has not called me back home till to-day".

Furthermore MATSUOKA said to OTT that he told Ambassador HENRI the Japanese request for French Indo-China which is absolutely necessary and urgent matter for the military operations in the borderland of French Indo-China and as he supposed that the French Government might refer this matter to the German Government, he asked OTT to cable to the German Government to persuade the French Government to accept the Japanese request without hesitation in that case, or if not referred, to send the intention of the German Government to the French Government.

Ambassador OTT replied that he would soon telegraph so.

Doc. No. 1590A

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1590A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated August 2, 1940, and described as follows: Outline of the conversation on August 1, 1940, between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of September, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1590C

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1590C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated August 2, 1940, and described as follows: Outline of the conversation on August 1, 1940, between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

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Signature of Official

SEAL

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6 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

TELEGRAM
(Secret Cipher Process)

613

TOKYO: 31 July 1940, 1150 hours

ARRIVAL: 31 July 1940, 2300 hours

No. 751 of July 31.

Annex to telegram No. 746 of July 30.

✓ 6

"According to reliable information, the Japanese action against the British Spy Service, organized all over the land, was carried out at the demand of the new War Minister, Tojo. The War Minister is hereby pursuing two aims.

"1. Acute aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, to drive them as much as possible to a breaking point and to hasten the action against British possessions in East Asia desired by the Army.

"2. A blow against the influential pro-British groups - viz court and economic circles - which, impressed by the energetic action, will be dissuaded from further pro-British activity. The greatest sensation was caused by the arrest, which has in the meantime become known, of leading British business heads in Kobe, in particular, of the Swedish honorary consul, JAMES, who, since the beginning of the war, has appeared as a carrier of hate propaganda against Germany in press and economic circles, using all means."

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 1590C

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1590C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated August 2, 1940, and described as follows: Outline of the conversation on August 1, 1940, between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

6th day of September, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this

6 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo: 23 Aug. 1940 0200 hours
Arrived: " " " 1100 hours

No. 853 of 23 August

1. The Government announces an extensive revirement of the Foreign Service. Recalled are the Ambassador of the U.S., Ambassadors of France, Turkey, Brazil and also nineteen ministers, among them representatives in Hungary, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Argentina, Egypt, Canada, besides them five embassy councillors / among them the councillors from England and Russia/ and finally eleven Consul Generals, among them the Consuls from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, Hamburg, and Prague. The Foreign Minister declared to the press, that this action had become necessary in order to secure the new foreign policy introduced by him and to bring the Japanese Foreign Service into coordination with the new Japanese conditions. For this reason it is also necessary to replace most of the division heads of the Foreign Ministry with new personalities. Publication of these changes will soon take place. The whole press of today is governed by this radical and, in Japanese history, unique revirement, which is called a 'coup d'Etat' in several papers. The drastic action of the government evidently intends in the first place to render harmless the exponents of pro-Anglo-Saxon courses. This is also strongly underlined by the press. Only a few of the recalled officials will be used in other pcsts.

2. With the aim of further preparation of suitable actions for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the commission. The commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers which is constantly demanded by this movement.

3. Both the diplomatic adjustment and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the government to follow a new course.

OTT.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs; and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 15 August 1940 1900 hours
Arrival 15 August 1940 1720 hours

No. 823 of 15.8 Appendix to Tel. No. 813 of 14.8

URGENT!

The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:

The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands regarding Indo-China /to the attitude/ that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renouncement of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted based on the demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (1 group garbled) Ministry Director promised, but it was pointed out that with reference to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 that our influence on French policy is limited.

OTT

/136410/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

616

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dates (Sept. 9, 1940 5:00-7:00 P.M.
(Sept. 10, 1940 5:30-6:30 P.M.)

"SOME OF THE SALIENT POINTS IN THE INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MATSUOKA AND STAHNER, WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASSISTING.

"1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

"2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England.

"3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U.S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U.S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance.

"4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U.S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U.S. cannot eventually be avoided.

"5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both, Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future.

"6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U.S. and the world at large at this juncture, that alone can only be of a powerful and effective deterrent on the U.S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger.

"7. Germany hopes Japan will also size up the situation and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will act quickly and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing.

"8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U.S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (MATSUOKA remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granted that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants.)

"9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature, and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need.

"10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements.

"11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U.S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible.

"12. Germany, in asking Japan to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the word and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxondom including America. (In short, he is indicating that this war is destined to develop into a strife against the Anglo-Saxondom.) The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (MATSUOKA emphasized this phrase). Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved.

"13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the German Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The German Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither STAHMER nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter.

"14. STAHMER's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop.

"15. The Japanese Foreign Minister also made observation on several points, but they are not noted here."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1129

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Sept. 9 and 10, 1940, and described as follows: Some of the salient points in the informal conversations between MATSUOKA and STAHRER, with the German Ambassador assisting, Sept. 9 & 10, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
22nd day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

*not used
Dated Case
slip*

SECRET

This report is not to be made public, so please keep it especially secret.

13 September 1940

National Policy Research Association, Racial Problems Committee

Urgent Counter-measures against Singapore

At the present time when the world situation is changing every moment, if the government hesitates uselessly by aiming at the perfection of preparations and right opportunity, the fear is great that our nation will lose the right of leadership and its voice in the South Seas. Therefore, the government should carry out a blitzkrieg-like attack on the Singapore, the keypoint to the control of the South Seas, at the earliest and most appropriate opportunity, even if the preparations should not be complete.

Reasons.

1. Singapore, because of its geographical position, complete harbor facilities, and strong military installations, holds the key position in the South Seas. The one who commands Singapore can control the whole of the South Seas, whereas, on the other hand, as long as one does not command it, it is absolutely impossible to lead and control the whole of the South Seas thereby perfecting the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
2. With the China Incident still unsettled, and for our country who must make thorough preparations against Soviet Russia too, our country should, at this juncture, avoid as much as possible the policy of useless expansion of land battle-fronts, as, needless to say, it would be more appropriate to advance southward by means of individual attacks and occupying of strategic points, and control the surrounding areas by means of potential military power. As mentioned before, Singapore is verily this strategic point. Therefore, if we quickly occupy it by the Blitz method and keep a fairly strong military force there, British Malay, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and Thailand will probably automatically come under our power.
3. There is no need to waste a large force to attack Singapore.
4. If we do not occupy Singapore, there is a great possibility that it will become a base for the remnants of the defeated British fleet and the U. S. fleet. Also, there is no telling that it may not become a German base in the future. If such should become the case, it would become impossible for our country to assume the leadership and control of the South Seas.

5. In the event of our country touching Singapore, we must be determined to fight not only Britain but also the U. S. There is an opinion that in that event, if Britain and the U. S. do not come out for a decisive battle, but carry out a prolonged war, our country would become troubled financially. However, considering that lately the U. S. is carrying out a great expansion of her navy, air force, and army, and at the same time not only steadily re-enforcing her embargo against Japan, but is even showing signs of trying to check our country's use of resources of the South Seas. Furthermore, as mentioned before, as there is a fear that the British and American fleets may concentrate at Singapore and fortify it, our position in regard to the U. S. would probably become more and more disadvantageous in the future. Therefore, to hesitate or dilly-dally at this time means awaiting self-suffocation, and would be unwise.

6. If at this time, when the necessity of the three powers, Japan, Germany, and Italy, jointly striking at the U. S., is increasingly becoming greater, our country should resolve to attack Singapore, the strengthening of cooperation with Germany and Italy would certainly become effected, and upon this foundation, it is probably possible to attain a certain degree of conciliation with Soviet Russia. Furthermore, if we capture Singapore at the most opportune time, in conjunction with the German invasion of the British Isles (for example, at the time when the German Army has occupied Southern England), it will not necessarily be absolutely impossible to allow no time to the U. S. to rise on her feet.

7. There is a viewpoint that Hong Kong should be captured first. However, if our forces should attack Hong Kong, an Anglo-Japanese war will immediately break out, and consequently a Japanese-American war will probably follow. It would be an unwise policy to later attack Singapore strongly fortified by both British and American forces during the Hong Kong attack. Therefore, it would be necessary to capture Singapore first, and as for Hong Kong, as long as they /TN: the other party, i.e. the enemy/ do not come out, it would probably be in order in leaving same in a state of temporary besiegement.

8. In view of the actual situation of the racial composition of the inhabitants of British Malay (Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States, Non-Federated Malay States), it is inappropriate to have this country join the East Asia Cooperative Body /TN: Toa Kyodo Tai/ as an independent nation. Therefore, there is nothing to do except to place this country under our direct control, but if we should capture Singapore, as mentioned before, the above result will probably become realized of itself.

Preparations.

1. To prepare a military strength sufficient for the occupation of the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and the Philippines, besides the military strength directly necessary for the capture of Singapore.
2. To carry out propaganda to the effect that our country has no ulterior motive whatsoever in regard to such countries as the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, French Indo-China, Burma, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. (As long as no actual power has been put into action against these various regions). To also exert pressure with potential military strength as mentioned before.
3. To carry out propaganda to the effect that our country has no thought of preventing the U. S. from making lawful purchases of rubber and tin from the Dutch East Indies, and British Malay.
4. As far as possible, to despatch economic missions to the Dutch East Indies, Thailand, French Indo-China, Burma, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines and commence negotiations aimed at increasing trade.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Yatsugi Kazuo, Former Chief Secretary of the National Policy Investigation Association /TN: KOKUSAKU KENKYUKAI/, do hereby certify that the document dated September 13, 1940 /Showa 15/ annexed hereto consisting of 4 pages, and entitled "Urgent Measures Against Singapore," is a document prepared by the Racial Problem Committee of the National Policy Investigation Association /TN: KOKUSAKU KENKYUKAI/.

Signed at Tokyo on this
7th day of November 1946
/Showa 21/.

/s/ Yatsugi, Kazuo
/TN: Signature and Seal/

Title of above party: Former Chief Secretary,
National Policy Investigation
Association /TN: KOKUSAKU
KENKYUKAI/

Witness: Furuyama, Shiro

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Dates (Sept. 9, 1940 5:00-7:00 P.M.
(Sept. 10, 1940 5:30-6:30 P.M.)

