

1758A to 2038
[AFFIDAVIT] ne POW UC

Appeared before me Lt. Col. Dr. B. Damen in Changi Jail, Singapore this 29th day of May 1946, the person of

YAMAMOTO Moichiro

Who after having taken the oath to tell the entire truth and nothing but the truth, answered to the questions put to him as follows:

Q. State your name, birth, education and career.

A. I was born from an humble peasant family, living in the village of Ito near Osaka in Prefecture of Wakajama on the island of Honchu on the 8th of October 1898.

My religion is Buddhism and I am a Major General of the Imperial Japanese Army. When I was eight years old, I went to the elementary school in my village Ito and there I stayed till my 14th year. Then I went to the middle school in the Prefecture of Kara and after having completed my 18th year I became a Cadet of the Military Training School in Kyoto where I was attached as a Cadet to a Regiment being garrisoned there. I was in training here for a year in order to become an Officer and was enlisted in the Military Academy in December 1915. In December 1919 I had finished my Military Studies and got an appointment as a 2nd Lieutenant of the 38th Infantry Regiment, in garrison at Kyoto. I served in this Regiment till I was placed in 1923 in the Staff College at Tokyo. I left this school in November 1926 as a 1st Lieutenant. Then I was ordered to be an acting Commanding Officer of a Company. In this quality I served for 6 years. In 1928 I was transferred as a member of Staff in the Ministry of War. The Section Chief of the Department for Preparations was the then Colonel TOJO Hideki, and I was under his command for 1 year. He was a man who was not exactly harsh, but also not so mild, he was an ardent man who was very able and tactful to realise the plans he was bearing in mind in a proper way. I did not perceive any sign then of his political aspirations as he was always busy with his military professional work. In August 1928 I was promoted to be a Captain and remained in my new rank in the aforesaid Department of Preparations till October 1930. Then I was ordered to sail for Great-Britain in order to complete my military education there. I arrived in England in February 1931 and I was attached to several various Regiments. I was in England for 2 years. This is the reason I can understand the English language rather sufficiently. I do not speak it in a good way. Other languages beside my own Japanese language I do not understand. Now this is more than 10 years ago and I cannot say that I master the English language in a sufficient way now. In March 1933 I was ordered to be a Member of the Japanese Delegation for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. I was a Member of Staff under the command of Admiral HASEGAWA. I had several chiefs there, but Admiral HASEGAWA was always in command. The Leader of our Delegation was SATO, then Ambassador of Japan in Paris. I was standing under direct command of Col. SHIMOMURA who was a member of the Committee of Effectives. I did not take any part in the negotiations and the talks as such things were done by my Superiors.

Q. Do you know anything about the famous Crucifixion Speech delivered by MATSUOKA?

A. Yes, I know that he has made this speech before I had arrived in Geneva. I saw him several times in the League of Nations.

Q. You remember that in 1931 the Japanese Armies overran and seized Manchuria? What was the general feeling in your circles there about this matter?

A. We had the conviction that Japan had been compelled to do so in order to get some more living space, that this step had been taken, because it was necessary and we always hoped that a satisfactory settlement of this affair should be reached. We had many talks about it and we agreed all in this point that Japan must act in this way and that everything should be tried to get out of this impasse.

I stayed in Geneva till November 1933 and returned to Japan via America and I arrived in Japan in February 1934, when I was placed again in my former job in the Department of Preparations.

Q. What was the scope of this Department and what was its significance?

What did you do there exactly? Were you making there some campaign schemes or other war plans?

A. No, that we did not do. The real job we performed was the preparation of armament, fouraging of the Army and that always in connexion with a possible mobilisation.

Q. Was this a preparation for the forthcoming campaign in China?

A. I did not know that. The only thing I knew was that the Staff Officers formed the plans and we the younger ones had to obey their orders.

Q. Do you know the famous Captain DOIHARA who was working in China before the war started?

A. Yes, I knew him by face only. When I returned from England he was a Major General already. He was a grand man. I never had a talk with him.

Q. Do you know anything about the Doihara-incident in China?

A. I do not know.

Q. When did they make you a Major?

A. I became a Major in 1934 and remained in my old job at the Department of Preparations. In August 1935 I was transferred to the Secretariat of the Ministry of War. In December 1937 I got the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In August 1938 I was transferred to the Bureau for Military Affairs in Tokyo. In 1939 I became a Colonel and received the command of the 328th Infantry Regiment in Nagoya. I went then to China and acted there in Canton and Sam-Sui as commander of Occupation troops. I did not take any part in the real warfare. In October 1940 I was appointed to be a Staff Officer attached to the North-China Commander at Peiping. There I was partaking in the actual war operations.

Q. Had you to do also with the civilian population?

A. No, my work was merely of a military nature. In March 1942 I returned from China on my way to Tokyo where I was Section chief of the Military Bureau for Training and Education. In August 1945 I became a Major General. In this year, in the month of March, I was sent to Java as Leader of the Civil Affairs of the Military Administration at Batavia. (Oranjeboulevard in the house of a former Dutch Medical Officer). I was acting in this quality till November 1944 when I became Chief of Staff of the Army and as such I was the Gunseikan, the Governor-General of Java, residing in Batavia. The Army Commander was then Lt. Gen. HARADA. I do not know where he is at the present.

Q. Who was the man who appointed you to be the Governor-General?

A. I was appointed by an Imperial Decree and such was told me by the Minister of War TOJO as far as I can remember. I do not know it for certain. I resided in the house of ISHIZAWA at Batavia. General HARADA was residing in the palace of the Dutch Governor General, Koningsplein.

Q. How was the command instituted?

A. The Supreme Commander of the Southern Areas was count Field-marshal TERAUCHI, who was residing in Saigon. General ITAGAKI Commander in Chief of the 7th Area of Command was functioning in Singapore. Till June 1945 Java was divided in two parts: East and West Java. The Army Commander of East-Java was General IWABE.

The Commander of West-Java was General MOBUCHI who was under direct command of HARADA. Then in June 1945 Middle-Java was created and the Army Commander was General NAKAMURA, headquarters at Magelang. After the Japanese Surrender West-Java was divided in two parts: The Cheribon, Priangan areas with General MABOUCI as Commander and the Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bantam areas under General NISHIDA.

Q. When you were functioning as Governor-General, did you carry out the orders given to you by FARADA or did you have a free hand?

A. The general leading rules were laid down in regulations and so I had to obey. But in smaller matters I had a complete free hand and I could act on my own authority. On any important matters not specified in the rules and regulations I always obtained the Army Commander's sanction. The important political lines were totally prescribed by TERAUCHI. I was responsible to Gen. FARADA, who could make a proposal to Tokyo for my dismissal. He also was able to suspend me temporarily. I could only be dismissed by the Tenno Heika, who had appointed me. When in March 1945 the Lines of communication with Tokyo were cut off and it was very difficult to get into touch with Tokyo, it was agreed that Gen. FARADA should be empowered to dismiss on his own authority practically all officials serving under him. I do not know if this measure was issued by the Emperor. I believe that this had been ordered by Gen. ITAGAKI who issued always all important decisions. Exceptions were to be referred to TERAUCHI and/or ITAGAKI.

Q. Had you any responsibility in matter of death sentences or did you act with absolute freedom?

A. I had nothing to do with death sentences given by Courts Martial. The death sentences given by a Civil Court were to be carried out according to the rules laid down by the Army Commander. These sentences had to be examined by the Chief of Preservation of Peace and Order, who was working under me and so normally I did not receive these sentences for examination.

Q. Were you empowered to stop an execution?

A. I think I was, but I never received a petition for mercy from Europeans, and this is the reason I do not know it for certain.

Q. After the Japanese surrender you sent a letter to Rear-Admiral Patterson aboard of the Cruiser Cumberland, admitting that you had given your "fiat execution" for the killing of a number of Dutch subjects /and such after the surrender. /at Soerabaya.

A. Yes, but I did not write that letter myself, it was written by one of my subordinate officers. I have signed it. In fact the Chief of the Preservation of Peace and Order gave this "fiat" for the execution concerning a number of people in East Java, whose execution, when I remember exactly, had been delayed. They had been sentenced by a Civil Court in January 1945.

Q. So you were Lord of life and death in Java?

A. I cannot say that.

Q. Do you admit that you are responsible for all executions carried out during your Governor-Generalship?

A. Yes, I do. As Gunseikan I was responsible for all these executions not only for my own doings, but also for the activities of the Chief of the Preservation of Peace and Order, when I was aware of that. In so far I was responsible. If executions of death sentences were carried out without my knowledge then I do not hold myself responsible.

Q. Do you admit now your responsibility for your subordinates because you were their controlling chief?

A. Yes, I do now. I could stop an execution and I was empowered also to commute a sentence. All was done under the Army Commander's sanction and in his name I think. The legal rule was this that every death sentence when a petition for mercy had been sent in must be examined by the Chief of Preservation of Peace and order. That was a civilian MIYANO Shozo, now in Galang.

Q. Can you remember what these people were charged with?

A. I do not remember exactly and the only thing I can mention in connection with this case is that I think that the proposed execution has not been carried out.

Q. When you came to Java you were provided with special instructions concerning the government?

A. I had not received special instructions from Minister TOJO Fideki. I had no personal interview with him before I left for Java. I was instructed to obey and to carry out the orders of General HARADA who had outlined the principal rules of Government. I was responsible to him for the carrying out and realization of these rules. The practical application was for me and for that I had a free hand.

Q. Were you especially instructed to promote the Indonesian Independence Movement?

A. As far as I know, HARADA did not stimulate the Indonesian Independence Movement, leaded by SOEKARNO. I do not know of any especial anti-Dutch measure taken by him or me. We had in mind to treat the population of Java as one body, although it consisted of various elements like Arabs, Javanese, Chinese and Dutch indo and totok. It was a very complicated problem.

Q. Was it your purpose to make Java a free selfsupporting country or a slave colony for Japan with no hope of freedom?

A. We had the outlined plan to liberate the Asiatic peoples from Western oppression and to bring them to freedom under the Japanese leadership. Japan was destined to play the leading role. In 1944 Sept. 19 Minister General KOISFA made a statement in Tokyo saying that no sharp measures were to be taken against the populations of the occupied areas. Nippon intended to give independence to Indonesia in future.

Q. And how did you do in Java, especially against the Dutch? Do you remember the internee camps, the POW camps, the expropriations of Dutch property, the confiscations and so on. Can you fit this in with a policy of appeasement?

A. Any confiscation of Dutch property that might have happened, was done prior to this declaration of KOISFA.

Q. Who was responsible for the looting of Java, for the shipping to Japan of products, industrial outillage and all things that could be of any use to Japan?

A. I do not know that such things have happened and I do not know who should be responsible for that. It happened perhaps especially in the former days of the occupation of Java. I know also the slogan: Asia for the Asiatics. I am fully aware of the Nanyo idea and I know that the principal plan was that Japan should lead Asia giving freedom to all populations.

Q. What was the role played by SOEKARNO?

A. SOEKARNO was used by us and paid by us f. 750 (seven hundred fifty guilders) per month for his activities as an adviser to the General Advice Department in Batavia.

Q. Was he a puppet or a real freespoken Javanese leader?

A. SOEKARNO had little influence, because he was under a strict censorship of which he had complained several times in a bitter way. All his speeches were examined before and he did not like this. We kept him under control but as time went on, the censorship slackened and about the Japanese surrender there was no more censorship at all. SOEKARNO had no political power at all. He was allowed to deliver speeches and to hold meetings with his fellow-countrymen, but he had no power to issue rules and to take measures. He felt his uneasy position very clearly and complained about that. But we did not give in, although censorship was softened.

Q. Did you know, as we know all that SOEKARNO abused and assaulted the Dutch and uttered threats against us by radio and press?

A. That must have happened in the last days of the censorship when we did not keep an eye on all these things in a sharp way.

Q. Do you know that SOEKARNO paid a visit to General ITAGAKI at Singapore accompanied by FATTA and RADJIMAN?

A. Yes, I know that these three men were ordered by Count TERAUCHI to be transferred to his HQ at Saigon for a conference. They left for Saigon by plane on 9 August 1945. They returned to Java on August 14. I presume that they paid this visit to General ITAGAKI returning from Saigon.

Q. Do you know the proceedings during the conference with TERAUCHI?

A. Yes, I know.

On the 15th of August I heard by radio that Japan had surrendered to the conditions of Potsdam. We kept it secret in behalf of law and order.

In the night between 16 and 17 August SOEKARNO and FATTA had a conference with Admiral MAEDA as I heard afterwards.

In the morning of 17 August they set up and proclaimed their Republic. The proclamation was done by pamphlets distributed to the people from lorries. This proceeded in such a quick way that we were unable to prevent it. I heard that TERAUCHI granted them the following things:

1. They were permitted to form an Independent State and to set up the Government of it as soon as preparations should have been accomplished.
2. The territory of this State should include the former Dutch East Indies.

We kept the surrender secret till the morning of August 19th. Then I, not ordered by any Superior, ordered SOEKARNO and FATTA, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Indonesian Preparation Committee, to see me and between 9 and 10 o'clock I told them the following points:

1. Japan has surrendered to the Potsdam conditions.
2. The Japanese authorities remain in command in Indonesia till they can hand over the powers and all weapons to the Allies.
3. Severe punishment for all persons who should attempt to disturb law and order.
4. From now the Japanese do not back any longer the Indonesian Independence Movement.
5. The Indonesian Leaders are requested to help in keeping quiet the population because we were afraid of losses of innocent lives.

One of the reasons of the Emperor's surrender was to save mankind from the havoc of atomic bombing.

Q. Who was responsible for the extradition of Japanese armament?

A. I think the Indonesians themselves, because they took them by force. The Japanese had stored away all heavy armament in order to hand it over to the Allies and their troops were armed with rifles only. So they could not prevent the Indonesians from capturing the arms.

Q. Was the capturing of the arms ordered or permitted by TERAUCHI on that conference?

A. I do not know that.

The interrogation was resumed on this 30th day of March 1946 by the same Interrogator Lt. Col. Dr. B. Damen.

Q. How was the Romusha organization working?

A. The deportation of labourers outside of Java was always ordered by the Commander in Chief of the 7th Area of Command General ITAGAKI, residing in Singapore. I had nothing to do with that. But inside of Java the situation was another one. According to the needs of industry, irrigation, etc., the Japanese Government had started before my arrival a service known as the Romushas (romu-labour and sha-man). This organization was working already when I entered Java, although on a smaller scale. I was the Chief of it and under me was working the Romu Kyoku in Home Affairs at Batavia with TAKAHASHI, a civilian official, as leader. He is in Galang now. In my name he issued orders to obtain a sufficient number of labourers for the purposes mentioned. This labour was voluntary and was paid. TAKAHASHI gave his orders to the civilian authorities who gave them through to the Wedanas and loeraks and they were obliged to collect as much manpower as was requested for certain industries. Work was done in factories, on railways, textiles, etc.

Q. Was this a labour to be performed by all classes and races of the population?

A. Everybody could get work, it was no forced labour. They were also working on defence works for the Japanese army. But the system did not operate in a satisfactory way because the number of labourers was not sufficient and especially during the last months before our surrender things became rather confused and labourers were no longer engaged. I persist in asserting, that this labour was voluntary. The population was kindly asked to plant djarak keliki everywhere along the roads in order to get greasing oil for our planes. This planting was paid also. All orders issued by me were pointing out that this labour was a free one. There existed also a Labour Association which paid fees for excellent work.

Q. But we know that the population was forced to work and so I doubt if this labour was free indeed.

A. My orders were regarding a free labour, but I do not know if and it can have happened that my subordinates exceeded their faculties, but I do not know that.

Q. Were you content of that Romushas organization?

A. No. I think that better work should have been done. There were two things annoying me:

1. The labourers were short of food, clothing and housing was insufficient.
2. The special abilities of the labourers for certain jobs were not enough scrutinized.

So I ordered improvements of food, clothing and housing. After all I cannot say that the Romushas affair was satisfactory. I repeat that I had issued orders for good treatment and therefore I inspected several times factories and shipyards in order to see the situation with my own eyes.]

Q. Did the Kempeitai interfere with the Romushas?

A. Not that I know.

Q. Had you any connection with the Kempeitai?

A. No I did not. The Kempeitai was a Unit, standing apart from the Army and the Civilian Government. The Army commander General FARADA was the Commander of the Kempeitai, like he was the Commander of the Civilian Government. My Bureau was not working with the Kempeitai and we could not issue orders to each other. The Commander General FARADA left all the managing of the Kempeitai to the leader General NISFIDA who was responsible to him. General FARADA could correct the Kempeitai and he could intervene when he wished to do so. This General NISFIDA is the same man I mentioned as Commander of the Batavia, Buitenzorg and Bantam Areas. He was a fine soldier and he is no harsh or cruel man.

Q. Did you ever hear of any atrocities, committed by the Kempeitai?

A. No, Sir never.

Q. The whole world knows that the Kempeitai has committed a mass of tortures, ill treatments etc. Did they keep this secret from you then?

A. I did not hear of any atrocities committed by the Kempeitai in Java. I do not think that they kept this secret from me.

Q. Be reasonable and you will admit that the population of Java has suffered incredibly from the hands of the Kempeitai. Of course you know that.

A. Yes, Sir, I understand it now. I heard of it afterwards.

Q. When Japan had surrendered, were the armament stores well guarded?

A. They were guarded, but the Indonesians stole the weapons in East and Middle Java. In West Java I did not hear of such a thing.

Q. Do you know about the sabotage by Japanese personnel near Lenbang, where a store was blown up and a kampong was destroyed?

A. I heard of that, but then I was in Batavia and this store was a Navy store, so I had nothing to do with it. I think that the Navy personnel were guarding the store.

The above statement has been read over to me by an interpreter and is a true and correct transcript of what I have said, to the whole of which statement I now append my signature.

Signed at Changi Jail this first day of June 1946.

Signature /s/

(Name in Block Capitals) Yamamoto Hoichiro

Sworn before me Lt. Col. Dr. B. Daman

Signature /s/ B. Daman

Rank Lt. Col.

description R.N.I.A. this first day of June 1946

An officer detailed to examine the above by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces, South East Asia (Authy ALFSEA War Crimes Instruction No. 1 2nd Edition, para 19 (a))

Certificate of Interpreter

I Kim Ilsun make oath and say that I truly and correctly translated to the witness Yamamoto Moichiro the words of the above caution and that he thereupon elected to make a sworn statement, that he was duly sworn, and that he then made a statement which I truly and correctly translated in English and saw taken down by Miss E. M. Schwab I read over the whole of the above statement to the witness in the Japanese language and he acknowledged it as correct and has now duly signed it in my presence and in the presence of Lt. Col. Dr. B. Daman.

/s/ Kim Ilsun 1

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed document, entitled:

"Statement of Dr. Ch.O. van der Plas, Batavia, Political Adviser to the Netherlands Indies Government, dated 22 June 1946",

has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

/s/ Charles Jongeneel

SEAL

June 25th. 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. deWEERD, LL.D. First Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.I.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

Statement

of Dr. Ch. O. van der PLAS, Batavia, political adviser to the Netherlands Indies Government.

Duly sworn, Dr. Ch.O. van der PLAS states:

I am 55 years of age, of Netherlands nationality.

My permanent home is Batavia, where I am living at present.

On September 15, 1945, I arrived on the British cruiser "Cumberland" at Batavia, in my function of representative of the Netherlands Indies Government with C.S.5 Rear Admiral Patterson, on which day Major General YAMAMOTO came on board as Chief of General Staff, in order to receive instructions concerning the Japanese preparations for internment as prisoners of war;

A few days later, the Red Cross, I think it was the British Red Cross at KANDY, requested British Rear Admiral PATTERSON, Chief Allied Officer in Command, to inquire into the execution at SOERABAYA, after Japan's capitulation on August 15th, of a number of Dutch and Chinese for political activities against the Japanese.

On a date between September 23 and 26 a letter was received from General YAMAMOTO in reply to the British request for information, in which, while enclosing a list of names, he admitted the fact of the execution, and stated to have granted fiat (order) for the execution on a date between August 22 and 25, which letter and list were shown to me and were read by me.

I have been informed, before September 27th, that General YAMAMOTO had claimed back his letter in order to make a few changes in same;

I have not seen the new letter from General YAMAMOTO, but heard from Admiral PATTERSON's secretary that only slight alterations were made in the list of names;

This communication was made to me on one of the last days of September, in any case before October 4th;

I remember that the list of names contained for the major part Dutch names and a minority of Chinese names and that on the first list one person appeared whose offence, had not been political action, but an ordinary offence, namely rape and manslaughter. This was a Chinese. The number of people executed I do not remember with positiveness, but I seem to remember there were 19.]

I presume that the Red Cross will have more details and that British Head Quarters positively must have them, as the relative documents went over to AFNEI.

[Made out according to the full and complete truth, at Batavia, June 22nd. 1946.

/s/ van der Plas

✓ Sworn and subscribed before me, K. A. de Weerd, 1st Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior official attached to the Office of the Attorney General, N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd]

1760A

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed reports are full, true, complete and accurate copies of the original documents entitled:

- 1 Javint report 3106/3, 20 Oct 1945 (OM/232/E), containing statement of Kempei Major KATSUMURA,
- 2 Javint report 3106/1, 18 Oct. 1945 (OM/231/E), concerning case "Koo" officers concerned.
- 3 Javint report 3003/2, (OM/237/E), further interrogation of Kempei Major KATSUMURA and Sgt. Major HAMADA of Buitenzorg Kempei-tai,

copies of which documents are part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE: *CH. Jongeneel*

SEAL

BATAVIA, June 7th 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher official attached to the office of the Attorney - General N.E.I.

/s/ K.A. de WEERD.

OC
4 Int Unit,
23 Ind Div.

CONFIDENTIAL

1401
OM 232/E
Javint 3106/3, 20 Oct 45

[Herewith translation of 15 page statement handed over by Kempei
Major KATSUMURA on 20 Oct 45.]

1. Origin of the report from Sgt-Maj YABANA ()

Sgt-Maj YABANA is not here, and so it is not clear; but, at that time, in Hq, he was working with a number of other people and, if they could be collected, it would certainly be possible to discover the names of the spies.

The following were working with Sgt-Maj YABANA at the time:

Lt. ONISHI	()
Lt. OKUBO	()
Sgt. Maj ICHIKAWA	()
Sgt. Maj KAGIYA	()
Sgt. Maj MORIWAKI	()
Sgt. Maj YAZAKI	()
Sgt. Maj KAWANISHI	()
Sgt. Maj TAKAHASHI	()

Plus 5/6 others.

All are at present concentrated in BOGOR and neighbourhood. For Maj KATSUMURA to demand a direct explanation in reply would be quickest and simplest.

[II The reason for putting into effect KO KASAKU (TN Yellow operation -?)

At the beginning of 1943, in SUMATRA, every kind of anti-Japanese espionage organisation was discovered, and this order came out from the GOC SUMATRA Army. Investigators came from JAVA also to cover the case, and the Army, in order to clear everything up before the Allies counter-attack, and prevent any damage being done, set up the necessary internal defence.

With the Army in central control, the following investigation system was enforced:

Army

Mil Adm Dept of Army KEMPEI various def BEPPAN
Civil Peace Tai units

This operation was known as Operation 'JI', and took place between Aug 43 and Mar 44. At this time there were many suspects picked up and

held by each unit of the Kempei tai; in view of the number of suspects and the place, they weren't sent up to Court-Martial because otherwise the latter would not have been able to cope with the work; thus a speedy settlement was difficult. On the other hand the war situation was daily growing more unfavourable to us, and in view of the possibility of an Allied landing it was decided to deal with the criminals as quickly as possible. Consequently, where the crime was clearly proved, and the death sentence considered suitable, on the decision of Army the criminals were punished wherever they were.

This was carried out fortnightly by every detachment of every section, on the orders of Army / and in accordance with the regulations for Courts of Military Law and similar ceremonies.

On these occasions, we were ordered to preserve secrecy, and to this end chose a place remote from sight, and a time early in the morning, or in the evening.

III. Procedure after execution.

After execution, of the punishment, time and place were at once reported to HQ, who at once reported to Army.

IV. People actually employed on this KO (yellow) operation.

The people actually employed were Staff Officer MASUGI (), of Army, and Maj. MURASE (), Chief of Dept at Hq, Kempei Tai.

V. Assistants of the above.

Capt NOMURA (), attd Staff Officer MASUGI
Lt. ONISHI (), attd Maj MURASE

VI. Present whereabouts of above 4.

Staff officer MASUGI - Staff officer of a div in Malaya

Maj MURASE - Staff GHQ of KEMPEI TAI, TOKYO

Capt. NOMURA - JAPANESE troop concentration near BOGOR

Lt. ONISHI - BOGOR KEMPEI TAI

VII. Men responsible for 'KO' Operation.

The operation was begun and carried through by MASUGI and MURASE, so naturally the burden of responsibility rests with them. Except that, if any of the reports which they received in the course of their activities

were false, they are no longer responsible for them. All other persons acted on orders and are not responsible. For this reason it is essential for the clarification of the case to recall MASUGI and URASE to JAVA with the utmost despatch.

VIII. How to treat this case.

It is first of all desirable to call a committee for the investigation of Operation 'KO', consisting of Staff Officer OBANA (), who succeeded MASUGI, and Maj KATSUMURA, who succeeded Maj MURASE. This committee would investigate the items listed below, and then, together with a committee of Allied authorities, make necessary additions in order to establish the truth, after which action can be taken.

Following particulars about the accused:

Name, age, sex, nationality, date of execution, place of execution. (These particulars are already being prepared at the request of the Allied authorities, but they still have to be revised). Reason for execution in each case, proof used to convict, investigator, executioner, OC Section and Detachment (also present address of KEMPEI concerned).

IX. Items to be investigated regarding the KEMPEI.

If there are any items to be investigated regarding the KEMPEI TAI, Maj KATSUMURA, is responsible for them (as announced by Comd 'DEWER' of the British Navy about the middle of September, so please ask him about them, if Maj KATSUMURA postpones the investigation, or makes false reports, he should be punished by the Allies.

X. Career of Maj KATSUMURA in JAVA.

- 3 Jan 43. Arrived BATAVIA by plane (Lt)
- 19 Jan 43. Studying JAVA in BATAVIA Hq
- 20 Jan 43. Transferred to SOERABAYA KEMPEI Buntai (SEC) As Senior General Affairs Officer, studied actual operation of Kempei Tai.
- 1 Mar 43. Promoted KEMPEI Capt.
- 5 Mar 43. Transferred to BOGOR as OC KEMPEI Buntai there.
- 10 Mar 43. Reached BOGOR Buntai. In Apr, sent in reports of several cases already decided by my predecessor. When Army started Operation 'JI', began the following investigations:

KYUSAIDAN (Rescue Gp) - treated by civil adm as a minor case and not sent to court-martial. Investigated by Sgt. Maj KIBA. ()

WERNINK Secret Organisation (this case NOT yet finished).

Activity in planning recapture of NEI (investigation nearly finished, but case NOT yet settled). Investigated by Sgt. Maj HAMADA.

'DEPOK' Secret organisation (anti-Japanese secret organisation by half-castles and AMBONESE). Investigated by Sgt. maj OGAMI ().

Reconstructed 'WETTER' secret organisation. Investigated by Sgt. Maj HAMADA

20 Dec 43. Transferred to SEMARANG KEMPEI TAI as OC succeeded by Lt. TANIGUCHI ()

23 Dec 43. Arrived SEMARANG. Took over 'Mayor of Semarang spying case' (Investigated by Sgt-Maj KANEKO () and finished about Dec 44, but the investigator was changed towards the end).

Railway sabotage case (Feb-Jul 44. But Capt KATEUMURA was studying for an exam in the Army University, so not so much concerned in the case. Investigated by Sgt. Maj NEDACHI ().

'SUDERO' Communist Party case INDONESIAN Communists. Case closed by instructions, from HQ. Investigated by Sgt. TANAKA ().

During the time in BOGOR and SEMARANG, there were also a few minor cases of rumour-mongering and violating the laws on radios.

1 Dec 44. Promoted KEMPEI Maj

15 Jan 45. Transferred to KEMPEI HQ

20 Jan 45. Arrived Hq. BATAVIA. Took over Chief of Trg. Dept.

20 Feb 45. present time. As Chief of Mil Affairs and Trg Depts, assisted Head of the Kempai Tai.

XI. OCs of BOGOR KEMPEI Buntai

Mar 42 - May 42 Lt TANIGUCHI

May 42 - Mar 43 Capt CHO ()

Spec Secret Service Han	Police Affairs Han OCs	Adm Han OCs
1. WO KANDO ()	1. WO TAKAMIYA ()	1. WO KANDO ()
11. Sgt. Maj WAKIYAMA ()	11. WO AIZAWA ()	11. Sgt-Maj HASHIMOTO ()
111. WO HIBINO ()		

XV. General situation of civil peace in JAVA and operation 'KO'

At the time of the Japanese attack in Mar 42, all the people, especially DUTCH, half-castes, AMBONESE and MENADONESE, being strongly influenced by DUTCH propaganda, believed that the DUTCH would reconquer the island within 3 months. Accordingly, soldiers, government officials and civilians made preparations for the counter-attack, believing that without their help the DUTCH would not be strong enough to retain the initiative in a counterattack, and imbued with a strong feeling of patriotism. For this purpose, there were many schemes, utilising the former (TN - DUTCH - established) installation destruction groups, the administrative machinery, troops still at large, and native youths. In fact the organisations were legion. On the other hand, the Japanese army filled with the spirit of victory even the air-raid shelters were filled in, and nothing was done to conflict with the spirit of peace.

After Jun or Jul one or two espionage organisations were discovered and picked up one by one. There however were very local, in BANDOENG, BATAVIA, BOGOR and SOERABAYA, and were thought to be only isolated minor cases. With the discovery of these cases, and the realisation that the Allied counter-attack was to be delayed, the formation of espionage organisations ceased, and from Dec 42 to Apr 43 a period of real peace and quiet ensued. From about Apr 43, however, as the war situation in SWP grew more and more unfavourable to the Japanese, the people, especially DUTCH, half-castes, AMBONESE and MENADONESE, began to believe in the imminence of the Allied attack, and underground activity once again increased. At the same time the JAPANESE army awoke from their easy confidence, and began to prepare against a possible Allied landing. In other words, it was a time of crisis, in view of the dangers of trouble from within and of Allied action from without.

At this juncture a big espionage case was discovered in SUMATRA, and a wide organisation unearthed there. It was also considered that a very similar organisation probably existed in JAVA, and in order to investigate this, operation 'JI' was begun, and, to bring it to a speedy conclusion, operation 'KO'.

TN - the word operation has been used to translate 'KOSAKU' throughout, though it is not clear if KATSUMURA is referring to the operation itself or to the operatives concerned in it).

CONFIDENTIAL.

JAVINT/3106/1

18th October 1945.

Concerning Case "Koo"Officers concerned.

Army HQ.

Staff Officer MASUGI (Chief of Judicial Affairs
Department)

MASUGI

Attache Capt. NOMURA

NOMURA

Kempeitai.

Major MURASE

MURASE

Attache Lt. ONISHI

ONISHI

Officers commanding all units and sub-units concerned.

Officers commanding all TOKKOOHAN (Special Secret Sections)

All investigating Kempei.

All Executioners.

SUMMARY.

1. In accordance with "OSAMU" plans, this case was dealt with on the spot at the decision of the military, so as to settle it as soon as possible. OSAMU
2. The investigating Officer decided whether to inflict death sentence. The Hanchoo then approved it and after the Buntaichoo had approved it the documents were presented to HQ.
3. Firstly it was presented to several high officers at HQ, then to the Chief of the Department, then to the Chief of the Kempeitai, and finally to Army HQ, where it passed from Lt. NOMURA to the Staff Officer (MASUGI). After this, it is not clear how it was decided (But Capt. NOMURA may know something about this). Anyway, the order agreeing with the sentence was passed down.
4. This execution took place in strict secrecy, in the same way as after a Court Martial.

Reasons.

Owing to the civil and military situation, it was essential to deal with this case as quickly as possible and to prepare to repulse the Allied onslaught.

Officer who ordered the execution.

Name of C-in-C: Lt. General HARADA

HARADA

But the case was examined by Staff Officer MASUGI.

Method of dealing with case.

We first, within one week, investigated the following facts.

1. Name, age, and race of victim.
2. Investigating Officer. Hanchoo: Buntaichoo (Bunkentaichoo)
3. Name of executioner, place and method of execution.
4. Liaison carried on inside Army circles.

Sheet 2./

Period covering executions, July 1943 - March 1944.

Number of persons executed, (approx.).

Banjoewangi	150
Soerabaya	50
Madoera	20
Semarang	1
Djoekd jakarta	20
Soerakarta	10
Banjoemas (Proekoerta)	5
Chirebon	0
Bandoeng	10
Bogor	7
Serang	0
Djakarta	20
TOTAL	293

STATEMENT

The undersigned, Charles JONGENIEL, Captain R.N.I.A., Head of War Crimes Section of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, Batavia, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states:

That the above mentioned War Crimes Section is in possession of lists made out by Japanese Administration authorities, covering 38 of the 104 prisons in Java and Madura, of deaths occurred during the Japanese occupation period among the persons incarcerated in those prisons.

That it has appeared from several random tests that these lists are not complete and that therefore in reality the figures were more unfavourable than those given in these lists.

That these incomplete lists state the names of 1717 prisoners who died in the said prisons during the years 1942 to 1945, of whom three in 1942, 21 in 1943, 452 in 1944 and 1241 in 1945, namely 35 people under 18 years of age; 1085 from 18 to 45, and 597 persons older than 45 years of age; being respectively 511 Europeans (23 - 197 - 291 of the three age groups), 1112 Indonesians (12 - 821 - 279), and 94 Chinese and Arabs (---67-27).

That in so far as the time has been mentioned between sentence and death (i.e. of 477 cases), it appears that 17 prisoners died within one week, 68 within one month, 75 after two months, 52 after three months, 34 after 4 months, 32 after 5 months, 48 after 6 months, 31 after 8 months, 10 after 9 months, 50 after one year, 17 after one year and three months, 18 after 1½ years, ten after two years, 18 after 2½ years, and 5 after three years - after being sentenced,

That therefore six months after the 477 cases mentioned already 326 or more than 68% had died.

That only of 154 cases the cause of death has been mentioned, i.e. dysentery 49, scurvy one, tuberculosis 7, starvation oedema 5, marasmus 13, beri-beri five, enteritis 9, malaria 22, asthma and pneumonia 12, anaemia 2, chacoxia and cachexia 28, leprosy one;

That it is apparent from 1940 statistics published by the Head office of Penology (department of the Department of Justice of the N.E.I.), that in the 104 prisons of Java and Madura, on an average population per day of 46,348 only 843 deaths appear in 1940, being 18% of the prison population during the statistical year 1940 (present on January 1, 1940; 39,293, taken in during 1940 401,011 and liberated 398,594; present on Jan. 1, 1941: 41,710).

