

628

12/20/1940

Memorandum

The governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have reached an agreement regarding the mutual technical commission provided for in Article IV of the Tripartite Pact concluded in Berlin on 27 September 1940.

Upon instructions from their governments, the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, the German Ambassador, Mr. Eugen Ott, and the Royal Italian Ambassador, Mr. Mario INDELLI, met in order to confirm and sign the agreement which had been reached. The text agreed upon has the following wording:

A general commission and two technical commissions (a military and an economic one) are to be formed in each of the three capitals--Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome.

The general commission to be formed in Tokyo is to consist of the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the German Ambassador and the Royal Italian Ambassador.

The general commissions to be formed in Berlin and Rome respectively are to consist in Berlin of the German Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, and the Royal Italian Ambassador, in Rome of the Royal Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, and the German Ambassador.

The members of the general commission can, if necessary, take into consultation military, economic, or other technical experts for their sessions.

The general commissions have the task of executing the Tripartite Pact. For this purpose they can claim the support of the military and economic commissions.

The military and economic commissions are to consist of permanent members appointed by the governments of the three countries.

The military commission in Tokyo is to be composed of the representatives of the Japanese Army and Navy as well as of the Military, Naval and Air Attaches of the German and the Royal Italian Embassy.

The economic commission in Tokyo is to be composed of the number of experts found necessary by the Japanese Government, and the German and the Royal Italian Embassy.

The military as well as the economic commissions may, if necessary, take into consultation also non-permanent co-workers and technical experts.

A number of secretaries are to be appointed for every commission.

The military and economic commissions in Berlin and Rome are to be composed in a similar way as they are in Tokyo.

The chairman of each commission is principally appointed by the government of the country in which the commission is formed.

The military and economic commissions convene either upon invitation from the appertaining general commission, or when the necessity arises to discuss questions which come up. In each case they will submit their proposals to the general commission.

All proposals of the general commission will be submitted to the governments of the three powers for the final approval.

Drawn up and signed in three copies in the Japanese, the German, and the Italian language.

Tokyo, 20 December 1940

/s/ OTT  
/s/ INDELLI  
/s/ MATSUOKA

Doc. No. 955

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 955

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated Sept 27, 1940, and described as follows: Memorandum Agreement dated 20 Dec 1940 between Japan, Germany and Italy regarding the mutual technical commission provided for in Article IV of the Tripartite Pact of 27 Sept. 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
24th day of August, 1946

K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

/s/  
Witness: Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
24th day of August, 1946

Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: R. H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Telegram from OTT dated 13 December 1940

Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept  
in locked file

Tokyo, 13 December 1940  
Arrival, 13 December 1940

1.22 hours  
9.35 hours

Subject matter delayed due to garbling

No. 1389 of 13 December

Most Urgent!

Secret:

The Foreign Office reports that Ambassador KURUSU is commissioned to seek an agreement for General OSHIMA as Ambassador in Berlin. For the previous history, I know that the Foreign Minister has repeatedly offered the Ambassadorial post in Berlin to OSHIMA, who, however, declined it in order to be able to continue his politically active work for the Tripartite Pact in Japan. After the appointment of Admiral NOMURA as Ambassador in Washington, the Foreign Minister put renewed pressure on OSHIMA who thereby wanted to avoid the appearance of a weakening of his Tripartite Pact policy. At the same time, the army, supported by important navy circles, urged OSHIMA to accept, in the endeavour to have a completely reliable proponent of the Alliance policy with Germany occupy the most important ambassadorial post in Europe, especially since the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador in Rome is primarily a parliamentarian prominent in domestic policy who has little experience in foreign policy and since the former press chief SUMA appointed as envoy to Spain is widely known for his leanings toward America. Also Ambassador SHIRATORI, who is at present indispensable here as a leading figure in a Japanese pro-German rejuvenation movement, has emphatically supported the candidature of OSHIMA.

OTT

/136491/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

"I Count Upon AMBASSADOR OSHIMA" (Speech delivered by  
YOSUKE MATSUOKA at the farewell party held on 15 January 1941)

I am most delighted to speak a part of my feeling at this farewell party which is given here today in honor of the Ambassador to Germany OSHIMA. At the beginning of the new year of 2601 of the Imperial Calendar, perhaps, you all will keenly feel that the international situation is growing most serious. In Europe, the war of Germany and Italy against Britain is being fought more and more violently, and in Asia our Empire has already been engaged for three and a half years in a holy war for the purpose of establishing a New Order in East Asia. And according to the results of this European War and also to the success or failure of establishing the New Order in East Asia by our Empire the history of the world will fundamentally be altered.

p.113 The efforts exerted by our country for establishing the New Order in East Asia which began with the Manchurian Incident, and the efforts exerted by Germany and Italy to break down the Versailles system both have a fundamental common cause which in turn will contribute to the establishment of the New Order of the world. The unity between Japan and Germany effected by the Tri-Partite Pact was not at all by chance, but it can be said to be the result of a strong spiritual combination based on a common idea surpassing any pledge made between countries which have simply a common interest.

p.114 It is our profound pleasure that His Excellency Hiroshi OSHIMA departs as Ambassador again to one of the member countries of the Alliance, Germany, which is now in an inseparable relation with us and, at the same time, is making an effort to establish the future by overcoming present difficulties, while the Alliance itself is the leading principle of our diplomacy. His Excellency not only assumed previously the posts of military attache and also of Ambassador to Germany, but has studied about Germany for scores of years, and must be well-informed of the state of affairs in Germany. In fact, he has built up such an absolute personal credit among the leaders of the German government that he can talk with them without reserve. No wonder that the German authorities have already expressed fervent welcome, as soon as his appointment was announced. With German-Japanese relations, destined to become closer, this very suitable appointment will help to promote future cooperation. The practical use of the Japanese-German relations which is built upon the foundation stone of the Tri-Partite Pact will largely depend upon the future and the field, wherein we will depend upon His Excellency OSHIMA's ability, is extensive. When I come to think of the future of the two countries, which are endeavoring to develop their fate in East Asia and Europe under the present international situation, I cannot but think of the importance of responsibility of the Ambassador

who is to be sent to the Allied power. When I come to think of the future relations between Germany and Japan, I believe what our national reliance upon Ambassador OSHIMA will be quite tremendous.

Lastly, I wish to congratulate His Excellency OSHIMA on his departure, and will look forward to his future activities.

Berlin, 29 Nov. 1940

St. -S, No. 864

## CONFIDENTIAL

The Japanese Ambassador looked me up today to repeat to me in outline what he had said at his last visit to the Foreign Minister of the Reich: /that is/ that, on account of the peace-feelers between Japan and China, it is necessary at first to wait /to see/ what instructions the Chinese Ambassador will now receive from CHIANG KAI-SHEK. KURUSU indicated that the simplest complete solution (which, however, had supposedly not been given to him by his Foreign Minister) for a settlement between Japan and Russia would be the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese neutrality pact with the simultaneous Japanese renunciation of her oil concessions in North Sakhalin, with, however, the guarantee of the exportation of 200,000 tons of Russian oil to Japan. Territorial questions should at that time be completely left out of the picture. The publication of the neutrality pact and the oil arrangements were to be arranged in such a manner in regard to time that the Japanese population would not take offense at it.

KURUSU described the conclusion of these two agreements (the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese) as the desired and at the same time required prerequisites for a Japanese advance through the regions south of China (including Siam), without the use of which Singapore could hardly be brought to fall. KURUSU portrayed the latter /idea/ also as his private strategy.

(Signed) WEIZSACKER

Henn R.A.M.  
" U. St.-S. Pol.  
" Dg. Pol.  
" Ges. Stahmer

RUSSIA

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Berlin, 29 Nov. 1940

St. -S, No. 864

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Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

re attack on SINGAPORE?

Doc. No. 4032 B

Page 1

/handwritten/  
KURUSU

To be kept in locked file

Telegram  
(Secret Cipher Process)

BY OTT -

Tokyo, 31 January 1941  
Arrival: 31 January 1941

5:40 hours  
17:05 hours

No. 146 of 31 January

Very Urgent!

TO

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

Sharpened attitude of American Government has heightened the political tension of Japan considerably and has brought conflict with America closer.

2 Unity of government and nation behind the Tripartite Pact has been unmistakably proved in the Diet negotiations, economic circles are also decreasing their resistance. The government is trying to scare America from entering the war by threatening attitude, armament measures, and sharp speeches in Diet and press.

In contrast to this, activistic circles demand preventive attack on Singapore as the key position in the West Pacific Ocean. They expect to deprive America by a surprise action of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific Ocean or to render it difficult. This minority group is under the leadership of Admiral SUETSUGU, Ambassador SHIRATORI, and has the support of the young officers' corps and individual high leaders of the Army and Navy.

In two days' research with the attaches of the armed forces, and the officials in charge of policy and economic policy at the Embassy, I examined in detail the prospects of an attack on Singapore with the following results:

1) Chances of success of an attack against Singapore, in which case, however, Japan for the first time meets with a European opponent of full quality /vollwertig/, are favorable; it will have to be carried out in steps by occupying Saigon and landing on the Malayan Peninsula. At present British forces of any kind are far inferior to available Japanese offensive forces and cannot be increased decisively in a short time. The same holds true for addition of American forces of the West Pacific Ocean, in case America automatically renders military support. Japanese Navy does not consider complete activation of American Pacific Ocean Fleet. It could easily be detected on the overly long approaches /Anmarschweg/ from Hawaii and would be endangered to the point of annihilation.

2) As consequences of the capture of Singapore, Japan will have to expect:

- well why add these words*
- a. Achievement of the claim for leadership in the Great East Asia Sphere. The Netherlands Indies would no longer be able to resist Japanese pressure.
  - b. Speedy conclusion of the China conflict. CHIANG KAI SHEK's position would be much weakened by Japan's gain of prestige and the breakdown of supplies.
  - c. Acquisition of war economically necessary raw material sources. However, Japan's well known unmethodical exploitation would limit planned production for a long time.
  - d. Lessening of tension of inner political pressure by categorical actions.
- Z ??*

*1 yr War*

Against these advantages stand the disadvantages of a continual state of war with England and America's entry into the war, which will probably occur. Both states will carry on mostly economic war against which Japan can stand up with approximately one year's war supplies.

*Risk?*

Summarized the advantages for Japan prevail if the war does not last longer than one year. Thus there are chances for the idea of a Japanese preventive attack to be also successful in soberly weighing economic circles. Experiences in history teach, however, that Japan would choose as moment for action least (one group garbled), and, therefore, will try to await the German attack on England which will seek the decision.

3) Judgment from the German-Italian standpoint. All advantages enumerated above strengthen the Japanese partner in the area of the Pacific Ocean and are, therefore, indirectly in our interest. The Netherlands Indies will hardly be able to maintain their independence in the course of the war, but are endangered by the grasp of Japan or America. The Japanese invasion to be mentioned would, therefore, be the lesser evil. Especially favorable would be a Japanese pressure from Singapore on the Indian Ocean and India, the main British reinforcement area to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, especially from Australia and New Zealand - the development of the Italian war situation has raised the importance of Singapore extraordinarily. Main disadvantage lies in an extension of the war, against the endeavors we made up till now, by the nearly certain entry of America into the war, which cannot permit dominating position of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. New theater of war in the Pacific Ocean would be largely removed from our influence and would complicate a conclusion of peace.