"SOME OF THE SALIENT POINTS IN THE INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MATSUOKA AND STAHLER. WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASSISTING.

"1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

"2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England.

"3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U.S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U.S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance.

"4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U.S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U.S. cannot eventually be avoided.

"5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both, Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future.

"6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U.S. and the world at large at this juncture, that all can only be of a powerful and affective deterrent on the U.S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger.

"7. Germany hopes Japan will also size up the situation and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will act quickly and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing.

"8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U.S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (MATSUOKA remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granted that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants.)

"9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature, and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need.

"10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements.

"11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U.S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible.

✓ C X "12. Germany, in asking Japan to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the word and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxondom including America. (In short, he is indicating that this war is destined to develop into a strife against the Anglo-Saxondom.) The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (MATSUOKA emphasized this phrase). Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved.

"13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the German Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The German Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither STAHRER nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter.

X "14. STAHRER's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop.

"15. The Japanese Foreign Minister also made observation on several points, but they are not noted here."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1129

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Sept. 9 and 10, 1940, and described as follows: Some of the salient points in the informal conversations between MATSUOKA and STAHRER, with the German Ambassador assisting, Sept. 9 & 10, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
22nd day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

REGARDING CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT

Strictly confidential

Subject: The Conclusion of a Treaty between
Japan, Germany and Italy
(Subject of the Imperial Conference)

In order to strengthen the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis we will negotiate with Germany and Italy and conclude a pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The gist of the Pact.

(1) That Japan will recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy in the building of the new order in Europe.

(2) That Germany and Italy will recognize and respect the leading position of Japan in the building of the new order in the Greater East Asia.

(3) That Japan, Germany and Italy will co-operate with one another in the efforts based on the above principle, and that, in case one of the three is (publicly or secretly) attacked by a power not involved at present in European War or China Incident, the three countries will aid one another by every means, political, economic and military.

(4) That Japan, Germany and Italy believe that they can create the fair and lasting foundation of peace only through the establishment of world new order, which is in keeping with the changing world situation, by their mutual assistance, and that they will adjust and combine their efforts for its realization.

(5) That Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above items do not in any way affect the political situation now existing between each of them and U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister's (MATSUOKA) explanations regarding
the conclusion of Tripartite Pact.
(Council in the Imperial presence)

A. Development

The present minister thought of strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy, on the principle just stated by the Prime Minister, since

the formation of this Cabinet in the last decade of July. At that time, Germany had conquered France, and Britain, too, seemed to be easily conquered in less than a decade. So German enthusiasm for co-operation with Japan was generally at a very low ebb. But even if Germany and Italy could subjugate British Isles now, the war for the destruction of the whole British Empire would be no easy matter. Moreover, they would have to cope with two great influences, - what may be called Anglo-Saxon kingdom or Bloc, consisting of America and surviving parts of the British Empire, and Soviet Russia strengthened still further by the present war. In that case, Japan, geographically blessed, and possessing a race in a peerless body politic, would be great in her strength. Even at present Japan has such a strength as is able to tip the balance of the world as she likes. This is the present minister's forecast and opinion. Hitler and at least a few persons near him was aware of this, - so I imagined. May, I even saw some signs. Even at that time they seem to have had considerable enthusiasm for co-operation with Japan. Such being the case, I thought it unnecessary to ask humbly for German co-operation, though I was prompted to do so by various international situations. I decided then to postpone the negotiation until after the surrender of the British Isles, if I was obliged to do so, and that in that case I would take my own time. To show impatience would have been a taboo diplomatically for us.

I believed that Japan must show the attitude that she would stand pat on her independent position, that she had no need to co-operate with Germany and Italy, and that she would join hands with America, or even dare to save Britain, if it was necessary or convenient for her existence and mission. Then, first of all, I had to begin reconnoitering throughout the world about this matter. The present minister had done so about the time of his appointment, and came to acquire a little information about world affairs. So I went a step further, invited Ambassador Ott to tea on August 1st, and told him that, as he knew, strengthening of the Axis was a desire of both our government and our people, but that the time was not ripe for it, and that the Cabinet had not come to concrete decision yet. Then, I continued and informed him that Japan intended to settle China Incident by herself by and by, and that Germany had no need to trouble herself. This silenced the German Ambassador, who had begun to talk about mediation. I then further informed him that Japan was seriously determined to realize the ideal of HAKKO-ICHIU (the whole world-one house), which was her traditional ideal since her foundation, and that she was going to try it first within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. I went on to say that, even though the British Isles might succumb shortly, it would be only the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, not the end. (The German Ambassador, too, said so of his own accord.) I then concluded that Germany should decide on the problem of Japanese-German co-operation from the above two long-range viewpoints, and asked him (1) what attitude Germany was going to take regarding above-mentioned Japan's realization of her ideal within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, how Germany could assist Japan, whether Germany intended to assist Japan or not, what Germany desired within this sphere, (2) what Germany thought about Soviet-Japanese relations, what Germany could do about the situation, (3) what Germany thought about Japanese-American relations, what Germany could do about the situation. Lastly I requested him to wire the above-mentioned 3 items immediately to Fuhrer Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and get their answer.

The German Minister seemed to think it no easy matter, and was unwilling to wire to Berlin. I also expected that I should not get the answer quickly. It turned out as I expected, but I left the matter to take its own course, without pressing him. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop promoted Consul-General Heinrich Stahmer, reportedly his right-hand man in Oriental problems, to the post of Minister, and ordered him to start from Berlin on Aug. 23rd, and quickly come to Japan via Moscow. The present minister showed no sign of impatience to see him. Then on 9th he asked for an interview. So I met him and Ambassador Ott at my private residence for the sake of secrecy. Then on the 10th we met for the second time, and on the 11th for the third time. At the last meeting we came to agree on a draft treaty. After exchange of opinions between the German government and the present minister, we decided upon something like the draft now submitted to you for approval. Regarding various points in this draft, and the present minister's questions which had been wired to Berlin through Ambassador Ott on Aug. 1st, Stahmer expressed his opinions clearly and frankly. The present minister is satisfied with this. Therefore, I am going to carry on negotiations and hope to come to compromise with this draft as the basis.

B. The Explanation of the Gist of the Pact.

Item 1 says that Japan will recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy, in the building of the New Order in Europe. I thought Germany would speak of the building of the new order in Africa, but the German Ambassador did not speak of it, so this item was confined to the recognition of the position of Germany and Italy in Europe. The "Greater East Asia" in "the building of the new order in the Greater East Asia" of Item 2 means for the present French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Strait Settlement, and such Oceanic islands as N.E.I., New Guinea, New Caledonia and C. At that time it was expected that the meaning would be gradually changed in keeping with the change in East Asia situation and with the development of world situation. So I spoke broadly to the German Ambassador on purpose, and told him that, though Greater East Asia did not at present contain Australia, New Zealand, and /areas/ to the south, it will gradually extend itself with time. I did not refer to India. The German Ambassador did not ask any detailed questions and agreed with the present minister.

The German Ambassador said in reply that Germany recognized Japan's political leadership in the above area, but that Germany might be given as many facilities as possible in economic field, in trade, enterprise, and acquirement of materials, for instance. I told him that Japan also expected the co-operation of Germany and Italy in the economic exploitation of that area.

The "one power" in Item 3, "in case 'publicly or secretly' attacked by one or more powers . . ." implicitly and chiefly means America. If one of us three were attacked by that one power, the other two would be automatically obliged to participate in the war. That is, our country will enter into a military alliance with Germany and Italy, with America as the objective. "Publicly and secretly" was inserted by Germany, but Minister Stahmer and Ambassador Ott agreed to striking out the expression

for the time being, and wired to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for instructions. But the German Foreign Minister may insist on its being left as it is. It is pretty difficult to interpret it correctly, and I asked the German envoy what was meant by "secretly attacked." He replied that what America had done up to then did not come within the meaning of this expression. This expression means such cases as America using important British bases in the Pacific under a secret Anglo-American treaty, or American fleet directly entering Singapore, and it was inserted rather with Japan's interests in mind, -- so said the German envoy. Then the present minister asked, "How about Germany and Italy?" The German envoy replied it probably meant such cases as Britain allowing America to occupy some strategic British base in a region near the European battlefield, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea. Whether attack is to be divided into the above two categories, or whether the expression is to be simply "attacked," the decision upon whether an action or a claim of actions by America or another third power would be regarded as constituting "attack," shall only be decided by a consultation among us three powers. We agreed to make the point clear in one form or another. So, which expression may be used, I think there is little cause for anxiety.

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ICHU
Regarding Item 4, I think I need not explain. I am now negotiating with the intention of making this item the preamble of the pact, and the German envoy has agreed in a general way. The phraseology has been carefully polished, taking in the principle of Hakko Ichiu (the whole world - one family), which was enunciated in the Imperial Rescript at the time of the foundation of our State, the principle that every nation and every race shall find its right place in the world.

Item 5 stipulates that this pact is not directed against the U.S.S.R. As the U.S.S.R. is supposed not to be involved in the war of Germany and Italy against Britain and France, there is room for doubt if "one power" in Item 3 may not apply to U.S.S.R. So this item makes it clear that there is no possibility that Japan, Germany and Italy will make an enemy of U.S.S.R. in building world new order. Especially this item makes it clear that the present pact in no way affects the existing agreements, views or situations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, regarding Poland and other European countries. So this item purports to relieve the apprehension of the U.S.S.R., and to prevent Soviet-American rapprochement. Apart from this, I want to draw up notes annexed to the pact, and stipulate that, after the conclusion of this pact, joint military and economic committees shall be formed immediately in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, which shall study detailed arrangements regarding the carrying out of this pact, based upon its purport, and that the agreed arrangements shall be submitted to the government for approval. I think Germany and Italy will promise to offer their good offices to make the U.S.S.R. attune herself with the purport of the present pact, and to adjust Soviet Japanese relations. I think, too, Germany will promise to supply us with war materials and technique, and, at our request, technicians and other personnel. Germany will also promise to help us to acquire oil from the U.S.S.R. and other countries. We, on our part, will promise Germany to supply war materials, foodstuffs and other necessities of life, and technique, if we are able to do so. Meanwhile, the phraseology of the pact will have to be reciprocal in form for the time being.

