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6870	618-A	On 28 September Thailand again requested revision of River Mekong boundary but dropped subject of Laos and Cambodia until the position of French Indo-China is altered.
6975	628	Statement of Japanese Foreign policy was made by Japanese Foreign Ministry on 28 September concerning establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; economic agreement with French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies; increased coalition with Thailand; plans for Japanese control of areas in southern Asia; instigate independence movement in French Indo-China so France will renounce its right therein; plans for bases in Thailand; Straits Settlements to be placed under direct control of Japan.
6817	868-A	On 1 October the Total War Research Institute was promulgated under the Prime Minister's administration to control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war; personnel requirements, etc. On 1 October HOSHINO was also Director of Total War Institute.

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8560	861	<p>A cabinet meeting of 3 October was held on "Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China."</p> <p>Decisions were made to accomplish this construction by perfection of reorganization of national economy organization and strengthening of sphere of self-existence, expansion and organization of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.</p>
6865	618-4	<p>On 7 October a councillor of the French Embassy at Tokyo notified the Japanese of the 26 September bombing and they paid French 33,000 pesos compensation money.</p>
6627	597	<p>Memo from Wiesel of German Foreign Ministry of 8 October related to trade between Japan and Germany. It shows close economic cooperation between Japan and Germany in war material field and also that Japan contemplated at time of signing the Tri-Partite Pact that such a treaty would react unfavorably against Japan's trade.</p>
9723	1027	<p>On 10 October in a message from the Japanese Embassy to the United States Department of State, the former stated that it is difficult to concede that U. S. measures with regard to iron and steel scrap were modified solely in the interests of national defense - in view of the situation of iron and steel, their supply and demand, and the volume shipped to Japan.</p>

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6870	618-A	On 11 October, France again refused Thailand's demands of 13 September; thus situation grew tense and Thailand concentrated troops on the French Indo-China border.
9768	1031	<p>Grew informed MATSUOKA on 11 October that the setting up of a complete and discriminatory control of exchange had caused American trade in North China to come to a virtual halt. American enterprise had been driven from Manchuria, reduced to insignificant proportions in North China, and now it appears Japan intends to force the United States out of Shanghai.</p> <p>On 15 October, OKA, Rear Admiral, was appointed Chief of General and Military Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry and Assistant to Navy Minister in the Imperial Headquarters; also (8 November) Secretary of the National General Mobilization Council.</p>
11826	1303-A	The Van Moek book states that the Dutch and Japanese delegations met from 14-16 October under the chairmanship of Kobayashi and Van Moek. The Japanese delegation stated that despite the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan wanted firm friendly relations with the Netherlands East Indies and wishes for co-existence and co-prosperity. The Netherlands, stated that while the Tri-Partite Pact raised serious misgivings, they were willing to continue negotiations if it could be understood Japan had no hostile intentions nor claims leadership over Netherlands East Indies. The Netherlands requested

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11826	1309-A	Japan to submit a list of points to be discussed but oil could be treated separately if desired.
8607	Liebert	On 16 October by Presidential proclamation an embargo was placed on all iron and steel scrap except to the western hemisphere and Great Britain.
11817	1313	October 18 telegram from Kobayashi to MATSUOKA regarding the urgency of placing the Netherlands East Indies within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and in order to accomplish this Japan's economic powers should be deeply implanted in the Netherlands Indies. Certain items requested in the budget of the next fiscal year should materialize.
8558	Liebert	An ordinance concerning operation of funds of banks and other financial institutions were promulgated on 19 October and provided that all financial institutions were required to adjust their investment policies in accordance with the directives of the Minister of Finance.
11829	1309-A	On 20 October, two days after accepting the Netherlands proposals regarding negotiations, Kobayashi, the Chief Japanese delegate, left for Japan.
11829	1309-A	On 21 October a note was given by the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands, stating their appreciation for the Netherlands explanation of the petroleum situation on 7 October. It went on to state that Murai had found wide differences in the proposals of the two countries and that the proposed quantity of aviation gas and crude

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11829	1309-A	oil to Japan is almost nil. Japan would like the Netherlands to comply with her proposals. Also Japan is hindered in her exploitations of oil wells on account of the Netherlands policy of allocating spheres of interest to existing companies and is anxious to obtain rights to unexplored territories as well as government reserves. Murai is ready to enter into negotiations.
9769	1032	On 24 October Grew informed MATSUOKA that since 1 October Japanese regulations governing control of inspections and shipments of raw materials for light industries in North China are destined to result in large financial losses unless modified.
11837	1317	A Cabinet decision of 25 October stated that the Netherlands East Indies must from the economic standpoint become a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Measures must be taken to stop Netherlands East Indies depending on the European-American economic bloc and all restrictions removed which hinder Japan's economic activities. Japan must be allowed to purchase agricultural products, obtain special cooperation from Netherlands East Indies in export of merchandise, obtain entry to unopened ports, have more freedom in fishing industry, inaugurate an air service, and although not including Netherlands East Indies in the yen bloc, must try to place exchange control under Japan's guidance and Netherlands East Indies

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11837	1317	banks should establish credit to the Japanese and give them financial facilities. Third Powers' interest in the Netherlands East Indies must be stopped and newspaper propaganda on Anti-Japanese view controlled. Various measures such as inviting influential natives to Japan and by propaganda are to be resorted to, and the economic policy is aimed to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and expand Japanese interests.
11834, 11835	1316	On 25 October Saito cabled MITSUOKA referring to Murai's telegram to the Chief of Fuel Affairs Bureau that from the standpoint of the industrialist it is most reasonable, but it is necessary that further consideration be given from the strategical standpoint. The application for prospecting in indicated areas may arouse Netherlands East Indies' suspicion, and those in Batavia think it necessary that Japan fortify certain areas in Dutch New Guinea etc. with planes and plain-clothes troops for a strategical base for operation against the Dutch. A large investigation is necessary and Saito advocated that prospecting rights be acquired for whole areas, taking into consideration strategical standpoint when selecting districts.

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11734	1299-4	<p>An article in Yomiuri newspaper of 27 October written by OSHIMA justifying the Tri-Partite Alliance as a peaceful instrument and stating that Japan must establish a new order in East Asia. A relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity must be established with French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies and the South Sea Islands to be settled with the new order in Europe and consultations with Germany and Italy. The Axis must unite in their efforts since the prosecution of the war in Europe is closely bound with the new order in East Asia.</p>
11831	1309-4	<p>On 29 October Murai requested that certain uncommitted oil territories in Borneo, Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, Aroa Archipelago and the Schouten Archipelago be considered as Japan's Sphere of interest, Japan would like acknowledgement of these spheres of interest for her in order to explore and exploit them and requests that the necessary steps according to the mining law be taken. Japan may consider the capital participation of Netherlands East Indies in these enterprises. Japan would also like shares in the N. V. Nederlandsche Indische Ardolie Maatschappij and requests terms and conditions.</p>

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5284	462	Announcement of Cabinet Information Bureau No. 5, November stated that now a new phase has been entered since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact, Cabinet Council have decided on summary of the program for economic construction embracing Japan, Manchukuo and China.
6873	618-A	At a ministers' conference on 5 November (TOJO War Minister), it was decided to help Thailand in her boundary fight with French Indo-China and make her cooperate politically and economically in establishment of a new order in East Asia.
3004	244	The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 5 November cabled the Vice Minister of War Anami concerning change of ambassadors to Manchukuo. On 7 November KIMURA was appointed to Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee, and Land Development Committee.
3005	244	Vice War Minister telegraphed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army on 8 November stating change in ambassadors to Manchukuo was approved.
9771	1033	On 15 November Grew complained to MATSUOKA that merchandise owned by U. S. interests is being refused to re-export permits from Indo-China as a result of Japanese pressure, and requested steps be taken to put an end to this interference.
11844	1309-A	On 15 November the Netherlands Minister recommended to the Vice Foreign Minister in Tokyo that the negotiations be discontinued, since they were at a standstill for lack of subject matter.

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6874	618-A	On 19 November France refused Japan's request to cede territory to Thailand.
11844	1309-A	On 20 November a verbal note stated that a new special envoy had been appointed by the Japanese for the Netherlands negotiations in order to speed up the proceedings.
6270		On 21 November OKA was appointed Councillor to the Cabinet Planning Board.
6444	563	A telegram from Ott to German Foreign Ministry of 21 November was introduced to show how German aid to Japan against French Indo-China and Siam served as a springboard for attack on Singapore. Discusses Japanese and Anglo-Saxon efforts to win Thailand over to their side.
6873	618-A	The second Four-Minister (TOJO, War Minister) conference was held on 21 November where it was decided to help Thailand to gain control of Pro-bang and Pakuse as well, provided she agreed to Japanese demands.
9724	1028	On 22 November, Sir Robert Craigie in a memorandum to the Japanese Foreign Minister, gave a survey of the very large number of outstanding Anglo-Japanese cases in China, some dating back to 1938, and Japanese laxity in settling them, he enumerates many by date and location.
9773	1034	On 26 November, Grew protested to MATSUOKA on the arresting of the American Vice Consul and United Press correspondent in Hanoi.
6873	618-A	On 28 November a clash occurred between French Indo-China and Thailand troops in the vicinity of Laos.

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11345	1307-4	On 28 November, Yoshizawa was appointed Japanese special envoy for the Netherlands negotiations.
6427	561	A conference between Weizsacker and Ambassador Kurusu of 29 November showed that within several months after the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, collaboration between the three powers was taking the definite course of preparation for Japanese advance through the region south of China as a prerequisite for an attack on Singapore. Conclusion of Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese agreement would pave the way for these advances.
5323,	464	On 30 November a joint treaty was concluded
5327	465	between Japan and the new Japanese controlled
	40	government of China, and joint declaration of
		governments of Japan, Manchukuo and Japanese
		controlled China as part of plan of establishing
		a "New Order in East Asia."
4793	396	On 9 December, the U. S. consul at Tsinan made
		a report on the cultivation, sale and use of
		opium in the Tsinan Consular District.
8607	Liebert	On 10 December, the U. S. embargo on iron and
		steel was placed under licensing system.
5421	560	A telegram from Ott of 13 December concerned
		the invaluable work OSHIMA and SHIRATORI have
		done and can do as ambassadors in Berlin and Rome,
		and urged OSHIMA to once more accept post as am-
		bassador to Germany because of his understanding
		of German-Japanese policy.

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		In December 1940 SHIRATORI, Toshio wrote an article entitled, "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" which was published in the publication "Contemporary Japan", regarding the treaty between Japan-Germany-Italy concluded in Berlin on 27 September.
3001	243	A telegram was sent on 16 December from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of War and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff concerning trade pact between Japan, Manchukuo and China and Germany.
9778	1036	On 17 December Grew reiterated to MATSUOKA his complaint of 15 November concerning export permits from Indo-China for United States goods.
7930	787	A Privy Council meeting attended by TOJO was held on 18 December at which MATSUOKA stated that relations with USSR should be regulated at the moment when USSR sees no menace in Japan.
6449	567	Telegram from Ott to Reich Ministry on 19 December tells of Japanese Foreign Minister's plans to visit Rome and Berlin to coordinate Tri-Partite Pact and overcome deadlock in negotiations with China and Russia.
		On 20 December OSHIMA was reappointed Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Germany.

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417	559	On 20 December an agreement was made providing for the establishment of a general commission and two technical commissions to be formed under the provisions of Article IV of the Tri-Partite Pact.
		on 21 December HIRANUMA was appointed Home Minister. SUZUKI, Lt. General, was appointed Director General of China Affairs Board and Councillor of Total War Research Bureau.
6269,		On 26 December MUTO was appointed Councillor of the South Seas Bureau of the Overseas Affairs Ministry and OKA was appointed Councillor of the Bureau of Southern Colonization, the Overseas
6270		Affair Ministry.
6451	568	Telegram from Ott to Reich Ministry of 31 December stated that the Foreign Minister was preparing to leave for Berlin.
10194	1128-A	SHIMADA stated in interrogation that Yamamoto submitted his plan for Pearl Harbor to the General Staff in January 1941.
8096	Sejima	Sejima stated in direct examination that he incinerated plans for the Japanese attack on the USSR planned to take place in 1939. From the plan, it appeared that Japan had contemplated an attack against "Far East-Russia" occupying Voroshilov, Vladivostok, etc. His position at the time was in Military Operation Section where he was in charge of the safeguarding and burning of secret papers; in this capacity he was told in the Spring of 1941 to destroy aforesaid plans, which he read before doing so.

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8097	Sejima	Sejima testified to the plan for the attack on the Maritime Provinces and against Russia prepared in 1941. Offensive to be taken in Sui Ren Ho district and extended towards Blagoveshchensk and Rubyshevska. Plan was an offensive plan, and the one for the following year was on the same lines.
1315	154	The orders of Restriction of Publication in newspapers and others, otherwise known as Imperial Ordinance Number 37 was enacted on 10 January and prohibited publication of any news which might hinder conduct of foreign affairs or national policies, or conduct of financial and economic policies and that which must be kept secret from foreign countries.
10057	1103	On 13 January a Liaison Conference was held attended by TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
6423	261	Address made by MATSUOKA on the occasion of a farewell party for OSHIMA on his departure for Germany on 15 January. MATSUOKA wished OSHIMA well and reiterated the confidence OSHIMA had gained from the German government, their pleasure at his appointment and the importance of his mission to further cement German-Japanese relations.
3451	352	Communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry to Ministry of Finance - Chief Finance Bureau, 16 January, requested confidential preparation of original plates of military currencies to be used in unspecified areas.

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11845	1309-A	<p>On 16 January, the new Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies headed by Yoshizawa presented a memorandum on their requests. It stated that in view of the fact that the Netherlands East Indies is thinly populated and undeveloped, Japan is of the opinion that if she participates in the exploitation and development of these islands great benefit will be reaped by both countries, therefore she makes the following proposals:</p> <p>That the entry of Japanese nationals into Netherlands East Indies be greatly facilitated, restrictions on medical practice be removed so Japanese medicos can practice in Netherlands East Indies, Japanese be afforded favorable treatment in Japanese-Netherlands East Indies joint enterprises, mining projects be allowed, unrestricted fishing permitted, air service established by Japanese, ports opened to Japanese, submarine cables laid, establishment of Japanese businesses facilitated, import quotas arranged, and friendly customs treatment afforded Japanese imports.</p>
11057	1103	<p>Liaison Conferences were held on 16, 17 and 19 January, attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.</p>
10301	1157-B	<p>TOJO stated in interrogation, that at the time he had agreed with MATSUOKA's speech of January when he stated the Tri-Partite Pact was the realisation of the ideal of Hakko Ichiu.</p>

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4886	425	On 21 January the U. S. Treasury Attache in Shanghai issued a report on the opium monopoly distribution there. He attached a Chinese inclosure signed by Lee Ming.
11740	1300	In a speech to the Diet by MATSUOKA on 21 January he stated that the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China should be intimately and inseparably related with Japan. Kobayashi (Minister of Commerce and Industry) had been sent to the Netherlands East Indies to discuss negotiations for purchase of oil, but had been obliged to return when the negotiations were at a definite stage and had been replaced by Yoshizawa.
9613	1008	On 22 January, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to try to make the President and other people appreciate the fact that if, as it seems, there is no means of finding mutual understanding between Japan and the United States, then Japan has to join with countries other than the United States and Great Britain. Japan, in order to prevent war, and for her own defense, had decided to contract an alliance with the Axis. Whereas, Japan's actions in China were considered to be aggressive and unjust, her actions there were based entirely on the desire to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the principle of "The World Under One Roof" and she was not thinking of excluding foreigners from this region.

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8807	865	On 22 January, the Cabinet decided to enforce a population increase policy to insure a source of military strength as part of Japan's General Military Preparations - Goal was set as 100,000,000 domestic population by 1960.
		On 23 January, MATSUOKA, MUTO and OKA were appointed Japanese members of joint Japan-German-Italy Committee in Tokyo, and OSHIMA to similar Committee in Berlin.
6981	629	Memo of Weizsacker dated 23 January which stated the Japanese Ambassador mentioned a conversation between Ott and the Vice Foreign Minister, the British influence on Vichy must be prevented since Japan's advance in the direction of Singapore necessitates use of Malacca Peninsula and the passage through Indo-China and Siam.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 23 January attended by HIRANUMA and TOJO.
9879	1067	An extract from the Japan Times and Advertiser of 23 January stated that the fundamental principles of Japan's population policy were decided at Cabinet meeting after HOSHINO, President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Welfare, Education and War (TOJO) Ministers gave explanations and decisions.
8451	852	Communication No. 2. Top Secret Sanctioned, 24 January bearing seals of several prominent officials referred to the subject of preparation and printing of military currency notes

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8451	852	and is acknowledgment of the communication and the matters contained therein by the several officials.
11856	1318	On 27 January 1941, Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA that since the more favorable position of the Allies through the defeat of Italy in the Mediterranean and increased United States aid, Netherlands East Indies had evidenced a strange attitude towards Japan and is even expressing her opposition on every measure. Unless Japan adopts determined measures not only the negotiations development, but also the development of relations would be difficult.
11743	1302	MATSUOKA instructed the Japanese delegate in Batavia on 28 January that Yoshizawa should absolutely refrain from using expressions that would deny Japan's hegemony within the Greater East Asia Sphere when speaking to outsiders.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 30 January attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
6982	630	Telegram from Leahy in Paris to Secretary of State, Washington, of 28 January re German refusal to allow French troops to enter French Indo-China, as if they do not wish to have French defense strengthened there.
6429	562	Telegrams from German Ambassador in Tokyo to the Reich Foreign Minister, dated 31 January, showing that the Japanese Government and people were united behind the Tri-Partite Pact and SHIRATORI led the demand for attack on Singapore

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6429	562	and thus inspired the making of a research study of such an attack by the Military Specialists of the German Embassy in Tokyo. Confliction with United States increased.
11744	1303	KIDO stated in his diary of 1 February that Prince Fushimi, Premier Konoye and General Sugiyama reported to the Emperor the policy which was decided at the Liaison Conference of 30 January regarding French Indo-China and Thailand.
	44	The use of naval and air bases was decided and the grasping of the opportunity afforded Japan by French Indo-China and Thailand having accepted arbitration would contribute to the preparation for the southward policy.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 3 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
11852	1309-4	On 3 February the Netherlands answered the Japanese proposal of 16 January. This memorandum stated that while the Netherlands wished to afford neutrals improved economic relations, consideration must be given to the progress and emancipation of the Netherlands East Indies people and the maintenance of a strict non-discrimination affording no preponderance of foreign activity in any economic field. The Netherlands refuted the Japanese statement that the Netherlands East Indies were not developed and stated it was self-supporting. While there is naturally room for improvement, it was pointed

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11852	1309-A	out that agricultural emigrants to Java were 50,000 persons a year and still increasing and Netherlands East Indies is not in need of immigration. Japan's share in imports is larger due to the buying power by exports by Netherlands East Indies to third countries.
8607	Liebert	<p>On 3 February copper, brass, zinc, nickel, and potash were placed on the embargo list by Presidential proclamation.</p> <p>On 5 February MATSUOKA was appointed Japanese mediator in dispute between France and Siam.</p>
6446	564	Telegram from Ott to German Foreign Office, dated 6 February regarding Japan's plans to obligate France and Thailand by secret agreement whereby they will make no military or political agreement with a/ Third Power.
11858	1319	Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA on 6 February reporting that MATSUOKA's speech on the Co-Prosperity Sphere had caused a great shock in the Netherlands East Indies and has been greatly publicized. He went on to complain of other irritating press releases and stated that the Dutch Minister, doubting Japan's intent, has requested recognition by Japan of the exiled government as the de jure and de facto government. Armed force seems to be the only way to make the Netherland East Indies a member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and full preparations must first be made to meet this eventuality. Otherwise Japan will have to choose peaceful economic negotiations, however unsatisfactory. If the latter case is so then speeches

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11858	1319	and actions must conform to this policy to aid negotiations. The most recent developments in Tokyo do not cover this aim.
9782	1039	<p>In a proposal from Anthony Eden to SHIGEMITSU on 7 February it is stated that although at the outset the British Ambassador had hoped the new cabinet would cooperate and settle problems peacefully, subsequent happenings reported to him did not illustrate this intention. The signing of the Tri-Partite Pact and the attitude that only Japan is entitled to mediate in affairs in the Far East can not be overlooked. In regard to the Far Eastern situation, Britain wishes to make it clear that although she has territories in the Far East, she harbors no aggressive intent, and has no objection to Japan formulating her own policy, but hopes that it will not lead to a terrible disaster.</p>
9789	1040	<p>On 7 February SHIGEMITSU replied to Eden, stating that he was not aware of such a critical situation and that England failed to understand Japan's intentions. While Britain accused Japan of cooperating with her enemies, she had consistently cooperated with Japan's enemies. Geographically, Japan should lead Asia, and this does not differ from the special interests which Britain and the United States feel to their neighbouring countries.</p>

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9648	1009	Telegram MATSUOKA to Nomura of 7 February tells him to impress upon the U. S. that Japan is not so exhausted by the China fighting as is supposed there. Japan has no intention of fighting the U. S. and they should co-operate lest the U.S.S.R. should bolshevize all China.
37	631	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 9 February regarding Japanese desire to assist Germany in getting rubber and other raw materials; telegram from Berlin approving Japanese intention in agreement with France and Thailand and these countries would make no agreements with third powers, awaiting further news on affairs in Indo-China.
6453	569	Telegram from Ott to Reich Minister dated 10 February states that MATSUOKA is to leave shortly for Berlin to discuss mainly: (1) attitude of Tri-Partite partners to America; (2) attempts to keep America out of the war. If this is unavoidable, Japan is considering a preventative attack on Singapore to eradicate the United States from the Pacific. (3) termination of China conflict.
11861	1045	On 13 February Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA, stating that the Netherlands East Indies were now much closer to the United States and Great Britain and that the South Seas problem, particularly Netherlands East Indies, is an important cause for United States expansion of naval ships. Netherlands East Indies is more inclined towards being in United States hands than Japanese, since they