*?*

Furthermore Japan would be out for transit trade from and to Germany and she herself is in need of raw materials and would no longer

be capable of transit to overseas countries. Whether Russia's attitude would be unfavorably influenced, cannot be judged from here.

*When it is essential* to unify all forces to a decisive blow against England, this attack on Singapore might be useful. The Japanese Government will, in view of the increasing pressure of the minority group, orientate itself widely in accordance to the plans of Germany and will have to be influenced accordingly. The role of intermediary between Thailand and Indo-China gives Japan (one group garbled) possibility to establish herself in Saigon militarily as guarantor of peace, as the first politically unimpeachable step towards the action against Singapore. In case the Japanese government and political circles should be influenced in the sense of the preventive action against Singapore, I would ask for instructions.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

/handwritten/  
KURUSU

To be kept in locked file

Telegram  
(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 31 January 1941                      5:40 hours  
Arrival: 31 January 1941                  17:05 hours

No. 146 of 31 January

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For the Reich Foreign Minister.

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Unity of government and nation behind the Tripartite Pact has been unmistakably proved in the Diet negotiations, economic circles are also decreasing their resistance. The government is trying to scare America from entering the war by threatening attitude, armament measures, and sharp speeches in Diet and press.

✓ In contrast to this, activistic circles demand preventive attack on Singapore as the key position in the West Pacific Ocean. They expect to deprive America by a surprise action of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific Ocean or to render it difficult. This minority group is under the leadership of Admiral SUETSUGU, Ambassador SHIRATORI, and has the support of the young officers' corps and individual high leaders of the Army and Navy.

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

## Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 21 November 1940                      1110 hours  
Arrival, 21 November 1940                      2215 hours

No. 1285 of 21 November

Urgent!

Annex to Telegram No. 1272 x) of the nineteenth.

x) with Pol. VIII.

Secret.

*check*

I. The Vice Foreign Minister informed me today regarding the situation in Thailand, that the Thailand Prime Minister, as well as the American Government have denied alleged negotiations for an alliance. However, British and American Ambassadors in Bangkok are working energetically to win over Thailand for the Anglo-Saxon Powers. The Japanese Government has today proposed to Thailand that she limit her territorial claims on Indo-China in some points, and would then be ready to mediate between Thailand and Indo-China. Should the occasion arise, Japan will request the support of the German Government in dealing with the French Government.

II. The Vice Foreign Minister informed me most confidentially that the Japanese Government intends to send warships to Saigon. The French Government will be informed that this will be a friendly visit, but it will be, in fact, aimed as a demonstration against Thailand.

III. In the opinion of the Vice Foreign Minister, if Thailand were to turn towards the Anglo-Saxon camp there would be no considerable military harm to Japan in consequence. This move could be countered by the occupation of Saigon, and thereby be compensated.

OTT

/136473/

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

634

Doc. No. 4037 A

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in  
locked file

Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9.40 S  
Arrival: 6 February 1941, 21.55

No.175 of Feb. 6

Cito!

Secret.

Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning here on February 7 concerning settlement of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no political or military agreement with a third power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obligation, as far as it concerns France, would, of course, apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Government of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because, in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed towards eliminating the British-American influence in an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for the reason that the French Government might possibly raise objections by referring to the German-French Armistice Agreements.

The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same information to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

/136552/

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept  
in locked file

Tokyo, 17 February 1941 1.30 S  
Arrival: 17 February 1941 10.00

No. 229 of February 17.

Citissima

For the Reichs Minister personally

To telegram No. 59 of 15th yellow

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, to whom I forwarded approval from there to his planned trip, asked me to express to the Reichs Foreign Minister his sincerest thanks for the report which had pleased him very much. He repeated that the time of the departure would depend on the progress of the Thailand-Indo-China negotiations, but would in any case take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulties on account of the excessive demands of Thailand. The Japanese Government is at present working on a proposal of a compromise which through me will be placed at the disposal of the Reichsminister in the next few days with the request to influence the Vichy regime in the direction of acceptance of the proposal through mediation of the Reich Government.

Draft of the press communique about MATSUOKA's trip will follow separately.

OTT

/136566/

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

DOCUMENT 4038 A

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 12 March 1941 - 5.25 S hours  
Arrival, 12 March 1941 - 15.55 hours

No. 376 of March 12

Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI just visited me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily valuable and effective support of the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

BCLTZE

AFFIDAVIT

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

## Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in  
locked fileTokyo, 19 December 1940  
Arrival: 19 December 194011.30 hours  
22.15 hoursNo. 1425 of 19 DecemberMost urgent!

For the Reichsminister

The Foreign Minister is considering, so he told me, to accept in the near future the invitation of the Reich Foreign Minister to come to Berlin. He is thinking of arriving there in the second half of January, to make a short visit to Rome from Germany, if possible stay in Moscow and return to Tokyo at the end of February. Prime Minister approves plan and would like to obtain the Emperor's sanction for a longer absence of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister emphasized to me his need to make a strong gesture in favor of the Tripartite Pact and if possible, to personally overcome the deadlock in the negotiations with Russia and China. The Diet /session/ beginning in January could postpone its foreign policy debate until the return of the Foreign Minister.

I have the impression that the Foreign Minister would like to enhance the weight of his policy and himself through the conversation with the Reichs Foreign Minister and an eventual reception by the Fuehrer and hopes with German help to set into motion the stalled negotiations with Russia. In my opinion his plan is entirely in our interest. The journey would make a strong impression on world politics, add weight to the Tripartite Pact centered in Berlin, would strengthen the attitude of the Foreign Minister towards America through the conversation in Berlin, and strengthen the German impression and would open up the possibility of a conversation with Moscow. Against this advantage, in my opinion, the extended absence of the leader of the Japanese foreign policy would not be of consequence since the armed forces, especially the army, will meanwhile reliably heed the policy of the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister would presumably be thankful for German encouragement of his plan. I, therefore, suggest to empower me to transmit a corresponding attitude of the Reichs Foreign Minister.

OTT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in  
locked fileTokyo, 10 February 1941  
Arrival, 10 February 194101.10  
2400

No. 196 of 10.2.41

Most Urgent

For the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

x) at the Reichs Foreign Minister's office.

xx) at the Reichs Foreign Minister's office.

To Telegram No. 77 of 19th x) and with reference to /Tokyo/ Tel.  
No. 146 from here xx)

*Matsuoka  
to  
Berlin  
Rome  
Moscow*

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA has just told me with obvious joy that the Emperor, on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission to accept the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to /visit/ Berlin. He intends presuming an agreement to this from the other side to depart after the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about 25 February and to reach Berlin between 12 and 15 March. He has set aside 12 days in all for the conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If need be, his stay in Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15.

*SMRR  
Kase*

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the European Division, Ministerial Director, SAKAMOTO, Director NAKANISHI, of the South Manchurian Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by the Legation Secretaries KASE and HOGEN, Attache SAIONJI, grandchild of the last GENRO who died recently, one younger officer from the army and the navy each, as well as two cipher operators.

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details re the most important questions which he would like to discuss in Berlin:

I. Attitude of the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact towards America.

1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

The Foreign Minister is endeavoring to prevent America's entry into the war in the spirit of the pact. To this end he has instructed Ambassador NOMURA to dwell most emphatically on Japan's unconditional loyalty to the pact and her military and economic might /in talks/ with President ROOSEVELT, and point out the senselessness of an American entry into the war. America could not stop the defeat of England by entering

the war. On the contrary, by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone are able to create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary even for America in the long run, she would act against her own interest.

2.) Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

✓ 2  
Should, in spite of this, America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese Government considers a preventative attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.

II. Termination of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The latter was showing signs of greater readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister expects favorable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang-Kai-Shek from the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to decide to recognize WANG-CHING-WEI.

III. Relations to Russia.

As the result of a surprise agreement with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, the Foreign Minister expects an important strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador OSHIMA of the questions, but had taken it upon himself to carry on the negotiations.

The Foreign Minister requests that his intended journey be treated very confidentially. He proposes to publish simultaneous communiques in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, shortly before his departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from there.

In view of the importance of the decisions to be made I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign Minister to be able to report about the situation here from my side and to receive personal instructions for the execution of the decisions reached there.

OTT

/136556-8/

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
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W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 4037 D

Teletype to Reichs Foreign Minister

Today

Berlin, 22 February 1941 Secret

(To be presented before OSFIMA's arrival)

The Japanese Ambassador visited me this morning. He briefly developed his viewpoints regarding the future Japanese foreign policy. OSFIMA arranged the three tasks of Japan in East Asia according to their urgency from north to south.

1.)

Russia

OSFIMA emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The latter would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices were to be brought for this. But perhaps a modus vivendi with Russia could be reached without sacrifices and would also be sufficient to relieve Japan in the north.

Speed is required.

2.)

China

OSFIMA deplored that Japan had not settled matters with CHIANG KAI-SHEK long ago. A settlement should now be found. There were two schools at present in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, the other which would put pressure on CHIANG KAI-SHEK by giving preference to WANG CHING-WEI. OSFIMA himself inclines toward the latter procedure.

3.)

British Possessions in East Asia.

In this connection OSFIMA made military statements concerning which it may be sufficient to mention that OSFIMA considers it necessary to take Hongkong first, which should not be very difficult. Singapore has to be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land.

I expressed doubts to OSFIMA whether the order of the problems, which he had mentioned, fits the demand of the historic hour which would probably never return. OSFIMA replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries.

I suppose that OSFIMA's trend of thought when he visits Fuschl will be within the framework depicted above.

WEIZSACKER

AFFIDAVIT

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegram from Ribbentrop dated 28 Feb. 1941.

To be kept in  
locked file

Telegram

(In the Clear)

Special train, 28 February 1941  
Arrival --- " ---

01.45 hours  
03.00 "

No. 120 of 28.2  
Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)

R A M - 51/R  
Fuschl 27 February  
Diplogerma Tokyo\*)

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information!

The Japanese Ambassador OSFIMA visited me at Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As regards details, it took the following course:

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation. After war with England had become inevitable, the Fuehrer decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run, the agreement also lay in the interest of Japan, which is interested in the speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, the further development of this /agreement/ must follow. For Germany, there are not more military problems of any kind on the continent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching developments in France, was not interested in occupying the whole country, also lost French Africa should fall to De Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time. Garrison the Occupied Countries was merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance. In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Partite Pact, Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand.

*Summary*  
*Ribbentrop*

*Defect of  
Britons*

*osdum*  
*JP*  
*no 7 p 10*  
*on 28.2.41*

*VVC*

*1000000*  
*Wor*

VC - The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish withdrawal from military developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would take any action in the event of a German intervention in Greece. Yugoslavian statesmen had recently expressed their desire for peace by their visit to Germany. Jugoslavia must come over to our camp sooner or later. Consequently the Balkans were in our hands. The English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without our knowledge and with poor military preparation. However the Italian front in Greece was now stable. General WAVELL's advance in North Africa was to be explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians, who had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against tanks. We had not sent an organization /verband/ to Libya, to bring about a change there if possible. The Italian people stood firmly behind the DUCE: we were helping with the supply of raw materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner or later she would come over to us openly; she hesitated still at present because of the difficulties of her food supply. With Russia relations were good. Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would beware of taking any action against us! STALIN was a cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing matters in the East with supreme ease. A Russo-German conflict - (not wished by us) - would mean a gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

VC - In the war against England our bombs had created serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was having a strongly retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the beginning of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to a definite minimum, below English subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was prepared, but depended on various factors. ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan. However it was in our interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come in to the war despite this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast extent of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategically more favourable position vis a vis England. We were not only equal to a combination of the British and American air forces but superior at any time. The number of pilots was unlimited,

VG likewise the aircraft production potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on U-boat fleets, air fleets and flak. The war was won today, militarily, economically, and politically; we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and for England to ask for peace soon. In this connection co-operation with Japan was important. In her most personal interests she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be an attack on Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation of Singapore must take place with lightning speed, if at all possible without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace, to contribute to a speedy termination of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador OSFIMA replied, that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials, especially re: steel and iron, was difficult. Construction of 45,000 ton ships had been suspended and instead they were building submarines, torpedo boats and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the sea. The occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need.