That among these 843 deaths, cause of death was e.g.: malaria 81 (9.6%), dysentery 28 (3.33%), beri-beri 7 (0.83%), while starvation, oedema, marasmus, chacoxia, and cachexia did not occur;

that it is clear, therefore, that under the Japanese domination the number of death cases as a result of insufficient food (scurvy, starvation oedema, marasmus, beri-beri, anaemia, chachoxia and cachexia) increased from 0,83% in 1941 to 35,06% of the total number of deaths, while the number of death cases as a result of insufficient hygienic care (dysentery, enteritis) increased from 3,33% to 37,66% of the total number of deaths,

that even if these figures are incomplete and although it is not known how many prisoners altogether died during the Japanese occupation period, and what was the total number of prisoners, still it is clear already from these meagre figures what mismanagement there was during that time and that we can speak of systematical starvation and neglect of hygienic requirements, as had already appeared from the many statements concerning the treatment of prisoners by the Japanese authorities,

that this is also evident from the annexed List of the convict goal Tjipinang (near Batavia), state of health and deceases, made up by Dr. Wijting, who, as a political prisoner, was interned in this prison and in charge also of keeping the administration up to date, which list covers the period from May 1, 1943 to May 1, 1945, and which especially as from April 1, 1944, indicate a terrible increase of the number of deaths (from May 1, 1943 - May 1, 1944: 167 deaths on an average of 4250 prisoners, i.e. approx. 4%; from May 1, 1944 - May 1, 1945: 2257 deaths on an average of 4400 prisoners, i.e. more than 51%),

Signature:

/s/ Ch. Jongeneel

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A.deWeerd, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., senior official attached to the Attorney-General N.E.I., on this nineteenth day of August, 1946.

Signature: /s/ K. A. deWeerd (SEAL)

Strength of the population of the Convict Goal Tjipinang, state
of health and mortality.

Year	Date	Total	Admitted into the hospital	Deceased
1943	May 1	4564	158	8
	June 1	4524	178	15
	July 1	4189	167	19
	August 1	4197	187	11
	September 1	4194	171	19
	October 1	4020	169	7
	November 1	4038	161	17
	December 1	4182	202	8
1944	January 1	4268	184	12
	February 1	4312	202	10
	March 1	4481	243	10
	April 1	4410	191	31
	May 1	4560	297	43
	June 1	4562	326	58
	July 1	4474	670	151
	August 1	4487	771	167
	September 1	4342	701	107
	October 1	4233	632	107
	November 1	4226	649	83
	December 1	4317	600	125
1945	January 1	4177	587	167
	February 1	4220	527	222
	March 1	4571	498	296
	April 1	4721	448	315
	May 1	4599	524	416

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER ARTHUR SEAFORTH BLACKBURN

The witness duly sworn states

My name is Arthur Seaforth Blackburn; I was born at Woodville in the State of South Australia on 25th day of November, 1892.

I am of Australian nationality; my permanent home is Crafers in the State of South Australia.

The film "Nippon Presents" has been made from an original in Java during the Japanese occupation by Japanese cameramen under Japanese direction made film, which original film I believe was intended to give a faked impression of the treatment by the Japanese of their prisoners of war and of women-internees. English, Australian and Dutch prisoners of war and British and Dutch women and children were forced to play an act in this film in the way as is described by me in the introduction of the film "Nippon Presents".

The original film was captured after the liberation of Batavia, as I am informed and verily believe, and brought to Australia, where some of the players, who survived the ordeal of the Japanese camps, gathered at the instigation of the Netherlands Indies Film Unit to give an idea of the real occurrences and conditions in prisoner of war and women's camps in Java. This is to certify that the statements made by me and the other actors in the Australian part of the film "Nippon Presents", i.e. the parts made in Australia after the liberation, are given according to the truth as I and my co-actors experienced such truth ourselves.

I am informed and verily believe that the shots which were interpolated in Australia have partly been taken from other Japanese films (not intended to fake the real condition, but meant to show the Japanese public the might of the Japanese forces) and for the other part from films, which were made by Allied cameramen of the camps at Batavia after the liberation, when conditions in these camps had already been slightly bettered. These last shots are not faked but given according to the truth as conditions were in the end of September, 1945.

/s/ Arthur S. Blackburn
Brig.

Subscribed and sworn to before me
on board
on this 21st day of October 1946.

/s/ S. H. Crawford
Commander R.A.N.R.
Commanding Officer

1763

Statement of J. SCHIM VAN DER LOEFF, Batavia.

The witness duly sworn states:

My name is J. SCHIM VAN DER LOEFF: I am of Netherlands nationality, my permanent home is Batavia, where I am living at present. I was born in Doesburg (Netherlands) on 25th September 1907.

In mid September 1945 I arrived in Batavia in the suite of Admiral PATTERSON as Captain R NIA (reserve), in charge of a detachment of Netherlands Indies Government Information Service (NIGIS), including several filmoperators.

Shortly after our arrival we captured several Japanese propaganda-films, made by the Japanese in Java during the Japanese occupation. Amongst these films was a film, named "Australia calling".

Afterwards I have read SEATIC translation reports JAVINT No. 3132/2 (translation of statement by Capt. YANAGAWA, dated 14 DEC 1945), from which I learned that said film was made from June to mid September 1943 under the direction of Capt. YANAGAWA of the "BEPPAN" (Special Intelligence Section of HQ 16th Army) as Chief Producer and that the film was meant to deal with the daily life of PWs with the purpose of creating anti-war spirit in Australia.

After many discussions it was decided by the NIGIS to send this film to Australia, to try and collect there the same (ex POW-) players whom the Japanese had forced to play in the film and to insert in the Japanese film cuts from films which showed the real conditions under which the POWs and internees had been living under the Japanese occupation. For these cuts were used the filmreels which the filmoperators from NIGIS and from other filmdetachments had taken on their arrival in the middle of September, 1945, in Java, especially in the POW-camps in the Xth Battalion barracks in Batavia, in the POW-hospitals "Mater Dolorosa" and "St. Vincentius" in Batavia, and in the women internmentcamps "Tjideng" and "kampong Makassar" in Batavia.

Also were used some cuts from captured Japanese newsreels, giving the "glorious victory" of the Japanese and to show off their POWs at the beginning of the war.

In this way the new film "Nippon presents" was made. I can state definitely that the cuts which have been inserted into the original Japanese film have not been faked like the Japanese film was, but show the real conditions in the POW and womencamps in Batavia as I have seen them myself in the middle of September 1945.--

This statement contains the truth and nothing but the truth.

signature:

/s/ J. SCHIM VAN DER LOEFF

Batavia, September 3rd, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, K.A. de WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA, Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

signature: /s/ K.A. de WEERD.
(SEAL)

1764

DESCRIPTION AND TEXT OF THE FILM "NIPPON PRESENTS".

Explanation: Each scene is marked with: "(Japanese)", "(Japanese outside Java)", "(Australia Studio)" or "(Allied Batavia)".

"(Japanese)" means: Scene of the Japanese film "Australia Calling", made in 1943 in Java.

"(Japanese outside Java)" means: Scene taken by Japanese cameramen during the war outside Java.

"(Australia Studio)" means: Scene taken in Australia Studio by Allied cameramen after the Japanese surrender.

"(Allied Batavia)" means: Scene taken by Allied cameramen in and near Batavia in September 1945, showing conditions as they were a month after the Japanese surrender.

QNT

" NIPPON PRESENTS"

On Screen: "Early in the Pacific War the Japanese who had over-run Java made a film for screening in a conquered Australia to show how well they treated their prisoners. This Japanese film fell into Allied hands. English, Australian and Dutch prisoners of war and internees were forced to play parts in it. Many of these prisoners are now dead, victims of starvation, ill treatment and disease. Some survived and a few of them have been brought together here to tell voluntarily and under a compelling sense of duty the true story of how the Japs made this film. To expose this pictorial evidence provided by the Japanese themselves of the inhuman duplicity of their gaolers, you are now to see this Japanese film and on the screen and in the audience will be some of the survivors. They are:"

1 AUSTRALIA STUDIO: INTRODUCING OF THE ACTORS:

Unseen speaker:

Introducing:

Brigadier Blackburn, Victoria Cross, AIF
Wing Cmdr. Davis, RAF
Squadron Ldr. Shepard, RAF DSC
Group Capt. Noble, RAF
Capt. Dr. Kingma, RMA
Mrs. E. J. Johnson, Dutch born English woman
F. O. Thomas, RAAF
Pvt. McNab, RAN
Pvt. Midfield, AIF
Pvt. Read, AIF
Pvt. Willard, AIF
Capt. Ellison, AIF
Sgt. Harrison, AIF and
Annenicke

2 AUSTRALIA STUDIO: The Scene shows a Film Auditorium of Allied Actors; on the 2nd screen is to be seen the end of the Japanese Film (faked memorial scene). Afterwards: Introduction by Brigadier Blackburn and Wing Cmdr. Davis.

BRIGADIER BLACKBURN:

"Well, gentlemen, you have once again seen this Japanese picture in which you played a part. We will now show it to the public but not as the Japanese intended. The Japanese film will be shown as they made it and as you have seen it but after each sequence will appear the truth -- scenes taken by Allied cameramen immediately after the liberation of Java. You will recognize most of these scenes and as the film unfolds your own comments will tell the true story.

I have had full reports from Wing Cmdr. Davis and others that the Japanese had forced you to make this film and that officers and men chosen had refused to take part in it. I know that you resisted to the limit; I know that they denied you food but still you did not yield. I know that then these cunning devils, the Japanese, applied the only form of pressure which could ever make you yield. They informed you that unless you gave way and took part in the film they would reduce the food ration to every man in camp and refuse any medical supplies. I know that your medical officers informed you that if they did that many of the prisoners under your command would die. I know that at one stage you, Wing Cmdr. Davis, were threatened with death if you did not give permission to the members of your camp to take part."

COMMANDER DAVIS:

"Yes, sir, that is quite correct."

BRIGADIER BLACKBURN:

"I have investigated the whole matter fully and I know, gentlemen, that you have nothing to be ashamed of, that you were prepared to resist, even under the threat of death, so long as it only concerned you yourselves. These officers and men have been troubled in their mind about having had to take part in the preparation of this Japanese film. I told them they need not be so troubled. They put up an epic of heroic resistance; they gave way only to save the lives of their comrades, determined to make as many difficulties as possible and to turn the whole thing into a farce if they could."

COMMANDER DAVIS:

"I discussed it with the other officers and men. It was clear what the Japanese had in mind but we thought that the reduction of food and refusal of medicines would cause the deaths of many of our comrades, so we had to go on. The Japanese had to go over the personnel of the camp with a fine tooth comb to find enough fit men for the film. It was a tough job too. At least one camp was on starvation punishment for some trivial offense. The scanty rags of thousands were raked over and repaired to furnish a sufficient wardrobe to make the chosen men look decent and some of them even got a banana to eat."

BRIGADIER BLACKBURN:

"So now, we will see the Japanese film and against its lies the real thing unfaked."

3 SAME SCENE AS 2 on the second screen, first: Cameramen shooting: afterwards: Swimming Scene, Ducks.

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"Japanese cameramen made this film but this shot is intended to give the impression that our troops made it themselves, men who would be more at home shooting with a Bren gun than with a camera. Look at them, even the ducks were forced to act."

4 (Japanese) Farm Leeuwigadjah near Tjimahi (West Java), (which farm the Allied Officers - PWs were forced to run in 1943), ducks.

5 (Japanese) Faked Library

6 (Japanese) Faked Surgery Office

UNSEEN SPEAKER: (Continuing)

"Ironical, isn't it, while these men of ours were in this Fake library and surgery, disease and sickness were riot throughout the camp but the Japs refused to supply the medicines which they were holding - - -"

7 (Japanese) Faked Pleasant Chat between PW Officers.

UNSEEN SPEAKER: (Continuing)

"And as for the pleasant chat between old friends, it lasted as long as it took the cameramen to shoot the scene."

8 (Japanese) Smoking Chimney of Xth Batallion PW Camp (so-called Cycle Camp) Batavia.

9 (Japanese) Kitchen of Hotel des Indes, Batavia.

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"Food, the thing we dreamt and talked about, succulent beef, steaming bread. No, this is not the kitchen of a prison camp in Java. These scenes were taken in the kitchen of the luxury hotel des Indes in Batavia, the Japanese headquarters. One day a few Australians were taken out in the belief they were going on a work detail but were instead taken into the hotel kitchens. It was a rare sight for them. They saw the food, handled it, smelled it, but that was all - the Japanese ate it."

DOCUMENT 5759

10 (Allied Batavia) Kitchen Xth Batallion Camp, Batavia. (garbage)

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"Food eaten by the prisoners was little better than garbage prepared in filthy conditions."

END OF REEL 1

REEL 2

- 11 (Japanese) Faked Womens Camp (re vera: Mountain Resort Selabintanah near Soekaboemi, W. Java)/ children playing games, singing, etc.
women around table, acting as a jury;

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"You will now see how the Japanese would have you believe the women lived in their camp."

Cries of (Dutch): "Loopen, loopen" = (run, run)

(Children singing around a tree)

"Ring around the rosy, pocket full of posies, ki chu, ki chu, all fall down," etc.

- 12 (Japanese) Board: Internment Camp for Women, woman sewing.

"Thank goodness, that's finished."

"Excuse me, I am going up to Mrs. Marsh with this dress. I won't be long."

"Faye, come here."

- 13 (Japanese) Drying Clothes.

"Fine weather today."

"I think the clothes will dry quickly."

"Would you like some tea?"

"No, thank you, not today, some other time."

(One line unintelligible)

- 14 (Japanese) Women before Hut G.

"It certainly is hard on me."

"What are you worrying about?"

"Well, when I came into this camp I did think I would be able to lose weight, instead of that I have been putting it on daily."

"What are you talking about?"

"Oh, it's (unintelligible), talking about her figure again."

15 (Japanese) Woman entering with child's dress - Room with women.

"Hello, everybody, I finished this frock, Mrs. Snipe."

"Oh, thanks, it's very pretty."

"You did it so quickly."

"Well, you wanted it in a hurry. Come, let's try it on Joyce and see how it fits. Come on, Joyce, show everybody your nice new dress."

"Do you like these records?"

" can't get records any more, so from now on we cannot play any more."

16 (Japanese) FITTING DRESS JOYCE - ROOM WITH WOMEN

17 (Australia Studio)

MRS. JOHNSON SPEAKING.

MRS. JOHNSON:

"For the first few months conditions were really not so bad in our camp. It was pleasantly placed, the food was good enough, and we had reasonable freedom. We lived in fact in a fool's paradise. When the Japs had made the scenes you have just seen, well, that was the end. We were whisked off to the germ laden, rat infested, filthy, slummy, bugbreeding slums you see of Batavia, a forlorn mess of modern misery, of brutal beatings and indignities, of degrees of fever, weevils, lice, weevily rice, and utter hopelessness. That is what Java meant to us from then on."

18 (Allied Batavia) SCENES OF DIVERS WOMEN CAMPS IN OR NEAR BATAVIA:
TJIDENG CAMP, KAMPONG MAKASSAR CAMP, TJIDENG CAMP AGAIN -
FETCHING WATER (TJIDENG CAMP)

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"Look at this little girl, where she gets the drinking water."

19 (Japanese) BATHING BEACH AND FISHING

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"And now Nippon presents some delightful bathing scenes. Two hours the Japs spent taking these lovely bathing scenes. This was the only swim these boys had - two hours during three and a half years of monotonous misery.

For the fishing, eleven men were given sticks with string to dangle in the water. That was all the fishing they got."

20 (Australia Studio) DAVIS SPEAKING:

"Allow me to introduce you to a camp's bathroom and showers. Look, no wonder that ulcers and skin diseases got most of us."

21 (Allied Batavia) PWs CAMP'S BATHROOM AND SHOWERS

22 (Japanese) PW OFFICERS SITTING IN A ROOM - Shepard is listening to radio-dialogue between officers. (FAKED PW CAMP; re vera MOUNTAIN RESORT SELABINTANAH)

RADIO:

"The report of enemy losses in our previous announcement regarding the Third Solomons Sea Battle is revised as follows: Sunk 2 battleships, 11 cruisers, 3 or 4 destroyers, and 1 transport. Heavily damaged 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 6 or 7 destroyers and 3 transports."

"Hey there, what about a cup of tea?"

"Thank you, we sure will."

(Visitors - PW's enter)

"Hello".

"Just got the news on the radio too".

"Pretty warm."

"Yes, it's warm all right."

"Thank you, Jack."

"Thanks."

"No, thanks."

"Hello, my friend, well, what's the news?"

SHEPARD:

"With reservations it was quite a news from Japan."

"Pretty tough on us when we hear that the American propaganda broadcast says most of us have been killed."

"Yes, it's sure hard on us."

1. SCENE 5759

23 (Australia Studio)

SHEPARD:

"Even as I heard the radio I realized the whole thing was faked. I was obviously listening to a voice transmitted from the nearby room. We had no radio in camp. After 1942 all religious services, concerts and educational lectures were forbidden."

24 (Japanese) SAME SCENE AS 22 - DIALOGUE CONTINUED.

"War surely makes live men dead, dead men alive."

"I'll make no monkey business, as long as my wife knows I'm alive, things will be all right."

"I can even see her."

(Officer Pw holding up dress) "What do you think of this, very nice, isn't it?"

"Do you think she'll appreciate that?"

"Well, maybe my taste is not the best but I am sure she'll appreciate the gesture. She's an A-I lass. That is proved by her letters."

"There he goes again - you married men."

"However, I was quite pleased to get a letter from home - - - it was an enjoyable moment. In the letter she said she was busy training for air raid guard." (One line unintelligible).

"By the time we get back I wonder what will have become of our homes."

"I sure would like to get home to try my luck at Pennington again."

"Well, you won't see me there, for once I am camping on the girl friend's doorstep."

"Yes, me too."

"I am going to make my wad then I will settle down on a nice little farm."

"Yes, the sooner it is the better."

25 (Australia Studio)

SHEPARD SPEAKING:

"Conditions of living declined as time went on until it was

quite plain that we were of no account to the Japs. International agreements and humanitarian principles meant nothing to them. Most of us lucky enough to survive have suffered in health due solely to the conditions under which we were forced to live. Had the Japanese taken the slightest interest in our welfare, many of our comrades would have been alive today."

26 (Allied Batavia) DIVERS CAMP SHOTS AND SCENES OF EMACIATED PWs.

27 (Japanese) TENNIS GAME:

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"One two, one two -

"Even this carefree happy game of tennis was merely another prisoner's drill under the orders of a guard."

28 (Australia Studio)

REED SPEAKING:

MICKFIELD - CUCKOO BIRD IMITATION

THOMAS - SPEAKING ABOUT CRICKET GAME:

REED:

"By Jove, Mick, you made the most of that funny face of yours. Remember when you used to imitate the cuckoo bird and had the Nips running around the camp looking for the bird? Can you still do it?" (Laughter)

MICKFIELD:

"I still can." (demonstrating cuckoo bird imitation).

THOMAS:

"What about the fancy cricket match I umpired? We certainly pulled their leg that time. They didn't know we were making up our own rules as we went along. I gave batsmen out whenever I felt like it and the boys played up to it. Never was cricket played as we played it that day."

29 (Japanese) CRICKET GAME: (ENGLISH CLUB, BATAVIA, AT THAT TIME JAPANESE CLUB)

"How is that?" "Out!"

END OF REEL 2

30 (Allied Batavia) SCENE OF DIVERS CASES OF HUNGER-EDEMA. THOMAS,
afterwards DR. KINGMA (BOTH UNSEEN) SPEAKING.

UNSEEN SPEAKER: (THOMAS):

"Sure, we picked men had our fun that day but a few months later not many of us were even able to lift a cricket bat, let alone run, but let Dr. Kinama who was also interned tell you about it."

DR. KINGMA: (Unseen)

"Far from being able to play cricket or any other games, these poor men suffered from all the diseases resulting from starvation; beri-beri was only one of them. The hospital scenes you are about to see were faked from beginning to end. The Japanese took a group of Australians to this hospital in Batavia. Tragic to think that the men who posed for this mock treatment were then still healthy, while the really sick men in the camps could not get the treatment and the drugs they so urgently needed."

31 (Japanese) FAKED HOSPITAL SCENE, NUNS, PATIENTS - FAKED USE OF X-RAY
PLANT: FAKED OPERATION.

NUN:

"How are you today?"

PATIENT:

"Fine, thank you."

32 (Australia Studio)

DR. KINGMA:

"Pretty, wasn't it? In fact, ideal. Yes, but the truth was quite different. In the prisoner of war hospital where I worked as a doctor the Japanese stole the X-ray plant, the radium and surgical instruments. How the hospitals really were, well, look for yourself."

33 (Allied Batavia) SCENES OF DIVERS CAMP HOSPITALS (HOSPITAL ST.VINCENTIUS, HOSPITAL MATER DOLOROSA, BOTH NEAR BATAVIA) AS TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER 1945, A MONTH AFTER THE JAPANESE CAPITULATION. THE DOCTOR AND ASSISTANTS ARE NEWLY ARRIVED.

3.4 (Japanese) TRAIN IN THE MOUNTAINS NEAR SOEKAPOEEMI:
TERRACE MOUNTAIN RESORT SELAPINTANAH
SWIMMING POOL "
BILLIARD ROOM "
GOLF COURSE "

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"This delightful mountain resort used by the Japanese Officers of the High Command was chosen as an occasion for the scenes of this Japanese film.

One day the Australian camp was gone over for men who still looked fit enough to act the part of happy sportsmen. They were told to be happy, that they could play billiards, swim, drink beer, play golf, and eat good food."

"Actually they did have a swim and played a game of billiards."

GOLF COURSE (PLAYER) (Unintelligible.) "----this sure keeps me fit."

35 (Australia Studio) DAVIS SPEAKING:

"Happy sportsmen indeed and then back to the barbed wire, the heat, the dirt, the weariness and worst of all to be herded and hounded by Japanese scum."

36 (Japanese outside Java) SCENES OF PWs herded by Japanese Soldiers (Scenes taken by the Japanese outside Java).

SPEAKER UNSEEN:

"Some of these particular scenes are from captured Japanese news reels made before the liberation of parts outside Java; they were exhibited with gloating pride through the one time Japanese Empire."

37 (Japanese) "WELCOME" SCENE: FAKED REUNION OF DUTCH PWs and THEIR FAMILIES, SELABINTANAH.

SPEAKER UNSEEN:

"You are about to see one of the most unnatural of all scenes - a faked reunion of Dutch prisoners and their sweethearts, wives, and children. Those who attempted to embrace in a natural way were pulled apart by guards and made to embrace to order in front of the camera."

38 (Japanese) SELABINTANAH. DUTCH CAPTAIN SEATS HIS FAMILY. DUTCH LIEUTENANT AND FAMILY, DIALOGUE IN DUTCH:

"Wat is't vandaag prettig, he! (What nice weather today)

"Ja, wat een fijne dag, zeg!" (Yes, what a fine day, isn't it?)

"Maar ik vind't zielig voor die Aussies" (But what a pity for those Anzacs).

"Ja, dat vind ik ook." (Yes, I think so too.)

"Zullen we ze roepen?" (Let us call them)

"Hey, folks, come here!" (Australians join the family)

39 (Australia Studio) ANNEMIEKE SPEAKING:

"I am Dutch, my name is Annemieke. Mammy and I were in a camp in Java. But it wasn't really like that, it was more like this, only sometimes much worse."

40 (Allied Batavia) WOMEN INTERNMENT CAMPS NEAR BATAVIA: TJIDENG CAMP, KAMPONG MAKASSAR CAMP (BAMBOO HUTS), AND AGAIN TJIDENG CAMP.

41 (Australia Studio: ANNEMIEKE (Continuing)

"I wasn't very naughty and I helped mammy as much as I could."

42 (Japanese) LOVE SCENE (DUTCH ENSIGN AND FIANCEE), SELABINTANAH - PRIVATE McNAB WRITING A LETTER.

43 (Australia Studio) McNAB SPEAKING:

McNAB:

"They gave me pen and paper and told me to write a letter. I started to write but not what I was thinking. An English speaking Japanese girl spoke the words you will hear and which I was supposed to be writing, but if I had been free to express myself this is what I would have described:"

44 (Allied Batavia) SEVERAL SCENES OF WHAT McNAB WOULD HAVE LIKED TO WRITE ABOUT. AMONGST THEM SCENES OF POW CAMPS, BATAVIA, OF WOMEN AND CHILDRENS CAMP KAMPONG MAKASSAR AND OTHER CAMPS.

ENGLISH SPEAKING JAPANESE GIRL (UNSEEN):

"Today is Visitor's Day - a day of joyous anticipation for the Dutch soldiers, and a day of sorrow for us as we have no one to call on us. Nevertheless looking at the happy families and sweethearts reunited in an atmosphere of love and happiness brings me closer to you in thought. As I sit writing I recall the happy times we had together. My first hour home will be (unintelligible) My thoughts are of home and you, of kangaroos and lovely beaches. - - - here amidst an atmosphere of - - - I wonder what you are doing now. Everything can be bearable as every facility is given us, but without you it is like a vain effort to keep body and soul together. My one wish is to get home and to you where nothing can make me leave you again."

45 (Japanese) SELABINTANAH, McNAB WRITING AND CRYING.

DOCUMENT 5759

"Even my tears were faked. They poured some kind of stuff in my eyes to make them water, pretty powerful stuff too, as I didn't stop crying for days."

END REEL 3

47 (Japanese) FAKED RECREATION ROOM

a. PAY DAY

SPEAKER UNSEEN:

"Rich for a couple of minutes, only, the first two envelopes contained money which had to be given back of course. The others were just padded."

b. Drinking beer (MICKFIELD)

SPEAKER UNSEEN:

"The beer you see on the tables was tea. Tubby Reed and I had the only real beer."

48 (Australia Studio) DIALOGUE BETWEEN HARRISON AND REED

HARRISON: "The best beer I ever had. Remember the way I swigged the last of that? - - - - another bottle and before they could stop me that went too."

REED: "Yes, I remember and after seeing where it went I saw an ugly look on the Nip's face so I scrambled."

HARRISON: "That was your day all right, you also had that big steak. I only smelled it."

REED: "By gum, that was good. One of the Nips asked me if I could eat a beef. I told him I could eat two feeds instead of one. They took me in there and fed me a bite of steak and said 'Eat it as if you enjoy it.' Well, I did not - - - - - I tried to tell the camera with my eyes what was going on. I hope you got me. Anyway, I seemed to make a pretty good job of it, at least the Nip said 'Goto' which means 'very good' and let me finish the lot."

49 (Japanese) SAME AS 47: REED EATING STEAK.

50 (Japanese) FAKED CAM? SHOP.

"How are you, Doc.?"

"How much are these films?"

"How much for this sale?"

"Reminds me, I will have a toothbrush too."

"Cheerio."

51 (Allied Batavia) PWs LINING UP FOR FOOD ISSUE

UNSEEN SPEAKER:

"Yes, it was a lucky day for a few; the rest of the prisoners carried on with their usual starvation rations.

52 (Japanese) STREET IN BANDOENG - WOMENS DRESS SHOP BANDOENG - Capt. Ellison and friend (Officer PWs) Entering.

"Good afternoon."

"Gray, do you think this will fit my kid?"

"What, the big one?"

"No, the new one."

"How many have you got?"

"Five."

"Five? Oh, no!"

"Yes."

53 (Australia Studio) CAPT. ELLISON SPEAKING:

"I was one of the men you have just seen strolling through the streets of Bandoeng. The joke is, my friend, Gracie Allen, who was buying the frock certainly had a daughter, but she was 18 years of age. We had no money so they gave us a fistful of Japanese invasion money which they took from us immediately after the transaction. The two shop girls were Dutch internees dressed up for the occasion and given special hairdo. During the whole of this farce our guards with fixed bayonets followed us just outside of camera range. Finally they replaced our prisoner of war badges and hustled us back behind the barbed wire."

54 (Japanese outside Java) PWs being herded behind barbed wire

55 (Australia Studio) NOBLE SPEAKING:

"At dawn one day 500 of us were assembled in the hospital grounds, where a large cross had been placed, its base inscribed 'Lest We Forget'. When General Saito and his staff came on, a religious ceremony commenced. It was impressive. We began to think that the Nips must have a grain of decency in them after all but when General Saito read his speech and the cameramen shooting and then re-reading it to let them get close ups and we saw the shoddy cardboard cross swaying in the wind, and we realized that the

barbed wire had been camouflaged with broken branches and the machine guns trained on us were hidden in the distance, then we tumbled to the farce it was. The reverence with which we Christians observe our faith became no more than a mockery and and insult to our fallen comrades."

56 (Japanese) FAILED MEMORIAL SERVICE.

SPEECH OF GENERAL SAITO: (JAPANESE), ENGLISH TEXT SHOWS ON SCREEN:

"We treat well our enemy soldiers

We protect them

May their spirits rest in peace in Heaven."

57 (Allied Batavia) CEMETERIES OF PWs NEAR BATAVIA, AMONGST THEM ANTJOL, BATAVIA, PLACE OF EXECUTION AND BURIAL OF ABOUT 300 PEOPLE: REBURYING OF CORPSES IN SEPTEMBER 1945 UNDER ALLIED ORDERS

SPEAKER UNSEEN:

"Only under compulsion after the liberation did the Japanese provide even the simplest of burial decencies for our comrades who did not survive.
Those we won't forget."

END OF REEL 4

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Klaas A. de Weerd, Attorney-at-Law, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Head Office of the Attorney-General of the Netherlands East Indies with the special task of collecting such documents as would be needed for the preparation of the Prosecution of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo and that as such I have received from the Netherlands Indies Government Information Service the four reels of the film, entitled "Nippon Presents", to which refer the statements of J. Schim van der Loeff, Batavia (Prosecution Document No. 5758) and of Brigadier Arthur Seaforth Blackburn (Prosecution Document No. 5740). Further I certify that I wrote down the descriptions of sequences as these appear in the attached script of said reels according to my best ability and knowledge from what I saw on these films. Signed at Tokyo on this eighteenth day of December 1946.

Signed: K.A. de Weerd.

DOCUMENT 5685

1766
Prosecution Document

5685

Class B and C Offenses

NETHERLANDS INDIES

SUMATRA

Synopsis

Netherlands Division I.P.S.

December 1946.

Lt.Col. J.S. Sinninghe Damste
R.I.I.A.,
Assistant Prosecutor.

SynopsisI. PRISONERS OF WAR.1. Murder.

Several murders of P.O.W. occurred after their surrender. Most of the executions were carried out in a very cruel way.

a. At Banka Island, East of Sumatra, on 15 February 1942, a group of shipwrecked Australian servicemen was murdered by machine gunning after they had been driven into the sea; without any trial, even without any comprehensible reason. As appears from the report of the interrogation of E. A. LLOYD, R.N., Prosecution Document 5617.

The Prosecution enters this document 5617 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

b. At Kotaradja, North Sumatra, on 18 March 1942, a few days after their surrender, about 50 Dutch P.O.W. (European and Ambonese) were pushed into sloops, towed to the open sea and shot. As appears from the affidavit of Sgt. M. LATUPERISSA, R.N.I.A., Prosecution document 5619.

The Prosecution enters this document 5619 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

c. Major LEENHEER has already testified regarding the murder of 22 Dutch P.O.W. at Tiga Roenggo, North East Sumatra, on 15 March 1942.

2. Camps.

The conditions in the various P.O.W. camps in Sumatra have already been described by the witness Major RINGER, who has given evidence from his personal knowledge and from the results of his official investigation regarding the other camps. Additional evidence is presented now concerning two other camps.

a. The British Wing Commander P.S. DAVIS, in his sworn report, gives a summary of conditions of the P.O.W. camps at Pakan Baru.

Central Sumatra, where initially 2,000 Dutch and British P.O.W. were confined; Prosecution document 5604. Filthy surroundings and bad accommodation; heavy labor, started immediately after an extremely exhausting voyage and overland trip, with only very little and poor food provided. The labor consisted in the construction of a railroad and was conducted by a group of Japanese soldiers straight from the Burma railway P.O.W. gangs; which resulted in the same slave driving conditions and brutality as already shown to this Court by the testimonies of the late Colonel WILD and Lt.Colonel COATES.

A dysentery outbreak was unavoidable because the P.O.W. on their way had been lodged in the overcrowded gaol at Padang, under dangerous sanitary conditions together with native coolies who almost all suffered from dysentery. Practically no medicines were supplied, and no dressings, although after the Japanese surrender large stocks were available.

Consequently, dysentery and malaria along with the results of malnutrition - beri-beri, pellagra, other avitaminoses, tropical ulcers - made the number of sick rise to almost 40%. The less sick people were forced to do garden work because the camps had to grow their own vegetables.

Some 170 shipwrecked P.O.W. arrived in bad condition but were not given the necessary treatment and care, so that many of them died. The death rate rose to 80 and even more per month, due to lack of food and heavy work, but still the forced labour was increased. The Japanese Commandant showed no interest; several instances of brutality and cruelty in the treatment, even causing death, are given.

The Prosecution enters this document 5604 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

b. In the Kota Tjane area, North Sumatra, in October 1944 the P.O.W. were forced to march day and night over a distance of 90 miles in 68 hours. Each man who fell behind was beaten until he kept up with the main party. As appears from the affidavit of Pte. W. HAGEDOORN, R.N.I.A.; Prosecution document 5601.

The Prosecution enters this document 5601 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

3. Executions.

In May 1943 the Dutch P.O.W. at Lawe Segalagala-camp, Kota Thane, were forced to enlist in the Japanese Army, Four of these P.O.W. who had refused were executed, as is vividly depicted by the eye-witness K.E.KRIJGSMAN, R.N.I.M., in his affidavit, Prosecution Document 5623.

The Prosecution enters this document 5623 as an exhibit.

II. CIVILIANS.

A. Internees.

The Prosecution refers to the testimony of Major LEENHEER who has given information from his personal experience and from the results of the official investigation carried out by him regarding the 70 odd civilian internment camps. Additional evidence is presented by the following.

1. Murder.

About the same time as the Japanese murdered a group of Australian servicemen at the beach of Banka Island, as stated before, they murdered by machine gunning and bayonetting a group of about 20 Australian nurses who were taken prisoner. Sister BULLWINKLE has given testimony regarding this murder.

They also murdered at the same place and time two captured civilians: Mr. GORDON BOWDEN, the official Representative of the Commonwealth of Australia in Malaya, and his political secretary. This appears from the affidavit by the Australian A. N. WOOTTON: Prosecution document 5645.

The Prosecution enters this document 5645 as an exhibit.

Major LEENHEER has already given evidence about the murder of three British civilians at Pematang Siantar, in March 1942.

2. Conditions.

As already described by Major LEENHEER in almost all camps conditions were utterly miserable.

/
In

In the women camp at Brastagi, North Sumatra, food conditions were terrible! In November 1944 the daily ration consisted of 140 grams of rice for adults and only 80 grams for children- (450 grams = 1 American lbs.) - ; in addition 20 grams of vegetables. These circumstances made hundreds of desperate women break out in order to find additional food in spite of the severe punishments to be feared. The Kempeitai investigated the matter and the two women camp commandants were severely ill-treated, including the threat of execution, as stated by one of them, Mrs. M. E. PRINS-nee ROHRBORN, in her affidavit; Prosecution document 5646.

The Prosecution enters this document 5646 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

5. Non-interned.

1. Romusha.

Not only Javanese were forced to hard labor and sent to other parts of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but also aborigines of Sumatra had to suffer this enslavement, as appears from the affidavit of AMIR BIN SARODIN, who was detailed to work at Singapore under the usual hopeless conditions; Prosecution document 5716.

The Prosecution enters this document 5716 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

It is brought to the Court's attention that several of the Romusha, whose affidavits have been dealt with when the area Java was presented, were also ill-treated when working on islands belonging to the Sumatra area.

