

1253 A  
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) ES: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, Sterling Tucker Dibrell, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, 7th Floor, Steuart Building, Washington, D. C. My residence address is 704 So. Lee Street, Alexandria, Virginia.

2. My official duties as Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, include the procurement, filing, evaluation, and dissemination of graphic information including photographs, maps, and intelligence reports. I graduated from the United States Naval Academy in the Class of 1921, completing a course in mechanical drawing. During the war, my work has been as head of the Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. In the course of my official duties I have studied the reports based on a comparison of the map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item No. 5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and photographs of Wotje Island, Enclosures (B) and (C) to Photo Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, and Report 2-46, and I have prepared and signed the letter dated 3 July, 1946, on the subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans: comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

4. I hereby certify that the statements and opinions contained in the foregoing letter are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ STERLING TUCKER DIBRELL

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
24th day of July, 1946

James J. ROBINSON /s/  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths)

Captain USNR Ser. #52853



3 July 1946

From: Op-23-F-3.  
To : Op-23-Y.  
Via : Op-23-F.

Subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans; comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

Encl: (A) List of Captured Map Material.  
(B) P.I. Special Report No. S-1-46.  
(C) P. I. Special Report No. S-2-46.

1. Enclosure (A) indicated that the elapsed time from beginning of hostilities to the first aerial photographic reconnaissance over subject areas varied from 32 days to 30 months. The shortest elapsed time (32 days) between beginning of hostilities and first photo cover was in the Truk Islands. However, the quality of photography was poor and clouds obscured areas of interest referred to in plans.

2. The Island of Wotje was photographed 53 days after hostilities began. This photography indicates that installations referred to in plans were operative at that time (See Enclosure (B)). Attention is invited to the fact that mechanical drawing practices usually indicate installations already constructed in solid lines, and planned construction in dotted lines. This being true, the power plant, transmitters, command post and block house were complete as of 10 August 1940, the date indicated in plans.

3. Enclosure (B) shows that planned construction indicated in captured document #JICPOA 5486 was completed at time of initial photo cover.

4. Enclosure (C) indicates that 41 out of 53 installations planned before the war were confirmed by war time photography.

S. T. Dibrell



CAPTURED MAP MATERIAL

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NAME PLACE</u>	<u>JICFOA NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF PLAN</u>	<u>DATE OF FIRST COVER</u>	<u>ELAPSE OF TIME 7 Dec. 41 to:</u>
1.	Truk Islands				
	Dublon Island	5478	15 Apr. 1940		
	Eten Island	8396	Feb. 1940		
	Eten Island	6053	15 Apr. 1940	9 Jan. 1942	32 days
	Fefan Island	5476	15 Apr. 1940		
	Otta & Mor	5477	15 Apr. 1940	4 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Polle Island	5475	10 Oct. 1940	(US)	
	Tol Island	6054	12 Feb. 1940		
	Uman Island	7838	10 Aug. 1940		
2.	Wotje Island	5486	10 Aug. 1940	31 Jan. 1942	55 days
3.	Ponape Island				
	Jokaj Mt.	6055	10 Aug. 1940		
	Namu Sector	5483	10 Oct. 1940		
	Napoli Sector	5474	3 Sep. 1937	7 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Param Sector	8550	10 Oct. 1940		
	Tolenot Peak Sector	5484	15 Apr. 1940		
4.	Palau Islands				
	Koror Section	5481	10 Oct. 1937		
	Koror Sector	5807	Undated		
	Arumongui	6207	10 Oct. 1937	30 Mar. 1944	28 months
	Peleliu	5482	20 Aug. 1940		
	Peleliu	8270	Nov. 1940		
	Peleliu	8271	Nov. 1940		
5.	Pagan Island	8273	Nov. 1940	25 May 1944	30 months

ENCLOSURE (A) TO Op-23-F-3 MEMO OF 3 July 1945.



U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
RECEIVING STATION  
Washington, 25, D. C.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SPECIAL REPORT NO. S-1-46

- LOCALITY : Wotje Atoll (Marshall Islands). Lat. 9° 28' N. - Long. 170° 15' E. Comparison of Japanese Pre-War places with actual installations.
- REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser photographic sortie No. PH-5 dated 31 January 1942.
- ENCLOSURE : (A) Commander Aircraft Battle Force, US Pacific Fleet Photographic Intelligence report No. 3, and supplement.
- (B) Annotated oblique photograph of Southern end of Island.
- (C) Annotated oblique photograph of Central section of Island.
- (D) Captured plan of Wotje Atoll.

This sortie was completely reported on in July, 1942, and the results recorded in Photographic Intelligence Report No. 3 of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, and the supplement thereto, (Encl. "A"). The purpose of the present report is simply the comparison of installations shown in photographs with the Pre-war Japanese Map, (Encl. "D").

These pictures show definitely that all of the defensive installations at least, shown on Encl. "B" and "C", were constructed by January 31, 1942. None of the positions on the southern end of the island showed definite evidence of construction in progress. The central revetment of the southern DP battery, however, has not been camouflaged by sod as have the other two, and is unoccupied, two facts which might indicate recent completion. The single revetment further south along the same section of coastline is also unsodded and empty, but this is a position not shown on the 1940 defense map. On the northern end of the island, photography is not clear enough to show whether or not construction is in progress, though all of the positions appear to be completed.

Several gun positions (notably the northern three gun dual-purpose battery) are in slightly different locations from those shown on the map, thus confirming the supposition that the map shows proposed positions, but the battery arrangements and building dispositions are sufficiently similar to permit checking the map. In addition, there are several gun positions visible on the photos but not shown on the maps.

For structures other than guns, the map agrees closely with the photographs in all areas where photographs are of sufficiently good quality to permit checking. The road network is more complete than that shown on the map, and airfield taxiways have been extended further south than the map indicates.



The following table shows the comparison in detail:

TABULAR COMPARISON OF MAP AND PHOTOGRAPHS

<u>NO</u>	<u>SHOWN ON MAP</u>	<u>PHOTO CONFIRMATION</u>
1.	Northern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area designated on Map by letter "A".	Battery confirmed. Appears complete. Adjacent buildings are located in positions with respect to the battery as shown on the map, but photos are not clear enough to confirm their function. The whole battery position is slightly further south than shown on the map.
2.	Southern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area, designated on map by letter "B".	Battery confirmed. All three positions appear complete, two are camouflaged with sod and occupied. The third is empty and unsodded. Battery C.P. and ammunition storage structures are complete and as shown. It is impossible to confirm Barracks area and power plant due to angle of the photographs.
2a.	Not shown.	A single 25' diameter revetment, empty, appears south of Battery B. This later became a C.D. gun.
3.	Blockhouses.	Confirmed.
4.	Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, two on south end.	At least two confirmed on south end of island. There are probably more along trench net-work. Two confirmed on north end.
5.	Listening "CP".	Small position of some sort.
6.	Radio transmitter station.	Confirmed.
7.	Heavy oil storage	Heavy earth revetment, probably around underground tank.
8.	Power plant near oil storage	There are buildings in this location. Function unconfirmed.
9.	Jetty.	Confirmed.



NO.	SHOWN ON MAP	PHOTO CONFIRMATION
10.	Seaplane ramp.	Confirmed.
11.	Northern fuel storage.	Area cleared of brush. Two tower-like structures above ground. No definite confirmation.
12.	Airfield.	Confirmed.
13.	Road network.	All roads shown on map, including these shown in dashed lines, are in existence. Several additional roads not shown on map.

/s/ C. G. Coleman.

C. G. COLEMAN.



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
Commander Aircraft Battle Force  
Administrative Office

(W-M-001)

CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
SORTIE NO. PH-5

SMALL SCALE OBLIQUES,  $9\frac{1}{2}$ " lens from medium altitude, taken of WOTJE ATOLL during attack of February 1, 1942, by airplane from U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON.

MAP: H. O. Chart No. 5428.

SUMMARY - WOTJE ATOLL, (MARSHALL ISLANDS) partial coverage.

WOTJE ISLAND proper contains a well developed air station for seaplanes and large land-based bombers. However, no aircraft are visible at time of photography. Dispersion of shipping under attack is observed, with sinking of one sizable vessel and damage of another probable. Several fires and two bomb explosions are seen on WOTJE ISLAND, but only a limited damage assessment can be done with these photographs. Of the several other portions of WOTJE ATOLL photographed, only ORMED ISLAND shows any evidence of activity.

SHIPPING

PHOTO NO.

Three freighter-type ships, one nearly 400', one about 350', and one about 300', together with probably five small vessels, are seen on a distant oblique underway toward the shore of WOTJE ISLAND a mile or more to the east, except for the 350' vessel, which is headed west. A bomb or shell splash is observed as a near miss alongside the 350' vessel.

C-1, C-2,  
C-4, C-12,  
C-13, C-14,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-23, C-24

A subsequent photograph shows the 300' vessel, which is white, as closer to shore, down at the stern, and listing to port, with dark gray smoke rolling over the superstructure from the bridge aft. Considerable smoke and cloud cover in most of these pictures preclude further conclusions as to shipping.

WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field

The landing field has two surfaced runways, 300' in width, bisecting each other at right angles, with circular turning areas at the ends. One runs NE-SW, 3,900'; the other is NW-SE, 5,700'. Between the NW and SW turn-arounds is a large concrete warming-up area, connected to those two turn-arounds by taxi tracks.

Adjacent to the east edge of the concrete is a trench, thought to be a ready magazine. Two, possibly three, large hangars and two large shop-type buildings, together with numerous smaller structures, are grouped to the west of the warming-up area.

C-23, C-12,  
C-14,  
C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-17, C-18,  
C-19, C-20, C-22.  
C-24.  
C-23.  
C-24.

Enclosure A to P.I. Special Report #S-1-46.



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field (Cont.)PHOTO NO.

A broad taxi track runs from the NW turn-around SW to a large apron and seaplane ramp on the leeward beach. On the SE edge of this taxi track is a large hangar (150' wide by perhaps 300' long), suitable for the largest seaplanes.

C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-20, C-23,  
C-24.

South of the landing field is a considerable tree-screened area with a wide cleared approach, suggesting aircraft dispersal space. South of this is a clearing containing eighteen sizable buildings suitable for barracks and/or storhouses.

C-23

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Radio Station

Near the SW tip of the island is a large two-story building flanked by three tall radio towers. Nearby are a smaller building, two tanks of 60' diameter, and a protective embankment enclosing four tanks of about 10' diameter.

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Additional Facilities

On the leeward shore just SE of the seaplane ramp is a large pier. An equally long but narrower pier farther south is probably less useful due to shoaling water. At several points on both leeward and windward shores are small docks suitable for vessels of very light draught. Three bridges crossing three open channels between islets to the NW of WOTJE ISLAND lead to a small pier running into a moderately deep channel, which appears accessible from the leeward side by an indirect route. Along the beach near the SE tip of the island lies what appears to be a section of dredge pipeline on floats, but no dredge is visible.

C-20, C-24,  
C-23, C-14,

C-22.

C-20

C-22

Near the landing field, on a road running NE from the NW turn-around, are two rather high tanks, probably water tanks. To the north of the intersection of the runways, and well away from the landing field, are two two-story buildings on either side of the belt road, one medium and one quite large - purpose unknown.

C-20

C-16

To the east of the radio station, between the road and the beach, is a raised circular structure some 70' in diameter, from which extends a small structure bridging over the road. Two objects on top of the circular structure might be vehicles, and four or five other objects on the beach nearby probably are vehicles. Nearby, to the NW, are three towers, two of which have crow's nests large enough to contain AA machine

C-22



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3

guns, presence of which is further suggested by the general PHOTO NO. layout. Close by is a group of small buildings. It has not been possible to determine the significance of this area from these photographs.

On the SW point of the island, the presence of two or more well camouflaged objects, possibly fuel tanks, is indicated.

A belt road runs close to the perimeter of the island. This, plus side roads, affords access to all the installations mentioned above.

WOTJE ISLAND - Defenses

On the windward beach, about a mile from the SW point of the island, are a battery of three guns, probably 5" or 6", a semi-underground magazine, and a number of small buildings. Between these guns and the beach is a fire trench of a wavy trace, supported by MG emplacements, and extending, with occasional breaks, SW along the beach almost to the point, and NW to the landing field.

A cut up area on the windward beach north of the landing field is probably a battery, but photography of this part of the island is not good enough for adequate interpretation.

C-16  
C-17,  
C-14A,  
C-20.

WOTJE ISLAND - Damage Assessment

Two bursts are seen over the probable ready magazine and nearby small structures on the east edge of the warming-up area. Smoke is emitting from one of the large hangars at the SW corner of the warming-up area.

C-20,  
C-23,  
C-19,  
C-15.

In the area of the seaplane ramp and apron, four columns of dense black smoke, one having a huge white flame at the base, indicate hits on underground fuel storage.

C-20,  
C-15,  
C-19,  
C-18.

In the NE wooded section inland from the battery is a large column of smoke with intense base flame, the volume of smoke being observed to diminish rapidly in succeeding photographs. A hit on a powder magazine is suggested.

C-16,  
C-17,  
C-18,  
C-19,  
C-14A,  
C-24, C-15.

A fire near the central east shore line is seen to rise from a group of fuel tanks comprising an area approximately 180' square, the one tank which is measureable being about 60' in diameter. A constant increase in smoke volume indicates that this entire storage has probably been destroyed.



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
-----ORMED ISLAND:PHOTO NO.

A road is visible for two or three miles parallel to and near the south beach. A number of very small buildings are located along or near this road, and several others may be seen in small clearings on other parts of the island. There is nothing visible of sufficient size to suggest military installations, but a moderate degree of camouflage would suffice to make such features indistinguishable on these distant obliques. A 40' boat seen near the south shore is moving.

C-9.

C-11.

EGMEDIO ISLAND:

Nothing to report. The scale of these photographs is too small for interpretation.

C-1, C-2,

C-3.

ENE CHERUTAKKU ISLAND:

Same as above.

C-2, C-4.

HEICHEN ISLAND, IWE GROUP, & N.E., TIP OF WETOWERAKKU IS.

Same as above.

C-5, C-6.

C-7.

- 4 - (Final page)

Enclosure (A) to Photo Officer, Airbatfor, Ltr. to Comairbatfor,  
Conf. Serial (L-02) of Feb. 9, 1942.



## PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE &amp; INTERPRETATION SECTION

F44-3/EG60Gpa  
Serial 011

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1942.

SUPPLEMENT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3SORTIE: No. PH-5LOCALITY: WOTJE ATOLL (MARSHALL ISLANDS) Lat. 9° 28' N.- Long. 170° 15' E.

Date taken: January 31, 1942.

Mean Time of photography: GCT 2130.

Camera Focal Length: 9½".

Altitude: 500-1500 feet.

Contact Scale: Not known.

Map Reference: H. O. Chart No. 5428.

Quality: Poor obliques.

Last Cover: None.

SUMMARY: (WOTJE ISLAND)

In addition to features noted in Rpt. No. 3, the following details were observed: One plane, additional gun emplacements, and building on various parts of the island.

AIRCRAFT:

Photo  
Reference  
Numbers

One unidentified plane is seen at the center of the south edge of the landing field. C-22

DEFENSES:

Additional gun emplacements are seen at the following locations:  
1 emplacement at the NW tip of the island; 2 probable emplacements C-20  
on the beach NE of the NW turn around; 2 emplacements in the NE C-20  
section of the island just west of the belt road; 2 emplacements  
(probable machine gun) south of the five-inch gun emplacements on  
the windward beach. C-22

A line of barbed wire is observed along the beach at the SW tip  
of the island. C-22

BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES:

In the NW corner of the island are nine well-camouflaged build-  
ings of approximately the same size, arranged on either side of the C-15  
road running through the wooded area. Also in this area, near the  
east edge of the woods, is another small building.

Adjacent to the main hanger at the seaplane base are two large C-23  
buildings, probably shops or storage, and nine small buildings.



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Charles G. Coleman, Jr., former Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., upon oath make the following statement:

1. I am Research Analyst, Photo Intelligence Center, United States Navy Receiving Station, Washington, D. C. Residence address is 2505 Burns S. E., Washington, D. C.

2. My official duties include the preparation of photo intelligence reports. I have been engaged in this work since 1942 when I graduated from the Naval Photographic Intelligence School, Naval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I served in amphibious forces and groups in the North African, Sicilian, and Normandy Invasions and in planning for landings in Kyushu, Japan. My duties were principally the study of aerial photographs and the interpretation of coastal terrain and military and naval installations. I was head of amphibious Photo Intelligence Units in the Sicilian and Normandy landings, and in the Kyushu operations.

3. I have examined the Japanese installation map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item #5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and I have compared with the map the aerial photograph of the same area as that presented by the map. I have reported the results of this comparison in Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46. I have indicated on the aerial oblique photographs, marked Enclosures (b) and (c) to Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, in red ink the principal installations visible.

4. In Report S-2-46, I present the results of my examination of maps of the Islands indicated in that Report, including Wotje Island, and of my comparison of each of such maps with the United States Naval Photographic Intelligence Reports of the same areas for the dates indicated.

5. I hereby certify that the Reports as signed by me are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ CHARLES G. COLEMAN, Jr.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
25 day of July 1946

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON

Name

(Status indicating authority to  
administer oaths)

CAPTAIN, USNR  
Service No. 52853



Doc 6254 A

No.1

駐東國陸軍軍事裁判所

アメリカ合衆國  
コロニア地帯  
シニントン市

S.S.

證明書

一 米國豫備海軍中佐「スターリング・タッカー・ディレル」

「Sterling Tucker Dittell」に宣誓を行ひ、上、次、陳述を行

(一) 私、首府「シニントン」市「スターリング・タッカー・ディレル」七階海軍情報部圖版課長  
たり、私住所「ワシントン」州「アキナル」市「リ」街、四、番地ナリ

(二) 海軍情報部圖版課長トシテ、公務ハ、之ニ関スル情報、收得、假  
シ、評價及配布ヲ行フモノナリ、之ニ關スル情報、中、寫真、地圖、及、諸  
報、報告、等、名、トシ、私、一九二二年ニ合衆國海軍兵學校ヲ卒業セシメ  
シ、機械製圖ニ関スル課程ヲ完了セリ、戰時中、私、仕事、ハ、海軍情  
報部圖版課長トシテ、海軍作戰部長、ハ、オラスニ於テ行ハリ

(三) 私、公務ヲ執行中、海軍書類第四号「JICPOA 事項第五、八、  
六号」ヲ「オス」(WOTJE)島、地圖、及、オス、島、寫真、即、寫  
真情報本部特別報告書第一、四、六号ニ於テ添付書(B)及(C)及報  
告書第一、二、四、六号、比較ニ基テ、諸報告ヲ研究シ、又、因、獲、セ、日本  
根據地、平、南、國、航空寫真ニ撮影セタル部分ト報告ト、比較ト、題、目、ニ  
因、一、九、四、六、年、(昭和二十年)七月三日附、手紙ヲ用意シ、且、署名  
セリ

(四) 私、私、知、テ、居、ル、範圍ニ於テ、又、信、ス、ル、範圍ニ於テ、上記、手紙ニ記載  
セタル陳述、及、意見、ハ、眞實ニシテ、正確ナルヲ茲ニ證明ス

(署名) スターリング・タッカー・ディレル

一 Sterling Tucker Dittell

一、九、四、六、年、(昭和二十年)七月二、四、日



No. 2

doc 6254 A

私面前ニ於テ署名スル旨 宣達スル

氏名 署名 JAMES J. ROBINSON

James. J. Robinson

(宣達言ハスル權限アリキ地位)

米國豫備海軍大佐職籍番号五二八五番







No 4

條項、所、名稱	JICPOA 番	互換圖日付	簿面番 影印附 九四五年十二月 廿以後發還海軍
(一) トルク諸島 / Turk /			
ダブロン島 / Dublon /	五四七八	一九四四年四月十五日	
エテン島 / Eten /	八三九六	一九四〇年三月	
エテン島 / Eten /	八三九五	一九四〇年四月十五日	一九四一年十月十日 三十三日
フィアン島 / Fiean /	五四七六	一九四〇年四月十五日	
オッタ及モア / Otta or Mor /	五四七七	一九四〇年四月十五日	一九四二年三月四日 二十六日
ポール島 / Polle /	五四七五	一九四〇年十月十日	
トール島 / Tal /	六〇五四	一九四〇年三月十五日	
ウマン島 / Uman /	七三三八	一九四〇年八月十日	
(二) ワタジ島 / Watje /	五四八六	一九四〇年八月十日	一九四一年九月五日 五十五日
(三) ポナペ島 / Ponape /			
ジョカシ山 / Jokaji /	六〇五五	一九四〇年八月十日	
ナンヌ島 / nanu /	五四八三	一九四〇年十月十日	
ナポリ島 / Napoli /	五四七四	一九三七年九月三日	一九四一年九月七日 二十六日
パラム島 / param /	八五五〇	一九四〇年十月十日	
トルネット峰 / Tolnot Peak /	五四八四	一九四〇年四月十五日	
(四) パラク諸島 / palau /			
コロル島城 / Koror /	五四八一	一九三九年十月十日	
コロル島 / Koror /	五八〇七	日付ナシ	
アラモンギク / Aramongui /	六二〇七	一九三九年十月十日	一九四一年三月三十日 三十一日
ペレリウ / Peleliu /	五四八二	一九四〇年八月十日	
ペレリウ / Peleliu /	八二七〇	一九四〇年十月	
ペレリウ / Peleliu /	八二七一	一九四〇年十月	
(五) ペガ島 / pagan /	八二七三	一九四〇年十月	一九四一年五月廿五日 三十一日

九四五年昭和十五年七月三日父老 Op-111-F-113 并久光添附物 (A)



Doc 6254A

165

米國海軍寫真情報本部受信所

ワシントン市二五

寫真謀報特別報告書一〇四六号

地域「ワオゲエ環礁」 - Wotje Atoll (マーシャル群島 Marshall)

北緯九度二分、東經一七〇度一分

日本軍戰前、位置、現在、諸施設比較

照合 (a) 九四二年/昭和十七年/一月三十日附、洋艦寫

真撮景出動PH 五号

添付物 (A) 艦隊司令官麾下航空戦闘部隊、米國太平洋

洋艦隊寫真謀報報告書才三号及補遺

(B) 島、南端註解附斜寫真

(C) 島、中央部註解附斜寫真

(D) 鹵獲元「ワオゲエアトール」 - Wotje Atoll 平面圖

コ、出書、九四二年/昭和十七年七月、完全報告セラシ、

結果太平洋洋領或情報本部寫真情報報告才三号

反、補遺(添付物A)中ニ記録アリ、本報告、目的

は、要ニ寫真中ニ示サレリ諸施設ヲ戰前、日本側、地圖

添付物Dト比較スニ過ギズ

コ、等、寫真、タクトモ添付物B及Cニ示サレリ防禦施設

ガ悉ク九四二年/昭和十七年/一月三十日にて建設セラレ

モノトコトヲ明確ニ示スモノナリ。島、南端ニ於テ陣地ニテ

何レモ場所ニ於テモ建設工事、進行セルトヲ確實ニ示ス證

據ナシ然レドモ南方、DP堡壘、中央部、掩体、他

ニ箇所ガ迷彩サレタレモ拍ラズツシバニヨリ迷彩サレテ



A Doc 625x

居ラス又兵員、配置ナシ、此、二ツノ事実ヨリ判断スバ、此、最近完成セルモ、  
 ナコトヲ示ス、同地区ノ海岸線ニ沿ヒ更ニ南方ニ位置スル 軍独ノ掩体  
 モ亦芝三環ハ、空に懸ナリ然レドモ、此ハ九四〇年/昭和十五年ノ防禦地圖ニ  
 示サレザル陣地ナリ。島ノ北端ニ於テハ各陣地、何レモ完成セル如ク見エドモ  
 写真真不鮮明ニシテ工事が進行中ナリモノトヤ否ヤ明カナラズ數個所ノ砲  
 兵陣地ハ(特に北端ノ水平高射ノ所用三堡壘)地圖ニ示サレタル位置ヨリ  
 シテ異リタル所ニアリ。此地圖ハ豫定ノ陣地ヲ示スト、推定ヲ確證スル  
 モナリ然レドモ堡壘ノ措置及建築物ノ配置ノ地圖ヲ照査スルニ充分  
 ナル程ノニ近キモノナリ、同写真真ニ數個所ノ砲兵陣地見エドモ地圖ニ  
 記入セザル

砲兵外構造物ニ對シテハ写真真が照査スルニ足レタリ、良ク撮影セ  
 タルモノニ於テハ凡テ地域及地圖ハ写真真ト完全ニ一致ス、道路網地圖  
 ニ示サレタルモノヨリ完全ナリ、飛行場諸軍事道路ノ地圖ニ示サレタルモノ  
 南方ニ延ビ居リ、

又表ハ、此、比較ヲ詳細ニ示スモノナリ、

### 地圖ト写真真トノ比較表

番號	地圖ニ示サレタルモノ	写真真ニテ確證セルモノ
(一)	北端ノ三水平高射ノ 兩用砲群及隣接セタ 電所軍需品倉庫及 兵舎区域ノ地圖ニ「A」字ヲ 示セザル	堡壘ハ確認完成ニ居ル如ク見エ 隣接建築物ノ地圖ノ示ス如ク砲群 ニ對應セル位置ニ在リ然レドモ写真真 不明瞭ニシテ其ノ機能ヲ確認シ得 ズ全堡壘ノ位置ハ地圖ニ示サレタ ルコトモツキ南方ニアリ



(二) 南部、三浦用砲群及隣接セル  
發電所、軍用品倉庫及兵舎  
区域、地図ニB字ヲ示セリ

(三) 示サズ

(三) ~~本島北端~~

(四) 小口砲台陣地ニ個所、  
島北端ニ個所、南端ニ

(五) 聴音指揮所

(六) 無線電信所

(七) 重油貯藏所

(八) 重油貯藏所近

發電所

(九) 桟橋

(一〇) 木工機用傾斜道

(二) 北段燃料貯藏所

堡壘、確認陣地凡テ完成シ居ル如ク見エ  
其中ニ個所、之ヲ以テ決断ヲ施シ兵員配置  
サレ、他ノバ、空虚ニシテ之ヲ攻撃シズ  
指揮所及彈藥倉庫建物、完成シ、写真  
示サレ、如ク写真撮影ヲ行ヒ、  
角度、タメニ兵舎区域及發電所ヲ確認ス  
ルコト能ハズ

直径ニ五呎、單独掩体、空虚ニシ、  
堡壘、南ニ見エ、之ハ後ニ海岸防衛砲  
台ナリ、

確認セリ

島南端ニ甚テモ三個所ヲ確認セリ

塹壕網ニ沿ツテ尚多數アルモノ、如ク

北端ニ個所ヲ確認セリ

或ル種ノ小規模陣地

確認セリ

又、地下油槽、周圍ニ作ラレ、重土掩  
作シラシ

此所建物、機密不明

確認セリ

確認セリ

此地、圧力、ミミミ掃除セリ、  
地上ニ塔ノ如キ構造物ニ重土、  
確認ヲ得ズ



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(三) 飛行場  
(三) 道路網

確認せらる

地圖ニ示サる道路ハ其數ヲ以テ示サる  
コトヲ全數存在ス其ノ他數本道路  
モハ地圖ニ示ス

署名 / シー・ジー・コー・レ・マン (C. G. Coleman)



米國太平洋艦隊司令部下  
航空戰闘部隊行政部

一九四三年/昭和十七年/三月九日

(秘) W.M.O. -

寫真謀報報告書第三號

出撃第PH五號

米國軍艦「ノーサンプトン」(Northampton)搭載飛行機一九四三年  
三月二日「ウオッシュアトール」e atollヲ攻撃セル際九時半に之  
ヲ用ニ中高度ヨリ斜ニ撮タル小規模寫真地圖—水路部海図第五三號

概要—ウオッシュアトール環礁/Wage atoll—ミミール群島

部分寫真

ウオッシュ/Wage/本島ニハ完備セル水上機及大型陸上爆撃機  
乗着所アリ。然レドモ寫真撮影セル飛行機全然見エ、攻撃受ケタル船舶分  
散ニ相当大型ノ船が沈没シタル地ニ復損傷受ケタリト訣タルモノアリ。ウオッシュ

Wage/島ニハ数所ニ大穴が起リ、之ヲ所ニ爆弾破裂セル見ルモノアリ。寫真ニハ輕  
微損傷ヲ認定シ得ルニ過キズ。ウオッシュアトール/Wage atoll/地ノ数所ニ撮  
影シタルモノアリ。Ormed/島ニ活動ノ跡ヲ示ス所アリ。

船舶

寫真卷號

貨物船型ノ船隻、其ノ中ニ其ノ約三ノ  
隻。其ノ中ニ其ノ上ニ其ノ小船ト云  
「ウオッシュ/Wage/島海軍同ト東方斜  
ニ哩又ハ哩ニ離ミタル所ニ見エ、但ニ三  
ノ船、其ノ西寄ニ其ノ爆弾或ハ砲彈、  
炸裂ヲ示ス。其ノ船、舷側近ニ着  
取タル。

U-1-U-2  
U-4-U-5  
U-13-U-14  
U-18-U-19  
U-23-U-24

次ノ寫真ハ白色ニ其ノ海岸近ニ其ノ



Doe 6254 A

船の傾<sup>ハ</sup>沈<sup>ミ</sup>左舷<sup>ニ</sup>傾<sup>キ</sup>後船橋<sup>ナリ</sup>  
上欄部分一面<sup>ニ</sup>黒煙洞<sup>ケルヲ示ス</sup>  
レ等ノ寫眞ノ多數モ、ハ煙及雪ニ  
非度ク散<sup>ル</sup>テ居<sup>ル</sup>ニ船船<sup>ニ</sup>関<sup>ス</sup>  
テ已<sup>ニ</sup>至<sup>ル</sup>結論ヲ與<sup>フ</sup>ルヲ得<sup>ズ</sup>。

~~「アキハ」グワジ ミツ — ナツ ツキ ウツ~~

着陸場二條、清走路、幅

$\cup - \frac{1}{11}, \cup - \frac{1}{11}$

1100 米 1117 反 1119 角 1121 端

2-10

所圖形，旋回場，一乘

V-18A

北二區隊二區二班 + 三九〇張

0-14 0-15

他 一 西北 三 東南 何 長 乃 也

$0-14 \quad 0-15$

味、西北及西南旋回場、固

0-12' 0-110' 0-1111

$$11 = \frac{1}{2} \times 22 = 11$$

0-10

常清正氣 下元滑老軌道

U - 1111

一二三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

2-11-0

「乙一」部東端二隣接三

塹壕 個所より急坂の兵登降

上卷六：準備奔走區域、西才二二回

或三個木格網庫及工場型大建築物

二、<sup>12</sup>棟建築物等数。

鳥具情報本部報告書第5-1-146號=訂入番附物A

庚午滑走軌道：西北旋回場西南

2-18A

三月風下海岸に大に波を起す

0-177 0-177

水上坡中園斜道二達。子一達佛。

0-1/2-1/2

滑公路(東南端)最大、水上橋

$$c = 1/5' \quad c = 1/1000$$

適元木格内庫(其ノ幅五寸)