VG I remarked that it would be better to delay the Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone. In case of a corresponding explanation and motivation of the occupation, America would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy action were of importance:

VG (1) Occupation of Singapore would mean a decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.

(2) America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected, even ROOSEVELT's argument re: prestige for entering the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the war, America would have to look on powerlessly, how Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

1-VG (3) Japan must secure for herself for the coming New Order in the world that position which she hoped to

✓ G  
Propaganda

have at the conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador OSFIMA agreed completely with this line of thought. He declared himself willing to do everything to realize this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told OSFIMA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest co-operation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria in an exemplary. The Ambassador intends to set up a program with our representatives for the intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U.S.A., I remarked that blunt speaking should be employed appropriately vis a vis them. The U. S. people did not like National Socialism, but on the other hand, were against entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U. S. people felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued toward the U.S.A. The U.S. people must know that if they had aggressive desires, an iron front of determined peoples, which practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with the closest co-operation. For this a continuous exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about principles was necessary. In this connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration of the Jap. ambassador in Washington NOMURA, on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To my reference that we had already made a great contribution to the shaping of the fate of the Allied Nations through the victory on the continent, also that in the future, on account of geographical factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war, while Japan would only have to fight against the periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her, and should not evade the final consequence - OSFIMA replied that Japan was determined to maintain her Imperial position. As he confidentially told me, KONOYE and MATSUOKA thought as he did and were for an early attack on Singapore.

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I then discussed the tasks of reconstruction in Europe and East Asia facing the powers of the Tri-Partite

Trade  
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Pact after the war. Over centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the great spheres of interest, the European-African sphere of power under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the East Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the western hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China, etc. In both economic spheres preference should be given over third powers. Ministerial Director SOFLTAT's task was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined in Berlin according to agreement by the Economic commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the grounds of renewed U.S. impudence for common action to open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation and possibly bring about a change in public opinion in favour of isolation. I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with the U.S. by the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of this action.

RIBBENTROP

\* \* \* \* \*

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

6405

High Command of the Armed Forces      Fuehrer Headquarters, 8 March 41

WFST/Abt. L (I Op.)

No: 44 282/41 gk. Chfs.

5

Top Secret

Only through Officers

14 Copies  
4th CopyDirective No. 24Concerning Collaboration with Japan

The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the cooperation with Japan:

1. The aim of the cooperation based on the Three-Power-Pact, must be to bring Japan, as soon as possible, to active operations in the Far East. Large English forces will hereby be immobilized, the center of the U.S.A. interest will be diverted to the Pacific.

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In view of the still undeveloped state of war mobilization on the part of her opponents, the prospects of success for Japan will be the greater, the earlier she intervenes. The "Barbarossa" enterprise provides especially favorable political and military prerequisites for this purpose.

2. For the preparation of the cooperation, it is necessary to strengthen the Japanese war potential by all means.

For this purpose, the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces must meet in a comprehensive and generous way, the demands of the Japanese concerning the communication of German warfare and combat experiences and assistance in matters of war economy and technics. Reciprocity is desired, but must not render the negotiations more difficult. Those requests by the Japanese which might effect the conduct of the war in a short time must naturally be put in the foreground.

In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decision for himself.

3. The alignment of the mutual plans of operation is a matter for the High Command of the Navy.

For this, the following guiding principles are to be followed:

a. It must be emphasized that it is the common goal of the war to force England down rapidly in order to keep the USA out of the war. As for the rest, Germany has neither political nor military or economic interests in the Far East, which might give rise to reservations with regard to the intentions of the Japanese.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in economic warfare, makes it particularly advisable to employ strong Japanese forces

for the same purpose. Moreover any possibility of assistance for German economic warfare must be utilized.

c. The raw material situation of the Treaty Powers requires that Japan seize those territories which she needs, especially if the US intervenes, for the continuation of the war. The deliveries of crude rubber must be carried on even after Japan enters the war, since they are of vital importance for Germany.

d. The conquest of Singapore, England's key position in the Far East, would mean a decisive success for the active warfare of the Three Powers.

Besides, attacks on other systems of bases of the English sea power -- of the American sea power only if the entrance of the USA into the war cannot be avoided -- will serve to shake the enemy's power system there and, just as in the case of attacks on the sea lanes, will bind essential forces of every kind. (Australia).

A date for the beginning of discussions on operational matters cannot as yet be set.

4. The military committees to be formed in accordance with the Three-Power-Pact are to deal only with such questions which concern equally the three participating powers. In the first place the tasks of economic warfare will belong into that group.

It is up to the "Main Committee" assisted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to make decisions in individual cases.

5. No hint must be given to the Japanese concerning the operation "Barbarossa".

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

Draft signed by Kaitel

Certified by  
(Signature illegible)  
Lieutenant Commander.

#### Distribution:

Commander-in-Chief of the Army (General Staff of the Army)  
1st copy  
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1st Skl.) 2nd copy  
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Economic Armaments Office (Wi.Rue.Amt)	8th copy
"H W K"	9th copy
"Dept. L"	10th to 14th copies

I. (Orig. in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document, numbered 384-PS by said Documentation Division.
2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.
3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.
4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.
5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

Page I Seckriegsleitung

Top Secret

(Naval Operations Staff)

Only by Officer

Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on  
18 March at 1600 hours.

(Present: Chief OKW, General Jodl, Commander von Puttkamer).

3 MAR 1941

Examination No. 2

\* \* \* \* \*

11.) Japan.

Japan must take steps as soon as possible to eliminate Singapore since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English fleet contained; unpreparedness of the USA for war against Japan; inferiority of the U. S. fleet to the Japanese fleet). Japan is making preparations for this action, but according to all statements made by Japanese officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on inducing Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes to avoid war against the USA if possible. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore soon.

According to a statement of Admiral Nomura, Minister Matsuoka has great misgivings about the Russian question and will make inquiries particularly about that.

The C-in-C of the Navy recommends (in a personal conversation with the Fuehrer) that Matsuoka be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

\* \* \* \* \*

NAZI  
ATTACK  
ON  
USSR?

II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered C-152 by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Navy.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

---

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

---

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL,  
hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General  
Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as  
such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records  
of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during  
the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached  
is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document  
which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the  
trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit CB  
122.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as  
aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military  
Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and  
as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate  
and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of  
said document in order to verify the existence and contents of  
said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the origi-  
nal of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been  
impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

40303

643

Page I Seckriegsleitung

Top Secret

(Naval Operations Staff)

Only by Officer

Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on  
18 March at 1600 hours.

(Present: Chief OKW, General Jodl, Commander von Puttkamer).Examination No. 2

\* \* \* \* \*

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The C-in-C of the Navy recommends (in a personal conversation with the Fuehrer) that Matsuoka be advised regarding the designs on Russia.

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II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

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2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Navy.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

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/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
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and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of  
said document in order to verify the existence and contents of  
said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the origi-  
nal of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been  
impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

Minutes of the conference between the "Fuehrer" and the Japanese Foreign Minister IATSUOKA in the presence of the German Foreign Minister as well as Ambassadors OTT and OSWILA on 27 March 1941.

\* \* \*

America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war some place else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone opposed to the powers of the Tri-partite Pact. But in no case could America wage a war some place else.

(Page 11 of orig) Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint action of the Tripartite power than the one established today will in all human possibility never again arise. On the other hand it is clear to him that with every historical act a risk has to be taken into consideration. Rarely in history, however, has the risk been less than at present while war is being waged in Europe, Britain is tied up there, America is still at the beginning of her armament, Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Western border. Such a moment will never occur again, it is unique in history. He (the Fuehrer) admits that there is a certain risk involved, but it is an exceptionally small one at a time when Russia and Britain are eliminated and America is not yet prepared. If this favourable moment would pass by and the European conflict would possibly end in a compromise, France and Britain would recover in a few years. America would join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner or later be faced with the task after all of defending the security of her living space (Lebensraum) in a battle against those three nations.

(Page 12 of orig) Militarily, too, there has not been since the memory of man a situation relatively as favourable as now, although the military difficulties resulting from action should not be underestimated.

Especially favorable is the fact that there exist no conflicts of interests between Japan and her Allies. Germany, which would satisfy her colonial demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe.

(Page 13 of orig) On the other hand the cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons never meant a real coalition but always only a playing off of one against the other. Just as much as Britain does not put up with the hegemony of one nation in Europe, she would in East Asia play off Japan, China and Russia against each other to promote the interests of her own empire. The United States would act just like Britain, she would inherit the empire and replace British imperialism with American imperialism.

A better situation for joint action would hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He (the Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, the German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody also in her previous history. He has the necessary power of resolution in critical situations and, finally, Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of successes which is also unique in the world but need not be repeated.

(Page 14 of orig) In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the year 1941. He has always been for cooperation with this country. Ambassador OSHIMA knows that he (the Fuehrer) has worked unflinchingly toward this goal for many years. He is determined never again to deviate from this line. As already mentioned, especially favorable for cooperation is the fact that there are no conflicts in interest between Japan and Germany. For interests in the long run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will of a Fuehrer, therefore they always endanger anew the cooperation between nations if they are turned in opposite directions. In the case of Japan and Germany, therefore, one can plan for the longest time on account of the non-existence of such conflicts. This has been his firm conviction since earliest youth. The Japanese, German, and Italian nations would be highly successful if they would draw the consequences from this present unique situation.

MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank statements which made the whole situation very clear to him. Although he already has occupied himself thoroughly with the arguments advanced by HITLER, he would once again consider most thoroughly the arguments mentioned.

(Page 15 of orig) On the whole he agrees with the views mentioned by the Fuehrer. Especially he is also of the opinion that any resolute action involves a certain risk. MATSUOKA declared with reference to the report of Ambassador OTT and the German Foreign Minister through which the Fuehrer will probably be accurately informed about the present situation in Japan, that he wants to present the situation personally and very frankly. There are in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which can be kept in check only by a strong man. This is the type which although he would like to have the cubs of the tigress, is, however, not prepared to go into the cave to snatch them away from their mother. These trends of thought, were presented by him using the same picture at a conference at headquarters in the presence of two princes of royal blood. It is regrettable that Japan has not yet rid herself of these circles, indeed that some of these people are even in influential positions. Confidentially, however, he can say that, after a violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at the conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that decisively, when she has the feeling that she would otherwise lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless of the condition of her preparations, because there would always be some people who would consider the preparation insufficient. This point he, MATSUOKA, carried successfully also against both the princes. The timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate and would act partly because of a sympathetic pro-British or pro-American attitude.