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11861	1045	can expect positive aid from United States and Britain. Success of the negotiations, due to Netherlands East Indies following United States attitude, seems remote and the only means of settlement left is for Japan to exercise her real power. No success can be obtained in negotiations by Japan shouting for a co-prosperity sphere under her leadership.
4798	398	An article from the Japanese-owned newspaper "Little Critic" of 13 February gives indication that Japanese residents at Tsingtao were opposed to present Japanese narcotic policy.
9794	1041	On 13 February MATSUOKA cabled SHIGEMITSU, informing him that he intended to see Craigie in a few days and asked SHIGEMITSU to hand Eden his telegram No. 47 and explain the reason he expressed so unreserved an opinion is that he felt so close to him. He stated Craigie's report was a fantasy and groundless. SHIGEMITSU is to make verbal representation that Japan has no intention to make trouble with England.
11057	1103	A Liaison Conference was held on 13 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
9798	1043	In a memorandum of 14 February of Hull, he stated that the President had informed the new Japanese Ambassador on his visit to him that Americans were concerned about Japanese movements south to French Indo-China, etc., and her entry into the Tri-Partite Pact. In view of these situations it might be wise for the State

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9798	1043	Department officials to frankly confer with him (the Ambassador) to see if relations could be improved.
9797	1042	Grew informed MATSUOKA on 13 February that Japanese officials in Indo-China continued their interference in granting permits to United States firms.
9804	1045	On 14 February MATSUOKA cabled Nomura in Washington and stated that he had urged at a recent Diet session reconsideration of Japan's attitude towards the United States. He set out a list of points which Nomura was to make clear to the United States Government. These points embraced the national policy of Japan and her determination to carry it out, also the fact that the China war had not exhausted Japan's supplies.
6446	565	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 17 February concerning difficulty of arranging treaty due to Thailand's excessive demands. Hope to effect compromise and press Vichy Regime to accept.
10043	1101	MATSUOKA, in a reply to Eden of 17 February, stated that Japan is surprised at Britain's concern over the Far Eastern situation, based on reports of Ambassador Craigie. He stated that Japan was also anxious over British and United States movements in the Pacific and South Seas, and some quarters are advocating that Japan take steps to meet the worst in these regions. He again stated Japan's peaceful intentions and her

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10043	1101	<p>motto is "no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." Japan is ready to act as a mediator anywhere, and he hoped England would agree that there is a grave responsibility to restore peace, which can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesmanship willing to be accommodating and generous.</p>
9801	1044	<p>MATSUOKA stated in a telegram to SHIGEMITSU on 17 February that Craigie's report seemed to be based the idea that Japan wanted military bases in French Indo-China and Thailand, and he did not know on what grounds Craigie had based this report. When the Vice-Minister stated this was based on speeches and actions of military men who controlled Japan's diplomacy, MATSUOKA stated he could find nothing to substantiate this.</p>
9811	1046	<p>On 18 February MATSUOKA cabled SHIGEMITSU concerning a conversation with Craigie to discuss Japanese-English relations. Japan accused England of misinterpretation of her actions and when Craigie inquired if Japanese mediation policy in the French Indo-Chinese-Siam conflict would not reap exorbitant compensation, MATSUOKA stated that Japan's real reward would be in the restoration of peace.</p> <p>On 19 February SHIGEMITSU was appointed Ambassador to China.</p>
11057	1103	<p>A Liaison Conference was held on 20 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUFO and OKA.</p>

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9816	1047	Craigie wrote MATSUOKA on 21 February with respect to the presence of British troops near the Malaya-Thailand border. A communique which had been issued by Thailand regarding their presence stated in effect "both countries still respect the Treaty and pact of non-aggression concluded between one another", while the Japanese press had misquoted this by stating, "Great Britain should respect the Non-Aggression Treaty which she concluded with Thailand."
6456	570	Report of conversation at Berlin between OSHIMA and Weizsacker on 22 February shows close German-Japan collaboration plans for Russian Pact, settlement of China matters, and plans for capturing Hong Kong and Singapore.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 23 February attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUFO and OKA.
6992	623-A	Excerpt from conference of Ribbentrop and OSHIMA of 23 February in which Ribbentrop refers to Germany's victory on continent as conclusion of Tri-Partite Pact being great advantage to Japan. Whereas in former times Japan's friendship enabled Germany to re-arm after Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany's victory has eliminated France as a power in Asia and greatly weakened English strength, allowing Japan to advance closer to Singapore.
7862	769	
9821	1049	An interchange of communications between Japan and Britain of 24 February stated that Churchill was pleased to see that MATSUOKA sees

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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9821	1049	no reason to feel any untoward developments in the Ea. There is no question of Britain's attacking in the Far East and Britain's concern was not only based on Craigie's reports, but on events in the Far East. Britain is fighting to overthrow a system of lawlessness and violence abroad and tyranny at home and to gain no personal advan- tage.
9819	1048	SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA on 24 February and related a conversation with Premier Churchill in which the latter expresses regret at the present worsening of Anglo-Japanese relations. He stated that measures in Singapore were merely defensive, and Britain had never taken any offensive policy towards Japan. England would emerge victorious from the present conflict and the mediation sug- gested by MATSUOKA would not arise.
9826	1050	OSHIMA informed MATSUOKA in a telegram of 25 February that he had stressed various matters con- cerning Japanese-German relations with Ribbentrop. He told the latter that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact and everyone is moving forward to the realization of the national policy with the pact as a keynote to foreign relations.
9828	1051	On 25 February SHIGEMITSU cabled MATSUOKA and told him that he had informed Churchill that MATSUOKA's offer was not one of mediation. SHIGEMITSU pointed out that most problems be- tween England and Japan had arisen out of the China situation and he regretted England had

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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9823	1051	been giving concrete assistance to China. The time had come for a constructive policy in the Pacific through goodwill and mutual understanding. Churchill stated Britain had kept strictly neutral in this situation and that Japan's intentions after the Tri-Partite Pact had been so vague that both Britain and the United States had become suspicious.
4797	398	Report from American Consul Tsingtao to Secretary of State on 26 February regarding New Opium Prohibition Bureau inaugurated at Tsingtao. Criticism of enforcement of opium restrictions.
9835	1053	Proposition of 27 February by SHIGEMITSU to Churchill stated that MATSUOKA wished to state that there was no hint of his readiness to act as mediator. MATSUOKA wished to reiterate what he had said before on the Tri-Partite Pact; it was a peace pact to prevent a third power from entering the European War or Sino-Japanese conflict.
9833	1052	On 27 February Grew cabled Hull and related a conversation with MATSUOKA, who had interpreted the stationing of British troops on the Malaya-Thailand border, and the reinforcement of Singapore, as offensive measures. Grew expressed amazement at this and stated that the United States should be guided by facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance and her occupation of many parts of Indo-China.

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	EXHIBIT REFERENCES	REFERENCE
6403	572	Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 27 February regarding encouraging Japan at all costs to take early possession of Singapore.
6456	571	<p>Extract from report of conversations between OSHIMA and Ribbentrop on 28 February states that after agreement made with Russia, Germany felt herself secure on the continent; bombing of England caused serious retard in her war effort; Japan needed by Germany in order to cut off England's possessions in the Far East, advocacy of early attack on Singapore.</p> <p>On 1 March HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army.</p>
7568	721-A	Excerpt from Military Topographical Data for the purpose of landing operations in the Northern Sea, Vol. 2, March - which contains military topographical data necessary for landing operations in 15 districts of the Soviet peninsula Kanchatka. Seizure planned by Japanese General Staff.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 2 March attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA & MUTO.
6469	573	Directive issued by Hitler's headquarters, 3 March, concerning collaboration between Germany and Japan, showing directives for cooperation with Japan which directly resulted from the OSHIMA-Ribbentrop conference: (1) mutual plans of action; (2) Japanese seizure of raw materials; and (3) conquest of Singapore.

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9841	1054	MATSUOKA cabled Nomura on 4 March desiring that Nomura, in answering certain types of questions act in concert with him since he had answered affirmatively when asked whether Japan would participate in the war if the United States should attack Germany.
6635	600	Letter from German Ambassador to Vice Foreign Minister of 5 March showing that Boltze replaced Ott as German Ambassador, when latter was absent in Germany.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 6-7 March attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, TOJO.
9842	1055	A newspaper announcement with respect to the new mobilization law of 8 March stated that detailed regulation of the National Mobilization Law will be enforced on March 20.
	98	On March 8 new Peace Preservation Law was promulgated.
9843	1056	A memorandum of Hull of March 8 related to a conversation with Nomura in which Hull inquired whether he considered the United States could sit back and watch two or three large military forces being assembled. Nomura was evasive and played on the subject of U. S. embargos. Hull expressed the United States concern at Japanese aggressive policies.
6993	633	Exchange of letters of 11 March between MATSUOKA and Henri - to Henri: Japanese offer to mediate dispute between French Indo-China and Siam. To

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6993	633	MATSUOKA: French Government accepts plan of mediation by Japan and for protection of its colonies will not enter into agreement with third powers.
8550	Liebert	Promulgation of the National Savings Association Law 12 March, under provision of National General Mobilization Law, with purpose of providing for establishment of Savings Associations to encourage thrift accounts, and associations in turn bought up national bonds with their assets.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 11 March attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO. On 12 March MATSUOKA was appointed to visit Europe.
6447	566	Telegram from German Ambassador, Tokyo, to German Foreign Ministry of 12 March re visit of Ohashi to express thanks for German support in mediation of Thailand-French Indo-China dispute.
9847	1057	14 March memorandum of conversation between the President and Nomura, stresses American anxiety as to Japanese intentions due to MATSUOKA's loud talk, and the unexplained presence of Japanese forces near Saigon and Thailand.
8290	Liebert	The Imperial Oil Company Law of 15 March (Law No. 73) established the Imperial Petroleum Company, a national policy company, to survey and develop oil fields and to control the purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products.

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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
6474	571	<p>Report dated 18 March of Commander-in-Chief of German Navy to Hitler, giving suggestion that Japan should speedily attempt to eliminate Singapore. Japan is making such plans but withholding action until Germany invades England; Japan wishes to avoid war with the United States and can do so if she takes Singapore soon, says Commander-in-Chief.</p> <p>MATSUOKA should be advised regarding the designs on Russia.</p> <p>On 18 March SATO was appointed Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry), Secretary of Manchurian Affairs Board and Liaison Committee of East Asia Development Board.</p>
4831	400	<p>Report Treasury Attache, Shanghai, dated 19 March, giving information that two Chinese were controlling numerous heroin dens operated by Chinese in Peiping. They work in cooperation with Japanese.</p>
11748	1334	<p>In a memorandum of 21 March for the German Foreign Minister, it is stated that the subject of obtaining rubber and tin for Germany from Netherlands East Indies and Thailand through Japan in exchange for foreign bills of exchange will have to be discussed with MATSUOKA. Germany feels that freest possible trade should be afforded her, and as yet no aggravation has arisen to the Japanese conception that Germany deal with China, Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies through Japan alone, since Germany is dependent on Japanese imports during the war.</p>

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PAGE	EXHIBIT WITNESS	REFERENCE
1216	180	On 24 March the U. S. Ambassador to Russia cabled the U. S. Secretary of State regarding a conversation with MATSUOKA, who stated emphatically Japan had no territorial ambitions and would on no account attack Singapore, or any United States, British or Dutch possessions. Japan would not go to war with the United States, and MATSUOKA stated that such a conflict would take place only as a result of affirmative action by the United States.
6476	575	Memorandum from Weizsacker to Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March, regarding debate on when Japan will enter war against England. Germany will agree to forfeit the Netherlands East Indies claim and other South Seas possessions, yet Japan apparently awaits further German success against England. MATSUOKA still friendly to Russia but should be advised of change in German policy towards Russia in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey.
6477	576	Memorandum by Ott for German Foreign Minister of 25 March regarding situation of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy planning for attack; air force attack of Singapore aided by German dive bomber specialists advising Japanese; promote good terms with Russia to avoid fighting on that side; suggest German specialists assist Japan's war economy in conquered areas to maintain free flow of raw materials from Netherlands East Indies and Malay.
6485	577	Minutes of conference between Hitler and MATSUOKA
7943	790	of 27 March, Ott and OSHIMA present, outline of

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6485	577	points favorable to an attack; MATSUOKA's mention
7943	790	of circles in Japan opposing this until actually forced to do so - he believes only matter of time till Japan will attack and cannot promise anything for his Government, but will promote to the utmost the goals indicated. MATSUOKA insists 3-Power Pact was not concluded on basis of expectation Germany would win, but rather on belief in a new order. This belief was his life's labour and he devoted all his energies to it. MATSUOKA then wishes to discuss his visit to Stalin in Moscow - he impressed Stalin that Japan was opposed to Anglo-Saxon capitalism in China and also that the Anglo-Saxons were greatest menace to New Order in Asia. The Anglo-Saxons were a mutual enemy of Japan, Germany and Russia. Conference ended with MATSUOKA's praise of Hitler's leadership and the unity of German people behind him.
6498	578	Record of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA of 27 March, in which Reich Foreign Minister gave survey of situation from Germany's point of view as follows: Germany has had high successes on land and sea and her own production is likewise high; she has practically subjugated her enemies. Smaller countries of Europe are agreeable to Tri-Partite Pact. Food in Germany will never become critical; raw materials have certain set-backs, such as rubber. Reich Minister believes Axis have practically won the war - he expects English capitulation this year.

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		<p>England might have given up sooner except Roosevelt gave them much hope. America promises aid to England, but it will be long time till she can produce modern war materials. Tri-Partite Pact aims mainly at frightening America to keep her out of war. Hitler discusses advantage Japan's entering war, especially to strike at Singapore which would also restrain Roosevelt. Hitler believed it advantageous for Japan to enter the war. The seizure of Singapore would be a decisive factor.</p>
7913	783	<p>Excerpt of talk between MATSUOKA and Ribbentrop of 27 March, in which it is stated that Germany concluded pact with Russia because Japan at the time could not join in pact with Germany. In view of approaching war had to conclude pact with USSR.</p>
4795	397	<p>Report of 28 March from American Consulate at Tsinan regarding Japanese Army profits through sale of heroin to renegade Chinese troops.</p>
6513	579	<p>Notes on conversation between German Foreign Ministry and MATSUOKA on 28 March, regarding closer co-operation between Germany and Japan. Hitler pleased with MATSUOKA's activity in this matter. Great Britain must be utterly defeated, particularly Singapore must be taken to insure Japan's control of the South. Germany would help Japan in event of attack by Russia. As to the United States, it would not risk its fleet beyond Hawaii, attack on Singapore would ensure American</p>

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neutrality. Germany was four times her strength in First World War, she and Italy would rule Europe, England might collapse sooner than expected. MATSUOKA asks Germany's attitude to America if England were beaten. Reply: If England were beaten, Germany has no interest in war with United States. If England were beaten, Germany-Italy would control Europe, Japan control Far East and United States limit herself to the American continent. MATSUOKA plans commercial treaty with Russia, but Japan is against Russia joining Tri-Partite Pact. Germany agrees to commercial treaties, but would not have Russia in 3-power pact. Japanese look with concern at war with the United States as it might last 5-10 years. If Japan conquered Singapore and took the Philippines, she would control the Far East. MATSUOKA favours German Minister's line of thought and said if Japan did not risk attack on Singapore, she would be relegated to being third-rate power, so that blow would have to be dealt one day. If she kept United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome.

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On 28 March Konoye cabled Yoshizawa, stating that he agrees that Yoshizawa's ideas on the settlement are only reasonable ones, but states that if the negotiations fail the impression that Japan is easily dealt with will be given to the enemy, and the latter will thus intensify operation. In view of the changed situation since MATSUOKA's visit to Germany, and the proposed visit of the

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11864	1320	Foreign and Colonial Ministers, Japan's original demands for acquiring resources should be pushed. Care must be paid to the fact that the negotiations do not fall into the Dutch plan to get rid of the Japanese representatives, since their presence there is imperative.
8452	852	Top secret communication of 29 March referred to printing of "Ha" and "Ni" series currency notes, pursuant to conference of 24 January.
6522	580	Report of conversation between Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA dated 29 March, regarding pending discussion of MATSUOKA with Russians.
7939	789	Germany asks he not go too far. Germany promises aid to Japan should Russia ever strike. Germany's largest army was on the eastern front and should Russia conflict with Germany, it would be beaten in a matter of months. Japan could always attack Singapore without fear of having Russia at her back. Also regarding such an attack, Japan need have no fear of the British Fleet as it was already tied up in home waters. Japan states no fear of British or American Navy, as she could smash either, but battle with the United States Navy might drag five years. Germany insists America could do nothing if Japan attacked Singapore. If Japan took the Philippines, America, because of inadequate armament would have nothing to offset such a loss. MATSUOKA meanwhile was doing everything to assure England she had no designs on Singapore. Germany believes Japan's declaration

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6522	580	of war on England should be attack on Singapore.
7939	789	<p>Looking to trade after the war, Germany and Japan would co-operate as between European and Far Eastern spheres; America would be self-sufficient in her own sphere. Possibility of three powers trading with South America. Japan would need German assistance in development of China potentials; Japanese business feared German competition more than American or British; German business felt exactly the same way. MATSUOKA brings up his discussion with Russia regarding Japan-Russia non-aggression pact. Also, Japan desired to purchase part of Sakhalien for oil resources which Russia took "as a joke." Germany did not care to go deeply into Japanese-Russian affairs but again pressed the point that Japan could best assist 3-powers pact by attack on Singapore.</p> <p>With a resultant joint victory, Japan would then have all she desired. MATSUOKA asks if Germany would assist her in attack on Singapore; Germany would have to study maps, refer it to Hitler; her aerial advices would always be available to Japan. Japan was assured she would also get control of the Netherlands East Indies upon the fall of Singapore. Germany would do as much as possible to assist Japan in the Far East, but it must be remembered that she was fighting Britain and the British fleet in the Mediterranean, whereas Japan was only fighting on the surface.</p>

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6533	581	Discussion between Goering and MATSUOKA of 29 March - Germany will make available to Japan all her military tactics, and especially air force improvements made during the war. Germany requests promised shipment of rubber, which she says she needs to supplement her synthetic rubber. MATSUOKA said he had done as much as he could to expedite this matter and did not know the exact situation just now.
1040 1047	141	Extract from "The Way of a Subject," 31 March - denunciation of Anglo-American imperialistic union since World War I, national development and expansion of Japan gave rise to jealousy among European and American nations and they attempted economic pressure on Japan.
11751	1305	A decision by Imperial Headquarters of April states that Japan must establish close military, political and economic relations with French Indo-China and Thailand, and close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies. Arms are only to be resorted to in the event the embargos or anti-Japanese encirclement of United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China became so tense they cannot be tolerated.
8452	852	On 1 April the Chief of Cabinet Printing Bureau ordered the manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni" series of military currency immediately in Dutch and English, to be completed in early April.

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8545	Liebert	Law concerning Extraordinary Exception from Application of Convertible Bank Note Law was passed on 1 April, which suspended the provisions which governed the monetary reserve of the Banks of Japan, Chosen and Taiwan and dissolved the distinction between specie reserve (gold and silver) and judiciary reserve (commercial paper and government bonds). These provisions and others had the effect of giving completely artificial value to yen.
8803	864	Excerpt Japan Year Book 1941-1942, giving details of further revised Military Service Law of 1 April with main points: (1) enrolment of new conscripts in overseas districts into garrisons nearest to their residences; (2) abrogation of 2nd reserve Service System; (3) prolongation of days of call for the education of supplementary reservists.
9850	864	Extract from KIDO's diary of 3 April refers to the appointment of SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board and Toyada as Minister of Commerce, with which KIDO agreed. On 4 April SUZUKI was appointed Minister of State and Chief Director Cabinet Planning Board; HOSHINO became a member of the House of Peers.
6537	582	Conversation between Hitler and MATSUOKA of 4
7945	791	April, in which MATSUOKA expresses thanks for gifts and friendliness showered on him during his stay in Berlin, and upon his return to Japan would seek to assure his people that they are treated by Germans with "honest friendliness and respect."

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6537	582	MATSUOKA requests German help in submarine warfare matters. In the event of war with England and the United States they would fight guerilla warfare in the Pacific and also request Germany's aid on this. Hitler promised this, and said Germany likewise considered war with the United States undesirable. Such war would depend on transportation, and Germany had extensive plans for U-Boat and Luftwaffe to prevent American landings in Europe. Germany would strike in the event of war between Japan and America. MATSUOKA again requests Germany's inventive aids as Japan feels Japanese Navy must prepare for immediate conflict with America. He has always believed conflict with America unavoidable, sooner or later. He personally argued Japan should strike soon and decisively and then perhaps avoid war with America for generations. She would then have firm hold in the South Seas. If she waited, she would have to fight anyway, and perhaps under less favourable conditions. MATSUOKA says America implies by notes she will not fight Japan unless Japan attempts to aid in the destruction of England. Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the United States and England would always help each other against the world. MATSUOKA requested no cables be sent regarding Singapore matter, but he would advise by courier of Japan's decision in the matter.
7945	791	

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6545	583	<p>Conference of Reich Foreign Minister and MATSUOKA in Berlin of 5 April, where at the Foreign Minister assured MATSUOKA Germany is full of vitality and absolutely certain of victory. MATSUOKA replies what he saw in Germany and Italy far exceeded his expectations; he was convinced Germany and Italy were united and would always remain so; remarked on high German morale. MATSUOKA questions Reich's intention towards smaller states; reply that they would be independent within the European whole, even maintain small armies and police force; England never again to meddle in the affairs of smaller nations. A basic mistake of the Versailles Treaty was increasing the number of European states; they should have been decreased. Reich Minister asked MATSUOKA to bring these points back to Japan: (1) Germany had already won the war; (2) there were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany; Germany-Italy rule Europe; Japan rule the East; (3) Germany would win the war, but Japan's entry into the war would hasten this.</p> <p>On 9 April NAGANO was appointed Chief of Naval General Staff.</p>
9852	1059	<p>On 9 April a proposal was presented to the Department of State through the medium of private American and Japanese individuals. This plan outlined methods to reach a peaceful settlement of the present difficulties between the two countries.</p> <p>On 10 April KIMURA was appointed Vice War Minister.</p>

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11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 10 April attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.
9869	1062	In a letter from Churchill to MATSUOKA on 12 April, he stated he had certain questions to ask. They were: Will the Germans, without command of the sea or daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Britain in the first nine months of 1941? Will the Germans try to do so, and would it not be better for Japan, until these questions are answered, to wait? Etc. He then said that the answer to these questions might enable Japan to avoid a serious catastrophe and bring about an improvement in Anglo-Japanese relations.
6553	45	On 13 April the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact was signed.
6553	584	Telegram from Boltze of German Embassy in Tokyo, dated 14 April, regarding the signing of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Russia. It would facilitate Japan's expansion policy in South Asia and attack on Singapore.
9873	1064	Grew complained to Konoye on 14 April of the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, and the resultant damage to United States property.
9861	1060	On 14 April a memorandum of Hull stated that Nomura might like to explore the question of improving United States-Japanese relations. Hull informed Nomura of the document of 9 April submitted by private individuals and suggested that it could be used as a basis for preliminary negotiations. Nomura agreed and stated his desire to do

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		anything within his power to preserve peace.
9866	1061	<p>In a memorandum of Hull dated 16 April he again referred to the document of 9 April, being a basis for negotiations, and there were many points on which the United States agreed, and some which would require further discussion. Nomura stated he could answer the questions, or submit them to his government for answer. Both agreed that they had not reached the stage of negotiations, but were only exploring in a preliminary and unofficial way the action which might pave the way for later negotiations. The four principles as to which the questions were submitted by Hull were:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity. 4. Non-disturbance of the <u>status quo</u> in the Pacific except as the <u>status quo</u> may be altered by peaceful means.
11057	1103	<p>Liaison Conference was held on 17 April attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA and MATSUOKA.</p>

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9875	1065	An extract from KIDO's diary of 19 April stated that after reporting to the Throne and conversing with Konoyo concerning Nomura's instructions, they concluded that every effort must be made to keep good faith with Germany and Italy, while realizing new order in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
9872	1063	In a telegram from MATSUOKA to Churchill of 22 April, he acknowledged his note of 12 April and stated that Japan's intent was to bring about the Hakko Ichiu, and there would be no conquest, oppression or exploitation, and that Britain may rest assured concerning Japanese Foreign policy.
8452	852	Top secret communications of 23 April referring to arrangements for the manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni" series military currency notes.
6630	598	Draft of a work programme for the economic sub-commission of the Tri-Partite Pact in Berlin dated 28 April concerns cooperation by signatories of Tri-Partite Pact in economic field, war and post-war period. Exchange of economic information between governments, mutual support in procurement of raw materials, etc.
9877	1066	KIDO's diary of 28 April relates to a question by the Emperor concerning who should be consulted on diplomatic matters when the Premier, Foreign Minister and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were ill, and asked about the progress on deliberation on Germany's policy towards the United States. KIDO expressed his opinion on these questions and had the Chief Secretary submit them to the throne. On 2 May HOSHINO became Councillor of Total War Institute.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 3 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, and OKA.