2-11月

No 10



doc 6254A

長サ三。呎ト思ハルアリ。

着陸場、南、廣大ナル樹木ニ蔽ハル

〇一三

タル地域ニシテ、ソノ中ニ切開カタル

〇一三

廣キ場所アリ、己ハ航空機ヲ分散ス

場所ト思ハル、コノ南ニ亦切開カタル

場所アリテ、其處ニハ、兵舎又ハ倉庫

ニ通スル相當ナル建物十八棟アリ。

「ウヰグ」島ノ無線局

島ノ西南端ニ近ク二階建ノ大建築

〇一三

物アリテ、三本ノ高キ無線燈ニ接ス、附近ニ

小建築物一、直径六十呎、油槽二個、直径

約十呎、油槽四個ヲ圍ム防禦用

盛ニアリ。

「ウヰグ」島ノ其他ノ施設

水上機用傾斜道、真東南、風下海

〇一二。 〇一三

岸ニ大棧橋アリ。其ノ南ヲ二回ニ長サ

但シ幅、モト狭キ棧橋アリトモ、己ハ恐ラ

〇一三 〇一四

打寄ル波浪、爲ニ使用ニ適スルモノナシ。

風下及風上、海岸、何レモ

〇一二

數箇所ニ汽水、極々淺キ船ニ適スル小船渠アリ。

小島ト「ウヰグ」島ノ「WOTJE」島ノ西北部間ニ 〇一二。

三本ノ運河ニ跨ルニ、橋、相當ニ深キ運河ニ

掛ケタル棧橋ニ通スル棧橋、風下、海岸ヨリ、遠道ニ道アリ



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行カルモノ、如心島、東南端附近、海岸に沿テ、浮船渠ニセタリ、後機用輸送管、断面ニキモ、アトモ、後機ハ見エズ。\*

〇一三

着陸場、附近、東北、旋回場、西北、旋回場ヲ連ル道路、ニ相当高キ

〇一二〇

「タンク」三個アリ、コハ恐ラウ水槽ナリ。

滑走路、交叉点、北方、着陸場ヨリ

〇一六

相当離ルニ所、道路、両側ニ二棟、二階建、建物アリ、一、中位他、極大ナル建物ナドモ用途不明ナリ、

無線局、東方、道路、海岸、間

ニ、直径約七、呎、浮上タル円形、構造物アリ、コヨリ、橋ヨリ道路ヲ越エ、小構造物ニ連カリ、円形構造物、頂上ニ三ノ物体、~~車~~車ヲシテ、近ク、海岸ニアル他、四五ノ物体モ見ラウ、~~車~~車ナリ。コ近ク、西北方ニ三基、塔アリ、其ノ中ニ基ニ、高射機、関銃ヲ容ルル大キサ、鴉ノ巢アリ、高射機、関銃、アルコハ、尚一般、配置ニヨリ推察セラル。之ニ接近シテ、一群、小建築物アリ。コ等、高真ヨリ、コ地域、重要性ヲ決定スルニ能ハザリキ。

〇一三

島、西南方、地、泉ニ三個又、ソ、以テ

ノ、迷彩、施サレタル物体アリ、之、見

No. 12



燃料「タール」ナシ。

島周辺近々ニ帯狀道路繞リ。  
エト横道ニ依リ、上述ノ諸施設ニ  
行クコトヲ得。

### 「ヤオバエ」WOTJE 島 - 防禦

島西南地奥ヨリ約一哩、風上、海  
岸ニ砲三門ヨリ成ル一堡壘アリ、  
砲、五吋又ハ六吋、又半地下火藥庫  
及多數ノ小建築物アリ、コノ等、砲  
ト海岸ノ間ニハ、枝狀、射撃塹壕  
アリ、コノ機銃砲床ガ配置サレ處々  
切テ居ル所モアレド西南ノ海岸ニ沿  
ヒテ殆ド尖端ヲ達シ、西北ニ陸場  
ニ達シ居リ。

陸場ノ北ハ、風上、海岸、切開カ  
レタル場所、一堡壘ニ見エドモ島ノ  
部分、高直良好ナズニテ、適當ナ  
解釈ヲ下シ得ズ。

C-16

C-17

C-18A

C-19

### 「ヤオバエ」WOTJE 島 - 損害、査定

準備滑走区域ノ東端ニハ、火  
成セリト思ハレド火藥庫及ソノ附近ニ  
ル小建築物ニ二個、爆彈、炸裂セル  
ヲ見ル。準備滑走区域、西南隅ニハ大  
格納庫、一ヨリ煙ガ噴出シタリ。

C-19

C-20

C-21

C-22

水上機用傾斜道及飛行機置場區域  
ニハ、四本ノ煙ヲ見、煙上ガリタリ、中

C-23

C-24



Doc 6254 A

70/14

一本、下部ニ、大ナル白煙アリシヲ以テ。  
 コハ地下燃料貯藏所ニ命中セシ  
 アトヲ示ス。  
 堡壘ニ、島ノ内方東北方、森林  
 地帯ニ、地面ニ煙ヲ燃有ス大煙柱  
 アリニ、煙ノ量ハ、数枚ノ寫ニ真ニ、  
 急ニ減少シ居リ、ニハ大藥庫ニ命中  
 セシト思ハル。

中部東海岸線附近、大ハ約

一ハ平方呎、地域ニ、一群燃料  
 「ク」ヨリニ居ル如ク見ユ。ハ中  
 一基ハ「ク」ニ、真徑六。呎ト測定  
 セラル。

煙ノ量ハ、絶エ増大シ居タルヲ以テ、恐ニク  
 コハ貯藏所全部破壊セシト見ユ。

「オーキド」ORMED 島

南海岸ニ平行、高ニ、近クニ、煙  
 至煙道路。コノ道路ニ沿ニ又ハ、近  
 クニ多数ノ小建築物アリ。又島ノ他ノ  
 部分、小空地ニ数軒ノ小建築物下。  
 コノ軍事施設ト判断、得ル程ノ大  
 ナリ有スニ、何モ見ユハトモ、相當ニ迷  
 彩ヲ施シタルヲ以テ、ニ、寫ラ遠方ニ斜ニ見  
 ルトハ、斯クハ、特徴ヲ判別シ能ハシ  
 ニハ、十分ナ

〇 | 一 九  
 〇 | 一 八  
 〇 | 一 六  
 〇 | 一 七  
 〇 | 一 八  
 〇 | 一 九  
 〇 | 一 四 A  
 〇 | 一 四 〇 | 一 五

〇 | 一 九  
 〇 | 一 二







Doc. 6254 A

太平洋領域情報本部

眞眞偵察解読課

F44-3/EG 600 pa

Serial 011

1942年\昭和十七年\十月十四

(12)

W-M-001

眞眞偵察解読課第三部

五島 H-500

地域「のちのち」WOTJE ATOLL (N-11 F-3 MARSHALL 群島) 北緯七度二八分、東經一七〇度一五分

資料取得——一九四二年\昭和十七年\一月三十一日

撮影時、平均一センチの波、深一五〇〇分

眞眞機、発見距離——九・五分

高度——五〇〇分至一五〇〇分

密着尺度——不明

参考地図——大略部海圖 第五四二八分

性質——不明の機

最後、「のちのち」

概要「のちのち」WOTJE (島)

報告書第三部二記載セル特徴、外、次、詳細事項(三)

四、飛行機一機、尚他、砲床、及島、数、所、散在セル機

航空機

参照眞眞機

着陸場、南端、中央ニ機體不明、飛行 〇—二二

機一機見

航空機

次、該地ニ尚砲床一ト見ル 即チ

No. 16



Doc 625-4A

島、西北端ニ一個所西北旋回場、  
東北海岸ニ多分二個所、島、東北  
部、帶狀道路、真西ニ二個所、風  
土、海岸、五吋砲床、南ニ二個  
所、多分機関銃

C-1-0

C-1-0

C-1-3

島、西南端、海岸ニ沿ニ

C-1-3

有刺線鉄條見ユ

建物其他、施設

島、西北隅ニ略同大、ヨリ迷彩ヲ

施シタル建物九棟アリテ、森林地帯ヲ

C-1-5

通ル道路、兩側ニ在リ、又コ、地區ニ

於テ森、東端附近ニ尚小建築物

一棟アリ

飛行場、主格納庫ニ近接シテ

C-1-3

大建築物二棟アリ、恐ラク工場或、

倉庫ト思ハル、又小建築物九棟

アリ

土梁、西、飛行場、格納庫ト一線ヲ

ナス位置置ニ平家ニシテ塔、突出セル小

C-1-24

建物一棟アリ、コ、恐ラク作戦室ト

官制塔ナラン

島、北部地区、森林区域ニ大建

築物一棟、小建築物七棟アリテ、帶狀道

C-1-3

路、兩側ニ散在ス、此、大建築物、コ、道



路一上陸場、西方ニ走ル道路ト、交叉  
点、所ニ在リ。

~~着~~陸場、南、森林(分散用)地域ニ、  
前ニ報告セル十八棟、外ニ五棟、建物アリ。  
コレヨリ西海岸、近クニ正方形、大  
建築物及二棟、小建築物アリ。

〇—二三

西北—東南滑走路、東~~着~~陸場、  
中央ニ矩形、輕建造物、一辟アリコレ、  
恐ラ補給施設、劃ラ示スモノナラン

〇—二三

「~~ウミ~~」~~ミミ~~、西北、第三、小

〇—二〇

島ニ、棧橋、如キ突本部アリ、コレ、

北岸ヨリ運河ヲ横切り距離、半分

以下、所ヲ達シ居リ。此小島ニ、然

料~~タ~~ニシテ及數個、建物望見サルヲ

以テ石構造物、築造中、橋頭達ナルカ

又、潜水艦給油船渠ナルカ何カナラン。



6254A cert-1

東京國際軍事研究所

アメリカ合衆國  
コロンビア地國  
ワシントン市

SS。

國民書

「前米國海軍大尉チャールス・ジー・コールマン」  
ニア／＼ CHAS. G. COLMAN, JR. /

宣誓ヲ行ヒタル上、次ノ如キ陳述ヲ行フ。

(一) 私ハ「ワシントン」市米國海軍受僱所爲員情報本部ノ  
研究分析者ナリ。住所ノ宛先ハ「ワシントン」市  
東高區バーンズ二五〇五番地ナリ。

(二) 私ノ公設ハ爲員情報報告所ノ準備ヲ行フニアリ。  
私ハ一九四二年／昭和十七年／「コロンビア」地  
國「アナコスティア」海軍航空場海軍爲員情報學校  
卒業以來コノ作業ニ従事ス。私ハ北亞弗利加「シ  
シリア」及「ノルマンデー」侵入ノ際ノ上陸部隊  
ニ勤ムシ又日本。九州ノ上陸計畫ニ参加セリ。私  
ノ仕事ハ主トシテ航空爲員ノ研究及沿岸地方及陸  
海軍施設ノ防禦ニ在リキ。私ハ「シシリア」及「  
ノルマンデー」上陸ノ際及九州作戦ノ際ノ上陸爲  
員情報隊ノ主任ナリキ。

(三) 私ハ「ウオツヂェ」 ( WOTJE ) 島ニ於ケル日本ノ地  
設ヲ記入セル地圖 JICPOA 第五四八六頁、海軍  
第四十一號ヲ記シ、地圖ニヨツテ示サレタル



6254A cert-2-

寫眞ト同一場所ヲ撮影セル航空寫眞ヲコノ地圖ト  
比較セリ。私ハコノ比較ノ結果ヲ寫眞情報本部  
別報告書第S-I-I-四六號トシテ報告セリ。私  
ハ寫眞情報本部別報告書第S-I-I-四六號ニ對  
スル添附圖(B)及(C)ト印サレタル寫眞シノ航空寫眞  
ニ主眼ナル施設ヲ赤「インキ」ヲ以テ示シ見易カ  
ラシメタリ。

(四) 報告書第S-I-I-四六號ニス、ソノ報告ニ記載セ  
ラレタル註「ウオツヂエ」(WOTJE)島ヲ含  
ム一ノ地圖ヲ査閲セル結果竝ニ同地圖ノ一校一校  
ヲ記載サレタル日附ノ同地域ニ對スル米國海軍寫  
眞情報報告書ト比較セル結果ヲ示セリ。

(五) 私ハ茲ニ、私ノ知ツテ居ル地圖ニ於テ又信ズル範  
圍ニ於テ私ノ署名セル報告ハ眞實ニシテ正確ナル  
コトヲ證明ス。

／署名／チャールズ・ジー・コールマン、ジュニア／  
／Charles G. COLEMAN, Jr.／

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／七月二十五日  
私ノ署名ニ於テ署名シ且宣誓セリ。

／署名／ジヘームス・ジヘイ・ロビンソン／  
／JAMES J. ROBINSON／

(宣誓書ヲ行ハシムル證據ヲ示ス地位)

米國海軍海軍大臣、 陸軍省第五二八三三番



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, Sterling Tucker Dibrell, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, 7th Floor, Steuart Building, Washington, D. C. My residence address is 704 So. Lee Street, Alexandria, Virginia.

2. My official duties as Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, include the procurement, filing, evaluation, and dissemination of graphic information including photographs, maps, and intelligence reports. I graduated from the United States Naval Academy in the Class of 1921, completing a course in mechanical drawing. During the war, my work has been as head of the Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. In the course of my official duties I have studied the reports based on a comparison of the map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item No. 5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and photographs of Wotje Island, Enclosures (B) and (C) to Photo Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, and Report 2-46, and I have prepared and signed the letter dated 3 July, 1946, on the subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans: comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

4. I hereby certify that the statements and opinions contained in the foregoing letter are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ STERLING TUCKER DIBRELL

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
24th day of July, 1946

James J. ROBINSON /s/  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths)

Captain USNR Ser. #52853



3 July 1946

From: Op-23-F-3.  
To : Op-23-Y.  
Via : Op-23-F.

Subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans; comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

Encl: (A) List of Captured Map Material.  
(B) P.I. Special Report No. S-1-46.  
(C) P. I. Special Report No. S-2-46.

1. Enclosure (A) indicated that the elapsed time from beginning of hostilities to the first aerial photographic reconnaissance over subject areas varied from 32 days to 30 months. The shortest elapsed time (32 days) between beginning of hostilities and first photo cover was in the Truk Islands. However, the quality of photography was poor and clouds obscured areas of interest referred to in plans.

2. The Island of Wotje was photographed 53 days after hostilities began. This photography indicates that installations referred to in plans were operative at that time (See Enclosure (B)). Attention is invited to the fact that mechanical drawing practices usually indicate installations already constructed in solid lines, and planned construction in dotted lines. This being true, the power plant, transmitters, command post and block house were complete as of 10 August 1940, the date indicated in plans.

3. Enclosure (B) shows that planned construction indicated in captured document #JICPOA 5486 was completed at time of initial photo cover.

4. Enclosure (C) indicates that 41 out of 53 installations planned before the war were confirmed by war time photography.

S. T. Dibrell



CAPTURED MAP MATERIAL

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NAME PLACE</u>	<u>JICPOA NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF PLAN</u>	<u>DATE OF FIRST COVER</u>	<u>ELAPSE OF TIME 7 Dec. 41 to:</u>
1.	Truk Islands				
	Dublon Island	5478	15 Apr. 1940		
	Eten Island	8396	Feb. 1940		
	Eten Island	6053	15 Apr. 1940	9 Jan. 1942	32 days
	Fefan Island	5476	15 Apr. 1940		
	Otta & Mor	5477	15 Apr. 1940	4 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Polle Island	5475	10 Oct. 1940	(US)	
	Tol Island	6054	12 Feb. 1940		
	Uman Island	7838	10 Aug. 1940		
2.	Wotje Island	5486	10 Aug. 1940	31 Jan. 1942	55 days
3.	Ponape Island				
	Jokaj Mt.	6055	10 Aug. 1940		
	Nanu Sector	5483	10 Oct. 1940		
	Napoli Sector	5474	3 Sep. 1937	7 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Param Sector	8550	10 Oct. 1940		
	Tolenot Peak				
	Sector	5484	15 Apr. 1940		
4.	Palau Islands				
	Koror Section	5481	10 Oct. 1937		
	Koror Sector	5807	Undated		
	Arumongui	6207	10 Oct. 1937	30 Mar. 1944	28 months
	Peleliu	5482	20 Aug. 1940		
	Peleliu	8270	Nov. 1940		
	Peleliu	8271	Nov. 1940		
5.	Pagan Island	8273	Nov. 1940	25 May 1944	30 months

ENCLOSURE (A) TO Op-23-F-3 MEMO OF 3 July 1945.



U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
RECEIVING STATION  
Washington, 25, D. C.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SPECIAL REPORT NO. S-1-46

LOCALITY : Wotje Atoll (Marshall Islands). Lat. 9° 28' N. - Long. 170° 15' E. Comparison of Japanese Pre-War places with actual installations.

REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser photographic sortie No. PH-5 dated 31 January 1942.

ENCLOSURE : (A) Commander Aircraft Battle Force, US Pacific Fleet Photographic Intelligence report No. 3, and supplement.

(B) Annotated oblique photograph of Southern end of Island.

(C) Annotated oblique photograph of Central section of Island.

(D) Captured plan of Wotje Atoll.

This sortie was completely reported on in July, 1942, and the results recorded in Photographic Intelligence Report No. 3 of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, and the supplement thereto, (Encl. "A"). The purpose of the present report is simply the comparison of installations shown in photographs with the Pre-war Japanese Map, (Encl. "D").

These pictures show definitely that all of the defensive installations at least, shown on Encl. "B" and "C", were constructed by January 31, 1942. None of the positions on the southern end of the island showed definite evidence of construction in progress. The central revetment of the southern DP battery, however, has not been camouflaged by sod as have the other two, and is unoccupied, two facts which might indicate recent completion. The single revetment further south along the same section of coastline is also unsodded and empty, but this is a position not shown on the 1940 defense map. On the northern end of the island, photography is not clear enough to show whether or not construction is in progress, though all of the positions appear to be completed.

Several gun positions (notably the northern three gun dual-purpose battery) are in slightly different locations from those shown on the map, thus confirming the supposition that the map shows proposed positions, but the battery arrangements and building dispositions are sufficiently similar to permit checking the map. In addition, there are several gun positions visible on the photos but not shown on the maps.

For structures other than guns, the map agrees closely with the photographs in all areas where photographs are of sufficiently good quality to permit checking. The road network is more complete than that shown on the map, and airfield taxiways have been extended further south than the map indicates.



The following table shows the comparison in detail:

TABULAR COMPARISON OF MAP AND PHOTOGRAPHS

<u>NO</u>	<u>SHOWN ON MAP</u>	<u>PHOTO CONFIRMATION</u>
1.	Northern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area designated on Map by letter "A".	Battery confirmed. Appears complete. Adjacent buildings are located in positions with respect to the battery as shown on the map, but photos are not clear enough to confirm their function. The whole battery position is slightly further south than shown on the map.
2.	Southern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area, designated on map by letter "B".	Battery confirmed. All three positions appear complete, two are camouflaged with sod and occupied. The third is empty and unsodded. Battery C.P. and ammunition storage structures are complete and as shown. It is impossible to confirm Barracks area and power plant due to angle of the photographs.
2a.	Not shown.	A single 25' diameter revetment, empty, appears south of Battery B. This later became a C.D. gun.
3.	Blockhouses.	Confirmed.
4.	Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, two on south end.	At least two confirmed on south end of island. There are probably more along trench net-work. Two confirmed on north end.
5.	Listening "CP".	Small position of some sort.
6.	Radio transmitter station.	Confirmed.
7.	Heavy oil storage	Heavy earth revetment, probably around underground tank.
8.	Power plant near oil storage	There are buildings in this location. Function unconfirmed.
9.	Jetty.	Confirmed.



<u>NO.</u>	<u>SHOWN ON MAP</u>	<u>PHOTO CONFIRMATION</u>
10.	Seaplane ramp.	Confirmed.
11.	Northern fuel storage.	Area cleared of brush. Two tower-like structures above ground. No definite confirmation.
12.	Airfield.	Confirmed.
13.	Road network.	All roads shown on map, including those shown in dashed lines, are in existence. Several additional roads not shown on map.

/s/ C. G. Coleman.

C. G. COLEMAN.



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
Commander Aircraft Battle Force  
Administrative Office

Page 7.

(W-M-001)  
CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
SORTIE NO. PH-5

SMALL SCALE OBLIQUES, 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " lens from medium altitude, taken of WOTJE ATOLL during attack of February 1, 1942, by airplane from U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON.

MAP: H. O. Chart No. 5428.

SUMMARY - WOTJE ATOLL. (MARSHALL ISLANDS) partial coverage.

WOTJE ISLAND proper contains a well developed air station for seaplanes and large land-based bombers. However, no aircraft are visible at time of photography. Dispersion of shipping under attack is observed, with sinking of one sizable vessel and damage of another probable. Several fires and two bomb explosions are seen on WOTJE ISLAND, but only a limited damage assessment can be done with these photographs. Of the several other portions of WOTJE ATOLL photographed, only ORMED ISLAND shows any evidence of activity.

SHIPPING

PHOTO NO.

Three freighter-type ships, one nearly 400', one about 350', and one about 300', together with probably five small vessels, are seen on a distant oblique underway toward the shore of WOTJE ISLAND a mile or more to the east, except for the 350' vessel, which is headed west. A bomb or shell splash is observed as a near miss alongside the 350' vessel.

C-1, C-2,  
C-4, C-12,  
C-13, C-14,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-23, C-24

A subsequent photograph shows the 300' vessel, which is white, as closer to shore, down at the stern, and listing to port, with dark gray smoke rolling over the superstructure from the bridge aft. Considerable smoke and cloud cover in most of these pictures preclude further conclusions as to shipping.

WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field

The landing field has two surfaced runways, 300' in width, bisecting each other at right angles, with circular turning areas at the ends. One runs NE-SW, 3,900'; the other is NW-SE, 5,700'. Between the NW and SW turn-arounds is a large concrete warming-up area, connected to those two turn-arounds by taxi tracks.

Adjacent to the east edge of the concrete is a trench, thought to be a ready magazine. Two, possibly three, large hangars and two large shop-type buildings, together with numerous smaller structures, are grouped to the west of the warming-up area.

C-23, C-12,  
C-14,  
C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-17, C-18,  
C-19, C-20, C-22.  
C-24.  
C-23.  
C-24.

Enclosure A to P.I. Special Report #S-1-46.



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field (Cont.)PHOTO NO.

A broad taxi track runs from the NW turn-around SW to a large apron and seaplane ramp on the leeward beach. On the SE edge of this taxi track is a large hangar (150' wide by perhaps 300' long), suitable for the largest seaplanes.

C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-20, C-23,  
C-24.

South of the landing field is a considerable tree-screened area with a wide cleared approach, suggesting aircraft dispersal space. South of this is a clearing containing eighteen sizable buildings suitable for barracks and/or storhouses.

C-23

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Radio Station

Near the SW tip of the island is a large two-story building flanked by three tall radio towers. Nearby are a smaller building, two tanks of 60' diameter, and a protective embankment enclosing four tanks of about 10' diameter.

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Additional Facilities

On the leeward shore just SE of the seaplane ramp is a large pier. An equally long but narrower pier farther south is probably less useful due to shoaling water. At several points on both leeward and windward shores are small docks suitable for vessels of very light draught. Three bridges crossing three open channels between islets to the NW of WOTJE ISLAND lead to a small pier running into a moderately deep channel, which appears accessible from the leeward side by an indirect route. Along the beach near the SE tip of the island lies what appears to be a section of dredge pipeline on floats, but no dredge is visible.

C-20, C-24,  
C-23, C-14,

C-22.

C-20

C-22

Near the landing field, on a road running NE from the NW turn-around, are two rather high tanks, probably water tanks. To the north of the intersection of the runways, and well away from the landing field, are two two-story buildings on either side of the belt road, one medium and one quite large - purpose unknown.

C-20

C-16

To the east of the radio station, between the road and the beach, is a raised circular structure some 70' in diameter, from which extends a small structure bridging over the road. Two objects on top of the circular structure might be vehicles, and four or five other objects on the beach nearby probably are vehicles. Nearby, to the NW, are three towers, two of which have crow's nests large enough to contain AA machine

C-22



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3

guns, presence of which is further suggested by the general PHOTO NO. layout. Close by is a group of small buildings. It has not been possible to determine the significance of this area from these photographs.

On the SW point of the island, the presence of two or more well camouflaged objects, possibly fuel tanks, is indicated.

A belt road runs close to the perimeter of the island. This, plus side roads, affords access to all the installations mentioned above.

WOTJE ISLAND - Defenses

On the windward beach, about a mile from the SW point of the island, are a battery of three guns, probably 5" or 6", a semi-underground magazine, and a number of small buildings. Between these guns and the beach is a fire trench of a wavy trace, supported by MG emplacements, and extending, with occasional breaks, SW along the beach almost to the point, and NW to the landing field.

A cut up area on the windward beach north of the landing field is probably a battery, but photography of this part of the island is not good enough for adequate interpretation.

C-16  
C-17,  
C-14A,  
C-20.

WOTJE ISLAND - Damage Assessment

Two bursts are seen over the probable ready magazine and nearby small structures on the east edge of the warming-up area. Smoke is emitting from one of the large hangars at the SW corner of the warming-up area.

C-20,  
C-23,  
C-19,  
C-15.

In the area of the seaplane ramp and apron, four columns of dense black smoke, one having a huge white flame at the base, indicate hits on underground fuel storage.

C-20,  
C-15,  
C-19,  
C-18.

In the NE wooded section inland from the battery is a large column of smoke with intense base flame, the volume of smoke being observed to diminish rapidly in succeeding photographs. A hit on a powder magazine is suggested.

C-16,  
C-17,  
C-18,  
C-19,  
C-14A,  
C-24, C-15.

A fire near the central east shore line is seen to rise from a group of fuel tanks comprising an area approximately 180' square, the one tank which is measureable being about 60' in diameter. A constant increase in smoke volume indicates that this entire storage has probably been destroyed.



CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
-----ORMED ISLAND:PHOTO NO.

A road is visible for two or three miles parallel to and near the south beach. A number of very small buildings are located along or near this road, and several others may be seen in small clearings on other parts of the island. There is nothing visible of sufficient size to suggest military installations, but a moderate degree of camouflage would suffice to make such features indistinguishable on these distant obliques. A 40' boat seen near the south shore is moving.

C-9.

C-11.

EGMEDIO ISLAND:

Nothing to report. The scale of these photographs is too small for interpretation.

C-1, C-2,  
C-3.ENE CHERUTAKKU ISLAND:

Same as above.

C-2, C-4.

HEICHEN ISLAND, IWE GROUP, & N.E., TIP OF WETOWERAKKU IS.

Same as above.

C-5, C-6.  
C-7.

- 4 - (Final page)

Enclosure (A) to Photo Officer, Airbatfor, Ltr. to Comairbatfor, Conf. Serial (L-02) of Feb. 9, 1942.



## PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE &amp; INTERPRETATION SECTION

F44-3/EG60Gpa  
Serial 011

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1942.

SUPPLEMENT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3SORTIE: No. PH-5LOCALITY: WOTJE ATOLL (MARSHALL ISLANDS) Lat. 9° 28' N.- Long. 170° 15' E.

Date taken: January 31, 1942.

Mean Time of photography: GCT 2130.

Camera Focal Length: 9½".

Altitude: 500-1500 feet.

Contact Scale: Not known.

Map Reference: H. O. Chart No. 5428.

Quality: Poor obliques.

Last Cover: None.

SUMMARY: (WOTJE ISLAND)

In addition to features noted in Rpt. No. 3, the following details were observed: One plane, additional gun emplacements, and building on various parts of the island.

AIRCRAFT:

Photo  
Reference  
Numbers

One unidentified plane is seen at the center of the south edge of the landing field. C-22

DEFENSES:

Additional gun emplacements are seen at the following locations:  
1 emplacement at the NW tip of the island; 2 probable emplacements C-20  
on the beach NE of the NW turn around; 2 emplacements in the NE C-20  
section of the island just west of the belt road; 2 emplacements  
(probable machine gun) south of the five-inch gun emplacements on  
the windward beach. C-22

A line of barbed wire is observed along the beach at the SW tip of the island. C-22

BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES:

In the NW corner of the island are nine well-camouflaged buildings of approximately the same size, arranged on either side of the road running through the wooded area. Also in this area, near the east edge of the woods, is another small building. C-15

Adjacent to the main hanger at the seaplane base are two large buildings, probably shops or storage, and nine small buildings. C-23



CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1942

SUPPLEMENT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES (Cont)

Photo
Reference
<u>Numbers</u>
C-24

A small flat building, topped by a tower, west of the apron and in line with the hangars at the airfield, is probably the operations building and the control tower.

In the wooded area in the north section of the island are one large and seven small buildings, scattered on either side of the belt road. The large building is at the junction of this road and the road running west to the landing field. C-22

In the wooded (dispersal) area south of the field are five buildings in addition to the eighteen previously reported. West of these, near the beach, is a large square building and two small buildings. C-23

East of the NW-SE runway, in the center of the field, is a network of light rectangles, which may possibly be servicing areas. C-23

On the third islet NW of WOTJE is located a pier-like projection, which extends from the northern shore less than half the distance across the channel. This structure may be either a bridge-head under construction, or possibly a submarine fueling dock, as a fuel tank and several buildings are seen on the islet. C-20



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS      C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, Charles G. Coleman, Jr., former Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am Research Analyst, Photo Intelligence Center, United States Navy Receiving Station, Washington, D. C. Residence address is 2505 Burns S. E., Washington, D. C.

2. My official duties include the preparation of photo intelligence reports. I have been engaged in this work since 1942 when I graduated from the Naval Photographic Intelligence School, Naval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I served in amphibious forces and groups in the North African, Sicilian, and Normandy Invasions and in planning for landings in Kyushu, Japan. My duties were principally the study of aerial photographs and the interpretation of coastal terrain and military and naval installations. I was head of amphibious Photo Intelligence Units in the Sicilian and Normandy landings, and in the Kyushu operations.