Moreover, the purport of this gist may be changed more or less by the development of negotiations, or expressions and form may be revised. Regarding these points I hope I may be allowed to exercise my discretion which is necessary in diplomacy. I am determined not to change the fundamental purport of the gist in any case, but if it should ever become necessary to change the fundamental purport, I shall take necessary steps anew. I want you to understand that.

C. Conclusion

The fundamental principle of the recent negotiations with Germany is entirely different from that of HIRANUMA Cabinet days. That is, as may be known from the fact that Germany has explicitly said Japan need not participate in the European War, Germany and Japan has a common aim in concluding this pact. Germany wants to prevent American entry into the war, and Japan Japanese-American conflict. Accordingly, the non-intervention policy, which the Imperial government has maintained up to now, will be continued for the time being, with the reservation that it may be influenced by this pact in future.

Shortly after American-Canadian joint defence plan was decided upon, America has begun to assume an attitude hardly bearable even in trifling problems between Japan and America. So the present minister was obliged to demand the reconsideration of American President and Secretary of State.

Judging from the recent movements, America, in addition to the military establishments which she has already built or is building both in the Pacific and in the South Sea, may now be trying to acquire strong military bases, in great numbers and in a hurry, within important British possessions in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma and other regions, and may be preparing a battle array for encircling Japan. The present minister thought of this already at the time when the conclusion of the above-mentioned American-Canadian joint defence agreement was announced. As I expected, even the press has come to report a news, which seems to be pretty trustworthy, that negotiations are going on among the British Empire, Australian Government and America. There is some reason to suppose that America, considering that Japan has suffered greatly through war of attrition in China Incident, and that her strength has suffered remarkable decrease, may use intimidating language. Whatever may be the cause, I think Japanese-American relations now leave little room for improvement through courtesy or desire for friendship. I rather fear such an attitude on Japan's part may only aggravate the matter. Is there a measure to improve the situation even a little, or prevent its further aggravation? I think there is at present nothing left for us to do but to stand firm. If it is so, we must cope with America by firmly joining hands with as many countries as possible, to back up our firm attitude, and by making the fact known at home and abroad as quickly as possible. I believe this to be an urgent diplomatic move. The present minister will watch the repercussions or effects of such a measure on the one hand, but, on the other hand, will always be careful not to overlook an opportunity to improve relations with America. For all that, we must, first of all, show a firm coping attitude with a steady resolve to all the world, so explicitly that there will be no room for doubt. This is the most important point in concluding this pact, so I repeat this in conclusion.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1202

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. FAYASHI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 22 pages, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: Foreign Minister's (MATSUOKA'S) explanation regarding conclusion of the Tri Partite Pact. Reference paper for the committee (Subject of the Imperial Conference). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
27 day of Aug, 1946

/s/K. Fayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
27 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Empire

Doc. No. 1202

CERTIFICATE

Oshima

W.D.C. No. 1202
I.P.S. No. 1202

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Signed at Tokyo on this
27 day of Aug, 1946

Signature of Official

SEAL

Re Oliver

Witness: Witness Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Lonsdale, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
27 day of Aug, 1946

Signature of Lonsdale

Witness: Witness H. Lonsdale
Investigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity

"SALIENT POINTS OF QUESTIONS (PRIVY COUNCIL)

September 16th, 1940.

No. 1

"Is not there any danger of extreme intensity of economic pressure by the United States upon Japan, as result of the conclusion of Tri-Partite Pact? What would be our counter-measure in such a case?"

No. 2

"What preparation have you to deal with, should the worst case (the commencement of war against U. S. A) happen?"

1. "We should be ready for that case. And, our precautions shall be (1) to strengthen our international standpoint by the conclusion of this pact, and (2) to take diplomatic, economic and military measures for the purpose of procuring necessary natural resources for national defense from the South Seas and other places, which we have procured hitherto from the United States. In deciding upon the present matter this very point was most carefully investigated.

Question.

"What effect will the Three Power coalition have upon the disposal of Sino-Japanese conflict?" /T. N. The answer is not given in the notes available./

Questions asked of the government by the Supreme Command of the Navy at an Imperial Conference regarding the military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, Sept. 16, 1940.

No. 1 "To what degree will this pact contribute to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations?"

No. 2. "By concluding this pact, Japan's trade relations with Britain and U. S. are deemed to deteriorate and the acquisition of resources now dependent upon the outside is deemed to become more difficult, should the worst condition come to exist. And, Japanese-American war will be probably a prolonged one. In consideration of the present condition of our country in which our resources have been considerably used up on account of the still existing Sino-Japanese conflict, what are the prospect foreseen and precaution taken by our government in order to maintain our resources?"

No. 3. By the conclusion of the present alliance it becomes imperative that preparation of our navy for Japanese-American war be accelerated and strengthened. And, this matter will be impossible to be realized, unless our government give serious consideration and cooperation with the Navy. What principle does our government have in this regard?"

No. 4. "Even if Japan should be compelled to participate in the European war from the participation of the United States in it, we would wish to choose the time of outbreak of hostility independently. What measure does our government have in this regard?"

(War Ministry)

"It is the United States that is encouraging Chungking government or anti-Japanese movement at the present time. Should a solid coalition come to exist between Japan, Germany and Italy, it will become the most effectual expedient to restrain the United States. The more effectually we restrain the United States, the more possibly and quickly we shall be able to dispose of Sino-Japanese conflict. On the other hand, if we can bring about rapprochement between the Soviet Union and our country as result of Tri-Partite coalition and through the good offices of Germany and Italy, especially of Germany, we shall be able to spur the quick ending of Sino-Japanese conflict."

(Navy Ministry)

No. 1. "Should this Tri-Partite alliance come to exist, Germany and Italy—especially Germany—will use its good offices with pretty firm self-confidence in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations. In view of the present amicable relations now existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, it must be far easier to iron out, with the aid of Germany, the difficult problems which involve Japan and the Soviet Union."

No. 4. "In the event Japan was compelled to participate in the European war, the time to start the war will be virtually decided in the following manner: First, the Army and naval authorities set a question at rest. Secondly, our government bring the matter to a settlement, basing upon the opinions of the Army and naval authorities and other circumstances. Thirdly, our government confers with German and Italian governments. In this regard (choice of time to start war) the standpoint of our Empire will be held independent, as a matter of fact."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____

I. P. S. No. 1259Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated Sept. 16, 1940, and described as follows: Salient points of discussions made at a Privy Council in the Imperial Presence, regarding Tripartite Pact - September 16, 1940.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
22nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Kayashi

Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official CapacitySTATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCUREMENT

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of August, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator

Official Capacity

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9/26/40

CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

Subject: Conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

The Investigation Committee

The President and the Vice-President of the Privy Council and its members met on September 26 (Thursday) Showa 15 /1940/ at 10 A.M. in the ante-chamber East-3 in the Imperial Palace, and soon after the introduction by His Majesty of the draft pact for review, President HARA opened the conference, designating the set-up of the plenary session of the Committee. The persons who attended are:

President HARA

Vice-President SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Investigation Committee

Privy Councillors: KAWAI, ISHII, ARIMA, KUBOTA, ISHIZUKA, SHIMIZU, MINAMI, NARA, ARAKI, MATSUI, SUGAWARA, MATSUURA, USHIO, HAYASHI, FUKAI, FUTAGAMI, MANO, TOSHIMA, OBATA, TAKEKOSHI, MITSUCHI

State Ministers:

Premier KONOYE

War Minister TOJO

Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs MATSUOKA

Finance Minister KAWADA

Navy Minister OKAWA

Explainers:

Chief of the Planning Board HOSHINO

Chief of the Legislation Board MURASE

Councillor of the Legislation Board MORIYAMA

Director of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office
MATSUMOTO

Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War
Ministry Major-General MUTO

Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry
Rear-Admiral ABE

Director of the Supervisory Affairs Bureau of the Commerce
and Industry Ministry TSUJI

Director of the Finance and Management Affairs Bureau of
the Finance Ministry AIDA

Director of the Banking Bureau of the Finance Ministry
MATSUKUMA

Director of the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Finance
Ministry HARAGUCHI

Privy Council Secretary General HORIYE

Privy Council Secretary MOROHASHI

Privy Council Secretary TAKATSUJI

(The meeting came to order at 10:10 A.M.)

SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Committee, called the meeting to order.

Premier KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA delivered explanations respectively as on separate leaf, following which interpellations and answers were exchanged between the members of the Committee and State Ministers the gist of which is as follows:

Councillor KAWAI: "The supplementary documents accompanying the treaty which has been exchanged concerns the relations between our empire and the State of Germany but they do not touch upon Italy. What is the reason for this?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "The German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP previously advised us that, as far as Italy is concerned, he himself

will take care of everything, and he desired that we refrain from even having an interview with the Italian Ambassador for the time being. That is why I had an interview with him for the first time yesterday (the 25th). On that occasion, he stated that all affairs pertaining to Italo-Japanese relations had so far been entrusted to Germany, and that the conclusion of a treaty such as the present one was what Italy had been looking forward to for some time. Moreover, in the documents exchanged between the German Ambassador and myself, we touched upon our relations with Italy to the effect that Italy in all probability would fall in line with Japan and Germany."

Councillor KAWAI: "How about our preparations to meet the situations when the worst turns up?"

War Minister TOJO: "As far as the Army is concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in case of war with the United States. Therefore, there is nothing to be worried about. Relations with Russia in such case, I believe, would be advantageous to us because the present Treaty acts as a check. But as long as Russo-Japanese relations are not satisfactorily adjusted, we of course cannot afford to delay preparations. Concerning the China Incident, it is necessary that we bring a speedy end to it and prepare ourselves for the worst.

"Moreover, as regards supplies, we have enough reserved to last for quite a while."

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "Preparations of our ships for battle have already been completed. Regarding war materials, crude oil in particular, we have enough to last us for quite awhile. If, however, the war becomes prolonged, we may be faced with a major difficulty in the way of replenishment. In order to meet such possibilities, we will take the best means possible to expand facilities for the production of synthetic oil."