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8607	Liebert	On 5 May the U. S. State Department revoked all licenses for shipment of scrap rubber to Japan and occupied China.
9884	1068	Ott in a cable to Ribbentrop of 6 May reported a conversation with MATSUOKA, the general outline of which was the proposal by America, which MATSUOKA thought originated through a report from the United States Ambassador to Russia, whom MATSUOKA had told that Japan would join with the Axis if the United States joined the war. Dealing with the United States proposal will lead to strained relations in economic circles and MATSUOKA wants to make the United States pledge not to participate in the European War. Regarding Russia, MATSUOKA stated the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was an offshoot of Russian fear of Germany and in the event of German-Russo conflict, Japan would be forced to attack Russia, and no neutrality pact could change this.
9891	1069	On 6 May Grew reported to MATSUOKA that the Consulate of Kunming had been seriously damaged in a raid of 29 April.
7159	46	On 6 May treaties of residence, navigation and customs system were concluded between Japan and French Indo-China, giving Japanese equal rights with nationals of that country.
7140	658	
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 8 May attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, OKA, TOJO.
6999	47	On 9 May peace agreement between France and Thailand signed.
6999	634	Memorandum from Chief of Staff, French Indo-China Expeditionary Force to KIMURA, dated 10 May, concerned incident of assault on Japanese military employee by French Indo-Chinese soldier as one which might cause

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severing relations of the two countries (reference to outbreak of China Incident in same way). Suggest Japan demand right to increase troops and area of its activity, freedom of housing and travel and free use of airfields.

11057 1103 Liaison Conference 12 May attended by MUTO, HIRANUMA, OKA, TOJO.

8805 864
 1038 On 10 May the National Defense Security Law was enforced to safeguard the secrecy of high state secrets regarding diplomatic, financial and economic matters.

9894 1070 On 12 May Nomura submitted to Hull a draft proposal of an agreement between the two countries. This draft concerned policies to be followed; that the United States should request Chiang Kai Shek to negotiate peace with Japan along the lines of Konoye's plan, bearing in mind that Japan's expansion in the southwest Pacific is of a peaceful nature; and declare the Philippines independent with non-discriminatory treatment for Japan. These are some of the main points brought out.

11867 1309-A' On 14 May the Japanese delegation to the Netherlands East Indies presented a new order, stating in reconsidering their Memorandum of 16 January they are presenting a new proposal by which to clarify that the Japanese viewpoint expressed in the preamble was still firmly held.

7984 807 On 15 May Ribbentrop cabled the German Ambassador to Tokyo concerning the fact that the present time was the most opportune moment to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Vladivostock, since Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. Japan must be made aware of this fact without directly forcing the issue.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9904	1071	<p>A draft suggestion from Hull to Nomura of 16 May showed that the United States made certain amendments to the draft plan. They wished a change wherewith Japan would declare the purpose of the Axis alliance defensive, and would only adhere to the military obligations in the event one of the parties hereto were aggressively attacked by a power not involved in the European War, whereas the United States would declare its attitude based on considerations of protection, self-defense, and national security. An amendment concerning the termination of the China War was submitted and a guarantee of equal opportunity for economic activity in the southwest Pacific.</p>
11057	1103	<p>Liaison Conference of 15 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, OKA.</p>
9908	1072	<p>Grew informed MATSUOKA on 17 May that the consulate at Kunning had again been damaged on 12 May.</p>
9910	1073	<p>Ott in a cable to Ribbentrop of 18 May reported on a conversation he had had with MATSUOKA. Ott told MATSUOKA that Germany wished America to give a clear assurance that she would not participate in the European conflict. MATSUOKA stated he would not jilt the Tri-Partite Pact and his motive in the negotiations is to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States into war and eliminate the increase of United States assistance to England. MATSUOKA stated he would inform Germany of the United States reply and as far as possible consult with German and Italy on further negotiations. MATSUOKA stated there were elements who are uncertain of Russia's actions, to whom he had to yield in the face of alleged United States entry into the War. HIRANUMA,</p>

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he stated, had to resign when the German-Russian non-aggression pact was signed.

9918 1075 OSHIMA cabled MATSUOKA on 20 May stating that he was deeply troubled concerning the many rumours of negotiations between Japan and the United States and finds it his duty to inform MATSUOKA of the opinion of the German Staff and himself. He then gave a long survey of German reactions and decisions on the proposed pact between the United States and Japan and stated in conclusion that such a pact might cause bewilderment concerning Japan's true policy. If it had to be, he suggested that Japan should make clear her adherence to the principles of the Tri-Partite Pact and demand the United States neutrality in the European War. In order to avoid any misconception regarding Japan's intentions, she should thoroughly convince the Axis about the meaning of the agreement.

9933 1076 OSHIMA cabled MATSUOKA on 21 May and stated that the new agreement is thought to be an important change in Japan's policy and it is of great concern to the plans of the Japanese military and naval attaches in Germany. (Attaches received copies)

11057 1103 Liaison Conference held 22 May attended by TOJO, MUTO and OK

11868 1321 On 23 May MATSUOKA cabled Yoshizawa, SHIGEMITSU and Nomura regarding an interview with the British Ambassador, Craigie. MATSUOKA told him that Netherlands East Indies still refused to supply the demanded tin and rubber to Japan, stating former supplies could be cut since Japan obtains some from French Indo-China. Holland claims that there is danger of Japan re-exporting these commodities to Germany; but while MATSUOKA insisted that the exports from French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies together

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are insufficient for Japan's needs, Japan considers it humiliating to give assurance to a small country like Netherlands East Indies that she will not re-export. If the negotiations fail, then the situation may incite not only anti-Dutch but anti-British and anti-United States sentiment.

6557 585 Secret instructions of 24 May from Headquarters German Army based on report by attache in Tokyo:

 (1) if United States and Japan are to fight, question of how Japan should open the war;

 (2) possible war between Germany and USSR caused United States to join war; (3) conclusion of China conflict before any other new tasks for Japanese army.

10752 Ballantine On 28 May Hull made it clear that the proposed formula with respect to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan's peaceful intention towards the United States should the United States become involved in a war with Germany.

9935 1077 A memorandum dated 28 May concerning a conversation between Ambassador Nomura and Hull related that Hull had informed Nomura that MATSUOKA on his return to Japan had been declaring Japan's support of Germany in the event of war between Germany and the United States, and stated that, unless Japan clarifies

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her obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact if the United States enters the war, there is no assurance of Japan's position. Hull also asked if Japanese troops were to be retained in China and Nomura replied he thought a permanent force would be stationed there, but he did not know how strong. Hull stated this would not aid Japanese-United States friendship, since their presence might tend to produce incidents.

11057 1103

A Liaison Conference was held on 29 May attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.

11910 1326E

On 30 May, Chuang at British Penang wrote to Hayashi, President of the Japan South Seas Association, Batavia, reporting on his activities to stir up trouble by spreading rumours and committing sabotage. They have decided to corrupt soldiers and organize 5th column activities in readiness for when the fighting begins.

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9938 1078

An informal oral statement by Hull to Nomura on 31 May stated that the U. S. will at some proper time prior to any definite decision talk over in strict confidence with China the general subject matter of the discussions, especially as it relates to China.

9938 1078
 1079

On 31 May another American draft of the proposal to adjust relations was handed to Ambassador Nomura, bringing out the same points mentioned in previous drafts and stating in regard to China that the U. S. will, on the basis of the Konoye principles, suggest to China she enter into negotiations with Japan. A statement was also handed to Nomura at the same time as the draft, saying that they were giving an unofficial exploratory and without commitment oral explanation to the amendments proposed.

9961 1081

Hull in a memorandum of 2 June stated that he had asked Nomura if he seriously believed Japan was seeking a peaceful settlement with the U. S. on Pacific matters, or whether the negotiations were merely a method of finding a way to get out of China. Nomura stated that Japan was honest in her intent and that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.

9963 1082

Grew complained to MATSUOKA on 4 June that on the 1st of June the Episcopal Mission at Chungking had been seriously damaged for the fifth time.

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9965 1083

A memorandum of Hull dated 4 June referred to a conversation between Hull, Nomura and others regarding the pact negotiations. It was stated that Japan was prepared to drop the suggestion that the U. S. state that it would not resort to any aggression aimed to assist one nation against another, if the U. S. would drop the statement in its draft requiring Japan to state that the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of defense. Amendments regarding cooperative defense of China against injurious communistic activities were suggested by the Japanese, as well as the acceptance by the U. S. of Japan's declaration as to their peaceful aims in the southwest Pacific.

9982 1085

In an informal statement of 6 June from Hull to Nomura he stated that Japan, by her many revisions to the original text of the proposed pact, seems to have strayed from the fundamental points which the U. S. considers involved in establishing peace in the Pacific. Japan has stressed alignment with the Axis to avoid giving a clear indication of its intentions to make peace with China on a lasting basis.

10753 Ballantine

On 6 June Hull told Nomura that he had the impression from the various revisions to the proposal and from recent manifestations that Japan was disposed to stress her alignment with the Axis.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
11071	1300-A	In a memorandum of 6 June the Netherlands answered Japan's memoranda of the 4th and 22 May. While stating that Japan had modified some of her demands she still adhered to the preamble of the 16 January memorandum, which advocated a special position for Japan in Netherlands East Indies since it was not adequately developed. The Netherlands reiterated her policy in Netherlands East Indies as stated on 3 February 1940 and stated that during war economic activities in the Netherlands East Indies would inevitably be affected since the defense of N.E.I. must be safeguarded and the Dutch war effort promoted.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference 6 June attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
9979	1084	An extract from KIDO's diary of 6 June referred to OSHIMA's report from Hitler that Germany would attack Russia and Hitler had intimated a desire for Japan's participation. Konoye called a Liaison Conference that morning to consider this. KIDO reported this to the Throne. MATSUOKA told KIDO that he did not think an outbreak of war very likely in spite of OSHIMA's message, and the War Minister endorsed this.
11875	1322	On 7 June Yoshizawa cabled MATSUOKA stating that although the Netherlands reply of 6 June had some points in favor of Japanese demands,

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the prospects for obtaining the full demands on immigration, important commodities, etc., were not bright. In view of MATSUOKA's protests to the British and Dutch it is impossible to accept the Dutch reply but it appears that the Dutch will not accept Japanese demands since their attitude is firm. Failure of the negotiations would result in the loss of many vital supplies, such as petroleum, and only strengthen the bond with the United States and England and the situation would be grave. The probability that the Japanese delegation may be asked to leave must be considered and Yoshizawa asked for instructions immediately.

On 9 June DOIHARA, General, was appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General, remaining Supreme War Councillor.

6560 586

On 10 June in a telegram from Woermann to the Reich Foreign Minister, it is shown how execution of Japanese plans of aggressive action in southern areas had progressed by this date. The Japanese Army desired bases in south Indo-China for the purpose of strategic position with Singapore.

11880 1309-A

The Netherlands delegation met the Japanese delegation on 10 June at the latter's request. Technical matters were discussed and it was clear that Japan wished to wind up the business.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
9981	1086	On 11 June in a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop he stated that General UMEZU welcomed the Japan-Russo Neutrality Pact at the moment, but when German-Russo relations changed Japan's attitude must do so, too, since the Tri-Partite Pact is basis for Japan's foreign policy.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 11, 12 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO, OKA.
11879	1323	On 14 June MITSUOKA cabled Yoshizawa stating that Japan had decided to break off the conference and withdraw the delegation.
9988	1087	On 15 June a draft of a proposal was received from Nomura, wherein it was proposed that the United States and Japan jointly conclude a declaration for resuming traditional relations, it being the desire of both governments that the deterioration of relations between them be corrected, and that by such cooperation establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific could be realized. Both agree on isolation from European War, except where it affects their own national defense, and a resumption of trade negotiations of all commodities except those needed for their own security and defense.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference of 16 and 17 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA. Japan declared its willingness to enter into treaty with the U. S. at any time for neutralising Philippine Islands when they become independent.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7155	660	On 16 June, a meeting of Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held concerning Treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China, and the Treaty between France and Japan concerning the Tariff System and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China, was presented for ratification. The non-official proclamation of the protocol was explained by the fact that it was to be enforced gradually and Japanese influence to be extended by degrees.
9996	1088	On the 16th of June, Grew in a telegram to Hull stated that at an appointment with MITSUOKA, he had delivered a note in regard to the recent bombing of Chungking, which had resulted in heavy damage to the U. S. Embassy and jeopardized lives of the U. S. Ambassador and others, pointing out the grave danger to U.S.-Japanese relations in consequence of such action.
11880	1309-A	On 17 June Yoshizawa visited the Governor General of Netherlands East Indies and both concurred that an agreement could not be reached. The negotiations, while not having been unproductive, would have to be discontinued. Yoshizawa presented a joint communique which was agreed upon and stated both nations' regret at the failure in the negotiations, but the discontinuation would

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not lead to a change in normal Netherlands East Indies-Japan relations.

9998	1089
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On 18 June, KIDO stated in his diary that at a visit with Konoye and MATSUOKA, the latter had told him that instructions had been sent to Germany to negotiate with Vichy in connection with the French Indo-China problem.

On 19 June SUZUKI was appointed member of the Thought Control Committee.

9998	1090
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On 20 June, KIDO in his diary stated that Konoye informed him in view of strained international relations and outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, it was difficult to understand MATSUOKA's opinion. When Konoye referred to Cabinet responsibility, KIDO promised they would discuss matter with HIRANUMA, Home Minister, at earliest opportunity.

8607	Liebert
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On 20 June, an executive order was issued banning all petroleum exports except to Great Britain and South America (by the US).

7910	781
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On 20 June, KIDO relates a discussion between Konoye, HIRANUMA and himself in which Konoye said that if war broke out between Germany and the USSR his Cabinet would have to take the responsibility and resign, as the HIRANUMA Cabinet had done in 1939 when Germany made a pact with the USSR while the Tri-Partite Pact was under negotiation. KIDO opposed this, saying that the circumstances were different.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7008	635	Telegram from Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister, 21 June concerning conversation with MATSUOKA and plans for air bases in French Indo-China in preparation for attack on Netherlands East Indies.
10001	1091	<p>On 21 June, in a statement to Nomura, Hull said although he had no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders shared Nomura's views, accumulating evidence showed some influential official Japanese leaders support Nazi Germany and its policies, envisaging Japan's fighting with Hitler in the event of U.S. becoming involved in the European War. The U.S., in view of Japan's wish to provide in its settlement with China the stationing of troops in parts of Inner Mongolia and North China to cooperate in resisting communism, while not desiring to enter into the merits, did not feel that the policies to which the U. S. is committed would permit it to associate itself with a course inconsistent with these policies and must await a clearer indication from Japan to pursue a course of peace. Nomura was then handed a revision dated 21 June to the document handed to him on 31 May.</p>
10009	1092	<p>On 21 June the draft proposal of a settlement between the U. S. and Japan was handed by Hull to Nomura. This draft was substantially the same as the one of 31 May with certain amendments - one being that with regard to the European war there be an exchange of letters</p>

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in place of the annex and supplement. Also that question of economic cooperation between China and Japan could be more advantageously settled when all points in that respect had been worked out and that the entire Pacific area be substituted for the western area.

10021 1093

On 22 June, KIDO stated in his diary that he was informed of the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany and he spoke to the Emperor presenting his opinion based on talks with Konoye and HIRANUMA and there had been difference of opinion between Konoye and MATSUOKA regarding Japanese foreign policy in case of war between Germany and Russia. It was desirable that the Emperor ascertain whether MATSUOKA had consulted the Premier and try to prevail ^{upon} him to follow Konoye's opinion. KIDO again saw the Emperor after MATSUOKA had had audience when the Emperor was doubtful whether government and Supreme Command would agree that MATSUOKA's policy for Japan's advance to north and south would ever be appropriate. MATSUOKA explained to Konoye that his report to the Emperor was his prospect for the future.

6561

Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June.

7958 795

Telegram from Ott to Berlin, 22 June, it was shown that on first day of German attack on the USSR, MATSUOKA refused hostile attitude to USSR, MATSUOKA received telegram from OSHIMA stating rumours Russia had withdrawn her forces from the Far East; MATSUOKA explained he would immediately propose counter-measures.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10024	1094	On 23 June KIDO in his diary stated that at an audience with the Emperor he had expressed his opinion on the Foreign Minister's report. He also discussed with Konoye and SUZUKI of the Planning Board the changed situation caused by the German-Russo War and agreed in principle with SUZUKI's opinion on the unifying and reinforcing of the Imperial General Headquarters.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference held on 23 June attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA.
956	793	Extract from Diary of Smetenin, USSR Ambassador to Japan on 25 June, states that MATSUOKA was asked if war occurred between Germany and Russia would Japan remain neutral and he replied Japan's foreign policy is based on the Tri-Partite Pact and supersedes the neutrality pact with Russia.
10026	1095	On 25 June KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye had discussed privately with Wang Ching Wei his opinion with regard to the question of general peace. U.S. assistance would be needed to win over certain Chinese and carry out political demarche to Chiang, but in order to meet the situation and avoid pro-American politicians again gaining influence, they would have to properly post people in the government. The adjustment of relations between Chiang and Wang would be placed in Toyama's hands. Although senior officers in

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the Japanese Army Hq in China understood Chinese policies, contacts between superiors and inferiors were bad and corrupt practices of Army were rife. KIDO saw the Emperor and Konoye and Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs reported to the Emperor on decision of Liaison Conference as to entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.

11753 1306

A Liaison Conference attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA on 25 June decided to accelerate all preparatory measures in Thailand and French Indo-China, such as stationing of troops in the southern part, acquisition of air and naval bases. Diplomatic relations will be opened to accomplish this; failing that, Japan will obtain her object by arms.

11057 1103

Liaison conferences were held on 26, 27 and 28 June attended by TOJO, HIRANUMA, MUTO and OKA.

10029 1096

On 28 June telegram from Ribbentrop to German Embassy at Tokyo stating that Ribbentrop had agreed with OSHIMA that he should influence his government towards speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and requesting German Embassy at Tokyo to use their influence to the same end. Ribbentrop outlined arguments to be used.

10034 1097

On 28 June Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that so far no clear cut decision had been reached by the Cabinet regarding Japan's

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		attitude to the German-Russo War. Preparations for an attack will take at least 6 weeks unless USSR weakens. Ott asks for instructions regarding activity in the south in view of the fact that southern expansion may be limited to FIC and thus hinder Japan's activity in the North; he also stated that OSHIMA had advised Japan to attack Russia soon.
6561	587	Ribbentrop cabled Ott on 28 June stating he agreed with OSHIMA that Japan should attack Russia soon. He should use as arguments to further this the fact that the annihilation of Russia would make Germany's victory over England possible, would solve the China problem, would protect Japan's rear in order to expand southwards, and be the best way of convincing the United States of the futility of entering the war.
10037	1098	In his diary of 28 June KIDO stated that TOJO had explained the Kwantung Army should be calm and prudent in dealing with the German-Russo War. They also discussed the China War, political moves in China and the strengthening of the I.G.H.
11057	1103	Liaison Conference held on 30 June attended by HIRANUMA, TOJO, MUTO and OKA
7962	797	On 1 July in a telegram from Mackensen, German Ambassador in Rome, sent to Berlin, he relates a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who said that Japan's intention was to advance actively against Russia but

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that such a policy would necessitate the resignation of MATSUOKA since the latter had recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with Soviet Russia. Japan's politics should aim at preventing America from entering the war.

10145 1108

On 2 July KIDO stated in his diary that that morning the national policy regarding the Russo-German War had been decided at an Imperial Conference. Konoye complained to KIDO he found it difficult to understand MATSUOKA's true intent. KIDO also had a conference with the Emperor and arranged to establish headquarters within the Imperial Court.

6566 588
 1107
 779

At the Imperial Conference of 2 July attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, HIRANUMA and OKA, relating to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the disposition of the China Incident, and dealing with the Northern problems according to the situation; Japan will remove all obstacles in attaining this policy. Japan will pursue her schemes against FIC and Thailand, continue negotiations with relevant nations in the south and take measures. While not taking up arms against the Soviet, Japan will secretly arm - and if that war progresses favorably, Japan will take arms to solve the problem. Japan must prevent U.S. intervention in the war, and if this

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fails she will follow the Tri-Partite Pact, deciding independently the time and method. Japan will continue pressure through southern regions to hasten surrender of Chiang's regime and prepare for war with Britain and the United States.