2. Kempeitai.

The methods of the Sumatra-Kempeitai did not substantially differ from those applied by the Java Kempeitai, from whom they received assistance. Major KATSUMURA, in his report already introduced, exhibit _____ (Javint 3106/s, sub II) gives evidence about the "JI"-operation, in Sumatra, 1943. The / suspects

suspects were not sent up to Court Martial but a speedy way of dealing with them was adopted, in fact the same system was applied as with the "Ko"-operation in Java. When the crime was clearly proved - in the opinion of the torturing investigators - and the death sentence was considered suitable, the criminals were executed, on the decision of the Army. These executions were carried out fortnightly by every detachment of every section, in secrecy. The executions were at once reported to Kempei Headquarters, who at once reported to the Army. Prosecution document 5756, already introduced as exhibit_____.

Personal experiences show the same pattern as in Java:

a. At Medan, North East Sumatra, the methods of torture applied were: watertest and severe beatings. The treatment of the victims was extremely bad and drove them to suicide. As appears from the affidavit of L. G. EMELIS: Prosecution document 5625.

The Prosecution enters this document 5625 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

b. At Shibolga, North West Sumatra: beatings and manhandling, torture, infliction of injuries, watertest, exposure of naked victims to the local population; bad treatment of the prisoners. As appears from the affidavit of Police inspector A. Suyker: Prosecution document 5635.

The Prosecution enters this document 5635 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

c. At Tandjong Karang, South Sumatra; beatings, burning of moustache, and other ways of torture. Affidavit of J. C. TEERLINK: Prosecution document 5636. From this as well as from the case of SUYKER appears that the Kempei officers condoned the ill-treatment.

The Prosecution enters this document 5636 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

d. At Palembang, Central South Sumatra, a Chinese doctor was a victim of the Kempei and afterwards forced to cure the victims. Here also: severe beatings, in several ways; watertest, with /

sometimes

sometimes more than 3 gallons of soapy water, incidentally resulting in death; hanging; burning; threat of beheading; playing ball with an Indonesian as the ball. Doctor LO DJIEN SIOE described these tortures in his affidavit: Prosecution document 5632.

The Prosecution enters this document 5632 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

3. Prisons.

In the gaol of Pematang Siantar, North East Sumatra, more than 300 out of the 550 prisoners died in two years time. The causes of death were invariably; dysentery, malnutrition and the consequences thereof. Prisoners who were expected to die soon were put into a special cell; the dying was speeded up by putting the patient outside the cell in the tropical sun. As appears from the affidavit of F. R. KRAMER, Head manager of the Deli Tobacco Company; Prosecution document 5634.

The Prosecution enters this document 5634 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

This completes the synopsis regarding the Japanese conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the area Sumatra.

COPY

WAR CRIMES

Interrogation of Ernest Alexander Lloyd, CKX 86448 RN.I/S. by
NX31499 Lt. K. M. Dixon, regarding atrocities by the Japanese against
Australia Nurses.

- (1) I was a member of the crew of the SS "Vynerbrook" which was sunk of
Bangka Island on 14th Feb. 42.
- (2) I reached the shore in the company with A/B. Cake and L/S. Noble,
some civilians and about 5 nurses.
- (3) We slept that night with other survivors on the beach. There were about
40 or 50 there including about 20 Australian nurses in charge of a Matron.
- (4) Next morning the First Officer of the "Vynerbrook" left to contact the
Japanese. A party of about 10 to 15 civilian women and children also Cake
and Noble left to go ahead.
- (5) The First Officer came back with a party of about 14 Japs, in charge of
an Officer or NCO. wearing a sword.
- (6) The japs separated us into three groups.
 - (a) Servicemen.
 - (b) Civilian men and women.
 - (c) Nurses.
- (7) I was with the group of servicemen and we were marched a short distance
along the beach. Just out of sight of the others.
- (8) The Japs set us a machine gun and clearly indicatee that they intended
shooting us.
- (9) Several of us made a break for the water and were fired on. I was
wounded but was carried out to sea by the tide. I later struggled back
ashore and into the jungle in the early afternoon.
- (10) I passed out. On coming to later it was daylight. I walked along the
beach and came upon the bodies of the group of servicemen some of whom I
recognised.
- (11) Further long the beach-where we had left them-I came across the bodies
of the nurses (about 10) and after that the civilians. All appeared to have
bayoneted or shot.
- (12) I went back into the jungle and about ten days later I made my way into
Muntok and surrendered to the Japs.]

(13) I was placed in a P.W. hospital and there met:-

- (a) An Englishman whom I remembered as one of the servicemen's group on the beach.
- (b) An American whom I recognised as one of the main group on the beach.
- (c) An Australian nurse whom I did not recognise.

Questions by the Interrogating Officer.

Q. 1. Have you any means of indentifying any of the Australian nurses?

A. No.

Q. 2. Have you any means of indentifying any of the party of Japs or their units. Did you see any of them again?

A. No. But they were Army and not of the other services.

Q.3. Do you know the name of the Englishman.

A. Yes. KINSEY Pte. He died at Muntok.

Q. 4. Do you know the name of the American.

A. No. But I saw him about July or August 42. with the civilian internees in Palembang.

Q. 5. Do you know the names of any of the Jap Units in Bangka Is. in Feb. 42.?

A. No.

Q. 6. Before the Jap opened fire on you did you hear shots or other sounds from the area where you left the nurses and civilians?

A. No. But I heard shots after I was in the water.

Interrogation concluded.

To the best of my belief the foregoing particulars are correct.

WITNESS (Signed)

NX31499 K.M.Dixon, Lt.

Interrogating Officer,

2nd Aust P.W. Contact & Inquiry Unit. AIF.

(Signed)

WITNESS (Signed)

NX53123 2/15 Field Art. Regt.

Interrogation conducted at Sungei Ron P.W.Camp, Palembang on 18th Sept. 45.

Certified true copy of original affidavit

/s/ R. B. Lambe, Lt. Colonel
A.G War Crimes
H.Q. AIFSEA

18th April 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of the NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Sworn statement of Melkianus LATUPERISSA, Sergeant first class, section commander No. 1884 of the NI Red Cross organisation, Kota Radja, dated 11 April 1946; Signed H. Latuperissa." OM 8221/S.

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE:

S E A L

/s/ Ch. Jongeneel

BATAVIA, June 7th 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WEERD, first lieutenant R.N.I.A. Higher Official attached to the office of the Attorney General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

S T A T E M E N T

SUMMARY OF EXAMINATION of Melkianus LATUPERISSA, civilian clerk at the military Hospital KOTA RADJA, at the time of the invasion, Segt. 1st class, section commander No. 1884 of the NI Red Cross Organisation, district of KOTA RADJA:

who, duly sworn, states:

I am 38 years of age, of AMBONESE nationality, born at LHO SOEKOEN, ATJEH. I am at present at MEDAN STORES HOUSE, MEDAN.

On 12 March 42 I stayed behind in the hospital at KOETA RADJA, after all the Dutch troops had gone South. A group of about 50 or 60 men, amongst whom was at least one officer, missed the train to the south and consequently was at KOTA RADJA when the Japanese entered. This group consisted of DUTCH, AMBONESE, MENADONESE and JAVANESE. Some of them were medical orderlies, wearing a red-cross armband, others were convalescent patients and further there were a few guards.

While gangs of ATJEHNESE were looting the town, the DUTCH soldiers hoisted the white flag on the Railway-station building and waited for the Japanese to capture them. I succeeded in persuading two JAVANESE and TWO AMBONESE, named SINAY not to wait any longer for the JAPANESE, because of the risk of being murdered by the ATJEHNESE. They followed me and I brought them safely to one of the nearby kampongs.

That same day, 12 March, I saw myself that the group of men was captured by the ATJEHNESE and brought to the KOTA RADJA club where they had to squat. The Oeloebalangs (ATJEHNESE district chiefs) were assembled in another room at the club. One of them, with whom I was acquainted, signalled me to go away.

Two days later a certain ALI, an ATJEHNESE with whom I often used to go out fishing, came to see me and I asked him to find out all he possibly could about the prisoners. In the meantime many Ambonese and Menadonese civilians were captured too by the ATJEHNESE. They were mishandled and several were forced to become MOHAMEDANS, before the Japanese stopped that on request of a certain Mrs. NOE. The plunder of the town went on for three days, before the Japanese put an end to that too and ordered the stolen goods to be handed in again.

On or about 18 March 42 Mrs. LECERG came to see me and told me, that her husband WO II LECERF, and the whole group of captured soldiers were brought by closed motor lorries from the local prison alsong the road to OLEH-LEH. The next day I met the aforementioned ALI, who told me that the day before he had seen at OLEH-LEH that about 50 Dutch and Ambonese PW., their hands tied behind their backs, barefooted, dressed in underpants only and well guarded by JAPANESE armed soldiers, had been unloaded from motor-trucks and had been literally kicked into three white painted boats of the KPM type, ALI had asked the Japanese officer in charge what was ging to happen to these people to which that officer had made the gesture of shooting.

The Japanese boarded the boats too and then the sloops were towed to the open sea by the steamtug "LIE TJENG", manned by the Javanese crew. When the boats were still visible ALI heard shooting. After less than 2 hours the steamtug returned in halfhour, however, with the sloops.

The next day after ALI had told me this story I went to OLEH LEH, pretending to go out to fish. I heard from fishermen there that they had seen at sea parts of human bodies drifting, apparently bitten off by sharks.

Two days thereafter I went again to OLEH LEH and that time heard the story that the corpse of an EUROPEAN had drifted into a poekat (fishernet) near the beach of OLEH LEH. Mrs. LECERF is living at MEDAN now and also a Mr. KROON, who at that time was at KOTA RADJA and who might know something about the tragedy.

I remember as names of men, who belonged to that group: MANAIT, Ambonese sergt. Med. ord. His widow is living now at GLOEGOER.

METEKOHY, Amb. Sergt. Med. ord.

KASWYAN, Javanese sergt. cook

ANATRADJI, " corporal

Rumours at that time at KOTA RADJA said that all these men were executed, because the Japanese believed they belonged to a destruction unit, which had destroyed bridges and roads.

Signed M LATUPERISSA
Witness

I certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

Signed J J A VAN DE LANDE
Translator

Sworn before me J J A VAN DE LANDE

for OC No 4 War Crimes Investigation Team

This 11th day of April 1946

Detailed to examine the above by the Commander-in-chief,
Allied Land Forces, South East Asia.

Authority: ALFSEA War Crimes Instruction No. 1 para 7.

MD/JAG/FS/JC/15(3A)

1769A

IN THE MATTER OF THE ILLTREATMENT OF BRITISH
PRISONERS OF WAR IN JAVA AND SULATRA BETWEEN
1942 and 1945

[A F F I D A V I T]

I, Wing Commander PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 P.R.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, make oath and say as follows:-

The Report which is now produced and shown to me marked "PSD1" is a report compiled by me on the 19th November 1945 relating to Japanese War Crimes in Java and Sumatra between 8th March 1942 and 20th September 1945.

The facts set out in the Report are true and are within my own knowledge except where the contrary is stated.

SWORN by the said PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS)
at 6 Spring Gardens in the City of)
WESTMINSTER this nineteenth day of)
November 1945) (Signed) PATRICK SLANEY DAVIS.

BEFORE ME:

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel,
Legal Staff.

Military Department,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

*Korean
P.T.
"anti-Job"*

I certify that this is a true copy of the original affidavit.

/s/ G. Barratt, Lt. Col.,
Legal Staff,
Office of the Judge Advocate
General.]

"P.S.D.1."

This is the Report marked "P.S.D.1" referred to in the Affidavit of Wing Commander Patrick Slaney Davis sworn this nineteenth day of November 1945
BEFORE ME

G. BARRATT, Lieutenant-colonel, Legal Staff.
Military Dept., Office of the Judge Advocate General,
London, S.W.1.

REPORT BY WING COMMANDER P.S. DAVIS, ROYAL AIR FORCE, RELATING TO THREE
AND HALF YEARS PRISONER OF WAR CAPTIVITY UNDER THE JAPANESE IN JAVA AND
SUMATRA. - MARCH 8th, 1942 to SEPTEMBER 20th, 1945.

I, Wing Commander Patrick Slaney DAVIS, No. 39862, Royal Air Force (Pilot) at present on the strength of No. 106 P.R.C., R.A.F. Station, Cosford, and on 42 days repatriation leave at my permanent home address - "Lyndhurst", 20 Cliff Parade, Leigh-on-Sea, Essex, report as follows:-

2. In January 1942, I was serving as the No. 2 Organisation Staff Officer to Air Headquarters Far East, Sims Road, Singapore, on the 2nd February, 1942, I was posted to the Near Headquarters Royal Air Force, Palembang, Sumatra. After two weeks, Palembang was attacked by Japanese Forces and I proceeded to Royal Air Force Headquarters, Java, located at Soekra Boemi, under the Command of Air Vice Marshal MALTBY. On 26th February, 1942, a new Allied Headquarters was opened at the Military Academy situated on the Dargoveg, Bandoeng, under the command of Air Chief Marshal, Sir Richard PIERCE. After four days, I returned to Soekra Boemi and on the 3rd March, 1942 I returned to Bandoeng, when Air Vice Marshal MALTBY took over as Allied Commander in Chief from General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Pierce. On 6th March, 1942, the Japanese attack on Java had progressed to the extent that the aerodrome at Kalajati had fallen to their occupation and a serious aerial attack was in progress against INDIR, the aerodrome south of the city of Bandoeng. Considerable confusion existed and it was decided to withdraw the present Headquarters to the Central Hotel, Tasik Malaja, where I proceeded on the 7th March, 1942, accompanied by Group Captain COGGLE. On the afternoon of March 8th, 1942, we were officially informed by the Dutch that a decision to capitulate to the Japanese Forces had been reached. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY decided to withdraw the British Forces located around Tasik Malaja and the Australian Forces located around Buitenzorg to the hills above Garoet and their dispose his forces to withstand the enemy. I was ordered by Air Commodore STATION to take command of the convoy of British troops from Tasik Malaja to Parmegatan, a tea estate situated in the hills above Garoet. On the afternoon of the 9th March, 1942, I reported to Air Commodore STATION the successful arrival of the whole convoy. The British force was disposed on the hills around PARMEGATAN, the Australian Force being dispersed on the next range of hills lying to the right of the British position. On approximately 10th March, 1942, we were informed by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY that the British Force had to surrender, together with the Dutch, under the terms of the capitulation by General ter POORTEN, Royal Dutch Netherland East Indies Army.

3. On the 11th March, 1942, I proceeded to BANDOENG with Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and after spending the night in the Dutch Headquarters at BANDOENG, visited the Japanese Staff who had established themselves in the FRILINGA HOTEL, BANDOENG. Air Vice Marshal MALTBY and I proceeded back to GILIOET with the Japanese terms. On approximately 16th March, 1942, I was ordered by Air Vice Marshal MALTBY to form an Advance Headquarters at a Railway Station at TJIBATU near GILIOET, where we were to work as Railway Control Officers to pass the entire British Force in groups of 600 through to the BATAVIA area. On approximately 18th March, 1942, Air Vice Marshal MALTBY was injured in a car accident and was taken to the Allied Hospital, Bandoeng, and that evening Air Commodore STATION and Group Captain BISHOP were ordered to the Japanese Headquarters, Bandoeng, from which trip they did not return. The Japanese under a Major SAITO were demanding much information which under the terms of my orders from Air Vice Marshal MALTBY, I could not give and I sent a dispatch rider to Air Commodore SILLY, who was located at Tasik Malaja, with a force of approximately 2000 unarmed airmen. Air Commodore SILLY arrived that evening and took command. Two days later, I left with Air Commodore SILLY and proceeded to Tasik Malaja where we located in a house pending the arrangement that the Japanese said they would make under the terms of which Air Commodore SILLY and his Staff (of which I was a member) would co-operate with the Japanese Headquarters and the International Red Cross Representatives for the general co-ordination of the Japanese plans in respect of the prisoners of war taken in Java.

3A. Two days later, I was taken ill with Malign Tertiary Malaria and sent by the Principal Medical Officer, Wing Commander C. COFFEY, R.A.F. to the Allied Hospital Bandoeng, at that time commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DUNLOP, Australian Medical Service. Two days later I was transferred by the Japanese to a hospital at TJIMAHI, where I remained as a patient for two months.

4. I then returned to Tasik Malaja on or about the 15th May, 1942, remaining there for two weeks, accommodated in a hangar on the aerodrome and then proceeded with all other personnel by train to SOERABAYA, where 1500 officers and men of the British force were accommodated in extremely cramped conditions in the Soerabaya Grammar School. The Camp Commander, working under the Japanese, was Wing Commander VINES, Royal Air Force. Seven months later, the command having changed in the meantime to Wing Commander WEICH, R.A.F., I proceeded to the Darmo Camp, also in Soerabaya, where conditions were extremely good. I remained there for six weeks and was then transferred to Yarmart Camp, in central Soerabaya, under the command of Captain BLOOM, Royal Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army. I remained there until the middle of April, 1943, when I was transferred to the Tjimahi Camp, near Bandoeng, commanded by Commander HOOT, R.D.N.E.I.A. I remained there for six weeks and was transferred to the Bandoeng Camp under the Commander of Wing Commander NICHOLIS, R.A.F. On 28th December 1943, I was transferred with the whole of the personnel of the Bandoeng Camp to the Cycle Camp, Batavia, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel JANCING, R.D.N.E.I. Army where I remained until my departure in May, 1944, as commander of the draft of 2000 men posted to an unknown destination.

5. The Japanese Officers who within my certain knowledge were personally responsible for bad living conditions and ill treatment were:- Colonel KAWABE, who had been commander of all P.O.Ws in the Soerabaya area and who had consistently refused the appeals of Allied Officers for medicine and food (See report of Wing Commander, C. COFFEY, R.A.F. Principal Medical Officer Soerabaya Camps), and Lieutenant SONI, who was commander of the Cycle Camp, and who in my presence wilfully maltreated prisoners of war and who has a record of unparalleled cruelty in the Batavia area. (See report of Wing Commander NICHOLLS, R.A.F. and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERPOST, Intelligence Corps, British Army). I cannot give further detailed reports on Japanese in Java as I was never in a position to obtain exact details, but the Allied Officers referred to above, especially Lt. Col. VANDERPOST, have been in a position to obtain detailed facts of the whole area. A valuable report has been submitted to the Allied Headquarters, South East Asia, by Lt. Col. LILLEY, R.A.M.C. who was the doctor commanding the Allied Hospital Batavia for approximately three years.

6. Colonel KAWABE is a small, wizened Japanese Officer, approximately five feet tall and of typical Japanese appearance. Lieutenant SONI, on the other hand, is young, approximately 30 years old, and extremely smart in his appearance, but walks with a pronounced swagger. He is rather handsome and is about five feet nine inches, of athletic appearance and is decidedly non-Japanese in facial characteristics. I cannot remember the names of the Commanders of the individual Soerabaya Camps but KAWABE was Supreme Commander of the area for General S. ITO whose Headquarters were in Singapore. The Tjemchi Camp was commanded by 1st Lieutenant YAMAGUCHI, another brutal officer on whom Major HOOT will report. The Bandoeng Camp by Captain TCHAKAGI, an officer who did not control his guards but who was not responsible for any atrocities as far as I know. (See report Wing Commander NICHOLLS and Lieutenant Colonel VANDERPOST). The Cycle Camp was commanded by Lieutenant SONI (See para 5 above).

SUMATRA DRAFT.

7. [On 1st March 1944, a draft was selected by the Japanese from personnel of the Cycle Camp, Batavia, consisting of 2 battalions of 1000 men each, comprising in total approximately 1750 Dutch and 250 English.] No. 1 Battalion was commanded by Wing Commander WIGHTWICK R.A.F., and No. 2 Battalion by Lieut. Col. LEBBEKHOORN, R.D.N.E.I. Army. The personnel of this draft was segregated from the rest of the Camp and placed on extra rations. Numerous dysentery tests were made (approximately one per week) and a very casual effort was made to re-kit personnel, but as nearly all the clothing issued was Dutch pattern uniforms intended for small native troops, very little could be utilised by the personnel on the draft. Towards the end of April, 1944, Wing Commander WIGHTWICK was admitted to the Camp Hospital suffering from dysentery, and I volunteered to take his place. I applied to Captain TCHAKAGI, the Japanese Commander of the draft, and when I explained that a large percentage of the British troops proceeding on the draft had previously been under my command, he accepted me as draft Commander.

8. [On the morning of the 14th May, 1944, the party marched with full load from the Cycle Camp to Pasir Sinan Station, Batavia and entrained for Tandjong Frick docks. There we embarked on a Japanese transport of approximately 5000 tons; 1000 men including all the British being accommodated in the forward hold and the remaining 1000 Dutch personnel in the aft hold. By application to Captain TCHIKAGI, I was allowed to bring the personnel of the forward hold on to the deck for Physical training in batches of 50 for 15 minutes at a time and I obtained permission to use one of the ships pumps for the men to bathe. Food and tea were available. The accommodation in the hold was extremely cramped, the men sitting upright with their legs round the men in front of them. Numerous cases of prostration had to be brought on deck, especially during the midday hours. The guards were not troublesome during the journey. The ship was in convoy with two other ships of approximately 5000 tons each, escorted by a Japanese corvette, with one Japanese bomber as aerial cover. Our sister ships were carrying approximately 5000 Javanese coolies under disgusting conditions. No incidents occurred during the voyage.

9. On the evening of the 17th May, 1944, we docked at PIDANG, Sumatra, and disembarked and marched approximately 12 kilometres to a disused cinema. No food was provided and no lavatory accommodation being available in the cinema. The following morning we marched a further 8 kilometers to the Padang Civil Gaol, where we were accommodated where normally 500 native prisoners were confined, we had 2000 of our draft and approximately 1500 of the Indonesian coolies that had arrived in our convoy. All these coolies were suffering from disease, mostly dysentery (both bacillary and amoebic) and a form of conjunctivitis. They were dying in large numbers. No lavatory accommodation was available and the drains of the gaol were full of blood from the defecation of the Indonesians. I called for volunteers to dig latrines and we attempted to clear the portion of the Camp that had been allotted to ourselves. A meal of approximately 200 grams of rice only was given to us at about 1800 hours, and at 2000 hours I was instructed to leave with my battalion (1000 men) for an unknown destination. We marched out, carrying with us approximately 200 grams of rice per man and marched about 6 kilometres to the railhead where we entrained in terribly crowded conditions and proceeded 124 kilometres to Paya Komboe. There we were met by Japanese motor transport and driven a further 180 kilometres to Pakan Baroe, where we were accommodated in a Camp which had contained Indonesians and which was indescribably filthy. I appealed to the Japanese Commander for food and was told that none was available. The following day the whole party were set to work to clean up the Camp and at approximately 1600 hours a meal of rice pap only (kind of porridge) was issued. The following day at 8 a.m. 900 men left the Camp and commenced work on the railway. They had to work extremely hard carrying sleepers, rails, and working with four pound hammers throughout the entire day, without food or shelter.

10. Although we were completely inexperienced in this type of work, our overseers were a group of Japanese soldiers straight from the Burma railway prisoner of war gangs and the same slave driving conditions and brutality was adopted. The men returned to Camp at approximately 9 p.m. and after the

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privations of the journey from Batavia, they were utterly exhausted but the Japanese explained that they could not give us any further food until our rations arrived. For the next five days, the situation remained unchanged. I personally experienced considerable trouble with the Japanese Lieutenant (1st Lieut. TANAKA) because of the rise in sickness. I explained that unless we received food, no improvement could be expected and the water that we were compelled to drink was extremely bad because it came from sulphur springs.] At the end of the five days mentioned above, a Japanese Colonel whose name I never knew but who was completely responsible for the railway construction in Pakan Baroe at that time, visited the Camp. He was an old man with gray hair and had a pronounced stoop and he told me that I must do my utmost to promote the welfare of the men under my command. I explained the ration and water situation to him and told him that the working hours were much too long. The Interpreter stated that the Colonel could do nothing about these working hours but that he would look into the food situation. [That evening I heard that Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN, with the remaining 1000 men had arrived at a Camp approximately three kilometres away. The following day our food supplies arrived and the day after, I moved with my men on a transfer of all the personnel from my Camp to Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's camp and Col. SLABBEKOORN, with his men, to my Camp.

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11. The heavy working parties continued despite a dysentery outbreak which the Allied doctors attributed to the conditions in the Padang gaol.) On the 24th July, 1944, approximately 20 kilometres of rail had been completed and I was instructed to post the first five railway gangs, each comprising 50 men, to the Camp known as Camp three approximately 15 kilometres distant from my Camp in the direction of Padang. The draft left under the Command of Lieutenant DALLAS, 3rd Hussars, and was joined a few days later by an additional 150 British under the command of Captain ARMSTRONG, R.A.S.C., who took over command of the Camp on arrival.

12. By this time I had arranged for limited canteen facilities for the local purchase of extra food when available and I was responsible for Camp 3 as well as my own. Lt. Col. SLABBEKOORN's Camp being No. 1 Camp, mine No. 2 Camp and Captain ARMSTRONG's No. 3 Camp, all administered from my Camp. It was extremely difficult to administer these Camps as I was not allowed freedom of action by the Japanese and two thirds of the personnel under my command being Dutch with a very limited knowledge of the English language. The medium of expression with the Japanese was the Malay language and with the Dutch Malay, French or English in that order. I therefore formed a Camp Committee of the responsible Dutchmen to assist myself and my Adjutant Lieut. der HARTOG, in administering the whole group.

SMRR

13. At about this time, Captain TCHAKAGI, sent for me and explained that he was returning to Java, with our Korean guards, and that we would be handed over to the control of Japanese civilians and Japanese guards and would come directly under the South Manchurian Railway Company. Two days afterwards he handed over to Captain MIYASAKI, who arrived from Medan accompanied by Lieutenant DOI. MIYASAKI assumed command of all prisoner of war camps in the Pakan Baroe area and DOI was in command of No. 2 Camp. Towards the end of

July, 1944, a further draft of prisoners of war comprising approximately 150 Officers and 100 men arrived in No. 2 Camp from Singapore - these men being the survivors of the draft that left Medan, Sumatra, for Singapore and were torpedoed en route (See report Captain J. G. GORDON, R.A. an eye-witness to the incident.) In addition we were informed that further drafts had arrived ex. Singapore and had opened up two further Camps (Nos. 4 and 5) and these were also placed under my administration. At about this time, [I was informed that No. 2 Camp was to officially be the sick Camp, all fit men to be sent working on the railway from the up-country camps and all sick being returned to me until fit enough to act as replacements or to work from my Camp. Wing Commander COFFEY, Senior Medical Officer, and I made repeated appeals to the Japanese (Captain MIYASAKI) for improved conditions, less work, more food and medicines, but all our appeals were of no avail as we were informed that food was not available and Doctor ISHII, the Japanese doctor in charge of P.O.W. Camps, told Wing Commander COFFEY that as medicine was not available we must grow our own herbs and make our own. The less heavy sick were forced to do garden work as Lieutenant DOI said that the ration situation would deteriorate due to lack of transport to convey the rations from BANGKINANG, the nearest town approximately 65 kilometres distant. The Allied doctors experienced extreme difficulty in dealing with the heavy number of sick, at this period about 800; mostly dysentery, malaria, beri-beri, avitaminotic diseases, pellagra and some tuberculosis, and in addition, a large number of tropical ulcer cases. Practically no medicine or dressings were available.] (See reports of Lt. Col. HANNESSY, R.A.M.C. and Wing Commander COFFEY, R.A.F.)

14. [On about 17th September, 1944, I was ordered to anticipate the arrival of a further number of seriously sick cases and I heard from a Korean guard that a further draft had been torpedoed between Java and Padang with very heavy casualties. On approximately the 19th September, 1944, two ambulances arrived with some 20 cases, most of whom died within a day or two. I was told that the remainder were in the gaol at Padang and in the Padang hospital. However, the remaining personnel were posted to Camps 4 and 5 and approximately one week later, 150 sick and dying men arrived in the middle of the night in my camp. At this period, although we had received no clothing for nearly three years, I was ordered by the Japanese to produce as much clothing as possible for the draft mentioned above as the Japanese explained that as the British had sunk this convey and as the Japanese could not produce clothing, we must provide it ourselves. This was done to the best of our ability but the conditions at Camp 4 were extremely bad.] The Commander of Camp 4 was Captain KROON, R.D.N.E.I. Army and Captain ROSIER, R.D.N.E.I. Army was in charge of Camp 5.

15. [At the end of November, 1944, I was informed that a Camp 6 had been established with the personnel who had left Medan some eight months previously for road construction work in Atjeh, North Sumatra, where they had been commanded by a Japanese Officer, Lieut. MIRA, an English speaking Japanese, and an extremely bad type.] (See reports Captain GORDON, R.A. and Lieut. HADLEY, Johore Engineers). [These men arrived in a very debilitated condition but nevertheless, were put on to railway construction work immediately.]

Lieutenant MURA visited my Camp and asked me for a senior British Officer to command the British personnel in his Camp, the Dutch being under the command of Captain van der LADE, an extremely efficient Dutch Officer now commanding Sumatra under British Administration. I posted Captain GORDON to command the British in No. 6 Camp and he left that day accompanied by Lieut. MURA.

16. At this period, the general situation regarding prisoners of war was deteriorating rapidly and I again made repeated appeals to Lieutenant DOI for an improvement in the situation. The appeals were all refused. We produced statistical reports showing the increasing death rate rising to approximately 80 per month was entirely due to lack of food and heavy work, but Lieut. DOI merely informed me that he considered that all the Officers should be made to do more work and that I and my staff were merely trying to sabotage the Japanese war efforts. These conditions deteriorated further and the death rate rose due to the constant exchange of personnel from the up country camps who had fallen sick who were replaced by only semi-fit men from No. 2 Camp.

17. On approximately 16th June, 1945, I was informed that the railway must be finished by the 15th August, 1945, and that every available man who could walk must be sent out to work. Despite our protests, medical parades were held by the Japanese and the men were forced out to work. The health situation of the whole area was now deteriorating with great rapidity, no medicine was available and the whole group was utterly exhausted and all personnel were extremely depressed due to constant slave driving by the Japanese guards and railway officials. Increased supervision by the Kempetai (Japanese Secret Police) was felt and all sorts of additional disciplinary pressure was brought to bear on us.]

*Koreans
very good
anti-Jap.*
18. At this point, the Japanese guards in Camp 2 were replaced by Korean guards and the illicit buying of foodstuffs increased and life inside the Camp became more bearable as the Koreans' attitude, although not pro-Ally, was definitely anti-Japanese. This state of affairs continued until our release. *K*

19. I submitted a detailed report of war criminals to Major GLOUGH, attached to the Intelligence Branch, Force 136, SEAC Headquarters, Goodwood Park Hotel, Singapore, and appended below are the names and description of the major criminals responsible for our condition in Sumatra during the 18 months that I commanded there.

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CAPTAIN MIYASAKI. In charge of all Prisoner of War Camps in the Pakan Baroe Area. A fat officer of medium height with a pronounced squint. He showed no interest whatsoever in the welfare of the Camps and although fully aware of the situation, gave us no assistance and was in fact always insolent whenever approached.

1st LIEUTENANT DOI. Camp Commander No. 2 Camp and Captain MIYASAKI's Adjutant. Another fat officer of medium height. Aged approximately 38 and according to my information, a watchmaker before the war. He was solely responsible for the extreme pressure put upon the men. He visited the Camp on numerous occasions and when groups of sick men were pointed out to him, he merely laughed and said we were but prisoners of war. A bestial type who had no control whatsoever over his guards.

1st LIEUTENANT (DOCTOR) ISHII. Medical Officer all prisoner of war Camps Pakan Baroe Area. A short Japanese Officer wearing glasses. A medical student before the war. Although fully aware of the critical situation expressed himself incapable of improving the conditions, and although he stated that no medicines or dressing were available, he had a large stock for Japanese consumption and after the capitulation produced a very large quantity of the drugs we had so urgently requested.

SERGEANT KATO. Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp in January/February, 1944. He was a bestial slave driver who took extreme delight in forcing sick men out to work. He placed all possible restrictions on the Camps and severely punished any infringement of the most trivial order. He was responsible for stopping all meat issues to the Camp for a period of over five weeks. He was a heavily built country type of Japanese and was extremely powerful. (Last unit MINOTAI).

SERGEANT KITAGAWA. Camp Sergeant No. 2 Camp from March, 1944 to July, 1944. Was if possible worse than his predecessor. Was unapproachable and had a particular hatred for the sick and for Officers. He took great delight in forcing sick men out to work and his favorite form of punishment was to make a man hold an extremely heavy piece of wood above his head for a long period. He agitated his guards to punish prisoners severely for any infringements of the rules. At times, he completely stopped all canteen purchases but at other times purchased large quantities of eggs and beef for the camp - his only redeeming feature. Another extremely powerful country type of Japanese, very heavily built and of medium height. (Last unit MIYASAKITAI).

1st Class Soldier KATO. (Last unit MINOTAI). A schoolmaster before the war. Slim, of medium height, wearing glasses and an extremely narrow face. Made a practice of beating prisoners of war and making them stand to attention in front of him for long periods each time he was on guard. Named: Four-eyes, Blue-Shirt.

K [KOREAN GUARD MATSUDA. (Miyasakitai) was in charge of transport in No. 2 Camp Headquarters. Was an extremely reckless driver who frequently injured POWs through his carelessness. On one occasion, throw four prisoners of war from his truck due to bad driving and immediately afterwards made all the occupants of the truck parade for check. As one of them could not stand properly to attention as he had been injured in the accident, MATSUDA struck him across the face with his torch causing a fracture of the jaw. The P.O.W. in question was L.A.C. DRAPER, R.A.F. MATSUDA was a tall, slim Korean with a long record of brutality towards prisoners of war.

↕
2nd Class SOLDIER FUJI. (Last Unit: MINOTAI). A very short, stocky, wide faced Japanese. By far the worst guard in my experience as a prisoner of war. He took an extreme delight in bestial actions and has a record of beating someone on every occasion that he came inside the Camp. As in the case of Dutch soldier MOLEMA, who suffering with an extremely large ulcer on the left leg which had just commenced to heal, was approached by FUJI, who demanded to know why he did not stand up when a Japanese soldier approached. MOLEMA showed the ulcer on his leg and was immediately kicked upon it by FUJI. The result of this attack was the amputation some three days after and the death of MOLEMA some three weeks later due to weakness and shock. The witness to this attack is Lieutenant (Doctor) KINGMA, Dutch Netherlands Medical Service. Nicknamed: Tiger of Pakan, Baron Flowerpot, Napoleon.

1st CLASS SOLDIER YUNDA (Last unit MINOTAI). One of the guard commanders of No. 2 Camp who assisted FUJI in most of his attacks. Like KITAGAWA delighted in making sick men hold large pieces of wood above their heads for long periods. A Japanese of above average height, heavily built and wore thick lens glasses. He was responsible for many totally unnecessary brutal attacks.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant.

(Sgd) F.S. DAVIS

Wing Commander, R.A.F.]

↕ [19.11.1945.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NLFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Sworn Statement of WILHELM FAGEDOORN, regular soldier No. 94859, R.N.I.A.", signed: W. Fagedoorn, No. OM/8094/S,

which document is a part of the official records of the NLFIS.

SIGNATURE: /s/ Charles Jongeneel

SMIL

BATAVIA, June 7th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. de WEEED, first Lieutenant, R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

Signature: K.A. de Weerd

STATEMENT

SUMMARY OF EXAMINATION OF:

No. 94859, WILLIEM WAGEDOORN, Regular soldier 1 Bn. S.W.K.
Artillery, RNIA

duly sworn states:

I am 28 years of age, of Dutch nationality, born at
ZWOLLE Holland. At present I am living c/o - O.C. L.O.C.
BATAVIA.