*The cubs of TIGER*

(Page 16 of orig) MATSUOKA then pointed out that he had advocated the alliance already long before the outbreak of the European war. He greatly exerted himself at that time on behalf of its conclusion, but regrettably had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he personally held the view that Japan first should attack Singapore and put an end to British influence in this district, and only then should conclude the Tripartite Pact, because the thought of

Japan joining the alliance without simultaneously making a contribution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to him. Because, while Germany has already waged a gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at the time of the conclusion of the Pact, had not yet contributed anything. Therefore, he had very strongly insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not push it through and then, by force of circumstances reversed his program and put joining of the pact in first place.

Page  
18 of  
orig)

He did not have the least doubt that the South Sea problem could not be solved without the capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only to intrude into the cave of the tigress and take out the cubs by force.

It is only a matter of time until Japan will attack. According to his opinion the attack should ensue as soon as possible. Unfortunately he does not govern Japan but has to convert the rulers to his opinion. He will surely also succeed in this some day. But at the present moment he cannot, under these circumstances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese nation.

Upon his return, he would give these matters his most serious attention after his conference with the Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having personally examined the situation in Europe. He could not praise anything definite but promises that he will personally advocate to the utmost the goals indicated.

Page  
19 of  
orig)

MATSUOKA then also urgently requested the statements just presented by him to be held strictly confidential because upon their becoming known in Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion would probably turn pale and try to get him out of his office.

While endeavoring to bring about the pact, he had also kept strictest silence until the very last moment and frequently and purposely created the impression of a pro-American or a pro-British attitude for the deception of his adversaries.

Page  
20 of  
orig)

Shortly before conclusion of the pact it was reported to him that the British Ambassador made strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite pact. The American Ambassador also expressed himself similarly. A few days after conclusion of the pact he asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador admitted everything and, moreover, stated that every Japanese he had met since publication of the conclusion of the pact, had expressed the opinion that Germany would win the war. This, according to the opinion of the American Ambassador, is untrue, Germany has no chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact perhaps with the assumption of a German victory.

MATSUOKA declared further that he had thereupon replied to the American Ambassador that only God knows who would win the war in the long run. But he (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the basis of the victory of this or that power, but based on his vision of the new order. He had listened with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer about the new order and was fully and entirely

(Page  
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orig)

convinced by them. If he would for once, assume purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would turn at a given moment against Germany, he must state to the American Ambassador that Japan would then immediately come to the assistance of her ally.

(Page  
22 of  
orig)

His visions of the new order were laid down by him in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact. That is an ideal which has been transmitted from one generation to another since time immemorial. For him, personally, the realization of this ideal is his life objective to which he has devoted all his labor up to now, in order to make a small contribution on his part toward its realization. This Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, is also a contribution toward this realization. The execution of these trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further, stands moreover with the motto: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." This was not yet understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan should ever deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA) would be the first to fight against it.

In this connection MATSUOKA also reminded of the other principle of the preamble to the Tripartite Pact according to which every nation was to take the place due it. Although Japan, too, will proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the new order, and although she sometimes would have to lead with a strong hand the nations affected by this new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously quoted motto constantly before her eyes: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation."

During the further course of the conversation MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an explanation about it to the German Foreign Minister and would have given it at the morning conference if the German Foreign Minister had not been called away prematurely. Now he intends to give this information to the leader.

(Page  
23 of  
orig)

First of all he intended to pay a complimentary visit to Molotov on his trip through Moscow. After some reflection however, he decided to ask the Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild way from the Soviet government whether there exists any interest in a conference between Stalin and him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could follow his instructions with the Soviet government, the proposal was made by the Russian government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsuoka. He spoke with Molotov for about 30 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that due to the necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes with Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin.

(Page  
24 of  
orig)

He had explained to Stalin that the Japanese are morally communists. This ideal had been passed on from the fathers to the sons since time immemorial. But at the same time he stated that he does not believe in political and economic communism and rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors had already early given up every attempt in this direction and had devoted themselves to moral communism.

For that which he called moral communism, MATSUOKA then quoted some examples from his own family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism and egoism introduced from the West. At present the situation in Japan in this respect is extremely confused. However, there is a minority which is strong enough to fight successfully for the resurrection of the "old ego" of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan is extremely bitter. But those who fight for the restoration of the old ideal are convinced of their final victory.

(Page 25 of orig) The Anglo-Saxons are basically responsible for the penetration of the above-mentioned prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the old traditional Japanese ideal Japan is compelled, therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just as well as in China she is fighting not against the Chinese but only against Great-Britain in China and capitalism in China.

WAR  
SAGE  
MATSUOKA stated further that he had explained to Stalin his ideas about the New Order and thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this order and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight against them. He explained to Stalin that the Soviets also on their part are advocating something new and that he believes to be able to settle the difficulties between Japan and Russia after the collapse of the British empire. He pictured the Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviet Russia's common enemy.

(Page 26 of orig) Stalin held out the prospect of an answer when he should travel through Moscow on his return to Japan, but immediately added after some deliberation that Soviet Russia never was friendly with Britain, nor ever will be.

TENNO  
MATSUOKA, in the further course of conversation, made some remarks about the nature of the TENNO. The TENNO is the state, and the life as well as property of each Japanese belongs to the TENNO, that is the state. This is so to speak the Japanese version of a totalitarian state structure.

(Page 27 of orig) In conclusion MATSUOKA spoke admiringly about the way in which the Fuehrer is leading the German nation, which stands behind him in complete unity, with determination and power through this great time of revolution unequalled in history. Each nation has such a leader but once in a thousand years. The Japanese nation has not yet found its Fuehrer. But he would surely appear in the hour of need and take over the leadership of the nation with determination.

Berlin, 1 April 1941

signed: SCHMIDT  
Ambassador

I. (Orig. in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document, numbered 1878-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.  
Lt Col IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 27th 1941 between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the ambassadors Ott and Oshima.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.  
LT Colonel, IGD  
O-508524

TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)

Record of Reich Foreign Minister

14/41

A

## RECORD

OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN THE PRESENCE OF AMBASSADORS OTT AND OSHIMA IN BERLIN ON 27 MARCH 1941.

3 | 27 | 41

The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed MATSUOKA with cordial words as a man who has shown by word and deed that he has the same attitude toward the problems of his country as the Fuehrer and his co-workers must have for Germany, and who made possible the conclusion of the pact with JAPAN as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country. The Tri-Partite Pact is a very important instrument for the future of the three countries, and represents the foundation on which the future of the three nations can be assured in a manner that has always been imagined by German and Japanese patriots.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the situation at it appears from Germany's point of view.

In reference to the military situation, he pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase of her fight against England. During the past winter, the Fuehrer prepared everything further so that Germany stands today completely ready for deployment in order to meet England everywhere she can be reached. The Fuehrer has at this moment at his disposal perhaps the strongest military might which has ever existed in the world. Germany has ready to strike 240 divisions, 186 of which are first class attack divisions of young soldiers. 24 of them are armored divisions to which must be added more motorized brigades.

The Luftwaffe has increased greatly, and has introduced new models so that in the future as in the past it will be a match for any combination, that is, Germany is not only a match for England and America in this field, but is absolutely superior.

The German navy owned at the outbreak of the war only a relatively small number of battle-ships. In any case, the battle-ships under construction have been completed so that even the last one of them could be commissioned within a short time.

In contrast to the world war, the German navy does not stay in port this time, but has been committed against the enemy from the first day of the war. MATSUOKA probably saw in the news of the last weeks that German dreadnoughts disturbed the supply routes between England and America with extraordinary success.

646

future

Final phase of war w/ England. Strongest army in history.

German navy doesn't stay in port.

*Submarine*  
 The number of submarines, committed until now, is very small. At most 8 or 9 boats have been in contact with the enemy each time. In any case, these few submarines in cooperation with the Luftwaffe during January and February sank 750,000 tons per month, exact proof of which Germany can show at any time. This figure, however, does not include the great additional losses which England suffered from floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning of April, the number of submarines will increase 8 to 10 fold so that 60 to 80 submarines could then be in contact with the enemy constantly. The Fuehrer here followed the tactics of committing only a few submarines at first, and to use the remaining ones for training the personnel necessary for a larger fleet in order then to attack the enemy like a stroke of lightning by the commitment of a larger number of units. Therefore, the expected number of sinkings by German submarines would in the future probably be considerably above what has already been reached. Under these circumstances, the submarine arm alone can be described as absolutely deadly.

*Greece*  
*Italian fear*  
*Rommel*  
*Wavell*  
*Eng. met*  
*at gave*  
*up."*  
*VC*  
 Turning to the military situation on the European continent, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that Germany practically had no longer any enemy worth mentioning because of the subjugation of the countries of the continent, except for the small English forces in Greece. Germany will repulse every attempt by England to land on the continent or to gain a foothold there. She would therefore not tolerate for the English to remain in Greece. Viewed militarily, the Greek problem is of secondary importance. The only factor of practical importance is that the advance toward Greece which probably will become necessary, will obtain a dominating position in the Eastern Mediterranean which will be of considerable importance for the further development of operations in these areas. In Africa, Italy has had bad luck during the past months because the Italian troops there were not familiar with the modern methods of tank fighting and were not prepared for anti-tank defense so that it was comparatively easy for the English armored divisions to capture the rather unimportant Italian positions. A final obstacle has been placed in front of further advance by the English. The Fuehrer has sent General ROMMEL, one of the most capable German officers, to Tripoli, with sufficient German forces. Unfortunately, the hope that General WAVELL would attack was not fulfilled. In several outpost skirmishes, "the English encountered the Germans, and then gave up all further offensive intentions." Should they still undertake an attack against Tripoli, then they would meet an annihilating defeat. Here as well, the tables certainly will be turned one of these days, and the English will perhaps disappear from North Africa even faster than they came.

*Suez*  
*blocked*  
 In the Mediterranean area, the German Luftwaffe has accomplished good work now for two months and has inflicted heavy shipping losses on the English who had dug themselves in there. The Suez Canal has been blocked for a long time and would be blocked anew after removal of the obstacles. It is no longer a pleasure for the English to be obliged to stick it out in the Mediterranean. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes that the Mediterranean would still be blocked off during the course of this year in such a manner that the English would no longer represent practically any danger. Their fleet would be tied down for the protection of their position in Africa.

If one calculates the sum total of the military situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion that the Axis is practically master of the situation in all of continental Europe in the military field. A gigantic army is at the disposal of Germany, which is practically unemployed and can be committed at any time at any place where the Fuehrer deems it necessary.

The political situation is characterized by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change of government arrived from Belgrade this morning, however all details are lacking so far. Also the political situation in Europe and in the whole world has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-Partite powers. Germany continues to strive to win over this or that state which still stands outside of the pact, to the cause of the three powers. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA confidentially that Spain at least in spirit is in the Tri-Partite Pact. Of the two or three countries remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interesting. He can tell MATSUOKA confidentially that here too, attempts would be made to win these countries for the Tri-Partite Pact.

Certain feelers have already been aimed at Turkey. Even if this country formally has an alliance with England, it is at least not entirely impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact.

\* \* \*

During the further course of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about the economic and the food situation. Although it is possible that individual food items are temporarily scarce, yet he could report that regardless of how long the war lasts no food difficulties would arise in Germany. Germany has enough space to produce in her own area the necessary food for the duration of the war.