3. I have examined the Japanese installation map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item #5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and I have compared with the map the aerial photograph of the same area as that presented by the map. I have reported the results of this comparison in Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46. I have indicated on the aerial oblique photographs, marked Enclosures (b) and (c) to Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, in red ink the principal installations visible.

4. In Report S-2-46, I present the results of my examination of maps of the Islands indicated in that Report, including Wotje Island, and of my comparison of each of such maps with the United States Naval Photographic Intelligence Reports of the same areas for the dates indicated.

5. I hereby certify that the Reports as signed by me are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ CHARLES G. COLEMAN, Jr.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
25 day of July 1946.

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON

(                      Name  
(Status indicating authority to administer  
oaths)

CAPTAIN, USNR  
Service No. 52853



Doc 6254 B

No. 1

檀東國際軍事裁判所

アメリカ合衆國  
コロニア地  
ワシントン市

S.S.

證明書

一 米國豫備海軍中佐「スターリング・タッカー・ディベレル」

私「Sterling Tucker Dibrell」に宣誓を行ふ上、次、陳述之行、

- (一) 私首府「ワシントン」に在り、七階海軍情報部圖版課長  
たり私住所「ワシントン」州「ワシントン」市「」街<sup>南</sup>。四番地ナリ
- (二) 海軍情報部圖版課長トシ、私公務ハ「ワシントン」内ニ情報、收得假  
シニ評價及配布ヲ行フモノナリ「ワシントン」内ニ情報、收得假  
報報告ヲ令スルニ、私、一九二三年ニ合衆國海軍兵學校ヲ卒業セルニ  
シテ機械製圖ニ関スル課程ヲ完了セリ。戰時中私、仕事ハ海軍情  
報部圖版課長トシ海軍作戰部長ハ「ワシントン」ニ於テ行ハタリ
- (三) 私ハ公務ヲ執行中海軍書類第四号「JICPOA」事項第五四、  
六号「ワシントン」(WOTJE)島、地圖及「ワシントン」島、寫真即チ寫  
真情報本部特別報告書第一一四六号ニ付スニ添附書(B)及(C)及報  
告書第一一四六号、比較ニ基キ諸報告ヲ研究シ又鹵獲セル日本  
根據地平面圖航空寫真ニ撮影セタル部分ト報告ト、比較<sup>ス</sup>題目  
圖ニ一九四六年(昭和二十一年)七月三日附、于紙ヲ用意シ目録者名  
セリ
- (四) 私、私、知<sup>ル</sup>居<sup>ル</sup>範圍ニ於テ又信<sup>ス</sup>範圍ニ於テ上記、于紙ニ記載  
セタル陳述<sup>ス</sup>及意見、眞實ニシテ正確ナルヲ茲ニ證明ス

(署名) スターリング・タッカー・ディベレル

一 Sterling Tucker Dibrell

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)七月二日



Mr. 2

Doc 6254 B

於面前三於三署名二目 宣讀外

姓名 (署名) JAMES J. ROBINSON

| James J. Robinson |

(宣讀外三於三署名二目)

米國海軍軍人正職證書五三六三番



No 3

Doc

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一九四六年／昭和二十一年／七月三日

OP 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100

OP 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100

OP 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100

標題、函覆の日本根據地平面図、航空写真、撮景の二つ

部令報告に較

添付書類 (A) 函覆地図資料目録

(B) 写真情報本部特別報告書第5-1-1-46号

(C) 写真情報本部特別報告書第5-1-1-46号

(一) 添付書類 (A) (主題諸地域に對し、始々航空写真偵察を行ひ、

日開戦、自ヨリ三十一日乃至三十一日、範圍に於て經過時日夫々異  
なり、之を示し、開戦ヨリ第一回写真撮景にて經過セル最遅時間  
のトシ、島場合ニ三十一日ナリ。然レドモ写真、全島ニシテ平面図中  
ニ多量ナル重要諸地域、雲、タメ不明瞭ナリ

(二) (六ヶ島) 開戦後五十三日ニシテ撮景セルナリ。此ノ写真、平  
面図中ニ多量ナル諸施設が當時機能ヲ發揮シ居リ、之ヲ示ス  
(添付物) (B) (多量) 機械制図實際ニ於テ設テ改工セル施設實線  
ヲ以テ示シ、計畫中ノ構造物、實線ヲ以テ示ス明白ナルことニ注意ス  
之が真ニ、從電研、電信研、指揮所及木造兵舎、一九四〇年／昭和  
十五年八月十日即チ平面図ニ記シ、之ニ既ニ完成シ居リタルナリ。

(三) 添付書類 (B) 函覆書類、CPOA五八、八号ニ示シ、之ニ計畫構  
造物が一面、写真撮景、既ニ完成シ居リタルことヲ示ス。

(四) 添付物 (C) 戦前計畫五八、五十三、施設中、之ヲ戰時中ニ撮  
景セル写真ニシテ確認セルモノヲ示ス

エス・ティー・ディ・ブル / S.T. Dibrall



No 4

條項, 名稱

JICPOA 4/24/74

附圖四

同治十二年十一月十一日

(一) トルク島	Turk			
ダブロン島	Dublou	五四七	九四四年四月十五日	
エテン島	Eten	八三九六	九四〇年二月	
エテン島	Eten	六〇五五	九四〇年四月十五日	九四四年十月十五日
フィファン島	Fifan	五四七六	九四〇年四月十五日	九四四年三月四日
オッタ及モア	Otta or Moa	五四七七	九四〇年四月十五日	九四四年三月四日
ポール島	Polle	五四七五	九四〇年十月十日	
トル島	Tol	六〇五四	九四〇年十月十日	
ウマン島	Uman	七三三	九四〇年十月十日	
(二) ワチガエ島	Watje	五四八六	九四〇年八月十日	九四四年十月十五日
(三) ボナペ島	bonape			
トコガシ山	Tokas	六〇五五	九四〇年八月十日	
ナミ	Nami	五四八三	九四〇年十月十日	
ナポリ	Napoli	五四七四	九四〇年九月三日	九四四年十月十五日
パラム	Param	八五五〇	九四〇年十月十日	
トレンティン	Tolent Peak	五四八四	九四〇年四月十五日	
(四) パラム諸島	palau			
コロ	Koror	五四八一	九四〇年十月十日	
コロ	Koror	五四〇七	日附十三	
アラモンギ	Aramongui	六二〇七	九四〇年十月十日	九四四年三月三日
ペレリン	Pelelin	五四八	九四〇年八月十日	
ペレリン	Pelelin	八二五〇	九四〇年十月	
ペレリン	Pelelin	八二五	九四〇年十月	
(五) パガン島	pagan	八二七三	九四〇年十月	九四四年十月十五日

九四五年昭和五年四月三日付の「南洋」一三三三号に添付物(九)



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米國海軍寫真情報本部受信所

ワシントン市二五

寫真情報特別報告書55-46号

地域「ウオジエ環礁」(Wake Atoll) (マーシャル群島 Marshall)

北緯九度二八分東經一七〇度一五分

日本軍戰前、位置、現在、諸施設、比較

照合 (a) 九五三年/昭和十七年/一月三十日附巡洋艦寫

真撮景出動PH五号

添附物 (A) 艦隊司令官麾下航空戰闘部隊、米國太平洋  
洋艦隊寫真情報報告書三号及補遺

(B) 島南端註解附斜寫真

(C) 島中央部註解附斜寫真

(D) 鹵獲元「ウオジエアトール」(Wake Atoll) 平面圖

コト由來、九五三年/昭和十七年七月、完全報告ヲ行ヒ、  
結果太平洋洋域情報本部寫真情報報告書三号

及、補遺(添附物A)中ニ記録アリ。本報告、目的  
台要ニ寫真中ニ示サレリ諸施設ヲ戰前日本側、地圖

(添附物D)ト比較スニ過ギズ

コト等、寫真ニシテモ添附物B及Cニ示サレリ防禦施設  
ガ悉ク九五三年/昭和十七年/一月三十日迄ニ建設セラレ

モノナルコトヲ明確ニスモノナリ。島南端ニ於テ陣地ニテ  
行ヒモ場所ニ於テモ建設工事、進行セラルヲ確實ニ示ス證

據ナニ然レドモ南方、DP堡壘、中央部、掩体、他  
ニ箇所ガ迷利サレリニモ拘ラズ、コトハサニミテ迷利サレテ

165



Doc 625x B

居ラズ又兵員配置ナシ、此ニツキ事實ヨリ判断スバ此ハ最近完成セル、  
 たらト示ス、同地区ノ海岸線ニ沿ヒ更ニ南方ニ位置スル。軍中ノ掩体  
 モ亦之ニ重複ハシ、空虚ナリ然レドモ此ハ元田中少佐知十五等ノ防衛地圖ニ  
 示サザル陣地ナリ。島ノ北端ニ於テハ各陣地何レモ完成セル如ク見エドモ  
 写真真不鮮明ニシテ工事ガ進行中ナリモノトモ否ヤ明カナラズ、數個所ノ砲  
 兵陣地ハ特に北端ノ水平高射ノ所用三堡壘地圖ニ示サタル位置ヨリ  
 少し異ナリタリ所ニアリ。此地圖ハ豫定ノ陣地ヲ示スト、推定ヲ確認スル  
 モナラズ然レドモ堡壘ノ措置及建築物配置ノ地圖ヲ照査スルニ充分  
 ナリ程ノニ近キモノナリ、同写真真ニ數個所ノ砲兵陣地見エドモ地圖ニ  
 記入セザルナリ

砲兵外構造物ニ對シテハ写真真ガ照査スルニ足リタリ、良ク撮影サ  
 スモノニ於テハ凡テ地域ニ於テ地圖ハ写真真ト完全ニ一致ス、道路網地圖  
 ニ示サタルモノヨリ完全ナリ、飛行場諸要路、水路ノ地圖ニ示サタルモノ  
 南方ニ延ビ居リ

次表ハ此ノ比較ヲ詳細ニ示スモノナリ、

地圖ト写真真トノ比較表

番號	地圖ニ示サタルモノ	写真真ニテ確認セルモノ
(一)	北端ノ水平高射ノ 所用砲群及隣接セル 電所軍需品倉庫及 兵舎区域ノ地圖ニ「A」字ヲ 以テ示セリ	堡壘ハ確認完成ニ居リ如ク見エ 隣接建築物地圖ノ示ス如ク砲群 ニ對應セル位置ニ在リ然レドモ写真真 不明瞭ニシテ其ノ確證ヲ確認シ得 ズ全堡壘ノ位置ハ地圖ニ示サタル ヨリモ多少ノ南方ニアリ

16.6



(二) 南部、三箇用砲群及隣接せる  
發電所軍需品倉庫及兵舎  
区域地圖ニB字ヲ示セリ

(二) a 示サレズ

(三) 火 兵

(四) 小口砲陣地三個所、  
島北端三個所、南端二所

(五) 聴音指揮所

(六) 無線送信所

(七) 重油貯藏所

(八) 重油貯藏所附近

發電所

(九) 棧橋

(十) 木工機用傾斜車

(十一) 北段燃料貯藏所

堡壘、確認陣地、完成之居ル如ク見ユ  
其ノ中三個所ハ芝ヲ以テ遮蔽シテ、兵員配置  
サレ、他ノ二箇空虛ニシテ、芝ヲ以テ蔽ハズ  
指揮所及彈藥倉庫建物完成之写真  
示サレ、ル如ク、写真撮影ヲ行ヒ、トキ、  
角復、タメニ兵舎区域及發電所ヲ確認ス  
ルヲ能ハス

直径三五呎、單独掩体、空虛ニシ、B  
堡壘、土圍ニ見エ、之ノ後、海岸防禦砲  
トシテ

確認セラル

島南端三箇所、モ三個所ヲ確認セリ

塹壕網ニ沿ツテ尙多數アリ、如シ

北端三個所ヲ確認セリ

或ハ種ノ小規模陣地

確認セラル

恐ラキ地下油槽、周圍ニ作ラシタル重土、掩

体トシテ

此ノ所ニ建物アリ、機能不明

確認セラル

確認セラル

此地區ガ芝ヲ以テ掃除セラル、  
地上ニ塔ノ如キ構造物ニ見エ、之ヲ確認  
シ得ズ



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(三) 飛行場  
(三) 道路網

確認せう。

地圖ニ示せし道路ハ其線ニ以テ示サレタ  
ヲ入テ全數存存ス其、他數本道路アリ  
モハ、地圖ニ示ス

署名 / シー・ジャー・コールマン (C. G. Coleman)



○ — 11/11' ○ — 11/11'

609



Doe 6254 B

No 10

船隻之說二左脈二通平後即有

上欄部分面原煙洞

一、學、真、真、大、教、主、煙、金、雲、

度乃散 仁至義公父 = 船 船 = 國

五、空 總論ヲ契スルコトヲ得ズ。

FRANK, ~~Quartz~~ - 100 - ~~Next to 100~~

着陸場二條着走路一増

U - III. U - I. VI.

1100 張 三丁 五 直南 三六

2-10

新國幣換圓券一萬

C-10A

北門南門，長九百步

$c = 14$   $c = 15$

21. 10. 1900

$$u = 14, u = 15$$

体，通其气，使精神之

$0 - 12' \quad 0 - 110' \quad 0 - 1111$

水、西北風、雨、旋回、同

2-110

$$H: \text{H} \rightarrow \text{H} \text{ and } \pi: \pi \rightarrow \pi$$

0-1111

脩清走文 下 卷 五 終

0-118

[illegible]

五、臺灣

豐饒 佳所 仁心 急務 文君所

國之天下，凡有民者，皆曰：『此吾國也。』

三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百。

魚貫情報本部報告書第三十一號(附物A)

2-18A

庚子所走軌道西北往回場東南

C-15, C-17

三月四日 上海南京路大光明行啟

0-1/2-12

以上各用藥計着三章九子傳一節

$\alpha = 110^\circ$   $\alpha = 110^\circ$

附錄 英國國會法案

2-11-11



doc 6254 B

長サ三〇呎ト思ハルアリ。

着陸場、南、廣大ナル樹木ニ蔽ハ

〇一三

タル地域ニシテ、ソノ中ニ切開カタル

〇一三

廣キ場所アリ、コノ航空機ヲ分散ス

場所ト思ハル、コノ南ニモ亦切開キタ

場所アリテ、其處ニハ、兵舎又ハ倉庫

ニ相当スル相当ナル建物十八棟アリ。

「ウオグザ」島 / WOTJE 島 — 無線局

島、西南端ニ近ク二階建ノ大建築

〇一三

物アリテ、二本ノ高キ無電燈ニ接ス、附近ニ

小建築物一、直径六十呎、油槽二個、直径

約十呎、油槽四個ヲ圍ム防禦用

盛ニアリ。

「ウオグザ」島 — 其、他、施設

水上機用 傾斜道、真東南、風下海

〇一二。 〇一四

岸ニ大棧橋アリ。 其、南ヲ二回長サ

但し幅、モット狭キ棧橋アリトモ、コノ恐ラク

〇一三 〇一五

打寄テ波浪、爲ニ使用ニ適ガレモナシ。

風下及、風上、海岸、何レモ

〇一二

数箇所ニ汽水、極々淺キ船ニ通ス、小船渠アリ。

小島ト「ウオグザ」島 / WOTJE 島ノ西北部、間ニ 〇一二。

アル、二本ノ運河ニ跨ルニ、橋、相學ニ深キ運河ニ

掛ケタル棧橋ニ通ス、コノ棧橋、風下、海岸ヨリ、遠張リ道アリ

1011



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No 12 ★

行カルモノノ如シ。島ノ東南端附近ノ海  
岸ニ沿ツテ浮船ニ上セタル 渡梁 機  
用輸送管ノ断片ヲシキモノアリトモ渡  
梁様ハ見エズ。

C-111

着陸場ノ附近、東北ノ旋回場ト西北  
旋回場ヲ連又ル道路ノ上ニ相当高キ

C-110

タシクニ二個アリ。コレハ恐ラウク水槽ナラン。  
滑走路ノ交叉点ノ北方、着陸場ヨリ  
相当離ラル所ニ、道路ノ西側ニ二  
棟ノ二階建ノ建物アリ、一ハ中位他ハ  
メテ大ナル建物ナリトモ用途不明ナリ。

C-116

無線局ノ東方、道路ト海岸ノ間

C-113

ニ直径約七。呎ノ浮上リタル円形ノ構造物  
アリ。コレヨリ跨橋ニヨリ道路ヲ越ス小構  
造物ニ連ガレリ。円形構造物ノ頂上ニアル  
ニアル物体ハ車輛ラシク、コレ近クノ海  
岸ニアル他ノ四五ノ物体モ現ラウク車  
輛ナラン。コレ近ク、西北方ニ三基ノ塔  
其ノ中ニ基ハ高射機関銃ヲ容ルル  
大キサノ塔ノ巢アリ、高射機関銃  
ルニトハ尙一般ノ配置ニヨリ推察セラル。  
之ニ接近シテ一群ノ小建築物アリ。  
コレ等ノ寫真ヨリハ、之ノ地域ノ重要性  
ヲ決定スルコト能ハザリキ。

島ノ西南方ノ地点ニ二個又ハ一ノ塔  
ノヨク迷彩ノ施サレタル物体アリ、之ハ恐



燃料「タンク」ナシ。

島、周辺近クニ带状道路繞リ。

エト横道ニ依リ、上述ノ諸施設ニ  
行クコトヲ得。

「ウオツガエ」WOTJE 島ー防衛

島、西南地奥ヨリ約一哩、風上、海

岸ニ砲三門ヨリ成ル一堡壘アリ、

砲ハ五吋又ハ六吋ヲシ、又半地下ノ火藥庫

及多數ノ小建築物アリ、コノ等、砲

ト海岸ノ間ニハ、玻璃、射撃斬撃域

アリ、コニハ、機銃砲床ガ配置サレ處々

切テ居ル所モアト、西南ノ海岸ニ沿

ヒテ殆ント尖端ヲテ達シ、西北着陸場

ニ達シ居リ。

着陸場ノ北方、風上ノ海岸、切開カ

タル場所ハ一堡壘ニテ見エトモ、島ノ

部分ノ地質良好ト云フコト、適カ

解釈ヲ下シ得ズ

C-16

C-17

C-18A

C-19

「ウオツガエ」WOTJE 島ー損害ノ査定

準備滑走区域ノ東端ニハ、現ニ完

成セリト思ハル火藥庫及ソノ附近ニ

ル小建築物ニ個ノ爆彈、炸裂セル

ヲ見ル。準備滑走区域、西南隅ニハ大

格納庫、一ヨリ煙ガ噴出シツアリ。

C-20

C-21

C-22

C-23

水ニ機用傾斜道及飛行機置場ノ区域

ニハ、四本ノ濃キ黒煙ニカリタリ、ソノ中

C-24

C-25



Doc 6254 B

一本、下部ニハ大ナル白焰アリシヲ以テ  
コノ地下燃料貯藏所ニ命中セシ  
トコトス。  
堡壘ヨリ島内方東北方、森林  
地帯ニハ地面ニ強ク焰有シ大煙柱  
アリ、煙ノ量、次数、枚、高、真ニハ  
急ニ減少シ居リ、ニハ大藥庫ニ命中  
セシト思ハレ。

〇 | 一九  
〇 | 一八  
〇 | 一六  
〇 | 一七  
〇 | 一八  
〇 | 一九  
〇 | 一四 A  
〇 | 一四 C | 一五

中部東海岸線附近、大ハ約  
一〇平方呎、地域ヲ云ハ群燃料  
「タニク」ヨリニ居ル如ク見ユ。中  
基ハ「タニク」真徑六呎ト測定  
セリ。

煙ノ量、絶ニ増大シ居タルヲ以テ、恐ニク  
コノ貯藏所全部破壊セシメントナリ。  
「オード」ORMED 島

〇 | 一九  
〇 | 二

南海岸ニ平行シテ、近クニ煙  
量、道路、コノ道路ニ沿ヒ又ハ、近  
クニ多数、小建築物アリ。又島、他、  
部分、小空地ニ数軒、小建築物ナリ。  
コノ軍事施設ト判断得ル程、大  
キナ有シ、何モ見エシトモ、相當ニ迷  
彩ヲ施シタルヲ以テ、尋ニ遠方ヨリ斜ニ見  
ルニハ斯ク、如ク特徴ヲ判別シ能ハシ  
ムルニ十分ナリ

7014







Doc 6254 B

太平洋領域情報本部

航空偵察報告書

F44-3/EG 600 pa

Serial 011

一九四二年\昭和十七年\七月七日

(秘)

航空偵察報告書第三号 補正

W 勢 H-五号

地域「WOTJE ATOLL」(MARSHALL 群島)

北緯九度二八分、東經一七度一五分

資料取得——一九四二年\昭和十七年\四月三十日

撮影時、平均一〇リニ、横洋時二時三〇分

写真機、焦点距離一七・五吋

高度一五〇〇呎至一五〇〇呎

着陸尺度——不明

参考地図——水路部海圖 第五四二八号

性質——少く斜々

最後、「WOTJE」

概要 (WOTJE ATOLL)

報告書第三号に記載せる特徴、外、次、詳細事項得る、

航空機、飛行機一機、砲台、砲床、及島、数ヶ所、散在せる建物

参照写真番号

着陸場、南端、中央、機種不明、飛行 〇一三

機一機見上

防衛物

次、該地、砲床、一ヶ所見上、即ち

No. 16



Doc 625-4B

島、西北端 = 一個所 西北旋面場、  
東北海岸 = 多分二個所 島、東北  
部 帶狀道路、真西 = 二個所 風  
土、海岸、五吋砲床、南 = 二個  
所 多分機関銃

C-1-0

C-1-0

C-1-3

島、西南端、海岸 = 沿ヒテ

C-1-3

有刺線鉄條見エ

建物其他、施設

島、西北隅 = 略同大、ヨウ迷紗ヲ

施シタル建物九棟アリテ森林地帯ヲ

C-1-5

通ル道路、兩側 = 在リ又コ、地區 =

於テ森、東端附近 = 尚小建築物

一棟アリ

飛行場、主格納庫 = 近接シテ

C-1-3

大建築物二棟アリ、恐ラク工場或、

倉庫ト思ハル又小建築物九棟

アリ

土梁、西飛行場、格納庫、一棟ヲ

ナス位置 = 平家ニシテ塔、突出セル小

C-1-4

建物一棟アリ、コ、恐ラク作戦室ト

管制塔ナラン

島、北部地区、森林区域 = 大建

築物一棟、小建築物七棟アリテ帶狀道

C-1-3

路、兩側 = 散在ス此、大建築物、道

No. 17



路と~~飛行場~~西方ニ走ル道路ト、交叉  
点、所ニ在リ。

飛行場、南、森林(分散用)地域ニ、  
前ニ報告セル十八棟、外ニ五棟、建物アリ。  
リ、コレヨリ西海岸、近クニ正方形、大  
建築物及二棟、小建築物アリ。

〇—三

西北—東南滑走路、東飛行場、  
中央ニ矩形、輕建造物、一辟アリ、コレ、  
恐ラ補給施設、一劃ヲ示スモノナラン

〇—三

「~~さび~~」~~ミ~~、西北、第三、小

〇—二〇

島ニ、棧橋、如キ突本部アリ、コレ、

北岸ヨリ運河ヲ横切り距離、半分

以下、所ヲ達シ居リ。此小島ニ、燃

料タンク、七及數個、建物望見サルヲ

以テ右構造物、築造中、碼頭堡ナルカ

又、潜水艦給油船渠ナルカ何カナラン。



6254-B cat-1

アメリカ合衆國  
コロンビア地區  
ワシントン 市

SS。

陸軍省

「前米國海軍大尉チャールズ・ジー・コールマン／シ  
ニア／Charles G. Coleman, Jr.」  
宣旨ヲ行ヒタル上、次ノ如キ原通ヲ行フ。

(一) 我ハ「ワシントン」市米國海軍受信所長眞情報本  
部ノ研究分析者ナリ。住所ノ宛先ハ「ワシントン」  
市東南區バーンズ二五〇五番地ナリ。

(二) 我ノ公務ハ眞情報社報告書ノ準備ヲ行フニナリ。  
我ハ一九四二年／昭和十七年／「コロンビア」地  
區「アナコスティア」海軍基地場海軍眞情報社  
卒業以來コノ作業ニ従事ス。我ハ北亞弗利加「シ  
シリア」及「ノルマンデー」に侵入ノ際ノ上陸部隊  
ニ對シ又日本。九州ノ上陸計畫ニ參加セリ。我  
ノ仕事ハ主トシテ海軍眞情報ノ研究及沿岸地方及  
海軍施設ノ保護ニ在リキ。我ハ「シシリア」及「  
ノルマンデー」上陸ノ際及九州作戦ノ際ノ上陸眞  
情報社ノ主任ナリキ。

(三) 我ハ「ウオツデヒ」(WOFJ) 農ニ於ケル日本ノ  
施設ヲ記入サル海軍JICPOA第三四八六頁、海軍書  
庫第四十一號ヲ調査シ、海軍ニヨツテ示サレタル



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: CERTIFICATE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, Sterling Tucker Dibrell, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, 7th Floor, Steuart Building, Washington, D. C. My residence address is 704 So. Lee Street, Alexandria, Virginia.

2. My official duties as Head of Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, include the procurement, filing, evaluation, and dissemination of graphic information including photographs, maps, and intelligence reports. I graduated from the United States Naval Academy in the Class of 1921, completing a course in mechanical drawing. During the war, my work has been as head of the Graphic Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3. In the course of my official duties I have studied the reports based on a comparison of the map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item No. 5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and photographs of Wotje Island, Enclosures (B) and (C) to Photo Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, and Report 2-46, and I have prepared and signed the letter dated 3 July, 1946, on the subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans: comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

4. I hereby certify that the statements and opinions contained in the foregoing letter are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ STERLING TUCKER DIBRELL

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
24th day of July, 1946

James J. ROBINSON /s/  
 Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths)

Captain USNR Ser. #52853



3 July 1946

From: Op-23-F-3.  
To : Op-23-Y.  
Via : Op-23-F.

Subject: Captured Japanese Base Plans; comparison with aerial photographic coverage and reports.

Encl: (A) List of Captured Map Material.  
(B) P.I. Special Report No. S-1-46.  
(C) P. I. Special Report No. S-2-46.

1. Enclosure (A) indicated that the elapsed time from beginning of hostilities to the first aerial photographic reconnaissance over subject areas varied from 32 days to 30 months. The shortest elapsed time (32 days) between beginning of hostilities and first photo cover was in the Truk Islands. However, the quality of photography was poor and clouds obscured areas of interest referred to in plans.

2. The Island of Wotje was photographed 53 days after hostilities began. This photography indicates that installations referred to in plans were operative at that time (See Enclosure (B)). Attention is invited to the fact that mechanical drawing practices usually indicate installations already constructed in solid lines, and planned construction in dotted lines. This being true, the power plant, transmitters, command post and block house were complete as of 10 August 1940, the date indicated in plans.

3. Enclosure (B) shows that planned construction indicated in captured document #JICPOA 5486 was completed at time of initial photo cover.

4. Enclosure (C) indicates that 41 out of 53 installations planned before the war were confirmed by war time photography.

S. T. Dibrell



CAPTURED MAP MATERIAL

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NAME PLACE</u>	<u>JICPOA NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE OF PLAN</u>	<u>DATE OF FIRST COVER</u>	<u>ELAPSE OF TIME 7 Dec. 41 to:</u>
1.	Truk Islands				
	Dublon Island	5478	15 Apr. 1940		
	Eten Island	8396	Feb. 1940		
	Eten Island	6053	15 Apr. 1940	9 Jan. 1942	32 days
	Fefan Island	5476	15 Apr. 1940		
	Otta & Mor	5477	15 Apr. 1940	4 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Polle Island	5475	10 Oct. 1940	(US)	
	Tol Island	6054	12 Feb. 1940		
	Uman Island	7838	10 Aug. 1940		
2.	Wotje Island	5486	10 Aug. 1940	31 Jan. 1942	55 days
3.	Ponape Island				
	Jokaj Mt.	6055	10 Aug. 1940		
	Nanu Sector	5483	10 Oct. 1940		
	Napoli Sector	5474	3 Sep. 1937	7 Feb. 1944	26 months
	Param Sector	8550	10 Oct. 1940		
	Tolenot Peak Sector	5484	15 Apr. 1940		
4.	Palau Islands				
	Koror Section	5481	10 Oct. 1937		
	Koror Sector	5807	Undated		
	Arumongui	6207	10 Oct. 1937	30 Mar. 1944	28 months
	Peleliu	5482	20 Aug. 1940		
	Peleliu	8270	Nov. 1940		
	Peleliu	8271	Nov. 1940		
5.	Pagan Island	8273	Nov. 1940	25 May 1944	30 months

ENCLOSURE (A) TO Op-23-F-3 MEMO OF 3 July 1945.



U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
RECEIVING STATION  
Washington, 25, D. C.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SPECIAL REPORT NO. S-1-46

LOCALITY : Wotje Atoll (Marshall Islands). Lat. 9° 28' No.- Long. 170° 15' E. Comparison of Japanese Pre-War places with actual installations.

REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser photographic sortie No. PH-5 dated 31 January 1942.

ENCLOSURE : (A) Commander Aircraft Battle Force, US Pacific Fleet Photographic Intelligence report No. 3, and supplement.

(B) Annotated oblique photograph of Southern end of Island.

(C) Annotated oblique photograph of Central section of Island.

(D) Captured plan of Wotje Atoll.

This sortie was completely reported on in July, 1942, and the results recorded in Photographic Intelligence Report No. 3 of the Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, and the supplement thereto, (Encl. "A"). The purpose of the present report is simply the comparison of installations shown in photographs with the Pre-war Japanese Map, (Encl. "D").

These pictures show definitely that all of the defensive installations at least, shown on Encl. "B" and "C", were constructed by January 31, 1942. None of the positions on the southern end of the island showed definite evidence of construction in progress. The central revetment of the southern DP battery, however, has not been camouflaged by sod as have the other two, and is unoccupied, two facts which might indicate recent completion. The single revetment further south along the same section of coastline is also unsodded and empty, but this is a position not shown on the 1940 defense map. On the northern end of the island, photography is not clear enough to show whether or not construction is in progress, though all of the positions appear to be completed.

Several gun positions (notably the northern three gun dual-purpose battery) are in slightly different locations from those shown on the map, thus confirming the supposition that the map shows proposed positions, but the battery arrangements and building dispositions are sufficiently similar to permit checking the map. In addition, there are several gun positions visible on the photos but not shown on the maps.