7008 636

Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo to German Foreign Minister dated 3 July concerning Japanese plans to secure "points" in French Indo-China to strengthen her pressure on Britain and America; that Japan has and will continue vigilance over the southwest Pacific against these two powers.

7009 637

Report of proceedings of Privy Council meeting of 3 July on ratification of Franco-Japanese Protocol. Outlines terms of protocol: - maintenance of friendly relations between two countries; respect each other's integrity; no regional restrictions on plans with Third Powers; maintain the peace of East Asia, etc. MATSUOKA explains Germany's treaty of non-aggression with Russia was for expediency only. MATSUOKA mentions political superiority over France, since its defeat in war in Europe and giving of 80% demands made by Japan.

7961 796

On 3 July, Ott cabled the German Foreign Minister stating that immediately upon receipt of his telegram of the 2nd, he had called on MATSUOKA personally and brought his attention to the Cabinet resolution, which will certainly not be understood by the people. MATSUOKA said

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that the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present Suetanin (USSR Ambassador) was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the USSR as is hinted at in the government resolution.

10154 1111

Weizsacker in a report to Ribbentrop on 3 July stated that when he had drawn OSHIMA's attention to a periodical describing Japan's attitude as iridescent; OSHIMA stated that he had received reports from Tokyo indicating that Japan wanted to continue fighting the communists with Germany, strengthen her military preparation, and bring pressure to bear on British and U.S. possessions in the southwest Pacific to tie them down. Japan's foreign policy was still based on the Tri-Partite Pact.

7031 639-A

Telegram dated 4 July from Thomas at Bangkok concerned the preparation and carrying out of certain military operations in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China by Japanese forces. Failure of economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies would necessitate use of force to take over oil resources. Military occupation of French Indo-China envisaged in order to provide a stepping-off point for Netherlands East Indies attack. Occupation of Thailand not envisaged.

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7030 638

Telegram of 4 July from the German Ambassador in Tokyo concerned personal impression received by military attache in conversation with Japanese General Staff. Impressions are that Japanese Army is secretly and zealously preparing. The occupation of Saigon is imminent, which is preliminary condition for further southward move which is not yet discernible.

7955 792

Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo of 5 July concerning his talk with MATSUOKA on 28 March on the subject of Japanese-Russo Neutrality Pact, MATSUOKA is quoted as saying in event of German-Russian war, nothing, neither Japanese ministers nor a Neutrality Pact, could keep Japan neutral.

8087 833

Affidavit of Matsumura states that on the return of Lt. Matsumura General Amakusu, General Okanuwa and Colonel Kaburagi from Peiping on 5 July, they called all the commanders of forces together. Amakusu had apparently received directives at the meeting concerning preparations for war against the USSR.

10156 1112

KIDO's diary of 5 July stated that the negotiations regarding entry of Japanese troops into Southern French Indo-China has been postponed for five days in view of the fact that the information had leaked out, and the British had lodged a protest with the Vice Foreign Minister, considering this a serious problem.

7965 798

Memo of Kramerets, Foreign Ministry official, composed in Berlin, dated 6 July, states that Colonel Yamamoto called on German Counter-Intelligence Section, and advised Japan was ready to carry out sabotage attacks against the USSR in the Far East, especially from Mongolia and Manchukuo against area adjoining Lake Baikal.

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On 7 July ITAGAKI, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army.

10157 1113 On 7 July Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that SHIRATORI had said that on his recovery he would advocate an active course for Japan and that he regarded Japan's entry into the war against Russia as the most important goal.

10040 1099 Grew again protested to MATSUOKA on 8 July concerning an air raid on Chungking on 29 June.

10041 1100 On 8 July Grew complained to MATSUOKA regarding the seizure of certain cargo at Hanoi and Haiphong by the Japanese, that it was impossible to check it because the owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses. However, a substantial amount of American cargo had been taken away.

7033 639-B A telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo on 10 July concerned the imminence of a Japanese move against French Indo-China. Utterances by MATSUOKA demonstrate that Japanese will first ask German Government to obtain Vichy consent to move. Excuse to be used will be proposition of joint defense of French Indo-China by Japanese and French. Anglo-Saxon countries are not expected to interfere and no serious French resistance is anticipated.

8476 Liebert A law forming the Karafuto Development Company was passed on 10 July with the purpose of developing and controlling mining, forestry and agriculture of that territory.

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7901 771 Telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated 10 July showed how participants of pact considered that with the collapse of Russia the Tri-Partite Pact powers would be so strong that the annihilation of the British Isles would only be a matter of time, and the United States would be left to face the world alone, cut off from the rest of the world.

7966 799 On 12 July in a telegram from Ott, German Ambassador in Japan, to Berlin he enumerated the Japanese preparations for war believed to have been taken.

7037 640 Telegram to Ambassador Kato of 12 July concerned the Government's decision to occupy military bases in French Indo-China and dispatch Japanese forces to Southern French Indo-China. Kato was requested to open negotiations at once with the French on the point and request an answer of Yes or No. In the event of "Yes" a peaceful advance will be effected, and if "No" a military occupation. Keep these plans secret from the British and Americans otherwise difficulties may arise.

8813 867 On 13 July Ambassador Ott cabled Ribbentrop stating that there were perceptible symptoms that Japan was taking mobilization measures. By influencing MATSUOKA and the military elements, the Military Attache is endeavoring to inveigle Japan into war with Russia. Preparations reveal Japan's participation will soon take place, the only obstacle being the disunity of the activist groups.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7043	641	Intercepted message from Canton to Tokyo of 14 July concerned peaceful occupation of French Indo-China if possible; if resistance is offered it will be crushed by force. Navy will play main part in Singapore occupation. With air arm and submarine fleet crushing of Anglo-U.S. power will be effected. Military Headquarters for Japanese forces will be at Saigon.
7061	647A	On 14 July a memo was sent by the Japanese to France demanding bases, etc., and requesting answer by 22 July 1941.
7957	794	Ott on 15 July cabled Berlin stating that the Russian Ambassador called on MITSUOKA to ask if Japanese would apply the Neutrality Pact in view of the (present) German-Russo war. Was much taken aback by MITSUOKA's refusal based on the fact that Japan had concluded this pact when German-Russo relations were essentially different.
8079	Takabo	Takabo, stated that he had heard of the existence of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver (Kan Toku En) from Korokawa and UMEZU, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in July. He knew that Kan Toku En was the Kwantung Army reinforcement plan and UMEZU had told him about the increase of troops of Kwantung Army and demanded food for these troops.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10159	1114	Ott cabled Berlin on 15 July stating that the Vice Foreign Minister had asked him to send on a request to influence Vichy in the matter of French Indo-China. He stated that negotiations were going on to obtain naval bases in Southern French Indo-China and Saigon and several air bases. Japan has no territorial intentions in French Indo-China but will suffer no interference from England and the United States with regard to her desires, and if France asks German help against these requests, Japan would like Germany to influence Vichy towards a peaceful settlement.
10162	1115	In his diary of 15 July, KIDO stated that while MITSUOKI wanted to reject Hull's oral statement as disgraceful to Japan, and then send the compromise formula; he (KIDO) wanted the formula to be wired simultaneously, lest the United States take it as Japan's intention to discontinue negotiations. KIDO sent Saito to MITSUOKI to try to persuade him, and when no answer had been received by the morning of the 15th, it became clear after a visit to MITSUOKI by Terazaki, that MITSUOKI had sent instructions to Nomura by himself and not through the competent director. KIDO wanted MITSUOKI to resign, and if he refused the whole Cabinet to resign. He reported this plan to the Emperor, but

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Konoye thought that if MITSUOKI resigned he would use it to make propaganda that his resignation had been compelled by pressure of the United States on Japan.

On the 16 July the 2nd Konoye Cabinet resigned.

10165 1116

On 16 July KIDO in his diary related a telephone conversation with Matsudaira in which the latter informed him that the resignation of the Cabinet "en bloc" had been decided upon at a special Cabinet meeting. The Lord Chamberlain had been ordered to invite the President of the Privy Council and the Ex-Premier to meet and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would consult them as to a suitable person to select as Premier of the next Cabinet.

10166 1117

On 17 July, KIDO stated in his diary that a conference of ex-premiers and the President of the Privy Council (including HIROTA) was held. KIDO was advised whom to recommend to the Emperor as the new Premier. Konoye was the choice and that evening he received the Imperial Command.

On 18 July the Third Konoye Cabinet was formed; MITSUOKI was replaced by Toyoda, HIRANUMA reverted to Minister of State and the other Defendants retained their former offices.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7053	645	Telegram from Bangkok dated 18 July dealing with a defensive front being erected aimed at suppression of De Gaulle movement through the occupation of French Indo-China.
7046	642	Telegram signed Rintelon to German Foreign Minister of 19 July concerned negotiations with French Government for naval and air bases in French Indo-China. This plan is the first move in southern push and Japanese Government believes Germany and Italy will uphold Japanese demands since in pursuing this and Japan will create diversion for Anglo-United States forces and render valuable assistance to Germany, therefore any entreaty to Germany by France for intervention would be useless. Japan wishes billeting, foreign exchange facilities, etc., to be provided for her forces.
10170	1118	In a telegram from Ott to Berlin on 20 July, it was stated that the policy of new government, as revealed by the new Foreign Minister, was to be the same as previously, based on the Tri-Partite Pact. The new Foreign Minister will continue MATSUOKA's foreign policy and strengthen the close unity with Germany and Italy.
7051	644	Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo of 20 July which deals with inquiry by Ambassador whether change in government might alter Japanese policy towards French Indo-China. Japanese denied this. Regarding Vichy answer to Japanese demands on French Indo-China, in event of refusal, Japan will resort to force.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
10064	1103	On 21 July, it was decided that the Premier and the Foreign and other Ministers should meet with the High Command occasionally and exchange views and national policies with the Navy and War Ministers and staffs of the High Command. This meant no more press announcements of Liaison or Imperial Conferences, as had previously been made.
7054	646	On 21 July a telegram was sent from Paris quoting Japanese demands on 14 July on French Indo-China and Japanese regard for French integrity. Further stated that France, although forced by violence to give in to Japan, thought England and U. S. would interpret this as hostile action and asked Japan to consent to temporary and limited occupation for duration of operations only. On 22 July SHIRATORI resigned from the Foreign Ministry owing to ill health.
7057	648	Telegram from German Ambassador in Tokyo on 22 July states that the Foreign Minister states that unconditional acceptance of main Japanese demands was imminent. Estimated occupation would take several weeks.
10175	1120	On 23 July Nomura cabled Toyada stating that the situation was now nearing a diplomatic break. The change in U.S. opinion is due to the southward moves by Japan, which is considered as a step towards Netherlands East Indies and Singapore. He suggested Japan dispel United States doubts by informing Grew of Japan's real intentions in occupying French Indo-China.

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On 24 July, the U. S. Department of State issued a press release stating that although Japan had expressed a desire that no disturbance should spread to the Pacific and the U. S. had made it clear that she concurred, Japan was establishing bases in French Indo-China and making changes there under duress. This seems to point to the fact that Japan is obtaining bases in French Indo-China for further and more obvious movements of conquest into adjacent areas.

10178	1131
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Ott informed Berlin on 24 July that an agreement had been reached between Vichy and Japan regarding the occupation of bases in French Indo-China on 20 July 1941.

8071	830
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Ott sent telegram to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concurrently to High Command, (OKW) and Army General Staff (OKH) on 25 July. This telegram concerns itself with multiple Japanese mobilization preparations, quoting number of men under arms and due for call up, drafting of Russian speaking men and technicians, limitation of use of foreign languages in communication, restrictions on travel, and transportation of troops to Seishun, Bashin, and Shanghai. Impression from conversations is that besides Manchuria and Korea, parts of North China are to be used for action against the USSR. Goal not clear, but it does not appear it will be an attack limited to Vladivostok area, but will start simultaneously in direction of Lake Baikal. Time of start unknown, but possibly on the arrival of German troops at the Volga.

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67 Japanese assets in the U. S. were frozen on 25 July.

10763 Ballantine On 26 July Japanese assets in the British Empire were frozen.

11883 1324 On 28 July the Netherlands announced the suspension of the Japan-Netherlands Financial Agreement and the freezing of Japanese assets in the whole Netherlands East Indies.

7069 649 On 28 July, Privy Council meeting was held. Amongst those present were TOJO, MUTO, OKA, and SUZUKI. Discussion regarding protocol between France and Japan concerning military cooperation was conducted. Clarification to be made that occupation was in agreement with France and not executed by force, so as to avoid misunderstanding by foreign powers, especially U. S. A. Currency at disposal of forces as provided by French Indo-China would be adequate.

7074 650 2nd Privy Council meeting concerning exchange of official documents on military cooperation and the necessity of close Jap-France relations in military field. Agreement with France unanimously approved.

7079 651 Protocol between France and Japan of 29 July concerning joint defense of French Indo-China and two letters from Vichy. Japanese demands for air and naval bases granted, quartering of troops and freedom of movement to be arranged and recognized.

10180 1122 An official statement of the Bureau of Information on 29th July reported that Protocol between Japan and France had been ratified, the signing had been done on 29 July at Vichy--it will be effective immediately.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
7987	808	In a telegram dated 31 July from Tokyo to Washington it was indicated that Japan was pleased with the way the Russo-German War was going, since it gave her added time for preparations.
10184	1125	In his diary on 31 July, KIDO stated that NAGANO had concurred with former Chief of General Staff Fushimi that Japan should try to avert war as much as possible. NAGANO is opposed to the Tri-Partite Pact, since it makes the adjustment of US-Japanese relations impossible. If these relations cannot be adjusted, Japan will be cut off from her oil and would have only sufficient supplies of oil to last for 1½ years; in the event of war with the U. S., NAGANO told the Emperor a sweeping victory is doubtful. KIDO disagreed with NAGANO and stated that if the Tri-Partite Pact was annulled the United States would not have any more faith in Japan than before.
10192	1127-A	NAGANO stated in interrogation, that the fleet had started training for Pearl Harbor in the Summer of 1941--possibly July.
8930	870-A	The record of Table Top Maneuvers held by the Total War Research Institute in the first half of August 1941, showed that under the maneuvers the general policy of Japan concerning third power problems was that Japan did not give to the United States proposal a clear expression of her position nor expect a peaceful settlement, but would adopt a delaying policy by diplomatic negotiations, while completing her preparations for war.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
8938	871	Records of the Progress of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War No. 1, being the results of the third period, August 1941-the ninth period October 1942, showed that during the third period (Aug 1941) Japan through the Cabinet decided to take measures to delay U. S. conciliatory proposals to Japan and to inform Soviet that as long as she observes the Neutrality Pact, Japan will not attack her. The strengthening of relations with French Indo-China and Thailand was decided as well as the acceleration of imports from U. S., Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, and preventing further deterioration regarding the latter. Censorship measures, regulations of food consumption, increased production and revised capital mobilization plan were also accounted for.
7967	800	Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 1 August, concerning remarks of Colonel Yamamoto to the effect Japan's new power in Asia worries Anglo-Saxon powers, particularly since increasing her pressure in favor of Axis powers. Japan is mobilizing for action against USSR. SHIRATORI said Japan intended to start active advance on Russia through demands such as for territory which Russia could not concede; it was all Japan could do now in face of the neutrality pact.

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10196	1129	KIDO stated in his diary on 2 August, that Konoye was annoyed at the tendency of the tough naval elements to become strong. There must be no mistake in Japan's diplomacy to allow Japan's oil supply to be cut off. An understanding must be reached between the War and Navy Ministers and if this could not be reached the government would have to resign and the Navy and Army assume charge of the administration of the country.
10199	1130	In his diary of 7 August, KIDO stated he had met with Konoye and discussed the current problem. KIDO stated that oil was the most serious problem. Japan must occupy the Philippines and Singapore before a successful landing on Netherlands East Indies. Since Oil wells would be destroyed during action, it would be 1½ years before Japan could obtain oil in sufficient quantities. If Japan attacks Netherlands East Indies, then the U.S. would declare war and make the shipment of oil from these islands virtually impossible. Japan must restore friendly relations with the U. S. The ultimate aim of Japan is to advance south and to attain this, a 10-year plan has been mapped out to establish every machine tool industry Synthetic oil industry and expansion of ocean lines and shipping.

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11199	Richardson	A map dated 10 August showed that Japan had already at this time created extensive fortifications of Wotje.
7303	667-A	Newspaper cutting from Kokumin Shininbun of 14 August contained record of General ARAKI's talk with Ishiwata, Secretary General of Imperial Rule Association, showing that ARAKI regretted that during their intervention in the east against the Soviet Union in 1922, the Japanese failed to accomplish their plans in Siberia. Also shows that ARAKI felt in 1941 that time was ripe to carry out that which failed in 1922.
8913	686-A	On 14 August, the 6th Phase of Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War was prepared which again set forth the imaginary advances of the Axis forces and recounted the declaration of war by the United States on the Axis as 1 November 1941.
7977	803	A telegram from the Japanese Government to Berlin on 15 August concerned a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in which he inquired as to Japan's attitude to the German-Russo War. In reply Japan stated she was following the Neutrality Pact; however, if (1) Russia ceded, sold or leased any property in East Asia to a third power, or (2) took any steps to extend sphere of a 3rd power into East Asia, Japan would

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7977	803	consider this a threat. The Soviet Ambassador replied that Russia was strictly obeying the Neutrality Pact and gave assurance that Russia would never act in the two courses outlined above. Japan still adhered to the three-power pact as MATSUOKA had told the Soviet Government on 2 July.
7980	804	<p>In a telegram of 15 August from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Berlin, he said that in response to a question by Ott about the talk between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Soviet Ambassador, whether the Soviet does not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war, he had told Ott that in view of the military expansion by Japan under present conditions the present arrangement with the Soviet is the best means of taking first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, together with the German Government and that it is in harmony with the Tri-Partite Pact. He hoped that the German Government would fully understand that Japan's action is a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed.</p>
8895	686A	Excerpts commencing 16 August from the first table top maneuvers, a top secret symposium of the first total-war

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<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
8895	686A	Military Games of the Total War Research Institute, imagining and forecasting the events leading up to the December attack and subsequent gains by Jap armies. Relates tactical, strategic moves, preparations and manoeuvres in visualising the attacks.
10203	1131	Nonura informed Toyoda on 16 August that relations between the United States and Japan were critical and the next move by Japan might lead to a sudden change which both Japan and America fear might happen in case Japan advances into Thailand.
8032	814	Telegram from Foreign Ministry to Japanese Ambassador in Washington of 20 August, stating that if the United States is shipping iron, planes, etc. to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this would endanger American-Japanese relations and for the Ambassador to call American attention to the fact that Japan would like such further action restrained.
10204 10205	1132	A newspaper item of 23 August, shows that at a Cabinet meeting of 22 August, the national commodity mobilisation plan for the second quarter of 1941-2 proposed by SUZUKI, president of the Planning Board was decided. The plan's key points embraced expansion of war material production.

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10766 1245B
Ballantine

On 27 August, the Japanese Government issued a statement which was handed to the President on 28 August. Referring to the U.S.'s reply of 17 August, it stated that Japan's policy was determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements and removing obstacles against national security. Japan is eager to exchange views on basic policies with the United States and a meeting of the two heads of the countries would aid to solve the problems. Japan stated that her actions in Indo-China were to solve the China Incident, and that as long as the USSR maintains the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Japan will take no military actions in that direction.

8404 Liebert

Promulgation of key industries Control Ordinance on 30 August, based on provisions of Article 18 of National General Mobilisation Law was to serve as foundation for the complete control by government of all major industries, using the existing cartel structure as guiding principle.

8476 Liebert

The Imperial Petroleum Co., formed on 1 September, had purpose of surveying and developing oil fields in Japan and dominated territories and the control

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8476 Liebert

of purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products. This company was effective government instrument for complete control of petroleum.

7107 652

Telegram from Neumann at Bangkok of 1 September states that occupation of French Indo-China shows signs of being for a long period, contemplated that 45,000 Japanese will be there within several weeks, all strategic points, large towns, etc. are occupied. Attack on Sian is envisaged in November when additional troops have arrived and rainy season ends. Seizure of raw materials and economic measures parallel to military occupation have been effected. The Japanese are attempting to buy rubber and rice plantations, to acquire real estate, etc. in French Indo-China.

11917 1327

On 2 September Ishizawa in Batavia cabled Tokyo the increased anti-Japanese tendencies in the NEI pursuant to the occupation of French Indo-China; the strengthening of schemes with regard to the Chinese and a plan whereby influential Chinese be sent to NEI to advocate the doctrine that the Chinese and Japanese are one and influence Chinese opinion are some measures suggested. It was requested that Ambassador Fonda be informed of this message.

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10773 1245C
 Ballantine

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On 3 September the President replied to Konoye's message of 27 August expressing his appreciation at Japan's desire to improve Japanese-U.S. relations. The U.S. recognise the swiftly moving character of world events and is proceeding as rapidly as possible towards consummating arrangements for a meeting at which Konoye and Roosevelt could exchange views and adjust relations.

7971 801A

Telegram from Ott to Berlin of 4 September, after MATSUOKA's dismissal as Foreign Minister, states the third Konoye Cabinet still planned far-reaching mobilisation. Japanese Army was reserved on the subject of attack on Russia due to being weakened in Chinese War and not expecting to be able to make decisive victory before winter sets in. Plan to take action when numerical force of Japanese Army is increased.

10214 1134

On 5 September, KIDO stated in his diary that Konoye advised the Emperor to summon a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. This was done.

10215 1135

On 6 September, KIDO, in his diary related a visit he paid to the Emperor in response to the Imperial summons. KIDO advised the Emperor that since Hara, the President of the Privy Council, would

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10215	1135	ask important questions on his Majesty's behalf, the Emperor should only issue a warning, in conclusion, to the effect that as the present situation was one which might lead to war, the Supreme War Command should make every effort to bring about a diplomatic success. KIDO visited the Emperor again later in the day and learnt that the Supreme War Command had not answered the questions put by President Hara concerning diplomatic moves but that the Navy Minister Oikawa, had made an answer to Hara. The Emperor had expressed regret that the Supreme War Command did not give a reply and emphasized the need for whole-hearted efforts in diplomatic negotiations with the United States.
8814	588 1107	At Imperial Conference of 6 September, attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, it was decided that Japan would execute her Southern advance policy. Japan would therefore, complete her preparations by the end of October aiming at war with the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. In the meantime and in pace with this decision, Japan would strive to obtain fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic means. If the negotiations did not lead to success by

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1107

the beginning of October, Japan would immediately determine on war against U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands. There would be a strong endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

10778 1245D
Ballantine

On 6 September, Nomura handed to Hull another draft proposal setting out the various concessions which Japan will agree to including not advancing in French Indo-China or resorting to military action in the southern region, and withdrawing troops from China as soon as possible. The United States reciprocal measures were set out and included suspension of any military measures in the Far East and in the South West Pacific area.