X Chief of the Planning Board, HOSHINO: "We are as yet not complete in the matter of self-supply and self-sufficiency of resources. According to our resources mobilization plan for this year, out of the total amount of ¥5,000,000,000 worth of material necessary, we must depend on ¥2,600,000,000 from abroad out of which we must depend on the United States and Britain for ¥1,900,000,000 worth. However, we are already quite prepared. Regarding petroleum, particularly gasoline for airplanes with which we were most acutely concerned in the past, we have done a great deal in securing them from various countries with the result that we have a considerable amount in stock. In case the war becomes prolonged, the prospect of obtaining supplies from the Dutch Indies, Saghalien, etc., are quite good."

(Recess from noon to 1:10 p.m.)

Councillor ISHII: "(1) The treaty under review does not contain a clause for non-separate peace. What is the reason for this? (2) What is the meaning of New Order in Europe referred to in Article 1 of the treaty?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "With regard to the clause for non-separate peace, we did not touch upon it at all since the treaty under review aims, in principle, at prevention of war. If war should break out we would immediately come to an agreement on this subject between the three countries."

X "As regards the New Order, I interpret it as a materialization representing the preface of the treaty which embraces the spirit of 'Hakko-itu' (all the world under one roof) recommended by the Imperial Empire."

Councillor ARIMA: "If Japanese-American hostilities are at all events unavoidable, I believe it best to avail ourselves of the present opportunity. There is, however, one thing of which I cannot but

feel concern. That is the scarcity of petrol. If war is once started between Japan and America, it will not end in a year or two. Even if we are with a good supply of oil in stock at present, we may become short of it. I would like to know what measures are being considered to meet such outcome."

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "The production of synthetic oil is a recent undertaking. We can hardly expect much here. I, however, believe that there is still a possibility of importing oil in quantity from the Dutch East Indies and Northern Saghalien through peaceful means. I feel we can cover our needs for a good length of time with our present stock of oil plus what we will obtain in the future. Furthermore, our production of aeroplane gasoline is now reaching a substantial volume. We are not feeling the dearth which we experienced for a time."

Councillor KUBOTA: "(1) Judging from what is stipulated in Article 3 of the treaty, the Soviet can be considered as coming under the category of 'A state which is at present moment participating neither in the European war nor the Sino-Japanese conflict.' What is the view with respect to this? (2) Are there no signs that STAHRER, the special German envoy, discussed this question with some Soviet authorities on his way to Japan? (3) The proposition in view is liable to prompt a collaboration between the United States and the Soviet. What are the views of our authorities concerned?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "Specifically for the purpose of making it clear that the treaty under review has nothing to do with the Soviet, Article 5 is provided, while it is indicated in the supplementary documents to the effect that Germany shall take the trouble of mediating Russo-Japanese relations. (2) STAHRER said that he had no talk with any of the Soviet authorities in relation to this proposition. I, however, can hardly believe it. Rather I take it that much negotiations have taken place between Germany and the Soviet. (3) With regard to the supposed collaboration between the United States and the Soviet, our Foreign Office authorities are keeping close watch. We are convinced that so far nothing has been done by them in this connection. We will continue to be on the alert and watch their doings. Rather we intend to take the initiative in adjusting Russo-Japanese relations."

Councillor ISHIZUKA: "In the light of various bygone facts, I fear that we can hardly expect due fulfillment of the treaty on the part of Germany. In putting the treaty into effect, we must prove to her our sincerity; at the same time we must also ask for sincerity on the part of Germany. I hope that our government will make due efforts especially regarding this point."

Councillor SHIMIZU: "(1) What are the facts regarding Germany's assistance to the Chungking Government? (2) What are the contents of the talks regarding the mandatory areas, the former German colonies?"

War Minister TOJO: "According to reports, German technicians have made their way into Chungking. There is another report that the Chinese Ambassador in Germany is busy in an attempt to purchase the arms which Germany seized from France in the current European warfare. However, both informations are unauthentic."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "With regard to the mandatory areas under our control, the former German colonies, I wish to dispose of it in line with the supplementary documents we exchanged in connection with this proposition. In other words, we wish to hold the former German colonies included in our Empire just as heretofore by making some compensation to her. And the word 'some' means very little, almost tantamount to nominal."

Councillor MINAMI: "What is the real meaning of Greater East Asia, which recognizes the leadership of our Empire? I fear that a lack of understanding between the three states with regard to the

concrete demarcation of such area would give rise to an undesirable outcome in the future. (2) Who is the author of the treaty under review, Japan or Germany? According to rumors, there are some who say that the treaty was proposed by Germany, whose military operations turned out contrary to what she expected at first, for the purpose of utilizing Japan as a check upon the United States due to the fear that possibility of America's participation in the war would increase when the presidential election is over if the German-British war becomes prolonged. I wish to hear from our Foreign Minister his view in this respect.

"(5) Relations between Britain and America are very close. The latter is vitally interested in the Greater East Asia sphere; whereupon it is inevitable that relations between Japan and the United States grow worse. On the other hand, there are possibilities of improvement in relations between Germany and America. Is there no fear of Japan alone drinking from the bitter cup?

"(4) In the event of war between Japan and America, the attitude of Russia would have a serious bearing upon us. Why did not your government make any effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet also when we negotiated with Germany? Has there been anything done between Japan and Germany with a view to cause the Soviet to drop assistance to Chiang?

"(5) What is the meaning of so-called 'participation' contained in Article 3 of the treaty under consideration?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) By 'Greater East Asia' I mean the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the Oceanic Group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc. Regarding this sphere we have made an understanding that this sphere could be automatically broadened in the course of time. This point is already stated in the records of the treaty negotiations.

"(2) The treaty under review was proposed by Germany. The rumours in circulation contain a half truth, but nevertheless the German Foreign Minister's view as given in the documents exchanged between us is no empty word.

"(3) Our Empire should at this moment ally itself with Germany and Italy, and adjust its international relations with the Soviet Union, to bring about an international situation favorable to us. and thereby do our utmost to avoid an outbreak of hostility between Japan and America. Even if Japan and America should unfortunately come to fight against each other, I consider it advisable for us after all to maintain friendly terms with America. Also from such a viewpoint, I consider it very advantageous for us if we ally with Germany and manipulate to our interest Americans of German descent, who number in the neighborhood of 20 millions and who already hold an influential position in the United States. Further, I fear that if we do not bind us in an alliance with Germany, it would be possible that in future Britain and Germany might conclude peace between themselves, create a new situation in Europe, and attempt to rule over the South Seas area and other regions for their own purposes. It is necessary to show at this time Japan's determination.

"(4) A Soviet-Japanese Pact had been already planned by the preceding cabinet. The Soviet, however, made excessive demands which were a virtual refusal of our proposal. As the bond of tie existing between Germany and the Soviet Union is considerably strong and firm, it is difficult for us to arrive at any arrangement with the Soviet Union unless we first reach an understanding with Germany. In other words, the Pact under review forms the basis of the future foreign relations of our Empire. Further, although the German Ambassador, in the course of our negotiations, proposed to me to have the Soviet Union abandon her pro-Chiang regime policy, and to mediate between the Chungking government and Japan, I deliberately told him that

our country itself would dispose of such problems.

"(5) For instance, if our country cannot sit idle watching, in case a powerful American fleet enters Singapore, I believe that we may then get help from Germany; contrariwise, a U.S.-Canadian common defense can hardly be construed as 'participation', since the present Pact aims to avoid war. I feel that everything has been decided on the basis of the relevant conditions."

Councillor MINAMI: "With regard to the situation concerning the supply of materials, petrol in particular, I wish to be given an explanation sufficient to set our minds at ease."

President HOSHINO of the Planning Board: "We have a considerable stock of petrol, but difficulty is inevitable if worst conditions prevail for a long period. We will in this connection endeavor to secure its supply by utilizing various domestic installations and also by establishing connections with overseas sources."

War Minister TOJO: "As for the Army, the supply of oil on hand would be enough to cover our operation for sometime to come, but I have no confidence in this respect if war should continue three to four years further. I feel there will be no alternative other than to strive for a way out of the desperate situation."

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "For the use of the Navy, we have sufficient stock of petrol to cover our requirements for a considerable period. Assuming that our yearly requirement equals to our estimated maximum consumption of oil for a series of full scale fleet-to-fleet clashes, I do not think that our stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year. If the war is protracted for a long period, say five to ten years, the frequency of battles would automatically drop, and it is our intention to take steps to adjust our consumption so that our stock can be consumed during an extended period."

Councillor MINAMI: "How about our finance when hostilities between Japan and the United States break out before the China Incident is ended?"

Finance Minister KAWADA: "It will be quite natural that our financial distress will increase more than ever, but I do not think that there will be no measures available with which to meet the situation. As for the source of our revenue, we may look to bonds and taxes. In either case, we have no alternative but to rely upon the savings of the people. If the situation should progress in the present state for another few years, we would possibly meet no major difficulty in finance. If the situation should grow still worse, we must try to raise funds enough to cover the war expenditures by exercising utmost economy in the general expenditures. The difficulty in the field of national finance would almost be the same as that in the domain of materials."

Councillor ARAKI: "With the development of the situation, will there be no shortage of troops? Besides, I have lately been informed that among the returnees from the battle fields there are many who are suffering from tuberculosis. What is the true state of affairs?"

War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA: "Since the manpower needed by our Army in the war against America will be comparatively small in number, while Naval personnel is by its very nature limited in size, we feel no concern in respect to number of personnel. There are among the returnees a considerable number of tuberculosis cases, but the military authorities in charge and the Ministry of Public Welfare are doing their best in the way of medical facilities for these patients."

Councillor SUGAWARA: "(1) What is the relationship between the treaty under review and the anti-Comintern Pact? Moreover, Germany seems to be the only party with whom we have negotiated this treaty, and likewise in the supplementary instruments exchanged between the contracting parties Germany appears to be the only other party. Thus, there is concern with regard to our relation with Italy. How about this point? (2) What is the resolve of our government with respect to the finance to meet with the outbreak of a Japanese-American war?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "The Anti-Comintern Pact shall be retained. As to the adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, I believe that we can consider it separately. The reasons why Germany is the only party with whom we negotiated the treaty under review and with whom we exchanged the relevant documents, are that the treaty was negotiated at the request of the German government, and also that what is being sought by our Empire is principally related to Germany. With regard to our relations with Italy, we will endeavor to leave no cause for any regrets."