For structures other than guns, the map agrees closely with the photographs in all areas where photographs are of sufficiently good quality to permit checking. The road network is more complete than that shown on the map, and airfield taxiways have been extended further south than the map indicates.



The following table shows the comparison in detail:

TABULAR COMPARISON OF MAP AND PHOTOGRAPHS

<u>NO</u>	<u>SHOWN ON MAP</u>	<u>PHOTO CONFIRMATION</u>
1.	Northern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area designated on Map by letter "A".	Battery confirmed. Appears complete. Adjacent buildings are located in positions with respect to the battery as shown on the map, but photos are not clear enough to confirm their function. The whole battery position is slightly further south than shown on the map.
2.	Southern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent power plant, munitions storage and barracks area, designated on map by letter "B".	Battery confirmed. All three positions appear complete, two are camouflaged with sod and occupied. The third is empty and unsodded. Battery C.P. and ammunition storage structures are complete and as shown. It is impossible to confirm Barracks area and power plant due to angle of the photographs.
2a.	Not shown.	A single 25' diameter revetment, empty, appears south of Battery B. This later became a C.D. gun.
3.	Blockhouses.	Confirmed.
4.	Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, two on south end.	At least two confirmed on south end of island. There are probably more along trench net-work. Two confirmed on north end.
5.	Listening "CP".	Small position of some sort.
6.	Radio transmitter station.	Confirmed.
7.	Heavy oil storage	Heavy earth revetment, probably around underground tank.
8.	Power plant near oil storage	There are buildings in this location. Function unconfirmed.
9.	Jetty.	Confirmed.



<u>NO.</u>	<u>SHOWN ON MAP</u>	<u>PHOTO CONFIRMATION</u>
10.	Scaplane ramp.	Confirmed.
11.	Northern fuel storage.	Area cleared of brush. Two tower-like structures above ground. No definite confirmation.
12.	Airfield.	Confirmed.
13.	Road network.	All roads shown on map, including these shown in dashed lines, are in existence. Several additional roads not shown on map.

/s/ C. G. Coleman.

C. G. COLEMAN.



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
Commander Aircraft Battle Force  
Administrative Office

Page 7.

(W-M-001)  
CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
SORTIE NO. PH-5

SMALL SCALE OBLIQUES,  $9\frac{1}{2}$ " lens from medium altitude, taken of WOTJE ATOLL during attack of February 1, 1942, by airplane from U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON.

MAP: H. O. Chart No. 5428.

SUMMARY - WOTJE ATOLL, (MARSHALL ISLANDS) partial coverage.

WOTJE ISLAND proper contains a well developed air station for seaplanes and large land-based bombers. However, no aircraft are visible at time of photography. Dispersion of shipping under attack is observed, with sinking of one sizable vessel and damage of another probable. Several fires and two bomb explosions are seen on WOTJE ISLAND, but only a limited damage assessment can be done with these photographs. Of the several other portions of WOTJE ATOLL photographed, only ORMED ISLAND shows any evidence of activity.

SHIPPING

PHOTO NO.

Three freighter-type ships, one nearly 400', one about 350', and one about 300', together with probably five small vessels, are seen on a distant oblique underway toward the shore of WOTJE ISLAND a mile or more to the east, except for the 350' vessel, which is headed west. A bomb or shell splash is observed as a near miss alongside the 350' vessel.

C-1, C-2,  
C-4, C-12,  
C-13, C-14,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-23, C-24

A subsequent photograph shows the 300' vessel, which is white, as closer to shore, down at the stern, and listing to port, with dark gray smoke rolling over the superstructure from the bridge aft. Considerable smoke and cloud cover in most of these pictures preclude further conclusions as to shipping.

WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field

The landing field has two surfaced runways, 300' in width, bisecting each other at right angles, with circular turning areas at the ends. One runs NE-SW, 3,900'; the other is NW-SE, 5,700'. Between the NW and SW turn-arounds is a large concrete warming-up area, connected to those two turn-arounds by taxi tracks.

C-23, C-12,  
C-14,  
C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-17, C-18,  
C-19, C-20, C-22.  
C-24.  
C-23.  
C-24.

Adjacent to the east edge of the concrete is a trench, thought to be a ready magazine. Two, possibly three, large hangars and two large shop-type buildings, together with numerous smaller structures, are grouped to the west of the warming-up area.

Enclosure A to P.I. Special Report #S-1-46.



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February 9, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3WOTJE ISLAND - Landing Field (Cont.)PHOTO NO.

A broad taxi track runs from the NW turn-around SW to a large apron and seaplane ramp on the leeward beach. On the SE edge of this taxi track is a large hangar (150' wide by perhaps 300' long), suitable for the largest seaplanes.

C-14A,  
C-15, C-16,  
C-18, C-19,  
C-20, C-23,  
C-24.

South of the landing field is a considerable tree-screened area with a wide cleared approach, suggesting aircraft dispersal space. South of this is a clearing containing eighteen sizable buildings suitable for barracks and/or storerooms.

C-23

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Radio Station

Near the SW tip of the island is a large two-story building flanked by three tall radio towers. Nearby are a smaller building, two tanks of 60' diameter, and a protective embankment enclosing four tanks of about 10' diameter.

C-22

WOTJE ISLAND - Additional Facilities

On the leeward shore just SE of the seaplane ramp is a large pier. An equally long but narrower pier farther south is probably less useful due to shoaling water. At several points on both leeward and windward shores are small docks suitable for vessels of very light draught. Three bridges crossing three open channels between islets to the NW of WOTJE ISLAND lead to a small pier running into a moderately deep channel, which appears accessible from the leeward side by an indirect route. Along the beach near the SE tip of the island lies what appears to be a section of dredge pipeline on floats, but no dredge is visible.

C-20, C-24,  
C-23, C-14,

C-22.

C-20

C-22

Near the landing field, on a road running NE from the NW turn-around, are two rather high tanks, probably water tanks. To the north of the intersection of the runways, and well away from the landing field, are two two-story buildings on either side of the belt road, one medium and one quite large - purpose unknown.

C-20

C-16

To the east of the radio station, between the road and the beach, is a raised circular structure some 70' in diameter, from which extends a small structure bridging over the road. Two objects on top of the circular structure might be vehicles, and four or five other objects on the beach nearby probably are vehicles. Nearby, to the NW, are three towers, two of which have crow's nests large enough to contain AA machine

C-22



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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3

guns, presence of which is further suggested by the general PHOTO NO. layout. Close by is a group of small buildings. It has not been possible to determine the significance of this area from these photographs.

On the SW point of the island, the presence of two or more well camouflaged objects, possibly fuel tanks, is indicated.

A belt road runs close to the perimeter of the island. This, plus side roads, affords access to all the installations mentioned above.

WOTJE ISLAND - Defenses

On the windward beach, about a mile from the SW point of the island, are a battery of three guns, probably 5" or 6", a semi-underground magazine, and a number of small buildings. Between these guns and the beach is a fire trench of a wavy trace, supported by MG emplacements, and extending, with occasional breaks, SW along the beach almost to the point, and NW to the landing field.

A cut up area on the windward beach north of the landing field is probably a battery, but photography of this part of the island is not good enough for adequate interpretation.

C-16  
C-17,  
C-141,  
C-20.

WOTJE ISLAND - Damage Assessment

Two bursts are seen over the probable ready magazine and nearby small structures on the east edge of the warming-up area. Smoke is emitting from one of the large hangars at the SW corner of the warming-up area.

C-20,  
C-23,  
C-19,  
C-15.

In the area of the seaplane ramp and apron, four columns of dense black smoke, one having a huge white flame at the base, indicate hits on underground fuel storage.

C-20,  
C-15,  
C-19,  
C-18.

In the NE wooded section inland from the battery is a large column of smoke with intense base flame, the volume of smoke being observed to diminish rapidly in succeeding photographs. A hit on a powder magazine is suggested.

C-16,  
C-17,  
C-18,  
C-19,  
C-141,  
C-24, C-15.

A fire near the central east shore line is seen to rise from a group of fuel tanks comprising an area approximately 180' square, the one tank which is measurable being about 60' in diameter. A constant increase in smoke volume indicates that this entire storage has probably been destroyed.



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February 9, 1942.

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3  
-----ORMED ISLAND:PHOTO NO.

A road is visible for two or three miles parallel to and near the south beach. A number of very small buildings are located along or near this road, and several others may be seen in small clearings on other parts of the island. There is nothing visible of sufficient size to suggest military installations, but a moderate degree of camouflage would suffice to make such features indistinguishable on these distant obliques. A 40' boat seen near the south shore is moving.

C-9.

C-11.

EGMEDIO ISLAND:

Nothing to report. The scale of these photographs is too small for interpretation.

C-1, C-2,  
C-3.ENE CHERUTAKKU ISLAND:

Same as above.

C-2, C-4.

HEICHEN ISLAND, IWE GROUP, & N.E., TIP OF WETOWERAKKU IS.

Same as above.

C-5, C-6.  
C-7.

- 4 - (Final page)

Enclosure (A) to Photo Officer, Airbatfor, Ltr. to Comairbatfor,  
Conf. Serial (L-02) of Feb. 9, 1942.



## PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE &amp; INTERPRETATION SECTION

F44-3/EG60Gpa  
Serial 011

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1942.

SUPPLEMENT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3SORTIE: No. PH-5

LOCALITY: WOTJE ATOLL (MARSHALL ISLANDS) Lat. 9° 28' N.- Long. 170° 15' E.  
 Date taken: January 31, 1942.  
 Mean Time of photography: GCT 2130.  
 Camera Focal Length: 9½".  
 Altitude: 500-1500 feet.  
 Contact Scale: Not known.  
 Map Reference: H. O. Chart No. 5428.  
 Quality: Poor obliques.  
 Last Cover: None.

SUMMARY: (WOTJE ISLAND)

In addition to features noted in Rpt. No. 3, the following details were observed: One plane, additional gun emplacements, and building on various parts of the island.

AIRCRAFT:

Photo  
Reference  
Numbers  
C-22

One unidentified plane is seen at the center of the south edge of the landing field.

DEFENSES:

Additional gun emplacements are seen at the following locations:  
 1 emplacement at the NW tip of the island; 2 probable emplacements on the beach NE of the NW turn around; 2 emplacements in the NE section of the island just west of the belt road; 2 emplacements (probable machine gun) south of the five-inch gun emplacements on the windward beach.

A line of barbed wire is observed along the beach at the SW tip of the island.

BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES:

In the NW corner of the island are nine well-camouflaged buildings of approximately the same size, arranged on either side of the road running through the wooded area. Also in this area, near the east edge of the woods, is another small building.

Adjacent to the main hanger at the seaplane base are two large buildings, probably shops or storage, and nine small buildings.



CONFIDENTIAL

July 7, 1942

SUPPLEMENT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES (Cont)

Photo  
Reference  
Numbers  
C-24

A small flat building, topped by a tower, west of the apron and in line with the hangars at the airfield, is probably the operations building and the control tower.

In the wooded area in the north section of the island are one large and seven small buildings, scattered on either side of the belt road. The large building is at the junction of this road and the road running west to the landing field. C-22

In the wooded (dispersal) area south of the field are five buildings in addition to the eighteen previously reported. West of these, near the beach, is a large square building and two small buildings. C-23

East of the NW-SE runway, in the center of the field, is a network of light rectangles, which may possibly be servicing areas. C-23

On the third islet NW of WOTJE is located a pier-like projection, which extends from the northern shore less than half the distance across the channel. This structure may be either a bridgehead under construction, or possibly a submarine fueling dock, as a fuel tank and several buildings are seen on the islet. C-20



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS      C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, Charles G. Coleman, Jr., former Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am Research Analyst, Photo Intelligence Center, United States Navy Receiving Station, Washington, D. C. Residence address is 2505 Burns S. E., Washington, D. C.

2. My official duties include the preparation of photo intelligence reports. I have been engaged in this work since 1942 when I graduated from the Naval Photographic Intelligence School, Naval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I served in amphibious forces and groups in the North African, Sicilian, and Normandy Invasions and in planning for landings in Kyushu, Japan. My duties were principally the study of aerial photographs and the interpretation of coastal terrain and military and naval installations. I was head of amphibious Photo Intelligence Units in the Sicilian and Normandy Landings, and in the Kyushu operations.

3. I have examined the Japanese installation map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item #5486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and I have compared with the map the aerial photograph of the same area as that presented by the map. I have reported the results of this comparison in Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46. I have indicated on the aerial oblique photographs, marked Enclosures (b) and (c) to Photographic Intelligence Center Special Report No. S-1-46, in red ink the principal installations visible.

4. In Report S-2-46, I present the results of my examination of maps of the Islands indicated in that Report, including Wotje Island, and of my comparison of each of such maps with the United States Naval Photographic Intelligence Reports of the same areas for the dates indicated.

5. I hereby certify that the Reports as signed by me are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ C H A R L E S G. C O L E M A N, Jr

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
25 day of July 1946.

/s/ J A M E S J. R O B I N S O N

Name

(Status indicating authority to administer  
oaths)

CAPTAIN, USNR

Service No. 52853



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, W. A. Talbot Bielefeldt, Commander, USNR, upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I am on duty in the Washington Document Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, 4th Floor, Steuart Building, Washington, D. C. My residence address is 6617 Poplar Avenue, Tacoma Park, Maryland.

2. My official duties are: Head of Information and Research Section, Washington Document Center. My duties include supervision of classifying, indexing and filing of documents relating to the Far East and Pacific Ocean Areas, including documents captured from Japanese armed forces. I am a graduate of the Japanese Language course in the Navy School of Oriental Languages. I have been on duty involving the interrogation of captured Japanese personnel and the translation of Japanese documents since 1942 in Southwest Pacific areas and in Washington, D. C. I was with the Allied Translation and Interpreter Section in Australia and New Guinea for a total of 15 months.

3. Navy Document No. 41, a blueprint chart of Wotje Island, dated 10 August, 1940, is an official document in the permanent custody of the Washington Document Center. It was received from the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, located at Pearl Harbor, according to the usual procedure. The standard or usual operating procedure under which documents have been received after capture is as follows: The documents, upon capture by combat troops, would be delivered to a document collection unit, who in turn would examine the documents for immediate intelligence purposes. The documents would be stamped in the document collection unit with the name of the place where captured and an identifying number. The documents would then be forwarded to JICPOA at Pearl Harbor. After study and any other use there, the documents would then be forwarded by JICPOA to the Navy Department and the Washington Document Center for purposes of custody and proper use or distribution. It appears that Navy Document No. 41, according to this procedure, was captured on Kwajalein and forwarded to JICPOA. This document and other documents on Mandated Islands were forwarded to the Navy Department and are kept in the custody of the Washington Document Center.



4. According to the usual procedure, the English translations and interpretations written on the face of the document appear to have been written either by the document collection unit or in JICPOA. Both document collection units and the JICPOA staff normally have included military or Naval personnel qualified in making such annotations on such documents.

5. The foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ W. A. T. BIELEFELD T  
Commander, USNR  
Service No. 167617

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
25 day of July, 1946

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON  
Name

(Status indicating authority to  
administer oaths)

CAPTAIN, USNR  
Service #52853



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6254-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hidemi YOSHIDA hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Member of Research Division of  
2nd Demobilization Bureau  
and that as such official I have examined the document hereto attached  
consisting of 1 page, dated 10 Aug., 1940, and described as follows:  
Sectional Map of WOTJE Is.

I further certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the at-  
tached record and document is an official document of the Japanese  
Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of  
the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file  
number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the  
regular location of the document in the archives or files):  
Yokosuka Naval Civil Engineering Dept. of the Yokosuka Naval  
Sta. (Secret Map No. 852, Part 4).

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10th day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Hidemi YOSHIDA  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Member of Research  
Division 2nd Demob. Bureau  
Official Capacity

Witness: Y. YAMAMOTO

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, 2nd Lt., hereby certify that  
I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander  
for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by  
me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the  
conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10th day of October, 1946

J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: RICHARD H. LARSH

Investigator  
Official Capacity



6254 B cert-2

地境ト同一場所ヲ撮影セル航空寫眞ヲコノ地圖ト  
比較セリ。私ハコノ比較ノ結果ヲ寫眞情報本部特  
別報告書第S I - I - 四六號トシテ報告セリ。私ハ  
寫眞情報本部特別報告書第S I - I - 四六號ニ對ス  
ル添附物(B)及(O)ト印サレタル斜寫シノ航空寫眞ニ  
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シメタリ。

(四)報告書第S I - I - 四六號ニハ、ソノ報告ニ記載セ  
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ヲ記載サレタル日附ノ同地域ニ對スル米國海軍情  
報報告書ト比較セル結果ヲ示セリ。

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コトヲ證明ス。

／署名／チャールズ・ジー・コールマン、ジュニア／

／Charles, G. COLEMAN, Jr.／

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／七月二十五日

私ノ面前ニ於テ署名シ且宣誓セリ。

／署名／ジェームス・ジエイ・ロビンソン／

／JAMES, J. ROBINSON／

(宣誓約ヲ行ハシムル權限ヲ示ス地位)

米國豫備海軍大佐、職號番號五二八五三番



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 12)

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)  
To: Honolulu  
September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

ARMY 23260

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P. S. McManus, Lieut U.S.N.  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: \_\_\_\_\_

Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H., from 14 March 1941 to  
about 7 December 1941

and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 24 September, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #83 from Tokyo  
(Toyoda) to Honolulu.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of October 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 12)

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To: Honolulu  
September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret.

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Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

ARMY 23260

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P. S. McManus, Lieut U.S.N.  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: \_\_\_\_\_

Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H., from 14 March 1941 to

about 7 December 1941

and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 24 September, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #83 from Tokyo

(Toyoda) to Honolulu

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of October 1946.

Nagao KITA

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF

NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS

Official Capacity



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 13)

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)  
15 November 1941

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P. S. McManus, Lieut. U.S.N.  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 15 November, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #1111 from Tokyo  
(TOGO) to Honolulu.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt. Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day October, 1946.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt. Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



From: Honolulu (Kita) Japanese Messages Concerning  
To : Tokyo Military Installations, Ship  
November 18, 1941 Movements, etc. (Page 14)

# 222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219a on that day.

Area Ab - A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area Cc - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area Dd.

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to \_\_\_\_\_.

- a. - Available, dated November 14. Code under study.
- b. - Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
- c. - East Loch.
- d. - Middle Loch.

ARMY 25817

Trans. 12/6/41 (2)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS:

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P..S. McManus, Lieut. U.S.N.

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 18 November, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #222 from Honolulu  
(KITA) to Tokyo

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00  
a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I  
do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence.  
They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession  
or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am  
associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for  
the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me  
from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct  
of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



From: Honolulu (Kita) Japanese Messages Concerning  
To : Tokyo Military Installations, Ship  
November 18, 1941 Movements, etc. (Page 14)

# 222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219a on that day.

Area A<sup>b</sup> - A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C<sup>c</sup> - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D<sup>d</sup>.

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Relayed to \_\_\_\_\_.

- a. - Available, dated November 14. Code under study.
- b. - Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
- c. - East Loch.
- d. - Middle Loch.

ARMY 25817

Trans. 12/6/41 (2)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS:

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P..S. McManus, Lieut. U.S.N.

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 18 November, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #222 from Honolulu  
(KITA) to Tokyo

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00  
a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I  
do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence.  
They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession  
or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am  
associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for  
the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me  
from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct  
of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1858  
Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations,  
Ship Movements, etc. (Page 21)

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
December 2, 1941

#123 <sup>Top</sup> (Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P. S. McManus, Lieut. U.S.N.  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 2 December, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #123 from Tokyo  
(TOGO) to Honolulu

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this

8th day of October, 1946.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 26)

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Tokyo.  
5 December 1941

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239\* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.  
3 light cruisers.  
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and  
- - - - - were in dock.

\*Available, dated 29 November.

26029

JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS: C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the nineographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 25th day of July 1946.

/s/ R. S. McManus Lieut USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-G

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 5 December, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #252 from Honolulu  
(KITA) to Tokyo.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00  
a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I  
do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence.  
They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession  
or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

<sup>a</sup>  
Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt. Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated  
with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied  
Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above  
signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official  
business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1958

Document No. 6255-E

Page 1

Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations,  
Ship Movements, etc. (Page 21)

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
December 2, 1941

#123

*Top*  
(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note: This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) SS: C E R T I F I C A T E  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me  
this 25th day of July 1946.

(signed) P. S. McManus, Lieut. U.S.N.  
Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITTA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 2 December, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #123 from Tokyo  
(TOSO) to Honolulu

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00  
a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I  
do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence.  
They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession  
or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October 1946.

Nagao KITTA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated  
with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied  
Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above  
signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official  
business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



Affidavit of Otto Kuehn dated 1 Jan. 1942.

Honolulu, T.H.  
January 1, 1942

I, OTTO KUEHN, make the following statement to J. STERLING ADAMS and GEORGE E. ALLEN, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowing same to be such. No threats, inducements or promises of any kind have been made to me. I make this statement freely and voluntarily, of my own free will.

I, OTTO KUEHN, was born on July 25, 1895, at Berlin, Germany. In April, 1913, I enlisted in the German Navy, as a Cadet, on the training cruiser, HERTHA, at Flensburg, Germany. After serving my training period, I was a midshipman on the German cruiser, BLUCHER, on which I served in the war until January 24, 1915, at which time I was captured by the British following a naval engagement in which the BLUCHER was sunk. I remained in a British camp, as a prisoner of war, until January of 1918, at which time, during an exchange of prisoners, I was sent to Holland, where I remained for the duration of the war. Following the armistice, I returned to Berlin and studied architecture for three months. Following this, I again entered naval service, as a lieutenant aboard the WITTELSBACH, the mother ship of a minesweeper flotilla. I continued this navy service for an additional six months, following which I was released and placed in the Naval Reserve Corps. I then took up the study of medicine at the University of Berlin and at the University of Munich, continuing this for a period of one and one half years. During this time, 1920, I married my present wife, FRIEDEL, in Munich. Shortly before my marriage, I purchased a 500-ton sail freighter, which operated between Finland and Rotterdam. My father had previously left me an inheritance of about \$50,000 cash, as well as a number of houses and government bonds. The sail freighter, known as the "ANTARES," ran on a reef, after which I sold the boat for about \$2,000.00

In about 1921, I began working in Berlin with "SEIMENS," a machinery concern engaged in the manufacture of heavy motors, etc. I continued in this employment, serving as plant protection man, for about one year, following which I entered training with the same company to learn the business, and continued in this up until 1923. I then operated a manufacturing and distributing business of sparkling water and lemonade in Stettin, Germany, operating less than a year. Afterwards, I returned to Berlin and was employed as an inspector with "POMMERSCHE MEIERELEN", which business consisted in dairy products, etc. I continued in this work up until 1928, but before discontinuing this employment, about 1927, I entered into the coffee importing business in Berlin in partnership with one OVERBACK. My position was Sales Manager, and I continued the operation of the same business up until my departure from Germany in 1935.



My first contact with the Nazi Party was attendance at a meeting called by HITLER in Kiel, Germany, in 1930. HITLER spoke at the meeting, which I attended with my son, LEOPOLD. Following the meeting, and on that same day, I enlisted as a member of the Nazi Party, and influenced my son to join the party also at the same time. I did not become active in the party until 1932, when Mr. SUNKEL, district leader of the party at Kiel, advised me to go with REINHOLD HEYDRICH to Munich and to see a person, name unrecalled, who later became chief of police at Munich, about securing a job with the party. SUNKEL brought HEYDRICH by my home, and HEYDRICH and I took the night train, together, to Munich, after my having advanced HEYDRICH about a one-hundred-mark loan. Upon reaching Munich, HEYDRICH and I went to the City Hall Restaurant, to have a cup of coffee. HEYDRICH excused himself, stating he was going to see the person to whom SUNKEL had referred us, the party who later became chief of police at Munich, and it later developed he was given a position by this person, which turned out later to be chief of the German Gestapo system, working under HEINRICH HIMMLER, the head of the entire German police. At the time SUNKEL had sent us both to meet with this individual in Munich, he had indicated one or more positions were open and it is quite possible the position given to HEYDRICH was the one I, too, was being considered for. If such a position had been offered me at that time, I would unhesitatingly have accepted it.

HEYDRICH returned after about four hours to the City Hall Restaurant, where I was waiting in the company of the individual, whose name I have forgotten, who later became chief of police in Munich, and I accompanied them to HEINRICH HIMMLER's home, where I spoke with HIMMLER for may be half an hour regarding Communism and the means which should be adopted in order to eradicate it from Germany, following which HEYDRICH came to me and said that HIMMLER did not like me and it would be best for me to return to Berlin, which I did. Shortly after that, I received word from SUNKEL that I was to be assigned to work in Altona, Germany, for the party, as an investigator for the party to determine the identity of those individuals who were Communists and ascertain who was pro-Nazi in the Altona Police Department and residents of that vicinity. I engaged in this occupation for about six months, toward the end of which time I made a report on the chief of police in Altona, who was a party member, to the effect that he was immoral in his private life, and shortly thereafter, following some other minor troubles, I was advised that my services were no longer required, so I



returned to Berlin and my coffee business.

While in Berlin, a Jewish friend of mine, PAULSEN, came to my home and some individuals notified the party of this occurrence. They then told me to leave the Nazi Party, and I was later arrested by the police when I went to the office of a Nazi Party official to request a hearing. I was held by the police for two weeks, then placed in a concentration camp for four weeks. During this time I was not questioned. OTTO STRASSER was in this same concentration camp. During the time I was confined to the camp, my wife, FRIEDEL, and son, LEOPOLD, and Mr. BRUCKER were working for me among members of the party and I was released. At that time my son, LEOPOLD, was a stormtrooper in the party and my wife was working for the Nazi Welfare Department. About three months later, I was again arrested by the police on a charge of having attended a meeting between HITLER and VON PAPEN at Coeln, and having taken pictures of this meeting and made a report of it. I was taken into the German courts and proved my alibi that I had never been in Coeln during this time, and was released. All of this occurred during the year 1933.

TO  
USA

I returned to my coffee business but business was constantly going down and down and it was impossible for me to obtain re-orders and additional business, as I was no longer a member of the Nazi Party, and during the year 1934 I wrote several articles for the newspapers and magazines on the Far East, their culture and politics, and in April, 1935, I decided to go to the Orient in order to study the Japanese language. I sailed from Bremen, Germany, in April of 1935, on the SS STUTTGART. I arrived in New York, where I stayed for six days, took a train across the country to San Francisco, where I went to the German Consulate and asked for the names of some German individuals in Honolulu whom I could contact. They gave me the name of Dr. ARTHUR HOERMAN. I sailed from San Francisco on the TATUTA MARU, in company of my wife, who had been with me since I left Germany. The balance of my family had remained in Germany. On reaching Honolulu, I got in touch with Dr. HOERMAN, and he advised that I stay at the Brookland Hotel in Honolulu. I stayed there for three weeks, and then sailed to Japan, on the ASAMA MARU, with my wife. Upon reaching Japan, we went from Yokohama to Tokyo, to the Imperial Hotel, where I contacted Professor HISAMATSU, of the Imperial University, relative to the study of the Japanese language. My wife and I traveled on to Shanghai then, and she continued on to Germany.

Hono

TO  
Japan



I did not start to study the Japanese language at this time, but returned to Honolulu on the CHICHIBU MARU.

My original idea in wanting to learn the Japanese language was so that I could return to Germany and teach in the universities there. I had originally planned that my wife and children would stay in Germany. However, when I decided to come to Honolulu to study the language, we thought it best that she and the children join me here.

When I returned to Honolulu, I again stayed at the Brookland Hotel in 1935, until March of 1936. During this time I was joined by my daughter, RUTH KUEHN, and son, EBERHARD KUEHN, in December of 1935. During the time I resided at the Brookland Hotel, I met a Lieutenant KENNEDY, a submarine officer in the United States Navy. I also met FRANCESCO LOMBARDO during this time. Lieutenant KENNEDY introduced me to Lieutenant NEW, also a United States Navy submarine officer, who he stated wanted to learn to speak the German language. Lieutenant NEW also introduced me to a Lieutenant Commander DURGIN. Both Lieutenant NEW and DURGIN were interested in obtaining a job as Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Lieutenant Commander DURGIN received the appointment. I also met SPENCER WARNER, a Commander at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, during 1936. In March of 1936, I rented a home at 2369 East Manoa Road, Honolulu, T.H., and moved there with my daughter, RUTH, and son, EBERHARD, and was joined by my wife, FRIEDEL, and son, HANS, in April of 1936. During this time I was studying the Japanese language at the University of Hawaii.

During May of 1936, I rented a home at Lanikai Beach from a Mr. GRUNE. About June, 1936, I made a trip to Tokyo, to continue my Japanese language studies, and during the time I was gone my family moved to the Lanikai Beach home permanently. I returned to Honolulu from Tokyo, where I had studied at the Japanese language school for three months, about September, 1936. I continued my Japanese language studies at the Japanese language School in Kailua, under Mr. IKENO, the principal of that school. He gave me private tutoring at his home.

During 1936 and 1937, I met a Major RODNEY ROBERTS, of the 64th Coast Artillery, and through him I met Major HART, of the Quartermaster's Corps. I had also met a Lieutenant HAROLD LINDSAY, a submarine officer of the United States Navy, at the Brookland Hotel. These individuals visited me at my home on various occasions. I was also friendly with ARTHUR LUHR, a dentist in Honolulu, and Mr. VAN ORT, and Mr. EINDHOREN. I also met CARL



BASLER, about 1938, through my children's taking music lessons from his wife.

During 1938, I purchased the Modern Steel Furniture Company, which I operated for eight or nine months, which I finally turned over to a trustee after losing about \$15,000.00. The only other employment I have had in Honolulu was about June, 1941, when I went to work as a freight checker for the Honolulu Iron Works, which job I held for six weeks and quit as the work was too hard. I have since attempted to obtain a position with HAROLD CASTLE, through FRANZ MAIN of the Hawaiian Trust Company, with no success.

With regard to the income which I have been able to derive locally, I might state that in 1937 I leased eight acres of land from the Kaneohe Ranch Company, and since have sub-leased seven acres to a Japanese gardner. The other acre I use to raise fruits and vegetables for my own use. I also raise chickens at my Kalama residence, having about 200 at the present time. None of these operations are income-producing. My wife, FRIEDEL, operates the Kailua Beauty Shop, from which she derives an average income of approximately \$80.00 a month. This business was originally opened in June, 1940.