10213 1133

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi of 7 September, showed that concrete plans were being drafted by the Communications and Railway Ministry, based on the traffic mobilisation plan for 1941-1942. The Railway Ministry will embark upon construction of freight cars and the Communications office will establish the shipbuilding control association to systematise the shipbuilding industry. On 5 September, the Cabinet decided a traffic mobilisation plan to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis.

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10222 1138

On 11 September, KIDO stated in his diary that TOJO visited him after seeing the Emperor and explained the results of an investigation concerning the preparations for war with the United States.

10224 1139

In a telegram from Nomura to Toyoda on 12 September, it was stated that the main problem in the United States-Japanese negotiations was Japan's wish to keep troops stationed in China. The United States wants Japan to completely withdraw from China within two years. Since there is a possibility of the negotiations failing in the final stages of this problem, Nomura suggested that Toyoda deliberates on the proposal how to evacuate troops within 2 years after the peace.

10229 1140

On 12 September, the Cabinet adopted a plan, formulated by the Planning Board and Welfare Office, for the people's labour mobilisation.

10226 1131

Toyoda's reply to Nomura on 13 September, stated that he understood the United States wanted Japan to acknowledge the so-called 4 principles. Japan is not in a position to swallow the evacuation problem, since the world might think it was due to United States pressure. It seems that the United States have

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10226	1131	conferred with Britain, Holland and China beforehand, and although Japan can not hinder the United States from negotiating with others, she will refuse to be induced into a council or an agreement among numerous countries.
8452	852	Secret communication dated 13 September contained request to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Fo" series notes in denominations of pesos, and "Ni" military currency in denomination of dollars. Again requested preparation of notes in denomination of guilders. Manufacture of pesos to be completed by 20 October, dollars one half by 30 Oct and guilders by 20 November (one half).
8080	832	UMEZU, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, issued a directive on 16 September, which ordered that students of foreign language schools who have been Army Russian interpreters under Kan Toku En should be given supplementary education.
8455	852	Top Secret communication of 16 September, concerned the manufacture of "Fo" and "Ni" series military currency, gives order to manufacture these notes and is technical communication regarding the printing of them.

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10792 1245F
Ballantine

On 22 September, Japan communicated to Grew a statement of the terms of peace which it is proposed to offer to China.

11207 Richardson

From 24 September onwards, Japan ordered her consuls to make reports concerning vessels along certain routes embracing Pearl Harbour.

10782 1245E
Ballantine

On 25 September, Japan presented Grew a completely new draft of Japan's proposal and requested an early reply.

10230 1141

On 26 September, KIDO stated in his diary, that Konoye had told him that he had no confidence and there was no choice but for him to resign if the military insisted on starting the war on 15 October. KIDO hoped for prudence.

6412 558

Radio speech by Dr. Nobumi on 26 September, first anniversary of Tri-Partite Pact, enumerated Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia as having joined the pact, restating the peaceful intentions of the pact and the realisation of new world order as ultimate aim.

10231 1142

On 29 September, KIDO stated in his diary that the Emperor had requested an estimate of the U.S.'s rubber and tin resources and stock. KIDO contacted the President of the Planning Board. President of the Privy Council advocated

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10231	1142	that in the event of failure of the Washington parley, the Imperial Conference should not be so formal and a full discussion should be held with the senior statesmen present. KIDO promised to look into the matter.
10189	1126	NAGANO stated in interrogation that he had heard of the plan to attack Pearl Harbour in October.
7404	684	Excerpts from report of the Committee for the Administrative Measures, October, show that limits of Japanese aggressive plans of expansion into Soviet territory depended only upon place German expansion would stop; plans to run transcontinental railway partly by Japanese and partly by Germans; complete annihilation of USSR and dividing territory between Germany and Japan.
7608	731A	The 8th all-Manchurian Congress of the Kyo Wa Kai was held in October. Amongst those present was UMEZU. This was the first congress since the beginning of the Russo-German War and Russian delegates were invited.
7157	654A	A telegram signed Hemmen, a member of the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs dated 1 October, stated that the French had requested German support in order to obtain Japanese approval to deliver 5,000 tons of raw

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rubber to United States in exchange for vital goods obtain-

able only in the United States. Germany upheld Japan's objection, pointed out that German requests for rubber were urgent and requested the release of additional 5,000 tons be obtained for Japan during October.

10795 1245G
Ballantine

On 2 October Hull gave Nomura a memorandum of an oral statement reviewing the developments in the conversations and explaining the United States attitude towards various points in the Japanese proposal which did not appear to the United States to be consistent with U.S. principles.

7932 788A

Excerpt from telegram, Ott to Berlin, of 4 October, states that from careful sounding of the Army leaders it has been concluded that the inherent aim of the Tri-Partite Pact is to overpower the British Empire, keep the United States at bay and eliminate USSR, thus bringing about new distribution of power in Europe and the Far East.

10233 1143

In his diary of 7 October, KIDO stated that there was dissention between the Army and Navy concerning the Washington parley which the Navy wanted to continue and the Army to stop. The Navy wanted Konoye to declare his policy and a

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10233	1143	meeting of the Premier, War and Navy Ministers was held to settle Japan's national policy with respect to war with the United States.
10236	1144	<p>In a telegram from Washington to Tokyo on 8 October, the United States expresses dissatisfaction at the negotiations since Japan does not appear to express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The United States adheres to the 4 principles and wishes to bring about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which the two have failed to see eye to eye, then turn to other matters.</p>
10234	1145	<p>On 8 October Nomura cabled Tokyo regarding the curtailment of guaranties concerning the principles in the proposal of the 6th. The Americans are still making demands on the question of stationing and evacuating troops in French Indo-China to which Japan objects in principle.</p>
10241	1146	<p>KIDO expressed Konoye's concern regarding the failure of the Washington talks in his diary of 9 October and KIDO stated that 6 September Imperial Conference resolution was too outright. War with the United States would have little hope for victory at the moment, and KIDO advocated completion of the China Incident followed by 10 - 15 years preparation.</p>

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- 9012 809 It is shown in the document "Japan's Decision to Fight" that on 10 October, Colonel Ryuto, Commander of an anchorage group, wrote a report on conditions showing that the mobilization order had been issued on 12 September. They reached Paláu on 10 October and established anchorage headquarters and prepared for leading operations to accompany war.
- 9013 809 It is shown that on 11 October, in a diary of Pvt. Kashino of an Infantry Regiment, his unit landed at Shanghai and prepared for the Malaya operation from 12-14 leaving for Thailand on 22 November and arriving there on 8 December.
- 9014 809 In a diary of an unknown soldier of the 41st Infantry Regiment, it is revealed that his unit arrived at Shanghai on 12 October, was given jungle training and left on 2 December for Sama, and on 13 December was the first unit to enter Gubun Street.
- 10246 1147 On October 12th KIDO gave details of a meeting of the War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister Oikawa, Foreign Minister Toyoda, President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, and Premier Konoye. The War

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10246 1147

Minister TOJO called for a great resolution since there was no hope of an understanding with the United States while the Navy wanted to avoid war. A strong leadership by the Premier was urgent. The Foreign Minister Toyoda, stated that he was unsure of the outcome of the talks. They had agreed, on the advice of TOJO that Japan's demands for stationing of troops in China should not be altered. The successful results of the Chinese Incident should be made secure by all means; and the parley should be further based on the fact that these agreements should cease Japan's preparations for war. Konoye also wrote a full account of the meeting and other events leading up to the resignation. (Soon after it took place.) The effect is substantially the same, except that, according to him, no decision was reached on this occasion.

10251 1148

10272 1136A

TOJO recalled in an interrogation, the fact that the War, Navy, Foreign Minister and Premier attended the meeting of 12 October. At this meeting United States negotiations were discussed and the fact that the middle 10 days of October which had been set for a time limit for a favourable diplomatic turn

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10272	1136A	had arrived. The United States had turned down the meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt and the situation was tense. TOJO felt that there was no hope for a diplomatic success and time had come to make up Japan's mind for war.
7110	653	Telegram from Neumann at Saigon on 12 October concerning 5th columnist activities of Pan Asiatic League as a tool of Japanese expansionist policy in French Indo-China. Branch offices of league ordered to advocate agitation for Annamite independence, encourage anti-French uprisings, foster pro-Japanese sentiment through picked units of Japanese Army and to spy on French troop movements and locate raw material and foodstuff storage place. Annamites to be incorporated into Japanese occupation army; time for striking appears to be the end of the year or early spring. The leaders and a great part of the Annamite fighting units were ex-convicts. The heir to the Annamite throne fled to Japan at the beginning of this century and as early as 1935 presided over the Pan-Asiatic congress.
10274	1149	MIHO stated in his diary of 13 October that he conferred with SUZUKI on the political situation and their conclusion

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10274	1149	was that the Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.
10258- 10263	1148	Before and at a cabinet meeting on 14 October TOJO maintained the same view, and there was a deadlock. But later the Army (through MUTO) offered to give way if the Navy would come out definitely against war. OKA, for the Navy, refused to do this and left it to Konoye, which TOJO and MUTO would not accept.
10276	1150	On the 15 October, KIDO stated in his diary that SUZUKI delivered War Minister TOJO's message to him which stated that unless Konoye changed his mind the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable. The succeeding Premier should be able to unite the Army and Navy and follow the Imperial will. Prince Higashikuni's name was mentioned as a possibility. KIDO replied that this would involve a working-out of a common policy between the Army and Navy beforehand and asked whether War Minister TOJO had any accurate forecast to make on the fact that the establishment of a prudent policy would take precedence over all other questions. The Premier, Prince Konoye, visited KIDO and asked his opinion on the Higashikuni Cabinet. Prince Konoye said

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10276 1150

that the breach between himself and the War Minister TOJO was very great. Later President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI, telephoned to KIDO to say that TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of Prince Higashikuni, and KIDO objected to the plan. Later, the Premier, Prince Konoye, said he wished to secure the informal consent of Prince Higashikuni and KIDO said he had no objection so long as Konoye acted in his capacity as Premier. Prince Higashikuni, however, wanted a few days for consideration and wished to have a meeting with War Minister TOJO and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO.

7113 654A

Telegram from German Ambassador to Tokyo on 15 October, concerned Japanese occupation of French Indo-China which, according to reports was not without friction. Japanese intend to increase strength there to 40,000 and wrest concession from French colonial administration through local military authorities. He says open conflict will be avoided despite all this. The Japanese Foreign Ministry denied a Japanese-Siamese argument concerning the border zone.

8455 852

Secret communication from Chief of Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, to Chief of Financial Bureau of 15 October, requested the forwarding of certain currencies to the

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8555	852	Bank of Japan, Shanghai agency, to arrive by 22 October.
10310	1159	On 16 October, Toyoda telegraphed Nomura that Japan had repeatedly affirmed the aim of the Tri-Partite Pact to the United States, which is the prevention of the European war spreading. However, should German and United States relations become aggravated, there would be a distinct danger of war. It is desired that German-United States relations stop deterioration and Japan requests the consideration of the United States.
10282	1151	On 16 October, KIDO stated in his diary that he was opposed to the Higashikuni Cabinet, such a Cabinet would show that Japan lacked suitable persons, and in the event of war a problem would arise. He told TOJO of this opposition and urged a rescission of the previous decision and a unified policy of the Army and Navy. Konoye telephoned to say he was resigning and did so at 5 o'clock. KIDO, in his talk with TOJO, urged a revision of the 6th September decisions.
10285	1152	On 16 October the Konoye Cabinet resigned and Konoye issued a statement on his resignation. This stated that Army Minister TOJO judged negotiations with the United States on friendly terms could not possibly materialise before the desired time (middle or latter part of October); that it was impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the time had come to open war against the United States. Prime Minister Konoye, however, thought that all negotiations with the United States were not hopeless and that the stationing of troops in China could be achieved in substance while appearing to yield to the United States.

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10290 1147 TOJO stated in an interrogation that on or about 17 October he felt the times opportune for fighting was in danger of being lost, and that the Konoye Cabinet fell because TOJO favoured war with the United States while Konoye still thought a diplomatic solution possible.

10291 1154 KIDO stated in his diary of 17 October, that an ex-premiers' Conference (Procedure as on 17 July 1941) attended by Kiyoura, Wakatsuki, Okada, Hayashi, HIROTA, Abe, Yonai, and Hara, it was finally decided on KIDO's suggestion that he should recommend TOJO as the new Premier with additional position of War Minister.

On 18 October the Accused held the following positions:

DOHIFARA, General, Chief of Air Inspectorate, Supreme War Councillor-; HATA, Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, Central China; HIRANUMA, Ex-Premier; HIROTA, Ex-Premier; FOSHINO, Chief Secretary of Cabinet; ITAGAKI, General in command Korean Army-; KAYA, Finance Minister, Vice President China Affairs Board; KIDO, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal; KIMURA, Lt. General, Vice Minister of War; KOISO, General on reserve list; MATSUI, General, retired; MINAMI, Governor-General of Korea; MUTO, Chief, Military Affairs Board (War Ministry); NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff, Supreme War Councillor; OKA, Chief Bureau of Naval and Military Affairs in Navy Ministry, Assistant to Navy Minister in Imperial Headquarters, Councillor, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs, Imperial Member of German-Italian-Japanese mixed experts Committee in Tokyo; OKAWA, Director-General of East Asia Research Institute, South Manchurian Railway;

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OSIMA, Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Berlin; Imperial Member of the German-Italian-Japanese Special Council in Berlin; SATO, Major-General, Chief of Military Affairs Section, Military Affairs Bureau (War Ministry), Secretary of several Government Committees; SAIGEMITSU, Attached to Foreign Ministry; SHIMADA, Navy Minister, Vice President China Affairs Board; SUZUKI, Lt. General, President of the Planning Board, Minister of State, Councillor, Total War Investigation Institute, Member Committee on Thought Control, Chief Director, China Affairs Board; TOGO, Foreign Minister, Overseas Minister, Vice President, China Affairs Board, Supreme War Councillor; TOJO, Prime Minister, War Minister, Home Minister, President China Affairs Board, Supreme War Councillor; UMEZU, General, Commander-in-Chief, Kwantung Army and Ambassador to Manchukuo, ARAKI, HASHIMOTO, and SHIRATORI held no official positions.

10293 1155 On 18 October KIDO recorded in his diary that the Emperor sanctioned the petition to allow TOJO to remain on active service and promoted him to a full general.

10295 1156 On 20 October KIDO recorded the Emperor's congratulations to him on the new Cabinet. KIDO told the Emperor that one mistake might have meant war, this was the only way to give the situation a new turn and so he had recommended it.

10312 1161 On 22 October Nomura requested that TOGO grant permission for him to return to Tokyo. He felt that to resign was the only way open for him as a man of honor.

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- 11885 1325 An official report by the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies on the organisation of the Japanese Intelligence Service in the Netherlands Indies, 27 October, stated that the Japanese Intelligence Service of the Netherlands East Indies consisted of 4 organisations, the FOO, PNO, FAO, and OGO. These organisations were under the Foreign Office, Naval Information Service Tokyo, Military director in Central Formosa and Japanese Consul General as receiving centre respectively.
- 10314 1162 On 29 October, KIDO stated in his diary that SUZUKI had reported on the progress of the Liaison Conference, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and Manoeuvres against China.
- 8458 852 Top secret communication No. 10, dated 31 October, referred to the institution of procedures for handling military currency notes in foreign denominations for the southern regions. System of military currency will defray expenditure in event of operations in the south Seas area. Issuance of such currency decided by Premier (TOJO), Finance (KAWA), War (TOJO), and Navy (SHIMADA) Ministers.
- 7346 674A Excerpt from magazine "Kaizo" (Reconstruction) written by Tanaka (not the witness) entitled "The New Development in the Russo-German War and Japan", states world-wide struggle between Axis and anti-Axis is gradually approaching; Japan rejoices in and hopes for victory of Germany over Russia and Britain.
- 11923 1328 A list of questions was drawn up for the liaison Conference between the Government and Imperial

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11928	1329	Headquarters at the end of October. These questions relate to reactions to Japan's Foreign Policy and that repercussions will result from war, particularly if Japan attacks in the south, what help can be expected from the Axis etc. After consideration by the Navy, Army, Foreign, and Finance Ministries under the Accused SHIMADA, TOJO, TOGO, and KAYA, respectively, answers to these questions were decided.
10462	1197A	MAGANO stated in an interrogation that he approved the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbour either at the end of October or the beginning of November.
5105	450	Tokyo Gazette extract, Vol. V, No. 5 of November, entitled "Ten Years of the New State", relates to richness of Manchukuo, its abundance of iron, coal, and non-ferrous metals and its natural resources, the success of the five-year industrial development plan and the industrial and cultural development in border districts.
8980	874A	The monthly Wartime Report No. 4 of the H. A. Corps, November, gives details of the preparations for operations against Hong Kong and intensification of the blockade.
8462	853	Procedure for dealing with military currency expressed in Southern Region Foreign Currency Order from Finance Minister KAYA to Bank of Japan on 1 November. The Bank of Japan was to acknowledge receipt of notes from the Cabinet Printing Bureau and notify the Finance Ministry when they had disbursed any of these notes.
9043	809	The diary of Imoto of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Army shows that his unit reached Saigon on

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1 November, left on 27 November en route to Hainan, leaving there on 4 December. They reached Singora (in Siam, near Malayan border) on 7 December, landing at 0600 on 8 December.

10315 809 On 1 November, the final text of Combined Fleet Secret Operational Order No. 1 had been agreed upon and was being printed: It contained schedules and plans for attacks on Pearl Harbour and various British and Dutch possessions.

10316 1163 TOGO telegraphed Nomura on 2 November stating that the Imperial Conference scheduled for 5 November expected to reach a final decision for improving relations between the United States and Japan. He would inform Nomura of the results, which would be Japan's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. When negotiations were resumed it was urgent that a decision should be reached at once. This information was strictly for Nomura's information and TOGO trusted him to exercise great prudence in handling everything before negotiations were taken up.

10317 809 On 3 November, it was decided to attack Pearl Harbour and Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO set the date.

10318 1164 TOGO cabled Nomura on 4 November, stating that Japan-United States relations were very critical. The Cabinet and Imperial Headquarters had decided on a counter proposal for resuming negotiations which was to be submitted to the conference for sanction on 5 November. The telegram then goes on to justify Japan's attitude and accuses the United States of shunning and overlooking Japan's position.

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10324	1165	On 4 November, TOGO cabled Nomura concerning the revised ultimatum to meet the wishes of the United States. Nomura was to make clear that Japan did not intend to expand her sphere of self-defence and desired to avoid the European War's expansion into the Pacific. Re China: Japan would withdraw her troops from North China over a period of two years except for the areas of the Mongolian border and on Hainan, where they were to remain for a suitable period (if questioned to be vaguely quoted as 25 years). He wants Nomura to give the idea that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation.
10329	1166	On 4 November, TOGO informed Nomura that Kurusu was being despatched to help him in the parleys. Kurusu's activities were being kept secret for the time being.
10330	1167	A cabinet decision of 4 November, agreed on the Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on British and American Problems. This policy is to provide for the suppression of any war preparation information, etc., and to make the people hold hope for the future.
10333	1169 1107	At the Imperial Conference of 5 November, attended by TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and OKA, National Policy was again decided. It showed that at the Liaison Conference a decision was made to notify Germany and Italy of Japan's intention to start war against the United States and Britain when the present negotiations with the United States break down and war is inevitable (presumed to be 25 November) and as soon as preparations are ready they will open negotiations for participation by the Axis in

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the war against the United States and for a no-separate peace pact. The advance through Thailand was decided, first passage of troops to be demanded, if this is refused they will advance without it, but Japan will respect Thailand's sovereignty (in regard to decision of Liaison Conference of 1 February) and will try to turn negotiations to her advantage by suggesting the cession in the future of part of Burma or Malaya, this depending on Thailand's attitude. Plan for dealing with International settlements made, and a decision not to declare war against Chiang, but obtain same effect by a declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain.

10415 1186 On 5 November, the Ambassador at Bangkok reported to TOGO on measures to be taken in the event of Japan taking decisive action in the south. The co-operation of Thai (on which he had already undertaken work) is important and although in the event of an attack on Burma and Malaya, a temporary infringement of Thailand might happen, the independence of Thailand would be more respected after the objective had been obtained.

10347 809 On 5 November, Yamamoto issued the Combined Fleet
1252 Top Secret Order No. 1, which stated that operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands will be conducted in accordance with the provisions for preparations for war, communications, supply, allocation of forces, etc.

10346 1171 TOGO wired Nomura on 5 November, informing him that arrangements for the agreement were to be completed by 25 November.

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- 10343 1170 On 5 November, TOGO cabled Nomura that the counter proposals wired to him on the 4th had been approved by the Imperial Conference and talks were to begin. He then advised Nomura on the policy to be adopted in submitting the proposals.
- 10349 809 Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order of 5 November stated that Y Day would be 23 November, and Order 3 of 10 November stated that X Day would be 8 December.
- 10332 1168 On 5 November KIDO stated in his diary that an Imperial Conference decided the policy towards the United States, England and the Netherlands. TOJO advised KIDO of the formation of the southern Army and the dispatch of Kurusu to the United States.
- 10918 1246 On 7 November Nomura stated in a memorandum to Hull that withdrawal of troops stationed in China will be completed within 2 years, to proceed gradually according to special arrangements. Japan will guarantee territory sovereignty of French Indo-China and withdraw troops as soon as China affair is settled. Japan will recognize non-discrimination of trade in China and Pacific areas provided principle will apply to rest of world.
- 10348 809 On 7 November Admiral Yamamoto issued an order which
1252 stated that the Task Force would gather at Hitokappu Wan and remain there under great secrecy until 22 November (a combined Fleet Order on operation was issued simultaneously).
- 10351 1172 German Foreign Office cabled Washington on 8 November that TOGO had stated that Kurusu had been instructed to take a firm attitude and was given a

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limit which he could not cross.