In regard to raw materials, there are certain bottlenecks, as shown by the raw rubber negotiations with Japan. Fundamentally, however, one must say here as well that serious danger to the Reich is completely out of the question. The Fuehrer has accumulated war materials to such a great extent that German economy would proceed to reconversion. The German ammunition stockpile is so full that not the slightest shortage would arise for years. Therefore, during the next months, a great reconversion process would be carried out in the economy, and the main power of the German war potential would be used for the production of submarines and airplanes. Since the German army with the possible exception of Russia, practically has no more opponents on the continent, a high percentage of the German productive capacity can be used for these two weapons.

16. In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the war has already been won for the axis without doubt. In any case, it can by no means be lost any more. It is only a question of time until England will admit having lost the

England admit  
war lost? →

*Britain*  
war. When this will happen, he can naturally not predict. This time under certain circumstances could, however, occur very quickly. It depends on the events of the next three or four months. However, there is the greatest probability that England will capitulate in the course of this year.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about America. No doubt exists that the English would have given up the war a long time ago if ROOSEVELT had not given CHURCHILL new hope. There is precise and clear information about this in Germany from England. It is hard to say what ROOSEVELT ultimately has in view. It is not clear whether he wants to enter the war or not. It is only certain that the armament assistance promised to England, cannot be produced out of thin air. (Kann nicht aus dem Boden gestampft werden.) It will take a long time until this help will actually become effective. But even then, the question of quality will be very problematical, especially in the delivery of airplanes. The individual models become obsolete very rapidly during present developments. Improvements on German models are made from month to month on the basis of daily combat experiences, and it is doubtful, whether a country, remote from the war, can produce the highest quality in airplanes. In any case, whatever German flyers have met so far of American machines, they designated as "old junk" (alte Klamotten). Therefore, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes that a very considerable time would pass before the American help for England could even take effect. Germany in any case, also in the interest of her allies and friends is striving to finish the war as quickly as possible.

The Tri-Partite Pact has followed mainly the aim of frightening America from continuing on the course taken, and to keep her out of war. This goal is absolutely clear and appropriate. Furthermore, the Tri-Partite Pact is to serve to secure the cooperation of the signatories in the new order, in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and in the case of Japan in East Asia, for the future. The main enemy met in the establishment of the new order, is England. She is in the same manner the enemy of Japan as she is the enemy of the axis powers. America must be prevented by all means from entering the war actively or from helping England too actively.

*Singapore*  
Examining the possibilities which exist for further cooperation between Germany and Japan, the questions arose again and again during conversations with the Fuehrer whether in view of the new order, that is the defeat of England which is necessary for the establishment of the new order, an active participation of Japan in the war would not be useful. The Fuehrer has thought about this question in detail, and he believes that it actually would be very advantageous if Japan would arrive at the decision to participate actively in the war against England, as soon as possible. Germany believes that for instance an attack against Singapore in the near future would be a very decisive factor for a rapid overthrow of England. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes it would be possible to work from there much more closely with Japan in the maritime and other fields. It is also certain that the seizure of Singapore would be a very serious blow to England. This is especially of importance in view of the already rather bad moral state of the British Isles. He also believes that

the seizure of Singapore would perhaps be most appropriate to keep America out of the war because the United States could hardly risk sending her Navy into Japanese waters. If Japan today would succeed in a war against England with a decisive blow, such as attack on Singapore, ROOSEVELT would be in a very difficult position. Practically it is difficult for him to attempt anything against Japan. If he were to do it anyhow and declare war on Japan, then he must realize that for instance the solution of the question of the Philippines would take place in accord with Japanese intentions. This would mean a serious loss of prestige for the President so that he would probably think about an action against Japan for a long time.

16 On the other hand, Japan, by the conquest of Singapore would be put in a position to operate in an entirely different manner than until now, since she will then have the absolutely dominating position in East Asia. Thus Germany believes that, if Japan can decide on such an action, this would mean the solution of the Gordian Knot in East Asia.

In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that in case of an action by Japan in this direction, the war against English tonnage can be waged with much greater force in East Asia as well, that by the courageous step of Japan, America will probably be kept out of the war, that Japan can secure her position in East Asia from which, according to German opinion, she cannot refrain in the long run in the new order of the Greater East Asia Area. In this connection, a number of other questions will certainly arise for the discussion of which he would be available at any time.

In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the Tri-Partite Pact could do justice in the best manner to its true idea, that is, to prevent the spread of the war or in other words the entry of the United States into the war, in that the parties to the treaty conclude at the proper time mutual agreements for the final suppression of England in addition to the present assurances. In this manner, the spirit of the pact can be proven by deed in the most emphatic manner by all participants.

At this moment, the Reich Foreign Minister was called to the Reich Chancellery. Contrary to his original assumption that it would only be a question of a brief absence, the conferences were prolonged for a longer time so that the conversations with MATSUOKA were not continued any more before breakfast.

In connection, the breakfast provided on the program took place in the smallest circle, at first in the absence of the Reich Foreign Minister, who only appeared later.

Berlin 31 March 1941

Signed: SCHMIDT.

## III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm.)

## AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1376-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 27th 1941 in Berlin between the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the ambassadors Ott and Oshima.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese war criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Wurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart Jr. Lt.Col. IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

Notes on the conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, on 28 March 1941.

AXIS  
FOR  
CONFERENCE

The German Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuka a second time. The Fuehrer would have liked to express his attitude to the questions at hand more fully, but was much occupied for the time being with the developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential part was the question of possibilities and prospects of closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, concerning the transition from the passive to the active cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Matsuka was proceeding on this matter. It was actually the best opportunity that had ever been granted /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be better to make use of this opportunity before it slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important agreements and it formed the basis of relations between Japan and Germany for centuries. There were no clashes of interest.

The situation was such that a new order could only be established if Great Britain were utterly defeated. This was true in even greater measure for Japan than for Germany, which already dominated the European continent and which would within this year draw into her dominion the Mediterranean area and Africa, insofar as she had interests. Germany would then have all she needed. She did not seek world domination as Roosevelt had falsely asserted. The Fuehrer wanted to get the war over with as soon as possible in order to turn back to his task of construction. The goal which he had assigned himself, namely to assure the Reich the utmost security, had really already been achieved.

In contrast, the new order in the Greater East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan also controlled the south. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was essential.

Regarding Russia, the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans did not know how things would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia might take the wrong course, although he really didn't expect this of Stalin. No one could know. At any rate Germany would instantly strike if Russia undertook anything against Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and especially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the German army. The second misgiving,

which the Japanese Navy in particular had expressed with regard to the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer by saying that both these English fleets would be contained by Germany within European and Mediterranean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding America had been expressed. The United States, however, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything at all imprudent.

1000 YR  
clone  
Although he (the German Foreign Minister) thoroughly understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had illustrated by his tale of the tiger and her young, yet he must allude again to the fact that two of the strongest countries in the world, who are possessed of a youthful, powerful, and fearless spirit, had been granted by Providence an opportunity that perhaps recurs only once in a thousand years. Germany's great opportunity lies in her Fuehrer, whose co-workers are merely implements to carry out his will. He (the German Foreign Minister) had again and again explained to the English and French Ambassadors that they must never fall into the error of comparing the Germany of Today with the Germany of 1914 and 1918.

4 Blocs  
Even then the Reich had stood up for four years against a world of enemies, and only through its disunity and its inner weakness had it lost the war. Now, however, it was unified and had thereby double strength, which, through the highly gifted leadership of Adolf Hitler, would be redoubled so that henceforth Germany must be regarded as having four times her strength in the /First/ World War. The ambassadors had thrown this warning to the winds. However these predictions had been fulfilled and there was nothing in the world which would stop Germany and Italy from ruling absolutely the European-African hemispheres. If such an opportunity should present itself to Japan under such circumstances, she must consider these things very carefully and not let the opportunity slip from her grasp.

STRIKE  
DOWN  
To be sure when the present war would end, could not be prophesized with certainty, but the German Foreign Minister had the feeling that perhaps England might collapse sooner than was generally expected. If the English were to beg suddenly for peace, it would be most desirable if Germany and Japan were able together to determine that peace.

STRIKE  
DOWN  
The German Foreign Minister then spoke of his family traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover he had already in 1934 had an important talk with the Fuehrer on German-Japanese collaboration. The Fuehrer's high respect for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most important thing was not to let slip the joint

opportunity which offered itself in 1941.

1575  
1941  
the end  
of B.A.I.  
Emp.

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the collapse of the British Empire, would take place. He felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japanese nation in the Far East acted almost under a divine order to break up the British Empire and to establish a New Order.

Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would assume toward the United States if England were brought to her knees in summer, but America were not as yet at war.

The German Foreign Minister answered that this depended on the attitude of the United States herself. Of course, the possibility of an occupation of the British Isles required a good-weather period, and the British might possibly try to set up a new government in the United States. But in his opinion this could not be carried out.

CANADA  
4 B.C.O.  
THE  
3

Matsuoka thereupon made his question more specific in the following way: If England were beaten to the ground, the United States would not, in his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire. Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a New Order could not be established. The German Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise control in his own sphere. Germany would do this, together with Italy, in the European-African sphere, the United States would have to limit herself to the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would have to be watched closely and revolutionary propaganda would not be permitted on any account. In the future only the aforementioned three spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

Matsuoka replied that the only great problem that would remain thereafter was Russia. Japan was ready to let Russia get to an ice-free sea via India or Iran, but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast. Matsuoka then asked whether the Fuehrer had ever considered the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese-German Pact. The German Foreign Minister denied this and dubbed closer co-operation with Russia an absolute impossibility, as the spiritual bases of the army as well as the rest of the nation were completely opposed. The Soviet Union was still internationally inclined while Japan and Germany thought nationally. Russia undermined the family, Germany stood up for it. Here, as between fire and water, a union was

impossible. Stalin was very skillful and had therefore under the circumstances prevailing at that time, concluded the pact with Germany. Russia would also have joined the Tripartite pact, but her terms could not be met. The whole affair was being treated dilatorily by Germany, as he could tell Matsuoka confidentially. Besides that, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and - this Matsuoka must know at all events - she was prepared for any eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia, but if Stalin's policy was not in accord with what the Fuehrer thought right, he would shatter Russia. Matsuoka replied that Japan was now avoiding irritating Russia. Japan was waiting for Germany to complete its victory in the Balkans. Without the good services of Germany and without her strength Japan would have no chance to completely improve Russo-Japanese relations.

Matsuoka furthermore talked of the long-term commercial treaty, which would be concluded with Russia. He then put before the German Foreign Minister the question, if he should on his return trip stop over a little longer in Moscow, to negotiate with the Russians regarding the Non-Aggression Pact or the Neutrality Pact. Here he emphasized that immediate admission of Russia to the Tripartite Pact would never be allowed by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary cause one cry of indignation to arise throughout Japan. The German Foreign Minister replied that such an accession of Russia to the pact was out of the question and suggested to Matsuoka, if at all possible, not to touch on the aforementioned questions in Moscow, as it was not apt to fit quite into the framework of the present situation.

Upon a further remark by Matsuoka, that the conclusion of a fishing and of a commercial agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, the German Foreign Minister replied that there were no objections to the conclusion of such purely commercial treaties. In this connection, Matsuoka further mentioned that America was closely watching Japanese-Russian relations and for her part was trying to conclude an agreement with Russia against Japan.