Finance Minister KAWADA: "With regard to our finance, doubtless the burden on our people will grow heavier. I wish to arrange various measures so that the whole nation can bear the increasing burden."

Councillor MATSUURA: "With the conclusion of the Alliance under review, the attitude of the Soviet Union will greatly affect the future destiny of our Empire. Hence I hope that our government authorities would direct their efforts especially on this point."

X X Councillor USHIO: "The conclusion of the treaty under review will naturally result in increasing difficulties to our country. I feel it essential for our government authorities and also the leaders of our people to harness themselves with a renewed resolve and to arouse the people's spirit. As the dearth of civilian consumption goods will engender unrest in the people's thought, at least the supply of requisite items for sustaining the civilians' living should be given adequate consideration, so as to leave no cause for any regrets. What is the government's intention in this respect?"

President HOSHINO of the Planning Board: "In our commodity mobilization program, the center of gravity is laid on the items for military purposes. We have, however, paid a good deal of consideration to secure also the necessities for the civilians' living."

X Councillor HAYASHI: "In the light of the address made by STALIN before the Communist Party members after the signing of the Soviet-German agreement, it appears that his basic policy of launching a movement to Sovietize Germany and Britain at such a moment when their strength is spent, and likewise to Sovietize Japan and China, remains unchanged. If this be the case, rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union would be a task very difficult to accomplish. What is the view of the Foreign Minister in this respect?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "In my opinion, pessimism and optimism are divided on a fifty-fifty basis. Therefore, we intend to utilize Germany to bring the situation to an optimistic view. It is still not certain to what extent Germany will work upon the Soviet to adjust Soviet-Japanese relations. If, however, the Soviet Union is afraid of Germany, the latter would make considerable efforts to mediate between Japan and the Soviet Union."

X Councillor FUKAI: "(1) In what way will Germany give us military assistance in the event of a Japanese-American war? (2) I learned that a protest was made in connection with the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty on the ground that this infringes on the secret anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. How has this turned out? (3) In the preface of the treaty under review I find a passage which reads: 'This enables each nation of the world to have a proper place in the world,' but in Hitler's own language, he says 'against

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other races the survival of the fittest is the grand high-road of heaven and earth. These two clearly contradict each other. Is there no cause for unrest here? (4) If a Japanese-American war is unavoidable, as Foreign Minister said, his assertions might be justified; if, on the contrary, it is not unavoidable, there must be room for maneuvering behind the scenes.

X "In the event of a war, there will be the unrest in respect to the supply of civilian necessities, and also unrest in thought. Has the government any conviction that it can tide over the situation without the occurrence of a serious state of affairs? I wish to ask the Premier's resolve on this point."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO and Premier KONOYE:

"(1) German assistance will consist of the supply of superior arms and materials. This, however, will depend upon an understanding being reached with the Soviet Union;

"(2) It is open to question whether the protest was made to Germany officially. No answer has been received from Germany;

XX "(3) Any race that dies out under the rule of the survival of the fittest is not worth existing on this earth. If we fail to accomplish our grand mission of spreading the Imperial way at the time it should be done, then it can't be helped even if we go out of existence. The fact that we succeeded in placing these words in the preface is a victory of our diplomacy;

ulst P "(4) As to whether we shall be able to avert a crisis by courting America, such idea is wrong. In order to avoid a crisis, we must take a firm stand and nothing else. By this we will prevent an unfortunate situation to arise. Our government has come to a decision to conclude the treaty under review with an unusual determination, by taking into consideration from all conceivable angles the conditions of our country, the living conditions of the people, red propaganda, etc., in case of the worst situation. The Emperor himself also with an unusual resolve granted us his gracious words. We were deeply impressed at this as it reminded us of the resolve of the Emperor MEIJI at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. We are now determined to lay down our lives to serve the Throne."

Councillor FUTAGAMI: "(1) Did His Majesty consult us on the treaty alone? Or are both the treaty and the exchange instruments involved? (2) Does the passage in Article 3 which reads: 'the European war or the China dispute' mean that no participation is made in either of them? (3) What is meant by the mixed expert commission? (4) There exists a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hence, does Article 5 mean that Germany will not attack the Soviet Union even when the latter assaults Japan? Further, is Japan bound to fight against the Soviet Union if a Soviet-German hostility breaks out? If this were the case, would not such an arrangement be unilateral. Does the word 'existing' mean the date of signing?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) What we had submitted to the Emperor for review was the draft for the treaty; and we have here presented to you the draft of the exchanged official documents for your reference.

"(2) Yes, that is just what it means.

"(3) It means the Economic Expert Commission and the Military Expert Commission.

"(4) Although there exists a non-aggression treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.

"With regard to the word 'existing', if you mean to ask if the present status of the Soviet Union cannot be modified, I say no; I mean that it will not be modified by the treaty under consideration. It will be well to readjust Japan's relation with the Soviet Union hereafter."

Councillor OSHIMA: "(1) To what extent does the Greater East Asia include? (2) Three or four years later, when Germany will have recovered from her scars of war she may get herself involved in hostilities with Russia. Has there been any talk about Japan and Germany combining to cope with Russia?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "(1) This question has been mentioned before.

"(2) We do not anticipate a war with Russia. Even though the Russo-Japanese relation may be readjusted it will hardly last for three years. After two years, it will be necessary to reconsider the relations among Japan, Germany, and Russia."

Councillor OBATA: "Although we have heard explanations on the necessity of concluding the treaty in question, it does not mean that insecurity has been obliterated. Since we have decided upon this matter with great determination, unerring insight, and solemn formality, we shall hope that it will not bring about the worst situation."

X | "Article III, externally, seems bilateral, but the United States is about to participate in the European war, while on the other hand it does not consider Russian aid to Chiang Kai-Shek an act of participation. Therefore, in reality, is it not unilateral? It appears that Japan alone is bound to a great sacrifice, while the burden on the part of Germany is hardly conceivable."

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "STAHMER maintains that the United States' participation in the war is not desirable and that there is no fear of such a possibility."

"A Japanese-American war will be fatal. There is just as much danger of a Japanese-American war, as there is in the United States' participation in the European war. The situation of the presidential election will have great influence upon it. In connection with this election we must not ignore the influence of Germans residing in the United States, as these Germans will be a potent factor in preventing the United States' participation in the war."

Councillor TAKEKOSHI: "In the event of the worst situation, will Japan be able to choose the time and place to let the Japanese Navy participate in the war?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "As it is to be decided by the three powers whether the exchanged official documents will prescribe obligations for participation in a war or not, your opinion in the case just mentioned is true."

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI: "Irrespective of whether this pact will be concluded or not the Japanese people, must realize the inevitability of a Japanese-American war. Both the Japanese and American Navies will not be able to challenge each other. If they should fight in the Western Pacific the Japanese Navy will be able to annihilate the American Navy. The Americans also may think the same way. The United States is now going through a naval-expansion program, but I believe that Japan will be able to fight with its present strength in the course of the next year or two. What is the opinion of the Navy Minister on this point?"

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "For the time being, if we presume that the United States will challenge us to a short and decisive war, I have full confidence of victory. With regard to future plans I wish

to improve the quality of our Navy and expand our armaments as much as possible."

Councillor ISHII: "I have some doubts regarding the disposal of Japan's mandated areas as stated in the exchanged official documents. May I have the opinions of the authorities?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "I wish to have it arranged, at this moment, that we shall have these mandated islands ceded to us free from Germany, to avoid any controversies in the future."

X Councillor MITSUCHI: "(1) As the consequence of the signing of this pact, American economic pressure upon Japan and the internal economic difficulties to follow will be to some extent inevitable. To meet with such a situation, it will be necessary to control the various phases of economic life within our nation. As a result, some of our people will lose their power to procure their necessities of life. What are the Government's measures to cope with such a situation? (2) The Japanese people have an aptitude to look upon the signing of an alliance treaty as an assurance of perpetual amical relations, and to consider the nations who oppose it as enemies. I wish to ask our government, in making the announcement of this treaty, to emphasize that our people should be careful not to be captivated by Germany and Italy, and also not to have hostile opinions against the United States and Great Britain."

Chief of the Planning Board HOSHINO and Prime Minister KONOYE: "(1) With regard to the Anglo American pressure, we agree with you. As a result, those concerned with export and import will have to suffer. We are now taking up this aspect with a view to obtain some adequate measure to deal with it. (2) We entirely agree with your opinion on controlling the anti-Anglo-American movements."

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI, considering this the end of interpellations, ordered the State Ministers and the explainers to leave.

(The State Ministers and explainers retire.)

Then, deliberations were started among the committee members, every member exchanging his opinion on the formality and substance of the pact.

Finally, it was decided to avoid any incitement that may develop from this proposition against the United States and Great Britain; and to smoothen Japan's relations with the Soviet Union; and moreover, demanded the government authorities not to neglect preparations for the possible worst situation. Thus, the pact was unanimously approved.

Chairman SUZUKI adjourns the session.

(Session adjourned at 8:20 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1461

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. TAKATSUJI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 41 pages, dated Sept. 26, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes of conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council relative to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Sept. 26, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this
26th day of August, 1946

/s/ M. Takatsuji
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe

Secretary, Privy Council
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this
26th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. F. Larsh

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

"Strictly Confidential

Original

"RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

"SUBJECT: Conclusion of a Three-Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy

"The meeting is opened on Thursday, September 26, 1940 at 9:40 P.M.

"His Imperial Majesty enters.