I was taken prisoner in Padang by the Japanese on 17th
March, 1942 and was interned in PADANG BARRACKS.

We were moved to Medan, where we lived for 18 months
and left there in March 1944 for BLANGIRDJEREN. We arrived
there on 11th March 1944. BLANGIRDJEREN was the starting
point of a road 29 kms. long, which we had to build. At the
beginning the work was not too exacting and consisted in
widening the existing sand track. At this time we worked
a minimum of 12 hours per day. As we progressed the country
became rougher and the excavation was more difficult. During
the 7 months it took us to complete the task we had only
15 deaths. This was due to the fact that we had previously
had a comparatively easy time at MEDAN and that we were a
specially selected draft of young men.

Officer in charge of this party was Lt. MURA, who did
nothing to prevent the brutal treatment given us by the
Korean guards. Many times he witnessed beatings and never
interfered. Our clothing during the period consisted only
of a pair of shorts. We had no footwear.

Most brutal of the guards were:

MATSUOKA
URIMOTO
IWAMOTO
KANIKI
ISHIMI
OPARA

On completion of the road in October 1944, we were
forced to march day and night from Kms 29 to KOTA TJANI, a
total distance of 145 KMS. The time taken was 68 hours.
The Korean guard in charge of this march was MATSUOKA, who
judging from his behaviour seemed to have received orders

to take us back as quickly as possible. Each time a man fell behind he was beaten by MATSUOKA with a rattan cane until the man kept up with the main party.

Corporal CREWE R.A.F. a Welshman I believe, was one of our cooks and had a very difficult time on this march trying to prepare meals during the brief halts. At one stage Crewe collapsed and was beaten by MATSUOKA while he was unconscious. I and three others carried him for a time and we ourselves were beaten by MATSUOKA because we could not keep up with the main party.

There were many other beatings during the march but I was too exhausted to notice who the victims were.]

From KOTA TJANE we were taken by lorry to MEDAN, where we stayed for a month before being sent to work on the PAKAN BARU railway.

Matsuoka first took charge of us at Medan in August 1942. He came with us to ATJEH in March 1944 and took us back to Medan in October 1944. In about July 1945, when we went to LOGOS camp this guard was replaced by a Japanese regular soldier.

Others responsible for beatings during the march were

KANIMOTO
and YANEGAWA

[Sgd. W. WAGENDOORN /

C e r t i f i c a t e

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a fully true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

Sworn statement of Karel, Hendrik, Emile KRIJGSMAAN, concerning the execution of POWs who refused to enlist in the Jap army at Peiho (Lawe Segala Gale Camp - Kota Tjane jail, Sumatra,
-3946/R-

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

/s/ Charles Jongeneel

SMAL

Batavia, June 7, 1946

subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WIEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General, N.I.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

STATEMENT
SUMMARY OF EXAMINATION OF

Karel, Hendrik, Emile KRIJGSMAN, no occupation, formerly of PADANG, SUMATRA, who, duly sworn states:

I am 42 years of age, of DUTCH nationality, born at BENKOELLIN, SUMATRA. I have no permanent address; at present I am staying at ORANJESCHOOL, MEDAN.

I was taken prisoner of war by the JAPANESE army at PADANG PANDJANG on 17 Mar 42 and eventually interned at LAWE SEGALA camp in June 42. In May 43, I cannot recall the exact date, the Japanese camp commander MIYASAKI told we prisoners of war that we would soon have to enlist in the JAPANESE army as PEIHO. On 29 May 43 about 17.00 hours Lieutenant SUSUKI of the GUNSEIBU KOTA TJANE, and a KEI PEI officer from BRASTAGI, whose name I do not know, arrived in the camp. All the prisoners had to parade. When we were lined up, the interpreter IWASAKI told us that we were given five minutes to decide whether we would enlist in the JAPANESE Army or not. When this period had elapsed the prisoners were divided in three groups: A. those rejected medically unfit. B. the volunteers. C. those who refused to enlist. I myself was with the second group. The names of the people in my group were recorded; after this everybody was allowed to return to their quarters. Amongst those who refused were

Sergeant CROES, R.N.I.A.

" STOLZ

Private WOLFF

Regular sergeant VOSS had also refused but had been arrested previously, I do not know why.

On 29 May 43 about 20.30 hours, those who refused to enlist were taken to KOTA TJANE by JAPANESE and INDONESIAN police. I know this because I was driver to MIYASAKI the camp commander, and had to drive him to KOTA TJANE with SUSUKI, the unknown KEI PEI officer and the prisoners. The prisoners were locked in KOTA TJANE jail. Sergeant CROES, sergeant STOLZ, sergeant VOSS and private WOLFF were bound hand and foot and taken to the village square (aloon-aloon) and there publicly shown to the population who had been called there by the JAPANESE. They were executed at about 23.00 hours 29 May 43. The population had to look on by order of the JAPANESE. As MIYASAKI's driver I had to stand in the front line. VOSS was asked his last wish. He answered he wanted to die with the DUTCH national flag wrapped round his body. His request was granted. VOSS then addressed the audience in Malay, giving his opinion of the JAPANESE and abusing them. When he had finished the JAPANESE wanted to blindfold him but he declined saying: "I am a DUTCHMAN and not afraid to die."

The KEMPEI officer in charge of the firing squad then pointed his rifle at VOSS and fired twice. VOSS was not killed and cried out: "Long live the Queen!" The officer then put the rifle to VOSS' head and shot him dead.

The same KEMPEI officer then tried to behead Sergeant CHOLS with his sword. He missed however and hit CHOLS on the shoulder. He then drew his revolver and shot CHOLS in the head. After this WOLFF and STOLZ were shot by this same officer. I cannot remember exactly how this happened but this so called execution was in my opinion murder. To the best of my knowledge MIYASAKI and SUSUKI were also present.

K. V. F. KRIJGSMAN

Signed

I certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

Signed

E. W. SAYERS Lt.
Translator

J.J.A. VAN DE LANDE Maj.

SWORN BEFORE ME

No. 4 War Crimes Investigation Team (SEAC)

1775 A

OFFICIAL WRIT

2796/R

This day, Monday December 24, nineteen hundred forty five, appeared before me, Meester W. Beun, Substitute Public Prosecutor at the Court of Justice at Medan, in person:

A. E. PRINS-RÖHRBORN

to be heard as a witness in the case against a suspect, probably named DOBUTSJI and a second suspect not to be mentioned by name yet, suspect of Indonesian nationality.

After witness has declared to have known both the suspects before the deed of which they are now suspected, not to be related to them by blood, nor in law and not to be in their employment, witness answers the questions put to her as follows:

What is your surname and your Christian names?

Prins, born Röhrborn, Augusta, Eleonora

How old are you and what is your profession?

I am 43 years of age, without profession.

Where do you live?

Before Japanese invasion I lived at the rubber-estate Soengei Poetih, Galang, now I stay at Medan, 8 Mackaylaan.

As is supposed that witness will not appear at further investigations, she now swears the oath according to her religious principles, that, she will, as a witness speak the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and answers the questions put to her as follows:

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In the month of September 1944, Mrs. Eikens and I still occupied the function of camp-managers. The supply of food which the Japanese gave us was extra-ordinarily bad. For two and a half months we had been given neither sugar nor fat. The official rations, so we were informed by the Japanese, contained: rice for grown up people, 200 grams per head daily and for children 100 grams. Vegetables, 50 gr. per head daily. In reality we got 140 gr. rice for grown ups and 80 gr for children. Vegetables 20 gr. We complained continuously to the Japanese commandant about this treatment and when we got no result, we asked for an interview with the officer, TANAKA, who was occupied with the food-supply. He said, however, that he could not do this. But one day, when Tanaka came to visit our camp, he talked to him about this. After he was gone /

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our Japanese commandant was so furious that he struck both of us with his open hand. The discontentment about the shortness of food increased daily in the camp. The women threatened to break out of the camp to fetch it themselves. We proposed a hunger demonstration, whereupon the thinnest women accompanied by their division-leaders went to the Japanese guard. There we showed them to the Japanese commandant and said to him, that he could now see for himself the results of his hunger-system. We then demanded in the name of the whole camp for the supply of the official rations. The commandant promised us that he would go to Medan and see what he could do for us. When, however, there came no improvement we asked for permission to obtain food from people outside, by means of barter, but this was refused bluntly by the commandant. This went on until middle of November and the discontentment increased more and more.

In order to put off demonstrations which as we knew, could not be held in check much longer, we made a proposal to the inmates of the camp, to wait until November 25, 1944, before breaking out. We hoped vainly that on this date improvement should have come. The camp accorded with this and then we went again to the commandant. We informed him that we could not prevent the inmates from breaking out if no improvement came on the next supply of rations, which was due on November 20. We drew his attention to this: that he would certainly come into "Soesah" (trouble) with Medan, whereupon he replied that we were "Kapala Boesoek" (bad heads) but when we asked that he should name other managers, he said that this was not allowed by Medan. At last he promised me that our request for more food would be answered on November 20. The rations arrived but the amounts were the same as before. Again we went to the commandant and ^{after that} visited him daily with our complaints. Each time he gave us promises for next day, each time without any result and so came November 25.

Then we agreed that from each block-division some women in total 40 persons leave the camp on Sunday-afternoon November 26. However, people did not abide by the agreement and thus the next day about 3 o'clock 386 women left out of camp. To be ahead of events we went to the Japanese commandant and we saw him looking at the departure. He asked what this meant, insulted us again as "Kapala Boesoek" and ordered us to fetch the women back at once. If they would return at once he would not make a "pakara" (case). So we went out of the camp but each time we asked some women to go back we got the answer that they would not do this before they settled their business. The Japanese and Heiho's who had gone outside too, got no results. Later it appeared that someone had telephoned the M.P. at Kaban Djahe from the Japanese hospital situated across the road and from where the breaking out had

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been observed. About nine o'clock in the evening all were back again. Before this the first and second suspect had arrived with a Japanese whom we know by name of TOKASE. Mrs. Eikens and I were called in, whereupon the first suspect interrogated us with the assistance of an interpreter who made notes. When we had told him the real cause of the breaking out, he accused us of having incited the women to it and he boxed our ears with his open hand which was not very painful. We had just been sent away to our block, when we were called again because, as the commandant informed us the M.P. from Medan had arrived. We were ordered to line up the women who had been away. Thereupon the whole camp came to the office. The Japanese understood that not all women could have been guilty of disobeying the orders so that what they saw was but a demonstration. One of the Japanese got so furious, I cannot remember who it was, that he struck with the iron of a golf-club, on the head so that a little wound occurred that bled slightly. After about a quarter of an hour the women were dismissed but they protested when they saw that Mrs. EIKENS and I had to remain.

Again we were asked for the reason of the breaking out and our part in this, whereupon we naturally answered as before. Meanwhile, the second suspect struck me with his open hand about ten times in the face and stumped us on the back which was very painful. Then we got the order to write down all names of the guilty women and to send him this list next day. At about 3:30 o'clock in the night the nerveracking show was over and totally exhausted we went to bed after we had asked all the block-leaders to write down the names of the women who lived in the camp. We took these lists at 7 am the next day, 27th to the commandant. There were all persons who had been present the evening before; also the block-leaders had been called. The latter were heard in different rooms by the M.P. and from everywhere we heard cries of pain, while Mrs. Eikens and I together with the block leaders whose turn had not come yet sat waiting in a room next to that in which first suspect together with the second suspect led the interrogation.

When I was sitting in the waiting room I heard that a certain moment that Sister Schuddeboom a nurse of about 50 years old, was treated so cruelly in the next room that I wanted to enter that room but was prevented by a few Japanese who guarded the open door. When I heard Sister Schuddeboom leaving I asked permission to enter and to be heard by the first suspect. When I entered I saw on the table at which both of the suspects sat, a curtain rod of about 1 m. long and $2\frac{1}{2}$ cm. thick which I supposed was used on Sister Schuddeboom. This on enquiry proved to be true. I protested severely against this maltreatment, whereupon first suspect said that further investigations would be stopped if we would plead guilty on our own accord.

I retorted sharply that the Japanese were guilty themselves, which outraged first suspect so much that he struck me about six times with the wooden curtain-rod so hard on my back, shoulders and neck that the stick broke. Meanwhile, the hearing of the block-leaders was finished and about six o'clock we were sent away with many insults. I had to be supported because I could not walk without help. My body ached everywhere, but the stroke on my back of my neck had been the most painful. Under ordinary circumstances I should have been unable to do my daily work for some days.

In the evening the Japanese called me again, but I sent the message that I was unable to walk and could not come. Early next morning, 28 November, 1944, Mrs. Eikens and I were again ordered to come to the Japanese office together with the ladies: J. Vijzelman, D. ten Bloemendaal, Netty Hoets, Mody Claser, Hetty van de Lee and J. Scharenguiel. When we were all present Mrs. Eikens and I were driven by car and the others by bus to the Penitentiary at Kaban Djahe. When we arrived there our coats and hairpins if we had any were taken away, whereafter we were locked up. Mrs. Eikens and I each in a very small cell and the others together in a large one.

My cell and, as I was told later, Mrs. Eikens' also, was without light or ventilation; the floor was moist with urine, which former occupants had left and the walls were smeared with faeces. Afterwards I heard that these cells were destined for lunatics on transit. There was no bed and we had no sanitary toilet. Next morning November 29, 1944 I was taken by the jailor (toekang koentji) from my cell and taken to a room in the outer building at the back of the prison. First and second suspects were present. I saw lying on the table all kinds of cudgels, belts and whips and on the floor was a coal-fire with irons. Seeing these objects I understood this to be the torture-chamber. Very little light came through the window.

Again first suspect asked me the same questions as before. Indicating the weapons he threatened me to torture if I kept refusing to plead guilty. Finally, when he found that even his sweet words failed to bring results he made me stand on a chair, after he had tied my wrists tightly together behind my back. He tied a rope which ran over a pulley, right over my head to the cord round my wrists and pulled at the other end until I could hardly reach the seat of the chair with the points of my toes. Each time he saw that I lowered somewhat in the joints of my shoulders so that I could get a little more support for the seat of the chair with the points of my toes he drew the rope a little higher. Meanwhile, he stood before me and asked if I would plead guilty. Each time when I replied: "Nippon salah" (the Japanese are wrong), he beat me with a rubber stick very hard on my back which he did more than ten times. /

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After about ten minutes I shouted to him "Officier blanda tida tahoe ini matjem" (white officers do not behave like this), he suddenly let me go and the jerk caused me unbearable pain. Directly after this my nose bled profusely. Two Indonesian policemen were called and these men supported me back to my cell, giving evidence of their pity and disapproval. When I came to the cell, the jailer opened the door and this brute pushed me so hard in my back that I fell forwards on the dirty floor. I could not get up and lay there for a long time, totally numbed.

At about 9 o'clock I was again taken by the jailer to the torture-chamber. Again I was suspended, standing on the chair and again first suspect put the questions he had asked me innumerable times before. He did not beat me and after some time, somewhat shorter than in the morning, he let go the rope, meanwhile, the head of the M.P. had entered. He stood before me and in a fierce voice asked if I had anything to say about the Japanese officers. I replied that I had not referred to them, but to Netherlands officers, whereupon he slapped my face and ordered me to follow him to his office.

On arriving there he ordered a typewriter to be brought and ordered me to type out the names of the women who had been out of camp some days before. I told him that I was unable to do this because of the awful swellings on my hands and the unendurable pain in my arms and body. Then he told me to dictate the names to an Indonesian guard who was also present. As well as I could remember I dictated all the names of the women who lived in the camp with which I was occupied until 3 o'clock in the night, then I was taken back to the cell. For the first time since our arrival we got some food. Concerning me this consisted of precisely counted 72 grains of maize. This I cried out to Mrs. Eikens, who informed me in the same way that she had counted 78 grains. We got no water. Early next morning, November 30, 1944, I was taken out of my cell to the office of the head of the M.P. By use of second suspect, who acted as an interpreter, first suspect interrogated me about the same points as before, in the presence of the head of the M.P. and a certain TAKASE. They did not maltreat me. After some time I was told that they could have me shot as this was the punishment for escape according to international agreement. Thereupon, I was brought back to the cell and I saw Mrs. Eikens being taken away. She also told me afterwards that she had been condemned to death.

About an hour later we were put on a bus together with the other ladies and taken back to the camp. On arrival there we had to wait, standing before the guardroom of the heiho's. Mrs. Eikens and myself could not keep upright, broken as we were, and at last we were allowed to sit down on the grounds. About one hour later Mrs. Eikens and myself, also

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Mrs.

Mrs. ten Bloemendaal and I were transported to a bungalow of the Anglo-Dutch, "the Banteng". The other prisoners were taken back to the camp. We were taken to a large room where we expected to be shot. We were placed with our faces to the wall, Mrs. ten Bloemendaal between Mrs. Eikens and me and with our hands crossed behind our backs. I remarked to my companions that "I do not like it", to which Mrs. ten Bloemendaal replied that she wondered why we were not crying. Then we heard that three Japanese entered and standing behind us opened the locks of their rifles. A fourth Japanese entered and roared at the soldiers in a theatrical way a command to fire so we thought. Waiting for the end and nothing happened. Mrs. ten Bloemendaal could not withhold her curiosity and looked secretly back. "They cannot fire, because the dustcaps are still on the barrels", she whispered. The fourth Japanese gave another command, a soldier struck us once, we were ordered to turn and taken to a room where we saw the block-leaders. Then the three of us were taken back to camp, from where we were daily taken to the "Banteng" to be heard on the declarations of the block-leaders who were kept there for several more days.

During one month I kept the black bruises on my neck, arms, back and thighs. During ten days I could not move my arms, nor use my hands. Other people had to wash me. It was quite impossible to do my work as I was exhausted. When Mrs. Eikens told her story, it appeared that because of the same stubbornness she had met with the same treatment. She had also black bruises which she showed me. During three weeks she could not do anything as a result of the ill-treatment.

Read aloud, presented to, approved of, persisted in and signed.

The sworn witness

Signed

A. E. PRINS

The Substitute Public Prosecutor

Signed: Mr. W. Beun
and for certified true copy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGHEEEL, Captain R.N.I.A., head of War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed statement is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original Dutch document, entitled:

Sworn statement of Mrs. A. E. PRINS, nee Röhrborn, drawn up by
W. BEUN, LL.D. Judge-advocate MEDAN, dated 24th December 1945,
No. 2796/R,

which original document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

Batavia, August 28, 1946.

(S E A L)
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(/s/ Ch. Jongeneel)
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Subscribed and sworn to before me, K. A. DE WEERD, LL.D., Major
Artillery R.N.I.A., Senior Official attached to the office of the
Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ E. A. de Weerd

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(SEAL)

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENIEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true and complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

" Sworn report on atrocities committed by the Japanese M.P. at Sibolga, made by A. SUYKER, Superintendent of Police 1st Class, Assistant Public Prosecutor, dated 24 December 1945, signed SUYKER". OM/8057/S.

authentic copy of which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE

BATAVIA, June 7th 1946.

— SEAL

Subscribed and sworn to before me, K.A. De WEERD, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

PRO JUSTITIA

[SUBJECT: Report on atrocities committed by the Japanese M.P. at Sibolga.]

REPORT

The undersigned, A. Suyker, before the Japanese occupation, a Police Superintendent 1st class, Superintendent of the Country Police, and at the same time, Chief of the Residency preventive force, in the Residency of TAPANOEI, stationed at SIBOLGA, hereby declares to have suffered the following ill-treatment at the hands of the Japanese Sibolga Military Police personnel.

On 4 Aug. 1943, I was fetched from the SOENGEI SENGKOL Internment Camp in a car by the Commander and Sub-commander of the Sibolga M. P.

That night I was detained at the prison at MEDAN. Upon arrival at SIBOLGA on 5 August, I was looked up in the pantry of the E.M.S.

✓ Manager's house, then the M.P. office. This pantry had been rebuilt into a detention room. I was given a pillow and a mat. In the morning of the 7th of August I was interrogated by a M.P. Sergeant, who was assisted by a Japanese Interpreter who spoke Malay well. The M.P. wanted to know what secret instructions (perintah rahasia) had been passed on by me to the Native members of the Civil Service and to Police officials and to the Assistant Wedana of Police, active with the Residency preventive forces, before the Japanese occupation.

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Furthermore they wanted to know for which secret reason (maksod rahasia) our army in SUMATRA had made practically no resistance during the invasion of the Japanese Army, and also in which places our army had left secret radio-transmitters. I was considered to know this data.

As I answered these questions put to me in the negative the Japanese Sergeant, struck me a blow with the flat of his hand in my face, whereupon I stood up to ward off the next blow. Now this sergeant tried to throw me on the floor by means of pulling me at the collar of my shirt and lifting me over his hip, in which he did not succeed. He then ordered me to squat, at the same time holding a heavy arm-chair with stretched arms above my head. When I succeeded in doing so for some moments the Japanese interpreter pushed the chair, resulting in one of the legs hitting my face, and causing a heavy bleeding wound off the right jaw bone. A scar is still visible at the moment. Furthermore the interpreter kicked me on my right shinbone, causing a wound. As I was not strong enough to keep the chair above my head, the Sergeant thrashed me with a piece of rope and subsequently with a wide leather belt. After this I was brought back to my cell; my wounds were not given any attendance at all.

On Sunday 8 August in the morning, I was again interrogated by the same Sergeant interpreter. I was asked the same questions which I again answered in the negative. Hereupon I was ordered to strip. Both the Japanese also undressed except for their pants. In the bathroom my hands were tied on my back, whereas my feet also were tied just above the ankles. After being stretched out on my back, the Sergeant placed himself with his bare feet on my thighs, so as to prevent my turning over. A piece of cloth was then put on my face, after which the interpreter assisted by another M.P. Sergeant, who, in the meantime had entered the bathroom, commenced to continuously pour water on my head with a small bucket. During this illtreatment, called "Mandie" by the Japs, the Sergeant standing on my thighs, pressed my swollen belly with his foot, several times, as a result of which I vomited water and also food. Owing to the grating over the ribbed tiles, my elbows and knees were badly chafed and the skin stripped off. The above mentioned illtreatment continued until there was a knock on the bathroom's door probably from the M. P. Sub-commander. Hereupon my hands and feet were loosened and I was ordered to lie down on the tiles of the open back veranda of the M.P. office, entirely naked, and in full view of the natives present.

After a quarter of an hour (shivering on account of the cold) I was ordered to dress and was brought back to my cell. The wounds resulting from this illtreatment were not attended to.

On Tuesday, 10 August, I was again given the same treatment in the bathroom by the interrogating Sergeant with the assistance of the Japanese interpreter.

When I informed them in the course of this illtreatment of an instruction effected by the Assistant Wedana before the Japanese occupation, my feet were untied and I was taken to the room in which I had been interrogated, my hands still tied upon my back and was forced to sit down on the stone floor entirely naked, beside the writing-table at which the interrogating Sergeant was sitting. After this interrogation I was brought back to the cell. On Monday, August 16, in the afternoon I was transported by car from the M. P. office to the prison at Sibolga and locked up in a cell (a 3 personsono).

On August 25 I was interrogated once more at the M.P. office concerning the presence of secret radio-transmitters in TAPANOELI. During this interrogation the sub-commander of the M.P. present, threatened to have me "Mandied" once more. However, I was not ill-treated this time. After this date I was interrogated no more.

After having been imprisoned for about 3 months I was transported by bus to Medan and locked up in the prison together with the resident van der REYDEN and the Controller VISSER, who had been brought to SIBOLGA in the month of August 1943 and who had been locked up in a cell next to mine.

During the trip from SIBOLGA to TARO ETOENG our hands were tied behind our backs. After having been untied for a short time we were again tied by means of a rope around both upper arms. This took place in front of the M.P. office at TARO ETOENG.

9 November 1943, we were transferred to the prison situated at the electricititsweg, Medan and from this place after no further questioning, were transported to the internment-camp BELAWAN ESTATE on the 10th of November.

[It is worth mentioning:

1. That the illtreatments inflicted upon me took place on order of and with the permission of the Sub-commander of the M.P. at SIBOLGA.
2. That the wounds as a result of the illtreatment inflicted upon me, stated earlier in this report i.e. inflammation of the ear were attended only after repeated requests and only after some ulcerations had appeared.
3. That the food issued to us in the SIBOLGA prison was insufficient as regards both quality and quantity.
4. That no opportunity was given us during daytime to be aired.
5. That opportunity was given us during day-time only after repeated requests (once every 3 or 4 days) and then only after sunset.
6. That I will recognise the M.P. personnel, as mentioned in this report, when confronted with them.

I might add a statement of other atrocities committed by the Japanese Military Police at SIBOLGA viz:

During my internment in the SIBOLGA prison 3 Dutch military men were brought in by the Japanese soldiers in the afternoon of the 15th April 1942 and locked up together in one cell. Before entering the cell

these men were ordered to take off their shoes which then were divided amongst the native personnel of the Japanese. We internees were forbidden to contact with these military men.

In the evening the above mentioned men were taken out of the prison for interrogation and brought back late that same night. On 16 April 1942 between 12 and 1 o'clock pm. (we internees at the moment were locked up in our cells) a number of armed Japanese entered the prison and had the 3 men put into iron transport-handcuffs by the native prison guards, who subsequently took them away with them. They were transported on an open freight truck in the direction of Padang Sidompecan. About half an hour later a Japanese soldier entered the prison and returned the iron transport-handcuffs. That same afternoon we learned from the prison personnel and from other reliable police constables who were in charge of our guarding, that these 3 military men were executed on the beach near the B.P.M. works at SIBOLGA.

It is said that afterwards the bodies were beheaded and thrown into the sea. According to a statement of the jailer the names of the above mentioned military men were:

RYKSEN (non-commissioned 1st. Lt.)
THEUNISSEN and
VAN LEEUWEN

He stated that he had entered these names into the prison register. We have not come to know for which reason these military men were killed.

I did learn however that the native police officer JANNES HOETA OEROK at the same time engaged at the country-police detachment at SIBOLGA is said to have acted as an interpreter at the hearing of these men, which hearing took place on 15 April. The N.C. 1st lieutenant GERRIT RYK HYKSEN, who is still missing, I recognised from a photograph shown to me by Mrs. RYKSEN as a picture of her husband. He was one of those military men executed by the Japanese at SIBOLGA on 16 April 1942.

On a certain day between 20 and 30 April 1942, I do not recollect the right date, the 1st lieutenant (infantry) MATHES and the Army Medical Officer 2nd class DINGEMANS were brought to the SIBOLGA prison, where I was also interned. Both officers who had come from ACHTEN were caught by the natives in the neighbourhood of BAROES and handed over to the Japanese. On their arrival at the prison the above-mentioned officers had to take off their uniforms and these were kept by the jailer. After that they were clad in the well known brown prison clothes. First Messrs. DINGEMANS and MATHES were interned together with us in one cell, but were taken out next morning and locked up in a cell in which were already present 5 British or Australian Military men, who at the occupation of Singapore had succeeded to escape to PADANG via RENGAT. Sailing along the coast these men were caught by the Japanese in the neighbourhood of SIBOLGA.

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the day on which Messrs. DINGEMANS, MATHES and the 5 Britishers were locked up together, a number of Japanese armed with rifles appeared and took Messrs. DINGEMANS and MATHES with them. They were dressed in prison clothes. Later on we learned that Messrs. DINGEMANS and MATHES and also the 5 Britishers were put in a prau at SIBOLGA and were executed on the beach near ACHTEN Residency in full view of the natives.

During my stay at the SIBOLGA prison (August 16 November 18, 1943) I learned from a police constable who had to guard me, but whose name I do not remember, that above-mentioned military men had been executed on one of the islands in the bay of SIBOLGA.

According to a narrative told by two K.P.M. boatmen who for a long time after the occupation were active as a commander on small cargo-ships sailing along SUMATRA's West coast, Messrs. DINGEMANS, MATHES along with the 5 Britishers had been executed on the island of SINBANG.

During my stay at the SIBOLGA prison (16 August - 8 November, 1943) for interrogation by the Military Police, I learned from a police constable who had to guard me, that after our departure on the 4th of May to SIANTAR, another lieutenant of our army was caught by the Japanese, also coming from ACHEEN. The name of that lieutenant he did not know. This police constable however told me, that above mentioned lieutenant had behaved bravely during his hearing at the M.P.

He did amongst other things, adopt a threatening attitude and challenged the Japanese to fight him. According to the statement of this police constable this officer was taken away by prahoo and never seen again. It was suspected that he has been drowned by the Japanese or executed at one of the islands in the bay of SIBOLGA.

I have drawn up this statement under the oath of office sworn at the beginning of my service to my country, concluded and signed on the 24th of December 1945.

The Superintendent of Police 1st Class
Assistant Public Prosecutor,
Signed SUYKER

For copy conform

The Public Prosecutor to the Court of
Justice Medan.

Signed W. BEUN

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C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Sworn Statement of JULIUS COLNELLIS TEERLINK, Pensioned Official of the S.S. at Palembang, signed J.C. Teerlink." No. OM/8204/S.,

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE

/s/ Ch. Jongeneel

SEAL

BATAVIA, June 7th., 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

STATEMENT

SUMMARY OF EXAMINATION OF TEERLINK, JULIUS CORNELIS,
Occupation: Pensioned Official of the S S at PALEMBANG.
Address: 21, SOPHIELAN, PALEMBANG.

who, duly sworn, states:

I am 60 years of age, of DUTCH nationality (EURASIAN), born at Meester CORNELIS, JAVA. I have no permanent address and I am now living at 21 SOPHIELAN, Palembang. I was on my estate (a small agriculture concession) at TANDJONG KARANG 14 May 44 - 8 June 44. On 8 July 44 I was put in prison of the KEIMOBU at TANDJONG KARANG. After three days I was interrogated by an officer of the GUNSEI KAN (the interrogator told me this name) I was suspected of espionage and anti-Japanese-propaganda. I denied this, because I was NOT guilty. The Japanese officer ordered four Indonesian policemen, who were in the room to tie my hands behind my back with a rope and to put iron handcuffs on my hands. I was laid down on a bench (22 inches wide) on my back, my handcuffed hands under my body. I was tied on this bench with a rope from top to toe. The Japanese interrogator and two other Japanese officers, who also were in the investigation room, pressed burning cigarettes upon my arms - the scars are still visible. They ordered the policemen to press a piece of cloth upon my nose and to pour water out of a container into my mouth. I had to swallow because I could NOT breathe. After approx. 10 minutes swallowing I fell unconscious. I was lying on this bench for four hours. The Japanese officers went away. I do not know their names but should recognise them from a photograph. One had cauliflower ears. More information about these officers could be given by the CHINESE driver employed by them, named KIM TJON, living at present at TANDJONG KARANG. When the Japanese went away, I was beaten for approx. 1/2 hour by the four Indonesian policemen. They used a rotten stick (1 inch diameter). They beat my left thigh in turn. The names of these policemen are MACHMOED-PARDIOJALOE-SAMSOEDIN. MACHMOED was the man in charge of all the Indonesian policemen in the prison. He was very cruel, was used by the Japanese as an interpreter, interrogator and when the Japanese were NOT present, he gave orders to the policemen to torture us. I should recognise the policemen of this prison from photographs. After this mistreatment, I was brought back to my cell.

In my cell were 8 Indonesian criminals. The cell was 2 x 4 metres. Many times I was called at 10 o'clock at night and brought to the interrogation room, where MACHMOED interrogated us. I had to sit down on the floor. When MACHMOED was NOT satisfied with my answers, he ordered the other policemen to pour a bucket in my mouth and I had to look for several hours at the bright light of an electric bulb (60 Watt). When the little stick dropped out of my mouth, MACHMOED ordered the policemen to beat me, with a stick. Hereby a list of all the torturings which MACHMOED ordered the other policemen to do to me during the investigations:

1. to beat me with a stick on my head
2. to burn my moustache with a burning cigarette
3. to put burning tobacco under my nose, so that the smoke came into my nose and I started to cough whereupon I was beaten
4. to beat my feet with a heavy stick many times
5. to make me kneel down for half an hour. In the hollow of my knees, the policemen put a heavy pole and pressed this pole downwards with the whole weight of their bodies
6. to tie me for 24 hours on my back upon a bench. I had to look in the light of an electric bulb. When I closed my eyes MACHMOED ordered the policeman to pour water over my face, until I opened my eyes again.

The Kempei Tai officers of this prison agreed with this torturing and came sometimes at night time when we were tortured by MACHMOED and the other policemen, in the interrogation room. They looked at us and said to MACHMOED "Go on" - or - "All right".

Signed J. C. TEERLINK

I certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his language prior to his signature which appears above.

L. K. van der HORST Interpreter

Sworn before me

M E D'ASTUGUES

OC No. 4 War Crimes Investigation Team

(SAC)

CERTIFICATE

1777A

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, Captain R.N.I.A., head of War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed statement is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original Dutch document, entitled:

Sworn statement of LO DJIEN SIOE, drawn up by J. G. BENDERS, Captain R.N.I.A., dated 6th May 1946 No. 5049/R

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

Batavia, 28th August 1946.

/s/ Charles Jongeneel

SEAL

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. DE WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery R.N.I.A., Senior official attached to the office of the Attorney General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd.

SEAL

OFFICIAL RECORD OF INTERROGATIONA f f i d a v i t

Today, Monday May 6, 1946, appeared before me, Joseph Godfried Benders, Captain for Special Services of the Royal Neth. Indies Army, Head of the Netherlands War Crimes Investigation Team, Singapore, holding session at de Souza street 9, Singapore, a person who states to be:

Name: LO DJIEN SIOE

Grade: -----

Army No.: -----

Unit: -----

Civil Occupation: Private physician (practitioner)

Address: Singapore, 257 d Boekit Tinah Road

Future Address: Sourabaya

Born at: Madicoen on July 22, 1911.

* * * * *

Witness promises to tell the truth and nothing but the truth and replies as follows, after having declared that he persists with the data given above, to the questions put to him.

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August 14, 1943, during my furlough at TJOEROEP I was arrested by Corporal JAMASHITA, Corporal SAZAKI and interpreter WEEDA.

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Late at night we arrived at KERTOPATI, the station of PALEMBANG. By car I was taken to the Kenpei-Tai. Immediately upon arrival I got something to eat and a very amicable conversation started. After this I received the first blows from interpreter HAYASHI; this happened without any warning. He struck my head with his fist until I sank down on account of dizziness. ---

Next evening, August 17, 1943, I was again interrogated by Corporal YAMASHITA; blows were not lacking again. Like HAYASHI (this is a Fornsian and as such is called LIEM SIK TJONG) YAMASHITA first struck me with his fist on the head, then with a horse whip on my back. He stopped only when as a result of this I spat blood; he gave me something to drink, wetted my head and then left me lying the whole night on a cement floor without any cover. Next day I came into a cell where, to my astonishment, also the two Ambonese policemen who had been my transport-guards, were confined.

They were accused of participation in an anti-Japanese plot. For about seven days I lay there, ill with dizziness and continuously vomiting. HAYASHI did not seem to be able to tolerate lying down, for when he saw me he ordered me at once to sit up, giving me a kick at the same time. ---

The food may be described as bad and consisted of a helping of white rice and a few slices of cucumbers three times a day; certainly it was not more than a calory-value of 500 per man and per day. We had to drink jointly from a fingerbowl; often with more than 12 people. The cell was no larger than 2 x 4 meters and we were lying prettily like sardines one next to the other. Naturally the hygienic situation was extremely bad. When I had become more fit again, I was again beaten by YAMASHITA, i.e. with his wide linen belt with buckle, he struck me violet-blue from the buttock region until the ankles, so that sitting became impossible to me. Either I was standing or I was lying down on my belly in the cell.