10350	809	On 10 November Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued to all ships to complete battle preparations by 20 November. Rendezvous of fleet to be at Kuriles; strict secrecy to be maintained.
9014	809	Captured copy of a pamphlet entitled, "Just read this and the war will be won," stamped 10 November (although actual date of preparation is thought to be prior to this date) gives a map of Southern China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, and a small section of the northwest Australian coast on the front. This was issued to each soldier before he left for overseas.
8972	872	Group of charts and telegrams show that quantities of munitions, ammunition, machinery, fuel, oil, grease for motor cars and parts for repairing munitions were to be delivered to various seaports in Japan and distributed on 10, 12, 13 and 15 November to the 55th, 56th and 16th Divisions, and that in October notification was dispatched to various governmental agencies to keep secret the general plan for operation which was to be put into effect in French Indo-China.
10363	1175	At a Liaison Conference of 11 November the principal
9261	919	reasons alleged for the commencement of hostilities against the United States and Great Britain stated that it is Japan's mission to establish a new order in Greater East Asia. Although for eight months Japan and the United States have negotiated for a peaceful settlement, they can not concur, and Japan can not

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realize her policy and bring about stability if she accedes to the United States. Greater East Asia is at a crisis and Japan's future is in jeopardy and she is compelled to take up arms to smash all obstacles.

10356 1174 A telegram from TOGO to Nomura on 11 November related a conversation between Craigie and TOGO on the matter of United States negotiations. Craigie was of the opinion that they were still at the preliminary stages while TOGO pointed out they had reached the realm of actual negotiations. The Ambassador is to make the United States realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

10352 1173 On 12 November Tokyo Nichi Nichi printed Churchill's declaration that England was ready in the Pacific and will fight if America does.

8985 876A Report of Military Administrative Measures to be taken in event of Japan's entering the war, dated 12 November gives: plans for military operations in (a) Sino-Japanese War, (b) Russo-Japanese War, and (c) First World War, (d) Siberian Expedition, to be taken into consideration as a guide.

10376 1176 The general outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and Chungking, dated 12 November, provides in essence the plan to be adopted towards foreign powers of 5 November.

8993 878 On 13 November a Liaison Conference considered the measures to be taken towards foreign countries decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on 5 November.

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10377	1177	Nomura cabled TOGO on 14 November, stating that he would fight to the end and believed he would win out in the negotiations. American policy was based on stopping Japanese expansion in the Pacific and if Japan moves to the South, she will have to fight England and the United States, and possibly Russia.
8977	873	Secret telegram dated 14 November, from Nanking (Chief of Third Air Group) to Vice Ministers of War and General Staff regarding plans for aerial group to leave Nanking on 15 November, to establish command post at Saigon in South Indo-China on or after 16 November.
11207	1256	In a telegram from TOGO in Tokyo to Riyoji at Honolulu, dated 15 November, it is stated that in view of the critical situation between the United States and Japan, report on ships in harbour should be sent twice a week, observing secrecy.
9023	809	On 15 November a pamphlet entitled "Message to Warriors in the South Seas" was issued by General Horii, Commander of the South Seas detachment detailed to attack Guam.
10381	1178	TOGO cabled Nomura on 16 November requesting Nomura fight harder than ever before. In Nomura's opinion Japan ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. TOGO was sorry but he had set the deadline for solving the negotiations as 25 November.
7117	655	On 17 November Erdmannsdorff, former member of German Legation at Bangkok, cabled Foreign Minister of Reich

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concerning conversation with OSHIMA on possibility of Japanese action in northern and southern direction. After initial expression of ignorance, OSHIMA said there was a possibility of invasion of Thailand in order to secure a springboard for attack on Singapore, but increase of Japanese troops in French Indo-China would have to be effected first.

11210	1257	On 18 November Kita in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reporting ship movement in the harbour.
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10383	1179	On 18 November Kurusu cabled TOGO expressing faith in Roosevelt's desire to continue negotiations, and stated that Japan might give the United States sufficient security so that they could concentrate more deeply in the Atlantic, enabling Japan to occupy a more favourable position in the post-war international situation.
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9032	809	The diary of a member of the South Seas Detachment shows that on 18 November group war exercises were held under General Horii, the unit arrived at Hahajima on 28 November, landing there on 3 December. On 4 December there was an announcement of a Japanese-American war.
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10387	1180	TOGO telegraphed Nomura on 19 November, giving more amendments to the pact proposal, one of which was that Japan could not agree to non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, and also that Japan wished to decide independently whether there had been an attack and was not bound by the interpretation of other parties to the Tri-Partite Pact, in the event the United States should enter the European War.
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- 10389 1181 In his diary of 19 November KIDO stated he pointed out to the Emperor various conditions which might arise if the Emperor resolved on war by the end of November. For war to come just because November had expired might be very difficult with public opinion, and KIDO suggested that when the Premier makes his final decision he order a congress of senior statesmen to convene before the Emperor.
- 8988 877 In a Liaison Conference of 20 November a decision regarding "Details of the Execution of Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories" was made. It relates to the setting up of a military administration in occupied areas using existing organs as much as possible and ordering co-operation of United States and Dutch nationals with Japan's military. Final disposition of territories is to be decided later. The occupation forces will control all facilities and communications. All important matters on local administration are to be decided at Liaison Conferences. In French Indo-China and Thailand a military administration is not to be set up, but measures are to be taken later.
- 10811 1245-H On 20 November Nomura handed Hull another draft Ballantine proposal incorporating the various points of the previous proposals.
- 11943 1331 On 20 November it was decided at a Cabinet Conference to establish a new Committee within the Cabinet - the Sixth Committee under Chairmanship of the President of the Planning Board, SUZUKI. This committee was to draft plans for the economic exploitation of the southern areas. The establishment of the committee and its dealings were secret. The regulations

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for the establishment of this committee were approved by the Premier on 2 December.

9027 809 From the diary of Superior Private Yamashita of the 41st Infantry Regiment it is shown that his unit anchored in sight of Takao on 21 November.

10392 1182 On 21 November an Investigation Committee meeting of the Privy Council attended by TOGO and TOJO was held on Prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was decided unanimously to approve the pact and to request the government to make every effort to make it effective.

6637 601 Telegram from Ribbentrop 21 November, showing that on 18 November Japan sought advice from Germany as to whether Germany would agree not to conclude a separate peace with the United States in event of the United States-Japanese War, and that Germany would not conclude a separate peace regardless of reason for war and in the event Japan commenced it.

8984 875 In a cable from Tsukada, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, to KIMURA, Vice Minister of War 22 November, it is stated that the Southern Army will leave Tokyo on 25 November, landing at Keelung on 29 November and the establishment of the headquarters at Taihoku on 28 December.

10400 1183 TOGO in a cable to Komura on 22 November explained the difficulty of altering the deadline date of the

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agreement, but stated that if the signing could be completed by the 29th, and an understanding with Britain and the Netherlands be reached by an exchange of notes by that date, Japan would make arrangements to wait. After that things will automatically happen.

6640	602	Telegram from German Ambassador at Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister of 23 November states Japanese War Minister's gratitude for the fact that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of United States conflict, and also inquired if Japan-United States war would mean German-United States war Operation intentions of Japanese in the event of war gave the impression that Thailand, North and East Borneo would be occupied, but Philippine decision has not been reached.
10402	1184	On 23 November Nomura cabled TOGO that he had met with Hull and Ballantine concerning the negotiations. Britain, Australia and the Netherlands representatives had been conferred with on the 22nd and their opinions on Japan's proposals obtained. He gave a general survey of the conversations, ending by informing TOGO that the United States will submit a counter proposal on Monday.

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10408	1185	TOGO cabled Nomura on 24 November, telling him of a conference with Grew concerning the movement of troops in French Indo-China. Japan objected to intervention with Japan's efforts for peace when Roosevelt acts as mediator in connection with the Chinese problem and has Chiang Kai Shek propose peace with Japan. Clarification must be obtained on this point before negotiations between United States and Japan can be settled.
10411	1187	On 25 November the Japanese Ambassador at Hanoi stated that he had been advised that the United States was to reply by the 25th; failing this, he presumed war will result. However, if they fail, Japan's forces are ready to move. He queried whether status quo of FIC would be maintained in war.
8407	Liebert	The law entitled, "Law Concerning Industrial Equipment Corporation" was passed on 25 November, by virtue of which the Government created a special equipment corporation, having as its object in times of war to have war and essential industries equipped with necessary plants for increased production on definite lines of the government program.
6046	495	On 25 November the Anti-Comintern Pact was renewed
6048	496	with the provision for admission of new participants -
	48	Japanese - controlled China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark.
10418	1189	Nomura and Kurusu cabled TOGO on 26 November, stating that there was hardly any hope of the United States accepting the "B" proposal in toto.

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		Situation was tense and all they could suggest to save it was that Roosevelt cable Japan stating that he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate in maintaining peace and Japan replies with a cordial message. If Japan approved, they would begin negotiations on receipt of the wire. It seems to them that the rupture, although possibly not causing war, would result in the occupation of Netherlands East Indies, wherewith Japan would be forced to attack. They asked TOGO to consult KIDO (at least) on this point.
10815	1245I Ballantine	Hull replied to the Japanese on 26 November outlining a tentative form of the proposed basis for agreement.
10429	1190	In his diary for 26 November KIDO stated that he conferred with the President of the Privy Council about a senior statesmen's conference. The Emperor feared the worst and said that final decision for war should be carried out after another senior statesmen's conference with a broader discussion of the matter.
10461	1197A	NAGANO stated in interrogation that the Fleets started for Pearl Harbour either on 26 or 27 November.
10432	1191	Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto of the Foreign Office on 27 November reveals that the negotiations do not seem to be getting along any better. Yamamoto told Kurusu not to break them off and that he would carefully read the President's message. Kurusu said they wanted to keep on negotiating but the Army is champing at the bit and there is a crisis.

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10437	1192	On 28 November the Cabinet approved a plan for establishing a new system in press circles. An Imperial Ordinance creating a new system will be issued under the National Mobilization Law. It is aimed at placing the newspapers on a wartime basis.
10442	1193	TOGO informed Nomura on 28 November that in view of the latest United States proposal, there is practically nothing left but to break off the negotiations. However, Nomura and Kurusu are not to convey the impression that the negotiations are broken off and to say that they are awaiting instructions from home, and while not clarifying the Government's intent, they are to give personal opinion that Japan's claims have been just and the United States has not co-operated. The measures suggested in their telegram are considered improper, although they had been referred to the parties mentioned.
6644	603A	Intercepted message from Berlin to Tokyo of 29 November stated that if Japan should fight the United States, Germany would join war immediately, also no possibility of Germany entering into separate peace with the United States.
6652	604	Excerpt from interrogation of OSHIMA in which he stated that around 29 or 30 November he received word that Hull's reply of 26 November with regard to Japanese-United States negotiations had been extremely severe in tone.
10444	1194	TOGO cabled Nomura on 29 November, instructing the Ambassadors to make one more verbal attempt by

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		stating traditional United States fairness, and Japan can not understand why United States rejects her new proposals. They were to ask careful reflection on what has become of the basic objectives that the United States has made the basis for negotiations for 7 months (with this change of front on the China problem) and to exercise care that this does not lead to breaking off relations.
11938	1330	On 29 November the Japanese Consul General in Batavia instructed all Japanese consuls in Netherlands East Indies to report the arrival, departure, nationality, port, etc. of all foreign merchant men or warships operating in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and South China Sea zones.
10452	1196	On 29 November KIDO in his diary described a meeting of Senior Statesmen (ex-premiers etc., in- cluding HIRANUMA and HIROTA) to give the Emperor their individual views on the question of peace or war. The Government explained that in their view war was inevitable. According to TOJO the members of the Government present besides himself were SHIMADA, TOGO and SUZUKI at the first part of the conference when the explanations were given; himself only in the later stages when the Senior Statesmen spoke. KIDO summarizes the views of the Senior Statesmen; none dissented from the Government view.
10468	1198	KIDO stated in his diary of 30 November that in view of Prince Takamatsu's statement that the Navy wished to avoid war, he advised the Emperor to ask opinions of the Navy Minister (SHIMADA),

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		Chief of Naval General Staff (NAGANO), and the Premier. Later, the Emperor told KIDO that in view of the fact that the Navy Minister and Chief of Navy General Staff had given affirmative answers as to the success of war, he had told the Premier to act accordingly.
7974	802	Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 30 November showed that the Japanese were ready to turn on Soviet Russia should it join with England and America.
10449	1195	On 30 Nov. TOGO cabled Nomura setting out the lines along which Nomura is to make one more attempt with the negotiations. The Imperial Government cannot understand the proposal of the 26th and holds a doubtful attitude towards the fundamental plans of the United States government in the negotiations.
10469	1199	TOGO cabled OSHIMA on 30 November and informed him that the Tri-Partite Pact had throughout formed the corner stone of Japanese Foreign Policy. Regarding the negotiations, the question of evacuation of troops on which the negotiations rested had been violently opposed, and it has become clear that Japan could no longer continue negotiations. The American proposal of 26 November which aimed at attempting to trick Japan into agreeing that if United States enters the European war Japan cannot assist Germany and Italy has made their attitude clearer than ever. The United States is now in collusion with Australia, England, Holland and China and has decided to regard Japan as well as Italy and Germany as an enemy.

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10475	1200	Record of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto on 30 November showed that Kurusu stated that a reported speech by TOJO had caused much publicity and comment in the United States and the President was returning, possibly on account of it. Yamamoto told Kurusu to continue negotiations and Kurusu said to stretch them out they would need help from home. Kurusu said that more discretion should be exercised in speeches by the Premier and Foreign Minister and that he would see Hull the next day.
10506 to 10513	1206A 1207A	TOGO in his interrogation stated that the contents of the final note from Japan to the United States were decided at a series of Liaison Conferences on or before 30 November and confirmed by the Cabinet shortly afterwards, and that the instructions as to the time of its delivery were known to all the members of the Liaison Conferences. These included in both cases the accused TOJO, SHIMADA, NAGANO, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO, and OKA. The accused members of the Cabinet were TOJO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI and HOSHINO. He claims that all the above mentioned were responsible in both respects. TOGO admitted and excused the non-delivery of any warning whatever to Great Britain until after 0700 hours on 8 December when he handed a copy of the note to Ambassador Craigie, by saying that he thought Washington would pass it on to London.
10482	1202	
10483	1202	According to TOJO it was decided at one of these Liaison Conferences to leave it to TOGO, NAGANO and Sugiyama to decide the time of delivery of the note.
	1201A	In accordance with the repeatedly expressed wishes of the Emperor it was to be before the attack. He agrees

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	1201A	that the gist of the contents of the note was approved both by the Liaison Conference and the Cabinet; he denies that the time of delivery was reported to the Liaison Conference, but says that SUZUKI also knew it.
10498	1204A	Ideas as to the length of the interval between the delivery of the note and the attack varied from half an hour to one and a half hours, but it was not to be such as to interfere with the success of the "surprise attack".
10493	1204A	TOJO admitted that the note was not a declaration of war, but he says he thought it was a breaking off of diplomatic relations. He and the Cabinet studied the relevant treaties and he says they thought they were justified, in spite of the Hague Convention and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, because Japan had been challenged militarily and economically by the other countries and was acting in self-defense. He and TOGO expressed the same opinions to the Liaison Conference and they all agreed.
10488	1203A	TOJO agreed that owing to the shortness of time allowed there was danger of a hitch, but trusted the Foreign Ministry to see that it did not occur.
10484	1202A	The War (TOJO), Navy (SHIMADA), Planning Board (SUZUKI), Foreign (TOGO), and Finance (KAYA) Ministers were among the members of the Cabinet who were always present at Liaison Conferences.
10173	1119A	The decisions of the Imperial conferences as a rule merely confirmed decisions previously taken at Liaison Conferences, according to TOJO.
10491	1203A	TOJO said that the Pearl Harbour plan was kept secret in the Navy Ministry until it was disclosed at the Liaison Conference of 30 November.

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- 11969 1334 The Fundamental Principles of Remedial Measures in Southern Regions to be occupied through Great East Asia War, dated December, states that when all American, British and Dutch southern regions are occupied, Japan will alone decide their sovereign, political, cultural and economic futures. Remedial measures should accord with statement in Imperial Rescript declaring war. Independence is to be afforded various countries, but even so their defense and foreign relations will be indirectly controlled by Japan.
- 10516 1208 On 1 December TOGO cabled Nomura, stating that the deadline date had come and gone and the situation was increasingly difficult. To prevent United States suspicion they had advised the press that though there were wide differences between the United States and Japan, negotiations were continuing. The note would be withheld from the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo and representations made in Washington only. They were asked to make investigations concerning the President's return.
- 10519 568 On 1 December an Imperial Conference was held at
1107 which it was decided that since the negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of national policy decided on 5 November have failed, Japan will open hostilities against Britain, the United States and the Netherlands. According to TOJO (and as shown in Exhibit 1107) there were present on this occasion himself, all or nearly all the Cabinet members (who included SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, and SUZUKI) NAGANO, HOSHINO, MUTO, AND OKA.
- 10523 1210 KIDO's diary of 1 December stated that the Council, in the presence of the Emperor, was held that day and decided on war between Japan and the United States; the

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Premier consulted KIDO about the declaration of war.

10523 1211 On 2 December TOGO instructed Nomura and consuls in the United States territory by cable to burn all codes, secret documents, etc., without raising suspicion from outside.

11214 Richardson Bernard Kuehn admitted that on 2 December he gave Kita, Consul General Honolulu, documents concerning full details of United States shipping information in Pearl Harbour.

11193 1252 On 2 December Combined Fleet Top Secret Order No. 7 was issued.

11211 1258 On 2 December TOGO cabled Honolulu stating that in view of the present situation, he would like a day by day report on whether balloons have been installed above Pearl Harbour and if warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

6654 605 In a telegram sent on 2 December from OSHIMA to TOGO he stated he had been unable to get Hitler's opinion on the subject of German participation in American War with Japan, but would do so as soon as possible. OSHIMA had assured Gaus that the agreement would be mutual. OSHIMA suggested that a German-Italian-Japanese declaration of joint non-conclusion of separate peace would be best.

On 2 December TOGO ceased to be Overseas Minister, but retained other offices.

6657 606 Intercepted message from Rome to TOGO of 3 December concerned the fact that United States-Japanese negotiations are not working out and Mussolini backs up

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		for the moment. Since she is closely bound with Japan, and England, United States and Holland have not recognized her, she will consider them as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly.
10569	Shirao	On 4 December witness Shirao stated that on orders from the War Ministry he issued written instructions to all branch offices in Tokyo and to other sections of his censorship staff concerning 5-hour delay for cables to and from abroad.
6661	607	Extract from Ciano's diary of 4 December states that Berlin does not like the idea of United States intervention in war, while Mussolini appears pleased about it.
6662	608	Telegram from German Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister of 5 December, concerning impending break-off in United States-Japanese negotiations. Deliberations in Foreign Ministry on how Japan will open conflict, whether by declaration of war simultaneously with, or after the beginning of hostilities.
10532	1215	On 5 December Momura handed a statement to Hull, giving the explanations regarding troop movements in French Indo-China as instructed by TOGO in his cable of 3 December.
11219	1262	A message from Honolulu to TOGO dated 5 December gave specific mention of the movements of ships in and out of the Harbour.
6662	607	Extract from Ciano's diary of 5 December related that Ribbentrop, after two days' delay, sent a message and submitted a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace.
7981	805	Telegram from Tokyo to Berlin of 6 December states that

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		Japan hesitates to bring about a clash with Soviet until circumstances are right and wants this explained to German Government so it will not insist on exchange of notes on this matter at the present time.
10534	1216	TOGO cabled Nomura on 6 December and stated that the Government had deliberated on the United States proposal of 26 November and had decided on a memorandum. This memorandum may be delayed until the next day and the exact time for handling it will be telegraphed later.
10536	1217	On 6 December TOGO informed Nomura again of the strict secrecy of the memorandum.
11224	1264	A message was sent from Honolulu to TOGO on 6 December, giving the location of ships in the Harbour and that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm.
10825	1245-J	On 6 December the President of the United States
Ballantine		telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor that the
1221		tragic possibilities in the situation be avoided. By the President's instructions the telegram was in gray code, easy to decipher. The alerting message was dispatched at 2000 hours on 6 December and the message at 2100 hours on the same day, all Washington time.
11222	1263	A message of 6 December from Honolulu to TOGO gave direct information for the surprise attack and dealt with important subjects of barrage balloons and torpedo nets.
10569	Shirao	On 6 December Shirao, Chief of Censorship Department, Communications Ministry, stated his orders to

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delay telegrams were changed from 5 hours' delay to 5 and 10 hours on alternate days: 7 December became a "ten-hour" day.

10537 1218 On 7 December (6 December in Washington) ~~Homura~~ *Homura* **TOGO** cabled ~~TOGO~~ that the reply was to be given to the United States at 1:00 PM on 7 December, Washington time.

10538 1219 A telegram from TOGO of 7 December stated measures to be taken in the event of a national crisis, in regard to China. British concessions to be occupied, Shanghai International Settlement, Peking Legation compounds to be taken over. On declaration of war the Nanking Government is to be directed (contrary to previous instructions) not to participate, but to maintain close relations with Japan.

10542 1220 KIDO stated in his diary on 7 December that HOSHINO visited him to consult about the war with the United States and England.

10330 Ballantine At 7:40 PM on 6 December the White House informed the Press that a note was being dispatched to the Emperor.