"Present:

President HARA

Vice-President SUZUKI

Ministers:

Prime Minister KONOYE (No. 5)

War Minister TOJO (No. 6)

Foreign Minister - Overseas Minister MATSUOKA (No. 7)

Education Minister HASHIDA (No. 8)

Finance Minister KAWADA (No. 10)

Justice Minister KAZAMI (No. 12)

Communications Minister - Railways Minister MUROTA (No. 13)

Agriculture & Forestry Minister ISHIGURO (No. 14)

Navy Minister OKAWA (No. 15)

Privy Councillors:

Councillor KAWAI (No. 18)

Councillor ISHII (No. 19)

Councillor ARIMA (No. 20)

Councillor KUBOTA (No. 21)

Councillor ISHIGUKA (No. 22)

Councillor SHIMIZU (No. 23)

Councillor MINAMI (No. 24)

Councillor NARA (No. 26)

Councillor ARAKI (No. 27)

Councillor MATSUI (No. 28)

Councillor SUGAWARA (No. 29)

Councillor MATSUURA (No. 30)

Councillor USHIO (No. 31)

Councillor HAYASHI (No. 32)

Councillor FUKAI (No. 33)

Councillor FUTAKAMI (No. 34)

Councillor MANO (No. 35)

Councillor OSHIMA (No. 36)

Councillor OBATA (No. 37)

Councillor TAKAKOSHI (No. 38)

Councillor MITSUCHI (No. 39)

"Absent:

Imperial Princes:

Prince YASUHIRO (No. 1)

Prince NOBUHIRO (No. 2)

Prince TAKAHIRO (No. 3)

Prince KOTOHIRO (No. 4)

Ministers:

Commerce & Industry Minister KOBAYASHI (No. 9)

Home Minister- Welfare Minister YASUI (No. 11)

Privy Councillors:

Councillor KANEKO (No. 17)

Councillor TANAKA (No. 25)

"Committee Members

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO

Director of the Board of Legislation MORASE

Councillor of the Board of Legislation MORIYAMA

Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUMOTO

Director of the Control Bureau, Commerce & Industry Ministry TSUJI

Director of the Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry SODA

Director of the Banking Bureau, Finance Ministry MATSUKUMA

Director of the Exchange Bureau, Finance Ministry HARAGUCHI

"Reporting Councillor: Chairman of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI

"Chief Secretary: Chief Secretary HORIE

"Secretaries: Secretary MOROHASHI

Secretary TAKATSUJI

"PRESIDENT (HARA): The meeting is called to order.

"The matter of the conclusion of a three power treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy is submitted as the subject for discussion.

"I now open the first reading. Omitting the reading I immediately call for the report of the Chairman of the Investigation Committee.

"REPORTING COUNCILLOR (SUZUKI): Recently the conclusion of a three power treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy was referred to this Council for deliberation. Today I and all other councillors present received the command to serve on the Investigation Committee. We immediately opened the committee meeting, and thinking of the great importance of this draft, we listened minutely to the explanations given by the ministers of state and various officials concerned and gave the matter careful consideration. Moreover as the matter was urgent there was no time to issue a report on the investigation. I ask for your understanding concerning the above.

"According to the explanations of the ministers of state, at this time when the China incident is still unsolved the recent attitude of the United States towards our country had gradually stiffened. The attitude of the Chungking Government and other countries antagonistic to our country have also been influenced by this attitude; the international position of our country has become more and more difficult; and we cannot but be gravely concerned over the future. Now the only way to surmount this crisis

and strengthen our international position is to strengthen our cooperation with countries having the same interests as ours. Now Germany and Italy are eager to prevent the entry into the war of the United States, while our country also is desirous of avoiding a crisis with that country, so that our interests coincide. Therefore the Government has made zealous efforts in this direction ever since its formation. Recently, based on a German proposal, the opportunity for us to strengthen our cooperation (ties) with Germany and Italy without entering the present European war has arrived. For this reason we planned to conclude a treaty, opened negotiations with these two countries, and after many conferences finally reached a conclusion on the twenty-fourth of this month. This is the treaty now placed before this Council for deliberation.

"I shall now give the substance of this treaty. First, in the preamble, the governments of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy recognize that the prerequisite for eternal peace is the enabling of every country to have its own place, and therefore, their basic principle is the construction and maintenance of a new order sufficient to show the fruits of co-existence and co-prosperity of the various races in Europe and Greater East Asia. They have decided to act in harmony and cooperation regarding the efforts to be based on this object (aim), and furthermore they will give unstinting cooperation to countries in every part of the world who desire to make the same efforts. In this way the three countries hope to realize their ultimate aspirations regarding world peace. Next, in the body of the treaty, the following points were decided: (1) Japan recognizes and respects the leading position of Germany and Italy in the construction of a new order in Europe while Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leading position in the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia.

"(2) The three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy will cooperate with each other in their efforts based on the above-mentioned line of policy. When one of these three countries is attacked by a country not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese hostilities the three countries will aid each other with all political, economic and military means.

"(3) In order to carry out this treaty a mixed special committee composed of members appointed by each of the governments of the three countries shall be assembled without delay.

"(4) The three countries confirm the fact that the articles of this treaty shall in no wise affect the existing political situation between these three countries and the Soviet Union.

"(5) This treaty shall take effect simultaneously with its signing and shall be effective for ten years. At an appropriate time before its expiration, upon the demand of one of the contracting powers negotiations shall be opened regarding the renewal of the treaty.

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"We think that the proposed Japan-Germany-Italy Three Power Treaty is based on the common interests of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy, and will strengthen all the more the cooperation of the three countries in working together and pushing forward in constructing a new order respectively in Greater East Asia and Europe. Furthermore it is proposed that the three countries promise to aid each other in every way against the attack of another country not at present in the war. This is indeed a matter of unprecedented gravity for our country and there is need for deep and mature deliberation on the influence it will have on our national destiny. Nevertheless, in view of the present situation, we are forced to recognize that it (the treaty) was truly unavoidable. But there is need to take steps to prevent, as far as possible, the inciting of Great Britain and America as a result of the conclusion of this treaty. At the same time, we must also make ample preparations in case by any chance worst should come to worst. The Government has said it will make ample efforts concerning these several points. Also, as to our country's relations with the Soviet Union, we need to make special efforts for smooth relations, and on this point also the government has declared it will exert itself for the accomplishment of its objective through Germany. Hereupon I and my colleagues place our trust in the government's declarations and furthermore earnestly desire the government to do its utmost. Thus I and my colleagues unanimously voted that this draft should be passed as it stands, together with the above-mentioned requests.

"I hereby report the results of the investigation.

"No. 19 (ISHII): I believe that the proposed draft (this matter) is one of the most important problems since our country opened up diplomatic relations. I hereby make clear that in the final analysis I agree with the proposed draft. Because I deeply fear that the enforcement of this alliance is apt to invite grave disasters I wish to give a few outspoken opinions concerning this draft and thus urge the careful attention of the government authorities.

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XX

HITLER

"To begin with, modern international alliances are different from those of olden times, which gave birth to very intimate relationships comparable to those of husband and wife, or of brothers, for they constitute simply a union (partnership) of one country with another. Furthermore in the operation of a treaty of alliance, one ally tries to gain exclusive benefits for his own country at the sacrifice of the other. It is because of this that diplomatic relations between allied countries are particularly difficult. With this actual fact as a premise, let us consider the national character of the two countries of Germany and Italy. It is a conspicuous fact that there is not a single country that has gained any benefit from allying itself with Germany and her predecessor Prussia. Not only so, but there are countries which because of this alliance have suffered unforeseen disasters and have finally lost their national entity. Chancellor BISMARCK of Germany once said that in international alliances one horseman and one donkey are required, and that Germany must always be the horseman. Sure enough, just as he had said, in the last European war, her attitude towards Austria and Turkey was as that of a horseman shouting at and whipping a donkey--she made these two countries endanger their very existence, so that even onlookers (outsiders) could not help shuddering. But of course these were events concerning Imperial Germany, and there are people who will say that the newly-arisen Nazi Germany will not necessarily follow in the tracks of the Imperial Regime. In spite of this I believe that Chancellor HITLER of Nazi Germany is a character of no little danger. He is said to have taken MACHIAVELLI as a model and always has his book Il Principe at his right hand. Verily, he has declared that international alliances are a temporary expedient, and has publicly stated that one should not hesitate in breaking them as soon as the time comes. For instance the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact last August, which clearly conflicts with the anti-Comintern pact that country had previously concluded with us, should from the first have occasioned no surprise. From early years he (HITLER) had studied about the Orient, and held from the first that Japan should not be allowed to become a strong power, and it is said he often spoke of this to those close to him. From whatever angle we view it, we cannot believe that Nazi Germany under the leadership of HITLER can be a loyal friend of Japan for a long time. Next, when we consider Italy, we find her national character just as unreliable as that of Germany. From early days she has thought of herself as being the king (queen) of power politics among the European powers. Probably this is why she received no heavy damage from Germany in the last European war.

"To sum it up, both Germany and Italy should not be trusted too much. Then what is my reason for agreeing to this draft, the purpose of which is to conclude an alliance with these two untrustworthy countries? In spite of the reasons I have here stated, I believe that the proposal of allying ourselves with these two countries is opportune. When one thinks of the position of Germany and Italy in recent years, from the economic viewpoint of haves and have-nots, or from the connection of the balance of power, it may be considered that there are no countries whose interests are as similar as those of Japan, Germany and Italy. The alliance can be said to be based on common national interests, rather than on their national character of the personality of their leaders. Thus the Germany of today must be called a truly invaluable ally for the Japan of today. However as I have said before, as the national character of Germany is such as would suck the blood of others, we must pay deep attention lest she should boast of being the only horse rider. Both in modern science and in her capacity for the production of munitions Germany shows a degree of progress one step ahead of ours. Since we are concluding an alliance with her we should of our own accord make efforts to take advantage of those points in which she is superior. I am in favor of the conclusion of this treaty of alliance as a timely step, but in the light of past history, I earnestly hope that when this treaty is realized, the honorable members of the government will not neglect to take exhaustive and scrupulous care so that we need have no future regrets. It is a matter for rejoicing that our isolated and friendless country has here unexpectedly received a hand from strong other countries, and I fervently pray that my fears may prove to be groundless. But if by any chance even a part of my fears should be realized it will lead to serious consequences. It is for this reason that I have taken it upon myself to give some outspoken advice to the government, and have hereby stated my inmost thoughts so that they may be of reference to you.

"PRESIDENT (HARA): As no other opinions are voiced, I shall omit the second reading and so forth and immediately call for a vote. I ask all those in favor of the draft to rise.