Matsuoka then again came to speak of Singapore. The Japanese were not worried about the British Navy. However, there were Japanese circles which looked with great misgivings upon a conflict with America, as they presumed that in such a case it would mean a five-to-ten year war with the United States. He immediately admitted that America would not stake her fleet in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these Japanese circles were worried because under these circumstances the war would last for years. The German Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would never let it come to a war, as he was fully aware of the impossibility of an advance against Japan. Japan for her part, could, however, occupy the Philippines and thus deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan conquered Singapore, the greater part of the world would thus be under the control of the Tripartite Pact powers anyway and America would find herself in an isolated position.

Matsuoka was personally strongly in favor of the German Foreign Minister's line of thought. If Japan did not run the risk connected with the conquering of Singapore, it was his opinion that she would become a third-rate power. Therefore, in any case, the blow would have to be dealt one day. If he succeeded at the same time in keeping the United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation which hesitated in a matter of such fundamental national importance would only prove that it lacked the most important characteristic, the capability of decision.

THIS memo  
3/28/41  
Berlin, 31 March 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 28th 1941 between the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR  
Lt COLONEL IGD  
O-508524

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Notes on the conversation between the German Foreign Minister  
and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, on 28 March 1941.

3-28-1941

*Bait "now"*

The German Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuka a second time. The Fuehrer would have liked to express his attitude to the questions at hand more fully, but was much occupied for the time being with the developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential part was the question of possibilities and prospects of closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, concerning the transition from the passive to the active cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Matsuka was proceeding on this matter. It was actually the best opportunity that had ever been granted /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be better to make use of this opportunity before it slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important agreements and it formed the basis of relations between Japan and Germany for centuries. There were no clashes of interest.

*VC*  
*Britain*

The situation was such that a new order could only be established if Great Britain were utterly defeated. This was true in even greater measure for Japan than for Germany, which already dominated the European continent and which would within this year draw into her dominion the Mediterranean area and Africa, insofar as she had interests. Germany would then have all she needed. She did not seek world domination as Roosevelt had falsely asserted. The Fuehrer wanted to get the war over with as soon as possible in order to turn back to his task of construction. The goal which he had assigned himself, namely to assure the Reich the utmost security, had really already been achieved.

*Bait "now" Singapore*

In contrast, the new order in the Greater East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan also controlled the south. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was essential.

*USSR*

Regarding Russia, the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans did not know how things would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia might take the wrong course, although he really didn't expect this of Stalin. No one could know. At any rate Germany would instantly strike if Russia undertook anything against Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and especially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the German army. The second misgiving,

*Brit Fleet* { which the Japanese Navy in particular had expressed with regard to the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer by saying that both these English fleets would be contained by Germany within European and Mediterranean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding America had been expressed. The United States, however, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything at all imprudent.

*Bait "now"* Although he (the German Foreign Minister) thoroughly understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had illustrated by his tale of the tiger and her young, yet he must allude again to the fact that two of the strongest countries in the world, who are possessed of a youthful, powerful, and fearless spirit, had been granted by Providence an opportunity that perhaps recurs only once in a thousand years. Germany's great opportunity lies in her Fuehrer, whose co-workers are merely implements to carry out his will. He (the German Foreign Minister) had again and again explained to the English and French Ambassadors that they must never fall into the error of comparing the Germany of Today with the Germany of 1914 and 1918.

*Bait "now"* Even then the Reich had stood up for four years against a world of enemies, and only through its disunity and its inner weakness had it lost the war. Now, however, it was unified and had thereby double strength, which, through the highly gifted leadership of Adolf Hitler, would be redoubled so that henceforth Germany must be regarded as having four times her strength in the /First/ World War. The ambassadors had thrown this warning to the winds. However these predictions had been fulfilled and there was nothing in the world which would stop Germany and Italy from ruling absolutely the European-African hemispheres. If such an opportunity should present itself to Japan under such circumstances, she must consider these things very carefully and not let the opportunity slip from her grasp.

*England "collapse"* To be sure when the present war would end, could not be prophesized with certainty, but the German Foreign Minister had the feeling that perhaps England might collapse sooner than was generally expected. If the English were to beg suddenly for peace, it would be most desirable if Germany and Japan were able together to determine that peace.

*Bait "now"* The German Foreign Minister then spoke of his family traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover he had already in 1934 had an important talk with the Fuehrer on German-Japanese collaboration. The Fuehrer's high respect for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most important thing was not to let slip the joint

opportunity which offered itself in 1941.

*collapse of Brit Emp. - German-Japanese War "divine order" against Brit Empire.*

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the collapse of the British Empire, would take place. He felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japanese nation in the Far East acted almost under a divine order to break up the British Empire and to establish a New Order.

Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would assume toward the United States if England were brought to her knees in summer, but America were not as yet at war.

*Invasion Brit. Govt to U.S.*

The German Foreign Minister answered that this depended on the attitude of the United States herself. Of course, the possibility of an occupation of the British Isles required a good-weather period, and the British might possibly try to set up a new government in the United States. But in his opinion this could not be carried out.

*Canada "annexed"*

Matsuoka thereupon made his question more specific in the following way: If England were beaten to the ground, the United States would not, in his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire. Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a New Order could not be established. The German Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise control in his own sphere. Germany would do this, together with Italy, in the European-African sphere, the United States would have to limit herself to the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would have to be watched closely and revolutionary propaganda would not be permitted on any account. In the future only the aforementioned three spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

*Brit Emp. out.*

*USSR can live. Iron Post built unimpaired*

Matsuoka replied that the only great problem that would remain thereafter was Russia. Japan was ready to let Russia get to an ice-free sea via India or Iran, but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast. Matsuoka then asked whether the Fuehrer had ever considered the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese-German Pact. The German Foreign Minister denied this and dubbed closer co-operation with Russia an absolute impossibility, as the spiritual bases of the army as well as the rest of the nation were completely opposed. The Soviet Union was still internationally inclined while Japan and Germany thought nationally. Russia undermined the family, Germany stood up for it. Here, as between fire and water, a union was

*Stalin had stiff terms for membership*

impossible. Stalin was very skillful and had therefore under the circumstances prevailing at that time, concluded the pact with Germany. Russia would also have joined the Tripartite pact, but her terms could not be met. The whole affair was being treated dilatorily by Germany, as he could tell Matsuoka confidentially. Besides that, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and -- this Matsuoka must know at all events -- she was prepared for any eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia, but if Stalin's policy was not in accord with what the Fuehrer thought right, he would shatter Russia. Matsuoka replied that Japan was now avoiding irritating Russia. Japan was waiting for Germany to complete its victory in the Balkans. Without the good services of Germany and without her strength Japan would have no chance to completely improve Russo-Japanese relations.

*USSR*

Matsuoka furthermore talked of the long-term commercial treaty, which would be concluded with Russia. He then put before the German Foreign Minister the question, if he should on his return trip stop over a little longer in Moscow, to negotiate with the Russians regarding the Non-Aggression Pact or the Neutrality Pact. Here he emphasized that immediate admission of Russia to the Tripartite Pact would never be allowed by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary cause one cry of indignation to arise throughout Japan. The German Foreign Minister replied that such an accession of Russia to the pact was out of the question and suggested to Matsuoka, if at all possible, not to touch on the aforementioned questions in Moscow, as it was not apt to fit quite into the framework of the present situation.

Upon a further remark by Matsuoka, that the conclusion of a fishing and of a commercial agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, the German Foreign Minister replied that there were no objections to the conclusion of such purely commercial treaties. In this connection, Matsuoka further mentioned that America was closely watching Japanese-Russian relations and for her part was trying to conclude an agreement with Russia against Japan.

*Singapore*

Matsuoka then again came to speak of Singapore. The Japanese were not worried about the British Navy. However, there were Japanese circles which looked with great misgivings upon a conflict with America, as they presumed that in such a case it would mean a five-to-ten year war with the United States. He immediately admitted that America would not stake her fleet in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these Japanese circles were worried because under these circumstances the war would last for years. The German Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would never let it come to a war, as he was fully aware of the impossibility of an advance against Japan. Japan for her part, could, however, occupy the Philippines and thus deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan conquered Singapore, the greater part of the world would thus be under the control of the Tripartite Pact powers anyway and America would find herself in an isolated position.

*But "no way" Singapore*

*Singapore*  
"Keep US  
quiet 6 Mo."

Matsuoka was personally strongly in favor of the German Foreign Minister's line of thought. If Japan did not run the risk connected with the conquering of Singapore, it was his opinion that she would become a third-rate power. Therefore, in any case, the blow would have to be dealt one day. If he succeeded at the same time in keeping the United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation which hesitated in a matter of such fundamental national importance would only prove that it lacked the most important characteristic, the capability of decision.

Berlin, 31 March 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 28th 1941 between the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR  
Lt COLONEL IGD  
O-508524

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

SECRET INSTRUCTION  
MOST IMPORTANT  
ONLY BY HAND OF OFFICER

24 May 41

Foreign Section /Defence/  
Department for Foreign States, No. 173/41 G. K. Chief III Org.

To be presented to the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Army.

The Military Attache, Tokyo, reports with No. T47g of 23 May:

AKITA's answer regarding the handling of Japanese-U.S.A. relations in the press gave cause to the wish to hear OKAMOTO on the form of the Japanese opening of the war in case of a war between the U.S.A. and Germany. Instead of a reception by OKAMOTO, visit by AKITA who stated:

To be presented  
to the Chief  
of the Foreign  
Section/ABW  
(at the same  
time for ZL)

- 1) In case the U.S. enter into the war Japan at once acknowledges casus foederis. But will not yet start hostilities. Surprise attack on Singapore, Manila remains prepared.
- 2) Possible war between USSR and Germany causes U.S.A. to enter into war. Therefore Japanese attitude remains as under 1) with additional preparations for a possible attack on Wladiwostok and Blagovestchensk.
- 3) Conclusion of China conflict before new tasks for the Japanese Army is important. In the first place I emphasize that the Japanese acknowledgement of a casus foederis requires strengthening through immediate opening of hostilities.

Staff of air  
command Ic  
/signed/ Brueckner

VR IA

SCFMID 24/5

Copy:

L

3.SKL.

Special Staff. FWK.

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

## CERTIFICATE

WILLIAM

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL/L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 154.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April, 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say::

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division in the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1538-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Air Ministry.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ Gerard Schaefer

Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ John W. Auchincloss

John W. Auchincloss

O-2052152

Capt., JAGD.

Kase

654

U. St. S. Pol. No. 526

Berlin, 10 June 1941

SECRET



Ambassador OSHIMA delivered me today through Embassy Secretary KASE the wish to be once again received by the Reich Foreign Minister in the near future. As the main topic of the conversation he pointed out the following:

The Japanese Government, or as he said correcting himself, the Japanese Army had the desire to obtain bases for the fleet and the Navy in southern French Indo-China. KASE added, he personally believed that this wish could be traced back to the fact that the Japanese Armed Forces /Wehrmacht/ would like to create for themselves a favorable strategic position vis-a-vis SINGAPORE. Furthermore Ambassador OSHIMA would like to talk with the Reich Foreign Minister more generally about the German-French and French-English relations.