10544 1222 Synchronized Time Chart for 6, 7, 8 December showed that events occurred in the following order, according to Tokyo time:

December 7 0940 American Press told telegram on way to Emperor

1000 Hull cabled Grew the cable was on way

1100 Hull sent President's message to Emperor to Grew, cable marked "Triple Priority" and message sent in easily decipherable code

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		1200 President's message received in Tokyo
		1500 U. S. radio announces message on way
		1800 by this time at latest the contents of the President's message were known in Japanese Government offices.
		2230 Grew received the message
December 8	0015	Grew sees TOGO, reads message to him, and asks for appointment to deliver it to the Emperor personally
	0045	The Shanghai Bund occupied
	0140	Kota Bahru shelled
	0200	Nomura asks to see Hull
	0205	Japanese land at Kota Bahru
	0300	Nomura asks for postponement of meeting with Hull
	0305	Japanese land at Singora and Patani (Siam)
	0330-25	attack on Pearl Harbour
	0405	Nomura arrives at Hull's office
	0420	Nomura hands Hull the document terminating negotiations
	0520	H.M.S. Peterel sunk
	0530	Japanese troops invade Siam from French Indo- China
	0610	air raid on Singapore
	0700	Tokyo radio gives first notice that hostilities have begun
	0730	Grew calls on TOGO, who hands him copy of document handed by Nomura to Hull, stating it was Emperor's answer to President's message
	0800	Craigie sees TOGO at his request and is handed a copy of the last-mentioned document
	0805	Guam attacked

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		0900 Hong Kong attacked
		between 1140 and 1200 Imperial Rescript issued.
10552	1224	Affidavit of Joseph Clark Grew stated that about 1500
	1247	on 7 December it was announced by radio in the United States that the President had sent a message to the Emperor, but no information was given as to its substance or the channel of transmission. At 2100 he received a telegram marked "Triple Priority" from Hull, sent at 2000 6 December, Washington time (1100 7 December Tokyo time), stating that a telegram was then being encoded containing a message from the President, which Grew was to communicate to the Emperor at the earliest possible moment. About 2230 the actual message was delivered at the Embassy. It was stamped as having been received in Japan at 1200 and was marked "Triple Priority" sent 6 December, 2100 Washington time (1100 7 December, Tokyo time). Grew immediately telephoned to TOGO asking for an urgent appointment at midnight. TOGO attempted to put it off until the next day, but made the appointment. As soon as the telegram was decoded and typed, Grew took it to TOGO's residence and saw him on 8 December at 0015. He requested an audience with the Emperor to present the message, which he read aloud, and of which he gave a copy to TOGO. TOGO said at first he would study the document, but when Grew asked if this meant some doubt as to whether he would ask for the audience, he replied he would present the matter to the Throne. TOGO made some further remarks about the Washington conversations, but when Grew said he had not received a report of the 5 December talk and it would complicate

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matters if he tried to repeat talks in his comments to the Department, TOGO said it was not necessary. Grew left at 0300. At about 0700 Grew received a telephone call requesting him to come and see the Minister at once. The person speaking said he had tried to get Grew since 0500. Grew arrived at the Minister's residence at about 0730. TOGO said he had seen the Emperor and handed Grew a copy of the memorandum entitled, "Memorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 PM on December 7, 1941." TOGO said he had seen the Emperor at about 0300, and this memorandum is the Emperor's reply. Grew reminded TOGO that he had asked for an audience and still wished to present the President's message personally. TOGO said he had no desire to stand between the Throne and Grew. He then thanked Grew for cooperation during the conversations and saw him off. TOGO said nothing to Grew about war having broken out anywhere, or about Pearl Harbour. Shortly after returning to the Embassy Grew learned through a newspaper bulletin that Japan was at war with the United States and Great Britain. Later that morning an official of the Foreign Office called at the Embassy and read the official announcement that war had broken.

10570 Shirao Shirao stated that on 7 December before 6:00 PM, possibly between 4 and 6 -- he knew of the contents of Roosevelt's message to the Emperor from the War Ministry.

10831 1945-X Text of the memorandum handed on 7 December at 2:20 PM, Ballantine Washington time, by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of State Hull, breaking off negotiations with the United States.

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10629	1232	At 1:20 PM, 7 December, Washington time, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour.
10627	1232	Nomura and Kurusu arrived to see Hull at 2:05 PM on 7 December (Washington time) and were received by him at 2:20 PM. They presented the memorandum breaking off negotiations and apologized, saying it should have been delivered at 1:00 PM, but decoding had delayed its delivery.
10571	Shirao	Shirao stated that at 0430 on 8 December he was told by the Chief of the Foreign Telegram Section to stop all communications with foreign countries.
10680	1238	At 0645 on 8 December, General Maltby was informed that war existed between Japan and Britain and at 0800 Japanese aircraft bombed Hong Kong airfield.
10637	Tateno	Witness Tateno, radio announcer, stated that at 0700 on 8 December he broadcast the first publication of Japan's attacks. It was not true as stated in the broadcast that there had been a previous announcement at 0600.
10673	1236	At 0800 on 8 December (Tokyo time) TOGO handed the same reply to Craigie at which time Craigie stated he had received no information of any state of war or attack on Britain or the United States, and was relieved to find the document did not suggest it.
10676	1236	At 1130 on 8 December an official of the Japanese Foreign Office informed Craigie that war existed between Great Britain and Japan.
10572	Shirao	At 12 o'clock midday on 8 December the Imperial
	1240	Rescript was read according to testimony of Shirao.
10683	1239	On 8 December KIDO in his diary stated that at 12:40 AM Foreign Minister TOGO reported that Ambassador Grew had brought a personal telegram from President to the Emperor.

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KIDO advised TOJO to deliberate carefully with Premier TOJO as regards its diplomatic effect. The Emperor would grant an audience even at midnight. KIDO went to the palace at 2:40 AM and talked with TOJO, back home at 3:30 AM. As he was returning to his office, which he reached at 7:15 AM, he saw a fine sun rise and reflected that this was the day on which Japan was to enter the war against the United States and Britain, and that at day-break a mass air attack had been carried out at Hawaii. Knowing this, and being anxious about the result, he prayed. At 7:30 AM on arrival at the office, he heard of the grand success of the surprise attack from TOJO, NAGANO and Sugiyama. From 11:40 to 12:00 midday, KIDO was received in audience. The Imperial Proclamation of War was issued.

10642 1235-A 8 December 1140 Japan announced her attack on Hong Kong

1150 " " " " on Malaya

1300 " " " air raid on Hawaii

and others

1700 " " air raid on the Philippines

2100 " " air raid on airdromes in

the Philippines and advance into

Thailand.

10690 1241 At an Inquiry Committee Meeting of the Privy Council
at 7:30 AM on 8 December, attended by TOJO, SHIMADA,
TOGO, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA, while SHIMADA was re-
porting on the starting of war against the United States
and England, the Emperor's reference bill for their
deliberation on the subject arrived. In answer to a
question as to the time of declaration of war, TOJO
replied it shall be done as soon as the Imperial Sanction

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is obtained. He also said since 1 December the negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy, and that Japan would not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. KAYA said there would be a Special Emergency War Expense Account.

TOGO spoke of the form in which the announcement would be made to enemy countries. The Secretaries reported that at 8:00 PM on 7 December they were informed at Premier's residence that the action would begin in the early morning next day, and that during the day the declaration of war against America and England would be presented for Imperial Sanction.

10700 1242

On 8 December Berlin cabled Tokyo reporting that OSHIMA had stated to Ribbentrop Japan's wish for a formal declaration of war by Italy and Germany. Ribbentrop agreed to transmit TOGO's wish to Hitler.

7122 656

Local Military Treaty between French authorities and the Japanese Army was enacted on 9 December concerning the joint defense of French Indo-China. By this agreement Japanese troops are granted all facilities of movement, etc. France and Japan agree to collaborate for defense of French Indo-China with all their resources and various measures concerning air defense, ship movements, plane movements, transport communications and counter-espionage adopted, all of which benefit Japanese and give them virtual control.

11304 1266

On 10 December the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council met to discuss the matter of no-separate peace. TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, MUTO and OKA were present when it was queried whether the treaty should not be deferred until Germany and Italy had actually entered

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the war; TOGO and TOJO answered that it had been arranged with Hitler to announce German participation as soon as he signed the agreement and they could trust the Germans.

11305 1267 On 10 December a Privy Council Meeting was held attended by TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA and SUZUKI on the matter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy regarding the waging of a common war against the United States of America and the United Kingdom, non-separate peace and collaboration for the establishment of the new order.

6668 51 On 11 December the Board of Information announced the conclusion of an agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy with respect to their joint prosecution of war against the United States and British Empire, abstention from concluding peace and cooperation for the establishment of a new order.

8060 826-A Excerpt from newspaper "Asahi" of 12 December giving text of statement of TOJO on occasion of declaration of war by Germany and Italy on the United States and of the conclusion by Japan of the military agreement with Germany and Italy. TOJO states the world is divided into two groups, one fighting to maintain the status quo and the other for a new order; he believes victory will come to the latter. Offers hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries.

11948 1332 On 12 December the first report of the Sixth Committee (SUZUKI, Chairman), "Outline of the Economic Counter-Plans for the Southern Areas," was made. Principal policy stated to be meeting demand for important national resources so as to help war, to establish self-sufficient system for co-

PAGE	EXHIBIT WITNESS	REFERENCE
		Japan in the Far East, would declare war himself if Japan were involved, and give Japan all assistance possible by holding England in the Mediterranean.
6660	607	Extract from Ciano's diary 3 December related to a meeting between the Japanese Ambassador and the Duce, in which the former asserted that United States-Japanese negotiations were at a deadlock. He asked Italy to declare war immediately after Japan did so, and Mussolini said he would, reserving right to confer with Berlin first.
11216	1261	On 3 December Kita in Honolulu cabled Tokyo, reporting a change in his method of communicating by signals.
10526	1213	TOGO cabled Nomura on 3 December and instructed him concerning the rumour of strengthening of troops in French Indo-China to state that it was caused by exaggerated reports of strengthening troops there against Chinese troops which have been carrying on activities in French Indo-China and China border districts.
10528	1213	On 3 December Nomura acknowledged TOGO's cable and stated that he assumed it was a result of consultations and considerations. He stated that the United States considered it important and that this reply will be the key to peace or war. He could not anticipate the United States reply. Nomura asked for a clearer expression of Japan's intent, and intimated that the suggested explanation was unsatisfactory.
10530	1214	In a cable from TOGO to Hsinking on 4 December steps to be taken by Manchukuo in case the situation becomes critical are stated, reversing previous instructions. When Japan commences war, Manchukuo will not participate

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prosperity sphere, and to strengthen Japan's economy.

Two areas are named for this purpose: one to include Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Borneo, Philippines, and the other French Indo-China and Thailand.

11961 1333-A On 14 December a summarized plan for the management of the southern area was made. Purpose to guarantee Japan's security and establish necessary organization for Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as leader. Basic policies are acquisition and utilization of military bases, acquisition of resources for national defense, tightening economic cooperation, severing European and American political shackles and respecting local desire for emancipation and independence. The plans for the independence or occupation of the southern areas are then set forth, taking into consideration the cooperation afforded to Japan.

6671 609 At a meeting between OSHIMA and Hitler on 14 December, at which Hitler decorated OSHIMA with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold, Hitler expressed his delight at the method Japan used to declare war. Hitler stated that if the other party only puts one off when negotiating, then one should strike and not waste time declaring war. The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany; it facilitated her submarine warfare now that the United States position was clear. Hitler excused the set-back in Russia as due to weather and gave information on contemplated Mediterranean attack with U-boats. OSHIMA gave the Fuehrer a survey on the Pacific war situation, stating that after the fall of Singapore, Japan will turn on India; he also revealed

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		that Japan had been carrying out landing exercises on Hainan Island for some time.
9073	879-A	On 16 December TOJO made a ministerial address to the Diet, stating that Japan owes the Army and Navy debts of gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they had been silently preparing for this great day.
11308	1268	On 16 December KIDO stated in his diary that Prince Konoye visited him and expressed his feelings about political responsibility. KIDO asked him to be prudent.
11309	1269	On 18 December KIDO stated in his diary that the Chief of the Naval General Staff (NAGANO) reported to the palace the results at Hawaii.
11315	1270-A	Soon after 8 December, a collection of Essays on Problems of International Law related to the Greater East Asia War was prepared by a committee of well known Japanese international lawyers in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry. Amongst these was "A Report of Study concerning Hostilities on the Outbreak of War." It was delivered on 26 December.
12184	deWeerd	In 1942 the Japanese initiated the AAA Movement, the theme of which was Asia for the Asiatic.
12045	1339	In January Major G. L. Reinderhoff was taken prisoner by the Japanese in Tarakan. He states in his affidavit that he and two other Dutch officers were sent by the Japanese Commanding General to the Dutch Commander of Balikpapan. He was informed that if the oil works in Balikpapan were destroyed or a Japanese landing resisted, all soldiers and all Europeans of both sexes in Balikpapan would be killed.
8141		Matsumura stated in affidavit existence of plan of operation for 1942 against USSR which contained:

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(1) general tasks of Kwantung Army; (2) distribution of military strength; (3) tasks of different fronts and armies. Plan was signed by UMEZU, Commander Kwantung Army, and others and witness stated it was not clear to him whether war against USSR would actually be carried on.

7352 677-A

In the book "Thailand", of January, a map is shown encircling territory which Japan expects to encompass under her control of the new East Asia, including Maritime Province, Aleutians, Hawaiian Islands, Australia and New Zealand.

7532 706

According to Red Army reports, the strength of the Kwantung Army on 1 January was established as 1,100,000 men strong, 22 times the strength in 1932 and 4 times the strength in 1937; 1000 tanks, 500 pieces of ordinance; 7 divisions; and 1500 planes.

7348 675-A

Excerpt from newspaper "Tokyo Dai Nippon" of 5 January states that Greater East Asia Sphere includes these countries: Japan, Manchukuo, China, Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines and islands of Pacific and Indian Oceans; they may not be included at once, but for purposes of defense Japan includes them in its sphere of influence. This article,

12021 675-A

which is entitled "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence" by HASHIMOTO goes on to state that careful consideration should be given to the divisions and administration of the countries in the Sphere. The principles to be followed were independence to be given to each race in its proper place and incorporation into Japan for those areas where the inhabitants have no

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capacity for independence or where the areas were of strategic importance. There should also be a supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Japan's leadership to be set up in Tokyo. The article advocated the launching of anti-American and British movements and the development of superior races in preparation for the great future fight between white and colored races.

12024	1337	On 12 January there was a declaration by the Board of Information concerning the opening of hostilities against Netherlands forces. This stated that, in spite of the previous declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain, Japan had wished to avoid war against the Netherlands East Indies, but Holland had notified Japan that, in view of Japan's war against the United States and Great Britain, a state of war did exist between Japan and the Netherlands. In view of the need for protecting Japanese interests, therefore, Japan opened hostilities against the Netherlands forces on 11 January.
6681	49	On 18 January a military agreement was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in which the Axis, acting in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, divided the world into zones of military operation.
7424	688-A	Excerpt from secret publication of the Institute of Total War of 27 January entitled, "Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," defines extent of co-prosperity sphere as within limits of Pacific Ocean, Central Asia and Indian Ocean; plans for development of Manchukuo and fortifying it for military operations against USSR; plans for annexation of Soviet Maritime Provinces; provisions for Mongolian defense wall against USSR.

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12047	1340	On 20 January the Dutch Commander of the town of Balikpapan received from Captain Reinderhoff the Japanese ultimatum. He replied that he had received the necessary order and that the oil installation would be destroyed.
12050	1341	On 24 January the Japanese occupied Balikpapan as is stated in the affidavit of J. T. Amstel. On 20 February it was rumoured that all Europeans would be murdered by the Japanese on 24 February and this was duly carried out, the number of Europeans killed being from 80 to 100. The native population was compelled to attend.
12028	1338-A	On 22 January Foreign Minister TOGO made a speech in the Diet. In this speech, TOGO stated that Japan's task was the emancipation and prosperity of East Asia and the setting up of a new world order. The Axis connection had become increasingly tight and there was close economic, military and diplomatic cooperation. The Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union remained unchanged. Japan wished to keep on good terms with neutral states but Japan was watching the situation in South America. Japan had begun fighting against the Netherlands East Indies because Britain, Holland and Chungking had made the Netherlands East Indies their strategic base. TOGO then outlined the aim of the war, which was to establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere and decide the destiny of all East Asia. It was, therefore, natural that areas necessary for defending East Asia should be grasped by Japan.
12035	1338-B	On 22 January TOJO made a speech in the Diet. TOJO stated that the cardinal principle for directing the war was to secure strategic points in Greater East Asia and

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gain control of areas containing important resources, to fight out the war until the United States and Britain were defeated. Japan would carry out aggressive operations closely with Germany and Italy. While Japan was pushing her military operations, she was engaged in establishing the East Asia Sphere. Japan would establish eternal peace in East Asia and construct a new world order absolutely indispensable for the defense of Greater East Asia. TOJO then enumerated the territories captured and outlined Japan's intentions towards them.

12009 1336 On 27 January the Total War Research Institute drafted the basic plan for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It stated that the States, Citizens and Resources belonging to the Pacific, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean, were to be established as an autonomous zone on behalf of the peoples of East Asia. The area was to include Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower Yangtze River and the Russian Maritime Province. It was Japan's duty to be leader of this Union. There would be the Inner Sphere, vital for Japan. The Smaller Co-prosperity Sphere would be the smaller self-supplying Sphere of East Asia, and the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere would be the larger self-supplying sphere and would include the smaller one plus Australia, India and the Islands in the Pacific. The points which should be made the primary starting points for political construction were explained.

11339 1271 On 29 January Otto reported to Berlin the various
(7983) (806) speeches made by TOJO, TOGO and SUZUKI at the Diet and Budget Commission recently which brought forth many interesting and important declarations concerning Japanese

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aims and the execution of the war. Future moves towards the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and the Soviet are mentioned. The military occupation of the conquered countries is to be a benevolent one (Greater East Asia under Japanese management) and the main object to be the acquisition of sources of raw materials. The countries conquered, or to be conquered, were divided into groups: some (Hong Kong and Malaya) to remain in the possession of Japan, and others (Philippines and Burma) to be granted independence on the model of Manchukuo if they cooperate with Japan; Netherlands East Indies, Australia and Chungking, China, to be conquered if they persist in resisting. TOJO stated relations towards Russia to be unchanged, but very confidential information showed military preparations against USSR to be already underway in Manchuria. Japan must turn against Russia, seize Vladivostok, the coastal provinces and North Sakhalin in order to feel secure in the north.

7349 676-A Article by Tanaka, Naokiti in paper "Osaka Ji Ji," dated 31 January, stated the purpose of Great Union of Asia is first to unite morally Japan, China, and Manchuria under Japanese leadership; second, then include Thailand, Annam, Philippines and Burma; and third, to effect emancipation of Australia, India and Siberia.

7991 810 Excerpt from symposium of Institute of Total War entitled, "The Program of Total War in the First Period," The Construction of East Asia" of February 1942. If prospect of peace between Germany and USSR would cause Soviet alienation from England and America and thus reduce threat to Japan, Japan would attempt to mediate, or she

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		might threaten to attack Russia if Russia refused to suspend hostilities. If war situation is unfavorable to Germany, no efforts will be made to bring about peace.
7610	731-A	All Manchurian Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai (General UMEZU was present) was held on 8 February. UMEZU's speech relates to Japan's aim to liberate East Asia from baneful influence of England and the United States and delegates must contribute to cause of national defense so Nippon might be sure as far as rear is concerned. On 17 February TOJO resigned from Home Ministry, remaining Premier and War Minister.
7410	682	An extract from the plan concerning scope and structure of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of 18 February plans for German-Japanese occupation of Russia and Japanese counter plans to keep Slavs from German occupied territory out of Japanese section of the USSR.
7430	689	A top secret publication of the Total War Research Institute dated 18 February entitled, "Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia", introduced to show Japanese plans for war against USSR and capture of Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal.
8410	849	In March SATO in his speech made clear that prior to 1941 Japan had expanded her production far in excess of need for China War, and had carefully gathered all controls in hands of government, effectively chaining all industry to the national policy of industrial preparation for a far greater conflict.
12150	de Weerd	7 March Japanese military paper currency was introduced and the guilder reduced to the value of the yen.

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12053	1342	The discussion and agreement of the surrender of troops
to 12064		in Netherlands East Indies to Japan was conducted on 8 March.
12183	deWeerd	On 20 March the Japanese prohibited discussion or activities in the organization and structure of government and certain Indonesian leaders were arrested. In December 1942 to January 1943 there was a large scale round-up of Indonesians and those who were not executed or who did not die in prison remained in captivity until September 1945.
12140	de Weerd	In April a ban on listening to the radio from outside Netherlands East Indies was enforced, and in July some persons who had listened to broadcasts and spread news were sentenced to death by court martial.
12143	de Weerd	In April all existing law courts were abolished and Ordinance Nos. 2 and 3 of March 1942, all meetings and associations were forbidden in the Netherlands East Indies. On 20 April SATO became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, MUTO being appointed Commander of the Imperial Guards Division, in Tokyo .
12145	de Weerd	On 29 April the first daily newspaper in the Malay language appeared and all forms of propaganda came under Japanese control.
7984	807	Telegram from Ribbentrop to German Ambassador in Tokyo of 15 May stated that if Japan feels unable to capture Vladivostok and penetrate into Siberia successfully, without weakening her position against England and America (as in Burma), then she should maintain friendly attitude to Russia. By maintaining neutrality the risk of long-drawn out war and attack on Japanese home islands may be avoided. In short, a sudden and successful attack against Soviet Russia would be great boon for

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Further conduct of war, but should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

11352 1272 On 17 May Ott cabled Ribbentrop suggesting that SUZUKI, SHIRATORI, Sugiyama, KIMURA, MUTO, SATO, Kasahara, and DOHIHARA be recommended for decorations by Germany, in view of the important contributions they had made towards German-Japanese cooperation, details being given in each case. On 29 May MINAMI was appointed a Privy Councillor.

12154 de Weerd On 1 June so-called private estates in the Netherlands East Indies were appropriated without payment and public utilities seized.

7900 778 In a talk between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA on 24 June Ribbentrop stated that the strength of the Tri-Partite powers had been in their offensive war. OSHIMA agreed and stated that neither he nor his government believed in defensive war, but that victory was based on further attacks.

5023 439 In Imperial Order 613 of 14 July it is shown that the Government had power to issue orders for supervision of enterprises of South Manchurian Railway; the Kwantung Army may direct military affairs concerning business affairs of company, - in wartime, may issue orders involving business affairs of company.

12161 de Weerd On 5 August an entirely new system of local administration was set up. The composition of the Administration Corps was later modified according to TOJO's promise but leading positions remained with the Japanese and they did not hand over authority until August 1945. Witness de Weerd then explained the reorganization of the Judicial System.

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11359 1273

KIDO related in his diary on 1 September that friction had arisen between TOJO and TOGO, who objected in principle to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. TOGO had been asked to resign, and after intervention by SHIMADA had agreed to do so, thus averting a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc.

On 1 September TOGO resigned; TOJO temporarily was also appointed Foreign Minister.

On 1 October UMEZU, General, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army (previously Commander).