Other friends I have in Honolulu, not previously mentioned, are as follows: MARIO VALDASTRI, a regular acquaintance, with whom my wife and I frequently play bridge, Dr. E. A. STEPHENS, Kaneohe Territorial Hospital, Kaneohe, Oahu, who prior to his divorce was a frequent visitor in my home, a slight acquaintance with Dr. MARQUIS STEVENS, Dr. and Mrs. ARTHUR HOERMANN, who were close associates up until the past two years, HENRY B. WOLTER, better known to me as HEINE, a neighbor at Lanikai through whom I first met HEINZ PLOENJES, representative of the Roechling Steel Works, a German firm, stationed in Tokyo, Japan, from whom I have since received some correspondence. Dr. HOMBERG, also a representative of the Roechling Steel Works at Tokyo, Japan, first became known to my family through RUTH, who met him in 1937, while en route to Japan on a Japanese vessel. Since that time, Dr. HOMBERG has visited Honolulu on two occasions, once in early 1938, at which time he occupied my Lanikai Beach residence, for two to three weeks, and again in September, 1938, when he stopped over only for a night on his way back to Japan.



Regarding the monies which I have received from time to time from outside sources, I wish to make the following statements: At the time I left Germany in 1935, I was only permitted to carry about ten marks with me. I have been unable since to get any of my monies out of Germany and the other members of my family were also unable to bring out additional funds. About 1918, during the first World War, I had opened a small account in a Rotterdam bank. Afterwards, during the period I owned and operated the sailing freighter **ANTARES** I deposited funds received from the operation of the vessel in this same bank in Rotterdam. In 1934 my Aunt **ELSE SVENDSON**, resident in Sweden, transferred to me about \$35,000.00 as my share of the inheritance which I would have received later, which money was deposited in an Amsterdam bank. During the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, I received money transfers totaling about \$30,000.00 from these accounts through the Bishop National Bank, Honolulu. I have been unable to get any additional funds from Holland since 1938. From 1938 to the spring of 1940, I received no additional funds from the outside and as a result was forced to sell one of my wife's homes at Kalama as well as mortgage my wife's other Kalama residence and Lanakai residence. I had previously acquired these three pieces of property during 1937.

In the spring of 1940 my wife, **FRIEDEL**, planned a trip to Japan in order to make arrangements with Dr. **HOMBERG** of the German steel firm, **ROEHLING STEEL WORKS**, Tokyo, Japan, for further funds. At that time she borrowed money from the bank on Dr. **MAURICE CORDON**'s signature. My wife made arrangements with Dr. **HOMBERG** to transfer her property in Germany to him for a consideration of \$40,000.00. However, he was to first have an inquiry made in Germany to determine the value of the property and arrive at the exact figure, but in the meantime he advanced my wife \$6,000.00 on account. She brought the \$6,000.00 in cash with her on her person. Upon reaching Honolulu my wife told me that Dr. **HOMBERG** had promised to send more money after the lapse of five months. About five months later, around September, 1940, an additional \$10,000.00 in cash was brought by a Mr. **KAI**, purser aboard the **CHICHIBU MARU** from Dr. **HOMBERG**. My wife had previously made the acquaintance of Mr. **KAI** while on board the **HAKUSA MARU** on a trip from Shanghai to Germany in 1936. Mr. **KAI**, upon reaching Honolulu, telephoned me and then brought the money to my Kalama residence. The money was made up entirely of American currency.

In October, 1941, following the arrival of the **TATUTA MARU** at Honolulu



from Japan, a Japanese employee of this vessel called in person at my Kalama residence and delivered to me a package enclosed in cardboard which contained \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. At the time the package was delivered by this Japanese he remarked that same was from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. The name of this Japanese is unknown to me and I had not seen him before or since. The money was afterwards given by me to my wife and I do not know where she has it hidden. However, we at no time have deposited these amounts in the banks in Honolulu, except to carry a small account.

During our residence in Hawaii, my step-son, LEOPOLD, has continued to reside and work in the Nazi Party in Berlin, Germany. He presently is employed under GOEBBELS, Minister of Propaganda. There has always been a very close relationship between LEOPOLD and my wife. Therefore she has been insistent on supplying him with foods and a monthly allowance of 50 marks. In the past, shipments of food have been made through FORTRA, INC. in New York City, and the monthly allowance was sent through the Bishop National Bank until June, 1941, when the freezing order went into effect.

I talked to Mr. LOW of the Bishop National Bank several times and asked him if he would help me, if there was any legal way he could send money to my son, so Mr. LOW wrote to New York and got an answer that there was no chance of sending money. Mr. LOW told me the only chance would be to send pesos to a friend in South America and this friend could send the pesos to Germany and we found somebody in South America, whose name I have forgotten, that my wife wrote to but never received an answer in an attempt to transmit money to LEOPOLD via South America.

About the first part of November, 1941, after talking the matter over with my wife, FRIEDEL, I went to the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu and asked them to send money to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany through the Yokohama Specie Bank. They advised me at this time that they would inquire at the Yokohama Specie Bank to see if this was possible. I spoke to one of the Vice Consuls at this time, his name I do not recall. This was my first visit to the Japanese Consulate since the summer of 1940 when I had been to see a member of the Consulate staff to find if it would be possible to send a large package of food on a Japanese liner to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany via Japan and Russia. I was advised at this time to make inquiry at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce above the Yokohama Specie Bank, which I did and they informed me that I could send only a one-pound package.



About two or three days after my first visit to the <sup>Consulate</sup> ~~Consul~~ late in November of 1941, I returned and this time I spoke to the man sitting behind the large desk in the back of the room, to the left of the entrance of the Consulate. He and I went across the hall into the second room on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time he refused to send any money to my son and I offered to assist him and the Consulate in obtaining information that they might be interested in. He asked me if I know how many ships were in Hawaiian waters and I told him I could find out. Then I left the Consulate and went home and after three or four days returned to the Japanese Consulate, at which time I spoke to the same man and KITA, the Consul himself, in that same room, the second one on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanakai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 <sup>A.M.</sup> meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p.m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p.m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p.m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p.m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p.m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a.m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanakai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a.m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a.m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and



10 a.m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a.m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p.m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p.m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

They told me at that time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanakai home: One light between 7 and 8 p.m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p.m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p.m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p.m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p.m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanakai between 8 and 9 a.m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a.m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a.m. meaning No. 3; one between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a.m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a.m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It



was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p.m. would mean No.1; one between 8 and 9 p.m. would mean No.2; one between 9 and 10 p.m. would mean No.3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p.m. would mean No.4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p.m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanakai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p.m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No.1476 at Honolulu.

This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.



I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

On the same occasion that I transmitted this simplified system of signalling I had also advised the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, forty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, or some similar figure, in Hawaiian waters. These figures were purely fictitious as far as I knew. This information was submitted in the same enveloped as the one containing the latter plans.

Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanakai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanakai residence on November 1, 1941 to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time.

The above statement consisting of eleven pages has been read by me and I have signed each page individually and I certify the same to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and sign the same of my own free will.

/s/ Otto Kuehn

WITNESSES:

/s/ George E. Allen

George E. Allen, Special Agent

/s/ J. Sterling Adams

J. Sterling Adams, Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice,  
Honolulu, T. H.



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6256

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, James O. Richardson, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the United States Government in the following capacity:

Admiral, United States Navy. Retired, on duty in the Office of the  
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, temporarily assigned to  
duty with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection  
with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

I further certify that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached, namely: IPS Document No. 6256-A, consisting of 11 pages, dated January 1, 1942, and described as follows: "Affidavit of Otto Kuehn dated 1 January 1942," and IPS Document No. 6256-B, consisting of 5 pages, dated January 3, 1941 (1942), and described as follows: "Affidavit of Otto Kuehn dated January 3, 1941." I further certify that the attached records and documents are official documents of the United States Government, and that they are part of the official archives and files of the following-named Department: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  
Navy Department, United States Government.

Witnessed this 14th day of

November 1946.

/s/ JAMES O. RICHARDSON  
Signature of Official

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON  
Captain, USNR  
#52853

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired  
Official Capacity



~~affidavit of Ott Kuehn~~

1260

Doc. No. 6256 B

Page 1

*affidavit of Ott Kuehn*

Honolulu, T. H.  
January 3, 1941 (1942)

I, Otto Kuehn, make the following voluntary statement to J. Sterling Adams and George T. Allen, whom I know to be Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and who have informed me that I cannot be required to make a statement, further that anything I might say can be used against me in court.

In July of 1936, when I made a trip to Japan to study the Japanese language, on a Japanese boat I met a Baron KYOGOKU who was returning from England. KYOGOKU told me that he was one of the old noble Japanese families and was connected with the MITSUI family in Japan. Prior to his return from England, KYOGOKU had spent some time in Germany as well as England and he speaks both English and German fluently. When we left the boat in Yokohama, KYOGOKU asked me my address where I would be stopping and I told him the Imperial Hotel, Tokyo. He then stated that he would see me later on. Two or three days later KYOGOKU called on me at the Imperial Hotel. We spent the entire afternoon together, KYOGOKU showing me around Tokyo and I afterwards invited him for dinner at the Imperial Hotel.

I had previously told KYOGOKU that I had served in the German Navy as an officer during the World War and had recounted some of my experiences to him during that time. While we were eating dinner KYOGOKU began very tactfully to question me as to whether I would from time to time furnish him with information about Honolulu. This information, or whatever I was asked to do, was to be for the Japanese Government. I refused to have anything to do with the idea and KYOGOKU never mentioned the question any more. Although KYOGOKU never again attempted to get me to give information to the Japanese Government, he visited me quite often at the hotel and took me to his castle near Gifu and he also took me cormorant fishing near Gifu. We also went to the theater and some other places and had dinner together on occasions. On all of these occasions KYOGOKU and I were alone with the exception of one time when Mr. SAFO, a doctor in one of the Japanese hospitals whom I had previously met in Honolulu through Mr. KUNITOMO, was with me at a time when KYOGOKU called on me and KYOGOKU took us to dinner.

During this time KYOGOKU often told me that if there was any favor or anything that he could do for me, that all I need do was to ask him and he would do it. I left Japan about October, 1936, following about



a three month visit. Before leaving Japan I obtained my quota visa for permanent residence in the United States. KYOGOKU went to the boat with me to bid me goodbye and at that time he reminded me that if he could ever do a favor for me he would be willing to do so. From the time we parted and when I returned to Honolulu, I heard nothing from KYOGOKU nor did I communicate with him in any way until 1940, with the possible exception of one Christmas card I received from him in 1936.

In the spring of 1940 my wife made a trip to Japan and returned with about \$6,000.00, which she had obtained from DR. WILHELM HOMBERG. Following her return to Honolulu and about four weeks later, I received a letter from Dr. HOMBERG advising me that it would be necessary for me to make some arrangements to get any additional funds out of Japan; that it was becoming too difficult and dangerous for him to do this. About three weeks after receipt of Dr. HOMBERG'S letter, I wrote him suggesting that he contact Baron KYOGOKU, an old friend of mine, and that KYOGOKU could assist us in sending the money from Japan to Honolulu. With this letter I sent a Duden (German) grammar dictionary, similar to a Webster dictionary. At the same time I retained a duplicate dictionary in my possession. In the letter to HOMBERG I explained that in future communications I would use a number code which would indicate the number of the page and the word from the top of the page denoting the word intended, such as if the word "money" appeared on page 210 of the dictionary and was the sixth word down from the top, to indicate the word "money" I would send the numbers "210-6." This letter and its contents, the dictionary, were sent by me from Honolulu through Mr. KAI, purser on the KAMAKURA MARU, whom I had known in the past and who had previously brought presents from HOMBERG to my daughter. This message was sent through Mr. KAI during July, 1940.

I received no further communication from HOMBERG until September, 1940, at which time Mr. KAI telephoned me at my Kalama residence and asked me to meet him in front of the N. Y. K. office in Honolulu. I did so and he gave me a package of money containing \$10,000.00. At the same time Mr. KAI gave me a slip of paper which instructed me not to write to Dr. HOMBERG but rather to address my letters or communications to Baron KYOGOKU at a post office box number in Tokyo.

During July, 1941, shortly after the freeze order went into effect and I was given to understand that each alien must submit a list of all of their property, I contacted a Vice Consul at the Japanese



Consulate, Honolulu, as Mr. NITA, the Consul, was not there. My purpose in doing so was to send a message to HOMBERG through KYOGOKU in the pre-arranged manner. I had prepared a brief message in the coded form mentioned above which in substance read: "Please send balance as soon as possible." At first the Vice Consul was suspicious and reluctant about sending my message but I explained as follows: I told the Vice Consul I was acting for the Japanese Government and that I had an important message to go through to BARON KYOGOKU, an important official in the Japanese Government at Tokyo. I told the Vice Consul that I needed the money before October 29 so that I could make my statement of property under the Foreign Funds Law and so that I could include this amount in my statement of property holdings as required by the foreign funds division in order that no questions would be asked at a later date relative to my source of income and how I came into possession of these monies. I intentionally gave him the impression that the money I was to get from Baron KYOGOKU was as compensation for services I had rendered for the Japanese Government. The Vice Consul agreed to send my message to KYOGOKU at this time.

After two or three weeks I came back and spoke to the Vice Consul and asked him if he had gotten an answer or any money as yet. He said no, so I again returned about three weeks later and he still said no. At that time I made arrangements with the Vice Consul that when he heard from Japan regarding the money or got an answer that he should send me a post card to my box signed "JIMMIE" and he said for me not to come too often to the Consulate.

I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUTHN and I said "Yes, " and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG, "so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten



and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up.

It was about a week after this, and after the TAIYO MARU had sailed from Honolulu, that I again contacted the Japanese Consulate and talked to the Vice Consul and asked him to send some money to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany. He said that he did not think it could be done and I suggested that he take it up with the Yokohama Specie Bank and I would come back two or three days later.

I went back and spoke to the Vice Consul about three days later, at which time he asked me what information I could give him about the United States Fleet and how many ships were in the harbor. He also asked me if I knew which part of the Pacific the United States Fleet usually went in on their maneuvers and how long they would be out. I told him that I could tell him how many ships there were in the harbor but that I could not tell him where the fleet was or when it would be back. He suggested that I work out a set of signals so that we could let the Japanese Fleet know how many ships were in the harbor, how many were prepared to leave and how many had already left for Japan. I told him that I could do all this.

I think that sometime between my previous contact and this time when he asked me for information about the fleet and suggested I prepare the set of signals that he had contacted KYOGOKU or someone in Japan about me. He appeared to me to be very glad to have me in his office and to have me do something for him.

About three or four days later I went back to the Japanese Consulate and showed him a set of signals containing fifteen numbers, each one of which was to indicate a certain situation, as to how many ships were in the harbor, how many prepared to leave, how many had left, whether they were battle fleet, scouting fleet or aircraft carriers, exactly as previously told by me to Special Agents Adams and Allen



in my statement of January 1, 1942. He told me at this time that the system was too complicated. During this visit KITA was present in the room. I did all of my talking with the Vice Consul who would speak in Japanese with KITA, the Consul, who would in turn speak in Japanese to the Vice Consul and then the Vice Consul would speak with me in English. They said that this system was too complicated and requested me to make a simpler method of signals, which I said I would do.

On Tuesday, December 2, 1941, I went back and took them two envelopes, one containing the money to be sent to my son and the other containing the simplified system of signals as described by me in my previous statement to Special Agents ADAMS and ALLEN dated January 1, 1942, and also I had written at this time some information as to the number and various types of ships in Hawaiian waters, as also set forth in that statement. I handed these two envelopes to the Vice Consul and he asked me to come in and said he would like to talk with me but I told him that it was all written out and there was no need to and turned around and went back to my car and went on into town.

I have read the above statement consisting of five pages and certify that the same is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Otto Kuehn  
Otto Kuehn

WITNESSES:

/s/ J. Sterling Adams  
J. Sterling Adams, Special Agent

/s/ George F. Allen  
George F. Allen, Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Honolulu, T. H.



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6256

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, James O. Richardson, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the United States Government in the following capacity:

Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, on duty in the Office of the  
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, temporarily assigned to  
duty with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection  
with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

I further certify that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached, namely: IPS Document No. 6256-A, consisting of 11 pages, dated January 1, 1942, and described as follows: "Affidavit of Otto Kuehn dated 1 January 1942," and IPS Document No. 6256-B, consisting of 5 pages, dated January 3, 1941 (1942), and described as follows: "Affidavit of Otto Kuehn dated January 3, 1941." I further certify that the attached records and documents are official documents of the United States Government, and that they are part of the official archives and files of the following-named Department: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,  
Navy Department, United States Government.

Witnessed this 14th day of

November 1946.

/s/ JAMES O. RICHARDSON  
Signature of Official

/s/ JAMES J. ROBINSON  
Captain, USNR  
#52853

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired  
Official Capacity



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 22-24)

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Tokyo.  
3 December 1941

#245 (In 2 parts, complete)

(Military secret)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military  
Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals  
to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

<u>Meaning</u>			<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	:	Preparing to sortie.	1
A number of carriers	:	Preparing to sortie.	2
Battleship divisions	:	All departed between 1st and 3rd	3
Carriers	:	Several departed between 1st and 3rd	4
Carriers	:	All departed between 1st and 3rd	5
Battleship divisions	:	All departed between 4th and 6th	6
Carriers	:	Several departed between 4th and 6th.	7
Carriers	:	All departed between 4th and 6th	8



## 2. Signals

I. Lanikai\* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	<u>Signal</u>
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.	1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m.	2
" " " 10 and 11 p. m.	3
" " " 11 and 12 p. m.	4

## II.

Two lights	" 12 and 1 a. m.	5
" "	" 1 and 2 a. m.	6
" "	" 2 and 3 a. m.	7
" "	" 3 and 4 a. m.	8

(Part 2)

## III. Lanikai \* Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House\*\* will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900-2000	3
2000-2100	4
2100-2200	5
2200-2300	6
2300-2400	7
0000-0100	8

## V. K. G. M. C.\*\*\* Want Ads

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6

B. CHIC..CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium \*\*\*\* at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your ~~EXEX~~ signal is received.



<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
From 7 - 8	3 or 6
From 8 - 9	4 or 7
From 9 - 10	5 or 8

\* Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

\*\* A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai

\*\*\* A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

\*\*\*\* At latitude 20-42-45 N., Longitude 156-20-20 W.

JD-1: 7370

(M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS: C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the nineographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
25th day of July 1946.

/s/ R. S. McManus Lieut USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-F

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 3 December, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #245 from Honolulu  
(KITA) to Tokyo.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 26)

From: Honolulu (Kita).  
To: Tokyo.  
5 December 1941

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239\* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.  
3 light cruisers.  
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and  
- - - - - were in dock.

\*Available, dated 29 November.

26029  
JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS: C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 25th day of July 1946.

/s/ R. S. McManus Licut USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-G

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 5 December, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #252 from Honolulu  
(KITA) to Tokyo.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00  
a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I  
do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence.  
They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession  
or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

<sup>a</sup>  
Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

SEAL  
Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated  
with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied  
Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above  
signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official  
business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1263

Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc. (Page 27)

From: Honolulu  
To: Tokyo  
December 6, 1941

#253      Re the last part of your #123<sup>a</sup>.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa<sup>b</sup>, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

a - not available.

b - Kana spelling.

ARMY 25377

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS: C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baeher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.

2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.

3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

/s/ John Ford Baeher

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 25th day of July 1946.

/s/ R. S. McManus Lieut USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-H

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 6 December, 1941, and described as follows: Japanese Message #253 from Honolulu  
to Tokyo.

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., INF.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1264

Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc.  
(Page 29)

From: Honolulu  
To : Tokyo  
December 6, 1941

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were --- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874

JD-7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

SS: C E R T I F I C A T E

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath,  
make the following statement:

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3. The messages as copied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

/s/ John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 25th day of July 1946.

/s/ F. S. McManus Lieut USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-I

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Nagao KITA hereby certify  
that I was officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. H.  
from 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941  
and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which  
is attached consisting of 1 page, dated 6 December, 1941,  
and described as follows: Japanese Message #254 from Honolulu  
to Tokyo

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the  
attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the  
Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official  
archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu,  
T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were recorded  
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or control since 7 December 1941.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

SEAL  
Former Consul General  
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Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1264

Japanese Messages Concerning Military  
Installations, Ship Movements, etc.  
(Page 29)

From: Honolulu  
To : Tokyo  
December 6, 1941

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were --- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874

JD-7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)



## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON )  
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/s/ John Ford Baecher

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 25th day of July 1946.  
/s/ F. S. McManus Lieut. USN

Name

(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 6255-I

Statement of Source and Authenticity

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Signed at Tokyo on this

8th day of October, 1946.

Nagao KITA  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Former Consul General  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this

8th day of October, 1946

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
NAME 1st Lt., Inf.

Witness: ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.

Chief, Inv. Div., IPS  
Official Capacity



1265-1621  
RESTRICTED

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

No. 132

DATE: 1 Dec 45

THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

RESTRICTED



**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS**

A.P.O. 500  
1 December 1945

Published for the information of all concerned.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

**R. K. SUTHERLAND,**  
Lieutenant General, United States Army,  
Chief of Staff.

**OFFICIAL:**

**C. A. WILLOUGHBY,**  
Major General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G.2.



ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

SUBJECT: THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

I.G. No. 6909  
6913

B.I.D. No. 0100.0100  
0811.0200

DATE OF ISSUE 1 December 1945

No. 132

SUMMARY:


1. This is the second of a series of research reports solely based on documentary evidence held at ATIS, GHQ, prior to 1 January 1945, treating of the planning and execution of the several Japanese strikes which initiated the present hostilities. It was preceded by ATIS Research Report No. 131, entitled "Japan's Decision To Fight."

2. It is the purpose of the present report to collate all evidence available at ATIS, GHQ in respect to the planning and execution of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 8 December 1941.

3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the contrary is specifically stated.

HNB/REW/JWW/jg

Distribution H

  
SIDNEY F. MASHBIR  
COLONEL, S.C.  
CO-ORDINATOR

SOURCES: Captured Documents  
Statements by Prisoners of War  
Intelligence Reports

[INFORMATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED ACCORDINGLY]



ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT


I.G. No. 8908  
8913  
B.L.D. No. 0100.0100  
0811.0300

SUBJECT: THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

DATE OF ISSUE: 1 December 1945

No. 132

SUMMARY:



1. This is the second of a series of research reports which have been prepared on the basis of the evidence held at ATIS, GHQ, prior to 1 January 1946, relating to the planning and execution of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was prepared by ATIS Research Report No. 181, entitled "Japan's Decision To Fight."

2. It is the purpose of the present report to collate all evidence available at ATIS, GHQ in respect to the planning and execution of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941.

3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the contrary is specifically stated.

*[Signature]*  
SIDNEY E. MASHNER  
COLONEL, SC  
COORDINATOR

unclassified  
Distribution H

SOURCES: Captured Documents  
Statements by Prisoners of War  
Intelligence Reports



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# Section I. THE PLANNING STAGE

## 1. COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

The following excerpts from an account based upon the testimony of an unnamed prisoner of war and published in "Weekly Intelligence" provide a fairly comprehensive insight into the planning of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"When Japanese planes struck clustered United States warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pinpointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

"The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Japanese Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

"The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information proved reliable.

"Most remarkable of the prisoner of war's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

"As a yeoman attached to the Staff of Commander in Chief Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became

familiar with Japanese war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

"Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Japanese foes could scarcely have been obscure.

"During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between Commander in Chief Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly 'definitely much keener' than members of other fleet staffs.

"Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when Commander in Chief Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's Capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The prisoner of war claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; 'any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in'.

"On 2 September, the final all-important 'games' got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (NIPPON, AMERICA, and ENGLAND) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Japanese naval officer, were made up as follows:



# THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION

## “UMPIRES:

### NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:

### RANK

### OFFICIAL DUTIES

NAGANO, Osami	Admiral	
FUKUTOME, Shigeru	Rear-Admiral	Head of First Section (War Plans and Operations).
UOZUMI, Jisaku	Captain	Member First Section
YAMAMOTO, Chikao	Captain	Head of Sub-Section, First Section
MAYUZUMI, Harue	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
TAMURA, Saburo	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
UOZUMI, Yoriichi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section

### NAVY MINISTRY:

TAKATA, Toshitane	Captain	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
SHIKI, Tsuneo	Commander	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
TOIBATA, Kurie	Commander	Member of Office of Military Supply
FUJII, Shigeru	Commander	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

### N-TEAM:

### COMBINED FLEET:

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku	Admiral	Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
ITO, Seiichi	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff
KUROJIMA, Kameto	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer
SASAKI, Akira	Commander	Staff Air Officer
WADA, Yushiro	Commander	Staff Communication Officer
NAGATA, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer
WATANABE, Yasuji	Commander	Staff Operations and Plans Officer
ARIMA, Takayasu	Commander	Staff Torpedo Officer
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi	Commander	Staff Supply Officer
OTA, Kanai	Commander	Meteorologist attached to Staff

### FIRST COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro	Rear-Admiral	Commander
ARISAWA, Naosada	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff

### E-TEAM:

### SECOND FLEET:

KONDO, Nobutake	Admiral	Commander
YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
OISHI, Tamotsu	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer

### FOURTH FLEET:

INOUE, Semi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
-------------	--------------	-----------

### FIFTH FLEET:

HOSOGAYA, Boshiro	Vice-Admiral	Commander
-------------------	--------------	-----------

### ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:

TSUKAHARA, Nishizo	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Jinichi	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff

### A-TEAM:

### THIRD FLEET (Amphibious forces for southern invasion):

TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice-Admiral	Commander
ISHIHARA, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff

### SIXTH FLEET:

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff

### FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):

NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice-Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear-Admiral	Chief of Staff
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff



"On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. Prisoner of war was assigned to 'N' Team (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE—Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer—handed the prisoner of war an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November Operation Order No. 1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the prisoner of war realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

"On 5 September, the prisoner of war was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japanese apparently expected to catch all major UNITED STATES Fleet units in the PACIFIC in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the ATLANTIC. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that 'N' Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class aircraft carrier and one SORYU Class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.

"On 6 and 7 September, the conference of 'N' Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The prisoner of war, who was adept at the abacus—calculating board—was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The prisoner of war believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded—the basic plan continued as originally intended.

"These early sessions, the prisoner of war said, seemed confined primarily to two

general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, DUTCH EAST INDIES, the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central PACIFIC Islands—including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as an immediate military objective; the Japanese intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The prisoner of war heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked 'that's where friction with GERMANY will begin.'

"The conferences (and 'games') were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the staff were already on board.

"On 15 September, all the staff with four yeomen (not including prisoner of war) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The prisoner of war remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO—then still War Minister—was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

"The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Japanese Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

"On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Operation Orders No. 2 and No. 3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

"(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his Operation Order—i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct East Longitude Time.)

"The prisoner of war once knew the Operation Order intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could



remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline it is believed to be substantially as printed.

Notes in parentheses in the following order were added by the editor.

“Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY

1 November 1941

‘COMBINED FLEET SECRET

OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

‘The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

‘War will be declared on X-Day.

‘This order will become effective on Y-Day.

‘GENERAL SITUATION:

‘(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

‘In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self-protection for the preservation of our interests in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC Ocean, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

‘(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

‘BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES in interfering with our program of construction in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in EAST ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

‘(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

‘Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been under way with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently, she has threatened the fortunes of JAPAN which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

‘(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet

awakened from the deluding dream of “Fight the War and Save the Country” and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a “scorched earth” policy for all CHINA.

‘While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerrilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

‘(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

‘The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan Border is formidable.

‘The UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

‘OUR SITUATION:

‘The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has 11 Air Fleet (Naval Shore-based Air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

‘STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

‘To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater EAST ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the “Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof—HAKKO ICHIU”), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

‘STRATEGY:

‘The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

‘If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

‘If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with “Strategy



to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

'In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

'Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

'Precaution: Disposal of this Order:

'This Order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

'Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order  
No. 1

#### 'ANNEXED VOLUME

'1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

'2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having 1 Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 day and will set course, by way of TANKAN Bay (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American Pacific Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

'X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

'3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

'4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR".  
—"The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR"—  
"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack".—

"Climb Mount FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520".—"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack".—"Climb Mount NII-TAKA!"

etc.

'5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force Commander.

'The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstance whatever.

'6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack, either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION):

'(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

'(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

'(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force Commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

'7. The commander of the Surprise Attack Force (submarine Force), having 6 Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance



before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

'8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

'The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupation Force will probably be PALAU.<sup>(1)</sup>

'9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2 China Expeditionary Fleet.

'10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

'Soviet shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

'It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

'11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of 1 Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND Sea.

'After Y-Day has been determined, the JAPAN Steamship Company passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-PACIFIC liner scheduled to sail in this period).

<sup>(1)</sup> The prisoner is in error on this point. The forces for the invasion of MALAYA departed from HAINAN, while a sizeable portion of the PHILIPPINE Expeditionary Force embarked at MAKU.

'When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another prisoner of war confirms this).

'12. The Commander in Chief of 4 Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of 11 Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

'It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS bases were then listed in this paragraph—a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM—about X plus 2.

(2) WAKE—about X plus 7.

(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJI, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

'13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN Islands is scheduled for October 1942."

"Herewith are two of the above referenced documents:

#### "THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

'The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to prisoner of war, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows):

'1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

'2. Plans for escorting large Army con-



voys and the place, time and date for landings.

'3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare, Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes, and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy.

'4. Supply plans.

'Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

'5. Communications Plans.

'6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The Bandjermasin Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy."

#### "MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and stated in effect):

'It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 5 Fleet (Northern Force) will counter-attack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy.

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku

Commanding, Combined Fleet"

"Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.):

'1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

'That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

'2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

'3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

'4. That the campaigns in the NETHER-

LAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

'The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

'5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

'This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

'Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "Waterloo" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

'All of the planes of Carrier Division 1, Carrier Division 2, and Carrier Division 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6 Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (Destroyer Squadron 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of Battleship Division 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the main body of our fleet.

'6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

'7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it



will take at least several months for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

'8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.'"

"Communications Plans: (Prisoner of war does not know about these; no details.)"

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"6. The midsize submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHITODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor."

"7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it

"Supply Plans: (outline):

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet."

"5 November  
"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 2

"Y-Day will be 23 November."  
"10 November  
"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 3

"X-Day will be 8 December."  
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence, Volume 1, No. 22, pages 1-14)

## MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October—and dated in effect):

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 6 Fleet (Northern Force) will counter-attack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
Commanding, Combined Fleet"

"Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of submarines in Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk):

"1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world."

"That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power."

"2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago."