"(The entire body rises.)

"PRESIDENT (HARA): The draft has been passed by a unanimous vote. The meeting is adjourned.

"His Imperial Majesty leaves.

"(Meeting closed at 10:15 P.M.)

President: Yoshinichi HARA (Signed)

Chief Secretary: Sueso HORIE (Signed)

Secretary: Yuzuru MOROHASHI (Signed)

Masami TAKATSUJI (Signed)"

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. NO. _____

I.P.S. No. 1215Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. TAKATSUJI hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the
following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto
attached consisting of 30 pages, dated 26 Sept., 1940, and
described as follows: Record of meeting of the Privy Council
held Sept. 26, 1940, at 9:40 PM regarding conclusion of a
Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official
archives and files of the following named ministry or department (speci-
fying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official
designation of the regular location of the document in the archives
or files): Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this26th day of August, 1946./s/ M. Takatsuji
Signature of Official (Seal)/s/
Witness: Kichi, Chosokabe.Secretary, Privy Council
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, hereby certify that I
am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was
obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese
Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this26th day of August, 1946/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NameWitness: /s/ R. H. LarshInvestigator, IPS
Official Capacity

621
9/27/40
27th Sept., 1940/Showa 15th/
Official Gazette Extra.

Imperial Rescript

The enhancement of great righteousness in the eight corners of the world, and the unification of the world under one roof has been the great instruction given to us by our august Imperial forefathers, which we have never neglected. The disturbances in the world situation today are being endlessly aggravated, and the disasters which would be inflicted upon humanity would be immeasurably great. As we earnestly desire that no time will be lost in overcoming all the troubles and restoring peace, we have ordered our government to discuss the matters concerning coalition and collaboration with Germany and Italy, who have similar objects with the Empire. Accordingly, we are deeply pleased to see the conclusion of the pact between the three countries.

When we think of it, we realize that we still have a very long way before we accomplish the unprecedented task of enabling all the nations to have their own proper places and to live in peace and security. Ye, our subjects, guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne which is eternal as Heaven and earth, by overcoming the critical situation of today with united will and strength and with far-sighted wisdom and clearer concept of the national polity.

The Imperial signmanual and seal.

27th September, 15th year of Showa (1940).

Prime Minister	Prince KONOE, Fumimaro
War Minister	TOJO, Hideki
Foreign Minister and Minister) of Overseas Affairs) MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Education Minister) HASHIDA, Kunihiro
Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry)
Financial Minister) KAWADA, Retsu
Home Minister)
Welfare Minister) YASUI, Eiji
Justice Minister) KAZAMI, Akira
Communication Minister)
Railway Minister) MURATA, Shozo
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) ISIGURO, Tadaatsu
Navy Minister	OIKAWA, Koshiro
President of Planning Board	HOSHINO, Naoki

*see
attached*

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2600AStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 27 September, 1940, and described as follows Imperial Rescript

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____

CabinetSigned at Tokyo on this20th day of August 1946./s/ M. TAKAHASHI
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. KuriyamaSecretary of Cabinet
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this20th day of August, 1946/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAMEWitness: Ruth F. AndersonInvestigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity

Strictly Confidential (Draft)

Letter from the Foreign Minister to the
German Ambassador.

Excellency:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas shall remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be in a way compensated therefor. In regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the present European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in an accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to disposing of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1214A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: Letter from the Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24th day of Aug, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24th day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard F. Larsh

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

623

Tokyo, September 27, 1940

The German Ambassador.

No. G 1002.

Strictly confidential.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter Jyo-ni Nr. 134 of this date and to confirm the oral declaration made by me concerning the former German colonies in the South Sea contained in Your Excellency's letter under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

signed: Ott.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 940A, B & C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Official Capacity

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

The German Ambassador

Tokyo, September 27, 1940.
Strictly confidential.

No. G 1000

Excellency:

At the moment when our conversations, begun on the 9th instant at Tokyo, are about to eventuate in a successful conclusion of the Three Powers Pact, it is Minister Stahmer's and my sincerest desire to tender to Your Excellency the expression of deepest appreciation for the principal part Your Excellency has played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit.

We wish to take this occasion to state once more in this letter some of the salient points reiterated in our conversations with Your Excellency which are as follows:

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time to come their interests will coincide and the unrestricted mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties form the solid foundation on which the Pact is built.

The German Government firmly believe that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact will be settled without difficulties and that it would not be in keeping with the far-reaching importance of the Pact and it would be practically impossible to anticipate all possible cases which might arise in the course of its application; they can only be dealt with in the spirit of mutual confidence and helpfulness as they arise from time to time.

Conclusions of the Technical Commissions stipulated in Article 4 of the Pact shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties.

If Japan, contrary to the intentions of the Pact, should be attacked by a Power so far not engaged in the European War or the China Incident, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist it with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end.

Germany will use her industrial capacity and other resources technical and material as far as possible in favour of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake mutually to aid each other in procuring in every possible way raw materials and minerals including oil which they will have been in need of.

The German Foreign Minister implicitly believes that Italy will of course act in concord with Germany and Japan when and where assistance and co-operation by Italy is sought in reference to the matters above enumerated.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the above expose as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeatedly transmitted to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

signed: Ott.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 940A, B & C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Official Capacity

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

The German Ambassador.

Tokyo, September 27, 1940

G No. 1001

Strictly confidential.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Letter Jyo - ni Nr.133 of this date with the contents as follows:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

signed: Ott.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 940A, B & C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

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12/1940
626

EXTRACT FROM: "CONTEMPORARY JAPAN FOR DEC. 1940." pp. 1514-20.

THE THREE-POWER PACT AND THE WORLD OF TOMORROW
By TOSHIO SHIPATORI

In point of importance to the future of mankind, the Japanese-German-Italian treaty concluded in Berlin on September 27 must be considered of epoch-making significance. As clearly stated in the preamble, the three signatory Powers intend by this treaty to set up a permanent world peace by enabling all the nations to take their proper places under the sun and thereby translating into fact the principle of co-existence and common prosperity among them.

Peace is a natural desire of mankind and for its fulfillment repeated attempts have been made ever since the dawn of history. No religion worth the name has ever failed to profess as its primary object the realization of peace and tranquility among men. There is, for example, a Biblical teaching, intended, no doubt, to work out the salvation of man, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." It has become clear, however, by what has transpired since that no salvation of man, with human nature as it is, can be accomplished by such methods as the Scripture enjoins us, making as it does a distinction between what is God's and what is Caesar's and separating as it does flesh and spirit and substance and mind from each other. Not only that, but it has become increasingly clear that the course of international politics, based upon the principle of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's, has developed into sheer materialism, allowing the strong to prey upon the weak in denial of God's injunctions of justice and fraternal love for mankind. It is clear that such a system can produce nothing other than confusion and conflict in the world. In view of these failures in the past, Japan, Germany and Italy have come out to solve this all-important problem confronting mankind by an entirely new and hitherto untried means. Herein lies the fundamental idea which has motivated the conclusion of the tripartite treaty.

The new world order, to which reference is made in the treaty, has been conceived with such a motive. But as things stand today, with armed struggles raging in Europe and Asia, it would not be quite reasonable to expect the intentions of the signatory Powers to be evaluated readily at their full and proper significance by other Powers. This is especially true when many of them are either directly or indirectly involved in these struggles and are either aroused with feelings of hostility and hatred or are experiencing extreme uneasiness over their own future. Considering moreover the fact that the great historic change which is now taking place under our eyes requires of many Powers the abandonment of views of a world and life to which they have been accustomed for past centuries, it obviously would take a considerable time for the real meaning of the new world order to be generally understood and much more accepted. This means that the interim years which will intervene between now and the time when the fullest

significance of the instrument will be understood can by no means be peaceful ones. Most probably, therefore, a long period of perseverance and strenuous endeavour is in store for the three signatory Powers, which will do well to be fully prepared to meet adequately these eventualities.

Despite this fact, Japan, Germany and Italy are far from being eager to welcome a new struggle. Japan, for instance, has for the past three years of the China affair consistently demanded that China reconsider her attitude, understand Japan's real intentions, grasp fully the spirit of the new times and take advantage of it. In Europe, too, the leaders of Germany and Italy have since before the outbreak of the present war, continued to make Great Britain and France proposals for a similar peaceful understanding. Unfortunately, the opposition and antagonism between the new and old ideologies in both the East and the West was so profound as to render it essentially impossible to find a middle course of reconciliation, the result being the continued life or death struggle between them which we witness today. The issue of the wars in Europe as well as in Asia is clear beyond doubt; and the sooner the final submission of the vanquished comes, the less will be the tribulation of mankind. The present wars in the East and West are fundamentally different in character from those of the past. Although they entail a tremendous amount of destruction, their primary object is construction, as witnessed in the gradual emergency of a new order out of the ruins, and reconstruction where destruction has taken place. The three victorious nations, despite their immense sacrifices incurred in waging war, are steadily growing in power both materially and spiritually. This has been made possible due to the real strength of those who create, not destroy. But to those who hold to conventional ideas, who are prone to judge everything in terms of materials and figures, this would seem quite fantastic. In fact, it is for this reason that there are a number of people who have not yet awakened to the reality of the situation which is looking straight in their faces. This testifies incidentally to the great difficulty with which the hard crust of conventionalism can be broken through. This type of people fail to discover where the real source of strength and power which Japan, Germany and Italy are at present displaying lies. Clapping eyes on only the superficialities, they seem to be entirely ignorant of the great fact that the principle for which the three Powers stand cannot be overcome by mere material strength. Blissful in their ignorance, they continue their stubborn resistance against the three Powers in the hope of conquering the new order or at least of prolonging the tenure of life of the old one. But theirs is a vain effort. To protect what is naturally doomed to downfall in a historical process is nothing short of tragic. In truth, it is because of the existence of many such people that Japan, Germany and Italy have found it necessary to enter into this treaty. In this respect the treaty is bound to wield immense power and influence, and no doubt constitutes a menace in no small measure to those who cling to the old order of things. This may be called

the negative side of the treaty. The true purpose of the tripartite treaty, however, lies in its positive side. To contribute toward the construction of a new world order is the primary object which the three Powers desire to establish under the pact, and it is solely in consideration of its operation in such a positive sense that the writer emphasized at the outset of this article the importance of this treaty from the viewpoint of world history.