At this time an Indonesian was brought in suspected of theft of a bicycle. The poor man was standing in the middle of a circle of Japanese and acted as a ball. I could see and hear it from my cell. In spite of many blows the man continued to deny and now the "water cure" was applied to him. This I could not see but I heard the vomiting behind my cell, while later, when he passed in front of the cell, he was all wet. Then the first ill-treatment was repeated. Now I heard the blows. Apparently this was too much for the poor man, for he collapsed. He was put down on the floor in front of my cell. Without having regained consciousness he expired during the night at about 2 o'clock. The corpse was quickly put into the luggage space of a car and a chauffeur drove off with it.

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Of the Dutch I saw there Mr. STEVENS, was treated worst. Time and again he was tortured: water cure, hanging head down and fire treatment: this consisted of burning the naked skin with cigarets, mosquito-torches, etc. He told me all this himself and I saw the wounds. The wounds caused by the fire treatment STEVENS kept longest, for only after having been treated by me for about a month, he was rid of them.

For every prisoner these blows, given with a stick of five centimeters diameter, with a horsewhip or with rolled rope, were part of the daily treatment. Every day, or rather, nearly every hour, one heard the groans and screams of the poor people.

There were several special torture chambers. The mildest treatment was standing in the sun a whole day. Only in the morning one got something to eat then. ---

During the months of August and September 1943 there was a raid among the Ambonese; somebody was said to have discovered a plot against Japan among them. Many were arrested and of the hundreds of Ambonese friends not many are left. However, this was not settled by the Kenpei-Tai alone, but also by the Keimobu. The Kenpei-Tai did participate and nearly all Kenpei-Tai members have on that occasion been guilty of severe torturings. ---

In the meantime things were not going so well with me either; several times I was interrogated, not only about my own case but also for the supplying of information concerning suspected Chinese and about all sorts of things. For instance I was interrogated about the doings, the connections of persons whom I had hardly ever met. As I could not reply to this properly, I simply had to undergo those tortures. * * * *

Another time I was accused of owning a firearm. This was said to have been reported by a spy. However, I did not own a firearm, so that a search of the house did not yield anything. The last treatment I underwent probably was an effort to intimidation. In the evening I was brought by car to a distant plantation. The Indonesian chauffeur prepared a pit; I had to kneel in front of this pit, while SAZAKI put his sabre on my neck. Miraculously I escaped from this murder, because the gentlemen could not find fault with me.

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About the end of September 1943 many prominent people were arrested. Most were treated by the Bunseibu.

In the meantime I had gradually won the confidence of the Kenpei Tai and I had regularly to attend to the prisoners. Not only wounds, etc. caused by ill treatment, but also ordinary illnesses like malaria, beri-beri, dysentery, etc. which I did to the best of my ability. ---

The first patient I had to treat was brought in more dead than alive. He had been so maltreated that he had one inflamed burn from the buttock region to the ankles. I treated him for six months, and then he walked around like a gorilla. This was the Chinese A. KOF from Djanbi. He was said to have acted as an anti-Japanese spy. Probably he shall never become quite normal again.

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As far as I still can remember I will state hereunder the names of some people to whom I attended medically and who either died or who have come through alive (all arrested by the Palembang Kenpei-Tai). ---

1. A Chinese by the name of TAN, who under the Dutch Government had been working as inspector with the Political Intelligence service. I attended him for severe dropsy. He has now recovered. This happened around September 1943. ---
 2. The Chinese LIEN SAL TJUAN, owner of toko Djoe Seng, Palembang; he also suffered from dropsy as a result of a liver ailment. This occurred in 1944. Later he died of this illness, also as a result of tortures suffered at the hands of the Kenpei Tai. He had come there for having been in possession of Chunking currency.
 3. An Indonesian, name unknown, owner of toko Kenora, Palembang. I attended him for the results of tortures by the Kenpei-Tai. He had received many beatings. He could neither walk nor see after this ill treatment. In 1944 I treated him for about a month. He is cured. ---
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6. A Javanese train mechanic, I do not remember his name, of the State Railways. He had been terribly maltreated and had died during those tortures. I ascertained personally the traces of many blows, because the body was brought to my house. He was beaten to death by Sergt. NODA. The corpse I returned to his family. This also happened in 1944. ---
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Very, very often I was called to the Kenpei-Tai office to attend tortured people of all nationalities. Generally the illtreatments were of a severe nature, mostly caused by beatings. ---

Treatment by the Kenpei-Tai in the first instance was not the same. Sometimes one was given good food before the interrogation, to be beaten to death afterwards. --- Instruments used most for torturing, were:

- a. a wooden stick of some 4 centimeter diameter, applied to the knuckles. ---
- b. a leather horsewhip or a rolled rope. ---
- c. burning with cigarets, mosquito torches, etc. ---
- d. a big kettle, contents about 5 liters, to overdrink. Sometimes this kettle, generally filled with soapwater, had to be emptied up to three times.

Hanging at first was done head down. Later this method was changed and the victims were hung feet down and hands bound on their back. ---

As for the water cure: the victim was held by some Kenpei-Tai members, and, as soon as the kettle was empty, the stomach region of the victim was pushed strongly so as to promote vomiting, for instance by dancing on his body, etc. ---

As stated, the meals were very scanty and consisted mostly of a small plate of rice and a few slices of cucumber. Sometimes a man who had just been tortured did not receive food for three days. In my time bathing was a rarity. --

For the dead, who all died as a result of torture undergone, I often had to sign a certificate, stating that the person in question had died of tropical malaria, a heart-disease or beri-beri. So these were all false certificates, of which I have signed about 17 in all.

As a revenge for the murder of the Kenpei-Tai Corporal MOCHIMOTTO, which was not solved, no less than 100 people from Aer Iten were arrested, of whom there remained no more than 20. The remainder disappeared without trace. ---

I estimate that in total many more than 100 people have died as a result of torturing by the Kenpei-Tai department Palembang. ---

Head of the Kenpei-Tai here was Major JAHANE TAKASE. Sometimes he assisted personally at the tortures, for instance at nine, and then used to look on smiling. He certainly knew about everything that happened at the Kenpei-Tai.

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Among the Ambonese whom I know personally and who died, are BAKARBESEY and TUWA PATINJA, both working at the Neth. Indies Tax Office. They died two days after their arrest; this I know from their wives, who were called by the Gunseibu in order to take away the corpses of their husbands. The women told me this. They had died as a result of torturing.

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W. S. Lo Djien Sioe
W. S. T. G. Benders

1778A

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Sworn Statement of Foppo Rense KRAMER, Headmanager of the Deli Tabaksmaatschappij, Medan, dated 30 March 1946, Signed F. R. Kramer". OM/8187/S

Which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE:

/s/ Ch. Jongeneel

SEAL

BATAVIA, June 7th 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the office of the Attorney General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de WEERD

[S T A T E M E N T]

Summary of examination of Foppe Kense KRAMER, Head-manager of the "DELI TABAKSMA.TSCHAFFIJ", Medan.

duly sworn states:

I am 44 years of age, of Dutch nationality, born at GIETHOORN. I am at present living at Sultansweg 29, Medan.

On 17 Nov 43 I arrived at PEMITING SILINTAN-prison, sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. We were there 34 Europeans, Political prisoners including three females.

On 31 Aug 45, on which date we were released, only 12 persons had survived the miserable conditions in that prison.]

Their names are:

KRAMER	AUGENSTEIN
REELICK	Mrs. TELLINGS
GASPER	Miss SYNIA
TOOROP	VAN DEN BERG
GREENE	VAN DER SCHAEF

[of whom VAN DEN BERG and VAN DER SCHAEF died since.] The two other names I do not recall. I have handed in to the N.I. Red Cross organisation at MEDAN a list of the names of those who died in prison.

[At the end of 1943 the total number of political prisoners (all nationalities incl.) amounted to approx. 550. At Aug 1945 more than 300 of them had died. After my release, at the estate L.A.S., I calculated the exact percentage of mortality being 62%. Causes of death were invariably dysentery, malnutrition, a-vitaminosis, beri-beri. In short all kinds of food-deficiency diseases.

If the Indonesian guards thought that a man was going to die, he was put into a special cell. Each morning a guard came, kicked at the cell-door and shouted: "Are you alive or dead?" On 12 April 35 Mr. KOEK was brought to such a cell to die. He suffered with dysentery and as he could not help himself, nor was taken care of by anybody else, his own cell of course was unspeakably dirty. That same date (12 April) I was moved into Mr. KOEK's cell, dirty as it was, on order of mantri POEBA, who did not take any notice of my strong protests.]

A few days afterwards I myself got dysentery.

Mr. KOEK lived for another 15 days in his "dying-cell" and passed away on 27 April 45.

[If a man was about to die, but lived too long to one of the guard's opinion, the man was put outside his cell or barrack into the sunshine to speed up his death. I have seen such thing happen myself.

Once it happened that a prisoner, whom the guards supposed to be dead, had been taken away and loaded upon the cart, used for funerals. After a time he was brought back because he was found to be still alive.

The Indonesian doctor ROSKANDAN acted as prison Medicine Officer. This man visited the prison about once a month. The EUROPEANS were just nothing to him. Moreover there was a medical orderly, a Batak named LUKAS, who was not interested at all in the sick. The only medicine we ever got was now and again a spoonful of palmoil and about once a month some kind of liquid belly medicine.]

The Japanese prison-administrator, NISHIMURA, himself never visited us or inspected conditions. His second man, a Japanese, whose name I do not know, made his rounds through the prison daily. The only action he took, however, was beating up now and again the cookhouse-personnel when he states that they had stolen too much of the prisoners' rations.

The food was at first reasonable. From 6 Dec. 1943 already, meals became extremely bad and inadequate in quantity as well as in quality.

For about 40 days our meals consisted then of:

Breakfast: 3 very little pieces of sweet-potato
(weighing boiled certainly less than 100 grams)
Lunch: 4 or 5 little pieces of sweet-potato and a few leaves of
bad quality greens.
Dinner: same as lunch

Either at lunch or at evening-meal a very small piece of salted fish was issued, usually, however, consisting of the head of the fish only.

After 40 days we got every other day maize and rice for midday and evening-meal. Maize average 300 grams a meal (we have counted them!) and rice 7 spoonfulls.

At first we got a piece of boiled meat once a week and half an egg once or twice a week; this ceased, however, after 2 or 3 months. The hard-workers and those of us supervising the work got once a day a so-called foreman's meal in quantity about three times a normal meal. These extras were deducted from the food of the others. The total quantity issued remained the same.

From the very beginning we tried to smuggle our clothes out of the jail in exchange for food. After this had been detected all our clothing and other belongings were taken from us and we were only allowed one pair of shorts, one shirt, one blanket and one grass mat if we had any. We were not even allowed a spoon or a pillow.

Until 1 Jan. 45 Mr. KOEK and I slept together with 109 Chinese and Indonesian political prisoners in a barrack, marked for 44 persons.

[Signed F. R. KRAUER

I certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

Signed VAN DE LANDE

Translator

Sworn before me VAN DE LANDE Maj
for OC No 4 War Crimes Investigation Team.

This 30 day of March 1946

Detailed to examine the above by the Commander-in-chief,
Allied Land Forces, South East Asia.

Authority: ALFSEA War Crimes Instruction No. 1, para 7.

1779

Class B and C Offenses:

PROSECUTION DOCUMENT

No. 5682.

NETHERLANDS INDIES

TIMOR and LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS

Synopsis

Netherlands Division I.P.S.

December, 1946.

Lt.Col. J.S.Sinninghe Damstè,

R.N.I.A.,

Assistant Prosecutor.

TIMOR and LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS

Synopsis.

Occupation by the Japanese Navy.I. PRISONERS OF WAR.1. Murder.

Captured troops were murdered in the most cruel way.

- a. At Oesapa Besar, Dutch Timor, about February 1942 eight Australian P.O.W. were shot after capture, without any trial. This appears from the affidavit by the Australian Pte. R.B. CROW, Prosecution Document 5571.

The Prosecution enters this document 5571 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- b. At Babaoe (Baboe) Dutch Timor, about February 1942, an Australian Medical Corporal, who was left in charge of the hospital, was hanged and had his throat cut. This is stated in the interrogation-report of the Australian Army Chaplain TH. W. BINDFMAN, Prosecution Document 5573, who also affirmed the murder at Oesapa Besar, already mentioned.

The Prosecution enters this document 5573 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- c. At Babaoe, in February 1942 also three Australian P.O.W. were killed; they were tied to each other by string around their wrists and their throats were cut. This is stated by the Australian Lt. Colonel W.W. LEGGATT, Prosecution Document 5579.

The Prosecution enters this document 5579 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- d. At Tatu Meta, Portuguese Timor, in February 1942 seven Australian soldiers were captured. The Japanese bound their hands behind their backs by telephone wire which had been pierced through their wrists. Then they were bayonnetted. The bayonetting lasted for twenty minutes before they were dead. This appears from the affidavit by S. GRACA; Prosecution Document 5802.

At Dilli, Portuguese Timor, in March 1942 a Dutch officer was tied to a tree and pricked by a Japanese officer with his bayonet for about twenty

/minutes;

minutes; chest and stomach were pierced many times; then he was stabbed to death. This is related by GRACA as well.

The Prosecution enters this document 5802 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- e. At Soeway, Portuguese Timor, in August 1942 the Japanese, commanded by a Captain, murdered the captured Dutch sub-lieutenant STIEFKENS by beheading. This is reported by M. AUGUSTUN, who acted as an interpreter. Prosecution Document 5585.

The Prosecution enters this document 5585 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

2. Camps.

Conditions were about the same as in the camps in the other areas.

- a. At the P.O.W. camp, Oesapa Besar, conditions were decidedly bad as regards food, drinking facilities, accommodation and sanitation. Medicines were not provided but the P.O.W. happened to have sufficient drugs of their own. This is contained in the affidavit of Lt. Colonel LEGGATT, exhibit ____.

- b. At Flores Island, West of Timor, conditions were terrible. In the first months no dwellings were provided, the P.O.W., also the sick people, had to stay in the open air. Sanitation, hygienic and medical conditions were appalling. In the ward of the seriously ill patients no bedpans were available, therefore a little hole was dug next to each bedplace and the patients had to roll over it. Because a stool of 40 to 60 times a day was not an exception, time and again new holes had to be dug round the patient until there was no place left and a new bed had to be found.

In case the patient was too weak to roll over the hole next to his bed, one was dug under it and a hole made through his sleeping mat. Food was bad. Consequently health deteriorated and more than half were ill. Still the sick were forced to labour. Of these 279 Dutch P.O.W. 211 died from illness within a years' time. Discipline was harsh; corporal punishments were frequent, causing injuries and even indirectly death. P.O.W. were not protected against air attacks.

40/
60
a day

This is the sad story told in the report of Captain A.C.J. DE THOUARS, R.N.I.A., the camp commandant; Pte. C.K. BRANTS, R.N.I.A., and 1st Lieutenant H.H.J. DE VRIES, R.N.I.A.; Prosecution Document 5578.

The Prosecution enters this document 5578 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- c. At Soemba Island, West of Timor, interrogations were held under beatings and threats. As is reported in the affidavit of the Australian F/Lt. L.L. McKENZIE; Prosecution Document 5583.

The Prosecution enters this document 5583 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- d. At P.O.W. camp Koepang, Dutch Timor, P.O.W. were forced to an exhausting march under harsh beatings; food; sanitary conditions and medical care were bad; labour was exhausting. As appears from the affidavit of Sgt. CH. VAN DER SLOOT, R.N.I.A., Prosecution Document 5597.

The Prosecution enters this document 5597 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

3. Executions.

- a. At Oesapa Besar-camp an Australian P.O.W. who had struck a Japanese N.C.O and escaped was killed. This was explained in a letter written on behalf of the C.O. by a Japanese corporal who states: "In Japanese forces when a person strikes an officer or N.C.O. of higher rank the penalty is always death." However this P.O.W. was executed without trial but only on instructions from Headquarters. This appears from the affidavit of Lt. Colonel LEGGATT, exhibit ____.
- b. At P.O.W. camp, Flores, two P.O.W. were executed without trial. As is stated in the report of Capt. DE THOUARS c.s., exhibit ____.

II. CIVILIANS.

A. Internees.

Most of the European population was interned, also in Portuguese Timor, and their conditions were not much different from those in the civilian internees camps in other areas.

- a. At Soemba conditions were bad, although there was only a small number of internees. Accommodation and food were inadequate; their property was looted; severe beatings occurred causing injuries. As appears from the affidavit of the Controller (civil servant) W.F.H. PLAS, Prosecution Document 5596.

The Prosecution enters this document 5596 as an exhibit.

- b. At Liquica, Portuguese Timor, the Portuguese civilians were concentrated and interned. Conditions were as usual: bad accommodation, food, medical care; exposure to air attacks without protection, attracted especially by firing from a hospital. Particulars are given in the affidavit of GRACA, already introduced, exhibit _____, and the affidavit by C.J. SEQUEIRA; Prosecution Document 5803.

The Prosecution enters this document 5803 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

B. Non-Interned.

1. Murder.

- a. At Aileu, Portuguese Timor, in September 1942 the Japanese, disguised as natives, made an attack upon the Portuguese guards, who had been sent off duty, and killed most of them. This is stated by a survivor, the Portuguese Pte. E. SIMOES, Prosecution Document 5804.

The Prosecution enters this document 5804 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- b. At Ainaro, Portuguese Timor, in October 1942 two Roman Catholic priests were murdered.

At Atsabe, Portuguese Timor, in December 1942 the Japanese used, when attacking the Australian forces, 50 to 60 natives as a screen, of whom a number was killed.

The Japanese burned the native huts in the area of Mt. Katrai, Portuguese Timor, and shot the women and children as they ran from the huts. This was a regular practice.

These facts are related by the Australian F/O W.A. BEATTIE, Prosecution /Document

Document 5805.

The Prosecution enters this document 5805 as an exhibit.

- c. The Japanese attacked and sacked also other native villages in Portuguese Timor, using indiscriminate machinegun fire, e.g. Kelicaí and Nahareca, as appears from the affidavit by the Portuguese L.A.N. RODREIGUES Prosecution Document 5806.

The Prosecution enters this document 5806 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- d. At Koepang, two natives were killed without proper trial; as appears from the affidavit of VAN DER SLOOT, already introduced, exhibit ____.
- e. At Oesapa, a native was killed without trial, as stated in the report of Chaplain BINDEMAN, already introduced, exhibit ____.
- f. In September 1944 General TANAKA ordered a punitive action against the islanders of Loeang and Sermata, East of Timor, because some Kempeitai men had been murdered by the native population. The local Rajah of Loeang was ordered to search for the chief of the so-called mutiny and was executed because he could not find the mutineer. The chief of the rebels and two others were executed at Lautem, Portuguese Timor. Of the other Loeang rebels 34 were executed on Moa Island, and 60 of the 650 Sermata rebels were killed.

This appears from the report of Major General Y. TANAKA, Prosecution Document 5594.

The Prosecution enters this document 5594 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

VC | A Japanese Lieutenant gives a further description of the killing on Moa Island. The natives were killed by bayonetting, three at a time by 21 Japanese soldiers. He himself organised a brothel in which he forced five native women to act as prostitutes as a punishment for the deeds of their fathers. Statement by Lt. S. OHARA, Prosecution Document 5591.

The Prosecution enters this document 5591 as an exhibit.

2. Kempeitai.

The Military Police operating in this area applied the well-known Kempei methods of interrogation, torture, punishment and treatment. Burning with cigarettes, watertest, hanging, kneeling upon sharp stones; severe beatings. Even killing.

- a. L.A.N. RODRIGUES describes instances of torture at Ossu, Portuguese Timor, in his affidavit, exhibit _____, and also mentions that the Japanese forced the local chiefs to provide girls for the brothels.
- b. The Chinese CHUNG HAI CHENG, or HA HUI, acted as an interpreter for the Kempeitai at Dilli. In his affidavit he relates several cases of ill-treatment; Prosecution Document 5807.

Conditions in the prison were very bad as may easily be understood by the statement of HA HUI, Prosecution Document 5807. The Australian prisoners in the gaol at Dilli were very weak and exhausted. Women prisoners were beaten as well as men.

The Prosecution enters this document 5807 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

- c. At Manatuto, Portuguese Timor, the Portuguese Chef de poste (administrator) was murdered by the Kempei; his cut-up remains were put in a sack and sent to his wife. As stated in the affidavit by F/O BEATTIE, already introduced, exhibit _____.

This completes the presentation of evidence regarding the Japanese war crimes committed in the Timor area.

Evidence taken Manila 1/10/45

/s/ A.W. (?)

When COMPLETED this document must be classified as SECRETAUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES COMMISSIONQUESTIONNAIRE

NOTES:-

- (a) This questionnaire should be completed by:-
- (i) All repatriated Australian prisoners of war (A.I.F., R.A.A.F., and R.A.N.).
 - (ii) All repatriated Australian civil internees.
 - (iii) All repatriated British civil internees in the Pacific Area (excluding Malaya and China).
 - (IV) All members and ex-members of the Allied forces who have actual knowledge of war crimes committed by the enemy.
- (b) It will be completed in the presence of an officer who will counter-sign the signature of the person making the statement.
- (c) It is important that a full statement on page 3 (carried on to page 4 if necessary) be furnished as well as the answer to 8 (f).

1. Army number WX11036 2. Rank Chaplain
3. Full name (in Block Letters) BINDEMAN: Thomas William
4. Unit at time of capture and/or place of capture Sparrows Force, Timor
5. Home address 1 Fortune Street, South Perth W.A.
6. At what enemy camps and hospitals were you confined and when were you at each?

Oesapa Besar, Timor Feb. '42 - Sep. '42
 Tandjong Priok, Java Oct '42 - Jan '43
 Makasara, Java Jan '43 - Mar '43
 10th Battalion, Java Mar '43 - Sep '43
 Singapore Sep '43 - Oct '43
 Shirokawan, Formosa Nov '43 - Feb '45
 Fukuoka, Kyushu Feb '45 - Apr '45
 Mukden, Manchukuo Apr '45 - Aug '45

7. Do you have any information about any atrocities against, or mistreatment of, Allied soldiers, prisoners of war, civilian internees, or the civilian population for which you think the perpetrators should be punished? (Answer by stating YES or NO in the spaces provided below)--

- (a) Killings or executions Yes
Yes or No
- (b) Rape, torture, beatings or other cruelties Yes
Yes or No
- (c) Imprisonment under improper conditions Yes
Yes or No

- (d) Massacres, wholesale looting, pillage, or burning of towns or villages No
Yes or No
- (e) Use of prisoners of war or civilians on enemy military works or operations Yes
Yes or No
- (f) Exposure of prisoners of war to danger of gunfire, bombing, torpedoing, or other hazards of war Yes
Yes or No
- (g) Transportation of prisoners of war under improper conditions or deportation of civilians Yes
Yes or No
- (h) Public exhibition or exposure to ridicule of prisoners of war Yes
Yes or No
- (i) Failure to provide prisoners of war or internees with proper medical care, food or quarters Yes
Yes or No
- (j) Collective punishment of a group for offence of others Yes
Yes or No
- (k) Breaches of rules relating to the Red Cross Yes
Yes or No
- (l) Cannibalism No
Yes or No
- (m) Mutilation of the dead No
Yes or No
- *(n) Any other war crimes not specifically mentioned above for which you think the guilty persons should be punished Yes
Yes or No

If any question is answered YES then state the facts in 8 (f) and on pages 3 and 4.

8 Details of Atrocities -

- (a) Kind of crime killing
- (b) When and where it happened
- (c) Who was the victim? (Give complete description including name and whether military or civilian personnel)
- (d) Who was the perpetrator? (Give as complete description and as much information as possible
- (e) State if you saw it yourself, if you did not see it, who told you about it? (Give names and addresses of other witnesses)
- (f) Give brief story of crime. Full statement required on pages 3 and 4.

*Other war crimes not specifically mentioned include:-

- (i) Usurpation of sovereignty during military occupation.
- (ii) Compulsory enlistment of soldiers among the inhabitants of occupied territory.
- (iii) Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory
- (iv) Confiscation of property.
- (v) Exaction of illegitimate or of exorbitant contributions and requisitions.
- (vi) Debasement of the currency and issue of spurious currency.
- (vii) Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
- (viii) Wanton destruction of religious, charitable, educational and historical buildings and monuments.
- (ix) Use of explosive or expanding bullets and other inhuman appliances.
- (x) Directions to give no quarter and refusal of quarter.
- (xi) Misuse of flags of truce.

FULL STATEMENT OF ATROCITY OR CRIME

This MUST be signed by the person making the statement and counter-signed by the interrogating officer at the end of the statement.

- I Cpl Guthrie; W.C.(VX 23312) who was unarmed, wearing the red cross upon his arm, and left in charge of the hospital at Baboe, Timor, from which, fortunately, patients had been removed a few hours before, was hanged from a tree and had his throat cut. Troops of the Sparrow Force reported this incident. Personally, I verified the fact that Cpl Guthrie had met his end in this way by having to exhume the body from a slit trench in which it had been placed temporarily, in order to recover his identity disc and place his body in a place where it might not escape notice.
- II While traversing country where the Okabeti and Tjamplong roads cross in Timor, looking for dead to give them burial I came across the bodies of 8 Australian soldiers tied together by rope around their wrists. Each had been shot through the head at close quarters. Later it was related that 11 sick men were being removed to the Tjamplong Hospital when captured by the Japanese. After some time the Japanese decided to shoot all the prisoners but three men succeeded in breaking their bonds and escaping. One of the men, whose name I lost during a voyage, reached the Oesapa Besar Prison Camp and confirmed my theory formed from the evidence I had discovered.
- III Pte Terry, E.F. (TX3597) was taken from the Oesapa Besar Prison Camp to drive a truck for the Japanese. During one of his trips he suffered a breakdown to his truck. He was charged by his guard with sabotage, became angry and struck him. For this offence he was shot without trial. Lt. Hirada admitted this. Lt. Hirada was the second officer appointed to the Oesapa Besar Prison Camp succeeding Lt., later Captain, Fukada.

Tobyotimes

IV A native, familiarly known as Tommy "Broome", the latter name because he had engaged in pearling in Broome, West Australia and was the proud possessor of a discharge certificate which stated that he had rendered faithful service in his work, spoke to me as I passed him on my way to bury dead after capitulation. Hidashi Hioki, who claimed to be attached to the Tokyo Times in normal times but seemed to be a member of Japanese Intelligence Staff during the war on Timor, was acting as guard and immediately took Tommy into custody. He had him soundly beaten with a large piece of wood, upon his arrival in Tjamplong. I interceded on the native's behalf but my efforts were fruitless. He was taken into a building and a shot rang out. Hioki smilingly told me that Japanese soldiers were merely taking care of my native "friend." His death was confirmed by another native later.

To the best of my belief the above particulars ^{/s/ T. W. Bindeman} are correct.

Affirmed before me at Manila this 1st day of October 1945

/s/ . A. Walker, Capt.
(Signature of Interrogating Officer)

/s/ . T. W. Bindeman
(Signature)

AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMESBOARD OF INQUIRYBEFORE HIS HONOR, MR. JUSTICE PHILIP

WILLIAM WATT LEGGATT, Sworn and examined:

I am VX. 44907, Lieut.-Col. William Watt Leggatt.
C.O. 2/40th. My private address is Mornington, Victoria.

I was taken prisoner at TIMOR on 23rd February, 1942.
Before I was captured we recaptured a village called
Babaoe, which had been taken by the Japanese. While we
were in possession of the village I saw three men of
my battalion who had been tied each to each by string
around their wrists. Their throats had been cut and
there was evidence that they had also been shot.
I was confined in Oesapa Besar.

Accommodation

No covering of any sort was provided at first, except
a few native huts for the sick in a separate medical
area. We built our own camp, in the manner of native huts.

Food

The only food at first was rice. No cooking utensils were
provided and food was cooked in mess tins. Later we
obtained some of our own kitchen utensils.

The only water available for any purpose at all, was from
a swamp in the area.

Later on, about a month, we were placed on our own half-
ration scale from our own rations which had been recovered
from our base depot.

Medical and
Hygiene

No drugs supplied at all, at first; but we had sufficient
of our own drugs to carry on.

Latrines

No latrines were provided. We had to dig our own immediately
and very few tools were provided for the purpose.

Work

P.O.W.'s. were employed unloading ships, mainly food.

Munitions

At one time we were asked to unload Munitions. I objected
and that was stopped.

The general treatment by the Japanese of the P.O.W.'s was good
and I saw only one incident of a man being struck, for
stealing. The punishment administered to him was not very
severe.

/
Canteen

Canteen There was no canteen but we were able to buy some food from the natives.

EXECUTION OF V.X. 3597, PRIVATE TERRY, E.F., 2/40th BATT.

A copy of a letter written by me on 14th June, 1942 to the Japanese Commandant of the camp at OESAPA BESAR is attached hereto and marked with a letter "A".

The reply of Corporal Sakakura, for Lieut. M. Harada (the Camp Commandant) dated 16th June, 1942 is attached hereto and marked with the letter "B".

A copy of letter dated 16th June, 1942 from me to the Camp Commandant is attached hereto and marked with the letter "C".

I have no personal knowledge as to who actually executed Private Terry but I have been informed by some of my men that he was executed by a Japanese Sergeant, Soramento.

In July, 1942 I was taken to the Cycle Camp in Batavia.

ACCOMMODATION: Reasonable, but very overcrowded.

FOOD: Inadequate

MEDICAL & HYGIENE: Medical supplies were short but we were able to purchase some outside. Hygiene was fair.

WORK: Clearing up the town. Officers did not work except in charge of parties.

GENERAL: We were forced to salute all ranks.

The guards used to come through the camps several times a day beating up prisoners of war who did not stand strictly to attention.

I went to Changi on 12th September, 1942 and remained there until the end of hostilities.

This is the second and last sheet of the evidence of Lieut.Col. William Watt Leggatt C.O. 2/40th Batt., taken and sworn before me at Melbourne in the State of Victoria this 24th day of January, 1946.

/s/..W..Watt.Leggatt.....
DEPONENT

/s/...G.Philp..J.....
MEMBER

Australian Board of Inquiry
into War Crimes.

GIB/CR/lc

LIEUT.COL. W.W. LEGGATT
24/1/46

"A"

14 Jun 42.

The Commandant
Australian Camp
OESAPA BESAR.

Ref ALLEGED DEATH OF PTE TERRY E.F.

Information was received yesterday from a driver in KOEPANG that TX 3597 Pte TERRY E F who was driving a truck at SOE, was shot and killed a few days ago.

2. Please advise if this occurred and if so what were the circumstances connected with his death.

Lt Col.

(Sgd) W.W. Leggatt

"B"

Japanese HQ. Oesapa Besar,
16th June 1942.

The Commander,
Australian Camp.

The following message has been received from our HQ at Koepang:-

1. Driver Terry was killed under the following circumstances:
Some days ago he was driving a lorry which broke down. He left the lorry by the roadside and went back to the barracks for his meals. One of our N.C.O.'s noticed him and told him he should have brought the truck back to the garage before lunch and ordered him to go out and get it. The N.C.O. again noticed him and repeated his order but he did not obey and struck the N.C.O. and ran away. The garrison in SOE commenced a search and found him and acting on instructions from HQ. in SOE he was killed.
2. In Japanese forces when a person strikes an officer or N.C.O. of higher rank the penalty is always death. This is the first time that a prisoner of war has committed an act of violence and we hope that it will not occur again.
3. We do not wish to show any lack of courtesy to a prisoner of war but it is the duty of a prisoner of war to conduct himself in a proper manner.

(Sgd) Sakakura Cpl
for M. Harada, Lieut.

"C"

OESAPA BESAR

16 Jun 42

The Commandant
Australian Camp
OESAPA BESAR

KILLING OF Pte TERRY

Reference your memo of 16 Jun 42 it seems hardly credible that the summary shooting of Pte TERRY is contravention of even the customs of civilized warfare apart from the rules of the GENEVA CONVENTION should be countenanced by the Japanese authorities.

2. This Force surrendered on the condition that they would be properly treated, according to the rules of Prisoners of War.
3. Apart from the unjustified severity of the penalty should be carried out without a proper trial.
4. Please supply details of the evidence of any witnesses of the occurrence.
5. In view of the fact that the drivers are liable to be subjected to such summary treatment it is requested that they be returned to the P O W Camp.

(Sgd) W Watt Leggatt Lt Col

GIB/CR/3c

APPENDIX 2.

LT. COL. W.W. LEGGATT
24/1/46

/s/ G Philp J.

Excerpts.

Summary of examination of SEBASTIAO GRACA

Telephone Chief.

Dilli, PORTEGUSES TIMOR (permanent address).

being duly sworn states, I am a Portuguese subject, a Telephone Chief and live at Dilli, PORTEGUESE TIMOR. I was in DILLI when the Japanese first landed on 20th February 1942. I know Doctor OLIVERA.

On the 23rd February I was at my property at TATU META. I saw seven Australian soldiers who had been captured by the Japanese. One was a Sergeant. The Australians had their hands bound behind their backs by telephone wire which had been pierced through their wrists. About twenty Japanese were with the Australians. I was too far away to see if a Japanese officer was present.

The Australians were placed in a line and the Japanese commenced to bayonet them. They bayoneted them slowly at first a number of times. After twenty minutes of bayoneting, the Australians were killed by a last thrust of a bayonet.

The Australians were brought to the place in a truck.

The bodies of the Australians were thrown into ditches at the side of the road and the Japanese covered them partly with earth, leaving the legs and feet exposed. The Japanese then left and three days later as the bodies began to smell I informed Doctor OLIVERA. It was impossible to pass because of the smell.

The first Sergeant VICENTE of the Chief of Police, came with a party and buried the bodies in a proper manner two or three metres from the side of the road.

Later I went to near the graves and I found an Australian Paybook with a photograph of a soldier wearing sergeant's stripes. I do not remember the name in the Paybook. (Witness was here shown an Australian Paybook and identified it.) Later I took the Paybook to my place where an Australian officer was staying, at LAULARA, and gave him the Paybook. I do not know the name of this Australian officer.

The Australians were dressed in the usual Australian uniforms with Australian hats.

The bodies of the Australians were removed by the Australian Graves Commission in December 1945, after the remains had been exhumed by the Portuguese and placed in boxes.

In the beginning of March, I saw a Dutch officer brought by the Japanese to near the Post Office in Dilli. The Dutch officers hands were bound behind his back. It was about 6 o'clock in the evening. He was placed on the steps of the Post Office. He was left there all night. The next day the Dutch officer asked for water but the Japanese did not give him any.

I do not know the rank of the Dutch officer.

This is page one of the statement by SEBASTIAO GRACA.

Portugal

VC

[The Dutch officer was bound to a tree and a Japanese officer started to prick him slowly many times with a sword. This went on for ten to twenty minutes and then the Japanese officer killed the Dutch officer by thrusting his sword into the Dutch officer's heart. His chest and stomach had been pierced many times.]

I then went away and when I returned at midday the body of the Dutch officer had been taken away.]

In January 1943, I was told that a Portuguese and his mother who was 70 years of age were killed by the Japanese near the garden on the sea front in DILLI. The name of this Portuguese, was ANTONIO ARAUJO who was Secretary of the Administration of ALLEU. They were killed inside a house.

A number of Portuguese prisoners were taken to this house and never came out. This house was the Headquarters of the Japanese Police or Ortori, and the Commandant of the Japanese Police was an officer named MATSUDA.