"3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (1)

"4. That the campaigns in the NETHER-



## Section II. ASSEMBLY AND OUTWARD PASSAGE

### 2. ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY<sup>(1)</sup>

#### a. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1

The unnamed Prisoner of War quoted in Paragraph 1 above reproduced from memory "Striking Force Operation Order No. 1", specifying the assembly at HITOKAPPU Bay, as follows:

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI Bay  
10 November 1941

#### STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

- "1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
- "2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN Bay. (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island KURILES).
- "3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
- "4. Break-down of attack plane units:  
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit  
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX  
1st Carrier Attack Unit  
Etc. (details not recalled by Prisoner of War).
- "5. Fleet cruising formation  
(Including retiring formations)

<sup>(1)</sup> TANKAN Bay is also referred to as HITOKAPPU Bay. The latter name represents an alternative manner of reading the ideographs. The bay is located on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES.

- "6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO, Chuichi  
Commanding  
Striking Force "

(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Vol I, No. 22, page 11)

#### b. Assembly of Task Force

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), a third class seaman who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, gave the following account of the assembly of the task force at HITOKAPPU Bay. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimates of time in the manner set forth in Paragraph 2d below. All times are East Longitude Time.

#### "Assembly of Task Force:

"Task force assembled at TANKAN (indicated by prisoner as HITOKAPPU Bay), ETOROFU Island in the KURILES about the middle of November 1941 under the command of Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi. The aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO on 7 November, proceeded south of KYUSHU, up the east coast of JAPAN, and arrived at TANKAN on 15 November 1941. The aircraft carrier SORYU, three oilers and one supply ship arrived on 17




Figure 1. Sketch showing disposition of Japanese task force at anchor in HITOKAPPU Bay.



November. The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU, a heavy cruiser (thought by prisoner to be of TONE class) and two destroyers arrived at TANKAN before 20 November.

Three "I" Class submarines joined the

task force upon its departure from TANKAN. At TANKAN units anchored in the position shown in Figure 1, a sketch drawn by the prisoner, .....

Prisoner of War also sketched the terrain and installations surrounding HITOKAPPU Bay. This sketch is set forth as Figure 2.




Figure 2. Sketch of terrain and installations in HITOKAPPU Bay Area.

"HITOKAPPU Bay was surrounded by hills, the highest peak being about 500 meters high. Southwest coast was low lying with a rocky foreshore as far as the center of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 meters at northeastern side of entrance. Hills were covered with low scrub, not higher than two or three feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ashore. Prisoner of War saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in three houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of center or northeastern side of bay from KAGA, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

“Prisoner of War estimated width of bay to be 6,000 meters and distance between

entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 meters. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near center of bay. Bay was deeper than most harbors, but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

" Wind was from northwest.

“There was only one pier, situated at southwestern side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 meters long, 4 meters wide, 2 to 3 meters high, and steps out at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 meters. Prisoner of War had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.



"Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

"There were three fishermen's houses inshore and a little to south of pier. They were not visible from KAGA's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankments had been constructed, about 10 feet high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except three radio masts. Prisoner of War could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other sign of habitation.

"Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. Prisoner of War did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

"Landing would be difficult between pier and southwestern side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 feet. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. Prisoner of War saw no sand or beach in this area.

"Prisoner of War considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and center of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 meter. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but Prisoner of War saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

"From center of bay to northeastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. Prisoner of War saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAGA's anchorage.

"A radio station was situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of building were visible. Three masts could be seen, but Prisoner of War could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw none of its personnel, but thought it was a naval radio station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

"Prisoner of War saw no defenses, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of anti-submarine nets or boom defense. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no buoys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible at either side of entrance.

"Prisoner of War saw no airplanes while at TANKAN, and did not know of existence of any airfields or seaplane bases. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were any suitable sites

for airfields; ground near southwestern side of entrance was, however, low lying.

"There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that storm signals were displayed in vicinity of radio station.

"Prisoner saw no airplanes or patrol vessels while at TANKAN, except six torpedo boats which anchored southwest of entrance for about one day. Provisions were embarked in KAGA on 19 November. Prisoner thought she oiled, but was not certain. No shore leave was granted. An order was given however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by pier near southwestern side of entrance. Prisoner landed once, on 20 November, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. Prisoner saw, but did not speak to, about three fishermen who lived in houses nearby. He saw no army or naval shore personnel nor staff of radio station further inland." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 2-7)

### c. Greatest Operation Force in History

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote out an account of the operation. His written account has been supplemented in respect to several details by additional interrogation:

"Farewell, many memories of the home port. After leaving YOKOSUKA Harbor on the 15th of November our crack 18 Destroyer Division progressed directly towards HITOKAPPU (TANKAN) Bay in the KURILE Islands with the destroyer FUCHIKA leading and followed consecutively by the KASUMI, ARARE, and the YOEN.

"In the early dawn of the 21st we entered TANKAN Bay, our destination. Aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships entered the bay the following day. This is where our Imperial Navy organized her greatest operation force in history. (ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

### d. State of Readiness

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), (the same prisoner who gave the information quoted in Paragraph 2b above), upon interrogation, revised his version of the time schedule kept by the task force during the PEARL HARBOR operation as follows:



"15 November 1941—Aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO. Proceeded south of KYUSHU and up the east coast of JAPAN...

"22 November—The battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA and the aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU arrived at TANKAN, ETOROFU Islands in the KURILES.

"23 November—Aircraft carrier KAGA arrived at TANKAN.

"24 November—Aircraft carrier SORYU arrived at TANKAN.

"25 November—Aircraft carriers ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived at TANKAN.

"27 November—Task force left TANKAN for Hawaiian Area. Three submarines joined it on leaving the harbor.

"28 November—KAGA assumed Number 2 State of Readiness and antiaircraft look-outs were posted."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 268, page 8)

**e. Task Force Completed**

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki stated that :

"He was aboard the aircraft carrier SHOKAKU, when it participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack and gave the following account (all hours in TOKYO time) :

"On 20 November 1941, the SHOKAKU sailed from OITA to an anchorage in the north called TANKAN (Prisoner not sure of location). It arrived about the 25th to find

the battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA, the aircraft carriers KAGA, AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, ZUIKAKU : two or three cruisers and several destroyers.

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

**3. OUTWARD PASSAGE**

**a. Map Showing Date Task Force Departed**

Undated captured map establishes the task force's date of departure from ETOROFU Island as 27 November 1941. The authority responsible for the issuance of this map is not specified, but the source is obviously official.

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No. 04180, Item 643)

**b. Sketch Showing Formation of Task Force**

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, a member of the crew of the aircraft carrier KAGA, quoted in paragraph 2b above, gave the following description of the task force's outward passage. Upon reinterrogation, the prisoner revised his estimate of the dates involved in the manner set forth in paragraph 2d above :

"Task Force sailed at 1400, 22 November 1941, being joined by three submarines upon leaving." Formation on leaving and during passage is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Formation of Japanese task force during outward passage.

"Task Force proceeded east until 4 December, when course was altered to south. It did not zigzag. Speed was 13 knots. JAPAN time was kept throughout. No airplane patrols were carried out during outward passage. From 23 November antiaircraft look-outs were posted—three men in each of seven antiaircraft machine gun positions on either side. Tricks were two hours. No binoculars were issued to look-outs.

"On 28 November KAGA assumed No. 2 State of Readiness. Gun crews were closed

up in two watches. Ships were darkened from now on.

"On 2 December the Commanding Officer of the KAGA, Captain OKADA, Jisaku, addressed ship's company. He announced that Commander in Chief Combined Fleet had been summoned by the Emperor, who informed him that war would be declared against AMERICA on 8 December; the KAGA was now proceeding towards HAWAII; that at 1 a.m. on Saturday, airplanes would be flown off to attack PEARL HARBOR.



Prisoner stated that he was a little frightened on hearing this, but as a Japanese, he took war for granted.

KAGA oiled 27 November, and again 3 December. Prisoner did not know when other ships of Task Force oiled. Oilers and supply ship left Task Force during night of 4 December and prisoner did not see them again.

"Task Force altered course to south on 4 December."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 3-4)

#### c. Approached PEARL HARBOR

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987), who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote the following account of the task force's outward passage:

"On the morning of the 26th the operational commanding officer, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi passed the brief order, 'Attack PEARL HARBOR.'

"Thus, we left our Fatherland behind and advanced through high waves of the PACIFIC. Our advance was led by the destroyer OBORO consecutively followed by the 16 destroyer division; the light cruiser ABUKUMA; the battleship, HIEI; the aircraft carriers, AKAGI, KAGA, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, SORYU, and HIRYU; the battleship, KIRISHIMA; the 18 destroyer division; 2 submarines; 1 heavy oil tanker; and the heavy cruisers, TONE and CHIKUMA on both flanks.

"First the destroyers fired their ball ammunition, followed by the fire of the cruisers and then by that of the battleships ending with the take-off and landing practice of the airplanes from the aircraft carriers at dusk. After 10 or more days of traveling through rough weather and sea in an easterly course on the Northern PACIFIC, we finally approached PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII." (ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

#### d. Men Informed of Strike

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, gave the following account of the task force's outward

passage:

"On 27/28 November the fleet sailed, taking a northerly course south of the ALEUTIANS. On December 4 the Captain of the SHOKAKU informed the crew of the intended strike, and prisoner says that he was worried because he feared that an American counterattack would follow. On the night of 5 December the ships turned south.....

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM 101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

#### e. Method of Fueling

The article quoted at length in Paragraph 1 above summarizes the task force's outward voyage as follows:

"The Task Force sortied from ETOROFU Island, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (East Longitude Time), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral NAGUMO (Commander in Chief First Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5 less HOSHO); two battleships; HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8, plus ABUKUMA); elements of Destroyer Squadron 1; and about twenty submarines.

"One of the Japanese' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a chief petty officer on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. Oilers coming alongside the Task Force to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use." (CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 13-14)



## Section III. THE ATTACK

### 4. THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE

#### a. Task Force Sails

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in paragraph 2b above, a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA, described the attack on PEARL HARBOR as follows:

"During the night of 7/8 December, the three submarines proceeded on independent patrols in vicinity of Task Force. They were not seen again by prisoner.

"The same night Task Force increased to full speed of 26 knots and commenced zig-zagging. Ship's company of KAGA went to action stations and remained closed up all day. Prisoner was at 20 centimeter gun and saw nothing further. He thought Task Force remained in formation throughout 8 December and did not scatter and that battleships were stationed one on either beam of leading ships.

"Airplanes were flown off at 0100 hours, 8 December 1941 (JAPAN time), and returned about 0500 or 0600. About 30 airplanes failed to return, 15 of which belonged to KAGA. Prisoner of War attributed high proportion of losses from KAGA to fact that her airplanes were last to take off." (ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, page 4).

#### b. Glorious Success

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi, quoted in paragraph 3c above, wrote the following description of the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

"On the early dawn of December 8, we reached a point 400 kilometers off-shore of the HAWAIIAN Islands. As the sun rose the wide expanse of the sky cleared and the sea was calm. The weather was good as if planned for the great initial victory of YAMATO's airplanes.

"As the battle flag rose on the mast of the flagship AKAGI, the carrier-borne planes left the decks one after another from each of the carriers and in a magnificent formation of approximately 300 airplanes disappeared in the direction of PEARL HARBOR. Immediately, reports of glorious

successes came in.

"Again, the second attack unit made up of approximately 200 attack and fighter planes of the ship departed bravely to conquer.

".....another great and glorious victory. However, who would know of the remembrances of the holy sacrifices of the Imperial Army behind the glories. Approximately 15 of our planes and 5 special submarines failed to return. Only one enemy flying boat came to attack."

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published).

#### c. General Quarters

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the PEARL HARBOR strike as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, stated that:

"General quarters came at 2300 hours, 7 December 1941, and the planes took off at 0200 hours, 8 December. As soon as the last plane had taken off the fleet turned northward. Planes returned between 0600 and 0900 hours. Ten planes of the SHOKAKU failed to return."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6).

#### d. Succeed in Surprise Attack

Commander NAKAYA, Kenju, commander of the leading air formation in the attack on PEARL HARBOR, wrote an account of the strike which was subsequently edited by the Naval Information Department and published by BUNGEI SHUNJU SHA. A full translation follows:

#### "WE SUCCEED IN THE SURPRISE ATTACK"

"We received the orders to attack the Island of OAHU at sea. At the time, my ship was sailing directly eastward. The long-awaited orders finally came. Notwithstanding all, when I received these orders, I experienced the sensation of becoming hot from excitement and deep emotion. All hands formed ranks on the deck and received these orders. At this time, the signal flag, which went up high on the masthead,



was truly the 'Z' flag. The 'Z' flag which went up 36 years ago in the JAPAN Sea, when the fate of the Empire was at stake, floated again; this time on the PACIFIC. While all hands were looking up at the 'Z' flag waving in the strong wind of the ocean, unawares their eyes were running with tears. Our air unit commander intimately issued the following order:

'Each member of the crew make a vow to exert yourself to the utmost in carrying out your duties.' At that time, the rapture of being able to take part in an important, unique battle rose up within me.

"Soon after the 'Z' flag was lowered, I became conscious, for the first time, of the charging speed of the aircraft carrier which was going eastward at full speed. The morale of the officers and men rose up high, verging on the point of suggesting the engulfing of the enemy.

"The weather at that time was poor and variable. However, the triumphant officers and men took no notice of it. The maintenance crew, saying that they would also fight with the aircraft crew, gave us white head bands. The orders to start finally came. The orders of the commander at the time were: 'Succeed in the surprise attack operation; all hands charge.' The large waves just before dawn caused the aircraft carrier to roll and pitch sideways. The sea was still gloomy; the wind which went whistling by my ears was strong, and the weather was as bad as usual. This was to be expected, for a 17-meter northeasterly (sic) was blowing hard and strong. Vast, dark clouds hung over from an altitude between 1500 and 2000 meters. It wasn't the best situation for the large formation of airplane groups to leave the aircraft carrier to rush into that narrow PEARL HARBOR. If this had been the customary practice or training, flying would have been postponed; but, this morning, the training of many years was continued. It made no difference whether the weather was good or bad.

"Starting time 0 hour 00 minutes. One plane after another left from the unsteady deck which was pitching and rolling lengthwise and sideways. As they were arranging their formation in the air, my eyes unconsciously followed the friendly planes which were going up one after the other, and looked up at them encouragingly as if they were saying: 'Go to it!' Our planes which had already organized their formation rushed, at full speed, straight for HAWAII. However, the greatest anxiety of the com-

mander was during the time it took for them to reach HAWAII. Could there have been an error in the position of the aircraft carrier, after it had made a surprisingly long-distance journey of nearly 4000 miles to near the shores of HAWAII where the weather is bad? If there was a mistake, our airplanes would be unable to reach OAHU Island. Before long, the men in the airplanes greeted a magnificent sunrise. Usually in the South Seas area one can see over 30 miles, or even a long distance view of 50 miles when the view is clear. But at this time, a screen of vast, dark clouds almost cut off the view. Since HAWAII is ridged by mountains of a height of 1000 meters, the island should be seen at least 20 minutes before reaching it.

"Thinking that we should soon be reaching the Hawaiian Islands, I was straining my eyes through a telescope, when suddenly the shoreline appeared distinctly before us. Now! Now was the time for all hands to attack! The formation immediately deployed. Each unit, depending upon its duties, some at a high altitude, some at a lower altitude, changed over into a resolute attack formation. PEARL HARBOR was still asleep in the morning mist. It was calm and serene inside the harbor, not even a trace of smoke from the ships at anchor. The orderly groups of barracks; the wriggling white line of the automobile road climbing up to the mountain-top; fine objectives of attack from all directions. In line with these, inside the harbor, were capital ships of the PACIFIC Fleet, strung out and anchored two ships side by side in an orderly manner. The torpedo airplanes cut through the scattered clouds and went charging through in a straight line. A formation torpedo attack was very difficult because PEARL HARBOR is so shallow and narrow. Thereupon, the torpedo airplanes separated individually, some flew so low they skimmed the surface of the waters, others approached within 200 to 300 meters of the belly of the battleships, and discharged their torpedoes when they thought, this is it. Instantaneously, two white streaks of the wake of the torpedoes went rushing along the surface of the water. As I was feasting my eyes upon this scene, a terrific column of water flew up into the air from the side of a capital ship. It was an excellent hit upon the capital ship's side. The column of water went up high enough to compete with the altitude of the clouds. Columns of water continued to gush forth



one after another. If it were to be timed, it was an incident of three to four seconds. Notwithstanding this, the antiaircraft defense guns were still asleep. Even the fighter planes did not come up to challenge us. The surprise attack was a complete success. The great success of the surprise attack should be said to have been accomplished spectacularly. A message — 'We succeeded in the surprise attack' — was radioed to the aircraft carrier.

"Following this, the dive-bombers rushed straight on in a bee-line. Shortly after this, reddish-black flames were flaring up from the hangars of the enemy airdrome, and from the airplanes which were lined up on the airdrome. When these torpedo airplanes and dive bombers were about to deal freely their first blow and were seemingly standing on their noses about to dive, enemy antiaircraft fire began to burst around us. Next, finally came our large bombers. I was in the spearhead of the formation, and I fixed my sights on a giant battleship below. Since the air currents were rough, I could not fix my sights for horizontal bombing. Thinking that I could not afford to waste any bombs, I began all over again. As we circled midst the antiaircraft fire, the following formations did the same, and circled calmly midst the antiaircraft bursts. This time we succeeded. Just as we were about to release our bombs, our plane received a severe jolt. As I glanced backwards, there was a column of smoke rising into the sky 500 meters high.

"This is something which we learned later. But this was one of the successes of the battle which was the result of close co-ordination tactics between the fighter plane formations, torpedo plane formations, dive bomber formations and special submarines which carried out an extremely difficult undersea attack. The powder magazine of an enemy warship had exploded, and the bottom half of it had already burst open, spreading a wide oil film on the surface of the water. It was definitely of the ARI-ZONA class. The enemy antiaircraft fire finally became intense, and shells burst around our formation in such large numbers that it seemed as though they were throwing rocks at us. Presently a large hole was torn on the port side of the fuselage of the flight commander's plane. Following this, it appeared as though No. 5 plane had been hit; fuel was leaking from its tanks. Nevertheless, it continued in the formation. It seems that he was determined to crash

his plane after fulfilling his mission. When I signalled, 'Let me know your situation;' he calmly answered, 'It is only the auxiliary tank.' His attitude was completely serene, which seemed to ignore life and death.

"Next, we directed our attention upon Target No. 2, WHEELER AIRFIELD, which was situated in the center of the Island. Over 200 fighter planes and bombers were lined up here, but our dive bombers and fighter planes had already bombed and strafed them. Red flames were rising from the planes which had been wheeled out on the airdrome, and dense, black smoke rose from hangars. It was a scene of complete destruction. It was probably gasoline which was burning. Black smoke was spreading to the extent of almost screening the sky. This situation was the reason why the enemy planes could not take off to counterattack. Since these enemy objectives were in such a condition, we again turned our attention to the enemy capital ships.

"Two warships which were anchored side by side offered an excellent target, one which could never be repeated. While one formation aimed at the first ship, the other attacked the second ship. After the torpedo-airplanes and dive bombers had attacked, our large bombers would attack; it was a continuous attack. When No. 1 bomber attacked, a column of water 100 meters in height rose up. If the succeeding planes should dive then, they would be damaged, so they calmly waited until the column of water subsided. Therefore, the period of time during which they would be troubled by enemy antiaircraft fire would be prolonged. Nevertheless, they waited calmly in the air. Just about this time, the torpedo airplane attack reached its height of intensity. They boldly closed in on the enemy and dropped their torpedoes, and when they were about to level off from the dive, they were fired upon. The fuselage of one of our airplanes was enveloped in smoke. The torpedo airplane which became a mass of fire still continued to accurately release its torpedoes, and finally charged directly into an enemy ship and blew itself into a burst of flames. I definitely witnessed this with my own eyes.

"Just about the time that we had accomplished our attack-mission and were about to return, the first rays of the morning sun had already touched upon PEARL HARBOR. As I glanced back, I saw one battleship cut in half surrounded with black



oil; besides that, there were two sunken ships with their ugly, red bellies showing. Then, there was another ship tilted at a 45 degree angle, gradually sinking, and three ships were burning furiously. Every enemy ship along the coast of FORD ISLAND was damaged.

"We circled over PEARL HARBOR several times, as long as our fuel supply permitted. The reason for this was that, although we had clearly seen these with our own eyes, there was a faint hope that one of our crippled airplanes might return. When we returned safely to our aircraft carrier, the second attack formation took off. The reason for the sending of successive attack formations was to thrust home the final blow to the remaining strength of the enemy PACIFIC Fleet." (ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 3-5)

#### e. Grand Air Raid

Excerpt from communique issued by the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters at 1300 hours on 8 December 1941 reads as follows:

"1. At daybreak of the eighth, the Imperial Navy made a desperate, grand air raid upon the American fleet and military strength in the HAWAII Area....."

This communique was supplemented on 18 December 1941 by the following estimate of damages inflicted by the strike:

"Sunk—five battleships, two A or B-class cruisers. Severely damaged—three battle ships, two light cruisers, two destroyers. Medium damages—one battleship, four B-class cruisers. Besides these, 450 enemy planes were burnt by bombing and strafing, and 14 planes were shot down. Moreover, it was reported this day that our special assault unit, organized with special submarines, torpedoed and sunk a battleship of the ARIZONA class. However, word that five special submarines have not yet returned, and our losses were 29 airplanes greatly impressed our people".

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, page 2).

#### f. Propaganda Photographs

Various captured propaganda pamphlets and photograph albums have contained aerial photographs of damages inflicted by Japanese air attacks on PEARL HARBOR. These were given wide circulation for publicity purposes in JAPAN. A selection of these are reproduced as Appendix A. Translations of the captions are attached in each case.

## 5. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

### a. PEARL HARBOR Scouted Before Attack

Captured book entitled "Characteristics of Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations" undated, issuing authority not specified, contains the following passage.

"Reconnaissance and Scouting:

Before the surprise attack on HAWAII, JAPAN's best submarines (about thirty of them) had been assigned to scouting and reconnaissance duty at PEARL HARBOR." (ATIS Document No. 15807, not previously published)

### b. Chart of Proposed Submarine Activities

The Japanese plan of operations called for an attack on American naval units inside the harbor by midget submarines.

"This submarine beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the prisoner but it is believed that the submarine was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this submarine's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear failed.

"The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a UNITED STATES Navy Hydrographic Office chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The submarine also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the submarine was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

"At least three Japanese midget submarines were lost by our counteractions at this time. One submarine actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japanese admitted the loss of five of these undersize submarines."

(CINCPAC-CINCPHA "Weekly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 14-15).

### c. Special Attack Unit

Captain HIRAIDE, Hideo, Chief of the Naval Information Section of Imperial Gener-



al Headquarters wrote and issued the following account entitled "Heroes of the Special Attack Unit:"

"At the time of the iconoclastic blow against outrageous AMERICA, which disregarded our great motive and mission of world peace and even attempted the life of the Japanese Empire, we furiously struck the first blow at the heart of the enemy at the risk of our lives. With all reverence to those of the Special Naval Attack Unit who lost their lives in this great accomplishment, I make this report.

"Imperial General Headquarters communicate (1500 hours, 6 March 1942).

"The glorious, incomparable, strong attack upon PEARL HARBOR by the Special Naval Attack Unit has already been officially published. The plans of attack, which struck terror in the hearts of all the nations throughout the world, were conceived and executed by Lieutenant IWASA and several other officers. The plans were conceived by these men out of their sense of patriotic and loyal duty, several months in advance, in case of such an emergency; and were secretly submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets through their superior officers.

"After the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets had carefully studied these plans, he found that they would be successful and could be followed; so he accepted the fervent desires of the submitters. The non-commissioned officers who took part in this great enterprise were the most superior personnel in the Imperial Navy. All of the men had unshakeable faith in the officers who took part in the battle, and hoped and prayed that they would be able to live and die with their officers. In these plans, there were no volunteers because each officer submitted a request for the non-commissioned officers to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets, which he approved. As a result of the preparatory training and manufacturing experiments, which were carried out night and day without sleep and rest within a short period of time, both by the tacticians and technicians, and even by the workers, —while maintaining strict secrecy within the department,—they were able to complete their work before the beginning of this battle. The spirit of patriotism and loyalty of the officers and men taking part in the attack, the enthusiasm of those connected with the technical work, together with the distinguished ability of the Imperial Navy can be boasted throughout the world.

"Although, at the time of the attack, every available means would be utilized, security measures would have to be made more firm after the attack upon the main forces of the enemy. It is almost impossible to even imagine the extreme difficulties encountered in skirting about the widely scattered sunken hulls of ships within the narrow channel, and to escape and return from the fierce counterattack by the enemy. It is natural that sailors of the Imperial Navy should make preparation for the self-destruction of their ships if the worst should come to the worst.

"Thus, the Special Attack Unit, which was confident of the divine grace of the August virtue of His Majesty, undertook this daring enterprise with sealed lips on 0 day of 0 month, and rushed into PEARL HARBOR. It was through calm and clever maneuvering that they were able to break through the strict enemy security net and the complicated water route; all the ships were able to penetrate into the harbor from a pre-arranged disposition. Some attacked during broad daylight, while others made a night attack, and executed a daring enterprise unparalleled in history. After the completion of their duties, their fate rested with their ships. The sinking of the ARIZONA class battleship during the night attack was even clearly established by friendly naval units, which were far outside of the harbor. At 1631, 8 December (Hawaiian time 2101, 7 December), two minutes after the moon rose, a great explosion took place within PEARL HARBOR. Flames went high up into the sky and incandescent fragments of steel scattered high through the air. In a short time the blaze became extinct. It was established that, at the time, the enemy, thinking that the attack was being made by our air units, opened up a fierce fire. And on the same day at 1811 (Hawaiian time 2241), a radio message that the attack was a success was sent by one of the ships of the Special Attack Unit. After 1914, the radio message was interrupted. There was some belief the ship was self-destructed or sunk. Although it has been reported that the result of the daylight attack against the enemy fleet was slight, we strongly believe that it was a huge success. However, because of the confusion within the harbor, it was very difficult to discriminate between the successes gained by the air unit and the Special Attack Unit. At the time of their departure, they received orders to return upon the completion of the attack, but none of them returned because



they had no such intentions. Some approached (within a proximity unprecedented in history) and attacked enemy ships under the hail of bombs and torpedoes from friendly air units; others remained concealed in the water until the moon rose. Thus, the entire personnel of the unit made a definite attack upon those enemy capital ships which were slightly damaged during the daylight attack. Their concentration upon contributing to the success of the attack transcended beyond life and death.

"The unprecedented, peerless, sacrificial spirit of attack thoroughly demonstrated the tradition of the Imperial Navy, and should be recognized as one of the greatest achievements of the outbreak of this war.

"Furthermore, I wish to add that, as I recall the great achievements of the guardian spirit of our nation at this third month death commemoration of the Special Attack Unit, which our population of 100,000,000 cannot forget even though they might try, there is another new inspiration.

"These young men were always warmly received by their officers; they were subjects of respect by their comrades and subordinates. They all had excellent characters. But without the thought of fame, promotion, pleasure, and even without self-interest, they cast aside the thought of 'self', and only presented their whole body and soul to their Emperor and country; they bravely died for their country at the age of twenty some years.

"This attack, as in the report, was conceived by Lieutenant IWASA and other officers. They elaborated a plan by themselves. Wishing to do their loyal and patriotic duty, these men planned this achievement which was regarded as humanly impossible. Thereafter, during a period of several months, these men secretly carried out difficult training, indescribable beyond mere words, in order that there might not be any chance errors.

"Thus, as the battle began, they rushed into PEARL HARBOR and carried out the fierce attack, in which they all but threw themselves against the bottoms of the enemy ships; after which they calmly met their deaths. I wish to give my impressions of the situation of the attack, considering the reports from the American side today. When the Special Attack Unit attempted to slip into the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, they found submarine nets stretched across and many mines laid there; indeed, the enemy security measures were very thorough.

But, this group of well trained young men of the Special Attack Unit, through calm and clever maneuvering through these obstructions, easily penetrated into the harbor.

"At the same time, I believe these young men said, "Our mission is already completed,"—and smiled at each other. The commander and his subordinates were truly of one mind, and the ships and personnel were one. The confusion of the water route within the harbor was nothing; controlling their beating hearts, trying not to become delayed behind the others, all the ships penetrated on deeper into the harbor.

"Wasn't it the group of enemy capital ships, lined up orderly in two rows, which was presently reflected in their periscopes? We can easily imagine the satisfaction of these young men. Each ship finally began the attack. Some ships closed in on a large warship located in the middle of the row of ships, and inflicted the first fierce blow; other ships bored into the bellies of other ships nearby. At this time, a glimpse of the activity of friendly planes in the sky was seen in the periscope. The friendly planes appeared to be in the midst of a daring attack. The courage of the young men had grown a hundred-fold; they clenched their teeth and stood fast, determined not to allow even one ship to escape. It was time to begin the next attack. An enemy destroyer, probably having seen our periscope, was coming to crash into our side. There were some submarines, not having time to resist, which dived deeper to escape disaster.

"At this time, enemy shells rained down and our air unit attack became fierce; torpedoes and bombs flying around inside the harbor caused great confusion. I believe that the underwater attack by each vessel was a gigantic success; however, it is a difficult situation to discriminate between the success of the air units and the underwater attack.

"The members of a submarine of the Special Attack Unit which awaited the sunset, restrained themselves on the bottom of the sea, while listening to the fierce daylight battle; they passed the time away by occupying themselves with jig-saw puzzles which they had brought along. This is truly something which cannot be easily done. Finally, after nightfall and waiting for the moon to rise, the situation changes over to the attack. That submarine approached within close quarters looking for enemy capital ships which might have been slightly



damaged during the daylight attack. The large hull of an enemy ship, flooded by moonlight, became a clear silhouette and an excellent target of attack. At the command, "Open fire!" by OO commander, the final attack was carried out. There was no error in the attack which was full of the spirit of certain death for the enemy within sight. A thunderous explosion shook the interior of the harbor and columns of flames, several hundred meters in height, scorched the sky. Simultaneously, a conning tower began to calmly appear above the surface of the water, kicking up white-crested waves. The calm and courageous commander confirmed the last moments of the enemy ship, which broke in two, crumbled and began to sink.

"The long-cherished objective was now realized. What were the thoughts of these brave, young men in the moonlight? They were thinking about the several months of hardships which they underwent for this day; and now, these young men stood before the glory of death. The thunderous sinking of this enemy ship was distinctly confirmed by our units outside of the harbor; they even distantly saw, at the same time, flames shoot up and fragments of incandescent steel fly high up into the air. The time was 8 December (HAWAIIAN Time 2101, 7 December); two minutes after the moon rose.