What, then, is the new order which Japan, Germany and Italy intend to bring about, first in their respective spheres and ultimately throughout the world, as stipulated in the instrument? To give a clear-cut answer to this question is difficult at the present stage; but in view of the fact that the three Powers, discarding the ideologies of individualism and democracy, have adopted the principle of dealing with human society from the totalitarian point of view, the character of the new order to be created under their leadership must for the most part be clearly perceived.

From the time of ancient Greece down to the modern age, Western civilization has undergone various changes in form, but the basis upon which it has developed has consistently been the individualistic view of the world. It was the movement for Kultur staged in various fields of activity by the German people with the rise of Prussia to power which revolted for the first time against this conception of civilization. Yet because of the structures of her state and society as well as the thoughts of her people not yet being entirely free from liberalism and individualism, Germany was ultimately defeated in the last European War, and the German term Kultur was accordingly made the butt of ridicule and contempt by the conquerors. By its subsequent development, however, Kultur Kampf has proved that, though its steps may be temporarily interrupted, it is after all in line with the inevitable course of progress which mankind is destined to take. The totalitarian movement, started by the Fascist Revolution in Italy and now about to reach its zenith in the National Socialist Revolution in Germany, is spreading like a prairie fire, leaving no room for doubt that the world of tomorrow will be thoroughly permeated with this new concept of world and man.

The writer understands the totalitarian movement to mean, in the west, a return to that simple but virile human instinct which characterized the German and Latin peoples of more than a thousand years ago. Simultaneously with the appearance of such a movement in Germany and Italy, there also arose in Japan a similar movement for going back to the intrinsically Japanese way of ancient days. In Japan, however, no such drastic change as warrants being called revolutionary was necessary, as was the case in Germany and Italy. For Japan's polity has since the foundation of the Empire been established and maintained upon a permanent and unchanging basis, and the pure and unadulterated totalitarianism embodying the unity of sovereign and subjects as one organic body has always been the

immutable faith of the Japanese people. But it would be untrue to say that the evils of liberalistic civilization have not for the past half-century poisoned her ancient tradition. Indeed, the accumulation of its harmful influences had become so intolerably large in both internal and foreign affairs that at last the nation revolted and its dissatisfaction found expression in the form of the Manchurian incident of 1931. This incident meant the bursting out of the thitherto suppressed healthy, racial instinct of the nation, in challenge externally of unjust conditions long forced upon mankind by the democratic powers and internally of all alien ideas and thoughts grafted upon the people. It called for a re-examination and a return to what is really Japanese in politics, economics and indeed in all activities of the people. The characteristics of this movement in Japan have become even more accentuated in the current China affair, in which the classic expression, Hakko Ichiu, has been adopted as the national slogan, and the ultimate object of the affair, in consonance with the spirit of the slogan, is to be the establishment of a new order in East Asia. The controversies of the past ten years in the Far East, therefore, may well be called the racial revivalist-reform movement of the Japanese people, chief obstacles to which having been offered by the machinations of the democratic Powers who have clung to the old order as the best purveyor of their own interests. The war in Asia can thus be regarded as essentially a conflict between the view of the world as represented by these democratic Powers and the yokdo spirit which has consistently been protected and fostered by the Japanese nation since the foundation of the Empire. Since the current war in Europe is, fundamentally speaking, a struggle between two different ideologies and a clash between old and new civilizations, it may safely be said that in this sense the wars in the East and West are essentially the same.

Unless one views the present wars in the above light and takes into consideration the fact that the so-called new order movement is ultimately an ideological and cultural movement for a return to man's innate character, one will never be able to understand correctly the real nature of the new world order of tomorrow which is to be established through Japanese-German-Italian co-operation.

Before a new world order is fully established, there must first of all be effected a radical change in the thought of the people in general. In other words, the mental habit must be broken which has for past centuries controlled mankind. Everything requires reappraisal, and even the essential qualities of God and man must necessarily be re-examined. In this process many a dogma and prejudice will have to be wiped out, for in order to achieve the contemplated change, such things as freedom and equality of individuals, the inherent rights of man, the absolute sovereignty of a state and the right of self-determination of the people must be viewed from a completely different angle from that of the past. In the new world,

many things which formerly were highly evaluated as making this earthly life worth living may lose their value, for it must be emphasized that the very things which the old forces in the world have specially prized constitute the sources of injustice, irrationality, tyranny, and exploitation. It is not expected, of course, that such a tremendous reformation which has no parallel in world history can be accomplished in a brief space of time. But now the trend of the age is definitely in that direction. Not only that, but the construction of a new order is in fact already progressing over wide areas of Asia and Europe and promises to be greatly accelerated hereafter.

In view of this epoch-making movement now under way in Europe and Asia there should be no doubt as to the reasons for the birth of the treaty among Japan, Germany and Italy or as to the duty with which it has been charged.

A F F I D A V I T

City of)
)
Tokyo, Japan)

I, the undersigned, Katsuji INAHARA, being first duly sworn before John R. Pritchard, depose and say as follows:

That I have been editor of the publication "Contemporary Japan" since its foundation until the present day; that I was serving in this capacity in December 1940 when the article "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" by Toshio SHIRATORI was published; that I recall the publication of this article; and that said article was published without change of context at the instance of Toshio SHIRATORI in the December 1940 issue of the said publication.

Given under my hand this 5th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Katsuji Inahara
Kat suji INAHARA

Sworn and subscribed to by Katsuji INAHARA before the undersigned this 5th day of September, 1946.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING FOREIGN
RELATIONS

Sixteenth Year of Showa (1941)

Board of Information

pp. 130-133

10. RADIO SPEECH OF DR. NOBUMI ITO, PRESIDENT OF THE
BOARD OF INFORMATION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FIRST
ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE THREE POWER
PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALYSeptember 26, 1941.

Exactly a year has elapsed since the Three Power Pact was concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27 last year. Following its conclusion Hungary joined it on November 20, last year, followed by Rumania on the 23rd of the same month, and Slovakia, on December 24. On March 1, this year, Bulgaria participated in the Pact and on June 15, Croatia followed suit. In such a manner the Pact has gained successively new participants and all the signatory Powers in the East and West have been exerting themselves to their utmost for the construction of the new world order. We, the people of Japan, must bear in mind that tomorrow's anniversary is the day to be heartily felicitated.

The real meaning of the spirit of the Three Power Pact is clear from the Imperial Rescript granted on the day of its conclusion and from the message of Prime Minister Konoye. In the Imperial Rescript is stated, "We fervently hope that the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible", and in the Prime Minister's message, also, the same sentiment is expressed. As stated in the Prime Minister's message, it goes without saying that the maintenance of world peace as well as the stabilization of East Asia are attributable to the spirit of the founding of our Empire and constitute our immutable policy. The Three Power Pact is nothing other than a concrete expression of this spirit which constitutes the basis of our foreign policy at present.

The situation prevailing at the time of its conclusion was such that more than a year had already passed since the outbreak of the European War with the hostilities steadily expanding in scope and warlike clouds appearing to spread over the whole world. Ever being solicitous of the maintenance of world peace, the Japanese Government, considering it to be of urgent necessity for the welfare of mankind to forestall the spread of the war, concluded the Pact. Expressed in other words, the Three Power Pact is not one like military alliances of the past which were made for the purpose of acquiring advantages for the prosecution of war.

The fundamental purpose of its conclusion lay in the prevention of world-wide conflagration and the establishment of world peace on a firm foundation. It was this spirit which largely motivated the conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

The second point is the fact that by this Pact the leading position of Japan in the establishment of the new order in Greater East Asia was definitely recognized. The very fact that Japan, with a view to bringing about the permanent stabilization of East Asia has already waged more than four years of hostilities for the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek regime which is the cat's paw for the defense of the countries clinging to the old order, can be considered as one of the great movements for the change in the world at present. It is indeed regrettable that the real intentions of our country have not yet been fully understood throughout the world. Some think mistakenly that to persist to maintain the old order means peace, and some, although they recognize the necessity of change, still cling to the status quo; and thus they are prone to oppose the construction of the new order in Greater East Asia by Japan. Under such circumstances, it is quite natural that Japan should co-operate with Germany and Italy, which share with us the same ideals and aspirations

In the region of Europe, Germany and Italy have, with irresistible power, made signal progress towards the establishment of the new order since the conclusion of the Pact. It needs not be elaborated here what a strong encouragement it has been to Germany and Italy that Japan, as one of the signatory Powers, has maintained in the mean time a firm attitude in East Asia. In East Asia the first forward step was made for the construction of the new order with the three countries---Japan, Manchoukuo and China--serving as its pivot following the recognition in November last by Japan of the National Government of China under Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Not only that, our country mediated the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China in the early part of this year and successfully settled it, and, in July, concluded the Agreement for the Joint Defense of French Indo-China under which our forces made a peaceful entry into that country. Thus, the construction of the new order is also making steady progress in Greater East Asia where our country is shouldering her responsibility in this part of the world.

As I have already said, a year has passed since the conclusion of the Three Power Pact with new participants increasing, and in East Asia as well as Europe each signatory Power has steadily marched forward for the construction of the new order. There are undeniably many difficulties lying in the path of our country as is mentioned in the Imperial Rescript in which His Imperial Majesty graciously stated. "The task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security is indeed one of the great magnitude, unparalleled in history. The goal lies still far distant." As for us, it is my belief that we must be strongly determined to exhaust all peaceful means possible in accordance with

the spirit of the Pact, and if there be any interference by a third Power, to dispel it resolutely, and to go forward with steady steps toward the ultimate realization of the new world order.

In welcoming the first anniversary of the Three Power Pact, I congratulate upon the various accomplishments of the past year. Whatever changes there may be hereafter in international situation and whatever difficulties we may encounter, there will not be any change whatever in the fact that the spirit of the Three Power Pact constitutes the key-note of our diplomacy and that it will not be affected in the least by the activities of third Powers to alienate the three countries from each other. This point I wish specially to emphasize in view of the present delicate international situation.

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