I do not know the names of any of the Japanese who were concerned in the murders of the Australians or of the Dutch officer.

I could recognize MATSUDA again, but I could not recognize the others as they all appeared alike in features.

The Secretary of the Administration was one that escaped when the Japanese attacked ALLEU.

When the Japanese occupied the East side of DILLI they were commanded by MATSUDA and another officer, Lieutenant MATSYMOTO, and they reached MANATUTO, they killed the Administrator, MENDES LMEIDA and the Chef de Poste P. DINHA.

A Chinese, LEO FO, went with the Japanese to MANATUTO and saw the happenings. The Chinese later escaped to the Netherlands island. This was on 30th November 1942.

The Japanese with native troops then went to LAUTEM where they killed the Administrator, MANUEL BARROS and his wife and two other Portuguese, ANTONIO TEIXEIRA and MARIO CONSALVES. The Japanese also used natives of Dutch Island of ALOR and Dutch TIMOR as black troops in these attacks.

The Commandant of the Dutch native troops was PAULO of ATAMBOEA, DUTCH TIMOR. The native troops were organised by natives of Dutch Timor who were taken in large groups to Portuguese Timor to fight for the Japanese.

[I was later put into the concentration camp by the Japanese.]

In September 1945 nine native Chiefs of the Poste of LAELUTA were killed by the Japanese because the Chiefs had sheltered PATRICIA LUZ, who was a Portuguese Guerilla and worked with the Australians.

[In the concentration camp, the Japanese did not give sufficient food to us, only small quantities of potatoes and rice. There was a Portuguese Doctor there but he did not get any medical supplies. About fifty adult persons died in the camp through lack of food and through eating poisonous greens which they gathered through hunger. We were not allowed to write letters from the camp, nor were we allowed to receive letters.]

We were forced to work in vegetable gardens but the fields were not very suitable for vegetables. After the vegetables grew, the Japanese sent natives to take it away.

All my property was taken from me immediately after the Japanese landing. All other places were similarly robbed.

Native girls were forced to sleep with the Japanese. The Chef de Poste at the camp was ordered to bring Portuguese girls to the Japanese. The Chef de Poste, OLIVERIA, refused and he was held all night by the Japanese.

The Portuguese schools were all destroyed and the Japanese opened schools and forced the natives to attend to learn Japanese.

(Signed) Sebastiao Graça. .
Signature of Deponent

Taken and Sworn before me at DILLI, PORTEGUESE TIMOR, this 25th day of June, 1946.

(Signed) M. F. Quinton _ _ Major,

being Officer appointed by Commander-in-Chief, S.E.A.C., to make this investigation

and

(Signed) H. Pos _ _ _ Capt
N.E.I. ARMY.

and

(Signed) Illegible _ _ _
Intendente, PORTEGUESE TIMOR

Interpreter

I, GIL FIRRIERA, certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

(Signed) Gil Firriera _ _ _
Interpreter

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, Captain RNIA, Head of War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed statement is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original Dutch document, entitled:

Statement by MALKIANUS AUGUSTIJN, drawn up by T.DE BREE, NCO RNIA, acting security officer, dated Koepang, 16th October 1945, No. OM/21/M, 1456R, with annexed situation sketch, - which original document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

signature:

/s/ CHARLES JONGENEEL.

(SEAL)

Batavia, 28th August 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, K.A. DE WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA, Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K.A. DE WEERD.

Temo
Herba
P4

Translation of the Dutch original.

-STATEMENT-

Today, the 16th of October 1945, at 3 pm, a person, unknown to me appeared before me

T. DE BREE, W.O.I., in charge of security investigation at Koepang -
who, when questioned, gave as his name:

MELKIANUS AUGUSTUN, born at Kisar-Aboesoer, age 43 years, occupation none.

He stated as follows:

About the 13th or 14th of August 1942, I went together with the Japanese marines to Soeway (Portuguese Timor) under the command of a Japanese officer, with the rank of a captain. I was ordered to function as an interpreter.

On the second day at Soeway some Portuguese Timorese natives reported to the Japanese that they had discovered an European, who was hiding himself not far away in the bush. Immediately about 10 Japanese soldiers and about 10 Port. Timorese natives went to the bush to capture the mentioned European. I do not know any of the men who went on this patrol.

It was still before 12 am of this same day that the patrol returned with an European, dressed in the uniform of the N.I. Army, green trousers, puttees, green shirt, green forage-cap. Because of the distance (about 60 metres) I did not recognize him.

About 3 pm. MURAKAMI, the Japanese interpreter, came to me and asked me whether I knew the sub-lieutenant SIEFKENS. I answered in the affirmative, because I knew sub-lieutenant SIEFKENS at Koepang where he lived in the ward of Mardeka. After that this MURAKAMI asked me whether I dared to behead an European. I answered that I did not dare to do that. He asked the same question to Kapiann and got the same answer. Then MURAKAMI said to me: "My sword has eaten already many persons and today my sword will eat another one." After that he left us.

At about 6 pm. of the same day I saw that sub-lieutenant SIEFKENS was brought to already dug hole. He had to step into that hole and after that he was blindfolded with a white cloth. Then 10 soldiers took their stand at one side of the grave while two officers stood at the other side. MURAKAMI came and took his stand between these officers, drew his sword, grasped it with both his hands and beheaded his victim with the cry of: "Tenno Heika." Head and body fell into the grave after which the Japanese left

VG
"Tenno Heika"

the place and our patrol continued it's march.

I dare to affirm this statement on oath,

Koepang the 16th of October 1945.

Signed (T. de BREE)
W.O.I. in charge of security
investigations

The appearer signed
M. AUGUSTUN-

This statement is read to M.AUGUSTUN in a translation from the
Dutch in to the Malay language in the presence of S.SAUBAKI and
D. KENNING -

The witnesses:

Signed: S. SAUBAKI
Signed: D. KENNING

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report to a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document entitled:

"Report concerning Criminals of War Working Party Flores, drawn up by Capt. A.C.J. de THOUARS, Ldst soldier C.K. BRANTS and Res. 1st Lt. H.H.J. de VRIES, No. OM 205/E,"

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE:

(
/s/ (Ch. Jongeneel)
(S E A L)
BATAVIA, June 7th 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the office of the Attorney General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

CRIMINALS OF WAR WORKING PARTY FLORES

As criminals of war are considered all Japanese instances, authorities and military men (Korean guards incl.) who can be made responsible for, we well as those directly or indirectly concerned with, the undermentioned facts that are regarded as war crimes:

- A. The using of Ps/W to execute military works, viz. unloading war materials (benzine, oil, aeroplane bombs) and designing military airbases.

Reference is made to which is mentioned in enclosed report.

Responsible herefore are held the Japanese command of the P.O.W. camps in the area concerned and the possible higher military instance which gave orders hereto to this command.

- B. To make a working party as the undermentioned of a great number of Ps/W who on account of their age, physical condition and/or condition of health ought not to have been brought into consideration.

Reference to statement sub "Composition of transport"

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub A, the medical authorities, who on 18th April 1943 inspected at Tjimahi the departing persons, the senior officer who addressed them on April previous to 18th at Sourabaya and possible also the Japanese camp commandant ASHITA who the day before inspected them personally.

- C. The transport of Ps/W to Flores under conditions (want of accommodation and hygienic supplies on the ships, inadequate food, want of medicines and heavy unloading work), that inevitably led to weakening, illness and death.

Reference to statement on "Outward voyage Sourabaya-Flores".

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub A/ and persons, the authorities specially charged with the regulation of the voyage, and the on one of the vessels travelling commandant ASHITA, who neglected to make rules to ameliorate the situation.

- D. The transport of Ps/W Flores on ships that carried i.a. benzine, oil and aeroplane bombs, as well as using the Ps/W to unload this cargo at places more or less exposed to bombardments (f.i. Laoeteng and Koepang), this without practising safety rules.

Reference is made to the statement sub "Outward voyage Sourabaya - Flores (via Timor)".

Responsible herefore are the instances mentioned sub C and the authorities with the exception of ASHITA (insofar as he at least in the point had no influence or authority).

- E. To make Ps/W reside at Maoemore (Flores) during many weeks without any covering, in the open air (incl. hundreds of sick people, amongst whom many serious cases), in which conditions nursing of the patients was practically impossible through utter lack of hygienic supplies and the number of cases and deaths in this period increases in jumps.

For further details reference is made to the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blom-Camp" - Material care, 1st and 2nd Sickcamp (So-called Wulff-Camps) - Material care and health condition".

/
Responsible

Responsible herefore are the instances and persons mentioned sub A the P/W Command at Ambon (under which resort also Flores fell), the camp commandant ASHITA and possibly the directing medical authorities (in as far as these knowing about the bad health conditions nevertheless neglected to have measures taken.

- F. The transport thereafter of Ps/W in barracks in which accommodation, hygienic supplies etc. offered insufficient opportunity to prevent further spreading of diseases and to attain recovery of the already present patients, and of which the main part of the camp was situated in such a way in regard to the contiguous aerodrome, that there was continuous danger of bomb ardnments and/or machinegunning, without there being any decisive safety measures.

Reference is made to information re this in the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blom-camp-Material care-Safety/protection, "1st and 2nd Sick-Camp (also-called Wulff-camps) - Material care.

- G. Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities sub E. To supply inadequate food (which caused weakening and greater susceptibility for diseases and also deteriorated the possibilities for recovery of the sick seriously) and insufficient medicines (which made recovery of many ill people and the prophylactic administration of medicines - specially quinine - impossible). For further details reference is made to the report sub III "Stay at Flores" under the headings "Blomp-camp & 1st and 2nd sick-camps (so-called Wulff-camps) - Material care.

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities mentioned sub E, the Japanese sergeant and orderly NAKAHARA and the Korean hospital soldier (in as far as this one on his own account and purposely limited the supply of medicines still further), the Korean intendant and guards, who regularly the meat meant for Ps/W and other things used for themselves and those Korean guard commandants and guards who most often the Central Purchase to get restoratives (egs f.i.) from the suppliers.

- H. To employ Ps/W in places exposed to attacks of allies planes (aerodromes, ports), as well as have them carry out heavy duties under unfavorable conditions (long working hours, inadequate food, etc.) and by persons not fit for it (amongst others ill persons indicated by the guard OYAMA).

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities mentioned sub A, as well as the Japanese and Korean military men who are guilty, directly or indirectly, of above mentioned.

- J. The absolute lack of immediate management by the Japanese camp commandant and his subaltern officers (excl. Aoki), the practical impossibility for the Netherlands camp commandant to contact firstmentioned, and to obtain any amelioration with lastmentioned (excl. Aoki)

Reference to report sub III "Stay at Flores" behaviour of the guards.

Responsible herefore are the authorities mentioned sub A, the Japanese camp commandant and subaltern officers.

- K. The execution of the escaped Ps/W Visser and the murder of the P/W Borgman.

Reference to report sub III "Stay at Flores" - Execution/murder.

Responsible herefore are the Japanese camp commandant, all high authorities, who ordered or approved of Visser's execution and / possible

possible the Korean guard, who shot Borgman.

- L. The death of 214 Ps/W during the transport to/from and the stay at Flores, without mentioning the later occurring deaths and the permanent weakening of tens other victims of this working party.

Responsible herefore are all abovementioned sub A up till and including I instances, authorities, officers, subaltern officers and men.

- I. The utterly unnecessary torturing, beating, maltreating, of and wresting and stealing from Ps/W by the greater part of the Korean Guard and the maltreatment by the interpreter ASUMA, against which the Japanese camp commandant and his N.C.O.'s (sergeant major Aoki Excepted) did not act, or if he did inadequately.

Further details in report sub II "Stay at Flores" - behaviour of guards.

Responsible herefore are the instances and authorities sub A, as well as the Japanese and Korean military men, who directly or indirectly have been guilty abovementioned.

I COMPOSITION OF TRANSPORT

Because at present the completed details about the composition of the Flores-transport cannot be disposed of, we have to be satisfied with the information that the total number of 2079 men consisted of a contingent of 1974 men for the P/W camp at Tjimahi (4th/9th bataljon) and the remainder of 105 men from the P/W camp at Sourabaya (Jaarmarkt) - resulting in the liquidation of this camp. Attention is drawn to the fact the contingent from Tjimahi especially consisted of a great number of older and physically weak people, apparent from the fact that the death list of this transport counted 90 deceased of above 40 years of age, ex-Tjimahi.

It is accepted that the Japanese authorities

- a. who ordered the composition of the Tjimahi-contingent of this transport to the Netherlands commandant of the P/W camp at that place:
- b. who inspected the Ps/W who were indicated by lastmentioned for this transport, on 18th April 1943 in the presence of the Netherlands camp commandant at Tjimahi,
- c. who visited the departing on the morning of embarkation (April 1943) at Sourabaya (Jaarmarkt, namely the senior officer who addressed them on that occasion.

Beforehand must have known the destination of the voyage, as well as the transport condition, the accommodation at Flores and other things, as well as the duty-work to be done there.

Apart from the question in how far the health condition and age of the indicated Ps/W was taken into consideration in the instruction to the Netherlands camp commandant at Tjimahi, it has to be stated that the Japanese authorities at abovementioned inspection in any case could have been that it could be accepted of a great part of the persons who were not excluded on account of their health, and later taken of this list, that they on account of their age and physical condition reasonably could have been equal to the voyage and the employment. This not in connection with the second question whether at that moment they knew that among the indicated persons there were a number of those who recently had been dismissed from hospital and were not quite recovered yet, and whether they knew that among those who were left behind (about men) there were adequate young and strong persons to take the place in the transport for the unfit.

Although

Although it is to be doubted whether the Japanese commandant of the transport, Lt. ASHITA, at the moment he held the inspection prior to the departure from Sourabaya, might have been able to make alterations, it must be stated, that mentioned ASHITA ought to have known that after a number of sick, weak and older (above 50 years of age) people had been singled out, part of the departing was not strong enough to outlive this escapade.

In any case ASHITA who was conversant with the age and outward appearance of the departing, utterly neglected to take this into consideration during the voyage and the stay at Flores.

OUTWARD VOYAGE SOURABAYA - FLORES (via TIMOR).

EMBARKMENT AT SOURABAYA

Hygienic supplies.

By the way of a "show" the people who had to embark were gathered in an open shed used for manganete ore, and were disinfected by a group of Japanese orderlies dressed in white coats and with mouth-masks, that is to say packed and loaded as they were with their luggage they had to walk along a pumping apparatus and were bedusted with an unknown liquid. (This is only mentioned as a contrast of this comedy on the one side and the bad conditions, hygienic during the progress of this voyage on the other side.

Behaviour of the guards.

Already directly after arrival at Sourabaya the Korean guards started to act palpably. During embarkation the "big luggage" (field sacks etc.) was roughly snatched away from the Ps/W and flung on a stack; the men themselves were driven into the holds with pushes, beatings and bad language.

SEA VOYAGE SOURABAYA - MACEMERE (FLORES).

Material care.

Accommodation. The accommodation on each of the three ships was absolutely inadequate. In the between decks were sleeping places of wood at the height of one meter, on which and under which there was only room for the Ps/W, when all sat down hunched up; part of the people stayed and slept on the uncovered upper deck (in between the winches, in the machine-oil, and up and under the freight cars, next to the pigsties and the latrines) and all this often during heavy rains at night); as a result thereof the situation in the hold became better; to lay down stretched out, however, was impossible, there was no passage, the light was inadequate or there was no light at all. Therefore it was impossible for many (especially for stomach-patient) to reach the latrine on the upper docks in time, so that the excrements dropped along the ladders in the holds and the sleeping places and soiled those sleeping under it; respectively infected them. Especially the first nights many slept standing upright. Protest with the Japanese guards resulted in the advice to sleep in turns. The abovementioned counted for the s.s. "Tasima Maru" ad about 7000 tons (on which the between deck of hold II and the midship's between deck were available for 1030 men, but 150 to 200 men stayed on deck uncovered, which stay was still made more difficult when between Dilly and Koepang 3 loading prahoos still more limited the sleeping places and hindered the ventilation in the holds) as well as for the s.s. "Tensio Maru" ad 5000 to 6000 tons (here the between deck of hold I and in the beginning part of the centrecastle at starboard was available for 945 men); Concerning last mentioned ship it is told that after a few days the Ps/W were removed from the centrecastle and first

/ had

had to find places on deck upon hold II and later on (after unloading at Dilly Laoeteng and Koepang) when already part of the men were sick, together with others in the hold of health I viz. upon a row of standing drums, filled with oil and benzine. The third ship of about 4500 tons (name unknown) contained 104 Ps/W who together with 200 to 300 coolies from Singapore (Malays, Chinese, British Indians) and a number of Madurese prahoe-skippers were lodged in the betweendeck of hatch I which also had wooden places to sleep; outstretched position was possible, but the room in width was very narrow; At Koepang accommodation got still worse because in the same hold a number of sick and, during the bombing of the aerodrome at night there, hurt Japanese were lodged.

Hygienic supplies. The hygienic supplies on the ships were very inadequate. The latrine-sheds built of wood and alongside the gangway of the fore-part of the ship contained at the most 6 squatting places and 2 urinaries, which were often closed (during unloading f.i.) or reserved for the Japanese; The decline of the gutter and the amount of water available were insufficient; the waste-pipe outside the deck was too short causing the excrements to be spread over the deck at the smallest gust of wind even, and especially over the only place where the food had to be distributed and in the neighbourhood whereof the greater part of the Ps/W had to eat. The lack of latrines was apparent through the fact because of the long queues which practically night and day were waiting in front of the lavatories many were forced to discharge on deck which especially at night caused many sources of infection. The abovementioned counts for all three ships to about the same extent. The "Tasima Maru" as well as the "Tensio Maru" had a latrine shed at starboard and at larboard with 3 squatting places and 1 urinary, which larboard shed of lastmentioned vessel practically the whole day reserved for the Japanese, whilst at firstmentioned ship part of the latrines at irregular intervals was closed for Ps/W. On the third ship only 2 of the 3 squatting places in the latrineshed were available for the 104 Ps/W and 250 coolies, whilst there was no urinary. Opportunity to bathe and wash was at none of the ships, the little water which the Ps/W sometimes got was as a rule hardly enough to wash up the eating pans. The washing of clothes was out of the question which had disastrous result for many stomach-patient naturally. To get rid of rubbish was not taken care of (and to throw it overboard is forbidden in times of war).

Medical Care. The medicines especially meant and packed for this voyage were said to be put away in the hold at an unapproachable place. For this reason the repeated requests of our doctors to give some medicines, dressing material and disinfectants were refused; the supply thereof could only come from the very limited amount which our doctors and orderlies possessed. Needless to say what this meant during the extension of the number of stomach-patients (who mainly could be treated with magnesium sulphate and porridge diet) and infected wounds (as a result from the unloading duties). There was no room to nurse, to treat or to isolate. An improvised uncovered nursingroom on the poopdeck of the s.s. "Tasima Maru", as well as a shed situated behind the kitchen and used as "isolation shed", which gave place for 3 patients appeared to be utterly insufficient. On the s.s. "Tensio Maru" there was no nursingroom available; in the last days a little corner on the upperdeck was needed for seriously

ill dysentery cases. Bed pans were not available on any of the ships; serious cases had to use a limited number of little tins and bucket, which through lack of water could not be cleaned sufficiently.

Food supplies. The food supply on all ships was wholly inadequate. The food mainly consisted of small amounts of rice and wahoo, sometimes added with a little meat or fish, or left-overs from the Japanese kitchen. Usually the meals were limited to 2 per day. On the s.s. "Tensio Maru" the food was cooked with seawater - in order to economize on salt - and the rice that was always served as a porridge was mixed with undigestible kedelebeans; this last fact added to the quick extension of the number of stomach patients; the 104 Ps/W on the ship with unknown name have been privileged above the others to a certain extent because they had the same food as the 250 coolies traveling with them. The distribution of drink was limited to 2 cups "tea" per day on every ship and thus also inadequate.

DUTIES.

Sport of duty. During the voyage the duties consisted of heavy unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang, at a quick rate and during continuous chasing up. Moreover, the people often had to stand in the water more than waist high during hours to land the goods (bombs, benzine, oil, and food) from the unloading crafts. That this added to the quick extension of the number of stomach-patients is self-explanatory.

Physical condition of the working parties. Not mentioning the fact that the bad accommodation and food during the previous days of the voyage in general already deteriorated the condition of the Ps/W and a great number on account of their age, physical condition and their not being in training was totally inefficient for this work, it has to be stated, that on s.s. "Tasima Maru" also had to go on duty those Ps/W who were declared ill by our doctors and they were beaten out of the holds by the guards. Therefore it is not very amazing that f.i. it happened on the "Tasima Maru" that out of the 300 on duty 100 men had to return to the ship on account of stomach troubles and exhaustion.

Duration of the duty/Rests. The unloading duties lasted about from 8 o'clock a.m. to 8 p.m. and sometimes (f.i. at Koepang) until far after midnight. The rests during the duties usually was very short as well as the official rests (for meals); at Koepang even no rest was given during the last day. The food was distributed by the ships. The drinking supply was short and at Koepang often inadequate.

Safety/safe-guarding.

On board the ships. During unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang it appeared that the cargo of the ships amongst other things consisted of a considerable amount of benzine, oil and aeroplane bombs, which were located on the forepart of the ship in the holds under the between-decks, where the Ps/W stayed. The abovementioned counts for each of the 3 ships, and also has to be mentioned the fact that on the s.s. "Tensio Maru" during the last part of the voyage a remainder of filled benzine - and oil - drums in the hold under hatch I were placed. In the quality of safe-guarding there were sloops, enough for a cargo ship crew in normal times. Moreover, a limited number of rafts and a heap of life-belts, which were not allowed to be distributed. Each ship was supplied with A.A. battery (incl. operators) which was used during the / bombing

bombing of the aerodrome Koepang on the s.s. "Tasima Maru" lying on the roads. The ships have been convoyed during the whole voyage by a Japanese corvette.

During duty-work. During unloading at Dilly, Laoeteng and Koepang (which 2 lastmentioned places regularly subject to bombing) no regulations or precautions for the safety / safeguarding of the Ps/W who had to land the contraband were taken. During the bombing of the aerodrome at Koepang in the night of 7/8 May 1943 those on duty ashore had to try to find cover on their own initiative.

Health condition. The bad accommodation, the very bad hygienic precautions, the fact that it was impossible to do proper nursing, the inadequate food and the heavy unloading duties have been the causes that the health condition grew worse every day. At the disembarkation at Macemere f.i. there were already 126 dysentery cases amongst the Ps/W of s.s. "Tasima Maru", 63 of which (incl. 25 very) serious. It was the same on the other ships, only the amounts were smaller.

Deaths. On May 1943 the first victim died of dysentery and heart-berri2 on the s.s. "Tasima Maru". Although a funeral ashore was possible as the ship was in the Koepang roads, a request there-to was refused and the corpse was put overboard after leaving Koepang. On board the third (name unknown) ship lying on the Macemere roads on 11th May 1943 the second death occurred.

Behaviour of guards.

Japanese commandant and N.C.O.'s. The Japanese commandant as well as the Japanese N.C.O.'s never minded the Ps/W during the voyage and left the management entirely to the Korean guards; the Japanese interpreter ASUMA, who personally maltreated (beating with a piece of wood and kicking) a number of Ps/W.

Korean guards. Although these men were not yet "in full swing" on the ships, some of them amongst others the guards TAMURA and MATSUOKA who on the s.s. "Tasima Maru" beat the sick out of the holds for duty-work (as already mentioned above) directly applied themselves to beating and maltreating. It is remarkable that as from the disembarkation on this point they inspirited.

DEBARKATION AT MACEMERE.

s.s. "Tasima Maru" the Ps/W of this ship were disembarked on the 10th of May 1943. During this the sick had to wait in a lighter alongside for a tugboat during 2 hours in the burning sun. After they had waited a considerable time on a shadowless tennis court (where they had to discharge in gutters and slokans) the serious cases were transported on trucks to the coconut garden announced as a hospital, which later became known as the 1st Wulff camp (so undermentioned). The less seriously ill patients originally would have been transported by truck, but finally they had to walk to their destination (1½ km). The healthy Ps/W instantaneously had to start unloading the ship and only arrived in "camp" at night at about 11 o'clock.

s.s. "Tensio Maru". On May the 11th, 1943, the Ps/W of this ship were disembarked. The Korean Guards crammed the landing sloops under much shouting and beating, with healthy as well as with sick persons (amongst whom very serious cases); for the embarkation of lastmentioned no precautions were made, neither for the stay on board the sloops (the greater part had to stand). Most of the people had to stay on the uncovered tennis court from about 10 a.m. until 3 a.m. and to discharge gutter, slokans buckets and basins had to be used. The stick persons (incl. the very ill) finally had to walk staggering to the "1st Wulff camp" (as mentioned above), notwithstanding transport by car had been promised; the healthy departed walking to the coconut garden, located 3 km East from Macemere, which later on became the "Blom camp"./IIISTAY

OM 206/E

III STAY AT FLORES"BLOM CAMP"Material Care

Accommodation. When the healthy Ps/W arrived on May 10th, 1943 about 5 p.m. in the coconut garden meant as a "camp" and situated on the shore 3 km East of Macemere (see sketch, App. A), accommodation consisted of 2 native houses, which the guards immediately took. The Ps/W had to lie down in the open air, with hardly time to unpack or to spread out their mats and (during the next weeks) they were unable often to fix their mosquito-nets, having no means of doing so. This to a great extent caused the malaria epidemics later on; This situation lasted for until, after about 2 weeks the first barracks were ready (the building of which could begin after the harbour-duties were finished). First the "healthy" people were lodged the sick got cover last (after 4 weeks). The barracks were primitive, people had to sleep on the ground (not before September were the rattan bunks made and put up), the roofs were far from water tight because of the coconut trees standing in the barracks and the barracks near the road suffered from dust, caused by the bullock-carts which was made worse by the aeroplanes on the aerodrome; the lack of gutters - which were made later on - caused the rain to drain into the barracks. Special attention has to be drawn to the fact that no workers were available to improve camp or hospital. At night until the signal "lights out" (8.30) a small oil lamp was the only illumination.

Hygienic precautions. As a nursing room for the first weeks a fenced off part of the coconut garden was used for this "sick garden" as a matter of fact was at intervals cleared by the transfer of serious cases to the sick-camp ("1st Wulff-camp"), but the finally the sick barracks were the last ready, the inconveniences of these sheds (constructed in the same way as the workers-sheds) showed themselves still more (m.i.) lack of sleeping bunks and the patients having to kneel for the doctors and orderlies was especially demonstrated when Dr. SCHOOREL had to operate upon a patient for appendicitis in the "kolong" under the floor of the so-called "doctors's house" (in which the medical department was lodged); the dust falling from the roof was caught by blankets. Medicines were supplied inadequately. Thus it happened f.i. during many serious malaria epidemics that there was no quinine available for weeks, and only to patients with a temperature of over 40 degree pills could given this was apparent when this resulted in malaria comatosa, in which cases the lack of quinine invariably caused death. Only a few thermometers were available. For dysentery and other stomach diseases English salt was used; medicines were distributed only in very serious cases from those held by the doctors and orderlies. The same applies also to beri beri and other diseases for which medicines were inadequate. There were hardly ever sufficient dressing used.

Preparations of yeast, kadelah-milk, extracts of Djohar leaves, and patar-hading rind and such like had to make up for the lack of medicines. The distribution of restoratives was out of the question; the only thing that could be done was to buy eggs which were offered at intervals in small quantities and usually were claimed by the Korean guards.]

The result was that many (for the greater part infected) wounds were cause.

Clothing.

Clothing. To wear/carry along upperclothing was forbidden workers; pants hung like rags round their bodies as a result of inadequate means of repairing and heavy wear, also through the washing with sea-water (originally without soap). Only after many months a limited amount of graygreen clothing mostly in too small sizes was distributed.

Safety/Safe-guarding.

In the camp. Enclosed drawing of the situation (Encl.A) points out the very dangerous location of the camp near the aerodrome. (The end of the main landing strip was at a distance of 75 m from the barracks). Even if they wished to spare the adjacent Ps/W camp during a possible bombing, would be very much endangered. The same counts for a possible machine-gun attack on the adjacent Japanese barracks and those of the Korean guards. The Japanese also saw this proves the facts that a Japanese sergeant-major expressed himself in the presence of some Ps/W as above. Protection against airplane attacks was not present in the first months. Later open (parallel to the road and the shore) not very deep trenches were constructed, whilst still later a primitive camouflage was made (leaves upon the barracks); not considering the question whether these precautions ameliorated the safety of the Ps/W or not.

During the fatigue work. Precautions were neglected on the very vulnerable aerodrome work; in case of antallied attack the order was to try to seek cover as well as on the airbase itself there was not enough care taken to safe-guard as appears from the fact that had the Ps/W put dynamite into pits despite the protests of the leader because no precautions were taken and whilst the Japanese themselves looked on from a considerable distance. Also with the harbour duties the risks were still greater (the Japanese airplanes were continually in the air and American planes machine-gunned a convoy entering the harbour (Mid.July 1 1943) every precautions were lacking. There were no shelters and the order was lately: go on working in case of air alarm and only look for cover when the airplanes appeared, bombing or strafing.

1st & 2nd Sick Camps (so-called "Wulff-Camps")

The coconut garden within which on the 10th of May 1943, the sick and healthy Ps/W from the s.s. "Tasima Maru" and on about 11th May 1943 the sick from the s.s. "Tensio Maru" were lodged, remained after the departure (about the 20th May) of the healthy people, exclusively a sick camp (the so-called 1st "Wulff-camp"); on June 10th this camp was transferred as a whole to a barracks camp (the so-called 2nd "Wulff-Camp" which in the meantime had been built in the neighbourhood (about 300 m) and that was liquidated on to the sick department of the "Blom-Camp").

Material care.

Accommodation. In the "1st Wulff-camp" there was no accommodation at all, except a kampong house and a store room that were taken by the Korean guards the first day and thereafter used as a dispensary and a store. Hundreds of sick as well as doctors and nurses, lay in the open air on the ground and the only cover was a number of hastily made improvised covers of mosquito nets (partially covered with banana leaves) for the most serious cases. The latter were transferred in 2 cases of heavy rain to an open goat stable; in one of these cases (29th May 1943) 2 men died in the dark whilst they lay there crowded, without bed-pans and making each other dirty. This appeared when daylight came; The transfer on 10th of July 1943 to the "2nd Wulff-camp" (which lasted, for lack of stretchers, from 10.30 a.m. / until

until 10.30 p.m.) made the situation no better insofar that part of the patients could be lodged in 2 barracks accommodating 400 men normally, but now 550 sick); it was constructed the same way as the "Blom-Camp" with all the inconveniences thereof (There were no bunks and the men had to sleep on the ground).

Supply of food. As far as the food supplied by the Japanese the quantity, quality and change was inadequate during the whole stay at Flores, and the purchase on own initiative (part of the duty-money and officers' salaries) through a centralised bureau lessened the number of diseases and deaths (beri-beri, oedema, pellagra, etc.) The Japanese food supply only consisted of rice (varying from 350 to 500 gr per day), waloer and later on kedelehbeans, while from time to time (in the beginning) small quantities lard sapi- or goats meat and few times a little fish, fruit and green vegetables were distributed. To gather green vegetables (wild krokot i.e. sort of spinach) in the neighbourhood of the camp, only a few convalescents were available.

Duties.

Harbour-duties. Immediately on arrival the "Blom-Camp", FLORES the Ps/W dead tired from the voyage, had to unload the ships for 3 or 4 days and a number of Ps/W were beaten with a stick at the duty roll-call. This harbour-duty-work was repeated several times, when a group of ships anchored at the Macemere roads/ harbour. These duties as a rule lasted a few days with a working-time of 8 hours work - 8 hours rest and in some cases 16 hours work - 8 hours rest, which rest included the walk to and from the harbour, (thus twice 3 km). During these duties part of the workers often, (also in the evening and at night), stood waist deep in the water to pick up the benzine drums and wood that was cast overboard. The Japanese commands were confusing because each Japanese and Korean gave his own commands and orders the men were continuously beaten and urged.

"Karan-duties". To gather karang stones which could be got at low tide in the neighbour of the camp as a rule convalescent sick were used. When the tide was coming in which time they had to stand in the water up to the knees; this had disastrous results for many stomach-patients and malaria cases who were reconvalescent. Although footwear was compulsory, made many work without shoes, which caused many cuts and infection. As result

Aerodrome-duties. The main part of the duties were those on the so-called aerodrome (construction in total of 3 aerodromes); And the work which as a rule took place in mist and dust, consisted amongst other things of removing earth (often 1.5m per person per day) to smooth the field, digging the drainage canals, digging out and canalizing already existing kali's, constructing blastproof shelters for airplanes, digging sand-digging wells etc. As well as of serving a stone-breaker, during which they had to work without a stop in the burning sun, stone-gravel and dust. The working-time incl. rest was about 10 hours (7.15 a.m. to 5 o'clock pm.); later on when there were fatigue-duties the work stopped earlier. It has specially to be mentioned that as a rule people who were declared unfit by our doctors had to join the aerodrome-duties, they were appointed by the guards (especially by the Korean OYAMA who often himself kept the roll-call for the sick). Those who during the work dropped off on account of dysentery, fever or malaria (appr. 8 or 10 per day) were allowed to return to the camp after

lunch

lunch with these who fetched the food at about 2 or 3 p.m. and on arrival in camp they usually were waited for by the camp commandant, beaten and put to work or had to stand to attention until the main group of the workers returned to the camp some hours later.

Clothing and footwear.

Footwear. The footwear the workers had brought with them (partly shoes distributed at Sourabaya) was soon worn out, so that very soon part of the workers had to walk barefooted work (distance of 1½, 5 and 6 km) and had to do their work there. The result was that many (for the greater part infected) wounds were caused.

Clothing. To wear/carry along upperclothing was forbidden workers; pants hung like round their bodies as a result of inadequate means of repairing and heavy wear, also through the washing with sea-water (originally without soap). Only after many months a limited amount of graygreen clothing mostly in too small sizes was distributed.

Safety/safe-guarding.

In the camp. Enclosed drawing of the situation (Encl A.) points out the very dangerous location of the camp near the aerodrome. (The end of the main landing strip was at a distance of 75 m from the barracks.)

Even if they wished to spare the adjacent Ps/W camp during a possible bombing, it would be very much endangered. The same counts for a possible machine-gun attack on the adjacent Japanese barracks and those of the Korean guards. That the Japanese also saw this proves the fact that a Japanese sergeant-major AOKI expressed himself in the presence of some Ps/W as above. Protection against airplane attacks was not present in the first months. Later open (parallel to the road and the shore) not very deep trenches were constructed, whilst still later a primitive camouflage was made (leaves upon the barracks); not considering the question whether these precautions ameliorated the safety of the Ps/W or not.

During the fatigue work. Precautions were neglected on the very vulnerable aerodrome work; in case of an Allied attack the order was to try to seek cover as well as possible in the adjacent shrubs. Also during work on the airbase itself there was not enough care taken to safe-guard as appears from the fact that had the Ps/W put dynamite into pits despite the protests of the leader because no precautions were taken and whilst the Japanese themselves looked on from a considerable distance. Also with the harbour duties the risks were still greater (the Japanese airplanes were continually in the air and American planes machinegunned a convoy entering the harbour (mid July 1943) every precautions were lacking. There were no shelters and the order was lately: go on working in case of air alarm and only look for cover when the airplanes appeared, bombing or strafing.