"The battle was over. However, the young men of the Special Attack Unit did not return. The final message from one of the submarines—"We succeeded in the attack."—was at 2241 Hawaiian time. The members of the unit, surpassing life and death, devoted themselves to the annihilation of the enemy ships to the ultimate end; they had no thoughts of returning alive. It is confirmed that some of them were sunk, while others destroyed themselves. There were not a few instances of going into the jaws of certain death. However, they calmly attained the deep-rooted conviction of the noblest and purest region of self-effacement (non-egoism). This great spirit of complete sacrifice, which even makes the gods weep, is indeed the flower of BUSHIDO (Chivalry) and the essence of our racial (national) spirit. There isn't even one instance of such in world history. As we recall these meritorious services, we experience a quivering of the blood throughout our bodies.

"The unequalled, pure loyalty of the daring enterprise by the Special Attack Unit has graciously reached His Majesty's ears. When the spirits of these young men now under the ground, who came into this

world to protect His Majesty and to be the corner-stone of peace of the Fatherland, hear about this—how they must be choked with tears of joy! Although these young men were on the threshold of death, and not life, they carried on calmly and self-possessed, no differently than as though they were on a march during their daily training.

"Just before the departure, these young men gathered together with their comrades in arms to chat. One young fellow saying,—"After the attack I will go ashore and make this talk,"—innocently pulled out a pistol and palmed it. Another, after changing his underclothing said,—"I should wear my uniform, but since it is hot, I shall be excused in my fatigue clothes",—and placidly continued to dress himself. Another young one, in reply to,—"Be careful not to be caught in any bombing and torpedo attack,"—by one of this comrades, replied, "No fear, by that time there will be a big hole in the enemy's hull!" He carefreely engulfed them in smoke and laughed. There was even one who had enough improvised amusement in reserve to recite a stanza, "I heard ROOSEVELT whimpering before the King of Hell the following day!"

"It was said that another chap who liked his liquor, in reply to an encouraging remark,—"Let's celebrate after your return from a successful battle,"—by one of his comrades, did not smilingly reply, as he usually did,—"Yes, let's drink." These young men probably thought that they should not utter remarks such as "return" or "if I should live."

"Another young fellow, it is said, tapping the shoulders of his comrades who were remaining behind, encouraged them by saying. "Let's hold out together until the ultimate end; we will meet next at YASUKUNI SHRINE!"

"Presently, it was the time of departure. It is usually the custom when leaving for ordinary battle, to report to the superior officer, "I am leaving (with the intentions of returning)." However, these young men boldly reported, "Lieutenant So and So or Sub Lieutenant So and So, I go now! (to death, without the intention of returning)". And they did not say, "I am leaving (with the intention of returning)."

"Go to it!"

"O. K."

"Greetings were exchanged with those going to great achievements. It was a moment of deep, heroic emotion to those leaving, those remaining, those who were



sending the others off, and to those who were being sent off. Even at a time like this, when these young men were about to leave, they remained self-possessed. It is said that one young officer spiritedly climbed into the boat after saying, 'Carrying lunches, soda water, and receiving chocolates is just like going on a hike.' At this time, the happy memory of excursions during his childhood probably flickered in the thoughts of this young man. Heaving their breasts with dear memories of excursions and dancing with joy, these young men jumped into the jaws of death. It was learned later that these young men had disposed of their personal matters in perfect order. There were some who had left written expressions of gratitude to superior officers and comrades, and official recordings of their viewpoints; however, there was very little which appeared like wills. Among them is a swan song by some youth.

"If it be for the Emperor,

Why regret the lives of young warriors?  
If their deaths be not in vain.

Now we go through the nets and mines,  
Smashing into pearly gems after the strike.

Ah! The happiness of this morning sky,  
Meeting again at YASUKUNI SHRINE.

(TN YASUKUNI SHRINE is a Shinto Shrine in TOKYO where the spirits of the dead soldiers and sailors are enshrined).

"I believe that this expressed the deep emotions of all the young men. This understanding, this faith is easily expressed in words. However, these young men actually executed these in a tacit manner.

"I believe that, from the speech and behaviour of these young men, they not only desired to win in battle, but also to execute this with the belief that they had to oust and destroy American and British principles and ideas of selfishness, which penetrated the spirit of the Japanese people through their culture and thoughts over a long period of years.

"Isn't the first step towards the success of the Greater EAST ASIA War dependent upon the ousting of the visible American and British tyrannical power from EAST ASIA, and, at the same time, the sweeping away of the invisible, egotistic, materialistic American and British ideas from our thoughts? It probably can be said that the actions of these young men, from this standpoint, were shining examples.

"At this time, we must bear in mind that the great spirit of self-sacrifice, in which one destroys oneself and dies for one's

country is largely due to the powerful influence of mothers. Everyone of these young men were famous, as if by common consent, for their filial piety. It is said that a certain young man always returned to his home when he had a leave, even when it was but a short period, and derived great pleasure by spending the day with his mother. But this is enough to give you a general idea of the matter. The power behind the scene of the mothers of these young men, who tenderly raised them, is immense. Especially when she continued to work, disregarding herself, for her home, husband, and children. The supreme happiness which these mothers sought in their self-sacrificial, spiritual influence, became a great power which grew within these young men. How could these pure and loyal heroes be born without these great mothers of JAPAN? These mothers, who efface themselves to live only for their children, are mothers who live for the nation. What a great difference there must be when the morale of these young men should be compared with the enemy American and British soldiers, who immediately run at the sight of superior opponents, and who actually keep their distance when they realize that their lives are in danger. Behind this scene, the casualness of the relationship between the selfish, pleasure-seeking American and British mothers and their children, should not be overlooked.

"In AMERICA, a sailor's occupation is defined as one in which a person travels around the world for nothing, receives an enormous pay, and leads a pleasant and happy life. It has even been clearly shown by the speech and actions of survivors from several naval battles up to this time that they are strongly influenced by the self first idea; that is, 'while there is life, there is hope.'

"Isn't there all the difference in the world between the young men who loyally gave their lives for their country, and the natures of the American and British soldiers who make it their philosophy of life to further their own happiness?

"Since the outbreak of the Greater EAST ASIA War, the entire world can only remain amazed at our continued victories. But, behind all this, if they could understand the continuous flow of traditional spirit of first giving their valuable lives in the defense of their country, they would undoubtedly lower their heads in respect for the blood of the YAMATO (Japanese) race.

"However, when we realize that the source,



from which this incomparable and infinite strength gushes forth, lies in the Emperor, we cannot but be deeply stirred by the August Virtue of His Majesty.

"As we look back upon history over 2600 years, since Emperor JIMMU led his armies from MIMITSU HARBOR, the stalwart and heroic spirit of YAMATO has continued to this day! That which flares up and continues to burn is the fierce and high spirit which is exemplified in the following phrases. 'When we put out to sea, we do not intend to return.' 'Die only by the side of our Emperor.'

"The glory of this spirit increases with the advancement of the Japanese Empire. When the opportunity presents itself, this spirit will blossom forth in all its glory, just as in these young men.

"It is pre-destined that no matter how long this Greater EAST ASIA War lasts, no matter if additional strong enemies should appear, the moment the Fatherland should need them, these young men who have served their country will be reborn again and again to defend their country. There isn't the least bit of danger in the lack of such men.

"These young men of the Special Attack Unit are 'Gods of War,' and, at the same time, they are 'Gods who establish Peace.' That which follows the Greater EAST ASIA War must be everlasting peace throughout the world. Then, these 'Gods of War' will be 'Gods of Peace'. The present destruction is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but it is destruction for the sake of construction.

"These young men who defend our nation are the children, the older brothers, and younger brothers of the Japanese people. From the standpoint of the individual who is bewildered, how encouraging it is that it has been clearly shown that such pure, loyal and incomparable blood flows through the veins of our people when the nation is faced with a national emergency.

"I repeat again. It is easy to become

temporarily aroused, but it is difficult to face death calmly. This is still the beginning of one phase of a long period of war. I respectfully end this report, and I pray for the repose of the souls of the nine young men."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 6-11).

#### d. Photographs of Special Attack Unit Heroes

The Japanese admit loss of five midget submarines and their crews in the attack on PEARL HARBOR. From the tenor of the article quoted in Paragraph 5c above, it appears probable that this was the total number involved. Each submarine carried a crew of two men, or ten in all for the five ships. Nine of these men have been officially deified as 'military gods'. Their photographs, taken from a captured document, are reproduced as Figure 4. The tenth member of the crew, whose fate has been officially ignored by the Government, is the prisoner of war referred to in Paragraph 5b above.

The manner in which the Japanese had learned by 6 March 1942 that only nine of the ten crew members had died is not clear. At that time the Navy Department officially eulogized the nine young "Gods of War," and were even able to publish their photographs, indicating that they knew which of the two men manning the midget submarine beached on OAHU the day following the attack had survived. On the official publicity the fate of this survivor was pointedly ignored. In view of the fact that all radio communication from the midget submarines had ceased on the night of 8 December, it seems doubtful that the information could have been transmitted in this fashion. They may have gained it as a result of the normal exchange of prisoner of war information specified by the Geneva Convention. If not, however, this may represent an instance of successful espionage.



# 特別攻撃隊九軍神



稲垣 清兵衛 (左下)	片山 義雄 (右下)	上田 定兵衛 (左上)	佐々木 直吉 (中上)	横山 薫範 (右上)	廣尾 彰 (左下)	古野 繁美 (右下)	横山 正治 (左上)	岩佐 直治 (右上)
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Figure 4. Pictures and names of the Special Attack Unit. Nine gods of the armed forces. (T.N.: These men were killed in action and were deified as gods in the national shrine for war heroes, YASUKUNI SHRINE, TOKYO, JAPAN.)—1. Commdr. IWASA, Naoji. 2. Lt. Commdr. YOKOYAMA, Masaji. 3. Lt. Commdr. FURUNO, Shigemitsu. 4. Lt. HIROO, Akira. 5. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. YOKOYAMA, Shigenori. 6. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. SASAKI, Naokichi. 7. W. O. KAMITA, Sadamu. 8. W. O. KATAYAMA, Yoshio. 9. W. O. INAGAKI, Kiyoshi.



## Section IV. THE RETURN VOYAGE

### 6. THE RETURN VOYAGE

a. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in Paragraph 2b above, described the task force's voyage home as follows:

"On completion of attack, the task force proceeded in general direction of TRUK. The weather became very hot. Full speed of 26 knots was maintained until 10 December, when it was reduced to 18 knots. Zigzagging was carried out in vicinity of HAWAII when reports of two enemy submarines were received, off WAKE Island, and on approaching JAPAN.

"WAKE Island was bombed by airplanes from carriers in passing, but the prisoner knew no details except that nothing exceptional occurred. Before reaching TRUK, plans were suddenly changed, and task force altered its course northward, proceeding direct to JAPAN without calling at any port. It arrived at KURE on 27 December 1941.

"During the return passage, continuous single airplane patrols were maintained until shortly before reaching Japanese waters. One airplane from each carrier in turn carried out patrol lasting about three hours. KAGA remained in No. 2 State of Readiness during the day and No. 3 State of Readiness (with gun crews in three watches) at night. Special antiaircraft lockouts were not posted, this duty being carried out by antiaircraft ma-

chine gun crews. Task force did not fuel while on return passage."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 4-5)

b. Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, described the homeward voyage as follows:

"The fleet headed northwest for a few days and then directly for JAPAN. A few days before arrival, the SHOKAKU left formation and proceeded to OITA."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6)

c. Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) quoted in Paragraph 3c above, gave the following account of the homeward voyage.

"Thus each ship turned back simultaneously. Enroute to our home port we passed MIDWAY and WAKE safely and sighted our islands on the night of the twentieth.

"I can remember the natural tears which came to each one's eyes. It is the soul in that figure, praying for the eternal welfare of the Fatherland for which he longs, that is the Japanese man.

"Thus to our home port on the twenty-fifth and then to the KURE Naval Depot." (ATIS Interrogation Notes, not previously published)



## Section V. CONCLUSIONS

1. Available evidence indicates that Japanese plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR were finally formulated at the war games held at the Naval War College in TOKYO from 2-13 September 1941. There appears to have been a considerable amount of preliminary and partial planning, probably extending over the naval games and maneuvers of many years, but culminating in a series of games held at various fleet anchorages prior to late August 1941. It is perhaps significant to note that one source claims that the midget submarine unit had been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack.
2. The essence of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, specifying naval activities in the opening of hostilities, was embodied in the outline of conditions under which the September 1941 naval war games were to be held. These conditions were printed on 3 September 1941.
3. From 5-7 September 1941, officers participating in the naval war games discussed in concrete terms the problems and possibilities of an attack on PEARL HARBOR. They anticipated catching all major units of the UNITED STATES Fleet in PEARL HARBOR.
4. The advisability of an amphibious landing on HAWAII at the time of the initial strike was discussed. The project was rejected because of the apparently insuperable problems of logistics involved. The eventual occupation of MIDWAY and HAWAII was contemplated, the former in the late spring and the latter in October 1942.
5. Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi, who later commanded the task force making the attack on PEARL HARBOR, participated in the September 1941 war games as a member of "A" Team.
6. On 15 September, 1941 naval staff members conferred with army representatives at IWAKUNI. It was rumored at the time that the Army had no previous knowledge of naval plans for an attack on PEARL HARBOR.
7. On an unknown date at the end of October 1941 the Army Department and the Navy Department of Imperial General Head-

quarters jointly issued "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement." This seems to have been the basic document specifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, tasks and responsibilities of the two services in all cases where joint army-navy operations were envisaged. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 September and the end of October was occupied in large part with the working out of the details of this agreement.

8. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was dated 1 November 1941, aboard Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagship, the Battleship NAGATO, at SAEKI Bay. Together with its annexes, this order sets forth the basic plan of all naval operations attendant upon the commencement of hostilities. The following aspects are noteworthy in respect to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:

- a. Ships comprising the striking force were ordered to depart from their naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day (24 November 1941).
- b. Submarines comprising the Surprise Attack Force were ordered to depart from the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day (20 November 1941). Strength was to be so disposed as to command the mouth of PEARL HARBOR. American warships escaping the harbor were to be attacked.
- c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attacks were completed.
- d. Beginning on Y-Day (23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit was ordered to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Japanese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
10. The date for the official declaration of war was not finally announced till 10 November 1941, when Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3 stated "X-Day will



be 8 December."

11. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued by Commander, Task Force, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi on 10 November 1941, aboard his flagship, the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI, at SAEKI Bay. It ordered all ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November 1941. TANKAN (HITOKAPPU) Bay on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES was designated as the rendezvous for the task force.

12. Between 21-27 November 1941 the task force rendezvoused at TANKAN Bay.

13. Task Force consisted of the following units:

Battleships—

HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA).

Aircraft Carriers—

KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1)

SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2)

SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5, less HOSHIO).

Heavy Cruisers—

TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8)

Light Cruisers—ABUKUMA

Destroyers—

FUCHIKA, KASUMI, ARARE, YOEN (Destroyer Division 18 (??)) OBORO, KAGERO, SHIRANUHI and one unspecified destroyer (Destroyer Division 16 (??)).

Submarines—

Submarine force from Sixth Fleet, probably from 20-30 ships in all. (Submarine force, with the exception of three I-Class ships, proceeded independently to the area of operations).

Oilers—

Three.

Supply Ships—

One.

14. Task force left TANKAN Bay on 27 November 1941. It sailed east until 4/5 December, then altered course to the south-

east toward HAWAII.

15. Upon reaching a point approximately two hundred and fifty miles from HAWAII, the first wave of planes was launched. This took place at 0100-0200 hours, JAPAN time. The weather was very poor.

16. Evidence does not agree, but it seems probable that from twenty to thirty Japanese submarines of the Sixth Fleet were assigned to reconnaissance duties outside PEARL HARBOR before the strike. They were to engage any American ships escaping from the harbor.

17. Five midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the harbor. Evidence indicates that some succeeded, lay concealed on the bottom till night and then attacked. Four seem to have been destroyed by American counter measures. One was beached and captured.

18. The Japanese Navy Department on 18 December 1941 claimed the following damages were inflicted by their PEARL HARBOR Strike:

Battleships—

5 sunk by air attacks.

1 torpedoed and sunk by submarine attacks.

3 severely damaged by air attacks.

1 moderately damaged by air attacks.

Light Cruisers—

2 severely damaged.

4 moderately damaged.

Destroyers—

2 severely damaged.

Airplanes—

450 burnt by bombing and strafing.

14 shot down.


The Japanese officially admitted the loss of 29 planes and 5 midget submarines.

19. Following the attack, task force proceeded northwest then altered course to southwest, bombing WAKE Island in passing. Ships appear to have concluded cruise at either OITA or KURE.




## Appendix A.—JAPANESE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKE

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


1. Just before the attack, 8 Dec. 1941. Naval planes on a carrier ; a surprise attack on HAWAII.



2. "Black smoke rises over WHEELER Army Air Field, which is being reduced to ashes."  
"Navy Investigation B No. 17 (103), Approved 13 January 1942 (Reproduction prohibited)." This data is repeated on all photographs save Nos. 6 and 7






3. "Beginning of the Battle of HAWAII. The American PACIFIC Fleet just before its destruction."



4. "Concentration of the enemy main fleet cowering under our deadly attack."






5. "Enemy installations and warships 'left buried' around FORD Island." Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Half of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special airplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."




6. Surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR. Main fleet burning and being destroyed near FORD Island. Scattered about in the harbor are enemy ships scurrying in all directions as a result of our sudden attack. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."





7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."



8. "Grim spectacle of PEARL HARBOR fearstricken under our silver wings."





9. Enemy key positions burning up as a result of our accurate attack."



10. "Magnificent!! PEARL HARBOR gasping under our fierce bombardment."



Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 29 January 1942 0700 hours  
Arrival, 29 January 1942 2215 hours

No. 245 of 27 January

Secret!

Discussions in the Diet this past week have brought forth several important declarations by leading Japanese statesmen, particularly the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, concerning aims of Japanese policy and the execution of the war, the text of which is known there. The declarations are especially noteworthy because of their systematic character and the time at which they were given, namely shortly before the attack on the fortress of SINGAPORE, after the successful start of the attack on Burma in the direction of RANGOON, the beginning of the operations against the Netherlands Indies, the progressive conquest of the Philippines and the first action against the outer defensive ring of Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, and the Torres Straits. According to confidential information, Prime Minister General Tojo himself desired a systematic determination of Japanese policy and carried it through in the face of opposition. This spontaneous stepping forward shows TOJO to be a politically leading statesman, who is more than a mere exponent of the army. His aim was clearly to establish Japanese war policy on a line which is equidistant from the limited wishes of circles which earlier hoped for an understanding with the Anglo-Saxons and on the other hand from the very extended expansionist tendencies of certain radical groups. From TOJO and TOGO's statements the bases of the future building up of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership are firstly brought out, and secondly the government's program for future policy and waging of the war.

## I) Building up of East Asia.

1) Japan, Manchukuo, and Nanking-China shall form the inner core of the new organization. Thailand and Indo-China, who cooperate with Japan out of their own free will, will be included. The other areas of the new great sphere shall crystallize under various forms of government around this core. The active support of allied Thailand was thought to be especially hearty by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, though her claims for a revision were not mentioned.

2.) The remaining countries of greater East Asia shall fall into three categories:



a) Previous bulwarks of British imperialism which served to suppress and rule East Asia, namely HONG KONG and the Malay Peninsula. 11

This area must be transformed into a bulwark for the protection of Greater East Asia and must therefore be placed under the immediate control of Japan. This principle found a practical application in General ISOGAI's appointment as Governor General of HONGKONG, as reported from another quarter.

b) Areas, whose independence shall be preserved if they loyally collaborate with Japan: The Philippines and Burma. According to what the Military Attache confidentially learned from the Army, their independence shall be formed according to Manchukuo's pattern.

c) Areas which are to be conquered by force of arms if they persist in resisting Japan: Netherlands Indies, Australia, and Chungking China.

TOJO and TOGO's statements revealed that the original hope of the Netherland Indies' yielding without a fight is no more, and military action is considered essential. Both speeches contained a forcible appeal for Chungking's ear to turn away from the Anglo-Saxons and /come to an/ understanding with Japan. They were still especially underlined by the reported declaration of the Prime Minister before the Budget Commission on 23 January.

3) General principles for the future organization of Greater East Asia.

Concerning this, the speeches of TOJO and TOGO and the declarations of TOJO and General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, before the Budget Commission on 23 January, contain a few interesting points. The program is emphatically moderate. New areas are not to be exploited after the defeat of Anglo-Saxon mastery. Instead of that economic collaboration, no war of races, tolerance of religious freedom, no economic exclusion, but on the other hand guidance and regulation of production, and if necessary restriction of individual branches of production (Sugar, also rubber were named in a confidential conversation) in accordance with the needs of the Greater Sphere Economy, managed by Japan. The aim of the present measures is the securing of raw materials which are necessary for waging war and the founding of the later autocratic Greater Sphere Order/ autarkischer grossraumordnung/. Present program:

- a) Acquisition of important sources of raw materials.
- b) Prevention of the flow of raw materials from the South Sea areas to the enemy powers.
- c) Securing the self-sufficiency of the army in the areas of operations.
- d) Cooperation with Japan by existing enterprises in the occupied areas.



II. Future policy and warfare.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister forcibly emphasized the indivisability of the powers of the Tripartite Pact and the inner close collaboration of Japan with Germany, Italy, and her other European friends.

A push in the southerly direction: Netherlands Indies and Australia was set as the military goal. According to confidential military information, in Australia, PORT DARWIN is to be conquered first. Japanese war leadership can be content in Australia at first with the possession of this base. This concentration of power in a southerly direction explains why India was not mentioned. In connection with India, great restraint can be evidenced here. Administration leaders and the army maintain the standpoint that Japan cannot proceed against Australia and India at the same time, but must pause after the conquest of SINGAPORE and Burma since the push toward the South is more important and of greater use. According to confidential information from the director of the European division of the Foreign Ministry, the Indian Congress is opposed to Japan. Indian nationalism, even in case of a successful revolution, would not be able to establish an independent, orderly state. The control of such a huge area with 400 million inhabitants would hardly be possible for Japan along with her other numerous difficult tasks. Under these circumstances, the danger exists that India will fall prey to Bolshevism.

Concerning Soviet Russia, the Foreign Minister's speech emphasized that relations were unchanged and were as previously based upon the Neutrality Pact. In the Budget Commission, TOGO reported that the annual renewal of the Japanese-Russian Fishery Treaty is at hand.

According to strictly confidential information, however, military preparations in Manchuria against Russia are in operation. Influential circles defend the viewpoint here that Japan must turn on Russia after the conquest of Port Darwin and must seize Vladivostok, the coastal province, and North Sachalin, in order to finally secure herself in the North also.

I reported elsewhere about the Japanese standpoint concerning South America and the RIO conference.



I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4076 A.

/s/ Ulrich Straus, 2nd Lt.



AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Telegram  
(Secret Cipher Process)Tokyo, 17 May 1942  
Arrived, 18 May 19429.40 *Shours*  
0.25 hours

No. 1478 of 14 May 1942

Re: Telegraph of 30 January, No. 287.  
Prot B 22 IX 310.

I. The Japanese Army have repeatedly approached the Military Attache with the request to recommend certain Japanese for receiving German decorations on the occasion of the Tripartite Pact. *Besides above, it proposed 2 or 3 more awards*

Because of the hesitancy on the part of the Japanese Decorations Office in the matter of German desires for decorations and in line with your telegram of 9 October, No. 1070, according to which a list of recommendations for German decorations to be bestowed upon Japanese at the occasion of the Tripartite Pact is to take place only after the bestowal of Japanese decorations has been effected, I have since refrained, on principle, and in agreement with the Military Attache, from passing on the Japanese desires and from making proposals of my own.

However, in the meantime and notably since the war broke out, a number of Japanese should be mentioned; these have made important contributions to German-Japanese cooperation and our joint waging of the war at the same time they occupy key positions in the Japanese Government or Army of such importance, that even without regard to reciprocity, their decoration seems suitable. This concerns men of the immediate group surrounding TOJO, who will presumably retain for some time their decisive influence on the shaping of Japanese policy. I learned that the Italians have recently planned a number of bestowals of the decorations. Hence I would like to propose to suggest the following decorations to the Fuehrer:

(1) Teiichi SUZUKI, Lieutenant General retired, Minister of State, President of the Planning Board of the Cabinet, born 16 December 1888 in CHIBA. In the scope of the tasks conferred on him as head of the Planning Board to bring Japan on the highest level of defense, SUZUKI wields decisive influence on



the reorganization of Japan's inner administration, including almost all of the ministries. He likewise controls economic planning in Japan, as well as the organization of economic and administrative construction in the Southern territories. SUZUKI is at the same time an executive organ (General Secretary of the Board for the Construction of Greater East Asia). On the strength of this great authority, his connections with the Army and his personal relations to TOJO, SUZUKI has created a position for himself that can be labeled as a kind of a Vice-Chancellorship. This is also shown by SUZUKI's order of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events. Although he was formerly somewhat ambiguous in his attitude towards Germany, SUZUKI has especially recently supported cooperation with Germany and had an important share in the decision of Japan's entry into the war. Proposed Order: Grand Merite.

(2) Toshio SHIRATORI, born 8 June 1887 in CHIBA, formerly ambassador in ROME. Adviser of the Foreign Minister when the Tripartite Pact was concluded. For a long time he was the principal advocate of intimate cooperation with Germany. Member of the New Diet after having recovered his health SHIRATORI will probably again play an important part in foreign and home politics. Order: Great Cross.

On recommendation of the Military Attache:

(3) Colonel General SUGIYAMA, Chief of General Staff since 3 October 1940, born 21 January 1880 in KOKURA, former Minister of War. In all of his positions he has always openly advocated cooperation with Germany, wielding great influence in the conclusion of the alliance. Grade: Great Cross.

(4) Lieutenant General HEITARO KIMURA, Vice Minister of War, born 28 September 1888 in TOKYO Prefecture. K. was in Germany 1922-1924. In his position of Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, October 1939 to October 1940, he has especially worked in behalf of Germany. Vice Minister of War since 10 April 1941, he is one of the principal advocates of German-Japanese military cooperation. Grade: Great Cross.

(5) Lieutenant General AKIRA (TN: From context the garbled part seems to be MUTO), former Director of the military-political section of the War Ministry since October 1939, born 15 November 1892 in KUMAMOTO. He has now received an important field command, and an extraordinary career is predicted for him. Without regard to the vacillations of Japanese policy, M. has always advocated the conclusion of a German-Japanese alliance in a most important position. Order: Great Cross, under special consideration of his official position.



(6) Major General KENRYO SATO, Chief of the Political Section of the War Ministry, born 1 June 1895 in ISHIKAWAKEN. Definitely pro-German; representative and adviser and at present successor of General MUTO. The importance wielded by him during the last three months before Japan's entry into the war has obviously increased. Order: Distinguished Service Cross with Stars.

(7) Lieutenant General YUKIO KASAHARA, born 6 November 1889 in TOKYO, Chief of the European Section of the General Staff at the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact; until 1941 Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Army in North China; at present field command; using his important influence he has always worked as a leader for the Anti-Comintern Pact and German-Japanese cooperation. Order: Distinguished Service Cross with Stars.

On recommendation of Air Attache:

(8) Colonel General KENJI DOHIHARA, Chief of the Army's Airarm Bureau since 9 June 1941, born 8 August 1883 in OKIYAMA. By constant close and friendly cooperation with the Air Attache, he has in a leading position, contributed, in the true sense of the Tripartite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the military alliance. Order: Great Cross.

(9) Vice Admiral EIKICHI KATAGIRI, Chief of the Navy's Airarm Bureau since 24 September 1941, born 10 September 1885 in YONEZAWA. Reasons as per Para.(6). Order: Great Cross.

To the above proposals I would like to remark:

SUGIYAMA had been recommended for the Great Cross already in 1937 because of his pro-German attitude. As Chief of the General Staff he continued taking a leading part in working for Military cooperation with Germany.

KIMURA has closely cooperated with Minister of War and Prime Minister TOJO already on the Kwantung Army. His personal relationship to TOJO as well as his primary preoccupation in his position of Prime Minister have enhanced his influence on the leadership of the War Ministry, as well as his position in regard to the other Vice-Ministers to a marked degree.

MUTO, as head of the political section of the War Ministry since 1939, has often been mentioned in my reports. In view of the political influence wielded by the Japanese Army, his



attitude was and is of great importance. The same is now true of Major General SATO who has so far cooperated in a friendly way with the Military Attache and the Embassy as MUTO's representative.

DOHIHARA and KATAGIRI have an equally important share in military cooperation, along with the Chiefs of the Army's and Navy's Airarm Bureaus. Because of the successes of the Japanese airarm their position among Japan's military and political leadership has especially risen. In view of their position, simultaneous bestowals of the Great Cross seem called for.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4076 B.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus, 2d Lt.



AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Q "Where is Burma - ? Is it a country - ? or what?"

A. Of yer -!

Q I'm not stupid a'nythin' I've heard of the Burma Pass -!"

DOCUMENT NO. 823B (1)

1284

PAGE 1\*

C.I.E.

gratzy success.

Over attitude to gpk

12/4/46

FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENTS 1940:

Apr. 15, 1940. Foreign Minister Arita Replies to Newspapermen on the Question of the Netherlands East Indies.

On being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to the possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, the Foreign Minister Mr. Arita replied as follows:

With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's need. Similarly other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

Should the hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands, and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence, and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development, accompanying the aggravation of the war in Europe, that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies.

April 18, 1940. Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Question of the Netherlands East Indies.

We have received a report from our Minister at the Hague, Mr. Itaro Ishii, to the following effect.

Minister Ishii called on the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, on the 16th of April and explained to the latter the attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the question of the Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands Foreign Minister expressed the Netherlands Government's appreciation of the Japanese Government's attitude and at the same time stated that the Netherlands Government had not sought



nor would seek in the future any country's protection of the Netherlands East Indies, and that the Netherlands Government were determined to refuse any offer of protection of intervention of any kind which might be made by any country.

The Netherlands Minister at Tokyo, General J. C. Pabst called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachio Arita, today and confirmed the above report of Minister Ishii.



FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENTS 1940

May 11, 1940. Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman  
Concerning the Maintenance of Status Quo of the Netherlands East Indies.