Herewith presented  
to the

Reich Foreign Minister

Signed Woermann

Copy to St. S After return of  
Ambassador RITTER

/85171/

Report RAM 19/41

VVG

648

REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN  
MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

3-29-1941

*Singapore*

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

*USSR*

*Not*

He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

\*\*\*\*\*

*Singapore*

*British Fleet*

*am Sub n.c.*

Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based on the PHILIPPINES and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

*Sub say*

*Brit Navy n.c.*

MATSUOKA replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that in case of a clash with the American Navy it would be able to smash the

5 Year War.

latter without trouble. It was afraid, however, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

*Singapore*  
The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, ROOSEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while, on one hand, he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige and, because of inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

*VV 6*  
*"no intention to attack Singapore"*  
In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude, not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and Pro-American elements until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

*Singapore*  
The RAM declared that, in his opinion, Japan's declaration of war on England should take the form of an attack on Singapore.

*attack on Singapore will unite people.*  
In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war; "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate which would come, whether you wanted it or not.

*Rubber*  
Later on, the discussion turned to the question of the transportation of rubber. The RAM asked Matsuoka to see what the possibility was of transportation by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers to Lisbon or to France.

Matsuoka replied that, immediately after the steps taken by Ambassador Ott in connection with the rubber question, he had interceded in favor of Japan delivering certain quantities to Germany from her own rubber stocks, and later on making up the resulting deficit in rubber from Indo-China.

11

*Rubber  
ex  
Siberian RR*

The RAM pointed out in this connection that communication via Siberian railway was insufficient and that, moreover, 18,000 tons of French rubber from Indo-China would be delivered to Japan through German intervention. He here asked about the size of the auxiliary cruisers possibly to be used for the transportation of the rubber. Matsuoka, who stated that he was not precisely informed, estimated the size of 10,000 tons.

Then the RAM, referring to the discussion with Reich Minister Funk, turned the conversation to the future trade relationship between Japan and Germany. He amplified here the idea that trade between the big economic areas of the future, i.e., Europe and Africa on one hand and the Far East on the other, must develop on a comparatively free basis, whereas the American Hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States was concerned, would remain self-sufficient, as she had everything that she needed in her own territory, and, therefore, did not come into question in connection with exchanges with other economic areas. In South America, however, things were different. Here exchange possibilities with other economic areas actually presented themselves.

*open door  
China  
really closed*

Matsuoka replied that she needed cooperation with Germany for her own reconstruction and for the development of China. He had already some time ago given written instructions to the Japanese missions in China to grant preferential treatment to German and Italian economic interests, similar to what was already carried out in Manchukuo and North China. Japan was not in a position to develop the extensive areas in China without the assistance of German technical science and German enterprise. Outwardly she will, of course, declare the open door policy, in actual fact, however, she will concede preferential treatment to Germany and Italy.

*Japanese  
V.G.*

He must moreover admit openly that Japanese business circles feared their German competitors, whom they considered as very competent, whereas they were only amused at British and American competitors. German business circles had much the same opinion about the Japanese, which resulted in complaints from both sides. He was, however, of the opinion that the interests of both sides could be brought into harmony and told Japanese industry not to be afraid of German competition but rather to attempt to solve the problem by equal efficiency. In any case, the Japanese Government would do everything in order to equalize the interests of both sides.

\* \* \* \* \*

Following this, Matsuoka once again turned the conversation to Japanese-Russian relations. He pointed out that he had proposed a Non-Aggression Pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied with a proposal of a neutrality agreement. Therefore, during his stay in Moscow, he must adopt the attitude of having been the one to make

the original non-aggression proposal. He also wanted to take this opportunity to try to induce the Russians to forego the Northern half of the Sakhalien Peninsula. There were important oil resources there, against the exploitation of which the Russians were making every conceivable difficulty. Matsuoka estimated the total maximum quantity which could be obtained from these oil resources at 2 million tons. He would make an offer to the Russians to acquire North Sakhalien by purchase.

To a question by the RAM whether the Russians would be prepared to sell these territories, Matsuoka replied that this was highly doubtful, Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador, on a suggestion to this effect, whether "this was supposed to be a joke". Japan was in any case prepared to make other agreements as the equivalent of the Portsmouth and Peking Treaties and also to give up her fishing rights. In any case he would have to take up these matters and, above all, the question of the Non-aggression Pact during his stay at Moscow. He asked the RAM whether he should deal with these questions very deeply or only just touch on them.

*Sakhalien*

The RAM replied that he was of the opinion that these points would be dealt with only in a purely formal way and would not be gone into deeply. The question mentioned by MATSUOKA regarding Sakhalien could be settled even later. Should the Russians follow a stupid policy and compel Germany to strike, he would, in view of the temper of the Japanese Army in China, consider it right if this army were prevented from acting against Russia. Japan was helping the joint issue best if she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the action against Singapore. With a joint victory, the fulfilment of the aforementioned desires would in any case fall into the lap of Japan as a ripe fruit to a large extent.

*Singapore*

MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

*Hitler  
Best  
military  
expert*

The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the FUEHRER - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

MATSUOKA remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

The RAM replied that here, too, the FUEHRER had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

3 months  
for  
Singapore

MATSUOKA replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations even dragged out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

oil n.e.!  
"Set off"

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the oilfields would be set on fire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

Z.  
Singapore

The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive control over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

"

Matsuoka then further mentioned that the desire for airbases in French Indo-China and Thailand had been divulged by Japanese officer circles. He had, however, denied this, as he in no way wished to undertake anything which could in any way disclose Japanese intentions regarding Singapore.

Finally the RAM once more reverted to the question of Germany's help to Japan. Perhaps something could be done also here. Japan had, however, to bear in mind that, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay on the European side. These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

Matsuoka finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

(Berlin. 31 March 1941.)

III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1877-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,

Doc. No. 527

being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Shaefer  
Gerard Shaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 29th 1941 in Berlin between the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany,  
this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,  
Lt. Col., IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN  
MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

SORGE  
NAZI  
ATTACK  
ON  
USSR  
due in  
June 22  
WAR

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

WAR

He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

\*\*\*\*\*

Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based on the PHILIPPINES and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

MATSUOKA replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that in case of a clash with the American Navy it would be able to smash the

latter without trouble. It was afraid, however, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, ROOSEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while, on one hand, he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige and, because of inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude, not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and Pro-American elements until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

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In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war; "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate which would come, whether you wanted it or not.

Later on, the discussion turned to the question of the transportation of rubber. The RAM asked Matsuoka to see what the possibility was of transportation by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers to Lisbon or to France.

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Part  
won  
trade

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2

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the original non-aggression proposal. He also wanted to take this opportunity to try to induce the Russians to forego the Northern half of the Sakhalien Peninsula. There were important oil resources there, against the exploitation of which the Russians were making every conceivable difficulty. Matsuoka estimated the total maximum quantity which could be obtained from these oil resources at 2 million tons. He would make an offer to the Russians to acquire North Sakhalien by purchase.

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OIL  
NEI

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the oilfields would be set on fire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive control over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

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(Berlin. 31 March 1941.)

III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1877-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,

Doc. No. 527

being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Shaefer  
Gerard Shaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

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7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany,  
this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,  
Lt. Col., IGD  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
0-508524

Pencil note.

Not in journal

.....(illegible)

## Report

of the discussion between Reichsmarschall  
Goering and the Japanese Foreign Minister  
Matsuoka in the presence of Ambassador Ott  
at Karinhall on 29th March 1941.

Reichsmarschall Goering first of all expressed his satisfaction at being able to greet at his country residence the man who had successfully acted as a strong representative of his country in co-operation between the Japanese and German nations. As Reichsmarschall, he was able to tell him that cooperation between the Japanese and the German States was popular not only in the nation itself but above all among the German Army, the Navy and particularly the Air Force. This strong and consciously positive attitude to the alliance with Japan has its roots moreover in the recognition, which the great military traditions of Japan as well as the sense of sacrifice and the readiness for action of the Japanese people, found in Germany.

Matsuoka expressed his sincere thanks that the Reichsmarschall, despite the heavy claims made upon him, had found time to receive the Japanese Foreign Minister at his country seat. Already the journey through the big forests had been for him (Matsuoka) one of the finest experiences of the journey he had so far made. The feelings of respect for Japan of which the Reichsmarschall had just spoken were fully reciprocated by Germany's Japanese allies. Japan moreover was prepared to fulfil wholly and entirely the obligations of her alliance, even in the war, and was thus conscious of fighting not only for the allied countries but for the whole of humanity.

In the further course of the discussion, the Reichsmarschall mentioned that naturally all experiences which Germany had made during the course of the war would be made available to the allied Japanese Armed Forces. This was particularly important in the domain of the Air Force, which had acquired a new technique and new tactics, without being able in this connection to refer back to earlier examples. It was important to apply these experiences rightly so as to always remain fit for fighting and to avoid unnecessary losses. These experiences were particularly important in connection with a category of the aircraft which was actually developed only in Germany, namely the dive-bomber. These could render particularly valuable service to Japan in the conquest of fortifications.

If Japan would march towards her destiny as a Great Power in the Far East, she would, like all politicians who desired to achieve great aims, only attain her final goal by battle. These aims had already been very clearly discussed, so that he (the Reichsmarschall) could confine himself

to stating that Germany would give Japan her share of help by placing at the disposal of her Ally her previous experiences, as in the past so in the future.

Matsuoka replied that he did not need to tell the Reichsmarschall how very much German assistance in this field had been valued in Japan so far and would be valued in the future. He was expressing the sincere thanks for this, in the name of his own Government, to the Reichsmarschall, the German Government and the German Armed Forces, that Germany made available, in such a magnanimous way, the results of her experiences which had been obtained with much sacrifice of personnel and material. The great assistance which Germany had given in this way would be of inestimable value to his country if she followed the call of destiny of which the Reichsmarschall had spoken. Japan would thus fulfil the duties incumbent upon her within the framework of the alliance in their entirety.

Rubber  
War?  
In addition the Reichsmarschall spoke in his capacity as the highest responsible economic authority of Germany and as Head of the Four Year Plan, on the question of crude rubber. Each day on which Germany could receive these deliveries earlier and every increased quantity she could receive were of the utmost importance. Without failing to realize the difficulties which Japan herself had, he (the Reichsmarschall) would, however, be grateful if the increased quantities which had been agreed upon would soon actually materialize. Moreover, sea transportation had to be mutually considered in the event of difficulties in the Russian area and communications via the Siberian railway being no longer in operation.

The quantity of crude rubber which Germany needed was comparatively small in relation to its population, as the rubber was only required as an admixture for the manufacture of the synthetic rubber Buna.

✓  
Matsuoka replied that he wished to do everything within his power to meet German wishes in this matter. Ambassador Ott had already previously raised this question and he (Matsuoka) had immediately recognized its urgency and importance and had taken the necessary steps to hasten the solution of the question. He had asked the competent authorities to make available immediately a part of Japan's own rubber stocks so as not to have to wait first for the quantities expected from Indo-China. He did not know how the matter stood at the moment as he was not the Minister responsible for these matters. He had only forwarded an urgent request to the competent Department. He had also already thoroughly considered the question of sea communications. From a long term point of view, Germany and Japan could naturally not remain dependent upon the railway communications through Siberia.

\* \* \* \* \*

Berlin, 31 March 1941

(signed) Schmidt.

## AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1879-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 29th 1941 at Karinhall between the Reichsmarshal Goering and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsouka in the presence of Ambassador OTT.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dv. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD,  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

650

"Notes on the Conversation between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the State Minister Meissner in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

"At first MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for the presents handed to him in the latter's name which he would always consider a permanent treasure, and honor as a constant souvenir of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the friendly reception which he had received in Germany from the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Ministry and of the entire German people. As long as he lives he would never forget the friendliness shown him here from all sides. Upon his return to Japan he would endeavor with all his powers to convince the Japanese people of the fact that the latter are treated by the German people with honest friendliness and respect.

\* \* \* \* \*

*guerrilla  
war*

"MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a struggle with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (MATSUOKA) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic efforts from entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerrilla warfare and would be fought out in the Pacific and the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It is a question of how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and the like, could best be exploited by Japan.

"To sum up, MATSUOKA requested that the Fuehrer see to it that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely of England, but also America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would

be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer emphasized, that Germany on her part would immediately draw the consequences, if Japan should get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved whether with Germany or with Japan. It would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

"MATSUOKA once again repeated his request, that the Fuehrer give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

911 "As regards Japanese-American relationship, MATSUOKA explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not strike decisively the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just this way would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. MATSUOKA was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to go along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand MATSUOKA's position, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of military sovereignty). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an unavoidable fight at a time he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any extension of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

"MATSUOKA replied, that the United States or rather their ruling statesmen had recently still attempted a last maneuver against Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention of assisting in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education /oriented/ on English lines which many had received.

"The Fuehrer commented on this, to the effect that this attitude of America meant only that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed they one day could advance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the position of power of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

*Temo*  
"MATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (MATSUOKA) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, telling a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his intrinsic plans towards Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

"Should he, MATSUOKA, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers of the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

"Besides this, MATSUOKA made the express request that nothing be cabled in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

"The Fuehrer agreed and assured for the rest, that he could depend completely on German reticence.

"MATSUOKA replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

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CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL,  
hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General  
Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as  
such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records  
of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during  
the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is  
a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document  
which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the  
trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit  
USA 33.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as  
aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tri-  
bunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as  
a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and  
caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said  
document in order to verify the existence and contents of said  
Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of  
said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded  
as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1881-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said

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International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 4th 1941 in Berlin between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of State Meissner.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt. Col.  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT. COLONEL, IGD., O-508524

"Notes on the Conversation between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the State Minister Meissner in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

"At first MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for the presents handed to him in the latter's name which he would always consider a permanent treasure, and honor as a constant souvenir of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the friendly reception which he had received in Germany from the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Ministry and of the entire German people. As long as he lives he would never forget the friendliness shown him here from all sides. Upon his return to Japan he would endeavor with all his powers to convince the Japanese people of the fact that the latter are treated by the German people with honest friendliness and respect.

\* \* \* \* \*

3 July 1941  
army - navy  
thought 5 yr  
V 6.7

"MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a struggle with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (MATSUOKA) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic efforts from entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare and would be fought out in the Pacific and the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It is a question of how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and the like, could best be exploited by Japan.

"To sum up, MATSUOKA requested that the Fuehrer see to it that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely of England, but also America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would

be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer emphasized, that Germany on her part would immediately draw the consequences, if Japan should get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved whether with Germany or with Japan. It would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

"MATSUOKA once again repeated his request, that the Fuehrer give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

"As regards Japanese-American relationship, MATSUOKA explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not strike decisively the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just this way would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. MATSUOKA was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to go along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand MATSUOKA's position, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of military sovereignty). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an unavoidable fight at a time he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any extension of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

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"The Fuehrer commented on this, to the effect that this attitude of America meant only that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed they one day could advance against Japan together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the position of power of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

NOTE 2  
"MATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (MATSUOKA) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, telling a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his intrinsic plans towards Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

"Should he, MATSUOKA, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers of the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

"Besides this, MATSUOKA made the express request that nothing be cabled in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

"The Fuehrer agreed and assured for the rest, that he could depend completely on German reticence.

"MATSUOKA replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT

II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1881-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said

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International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.
2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.
3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.
4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.
5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.
6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 4th 1941 in Berlin between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of State Meissner.
7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.
8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt. Col.  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
LT. COLONEL, IGD., O-508524

"Aufz. RAM 21/41

"Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in Berlin on 5th April 1941.

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"The Reich Foreign Minister first expressed the hope that MATSUOKA's visit - the first ever paid by a Japanese Foreign Minister to Germany - would have a good general effect. MATSUOKA had been thoroughly informed of the German point of view. He would certainly have gained the impression that Germany was full of vitality and absolutely certain of her victory. The Reich Foreign Minister expressed the hope that their Japanese friends would deduce the inferences of this clearly recognized situation and thus participate in our victory.

"MATSUOKA replied that he had been more than rewarded for his long journey to Europe by getting into personal touch with the German and Italian statesmen. What he had seen in Germany and Italy had far exceeded his expectations. It was really hard for him to take his departure.

"Although he had had no doubt about it before, he was now thoroughly convinced after his journey to Germany and Italy that these two countries were united and would always remain so.

"MATSUOKA then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites anyhow. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must part with them. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities, when National Socialism put a stop to these doings. They will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

"In answer to a remark by MATSUOKA that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese character, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberations, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a /certain/ risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.

\* \* \*

"In answer to a question by MATSUOKA regarding the Fuehrer's intentions concerning the smaller States, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that the smaller States would be incorporated in the European whole; they would have their independence and would undoubtedly live more happily under the New Order than formerly. Great Britain, however, would

never again be allowed to meddle in the affairs of the small States, whilst the latter would never be allowed to take part in any military alliance against Germany. They would be absolutely independent, it is true, and even allowed to maintain small armies and police forces, but their protection and their general policy in the sense of the European continent would be looked after by Germany.

"In this connection MATSUOKA repeated the explanations he had already given the Reich Minister of Economics as regards the cause of the present difficulties. He attributed them to the clash between old traditions and the conditions of living brought about by modern inventions. One of the basic mistakes of Versailles was to increase the number of European states, whereas they should have been decreased in consequence of the new conditions of life caused by the development of technique. The great problem was to co-ordinate conditions created by modern inventions and old traditions, but taking care to leave a certain play for old traditions.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built upon the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only ruling power on the European Continent.

"In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted MATSUOKA to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

- 1) Germany had already won the war. By the end of this year the world would also realize this. Also England would have to concede it, if it had not already collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
- 2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated in the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
- 3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever recur for the fulfilment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in Eastern Asia.

"MATSUOKA replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation was offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

"In addition he asked about the Fuehrer's intentions as to the conclusion of peace. Would a general peace conference take place or did Germany intend to negotiate peace terms with each of her opponents separately?

*these were Germany's thought  
see earlier dated*

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he did not know anything about that. The whole matter appeared to him to depend upon the manner in which Great Britain collapsed. In any case, there could be no question of anything but a peace by capitulation, if a new British government came into being.

"To that MATSUOKA remarked that that meant there could be no peace based on compromise.

"He then requested the Reich Foreign Minister to assist on his part the Tripartite Pact Commissions, and especially the Economic Commission in which he (MATSUOKA) was chiefly interested.

"The Reich Foreign Minister took the occasion to stress the fact that the military sub-commissions were no special institutions; they had to be subject in all matters to the Chief Commission.

"MATSUOKA then added that the Japanese officers who were at present in Germany were very pleased indeed with the assistance they had received from the German officials. He thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for this attitude of the German authorities.

"Later, MATSUOKA spoke about the conference of the Japanese heads of missions in Europe, which he had called to Berlin. Unfortunately the ambassador to London had not appeared, owing to difficulties in flying; he certainly would have brought some interesting news. MATSUOKA emphasized that he had told the Japanese diplomats they would suffer no disadvantages if they were against the conclusion of a Pact of Alliance, provided they were so before Japan adhered. Now that a decision had been made he would unhesitatingly recall any Japanese diplomat who did not work loyally with the new policy and co-operate to the closest extent with the German and Italian representatives.

"Furthermore, he had told them they must be prepared for some critical moments which were close at hand. Japan was face to face with a serious situation.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that there had also been diplomats in Germany who had <sup>in fact</sup> taken a different attitude to certain questions. It was characteristic of great times that they were not understood by many.

"Directly after this interview MATSUOKA was handed a talkie-film apparatus as a present, and a luncheon-party was held among a small circle of people.

Berlin, 7th April 1941.

(signed) SCHMIDT"

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 5th 1941 at Berlin between the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsouka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr Lt Col  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., IGD  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

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CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 153.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy of said photostatic document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm.)

## AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1882-PS by said Documentation Division.
2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archive
3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.
4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.
5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss  
O-2052152  
Capt., JAGD.

Item 6 - Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 14 April 1941 - 1105 hours  
Received 14 April 1941 - 2330 hours

No. 563 of 14 April 1941 Urgent!

Annex to telegram No. 561 of 13th x)

x) with Pol V

The Vice Foreign Minister expressed to me today his vivid satisfaction on the conclusion of the neutrality pact with Russia. He declared that Russia, under the impression of powerful German successes had found herself ready to conclude a pact. Therefore Russia decided on going hand in hand with the powers of the Tri-Partite Pact. The Tri-Partite Pact has only now become the sterling instrument of the policy of the Axis Powers and Japan through the long sought for Russo-Japanese agreement.

Japan in particular expects substantial advantages for the termination of the China conflict from the Neutrality Pact. Even if, as the Vice Foreign Minister declared, the China problem had not been the subject of the Moscow negotiations, in any case CHIANG KAI SHEK's hope of eventual warlike entanglements between Japan and Russia, which would have meant a substantial relief for him, have come to naught with the conclusion of the pact. Moreover, Japan believes that by calling on the pact she can achieve a gradual separation between Moscow and Chungking. Furthermore, as all CHIANG KAI SHEK's support from the Anglo-Saxon powers has more moral than material significance, Japan hopes that the Marshal, now after the conclusion of the pact, will be ready for the dictation of a peace which preserves Japanese prestige.

The Vice Foreign Minister further declared that the Neutrality Pact would substantially facilitate Japan's expansion policy in the South of the Great East Asia Sphere and in particular would facilitate an eventual Japanese advance on Singapore.

The Vice Foreign Minister said regarding the realization of the Neutrality Pact that the beginning of negotiations brought considerable difficulties as MOLOTOV had held fast to the original Russian demand by which Japan, before the conclusion of the pact, should make certain concessions in the sense of a revision of the Treaty of Portsmouth. MATSUOKA explained that he was neither ready nor empowered for such concessions. In a personal conversation with STALIN, MATSUOKA had finally accomplished that Russia would renounce the concessions and would declare herself ready for unconditional conclusion of the pact. This decision took place on 12 April, that is, one day before the

14 April 1941  
Tenno rules

arranged departure of MATSUOKA from Moscow. In order to empower MATSUOKA's signing of the pact in time, the Prime Minister, without the participation of the cabinet or Privy Council, effected the Imperial sanction for the signature by immediate audience with TENNO. Agreement of the Cabinet and Privy Council, which could not be doubted after the Imperial sanction, will be obtained before the shortly expected ratification. The Vice Foreign Minister emphasized that it was unprecedented in Japanese history that an agreement of such significance should be concluded within a few days. In this connection, Japan has learned much from the "lightning diplomacy" /"blitz-diplomatic"/ of Germany.

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Document No. 4056-A

Page 3

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/84979-80/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
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W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)