1st & 2nd Sick Camps (so-called "Wulff-camps")

The coconut garden in which, on the 10th of May 1943, the sick and healthy Ps/W from the s.s. "Tasima Maru" and on about 11th May 1943 the sick from s.s. "Tensio Maru" were lodged, remained after the departure (about the 20th May) of the healthy people, exclusively a sick camp (the so-called 1st "Wulff-Camp"); on June 10th this camp was transferred as a whole to a barracks camp (the so-called 2nd "Wulff-camp") which in the meantime had been built in the neighbourhood (about 300 m) and that was liquidated on 9th September 1943, whilst the remainder of the sick were brought to the sick department of the "Blom-camp".

Material Care.

Accommodation. In the "1st Wulff-Camp" there was no accommodation

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at all, except a kampong house and a store room that were taken by the Korean guards the first day and thereafter used as a dispensary and a store. Hundreds of sick as well as doctors and nurses, lay in the open air on the ground and the only cover was a number of hastily made improvised covers of mosquito nets (partially covered with banana leaves) for the most serious cases. The latter were transferred in 2 cases of heavy rain to an open goat stable; in one of these cases (29th May 1943) 2 men died in the dark whilst they lay there crowded, without bed-pans and making each other dirty. This appeared when daylight came. The transfer on 10th of July 1943 to the "2nd Wulff-camp" (which lasted, for lack of stretchers, from 10.36 a.m. until 10.30 p.m.) made the situation better insofar that part of the patients could be lodged in 2 barracks (accommodating 400 men normally, but now 550 sick); it was constructed the same way as the "Blom-camp" with all the inconveniences thereof (there were no bunks and the men had to sleep on the ground). Appr. 200 men, who had no room in these barracks were: a. serious patients (who could only use the trench latrines and on that account were brought to the barracks); b. most of the convalescent patients; Both groups originally stayed in the open air, but later on each got 3 wood barracks for housing built by latter. The Orderlies had to be lodged in a space under the floor of the doctor's house. The kitchen accommodation in both camps was very poor; in the 1st camp there was no accommodation at all and they had to make the best of an improvised kitchen. There was no illumination and if any was very inadequate. Only 5 oil lamps for the whole of the ward of the 2nd Camp were available.

Hygienic precautions. In the "1st Wulff-camp" no bedpans were available. In the ward for serious patients a little hole was dug next to each bed and the patients had to roll over it. Because a stool of 40 to 60 times a day was not an exception, time and again new holes had to be dug round the patient until that was impossible and a new bed had to be found. In case the patient was too weak to roll over to the hole next to their bed one was dug under it, and through the sleeping mat. In the beginning there was no water to wash the patients let alone clean their dirty clothes, and therefore they lay in this ward with uncovered (or slightly covered) under-part of the body, which was dirty from excrement and flies; in many cases bed-sore patients had fist deep wounded filled with mites (In the 2nd Wulff-camp" the discharging system with holes had to go on until finally some bedpans became available and the serious patients could be lodged in the wood barracks. In the ward for less seriously ill people cans could be used which had to be emptied in a dry ditch; later on here also trench latrine were built as in the ward for convalescent patients, in which this system was used, only the convalescent patients had to dump and redig these latrines themselves. In the "2nd Wulff-camp" usually these trenches were deeper (because of the ground water), but the small distance from the ward for lightly ill caused a considerable plague of flies. Lack of bathing and washing opportunity is apparent from the fact that during the first 3 weeks doctors and nursing personnel, only three times had the opportunity to wash themselves with dry water from a well near a kampong house.

Medical care. Not only lack of accommodation and hygienic precautions but also intense shortage of medicines and dressing material

made

made application of medical care very difficult, often even impossible. Here also in the beginning the medicines which the doctors and orderlies possessed, had to be used. The official soatres, taken along from Java, became available only a week after arrival notwithstanding many repeated requests on account of the growing number of serious cases which were likely to die. A somewhat larger supply therefore was at our disposal, but often not the medicines which were most badly needed. Instruments were not available.

Food supplies. The Japanese only supplied rice and waloel. The first week it was prohibited to buy additional food but insufficient guard aided an individual "kawat" commerce, which of course the walking patients got first and made supply to the serious patients difficult. The purchase of pork ameliorated the household a bit. But the supply of milk by the Roman Catholic Mission for the serious patients was forbidden after a few days, while the purchase of other restoratives (eggs, fish, fruit) was very much thwarted and often made impossible because the Korean Guards themselves bought and stole these articles, or they made such a maximum price for our purchase, that the sellers who sympathised and helped us very much, had to return without effect. The meat meant for the sick camp butchered in the "Blom-camp" only arrived a few times. The Korean charged with the intendence usually used this for his own means. On arrival in the "1st Wulff-camp" there was only one well which had to be used for the kitchen; the first day there was no drinking water at all and thereafter for a long time the water was fetched with difficulty from a distant well, resulting in a poor distribution of tea to patients who often through loss of liquid resulting from dysentery were very thirsty and they clandestinely drank coconut milk and so made their troubles worse. Later on there came some improvement in the situation.

Duties.

Nursing. The number of nursing orderlies was so small, that the orderlies had to do too heavy work, had too little rest and as a result of the bad accommodation and food relapsed and became patients.

Other duties. The first 10 days the healthy people staying in the "1st Wulff-camp", who were not incorporated for harbour duty could be used but afterwards convalescents must be used for other duties (with exception of kitchen duty, which must be done by non-patients). Digging of latrines, cleaning of the camp, bearing of water in heavy casks, which when they are empty must be carried by 4 bearers, who must change after 100 M., distributing of food, making graves, bearing and cremation of corpses, must be done by convalescents. The result was that there were daily relapses.

Safety/safety-measures.

The boundary of the "1st Wulff-Camp" was made by a road, a dry gutter, and an imaginary line along some separate bushes. In this way it was very difficult, especially in the evening and at night, to know if you was inside or outside the boundary, so that the POW's were not safe from the guards in case of real or pretended passing the boundary (see case Borman). The Korean guards seldom patrolled around the camp, so that in fact the responsibility was for the Dutch camp command.

Acting of guards.

Japanese Commander and warrant-officer.

Japanese commander.

The Japanese commander of the Flores-camps, Lieutenant ASHITA, was known during

during his residence on Flores (as on the sea voyages) as a person, who never interfered with the direct command of the camps. He lived during the greatest part of his residence there in the village of Macemere, he never came in the camp of sick persons (once he walked through the "2nd Wulff-Camp" with a handkerchief to his nose and mouth) and very seldom in the "Blom-camp" (at the most once a week). Only to the ceremony of bowing at a funeral did he give his attention (unesteemed being too late, so that the cremation could take place in the evening). The only purpose for his visits to the "Blom-Camp" was the dentist and painting, later he gave his attention to the strength of the barbed wire fence of the camp and afterwards made concentration space between the sheds of sick persons, in case of alarm. The Dutch Camp commander was never given the opportunity to speak with him. In the rare cases when you could speak to him he listened absentmindedly and uninterestedly and reacted negatively to each urgent request or proposal by being silent and ending the conversation by walking away without answering. [In the first months he had given the direct command, by passing his warrant officers into hands of his Korean confident, the guard OYAMA, who was responsible for a reign of terror.] This reign of terror was ended by the Japanese Sergeant Major not act as "leader" and Japanese warrant officers were appointed to command. We cannot judge if the attitude of the warrant officers SAKEMOTA, HASIKAWA, ISHI, NAKAHARA and the interpreter ASUMA was a result of a lack of help from the Japanese camp commander. Their effort to get action from ASHITA on the illtreatment of Captain De Thoars gives an indication in that direction. But the real fact is that the warrant-officers (with exception of AOKI) never interfered with the daily matters and the behaviour of the Korean guards, so that the impropriety of the Flores-camps was partly a result of their attitude. Sergeant-Major AOKI was the man, who has taken active part in camp affairs, corrected the situation, never beaten anyone, stopped the misdemeanour of the Korean guards, his attitude and measures were human, a great difference with the attitude of the others. For a proper understanding it must be known that the other warrant officers (with exception of the interpreter, ASUMA, who committed many brutalities) did not illtreat the POWs directly. They did not oppose or limit the illtreatment of the guards in contrast with AOKI.

Korean Guards.

With a single exception the Korean guards misbehaved themselves during the whole period on Flores to the POWs. That it became a little bit better during the last months was exclusively the result of the long stay there and not of human feelings. The really unlimited power of the guard commanders, duty leaders, intendants, soldiers of the day and others functionaries were abused by measures, which resulted in illtreatment of the POWs and advantage to themselves. The orders and the control for the lining up and cleaning of dust-bins, the giving of the military salute, the regular and repeated effort at extortion of watches, fountain pens and clutches, the theft/embezzlement of meat and other food for the POWs, the many cases of bad behaviour in the camp as a result of drunkenness and the forcing, under menace, of unmoral acts, also the punishment for real or fancied offences, the slapping (or orders to others to slap) of the face, the hitting of head and body with bamboo, cane or rifle butt, etc. This gave in the camps of sick persons and in the camp of working people (incl. sick department), a nervous uncertainty, the best example for this was the

calling

calling of the name of the new acting guard commandant, which name went through the camp immediately, to give the POWs the opportunity to have time for making preparations for the special "hobby" and the punishment. In general there was no consideration by the Korean guards for the sick persons, no devotion for deaths, no human treatment of the POWs. There can be made an exception for some Japanese and specially for the two Christian-Koreans, who gave a quantity of cigarettes as a present to be divided between the POWs on Christmas night 1943 (as a present).

III treatments.

It is impossible to give all details in this statement. It is possible only to give the worst offenders (with some examples their behaviour) and the names of some other guards. (H) ITO. Korean guard. One of the most terrible, who for preference beat his victims on the head with a rifle butt. 1. He kicked a dying patient in the ward of "serious sick persons" of the "1st Wulff-camp", because he could not give the ordered honours in a standing position. (Witness Lieutenant H.V. de Vries). 2. He beat an ill orderly (officially because he did not come at once to the sheds of ill people, but really for refusing to sell a watch of which he had already stopped the central purchase) and Dr. Wulff, as the responsible physician, with 42 blows with a stem of a coconut leaf, whereby the left side of the body of the latter was bruised from shoulder to knee. 3. He maltreated the Dutch Camp commandant Blom, while he was ill, because he complained of the increasing maltreatments. 4. He maltreated Lt. SOERENS and Dr. EISBACH in the Taliboran camp, broke the arm of POW EEKHOF and beat one of the buyers so severely that he got a rupture of the ear-drum.

CYAMA. Korean guard. About his reign of terror see the aforementioned explanation.

1. He interfered during this period with the sick report and sent malaria and dysentery patients with fever on duty to the aerodrome.
2. He beat sick POWs who returned from their duty and some beri-beri patients with a rifle butt.
3. Serious illtreatment of the Res. 1st Lt. P.W. STEEN (fearpschycosis during following dysentery) which indirectly resulted in death of this person.
4. Very serious illtreatment of the landstorm-sergeant BROUWER and of Lt. HARMSEN (in connection escape of some soldiers of his platoon)

ARAY - Korean guard. This man committed serious maltreatment not only as a leader of the working-party, but also in other cases.

1. In the ward "seriously ill patients" of the "1st WULFF-camp" he kicked a very sick patient on the head, because he did not "lay at attention".
2. Maltreated with a coconut-rib a group of convalescents of the "1st WULFF-camp" (with permission of the guard-commandant) who were looking for medicinal herbs and after that made them kneel in the sun for some hours.
3. Beat up the part of the campstaff of the "2nd WULFF-camp" at that moment available because of an "offence" of no importance (ash trays not wholly clean) and after that punched them in the face for a long time.
4. "Kicked sergeant CHAVANNES in the hospital" (with a kidney injury and a broken arm).

MATSUOKA

MATSUOKA - Korean guard. Of the Korean guards this one was the most horrible type.

1. Summoned all the officers in camp Taliboera to the guardhouse and made them kneel down and kicked and beat them with sticks without any reason at all, only because he did not like the human behaviour of the Japanese camp commandant.
2. In the "1st WULFF-camp" he kicked a sick (later on he died) POW Mr. J. A. MEURSINGE on the leg causing a wound 10 cm. long to the bone because he was late in lying to attention and beat him once again.
3. Tried to induce some young P.O.W.s to commit homosexuality under threats (case van REES).

ASUMA - Japanese interpreter. This man was guilty of brutality several times not only during the voyage to and back, but also during the stay in Flores.

1. Serious maltreatment of Lieutenants HARMSSEN and HANGEVELD.
2. Kicked his shoe to pieces against the head of P.O.W. JOB.

KASHIMURA - Korean guard. Next to some cases of maltreatment he was extremely (CLAUS) keen on making the sick who come back from their duty on the aerodrome stand at attention at the guard house. He beat them up or sent them back again to their work until the working-party as a whole came back.

YAMAMOTO - Korean guard/leader of working patients. In last mentioned function he was several times guilty to maltreatment, refer to case de Thouars.

MAKIAMA, MASIYAMA, NAKAHARA, KIAMA, YAMASAKI, TAKAMINI and TAMURA

NAMES WHICH must be added to the list to illustrate the we comment on two more cases of illtreatment.

The case of Captain DE THOUARS. As a rule the Capt. of inf. DE THOUARS acted as Dutch duty-commandant during the days of disembarkation at the harbour of Macemere and immediately afterwards. May 13th 1943 he complained to the Jap. sgt. ISHI and sgt. SAKAMOTO of the excessive use of liquor (so called "soppie goenoeng") by the guards and he expected excesses based on the experiences of the former days. In the afternoon Cpt. DE THOUARS asked for and received permission from the Korean head of the working-party YAMAMOTO to send back by truck to the "Blom-Camp" some dysentery-patients who just had disembarked and some people on duty who fell ill. After a heated argument between YAMAMOTO and the Korean driver before starting the latter hit the Captain in the face, while YAMAMOTO kicked him on the shins screaming "kiotske".

Filled with indignation over this attitude Cpt. DE THOUARS, answered YAMAMOTO's questions as following: that he (DE THOUARS) had fought against the Japs, now he was obliged to obey the orders of the Jap, and that he would again fight against the Japs, if there was a chance. Then he got a total of forty blows with a rifle butt from the Korean MAKIAMA, on the mouth, was hit and pushed about, while in the meantime YAMAMOTO tried all sorts of jiu-jitsu-tricks on him.

Soon after that Sg. SAKAMOTO appeared again on the scene and through him Cpt. DE THOUARS was able to tell the camp commandant his complaint. YAMAMOTO answered during this very superficial interrogation that that reason of the maltreatment was that cpt. DE THOUARS without his knowledge sent the sick people of two kinds (disembarking people and duties) in one car, which caused confusion. The result of the illtreatment was a light concussion of the brain, an effusion over the whole body and a serious /

wound

wound of the right eye, causing a permanent injury. In the judgment of the Medical Officer, I Marien, this illtreatment would have caused the death to a less athletic person than Capt. DE THOUARS.
The case of BROUWER.

The 1st sergeant H.A.B. BROUWER, No. 121304, was beaten by OYAMA with a rifle butt, because he did not see OYAMA, who walked outside the shed where BROUWER stayed, when the gedek was $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. high and he did not bow. He was sent to the Japanese guard house to kneel and was beaten again with the rifle butt and was beaten by the rest of the guards for half an hour with bamboos, rifles and the open hand on head and body. BROUWER, who was knocked down with each blow collapsed when he went away to the gate of the camp and had to be carried to the hospital where he was for a week. The result of this illtreatment was as well as many painful spots over the body a terrific blue spot on the left buttock with a middle line of about 30 cm., also a torn eardrum. After his release from the hospital BROUWER stumbled for a long time before he could walk normally.

State of health/Death/Execution/Murder.

State of health.

Number of sick.

The medical information about the general state of health (the number of sick during the several periods on FLORES). is not available at the moment (they are buried in one of the Java-Camps together with other pieces. Some information would give a sufficient view of this case). The fact is that until the first return transport (27th January 1944) 800 men of the original 2079 men at the most favourable time were able to do their duty outside the camp and at the most unfavourable time not more than 350 men. These figures speak for themselves. The hospital in the "Blom-Camp" after the closing of the "2nd WULFF camp" held continually 1200 patients, except the sick in quarters in the department of healthy people.

The kind of illness. During the first dysentery explosion there was the beginning of beri-beri, whilst afterwards there came a malaria-epidemic, which lasted until practically the end. There were daily many cases pellagra and wound infections. Dysentery had the most victims, while malaria, especially the malaria comatosa, and beri-beri the so-called wet-beri-beri were deadly. Elsewhere there's an explanation of how the plague of flies as a result of the open latrines and the pigsty nearby increased the dysentery cases, whilst the malaria-infection came from the period in the open air and the appearance of a mosquito-swamp in the middle of the "Blom-Camp". Lack of accommodation, hygienical supplies and medicines, also bad food increased the sickness.

Death.

Number of death. Irrespective of the many deaths afterwards, during the voyage 213 POW's died, 2 on the outward voyage, 1 in the train during the return and 208 POW's died at Flores as a result of illness and two were killed by the Japanese. Below is a table giving the death in each age-group.

Age	Number of deaths		Age	Number of deaths	
	Total	In % of total deaths		Total	In % of total deaths
unknown	15	7	35-40	35	$16\frac{1}{2}$
till 25	20	$9\frac{1}{2}$	40-45	54	26
25-30	17	8	45-50	35	$16\frac{1}{2}$
30-35	31	15	50-60	3	$1\frac{1}{2}$

For the review of the deathrate for a week see the graph (supplement B)

Funerals. The treatment of the corpses of the diseased persons was very bad. First they were laid on the ground under a blanket or a mosquito net, afterwards consent was given to build a mortuary. In the beginning there were coffins, but soon the dead were buried in mosquito nets and blankets and later on in goenisacks. The funerals from the both "Wulff-Camps" took place on a stretcher; from the "Blom-Camp" the corpses were carried away on an open truck together with serious ill persons, who must be brought to the "Wulff-Camp". Later on the funeral took place in a little goods-van, where the attendants must sit on the ground around the coffin and which was driven so fast that it was very difficult to hold the body on their bier. During the first days there came the order to cremate the corpses of the dysentery-patients "on account of affection". This cremation took place in the vault and caused in the beginning some difficulties on account of inexperience (insufficient carbonization) specially when coconut husks must be used in place of wood. After a while they didn't give wood anymore for the crosses, so that 80 graves stayed without indication except a border of old coconuts. After the liquidation of the second Wulff Camp opportunity was only given 3 or 4 times to keep the cemetery in repair. (a coconut garden in the neighbourhood of the 2nd Wulff Camp). A request for hiring an Indonesian to do this, was refused, so that it soon became a wilderness.

Execution/murder.

The case of Visser. Two days after the end of May 1943, when the section commander in charge, of the POW Visser, missed him, news was given that Visser was arrested by some Japanese sailors, who saw him walking --- K.M. east of the Camp. It may be concluded that this POW escaped the Camp, but identification never took place. We learnt from a number of items about trial and execution and from the fact that in those days a shift of Korean guards went off with rifles and shovels, to come back after a short time, and from the fact that the Japanese interpreter ASUMA was seen with Visser's rucksack, that he had been executed. Up to now it is unknown where, in which manner and after which trial this took place.

The case of Borgman. Dr. Wulff, the interpreter Lottgering and the res. 1st Lieutenant H.H.J. de Vries were called by the Korean OYAMA, to the Japanese Camp commander who was in a kampong house in the neighbour (in the presence of an unknown Korean guard) about half an hour after two shots were heard, followed by about half an hour after two shots were heard, followed by shouting, in the 1st Wulff Camp, on the night of the 7th June 1945 at 9 o'clock.

This Camp commander gave the order to identify a shot prisoner of war "trying to escape" but were forbidden to ask questions. The victim who was lying on his back on some distance from the house (a little stream of blood trickled from his mouth) mentioned that he was Borgman. He whispered to Dr. Wulff and Lt. de Vries that his condition was hopeless, a shot through both lungs, so that nothing could help any more. After returning to the Camp commander and making a report about the identification the officers were lead to the Camp, afterwards they heard ASHITA giving an order to an unknown guard. On the way back they heard a 3rd shot, on arrival at the Camp OYAMA gave the order to the section commander of the victim (1st Lieut. Jellema) to go back to the kamponghouse with a stretcher and 6 orderlies (including Costerus and Driessen). They found Borgman dead with a shot through his head.

On completion of the order to bring the corpse to the cemetery to cremate it and to close the grave, the orderlies had the opportunity to state that the first shot really riddled the chest and in such a way, that the bullet had to riddle the arms if these were hanging down, (this can point to a "hands up" when this shot was heard) Lt. Jellema was maltreated the following morning in connection with this accident. Dr. Wulff was forced by OYAMA some weeks after this, to sign a death certificate, in which dysentery was mentioned as cause of death. We may be sure that Borgman did not want to escape but tried to buy some food from Indonesians, (so as many others tried) and in this case passed the boundary, the dry riverbed, see under head "1st and 2nd camp for sick people, the so-called "Wulff Camp", (sub safety/protection measures) seduced by the absence of barbed wire and the slight patrolling along this part of the camp.

Vc

IV. Return Voyage MAOEMERE (FLORES) -- BATAVIA.

Transport of sick people (27-1- '44 and 10-5- '44)

Embarkation in MAOEMERE.

The 1st transport of sick, which consisted patients could take with them the contents of a square military rucksack, not overpacked and without anything tied on, so that most of the patients had to leave behind a big part of their tattered belongings permission was refused for any of them to take with them their uniform, except the clutches they were wearing, whilst only officers were allowed shoes. Despite the provision of transport the distance "Blom-Camp" - Maoemere had to be done on foot with luggage (3 K.M.), while during the March more military trucks passed them, in which the men, who fell out even were not allowed. From 10 O'clock in the morning till 5 P.M. this group must wait for embarkation in a back garden of an Indonesians house in the village of Maoemere. Most of the sick people (i.e. serious beri-beri patients) must climb the rope ladder with their rucksack at the embarkation while there was a companion way. The barges alongside the ship were subject to heavy swell, so that it was impossible for many of them to get to the rope-ladder in time.

Voyage Maoemere - Sourabaya. The accommodation was insufficient at both sick transports. On the 1st draft the available space between decks of hatch 1 (dirty from cement) and of hatch two gave insufficient room for lying; stretched out, staying on deck was forbidden except for visiting the lavatory. The food distribution was also in the holds. There was no bath and wash-place, water was only allowed for washing up. Hanging baskets outside the ship were used as latrine for one person. Although it was insufficient in quantity and quality the food was better than on the outward voyage. Food was prepared in the Japanese kitchen. The distribution of drinking water was limited. The light was very bad. In the 2nd sick draft there was not enough room for isolation of infectuous patients. There was lying a patient with open t.b.c. and a patient with erysipelas between the other patients.

Arrival in Batavia. After a voyage of 5 days in the hold and a train journey of 64 hours (normal 12 hours) in overcrowded 4th class wagons the 1st sick draft was left on arrival at Adek-Camp Batavia at night 11 o'clock, for hours in the mud and the rain, in an open field and must undergo a search.

After

After this at 3 o'clock in the night they were lay asleep in an empty shed and were chased out the building at 7.30 in the morning to line up for "morning roll-call".

Deaths. One of the patients of the 1st sick draft died during the train journey Sourabaya-Bandoeng-Batavia in the pneumonia ward. It was possible to bury him in Bandoeng, but the corpse had to be carried on the platform to Batavia.

MORE RETURN TRANSPORT.

Material care. The accommodation at the 3rd, 4th and 5th return-transports were in general also insufficient; not enough room practically no bath or wash place, defective hygienic arrangements (hanging latrines outside the ship) and insufficient life-belts. It deserved a special mention, that the POW's (479) in the 3rd return transport had to sit down the whole first night on the unprotected foredeck. The following day a part got a place in a midship bunker, where the men must lie, packed like sardines in dust, coal-dust, in unbearable heat from the adjacent boilers, insufficient ventilation and light.

15 drums filled with petrol were on deck the 5th return transport from Macemere until Bima was reached.

Guards. On the 3rd return transport the Japanese interpreter ASUMA owing to the selling of goods to the ships crew, severely illtreated the victims, together with the two responsible section commandants (the 1st Lt. de Roo and the 2nd Lt. v. d. Eyck.) He beat them with a heavy wooden clog on the face and head helped by the Korean guard MATSUMOTO. Next he punished those caught smoking too early, together with their section Commandant 1st Lt. Harders, by kneeling about twenty minutes with the knees on the sharp corner of the steps of a ladder. The same ASUMA illtreated the 1st Lt. de Boer twice during the train trip Sourabaya-Batavia. (severe beating with a stone, which was taken from the sleeper and dragging him all over one of the stations) owing to pretended "mistake" in the distributing of tea and the closing of the windows. During the same journey the Korean TAKAMINI illtreated the POW van Mourik, because he asked his stolen grease tin back. In the 4th return-transport the Korean guard MATSIAMA kicked POW Felix Jr. for a minor reason and hit the ensigns de Mey and Remmers very severely in the face.

WS. Capt. A.C.J. de Thouars
 Ldst. soldier C. K. Bra
res. 1st Lt. H.H.J. de Vries

Manggalaan 47.

BANDOENG.

1786A

Doc. No. 5583

Page 1

I, VZ39006 Major John Kevin LLOYD of Army HQ Melbourne, make oath and say:

1. I am an officer of the Australian Military Forces.
2. Annexed hereto and marked "A" is a true copy of an affidavit sworn by 416284 - W/Lt Lyndon Lloyd McKenzie on 25 Mar 46 which I have in my custody in the course of my duties.
3. The original affidavit cannot be made available immediately as it is required for trials of minor war criminals.

/s/ J. K. LLOYD

Major

Sworn before me at Melbourne
this eighth day of
May 1946

/s/ S. Peach Capt
An Officer of the
Australian Military Forces

S. Beach Capt.

"A"

An officer of the A. M. F.

This is the copy affidavit referred to in the declaration
of Mayor J. E. Lloyd dated the eighth day of May 1946

On this 25th day of March, One thousand nine hundred and forty-six
F/Lt Lyndon Lloyd McKENZIE, No. 416284, of No. 2 Personnel Depot,
R. A. A. F. BRADFELD PARK, in the State of New South Wales, makes
oath and says as follows:-

1. I was taken prisoner at SOEMBWA on 27 Apr. 45 at approximately
0830 hours, together with eleven other RAAF personnel, members
of the crew of a Liberator bomber commanded by S/Ldr J. A. Wawn.
After capture S/Ldr WAWN, F/O SYKES and self were separated from
the rest of the party, hand-cuffed, blindfolded, legs tied and
hands tied behind our backs. So trussed we were placed on the floor
of a truck and driven over very rough road for a period of eight hours.
If we moved in any way we were struck with a rifle butt. Immediately
after this we were again separated and Japanese moved round and kicked and
beat us for one hour, then we were interrogated by several Japanese
Officers and threatened with death if we were found not to tell the
truth. I was then knocked into insensibility with a rubber truncheon and
when I had almost come to taken outside, had my head layed on a block and
a Japanese drew and raised his sword as though to execute me but he did
not do so. By this time it was about 0300 hours next day and I was tied
up tight and left that way for the rest of the night. I was unable
at this stage to identify personally any of the Japanese concerned in this
treatment. We were further illtreated at SOEMBWA by various frightening
ruses calculated to make us believe we were to be executed, tortured and
bayoneted.

2. We were taken to SOEMBWA, where we remained for three weeks,
being well treated and then moved to BATAVIA, arriving there in the
middle of June.

3. At CYCLE Camp, BATAVIA I was interrogated by a Japanese whom we
knew as the "BASHER", a thick set man who prided himself as an exponent
of ju-jitsu. Early in July the "BASHER" made me sit in a chair and
severely bashed me with a wooden sword, finally knocking me off the
chair onto concrete. The Japanese FCO who was with him, in his presence,
then continued the bashing with a rubber slipper whilst I was on the
ground. As a result of this my face became painfully swollen to such
an extent that at first I was not recognized by my fellow P. W.

4. On another occasion the "BASHER" gave a personal exhibition of ju-jitsu, using me as the victim. I was not allowed to retaliate in any way and was thrown about heavily and suffered considerable pain.

5. The day after my beating by the "BASHER", which I have described, I saw P/lt OLDFIELD, who had been similarly treated with a rubber slipper. His face was very swollen and one eye particularly was flaming red and in shocking condition.

6. About this time also I remember seeing Sgts McINERNEY and MALONEY after they had been subjected to a treatment wherein they were made to lay their hands palm down on the table and repeatedly hit on each finger nail in succession. Their nails were flattened and broken and they were in much pain.

SWORN by the above named deponent
Lyndon Lloyd McKENZIE at Sydney
on the 25th day of March
One thousand nine hundred and
forty-six

BEFORE ME

Capt

R. R. B. HICKSON

NX 25579

An Officer of the Australian
Military Forces.

Government Bureau for
the Investigation of
War Crimes.

17817

OFFICIAL RECORD

Today, 15 March 1946, I, Gerrit Jan SIP, 1st class Inspector of Police, charged with investigation of war crimes, have interrogated the person:

Charles van der SLOOT,

born at The Hague on 20 February 1917, enlisted in the "landstorm" (Tr.note: territorial militia army), acting as interpreter at the Office for Japanese Affairs, residing at Park Hotel, Batavia, who, on enquiry, stated as follows:

I served in the R.N.I.A. as an interpreter for the Moluccas area and was stationed at Ambon. On 30 January 1942 it became known that Japanese troops had landed on Ambon. After some battles in which I personally took no part, the Staff of troops stationed in Ambon was taken prisoner near PASSO (Lateri) on 2 February 1942 at 3 a.m.

.....

On 16 February 1942 I along with some 20 Javanese soldiers of the R.N.I.A. was taken by ship to Timor. The voyage lasted four days during which we were badly fed and one day were given nothing to drink. After disembarkation Koepang airfield proved to be our destination. The journey on foot took 5 days which I covered with hands tied behind my back. I was so exhausted that on arrival I lay unconscious for 5 hours. The next day I had to act as an interpreter between the Japanese and Australian Prisoners-of-war. There were more than one thousand Australians amongst whom were many wounded and malaria and dysentery patients.

An Australian medical officer asked for medical treatment and medicines for his sick. The Japanese officer named FUKADA bluntly refused. These Australians lived in an enclosure fenced in with barbed wire and bamboo, practically in the open air. I stayed there for about a fortnight and during that time about fifty Australians died and had to be buried within that same enclosure. The area in which more than one thousand Australians lived was about two acres. Food for these Australians was very poor. Only dry rice was supplied; they had to do their own cooking. Equipment for that purpose was insufficient so that preparation and serving of breakfast consisting of rice porridge lasted from 6 till 11 a.m. The Australian officer, a Lieutenant Colonel, asked my intermediary in order to get conditions improved. I translated this request to the Japanese named FUKADA but once again I received a blunt refusal. The Japanese supplied only rice, never vegetables or meat. During those two weeks I asked for improvement several times at the request of the Australian Lieutenant Colonel; I did the same of my own accord but it was all to no avail.

The Japanese demanded a working-party of 500 men each day to repair roads, to cut trees and to do digging. The Australian Officer could at most detail 300 men a day fit to do some work. The remainder was sick or too weak. The food supplied amounted to one liter of rice porridge per man per day.

The Australians had wounded personnel among them. During my two weeks' stay there about 30 men were operated upon for extraction of shell splinters among other things. These operations were carried out by their own doctors in the open air with the patient seated on and tied to a chair. The doctors were compelled in some cases to operate without anaesthetics. Medical treatment as well as admission to the hospital at Koepang were refused nor were anaesthetics given.

.....

In July 1942 a Timorese had cut a telephone wire at that place. The delinquent was caught in the act and arrested, along with two brothers of DENOE who happened to be in the neighbourhood. I am convinced they were not guilty; one was 21 years of age and the other 16. That very day they were sentenced to death which was done in the following way. In my presence and through my intermediary as an interpreter the suspect was merely asked his name and why he had cut the wire by KAWAKE. He stated his name and said further he wanted the wire for private use. The two brothers of DENOE were never asked a question. That same day on orders from KAWAKE and without any form of trial I had to draw up a document in the Malay language announcing the death sentence of these three which was placarded in the market-place. The public was instructed to come and look on. Rajas and I myself were told to attend. When I arrived on the spot I saw three new-dug graves. After a few minutes the three convicted with hands tied behind their backs were led in. One after another had to kneel before the graves facing the firing squad and the public. They were not blindfolded. A Japanese, Lieutenant KAWAKE read the sentence in Japanese warning that everybody who committed sabotage would be shot. I had to translate this in Malay to the public. Hereafter the three were shot; all three fell backwards in their grave. The 16 years old was immediately dead, the 21 years old received a coup de grace. The suspect was still alive and moaned. A Japanese soldier armed with a rifle and bayonet compelled one of the bystanders to take a heavy stone and to throw this into the grave at the head of the wounded man. The sight shocked me so that I went away. The graves have been filled up by bystanders on orders from the Japanese as I heard afterwards. Attending this execution were Lieutenant KAWAKE and Corporals KAWASAKI and KATO.

.....

Charles van der SLOOT, mentioned above, was duly sworn before me at the beginning of his statement in the manner prescribed to state the truth and nothing but the truth, while he, after having completed his statement and after having had it read to him adheres to it and signs it

/s/ Ch. van der SLOOT.

And I have embodied it in this official record in pursuance of the oath, taken by me on the assumption of my office and it has been signed and concluded by me at Batavia, on 19 March 1946

The Inspector of Police
/s/ G.J. SIP

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, Captain RNIA, head of War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed statement is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original Dutch document entitled:

Sworn statement of Charles van der SLOOT, interpreter, drawn up by G.J. SIP, inspector of police, dated 15th March 1946, No.2750/R,

which original document is a part of the official records of NEFIS,

signature:

sgd. Ch.Jongeneel
September 2, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A.de WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

signature:

sgd. K.A. de WEERD.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL first Lieutenant R.N.I.A. head of the War Crimes Section of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original documents, entitled

"Report regarding the accused S. Nagata, Japanese interpreter at Soemba from May 15th to approx. July 1944," drawn up by W.F.H. van der Plas, controller in Soemba, dated Waingapoe, 4 December 1945, No. OM/1022/RB,

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature: CH. JONGENEEL

SEAL

Batavia, June 7th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WIEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de WIEERD

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123/R.

REPORT REGARDING THE ACCUSED "S. NAGATA", JAPANESE INTERPRETER

AT SOEMBA, from MAY 15th to approx. JULY 1944.

Under the Japanese Commandant "JUNIHARA" at WAINGAPOE, the Japanese interpreter "S. NAGATA" in the beginning held the function of Civil Administrator in the Island of SOEMBA. He spoke the Malay language rather fluently and pre-war he presumably lived at MALANG for several years.

By his orders, the Europeans in SOEMBA and the 2 Americans who live there, in total 30 persons, received solitary confinement in the prison at WAINGAPOE, and 55 women and children were cramped in the "passanggrahan" at WAINGAPOE, which building contained only 3 bedrooms, an inner-hall and a dining room. Food was not supplied by the Japanese, everything had to be bought by the prisoners and prepared at home.

Private moneys, possessions and food-stocks were seized by or on orders of "S. NAGATA", most probably in co-operation with the Japanese "JUNIHARA". Fortunately the women had some money with them and the 30 men had together approx. f.900.-. Of this amount about f.300.- was stolen one night by a couple of Japanese guards on duty.