Considering the possibility of the war in Europe spreading to the Netherlands, the Japanese Government made public on the 15 of April their attitude of deep concern over any development that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, and subsequently they notified the Netherlands Government to that effect. In connection with this, the Netherlands Government expressed their determination not to alter their policy of maintaining the status quo of the said Netherlands, colony under any circumstances.

As the European war has now spread to the Netherlands, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachior Arita, invited the Netherlands Minister at Tokyo, General J. C. Pabst, to the Foreign Office this afternoon, and informed the latter that the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the Netherlands Government will firmly maintain their said determination regarding the question of the Netherlands East Indies.

The Foreign Minister has also called attention of the representatives in Tokyo of belligerent countries, namely, Great Britain, Germany and France, to Japan's concern over the said question.

The Foreign Minister has informed the representatives of two neutral countries, the United States and Italy, for their reference, the fact that the Japanese Government made the above notification to the Government of belligerent countries concerned.



## FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENTS 1940:

May 13, 1940. Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman  
Concerning the Netherlands East Indies.

The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, at 6:00 o'clock this afternoon, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, at the latter's official residence with the reply of his home Government to the representation made by Foreign Minister Arita on May 11 regarding the Netherlands East Indies. The British Ambassador told Foreign Minister Arita that the British Government fully share the Japanese Government's concern over the Netherlands East Indies but believe that the Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies are sufficient for the maintenance of the status quo of those islands, while Great Britain has no intention whatever of intervening there. The British Ambassador left the Foreign Office at 6:40 o'clock this evening.

May 15, 1940. Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman  
Concerning the Netherlands Minister's Notification with  
Regard to the Netherlands East Indies.

At 10:00 A.M. today, the Netherlands Minister, General J. C. Pabst, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, at the latter's official residence under instructions from his home Government with reference to the Foreign Minister's communication to the Netherlands Government made on the 11th of this month, and stated that the Netherlands Government are of the belief that Great Britain, the United States and France have no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East Indies.

The Netherlands Minister took leave of the Foreign Minister at 10:20 A.M.

May 16, 1940. Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman  
Concerning the French Ambassador's Notification with  
Regard to the Netherlands East Indies.

The French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, at the Foreign Office at 3:30 P.M. today under instructions from his home Government with reference to the Foreign Minister's communication to the French Ambassador made on the 11th of this month regarding the maintenance of status quo of Netherlands East Indies, and stated that the French Government entirely agree with the Japanese policy on the question.

The French Ambassador left at 4:00 P.M.



1287  
DOCUMENT NO. 220 N

Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, p. 285  
Press Release Issued by the Department of State on May 11, 1940<sup>6</sup>

In response to inquiries by correspondents concerning press reports from Tokyo relative to the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"I have no full report about the matter referred to in the press despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government assumes that each of the governments which has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments. On April 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said:

"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area."

"In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of intention to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated."

<sup>6</sup> Reprinted from Department of State, Bulletin, May 11, 1940 (vol. II, No. 46), p. 493.



## Memorandum by the Secretary of State

(Washington,) May 16, 1940.

The Ambassador of Japan called at his own request. He did not mention the Philippine Immigration Bill, or the reported Japanese disturbances in Peru, or, expressly, the Netherlands Indies, or the status of European armed forces in China. At the beginning of the conversation I made reference to the increased state of war and chaos in other parts of the world and the terrible destructive effects of it in every way, adding that it appeared more and more as if no large country, much less a small country, was safe from some aggressive intervention by force in one way or another, and that about the only thing a nation could do was to arm to the teeth and be ready for any serious interference with its rights and interests by the use of military force or the threat of force. I said that, fortunately, as was shown today in Congress, and as was apparent all over the nation since the more recent invasions of helpless peaceful nations for purposes of their destruction, the American people have now become thoroughly awakened, aroused and alert in regard to any threatened injuries to American rights and interests, and that this was a matter of great gratification to those of us in charge of the foreign affairs of the nation.

The Ambassador then proceeded at great length to question and cross-examine me about the Netherlands West Indies, comprising Curacao and Aruba. I said that, of course, my Government and the other twenty-one American Republics would not consider for a moment any departure from their traditional policy relating to the safety of this hemisphere, and if that was what the Ambassador had in mind, I could make that statement together with the further statement that as soon as this Government learned of the fact that British and French vessels patrolling the waters near Curacao and Aruba were offering potential aid to the Netherlands Government in preventing possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments on one or both of these possessions, such as governments are often seized in South American countries, this Government proceeded to assemble the facts as expeditiously as possible in regard to the ability of Netherlands guards and citizens in Curacao and Aruba to protect the islands and their governments from such dangers. I further stated that it was my understanding that the British and French patrols were in no sense interfering with the Netherlands government on these two islands, but were recognizing the authority of these governments during the brief temporary time deemed necessary to aid in safeguarding against the dangers already mentioned, and that they have made it clear that thereafter their patrols will not offer any guards for additional protection in connection with their continued patrol work, and hence there cannot arise the slightest question of interference with the traditional American policy relating to its own protection from possible dangers from abroad. Furthermore, the Netherlands Government would be expected to send from abroad any additional guards that may later be found to be needed. The Ambassador did not seem to be satisfied

with



with any sort of answer I made. He continued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it were. I suddenly and emphatically interrupted him and with right inquired of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask all these detailed questions about a matter of no importance to his Government or to any other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desired now to know what the motive and purpose of his Government was for doing so. I said that there would never be any friction between my Government and any other government on account of anything unlawful or unfair that my Government may do, but that it would be due to something unlawful that another government may do. I added that I had devoted most of the past seven years to efforts at understanding and peaceful relations between our two Governments.

I then picked up two or three pages of material which had come in via the news ticker from Tokyo, in which the Japanese Government is reported to be discussing every day or two some phases of the Netherlands East Indies and its supposed special rights in them. I stated that I had not intended to show him this, that it had just come to my desk as the Ambassador came in, but I remarked with emphasis that it had been thought that the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each was obligated to respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thought that settled the matter as among our four countries, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the status quo, but I added that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Government of Japan, there was continually coming out of Tokyo additional discussions of the Netherlands East Indies as though the commitment to respect and preserve the status quo had not been made. I said that these were news reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but that the tenor of the reports interfered with the efforts of the Ambassador and myself and others to preserve understanding and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the part of the people in each country. I said that I would make no complaint now about the matter if that was a part of the newspaper policy in Japan. I added finally that my Government strives for peace year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, and, therefore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lie at the door of this Government. I said further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promote and preserve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of ours would not be misunderstood.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to disclaim any purpose of his Government to send him to me to enter into the long examination to which he was subjecting me when interrupted. He then repeated that his Government was entirely satisfied with the situation following the reiteration of the status quo in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each of the four governments interested, and that it had no purpose to raise any further controversy in that connection unless perchance the British or French should land troops there to protect them. I remarked that, since my /

Government



Government was interested, I had made inquiries of the British and the French, and gathered the unequivocal understanding that they had no idea whatever to intervene in the Netherlands East Indies in any way.

The Ambassador then made some reference to the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the West Indies situation, and I replied that I had seemingly in vain sought to point out to his Government that, under the Monroe Doctrine, his country's merchant ships have equal access to every harbor in the Western Hemisphere (not including a special arrangement between the United States and Cuba), while under the policy which his Government is seeking to impose in the Pacific Ocean area, the United States and other countries are to be denied equality of trade and industrial opportunity in every Chinese port, and yet his Government seems to look with complacency on this conflicting situation.

I again brought to his attention the information contained in the news ticker report today from Tokyo, in which Japanese newspapers, as stated, were undertaking to keep alive and emphasize some supposed special interests of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies. I said it seemed very surprising to observe that, after the Japanese Government had undertaken to spread itself out over the huge republic of China, there was an intimation in the news reports that it would not be content unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly take in the great archipelago comprising the East Indies, presumably with a view of shutting out all equality of trade opportunities among nations, while Japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in every other part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere in the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan.

The Ambassador again stated that his Government was satisfied about the Netherlands East Indies situation in the light of the renewed promises of each of the three other governments interested, and that they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contact the Netherlands East Indies. I expressed my satisfaction with his statement, but again reminded him of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japanese Government or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lines of discussion indicating a claim to some sort of special interest of Japan in the Netherlands East Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the status quo should be respected and preserved by each of the four governments; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond my recent statement on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said.

I still interpret the Ambassador's visit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Japan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the Netherlands East Indies.

C( ORDELL) H( ULL)



FOREIGN RELATIONS of the United States--Japan, 1931-1941

Vol. II, pp. 143-145

762.94/484: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

(Paraphrase--Extracts)

Moscow, March 24, 1941--3 p.m.

(Received March 25--7.30 a.m. 12)

581. This morning I was given the opportunity by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to talk with Matsuoka <sup>13</sup> for an hour.

.....  
Matsuoka was emphatic in stating that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singapore or any of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that Japan has no territorial ambitions. Japan, he said, was ready at any moment to join the United States in a guarantee of the territorial integrity or independence of the Philippine Islands. As an evidence of Japan's lack of territorial ambitions, Matsuoka referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina. He said that Japan would not go to war with the United States, and added that from his reading of American history it appeared that it was the United States which went to war with other countries; if a conflict should take place it would come about only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.

Matsuoka said that he desired ardently to liquidate the war in China at the earliest possible date. Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help, he said, and any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-Japanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concerned, he was in a position to do it by bringing his influence to bear in this direction upon Chiang Kai-shek.

I asked him whether he had in mind terms which he was sure Chiang Kai-shek would be entirely willing to accept and which would meet with the President's approval. He replied that instructions had recently been sent to Nomura <sup>14</sup> to take the subject up with the President and to discuss with the latter the terms on which the Sino-Japanese war could be terminated. Matsuoka said that now was the time when statesmen should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not the little things" that matter; in his opinion the President is afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far Eastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he wished the President and the Secretary of State would trust him; on his record over the past few years, he said, he did not blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that Japan had no territorial or economic ambition, and that if an understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he would fight to put it through should any elements in Japan oppose it.

12 Telegram in three sections.

13 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on special mission to the Soviet Union.

14 Japanese Ambassador in the United States.



In reply to what he had first said, I merely suggested to Matsuoka that he instruct Nomura most explicitly as to exactly what was in his mind as a basis for ending the war with China, and that he leave nothing open either to chance or to misunderstanding. Again he was emphatic at this point in insisting on the acceptability of the terms which he had in mind.

Matsuoka characterized as "ridiculous" any fears which were expressed in the United States over interference with supplies of rubber and tin, as these commodities were obviously for consumption in the only market that was large enough to absorb them; namely, the United States. It would be folly, he said, to interfere with the export of these commodities to the United States.

. . . . .

He expressed the opinion that it was to the Soviet Union's interest to encourage war between Japan and the United States, and he said that he was well aware of the harm to Japan which would follow from any such conflict.

. . . . .

STEINHARDT



STATEMENT OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE FUTURE  
OF EAST ASIA

3 November, 1938

By the august virtue of His Majesty, the Imperial Army and Naval forces have succeeded in occupying Canton, Wuchang, Hankow, and Hauiyang, and the main territory of China has been conquered. The National Government has been reduced to a local regime. But, as long as the regime continues the anti-Japan and pro-Communist policy, Imperial Japan will never lay down arms until the regime is completely destroyed. The ultimate aim of Imperial Japan is to establish a New Order which will secure eternal peace in the Far East, and this is the final purpose of the present war.

The foundation of the New Order can be established through the collaboration of Manchukuo and China with Japan in economics, politics and culture, based on cooperation and mutual aid. The New Order should aim at the establishment of international justice, anti-Communist cooperation, the new culture and economic unity in the Far East. This is what stabilizes East Asia and promotes world development. What Japan expects of China is for her to take partial charge of the duty of establishing the New Order in the Far East. Imperial Japan expects the people of China to understand Japan's sincerity and reply to Japan by giving her cooperation. In case the National Government starts its life anew by casting away the old policies and changing its staff, it will not be refused entry into the camp of the New Order.

Because Imperial Japan believes that the powers will rightly understand Japan's intentions and that they will change their attitude in order to suit the situation in East Asia, Japan is especially grateful for the kindness of the Allied Nations.

*NATIONAL  
Policy* Believing that the establishment of the New Order in the Far East is originating from the spirit of the national foundation, the completion of the task is the glorious mission imposed on the people of Japan. Imperial Japan should take firm steps to renovate the various internal systems, to develop the total power of the nation and should advance to attain the mentioned purpose.

This is the unmovable principle and resolution of the Imperial Government.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1644

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 3 November, 1938, and described as follows: "Statement of the Imperial Japanese Government Concerning the Future of East Asia" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of November, 1946.    /s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo                      Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shinojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of November, 1946                      /s/ Henry Shinojima  
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larsh                      Investigator  
Official Capacity



Foreign Relations of the United States

JAPAN  
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pp. 86-87

711.94/1539a:Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

(Paraphrase)

*Status Quo*

Washington, June 22, 1940-noon.

215. 1. Unless you perceive any objection, it is my desire that at an early moment you call upon the Foreign Minister and in strictest confidence explore with him in continuation of your conversations of June 10 and June 19, the question of possibly arriving at an understanding between the American Government and the Japanese Government through an exchange of notes along the following lines:

The interest of both countries in keeping to a minimum the adverse effects of the war in Europe is the basis upon which the understanding would be premised. The understanding would refer to this interest. In the proposed notes there would be expressed the agreement between the Government of the United States and the Japanese Government that they have a common desire that the status quo, except as it may be modified by peaceful means, be maintained with regard to the possessions and territories of belligerent European powers in the Pacific area. There might also be in the proposed notes a provision for consultation between the Governments of the two countries should any question arise involving the status quo in respect to the Pacific possessions and territories of belligerent European powers which renders consultation desirable in the opinion of either the Japanese Government or the Government of the United States.

2. In the proposed exchange of notes this Government envisages and would understand the phrase relating to possessions and territories in the Pacific area of belligerent European powers to cover and include their possessions and territories in all parts of the Pacific Ocean.

3. This suggestion relates to a particular and definite problem, that of averting an introduction of new complications and new possibilities of difficulty and friction into the general situation in the Pacific. As you will realize and will keep constantly in mind, it does not involve and should not be inferred to imply any withdrawal from positions heretofore taken regarding any specific problems in the relationships between the two countries. It is intended as a preventive rather than a curative measure. At the sametime, it is our belief, and we hope it will be that of



the Japanese, that the possibility of contributing substantially toward making situations better is within procedures which tend to prevent situations from becoming worse. If adopted, we believe this procedure would tend to turn public thought toward consideration of peaceful and constructive processes. It would tend to dissipate various suspicions which apparently prevail among the public and to curtail various types of inflammatory discussion and agitation. It would take care of the particular present and future problem to which it would expressly relate, and, although it would in no way dispose of the many and various specific questions which have been and are the subject matter of current and past discussion between our two Governments, it might facilitate solution of some of them.

Hull



## Foreign Relations of the United States

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711.94/1626

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

(TOKYO) June 24, 1940.

When I called on the Foreign Minister at 11 o'clock this morning at the private house of a common friend, we discussed in strictest confidence the suggestion proposed in the Department's telegram No. 215, June 22, noon, with reference to an exchange of notes regarding upholding the status quo with regard to the Pacific territories and possessions of belligerent European countries.

The Minister gave his close attention to the diverse points in my oral argument and all the questions he put to me were covered in the Department's instructions. When asked whether the Pacific mandated islands were included in our proposal, I answered that if he desired I would submit the point to my Government, but he did not pursue the subject.

The Minister said finally that the suggestion would be given his close study and that he would reply soon. He stated further that, unless a number of the many outstanding differences between the United States and Japan were first solved, he, offhand and in his own opinion, thought that the suggestion might be difficult to accept. When asked to which difficulties he referred in particular, the Minister replied that the absence of a commercial treaty was the outstanding difficulty.

In view of some of his comments I made clear at the conclusion of our talk that our present proposal must not be misunderstood to imply any retreat from positions previously held regarding any particular problems between Japan and the United States, but I added that I found it significant in my own opinion that our exploration today was regarded by my Government as the continuance of the conversations of June 10 and 19, which were entered into with the express intent of discovering means to ameliorate American-Japanese relations.

Mr. Arita said that the Japanese press must have called my attention to the trend of public opinion in Japan, which was strongly for closer relations with Germany and Italy and was continually growing in strength. He claimed that he was personally, as I well knew, in favor of a rapprochement with the United States, but that the situation today opened him to severe criticism, and that the problem was extremely difficult.

J(oseph) C. G. (rew)

Grew  
Brew  
matsumoto  
wrote  
an  
friendship



## Foreign Relations of the United States

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711.94/1628

Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs  
(Arita) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)  
(Translation)

(Tokyo,) June 28, 1940.

1. The views of the Japanese Government concerning the basic policy of the American Government as stated by Your Excellency at the time of our interview on June 19 are as set forth on a separate document. I wish to refer you, as well, to my oral statements of May 18, 1939, and June 12, 1940. While in comparing the two positions, there appear to be differences of opinion between our Governments, when consideration is given to the unavoidable conditions accompanying military activities on a large scale, I do not believe that the viewpoints indicated by our two countries are irreconcilable.

2. I have given the most careful study to the proposal which Your Excellency set forth at our meeting on June 24. In view of present international conditions, however, I doubt whether consideration should be given to an exchange of formal notes between our two countries on the basis of a policy of giving effect directly to this proposal. In Europe at the present time hostilities are progressing. Japan is greatly concerned with the effect which the development of the hostilities will have on the status of the possessions and territories in the Pacific area of European belligerent nations. Under this situation, during a transitionary period, for the United States and Japan, which countries are not belligerents, to conclude any sort of an agreement concerning these possessions and territories would, it must be feared, give rise to very delicate relationships for Japan which has taken a position of non-involvement. I am, therefore, endeavoring at this time to offset and to prevent the spread of the European disturbance to the Pacific Ocean and with that purpose in mind and from that point of view, I believe it to be timely and appropriate to consider whether or not there is no room for discussions of problems concerning only the United States and Japan.

3. As I stated on the 24th, however, we cannot consider the American proposal dissociated from conversations which have been held hitherto, and in order to make further progress in our conversations concerning your proposal I believe it to be necessary in the first place to be informed of your Government's views with regard to the statements set forth in my oral statement dated June 12th.



*Like 21370*

## FOREIGN OFFICE ANNOUNCEMENTS 1940:

Aug. 1, 1940. Announcement by the Japanese Government.

The world stands at a great historic turning point, and it is about to witness the creation of new forms of government, economy, and culture, based upon the growth and development of sundry groups of states. Japan, too, is confronted by a great trial such as she has never experienced in history. In order to carry out fully at this juncture our national policy in accordance with the lofty spirit in which the country was founded, it is an important task of urgent necessity to us that we should grasp the inevitable trends in the developments of world history, effect speedily fundamental renovations along all lines of government, and strive for the perfection of a state structure for national defense. Accordingly, the general lines of the country's fundamental national policies have been formulated as follows:

## Summary of Fundamental National Policies.

## 1. Basic Policy.

*Hakko Ichiu*  
The basic aim of Japan's national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of Hakko Ichiu, in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Japan will, therefore, devote the total strength of the nation to the fulfilment of the above policy by setting up swiftly an unshakable national structure of her own adapted to meet the requirements of new developments both at home and abroad.

## 2. National Defense and Foreign Policy.

The Government will strive for the repletion of armaments adequate for the execution of the national policies, by taking into consideration the new developments both at home and abroad, and constructing a state structure for national defense, capable of bringing into full play the total strength of the national



Japan's foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward a complete settlement of the China Affair, and the advancement of the national fortune by taking a far-sighted view of the drastic changes in the international situation and formulating both constructive and flexible measures.

### 3. Renovation of Internal Structure.

What is urgently required in internal administration is the laying of the foundation for a state structure for national defense through a complete renovation of the domestic administration in general, for which purpose the Government expects the realization of the following points:

A. Renovation of education thoroughly in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity, and also the establishment of ethical principles of the nation stressing, above all, service to the state and eradicating all selfish and materialistic thoughts.

B. Establishment of a powerful new political structure and a unified control of government affairs.

a. Establishment of a new national structure, of which the keynote lies in the service to the state through the co-operation between government and people, every man according to the sphere of profession or business.

b. Renovation of the Diet as an organ for assisting the Throne, so as to adapt it to the new national structure.

c. Fundamental renovation in the operation of administrative organs, and the reformation of the bureaucracy, aimed at the unity and efficiency of those organs.

C. Laying the foundation of national defense economy, of which the keynote is to lie in the autonomous development of the economy of Japan, Manchukuo and China with Japan as the center.

a. Establishment of a sphere of co-operative economies, with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the units.



b. Inauguration of a planned economy through the co-operation between government and people, and especially the perfection of a unitary control system covering the production, distribution and consumption of important commodities.

c. Establishment of a financial scheme and reinforcement of banking control, directed toward the development of the nation's total economic power.

d. Renovation of the foreign trade policy so as to adapt it to the new world situation.

e. Establishment of the measures for self-sufficiency in the people's daily necessities especially in the principal foodstuffs.

f. An epoch-making expansion of the vital industries -- especially heavy, chemical and machine industries.

g. An epoch-making promotion of science, and rationalization of production.

h. Perfection and extension of the communication and transportation facilities so as to adapt them to the new developments at home and abroad.

i. Establishment of land development plans aiming at the enhancement of the total national strength.

D. Inauguration of permanent measures concerning the promotion of the stamina and physical strength of the nation, and especially the fundamental measures concerning the security and development of agriculture and agricultural communities.

E. Rectification of the inequality in individual sacrifices incident of national policies; full operation ~~of~~ various welfare measures, and renovation of the living mode of the nation, and the maintenance of such standard of living as will enable the nation to lead a plain, solid and vigorous life and to surmount the national crisis by persevering truly through years of hardship.

Aug. 1, 1940. Statement of Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka.  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have always said that the mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate to kodo throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of the



*Kodo*

international relations, this amounts, I think, to enabling all nations and races to find each its proper place in the world. Accordingly the immediate aim of our foreign policy at present is to establish, in accordance with the lofty spirit of the kodo, a great East Asian chain of common prosperity with the Japan-Manchoukuo-China group as one of the links. We shall thus be able to demonstrate the kodo in the most effective manner, and pave the way toward the establishment of an equitable world peace. We should be resolved to surmount all obstacles, both material and spiritual, lying in our path. Furthermore, in concert with those friendly Powers which are prepared to co-operate with us, we should strive with courage and determination for the fulfilment of the ideal and the heaven-ordained mission of our country.



ARTICLE BY OSHIMA, HIROSHI, LT.-GEN., FORMER  
AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY, APPEARING IN 27 OCTOBER  
1940 EDITION OF YOMIURI NEWSPAPER.

Activate the Alliance.

Shun Diplomatic Passivity.

One cannot fail to be deeply stirred by the fact that a three-power alliance with Germany and Italy has been concluded an Imperial Rescript has been issued on the subject, and the road which lies ahead of Japan's millions has been made clear.

In the course of the world's history many alliances before this have been made, by which countries have thrown in their lot together, each with the object of looking after its own interests; but this Three-Power Alliance is completely different in spirit, and concluded on quite different principles. As the preamble to the treaty reveals, this alliance has as its object the founding of a new order in East Asia and in Europe, and, by extension, the establishing of lasting peace in the world, and primarily arises from the conception of justice. The Treaty does provide for mutual military support; but this is not an object in itself, and is only an unavoidable measure to be taken should some third power launch an attack on us with the intention of destructing the founding of the new order.

HAKKO  
ICHU  
How did such an alliance, the like of which has never been seen before, come about? It is not necessary to stage again here that as far as Japan is concerned, it arises from that idea of "HAKKO ICHIU", which has animated us since our country's foundation, and of which the lofty and noble spirit is now being manifested in the China incident. And in the case of Germany and Italy too, Hitler's statement in his New Year's Day speech this year to the effect that the object of the war is to liberate all Europe from British oppression and to found a new Europe shows that the trend of thought in those countries is the same as in ours.

But let us consider what will be the effect of the Treaty on the establishment of a new order in East Asia. Our country's stabilizing influence in East Asia has since the Meiji Era been exerted at the cost of enormous sacrifices for the preservation of peace and the upholding of justice, and has indeed achieved a noble record; but we have hitherto shouldered this difficult task alone. In recent times, however, a remarkable change has taken place in world conditions; the interdependency of nations has increased, and the whole world is much



more intimately bound together for common good or ill. Hence events in one part of the world exercise a multitude of affects on the other regions, and what happens in Europe causes an immediate reaction in Asia. In Japan, there has long been a tendency to regard the settlement of the China Incident and the European war as separate and distinct matters; but they are not two problems and ought to be considered as a unity. This being the case, I think that one must feel that the new alliance will facilitate our plans to settle the China Incident and set up a new order in East Asia, and that the same thing may be said with regard to the plans of Germany and Italy in Europe. We must, however, beware of the emergence of a feeling that everything can be left to the other party.

Indeed, from one point of view, as this treaty calls for our cooperation in establishing the new order of Germany and Italy in Europe, an additional responsibility is imposed upon us, and we have to make up our minds to this. Furthermore and in particular, as there are nations in the world desirous of maintaining the old system, there will be cases where obstruction is offered to the attainment of the common aims of the three-powers. We must not count upon this not happening, but rather upon having to expect it, and the nation, with unswerving resolution, must make careful preparations for this. Unfortunately in recent years there has been a tendency for all sorts of conflicting opinions to arise within the country and for useless and indeed harmful friction and disputes to develop. If this sort of thing continues in the future, we shall certainly not be able to accomplish our mission in the world; indeed we should realize that the result might unexpectedly imperil the future of the Empire. If in the past there may have been a lack of clarity on some points, now, with the conclusion of this new alliance, the great objective for which we must strive, the unexampled task of founding a new world order stands illuminated, as when a shaft of sunlight pierces a bank of cloud. Our people must not indulge in vain bickerings but stand foursquare, ready to burst through any barrier to the achievement of our aims. When a great work is undertaken, certain attendant risks are to be expected. This year is the 2600th year of the Imperial Dynasty. If we cast our minds back to the founding of the country in the distant days of the Emperor Jumu, or if we consider the two wars with China and Russia in more recent times, we realize that the Yamato race has never flinched from danger, but has gone steadily forward, staking its destiny on spreading the benefits of the Imperial Way. But never have resolute determination and firm courage been so necessary if our nation is to fulfill its mission as they are today.



Here I diverge a little from the topic, but a common cause of disputation in our country has been the practice of summing up a diplomatic trend with a catchword, such as "Independent Diplomacy", "Axis Diplomacy", "Cosmopolitan Diplomacy". Catchwords may be all very well for the ordinary affairs of daily life, but to use such simple phrases to label such significant matters as a nation's diplomatic tendencies is impossible. Such glib labels often fail to hit off the truth, and give rise to the danger of misconceptions. And furthermore if such catchwords are used designedly to cloak one's true intentions, the harm they do is still greater.

To return to the main argument, if there are some who consider the conclusion of the three-power alliance imposes an additional strain on Japanese-American relations, I think this opinion mistaken. Our mission to set up a new order in Greater East Asia and our determination to establish a relationship with the "Southern countries" conducive to mutual harmony and prosperity, are already matters of long standing, and it cannot be supposed that the new alliance has given rise to them. Of course in some circles in America there are likely to be those who view the new treaty as a warlike challenge directed against America. But such feelings will certainly not arise in the minds of those who read the treaty with any composure. Furthermore, I suppose nobody knows better than America herself that Japan neither plans to attack America, nor is she prepared to do so. One cannot therefore avoid the conclusion that those who maintain this opinion either dislike the idea of a new order being established in East Asia, or have designs upon East Asia themselves. And I feel we should have to face opposition from these people whether the treaty existed or not. Indeed, should the feeling arise in America that she should obstruct our establishment of a new order in East Asia by force of arms, this alliance is more likely to have the effect of nipping such a senseless idea in the bud.

Ever since the outbreak of the China Incident, there has been much to which exception could be taken in the attitude of America towards this country. But being wholly intent on settling the China Incident, we have put up with this, and waited for America to think better of it. It may well be thought that the conclusion of this alliance gives America an opportunity to revise her attitude. America is not the world's arbitrator. If on the American continent, with its vast territories and rich resources, she will work to establish a new order, and work together with the East and with Europe towards a common and harmonious prosperity, she will indeed make a great contribution



to world peace and to the happiness of mankind.

The treaty is now in writing. But its concrete realization is work for the future. The present state of the world being what it is, the treaty must be activated with all speed. And the first essential step to this is to complete our preparations for action rapidly. Now what concrete steps should we take with regard to our position of leadership in Greater East Asia under the treaty? We must establish a relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity with the N.E.I., French Indo-China, India, the South Sea Islands, etc.; we must then settle the relationship of this area with the new order in Europe; these are the points on which consultation with Germany and Italy is necessary. From the military point of view too; cooperation is necessary between the nations of the East and the West. We must perfect a plan which will leave no gaps in the bonds of mutual cooperation between the three countries; and in the diplomatic field too, the three countries must march ahead in perfect concord to protect our common interests against any outside country. Furthermore, as the policy of Germany and Italy for prosecuting the war in Europe is so closely bound up with the establishment of a new order in East Asia, discussions will be necessary in this connection also. This being the case, there is a tremendous amount of preliminary work to be done with regard to a relationship with Germany and Italy, and within our own country itself.

Of all things the one most to be avoided is passivity, allowing the other party to make the first move. Particularly in war and diplomacy is this prohibition absolutely imperative. Careful preparations must be made before the event; the world situation must be constantly watched, care must be taken to let slip no opportunities; situations must be handled speedily and decisively. I believe that these must be the principles of our diplomatic policy from now on, and that with this in mind the people must stand solidly behind the government.

The country's policy has already been clearly laid down, so anxiety about the matter is uncalled for; but if by any chance faith in this alliance should waver, or if it should be mismanaged and the treaty become a dead letter, then not only will the dignity of the Empire be impaired, but also the task of setting up a new order will be made more difficult.



A F F I D A V I T

I, Yusai TAKAHASHI, certify that from 1933 until December 1945 I was editor-in-chief of the "Yomiuri Shinbun" and that I recognize the attached International Prosecution Section document number 587A as an article written under the name of Hiroshi OSHIMA appearing in the Yomiuri Shinbun of October 27, 1940.

I further certify that the above mentioned article was published under the name of Hiroshi OSHIMA with his consent.

/ s/ Yusai Takahashi  
Yusai TAKAHASHI

/s/ Hiram E. Newbill Witness  
Hiram E. Newbill

Sworn before me this 8th day of November 1946 at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher  
ERIC W. FLEISHER  
2d Lt, AUS, MI  
Investigator, IPS