By orders of "S. NAGATA" all the Europeans here, had to make a statement of private amounts of money and possessions, whereafter the money was seized. Many valuable articles disappeared into the pockets of said "S. NAGATA" and in those of the Japanese Commandant and his assistants. Silver forks and spoons were recently found at the house of a Savonese woman in the village of KAMBANIROE; they had been presented to her by "S. NAGATA".

Moreover "S. NAGATA" was a sadist. Once or twice a week in the period from May 20th until July 10th 1942, he entered the prison between 20.00 hrs. and 24.00 hrs. accompanied by some soldiers, in order to thrash 5 to 10 "whites" with rice-pounders and big bamboo sticks. Nearly all of us were once thrashed in this fashion. When the victim lost consciousness, buckets of water were thrown over his body to revive him, some final strokes were inflicted upon him and thereafter the man was permitted to return to his cell. It was always "S. NAGATA" who organized these maltreatments. First he held a secret conversation with the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him, then he laughed aloud after which thrashing commenced. I wonder that arms and legs were not broken during these maltreatments. An American airman, "HAINES," had 2 ribs broken as a result of maltreatment.

The Military Surgeon "van HASSELT" and Lt. "SCHUDEBEURS" incurred bruises, so that for days they were not able to walk and I myself partially fractured my left arm and was unable to use it for five weeks. Natives too, were beaten black and blue with "aloes" or rice-pounders. In June we saw a Soembanese, who had been carried into the prison and put in a cell, groaning with pain and with open wounds all over his body.

Other native prisoners received a small portion of under-done djagoong (Indian corn) only once a day. They had to live and to work on this poor food. More cruelties were inflicted upon the natives in SOEMBA by said "S. NAGATA."

The above-mentioned facts were witnessed by me and I am willing to declare this on oath. Against "S. NAGATA" there is a fierce hatred among the native population and also among nearly all the officials and it is universally hoped and expected that this sadist will be sentenced and punished, if possible, in SOEMBA.

WAINGAPOE, 4/12/45.

The Govt. Controller in SOEMBA,
Signed: "W.F.H. PIAS".

17894

[I, Carlos Jose Sequeira, widower of 51 years of age, of Portuguese nationality and born in Hongkong having been duly sworn, make the following statement:

PROTECTION ZONE OTHERWISE CONCENTRATION CAMP OF LIQUICA

- a) The village of Liquica, about a square mile, was chosen to be the protection zone. All the remaining families that did not abandon BAUCAU on the 14th November 1942, when the Japanese invaded that village, were transferred by the Portuguese boat OKUSSI, under Japanese control, on the night of 16th to 17th November 1942, and on the night of the 20th November 1942, to LIQUICA, except the Governor's family and some officials who were taken to Dili by Japanese trucks, to join His Excellency the Governor at the Government's House there. Almost everything that one possesses had to be left behind, because orders were to the effect that no one was to bring more than that which is considered indispensable.

GENERAL CONDITION

- b) Upon our arrival at Liquica we were given accommodations by the Chefe do Posto of Liquica but as the number of houses was limited, several families had to be put into one house like sardines in tins, and family peace was thus destroyed. For about eight months, life went on like this, and during this period, it seems that the Japanese were trying to make friends with everyone by allowing soldiers to pay frequent visits to some houses, and mingled with its inmates, in a most friendly manner, but after this period, conditions started to change, and in a most methodical way, and in July 1943, all the radio sets were taken away, all rifles and ammunitions were ordered to be handed over; nobody was allowed to keep out of the house after 8 p.m.; parties of from 2 to 6 Japanese soldiers made constant search for compromising objects, followed by ill treatment of the community, and prohibition of the natives to be in contact with us. Prices of food began to rise, and as it go on rising, natives were not allowed to sell to the Portuguese anything, and the weekly markets began to be controlled by the police, and only what was left after they have bought the best, and the best part of the whole, the remainder could be bought by the famine crowd. Finally even this mode of buying was taken away from us. We had to go weekly to the Government's Cantina to receive a meagre supply of food and the Cantina itself is being controlled by them. By the beginning of 1944, all the families living in MAUBARRA received orders to move to Liquica. Old men, women and children, had to make the journey some 15 miles on foot escorted by one mounted Japanese guard and several natives all armed. If lodgings in Liquica were already a necessity, with the influx of the new comers, things became worse. Servants were then taken into custody under all pretext and severely beaten for almost no fault, and many were afraid to return to work. Every now and then water supply were cut away and the excuse was that something was wrong with the pipes, when these are connected to the supply tank, next to their Headquarters.

FOOD SUPPLY

As aforesaid, not much more is to be added, except that natives were not allowed to go to Liquica to sell, and even the few remaining families who lived in the suburb, are not allowed to sell to the Portuguese. The rationed food received at the Cantina is so small in quantity, that it is not worth mentioning. No oil or fat was distributed, no sugar except about 200 grams once in 6 to 10 months time, and for vegetables we were given rotten potatoe and yam roots. We also received Wild beans and wild mandioc. Many had stomach troubles and some eventually died of poisoned beans. Everybody was down in health and weigh several stones less. I for instance, was weighing 85 kilos when I first arrived in Liquica, was weighing 49 kilos in 1945. Many died of insufficiency of food, and had the condition lasted for six months more, I do not think there will have been many left to-day to tell this story.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND ATTENTION

Not much has been done in this respect, for, although we had a doctor and several male nurses in the camp, there were no medical supplies to cope with the exigencies. Nearly everyone had a sore or a complaint. The majority had swollen feet and some even swollen faces and more. Malaria was almost a general case, so was general weakness, from want of food.]

LACK OF COMMUNICATION

We were living actually without any outside news. No natives were allowed to approach our camp. We do not know what was passing around us outside the barbed wires and anything that we happen to hear were news given to someone on purpose by the Police, that the allies were losing, which of course, only the ignorants believed.

WAS IT IMMUNE FROM AIR ATTACK ?

Yes up to a certain period, but when the Japanese tried to induce passing-by planes to attack the camp, we were then left liable for air attack. I say this because when the Liquica Hospital was machine gunned by some 10 planes, this incident was the result of the Japanese having treacherously opened fire from a spot between the Hospital and their High Command on a squadron of planes which were flying North, and these planes located the fire, made a half turn, and started machine gunning a limited area, about, and including the Hospital, but when the women and children who were hidden in the building could not stand any more the attack, and resolved to get out of the building, risking their lives, the pilots must have spotted them, for they immediately ceased fire and flew away, not without killing the very Japanese who opened fire from a machine gun. (I got this information from somebody whose name I do not recollect now: The male nurse LUIZ LEMOS was called to the Japanese Headquarters to treat a wounded Japanese immediately after the attack.) Except for a few slight scratches from broken splinters, nobody was seriously hurt at the Hospital.]

ATTENDANCE AT RELIGIOUS SERVICES

This was normal except for a few sarcastic remarks thrown now and then to church goers by Japanese guards, no interference was made on the part of the Japanese.

SANITARY AND HYGIENE ARRANGEMENTS

Nothing was done in this respect by the Japanese and everything was left to nature.

FORCED LABOUR

Directly against the internees no labour was forced, but by punishing severely the servants as stated above, many families were left without help and had to do their water carting and fetching of firewoods etc. In another word, forced labour was indirectly forced on the internees.

PORTUGUESE AND JAPANESE CURRENCY

Portuguese currency was the only currency used at the beginning but as the Japanese started on propaganda in the interior depreciating the value of this currency, natives started to refuse accepting Portuguese money and slowly, everything was paid in Japanese Guildens, only with a very few exceptions, Portuguese money could be made use of. From informations received after the war, very active propaganda did take place at the weekly markets in the interior of the Colony and to show and convince the natives that Portuguese money was of no value, officers in concluding their public speeches, use to burn some notes, and offer to exchange to the natives Japanese notes for Portuguese notes which the natives immediately decided to do.

ANY ANTI-ALLIED PROPAGANDA

Yes, of every kind. Only the natives, the ignorant ones of course, would believed.

[This is all I can offer for appreciation about the Concentration Camp.

Dili, 3rd July 1946.

/s/ C. J. Sequeira.

Sworn before me this third day
of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six.

/s/ H. Pcs
Captain, N.E.I. Army

1790A

Summary of examination of ERNESTO SIMOES, aged 29 years, born at HATOLIA, Portuguese Timor, a Portuguese subject, a driver and now residing in DILLI, Portuguese Timor, being duly sworn states:-]

I am unable to give any information regarding the murders by the Japanese of Australians in DILLI or elsewhere.

About September 1942 all Portuguese troops were concentrated around the town of AILEU. I was a Portuguese soldier at the time.

[About 15th September 1942 the Japanese troops came to AILEU and from then on the Portuguese troops were stationed in special quarters inside AILEU. When the Japanese came to AILEU they stopped us from patrolling the surrounding area and the Japanese ordered the Portuguese troops to stay in AILEU while they took over the patrolling.

Although they ordered us to stay in the town they expressed their friendliness to us, saying they wished to help us. Till then the Japanese used to pass through AILEU and only remained at the most a day, but on this occasion they stayed four or five days. The day before the attack was made on AILEU the Japanese were especially friendly and distributed cigarettes and gifts amongst the Portuguese troops.

On the night before the attack I was on duty at my house when I heard some noise outside the house where I and another ninety Portuguese soldiers were quartered. I thought it was the noise of horses moving about so I went and asked the man in charge of the horses but he told me that all the horses were inside. I then opened the door and looked outside but could see nothing. When I went away from the door a grenade came inside the quarters and killed two horses near the door. I rushed to the other Portuguese soldiers and told them to be ready for an attack. While waiting for orders from our Commander I saw a group of men outside the door. First Sergeant MARTINS asked "Who's there" and the answer was "Nippon". First Sergeant MARTINS then said, that if they were Nippon they could come inside. When the men entered we saw that they were Black Troops of the Japanese. When First Sergeant MARTINS assumed an offensive attitude with his gun the Black Troops ran away. Then the fighting commenced. From six points I could hear the noise of machine-guns firing and from one side several mortars were shelling us. There was also lots of rifle fire and many grenades thrown.

It was about three o'clock in the morning and too dark to distinguish the people firing the mortars and machine-guns. As I have never seen any natives handling mortars I was sure that the Japanese were attacking us. The mortar bombs fell and burst in our quarters and it was most accurate fire.

Suddenly in the midst of the attack I saw large numbers of native troops advancing on the quarters so I hid in the underground cellar. From a girl who actually saw it happen, I was told that my brother-in-law and another Portuguese soldier were captured and taken outside by the Black Troops and shot.

From where I was hiding I could see through a hole Japanese troops moving around. Then about five o'clock in the morning I heard the native Black Troops shouting out to the Japanese that the white men were all finished. The Japanese then sent the native troops away and made an inspection of buildings to see if there were any white men left.

A few of the Portuguese soldiers were able to escape, but some others were killed, among which, was our Commander, Capt. FERREIRA da COSTA and his wife, Secretary GOUVEIA LEITE, the Clerk of the Judge, AFONSO and Doctor PEDROSO.]

After the attack First Sergeant MARTINS and my brother came out of hiding and when the Japanese Commander saw them he expressed surprise that there were some whites left. Then all people who were hiding were ordered to come out and the Japanese formed them up in a line. I was amongst this lot. The

Interpreter of the Japanese told us that the natives had been very bad and were dangerous to our safety and the Japanese offered their protection against them.

The Japanese took a Portuguese machine-gun from one of the Portuguese soldiers and examined it to see if it had been used. They then opened fire with it towards the river in which their own native troops were camped.

We were taken before the Japanese High Commander where we were asked if we were wounded and if we needed treatment. We had to stay in the hospital when we were brought to DILLI and were not allowed to leave it. After four days we were interned in the internment camp at LIQUICA.

Captain MURIYAMA was the Japanese officer in charge of the Japanese troops around AILEU at the time. The attack took place on 1st October 1942.

/s/ Ernesto Simoes
Signature of Deponent

Certificate of Interpreter

I, GIL FERREIRA, certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

/s/ Gil Ferreira
Interpreter

Taken and Sworn before me this twenty-ninth day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-six, at DILLI, PORTUGUESE TIMOR.

/s/ N. F. Quinton Major
Australian Military Forces

and

/s/ G. N. Pof Capt.
N.E.I. ARMY

/s/ (Illogible)
Intendente, PORTUGUESE TIMOR

In the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East

The United States of America and others

v.

ARAKI, Sadao and others

I, William Anderson Beattie, of 632 St. Kilda Road, Melbourne formerly No. 129833 Flying Officer W. A. Beattie of Royal Australian Airforce, make oath and say:-

1. In September 1942 I was a member of 2/4 Independent Company and embarked with that Company on H.M.S. Voyager for Timor, I disembarked in Timor and went up in October 1942 to the neighborhood of Dilli. At that time the Japanese were in occupation of Dilli. I remained in the Dilli area until December 1942, part of my duty being to obtain information concerning Japanese Forces in occupation of Dilli.
2. I knew Fathers Noverto and Pires. They were Catholic priests at the Administrative Center Ainaro in the province of Suro. I knew them very well and they were strictly neutral as far as the war was concerned. They were only interested in their own mission work. In early October 1942 we left Ainaro for several days on patrol and a very large patrol of Japs came into Ainaro from the direction of Alien, unknown to us. On our return to Ainaro several days later I went up to the house where the priests lived and found that it was completely ransacked. I inquired from a mission boy as to the whereabouts of the priests. He told me to go over to the Church. I went over and found some bloodstained clothing outside the Church and on going in noticed the bodies imperfectly buried, where the concrete floor had been picked up and a wooden platform placed over it. I later saw the mission boy who looked after them in their house. He told me that the Japanese had questioned them asking where the Australian soldiers were. They refused to disclose our whereabouts. The Japs had then tied their ankles together and had tied their heads down to their ankles and bayoneted them to death.
3. On 12th December 1942 the Japanese attacked us near Atsabe. They used as a screen for this attack a number of unarmed natives whom they drove in front of them. About 50 to 60 natives were used and a number of them were killed. We also saw them burning native huts in the area of Mt. Katrai and shooting the women and children as they ran from the huts. This was a regular practice among the Japs to make it unpopular with the natives to assist us.
4. A doctor who was the brother-in-law of the Portuguese Administrator of Manatuto told me that the Administrator had been frequently questioned

by Captain Moriyema head of the local Kempai Tai, and that the Administrator disappeared one night. On the following morning a native called on his wife and left a sack which contained his cut up remains.

Sworn at Melbourne in the)
State of Victoria this the)
27th day of September 1946)
Before Me

/s/ W. A. Beattie

/s/ John Mansfield

1792A

Summary of examination of LOIS ANTONIO NUNES RODRIGUES occupation, Doctor's clerk, of Portuguese nationality and born in Portuguese Timor, and 30 years of age, and residing at DILLI, Portuguese Timor, being duly sworn states:-

I was in DILLI on the 20th February 1942 when the Japanese first occupied DILLI,

Two or three days after a wounded Australian soldier was brought to the hospital where I was employed by a native. This Australian soldier was suffering from a large number of wounds. I was present when the native told the officials of the hospital about the bodies of seven (7) Australian soldiers that were then lying partly covered in ditches by the side of the road near FATU MITA. The native had counted the bodies and told how their legs and feet were not covered by earth and the dogs were eating their legs.

I do not know of any person who actually saw the Australians killed, nor do I know the names of the Japanese concerned. I cannot now remember the name of the native who told me about the Australians being buried.

I only saw one Australian a Prisoner of War of the Japanese and that was the wounded Australian soldier brought to the hospital.

That is all that I know about the Australians.

↑
Torture
↓
In 1943 when I was in OSSU I saw Japanese beating natives including a native chief by the name of GERIMIAS, and also half-casts. The Japanese used torture methods on the chief and two or three more natives by burning them with cigarettes after their hands were bound together and also by giving them a water torture by holding closed their mouth and pouring water into their mouth. They also forced them to kneel down on sharp stones while they applied pressure to their backs. Cigarettes were also put into their ears. The natives were also beaten by slappings with hands and by beatings with sticks and when they fell unconscious they were revived with water and beaten again.

I saw the native chief, GERIMIAS, taken to a newly dug grave, he had his hands bound and four or five Japanese of the Kempetai with long native knives make small incisions on his throat, telling the chief that he had to disclose the whereabouts of Australians, otherwise he would be killed. The chief refused to give any information and was then taken away. About a month later, on a day of a Japanese feast, the Japanese announced that the chief had been killed because he was not a friend of the Japanese. The Japanese told another chief all this as a threat as to what would happen if they did not assist them.

The Japanese forced the natives to take part in celebrations of Japanese feasts, while the Portuguese feasts were not permitted.

On the 14th February 1943 I was in MATABIA when the Japanese attacked that mountain using black troops. I was in company with Lieutenant PIRES and Sergeant MARTINS and other Portuguese, and also two Australians, Lieutenant Frank HOLLAND and Sergeant SMITH.

↓
I saw the Japanese burn the village of KELECAI, including the hospital and Doctor's house. This was in December 1942. I also saw the village of NAHARECA burnt by the Japanese after the attack on MATABIA.

THIS is the first page of the Statement by LOIS ANTONIO NUNES RODRIGUES

When the Japanese attacked the native villages they used indiscriminate machine-gun fire.

The people in Portuguese Timor were forced to use Japanese money. The Japanese issued an order that anyone found with Portuguese money would be killed. The order was given to the natives by the Japanese after the natives had been collected in the market place by the beating of drums.

[On the 21st February 1942 I saw the Japanese forcing the doors of the Chinese houses in DILLI and many other houses, and looting the houses.

I know of a lot of places where the Japanese forced the chiefs to send native girls to Japanese brothels, by threatening the native chiefs by telling them that if they did not send the girls, they, the Japanese, would go to the chiefs houses and take away their near female relatives for this purpose.

On the days of the Japanese feasts I heard the Japanese telling how Asia was only for the Asiatics and all white people should be driven out.

I know the native chiefs were forced to give native labour to the Japanese to build military roads and at the aerodrome of LAUTUM. They also forced the natives to cut bamboo sticks for use against parachute attacks, and place the sticks in the ground. The Japanese paid the natives for this work with Japanese invasion money.

The Japanese used Arabs as spies for them and later appointed many Arabs to the positions of Chef de Poste and Administrators.

Two Japanese sergeants, APAI and DaGLOCA and another sergeant WATO were the Japanese who beat the native chief, GEMILAS.

/s/.Lois..Antonio.Rodrigues
Signature of Deponent

Interpreter

I, GIL PIRRIERA, certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above.

./s/.Gil.Pirriera.....
Interpreter

Taken and Sworn by me at DILLI, PORTUGUESE TIMOR, this 26th day of June 1946.

/s/.W.F.Quinton..Major..
being Officer appointed by Commander-in-Chief, S. E. A. C., to make this investigation

and

./s/.....H. Pos.....Capt.,

and

./s/...(unable to read).....
Intendant, PORTUGUESE TIMOR

1793A

CERTIFICATE:

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the attached report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document, entitled "I Statement on Sulmata Incident, II Statement on other Incidents, III Statement on arrest of former auxiliary soldier of Mori unit", being statement in the English language of the Japanese Major General Tanaka Yuki ddo. Soembawa January 27, 1946, on several "incidents" on the Sermata, Locang and Moa Islands, No. 4012/R which original document is a part of the official records of the Nefis.

Batavia

June 1946.

(S E A L)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, K. A. de Weerd, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior official attached to the office at the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

I. Statement on Sulumata Incident.

1. Reason why suppressive action taken.

In Sulumata Island 4 Japanese M.P. and 6 crews of air watch party belonging to Air Intelligence Unit had been installed since middle of June, 1944, when in the end of Aug. 1944, natives started disturbance and murdered these Japanese. A suppressive action was taken to clear out this disturbance to sweep away the rest of the line for the future and to establish law and order in the island. (Total of Japanese massacred was 9, for one of 4 M.P. survived because he was in hospital at Loutem.)

2. Cause of disturbance.

Radja of Sulumata stationed in Luan Island ruled both island, Japanese advance to Sulumata was quite natural for performance of War, and their enforcement of military administration was unavoidable measure under then existed circumstances. Nevertheless, the Radja perverting this, for encroachment of his governing authority, determined to raise a rebellion. Besides, seeing that, at that time, flight of the Japanese aircraft over his area was scarce instead of the frequent flight of Allied aircraft, and that Japanese shipping activity around Lautem area was declining, he decided that our fighting power already fell and that, therefore, no Japanese reinforcement could be sent to the island, if ever he might raise a riot; and, moreover, he intended to securify by this rebellion his own status of Radja against the probable landing of Allied force. Statement to the above effect was made by the Radja, the chief criminal, on his examination, and no other notable cause of the incident was tractable. Looking to these causes of the incident from political point of view conduct of the Radja and people of Sulumata and Luan must be taken as purely rebellious and it must be justifiable that the Japanese treated them as rebels.

3. Outline of rebellion.

(1) The Radja establishing himself in Luan took command of whole campaign and made his son Yoos to direct action in Sulumata. Yoos surrounded the camp of air-watch crew with his force of about 350 natives consisting of about 200 natives of Sulumata (mainly natives from Ero village and Rokisal village, and 10 to 20 natives from each of other villages) and 150 of Luan. Their weapons were spears and bows. At that moment, only one Japanese was in the camp, and others and gone angling at the coast without carrying any weapons. They were all massacred at last and their bodies were thrown into the sea or cast away in the hill.

(2) On that day, 1 W.O. and 1 N.C.O. of M.P. force went to Luan, on the Radja's invitation. The Radja had plotted to sink the ship they took on their way by taking off the plug of the hole in the bottom of the ship which was prepared beforehand. But it was not actually carried out owing to the shipmen hesitation. M.P. were suddenly attacked by about 300 natives that night in their camp. They are known to have escaped from the camp and evacuated the island by rowing a small boat, but since then nothing has been heard of them (M.P. uniform, pistol and

boots

boots worn by Yoos when he was arrested afterwards by suppressive party were probably robbed from their corpses).

(3) A N.C.O. of M.P. was massacred on small island west of Luan when he stopped there on his liaison trip to Lautom.

4. Motive of the discovery of crime.

Raised suspicion by the silence of their wireless since Sept. 1, 1944, a plane was sent to ascertain their safety. But the tragedy was felt when it received no answer to its signal.

5. Sending of suppression party.

Myself, the District commander, organized the following suppression party in accordance with the Divisional order;

Commander of the suppression party,	<u>Captain Shimada Tosaka</u>
	<u>One infantry company</u>
	<u>One machine-gun platoon</u>
	<u>One light trench-mortar platoon</u>
	<u>5 barges</u>
	<u>Total strength---about 200 men</u>

To the suppression party I ordered to such effect as they completely cleaned out the mutineers, and swept away the root of the evil to establish law and order for future, as well as they searched for their bodies and their belongings because it was almost certain that all of the Japanese on Sulmata were already annihilated by natives. In addition, I ordered to capture any intelligence party which I suspected to exist in the island, for it seemed to be probable that this, disturbance was the result of agitation made to these natives by such party.

6. Movement of suppression party.

(1) The suppression party on arrival to Sulmata Island, about 29th of Sept. 1944, landed at two points, northwest end and middle of north coast of the island. Most of the natives had retreated into the mountains, but some resisted with bow, sword and spear, while others attempted to stop our advance by conflagrating both sides of road. The suppression party captured some of the remaining natives, investigated the circumstances of the mutiny and succeeded in acquiring such information as that Yoos, son of the Radja was directing the whole, that natives of all villages joined to it, and that when the party landed, Yoos, went from north coast to south coast through east coast, animating the natives by spreading the false news that strong Australian force were landing the island from many points. The suppression party followed the trace of Yoos but his whereabouts could not be easily found. They called up the village chiefs to question this but they would not open their mouths. Their incorporative attitude (except Leran village chief) made the searching extremely difficult. It was continued by dividing the party to many places

(2) A part of the suppression party was sent to Luan island. They were charged with rifles fire and so fired back against this. They frustrated natives resistance although the Radja and his family tried to / shoot

shoot the Japanese by bows that night, arrested the Radja, his family and his chief subordinates, and returned to Sulmata.

(3) The main body of the suppression party fruitlessly continuing their search for Yoos, already for two weeks, ordered the Radja to search out Yoos within three days, with all the men in the island, under death penalty in default of carrying out this order. The Radja assented to obey this order and commenced the searching but could not find him out until the ordained date. Therefore he was executed. Next, a Japanese soldier found a native sentinel standing in front of a cave in the mountain, then the cave was surrounded by the Japanese and at last Yoos was found and arrested in spite of his resistance with a pistol.

(4) After the arrest of Yoos, those circumstances of the incidents brought to light, and most of the persons concerned with incident arrested, the commander of the suppression party requested for my instructions. To this I ordered the commander to bring Yoos and other leading criminals to Lautem, to execute those joined the conference of rebellion and led the crowd to the assault and to appoint Leran village chief as the next Radja. Three leading criminals including Yoos was executed in Lautem.

(5) Natives of Luan island were especially atrocious. They moved to Sulamata island from their own island to join the attack against our air watch party. On Luan island they assaulted our M.P. and they showed pretty stiff resistance when the suppression party landed there. Therefore, I ordered to bring 42 principals of them to Lautem. But, on the way, 8 of them escaped because they were divided to several small boats. So I made the remaining 34 executed on Moa island.

7. As the result of Sulmata mutiny, about 60 of total 650 persons joined the mutiny were put to death.
8. I do not know the names of executioners.

II. Statement on other incidents.

In Jan. 1943, natives of Elomalo, Lautem, Timor island assaulted the Japanese at Lore, and also natives of villages west of Matabia were at first against the Japanese rule. Therefore, subjugative actions were taken against them, and some of the natives were killed or injured during action, because the natives resistance was considerably strong at first. But they surrendered very soon. And, I remember, that considering the future influences on our administering natives, no native was put to death penalty after that subjugative actions. I have nothing more especially to state, because as the result of these subjugative actions, natives came to recognize the Japanese real power, and since were very obedient to our rule.

III. Statement on arrest of former auxiliary soldier of Mori Unit.

Sept. 1945, in Maumere Area, Flores 85 former auxilliary soldiers of Mori Unit deserted their unit. Therefore, I, as the District Commander, ordered Mori

unit

unit and other units to arrest these auxiliary soldiers. They succeeded in arresting about 50 of them. I ordered, therefore, to stand a special guard to watch them. And when they were handed over to Australian, most of remaining 35 also followed them.

Jan. 27th, 1946, at Soembawa.

was signed: Major General TANAKA Yuki (?)

Seal: TANAKA Yuki (?)

1794A
[C E R T I F I C A T E]

Page 1

"Jap. admit
illeg. House"

The undersigned, CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NLFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document, entitled:]

1. Compilation of NLFIS interrogation reports Nos. 2026/111, 2027/111, 2028/111, 2033/111, 2034/111;
2. NLFIS interrogation report No. 1810, informant WLONTLEY, Julius;
3. NLFIS interrogation report No. 1811, informant SA OIL DOLOIDI;
4. NLFIS interrogation report No. 1070, informant MATULATUWA SILVANUS;
5. Extract from letter from SOHMA LILIBA THOR;
6. Service report of Lt. OFARA, Cd. Garrison in MOA ISLAND;
7. Signed statement by YOELIUS WONTLEY;
8. Signed statement by DOIFINOIS TOPURTARVE;
- [9. Signed statement by Lt. OFARA SEIDAI;]
10. Signed statement by Sgt. MITSUSAKI TORUO;
11. Signed statement by Sgt. Haj. UDO BENZOO;

[concerning mass-murder and forced prostitution on LOIANG and SERAMAT ISLANDS;

which documents are part of the official records of the NLFIS.

Signature:

/s/ C. Jongeneel

(SEAL)

Batavia, June 7th, 1946

Subscribed and sworn before me K. A. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd

STATEMENT BY LT. OHARA Seidai

Q. What is your name and age?

A. My name is OHARA Seidai, my age 27.

Q. What is your unit?

A. TANAKA BUTAI, HAYASHI TAI.

Q. What is your home address?

A. KUMAMOTO KEN, KAMOTO GUN, IWANOIURA 2191.

Q. Give a resume of your service in the army?

A. Dec. 1940 2 Inf. Regt. of TAIWAN
Oct. 1941 KURUME Cadet Academy
Jan. 1942 JAVA
Dec. 1942 TIMOR
June 1944 MOA ISLAND

Q. Who was commander of MOA Island in Sept. '44?

A. I was.

Q. Were any natives killed on Moa Island in Sept. '44 and how many?

A. About 40 natives were captured at SIRIATA and LOHAN Islands and they were killed.

Q. Why were they killed?

A. Because the natives attacked the KHIFHI TAI on SIRIATA and LOHAN Islands.

Q. Who ordered the killing?

A. Gen. TANAKA ordered that the natives were to be sent to his HQ but before they left MOA the order was changed and I was ordered to kill them there, and send 3 or 4 of the natives leaders to TANAKA BUTAI.

Q. Did you kill these natives yourself?

A. No. I only supervised the killing.

Q. Who assisted you?

A. Sgt. Maj. UDO, Sgt. TOYOSHIGE and Sgt. MATSUSAKI and 21 other soldiers.

Q. Where are these men now?

A. Sgt. Maj. UDO and Sgt. MATSUSAKI are in LOPOK with 2 Inf. Regt. of TAIWAN. Sgt. TOYOSHIGE left for LAUTHE in July '45 and the barge arrived empty, so it was presumed that he was drowned.

Q. How were the men killed?

A. They were lined up in threes in column of route and then the 21 soldiers mentioned above charged them with bayonets, killing three at a time.

Q. A witness has said that you raped women and that women were brought to the barracks and used by the Japs. Is this true?

Brothel
A. I organized a brothel for the soldiers and used it myself.

Q. Were the women willing to go into the brothel?

A. Some were willing, some were not.

Q. How many women were there?

A. 6.

Q. How many of these women were forced into the brothel?

A. Five.

Q. How were these women forced into the brothel?

A. They were daughters of the men who attacked the KILPEI TAI.

Q. Then these women were forced into the brothels as a punishment for the deeds of their fathers.

A. Yes.

Q. For how long were these women kept in the brothel?

A. For 8 months.

Q. How many men used this brothel?

A. 25

Q. Have you ever beaten any natives?

A. Yes, I have struck native soldiers who co-operated with us.

Q. Why?

A. A native who lived on DAMAR Island who was one of these killed the Japs soldiers escaped to MOA. There he hid in a house of a native who was a spy for the Japanese. Then he escaped and I do not know where he went. After his escape I found out that he had hidden in the spy's house, so I beat the spy with my clenched fists about the head and shoulders because he had not told us.

Q. Was this native badly hurt?

A. No.

(Sgd) OHARA Saidai

Witness.

J. Lennie, Capt.
13 Jan. '46

The above has been read to OHARA in Japanese and he states that it is a true and accurate report of the information given by him.]

Summary of examination of CHUNG HAI CHENG, also known as HA HOI, occupation, merchant, aged 24 years, born in CANTONG, a Chinese subject, residing during the war in LIQUICA and now in custody in LIQUICA Gaol, being duly sworn states:-

During the Japanese occupation of Portuguese Timor I worked for the Japanese as an Interpreter from May 1943 until the end of the war. I was working for the Kempaitai. The names of the Kempaitai for whom I worked were:-

Lieutenant	AKUZAWA
Sub-Lieut	KANEKO
Sgt (First)	NARETA
"	YOKO
"	UESKY
" (Second)	IKETA
"	CNO
"	KITANO
"	MICCHY
"	KATO
"	UTCHEKI
"	NASKAWA
"	IMASAKY
"	FUKUMOTO
"	NAITO
Driver	OKAMARA
Soldier	TAKAMUNE
"	KCUALACHI

There was also a Sergeant ARAI in the Kempaitai on the West Side of the island and a Captain MATSUDA of the ORTORI. That is all that I remember.

I was not an interpreter when the Japanese interrogated Australians because the Japanese could speak English. I did not see them interrogated.

I saw some Australians in the Dilli gaol from September 1943. I was brought down from LIQUICA in that month.

I acted as an interpreter in Portuguese when ANTONIO AUGUSTO dos SANTOS, was interrogated by the Kempaitai. This was sometime after September 1943. I saw dos SANTOS with his hands bound together and hung from the top of a doorway and I saw him beaten with sticks. I saw this happen to DOS SANTOS only once. Sub Lieut KANEKA was in charge of the interrogation of dos SANTOS and ordered him to be hung up. There

was a Japanese interpreter present but I do not remember his name. I saw dos SANTOS hung up for a period of fifteen or twenty minutes. After that time he was released and given a drink of water and I was sent away. Dos SANTOS was interrogated because he was accused of stealing petrol and ammunition which had belonged to the Dutch.]

The Commandant of the gaol was Lieutenant AKUZAWA, he was aged about 40 years. One Kempaitai named KAHNAPEN was in DILLI gaol for a short time, he is the one who wears glasses.

[All prisoners in the DILLI gaol, including Portuguese, Chinese and natives, were treated in the same manner as dos SANTOS being hung by their hands from the top of a door with their feet off the ground. I saw this on a number of occasions. This was done to the prisoners if they did not give satisfactory answers to the interrogations.] All the Japanese of the Kempaitai named above, except UESKY, YOKO, AKUZAWA, KITANO, TAKAMUNE, AMASAKY, FUKUMOTO, OKAMARA, KOUJIACHI and NAITO, were the ones I saw tying the prisoners up by their hands to the doors. Sergeant KATO was the worst man. I know all the others did it but I did not see them.

I do not know the numbers of the Japanese regiments which occupied Portuguese Timor as they were kept secret, but I do know that the number of the Kempaitai unit for whom I was working was number 1921.

[I was also present as an interpreter when a Portuguese Lieutenant, LIBERATO, was interrogated by the Kempaitai, sergeant NARETA. Lieutenant LIBERATO was also tied up by the hands to the top of a doorway and beaten with sticks by NARETA.

I also saw Sergeant UTCHEKI using the "water torture" on Chinese and native prisoners.]

I could positively identify Sub-Lieutenant KANEKO and Sergeant NARETA again, if I saw them. I am not sure that I could identify the others.

[When I saw the Australians passing through the gaol to take a bath or to do other things, they were very weak and exhausted.]

There was another Japanese organisation which was worse than the Kempaitai, it was called ORTORI, and organised the native troops. There were many ARABS in this organisation. I heard that the ORTORI was responsible for the killing of several Chinese.

[There were also some native women prisoners in the DILLI gaol. I saw them interrogated by Sergeant NARETA and beaten and hung up from the top of a doorway by their bound hands by him. I saw some of these native women being interrogated.

I saw prisoners forced to squat down with a stick tied behind their knees until they fell over with exhaustion.] Sub-Lieutenant KANEKO, Sergeant NARETA, Sergeant KATO, Sergeant UICHEKI, were the ones I saw forcing prisoners to do this. One prisoner to whom this was done was Lieutenant LIBERATO. Sergeant NARETA was the one who did this to Lieutenant LIBERATO.

I know that the Japanese NARETA and TOKATA worked before the war for the SOCIEDADE AGRICOLA and came back in uniform with the Japanese invasion troops.

.../s/ Chung Hai Cheng.....
Signature of Deponent.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, GIL FIRRIERA, certify that I duly translated the above summary to the witness in his own language, prior to his signature which appears above:

[/s/ Gil Firriera
Interpreter

Taken and Sworn before me this First day of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, at DILLI, PORTEGUESE TIMOR.

/s/ W. E. Quinton Major
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

and

/s/ _____ Capt.,
N. E. I. ARMY

and

Intendente, PORTEGUESE TIMOR]