12070 687

On 9 October there was a meeting of the Privy Council on the Greater East Asia Ministry at which MINAMI, TOJO, HOSHINO and SUZUKI were present. TOJO made a report and explanation of the draft bill and made a statement to the effect that victory was an absolute necessity for Japan and that in order to achieve this the combined fighting power of East Asia must be strengthened. It was, therefore, desired to establish a Ministry which should be known as the "Greater East Asia Ministry". TOJO then gave his opinion as to the effect of this on foreign countries which was that their misunderstanding would be solved since the draft aimed for the benefit for all, but that close attention should be paid to the alienation of the relative countries. At the fourth meeting of the Privy Council on 14 October, there were present MINAMI and SUZUKI, the question of naming the new Ministry, Greater East Asia Ministry was discussed and SUZUKI approved of this name. The extranormal diplomacy with countries within the Sphere was discussed as well as the intimate relationship between foreign policy and

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extranormal diplomacy in the areas and it was decided that the new Minister should take charge. At the fifth meeting on 14 October, which MINAMI attended, the relations of Japan with countries in the Sphere and the diplomacy to be used was discussed. The overseas affairs would come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister. At the meeting on 20 October, MINAMI, SHIMADA, and OKA were present and at the 8th meeting on 21 October MINAMI, TOJO and OKA were present. Record of second conference of Privy Council attended by HOSHINO, MINAMI, SUZUKI and TOJO on 12 October concerning Greater East Asia Ministry - excerpt on Japan's plans for economic advancement by diplomatic means, last resort would be armed warfare, Greater East Asia Sphere defined as including Kwantung, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and any new occupation zones resulting from Greater East Asia War.

5186 90

Imperial Ordinance No. 704 of 1 November concerning establishment and organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Greater East Asia Ministry established to execute various political affairs concerning Greater East Asia protect commercial interests, affairs concerning Japanese subjects resident there.

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5191 456-A Extract from "Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations, - 1942", concerning East Asiatic Affairs refers to statement by Aoki, Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs on 1 November, concerning the establishment of Greater East Asia as a new order based on morality and righteousness, on basis of "Hakko Ichiu" (World Under One Roof). Necessary to win war and urgently required that nation's power be replenished and strengthened to do this by cooperating with high command. Hoped for cooperation from French Indo-China, China and Thailand. On 1 November Greater East Asia Ministry was created; took over all duties of Overseas Ministry and Manchurian and China Affairs Boards and some of Foreign Ministry (reason for TOJO's resignation).

On 25 November TOJO was also again appointed temporarily Home Minister.

8055 825 On 21 January 1943 the Board of Information announced the
50 conclusion of economic agreements between Germany, Italy and Japan; also they are considering an extension of the Tri-Partite Pact to enable three countries to prosecute war against their common enemy and promote permanent economic cooperation after the war.

7993 812-A Excerpt from record of Ribbentrop's talk with OSHIMA of 6 March in which the latter reported to the German Foreign Minister that the Japanese Government did not feel strong enough to open up hostilities against Russia at that time as such action might endanger operations on other fronts. Germany points out that all forces under the Tri-Partite Pact should join forces against Russia as well as England and America; Japan should make full use of her strength now as Germany is already strained to the limit. If Germany became weak, Japan alone would face a world

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coalition of not only England, America and Russia, but all bolshevized Europe. OSHIMA replied Japan did not have sufficient army and material to successfully engage Russia and also did not wish to split her Army. Japan would prejudice the southern front if she fought Russia.

12186 DeWeerd On 9 March the "Putera" Movement was begun whose aim was to arouse the strength of the people for victory, to establish a new Java, and eliminate occidental influences.

On 11 March KIMURA was appointed a Supreme War Councillor on resignation as Vice War Minister.

7434 690-A Summarized Research Papers for Year 1942, published by the Research Institute of Total War on 30 March 1943, introduced to show Japanese made plans for possible occupation of Siberia.

8174 839-A Talk between Reich Minister and Ambassador OSHIMA of 18 April shows that Germany considers this the best time for Japan's assault on Russia, who was now weakened by assault from west. Germany estimates Russian force in Siberia as considerably less than Japan's estimate. OSHIMA did not know his Government's views on the subject and for the past 20 years Japan had been preparing to attack USSR.

On 20 April SHIGEMITSU became Foreign Minister.

On 1 May DOHIHARA was appointed Commander of the Eastern District Army (in Japan) and a Supreme War Councillor.

11363 1274 On 13 May KIDO recorded that SHIGEMITSU visited the palace and spoke of the critical situation in Germany. The overwhelming of the Nazi Party by the Army may cause a similar situation to that which arose at the end of the last war, and SHIGEMITSU suggested that a powerful person be sent from Japan to establish liaison between the two countries.

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12096 1345

On 16 June TOJO made a speech at the 82nd Session of the Diet and stated that Japan was making arrangements to launch decisive operations. TOJO then outlines Japan's intentions towards the populations of Malay, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes and other places.

7663 737

Conference of Kwantung Army Information Department at Harbin conducted on 16 June by Major General Doi, Chief of Information Department, showing that the war of sabotage against the USSR was continued by Japan even in 1943 when Japan was bound by the Neutrality Pact.

On 21 June MUGANO became Supreme War Councillor and Admiral of Fleet.

11364 1275

On 18 August a meeting of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council was held to discuss the treaty between Japan and Thailand. MINAMI, TOJO, SHIGEMITSU, SATO and OKA were present. This provided that Thailand should annex the Shan States from Burma and that although this was contrary to International Law, Japan would overcome the difficulty by releasing her military occupation and allowing Thailand to annex them. TOJO said Japan would recognize International Law as long as the enemy did so but would interpret it from the viewpoint of the war according to her own opinions.

12192 DeWeerd

On 5 September by Ordinance No. 37 the Adviser System was set up which was established to advise the Resident on local government in the Netherlands East Indies.

8061 773-A

Radio address by SHIGEMITSU on 27 September, the occasion of the second anniversary of the Tri-Partite Pact, which states that the Axis Alliance remains unshaken, despite British and American maneuvers to induce the Badoglio regime to fresh acts of betrayal, and the Pact of Alliance shines forth illuminating the road to victory.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
12195	DeWeerd	<p>In October an army of volunteers for the defence of the homeland was set up to persuade the Indonesians to defend Java as part of the joint defence of Greater East Asia.</p> <p>On 8 October TOJO became temporarily also Commerce and Industry Minister.</p>
5010	466	<p>On 30 October a Pact of Alliance between so-called Republic of China and Japanese was concluded. This effected non-validity of former treaty of 30 November 1940.</p>
12103 12104	1347-A	<p>On 5 November TOJO gave an address at the Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations in which he stated that a successful conclusion of the war meant the completion of the construction of the new order. TOJO then gave his views on the conditions necessary for world peace and the ties which bound the nations of Greater East Asia together. While the nations of the Sphere mutually recognise their autonomy and independence there must be mutual trust and cooperation.</p>
12106 12107 12332	1344	<p>On 5 November, at the time of the decision of the Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations, TOJO was in favor of independence and was supported by the Foreign Minister. The Supreme Command and others, however, were against it and it was finally decided that the territories should be incorporated. The Japanese Army on the spot was dissatisfied with the decision but made no representations of their position. Soon after,</p>
12232	DeWeerd	<p>Sukarno who visited Japan after the Conference, requested TOJO to grant East Indies their independence. The meeting got no definite reply. Later, SHIGEMITSU supported a request for the independence of the East Indies. At the first War Supervision Conference it was decided to make a statement of independence. The Navy still maintained such strong opposition that the promotion of independence was deferred entirely so far as areas under the Navy's Administration were concerned.</p>

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
	1	The Cairo Conference was held on 1 December.
12178	DeWeerd	In December an organization for the training of the youth of Java was established.
7876	773	On 11 December SHIGEMITSU made a radio speech in which he accused England and the United States of being "forces of aggression" and having been driven out of East Asia during the past two years by the "irresistible might of the Japanese army and navy."
12138	DeWeerd	By the end of 1943 it was stated by witness that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands East Indies had been interned except people of 65 and over. All Occidental military personnel, some 45,000 men, were also interned.
12283	DeWeerd	In 1944, although witness did not see the atrocities to 1,200 Indonesians, he had learned of them from hundreds of reports and seen confessions by the Japanese chiefly responsible for them.
12213	DeWeerd	During 1944, Japanese propaganda was increased and all sections of the community were worked upon, using the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" and an increase of the campaign of hate against the west.
11367	1276	On 6 January KIDO discussed with his Chief Secretary measures Japan must take in the event the situation in Germany grows worse. The TOJO Cabinet, in their opinion, would not be able to cope with the situation. A plan was envisaged for the settlement of the Pacific war by coming to an understanding with the Allies which would not be too drastic for Japan. In February TOJO became Chief of Army General Staff. On 19 February KAYA resigned and became Adviser to Finance Ministry. On 21 February SHIMADA became Chief of Naval General Staff and Supreme War Councillor.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT</u> <u>WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
12208	DeWeerd	<p>On 9 March the "Putera" was officially dissolved and the corporation for communal services in Java, comprising all Asiatics, was installed. The organization was to enlist everyone in support of the military. The new organization abolished all others and anyone who attracted suspicion was tortured.</p> <p>On 22 March DCHIHARA became Commander-in-Chief of 7th Area Army in Malaya.</p>
8062	827	<p>On 15 April Prime Minister TOJO made a speech at a meeting of mixed specialists' commission, convened in accordance with the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact, in which he stated that although the Allies were hammering the Axis powers in East and Western Europe, firm conviction of victory still remains. Japan's solid camp has not even shown the slightest stir. Despite separation of western and far eastern battlefields, close concert must be maintained between Axis powers and Japan must smash all plots to segregate Japan from other Axis nations.</p> <p>On 2 June HATA became Field Marshal.</p>
4848	350	<p>Witness Wang Shi Ziang stated in his affidavit that on 4 July Japanese Kojo troops arrived in the village of Hiang Doong of the Shan District and subsequently indulged in arson, robbery, slaughter and other atrocities.</p>
11372	1277 1278	<p>On 17 July an unofficial Senior Statesmen's Council was held at HIRANUMA's house to discuss the reorganization of the Cabinet. HIROTA and Yonai declined to join the TOJO Cabinet (Yonai had been asked by OKA and SATO) and Wakatsuki stated that the present Cabinet had lost the sympathy of the public and the situation was serious. Decision: "to build a powerful national cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly."</p>

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11377 1278

On 18 July KIDO reported the meeting of the 17th to the Emperor. TOJO informed KIDO that he had decided on a resignation of the Cabinet en bloc.

On 18 July UMEZU became Army Chief of Staff; OKA became Vice Navy Minister.

At an official meeting of the Senior Statesmen convened by KIDO, a long discussion centered round the reconciliation of differences between the Army and Navy. HIROTA proposed the Imperial Prince, HIRANUMA objected and insisted on a military man, so did KIDO. Wakatsuki several times suggested Ugaki but got no support, except from Konoye. HIROTA said the prosecution of the war was first and foremost and no one dissented. They recommended Terauchi, KOISO or HATA. On TOJO's advice the Emperor selected KOISO.

11381 1279

On 19 July Konoye suggested to KIDO the new Cabinet should be a coalition between KOISO and Yonai; KIDO agreed to this proposal.

11383 1280

On 20 July the Senior Statesmen met and KIDO explained the development regarding the coalition. KOISO and Yonai were ordered by the Emperor to form a Cabinet.

On 22 July KOISO became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU remained Foreign Minister and became Great East Asia Minister; TOJO, SUZUKI and HOSHINO lost Cabinet office.

On 2 August SHIMADA ceased to be Chief of Naval General Staff and became Supreme War Councillor.

On 30 August KIMURA became Commander-in-Chief, Burma Army.

12216 DeWeerd

1352

In September an order from the Chief of Staff of the 16th Army stated that based on KOISO's proclamation on granting independence of the East Indies the Army would meet the situation with certain stipulations. The interpretation of

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>EXHIBIT WITNESS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
		independence and the time that it would come into operation were set forth.
12109 1348		On 2 September the Minister concerned proposed that the
12110		policy in regard to the independence of the East Indies was to announce that the East Indies would be made independent in the future. The Navy's approval was reserved. The form and time of independence would be determined separately. The measures to be taken in Java were then set forth.
3703 277		On 5 September KOISO made a speech before the 85th Diet
12215 DeWeerd		Session, on the occasion of his appointment as Premier.
12226 DeWeerd		On 7 September KOISO's promise that the East Indies would have independence, although it was not made clear what region, was announced in Java. In this he said that the matter would be a link in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and contribute to the development of Greater East Asia under Japan's leadership. At the same time the 16th Army was instructed to advise the War Ministry as to the areas to be declared independent and the time when it would be put into operation.
12221 DeWeerd		On 7 September an order from the Military Administration
1353		stated that the policy was to promote racial consciousness and incite feeling against the United States and Great Britain. Measures for independence would be left to the Army.
		On 5 October MUTO became Chief of Staff to Yamashita, 14th Area Army (Philippines).
2143 Tanaka		Discussion took place between MINAMI and Tanaka on 19 November, regarding the dissatisfaction in Mongolia - Tanaka asked MINAMI to become President of a Mongolian Society. MINAMI refused on grounds of his being a Privy Councillor.
		On 22 November HATA became Director-General of Military Education.

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8065	828-A	<p>A telegram was sent by SHIGEMITSU to Ribbentrop on 11 December (contained in copy of Nippon Times of 12 December). This telegram stated the determination of Axis to fight for common idea of establishing new order. Japan has faith in Europe's salvation by Germany and Italy and is confident of victory of Japan in Far East, and as long as the Axis is united there is no doubt of successful outcome of the war.</p> <p>In December, SATO became Deputy Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force.</p>
5026	439	<p>At Shareholders Extraordinary General Meeting of Southern Manchurian Railway on 20 January, it was decided to allot the Manchukuo Government 175,000,000 yen (in addition to 50,000,000 yen of 2 January 1930) and issue 3,500,000 shares for them.</p>
8067	829-A	<p>SHIGEMITSU made a speech at the 86th Diet Session on 21 January, saying that the combination between Japan and her Allies was becoming firmer and firmer, and that it is their sacred mission to continue fighting to make clear and accomplish common war aim of international justice in war of self-existence and self-defense. (This shows the tenacity in the realization of the aims of the conspiracy and the unity in aggressive war, despite fact that it was only three months prior to Germany's unconditional surrender.)</p>
7166	661	<p>On 1 February "Measures towards French Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the situation" were decided at the Supreme War Leadership Council.</p>
7165	662	<p>Telegram from Saigon, Ambassador Matsumoto to SHIGEMITSU dated 3 March, referred to the ultimatum to be handed to the Governor-General of Indo-China, with a view to placing the whole of French Indo-China under the Japanese Army Control.</p> <p>On 5 March KIMURA became General.</p>

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- 7177 663 Ambassador Matsumoto visited Governor-General of French Indo-China on 9 March, and requested strengthening of common defense of French Indo-China by France and Japan, in view of possibility of American landings. France rejected the proposal, and so the Japanese therefore set about disarming French troops and using force.
- 7183 664 Proclamations were issued by the Japanese on 10 March, relating to measures Japanese took to obtain control of military and administration of French Indo-China. Orders were issued to civilians regarding behaviour, and the fact was impressed upon them that this "coup" was merely directed against the anti-Japanese Government and not the people as a whole.
- 11385 1281 On 4 April KIDO reported in his diary that KOISO stated his intention to resign. KIDO suggested he postpone it until next day in order to give the Emperor time to consider and he agreed.
- 54 USSR denounced the Neutrality Pact on 5 April.
- 11390 1282 KIDO stated in his diary of 5 April that KOISO tendered his resignation because Cabinet must be strengthened in view of war situation and it was to be announced that night. KIDO first interviewed (among others) UMEZU, who stressed need of fighting it out to the bitter end, and need of a special cabinet for that purpose. He then called a Senior Statesmen's Conference. TOJO said there was now a section of opinion in favour of accepting unconditional surrender and demanded a decision on that. HIRANUMA said several times that Japan must fight to the bitter end, HIROTA agreed and was hopeful of victory. No one expressed dissent openly. HIRANUMA wanted to recommend cabinet members as well as the Premier. He

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finally suggested Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, President of the Privy Council, who spoke of being prepared to die fighting for the Emperor and country. KIDO supported and he was recommended. TOJO suggested that if the Army was not satisfied it might "stand aloof" -- to the general indignation.

On 7 April Suzuki became Prime Minister; TOGO again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor; SATO, Lt. General in command of the 37th Division in Indo-China and (later) Siam; DOHIHARA became Chief Inspector of Military Training and again Supreme War Councillor; ITAGAKI, General, Commander-in-Chief 7th Army (Malaya); HATA, Commander-in-Chief 2nd Army.

On 9 April HIRANUMA again became President of the Privy Council.

7193 665

On 11 April the Provisional Government of French Republic issued a warning to the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of French and Allied nationals in French Indo-China, any people who permit or perform injuries to nationals will be considered as war criminals.

7179 663

On 15 May the Japanese troops in French Indo-China finished the "mopping up" and armed operations against French troops in French Indo-China, although in view of activities of Viet Nam Party, Japanese were forced to employ considerable strength in cleaning this up until the surrender.

12234 DeWeerd

On 15 May Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters requested views on independence and on May 25 a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. Recognizing that the war was going against Japan, it was decided to allow Java to study preparations for independence, but the territory was narrowed down to Java as the naval territories were not represented at the Conference.

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12121 1350

On 17 July there was a Decision of the Supreme War Plans Council No. 27 regarding the measures for the East Indies independence stating that preparations for independence should be hastened. The area to be independent was the Netherlands East Indies and the independence as a new nation would be proclaimed as soon as preparations were completed. In areas where preparations were not complete, steps would be taken to transfer them by degrees to the jurisdiction of the new nation.

12115 1349

On 17 July, in the Data for Foreign Minister's explanation on measures for Netherlands East Indies independence, movements which had existed in the East Indies since the Dutch occupation had cooperated wholeheartedly with the Japanese in the expectation of realizing that independence. The Greater East Asia Joint Declaration was issued in November 1943 and this clarified Japan's position with regard to the independence of each country in Greater East Asia, and Japan considered it proper to carry out the spirit of this declaration.

12236 DeWeerd

On 17 July the Supreme War Direction Council decided to grant independence to the East Indies as soon as possible to comprise all Netherlands East Indies.

2

The Potsdam Declaration was signed on 26 July.

12237 DeWeerd

On 7 August, on orders from Tokyo, Terauchi set up a preparatory committee for independence.

64

USSR declared war on Japan on 8 August.

12241 DeWeerd

On 9 August Terauchi received three leading nationalists and transmitted to them the contents of the Imperial Decree. The decree stated that Japan was setting up a committee to prepare for the independence of the Netherlands East Indies.

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The day of independence was to be decided by Japan and the Government would be installed first in the place where preparations were complete and other areas would follow when they were ready.

11323 1283

On 9 August KIDO recorded in his diary that Premier Suzuki informed him that the Supreme War Guidance Council had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration with four reservations: (1) preservation of the Imperial Dynasty; (2) Independent evacuation of troops; (3) handling in our own country of persons responsible for the war; and (4) no guarantee occupation.

3

The Japanese qualified acceptance of 10 August contained only the reservation with regard to the Emperor.

4

The Allies replied on 11 August.

5

Final Japanese acceptance was 14 August.

12242 DeWeerd

On 14 August a Committee was formed with representatives from the various areas and the first meeting was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August they were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation. Japan's defeat was kept secret until 21 August.

On 17 August Prince Higashikuni became Prime Minister; SHIGEMITSU again became Foreign Minister, Greater East Asia Minister and Supreme War Councillor.

On 25 August DOHIHARA became Commander-in-Chief 12th Area Army, and again of Eastern District Army (Japan), and Supreme War Councillor.

6

The Instrument of Surrender was signed 2 September

On 9 October Shidehara became Prime Minister.

7

The Moscow Conference Agreement was signed 26 December.

APPENDIX A.

The following phases of the Prosecution Case are not fully dealt with in the Summary, owing to their general character. Oral testimony relating to these and other phases is only covered so far as it records a dated event. The following Exhibits are not referred to for the above reason. There are also a number of Exhibits mentioned in the Summary which bear upon phases in addition to those in which they were introduced.

I. 1. Treaties: Exhibits 12 - 35.

2. Japanese Constitution: Record pp. 517 - 685. Exhibits 68-99.

3. Preparing Japanese opinion for war: Record pp. 807 - 1678.

Exhibits 130-163 (of which only 135-8, 141, 148, 151, 155, 163 are mentioned in the Summary), 182, 267.

4. Narcotics: Record pp. 4407-4422, 4429-4634, 4663-4998. Exhibits: 17, 345, 372-425, all of which are mentioned in the Summary except 17, 389, 401-4, 416, 423(2), 429, 430-2, 434-5.

5. Economic Aggression in China (including Manchuria): Record pp. 4999-5350. Exhibits 436-471, 474, of which the following are omitted from the Summary, 441, 447-8, 454A, 467 - 472, 474.

6. Preparations for War: Record pp. 8182 - 9263. Exhibits 840-919, of which the following are omitted from the Summary, 843-8, 854-5, 858-60, 866, 868, 880-908, 913-18.

7. Class B and C Offences: (a) in China: Record pp. 2527-2708, 3353-342, 4455-4734. Exhibits 204-10, 213, 249 - 54, 306-347.

(b) Elsewhere: Record pp. 5351-5847: Exhibits 472, 473, 475-6 (Col. Wild) Record pp. 11403-11528 (Lt. Col. Coates), 11529-11651 (Brig. Blackburn),

(c) All evidence given after December 10th, 1946.

II. In addition the following Exhibits, dealing generally with other phases, have been omitted or only incidentally mentioned: 174-6, 199-201, 220, 221, 245, 247, 267, 275, 377, 389, 666, 668-70, 678-81, 683, 685, 691-700, 707-18, 722-30, 732-3, 735, 738-43, 750, 755, 763-5, 811, 813, 815-24, 831, 835-8, 1029, 1104-6, 1249, 1253-5, 1265, 1342, 1351

III. The following is a list of extracts (in order of date) from

"Foreign Relations Series, United States and Japan" (Exhibit 58), which relate to the negotiations in 1941, the break-down of which led to the Pacific War: Exhibits 1059, 1060, 1061, 1070, 1071, 1074, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1083, 1085, 1087, 1091, 1092, 1245A (comparison of 1070 and 1092), 1102, 1245B-I inclusive, 1215, 1245J, 1221, 1245K, 1232, (1246, 1247, put in by Defence from Pearl Harbour Report Exhibit 174). Affidavits and statements Exhibits: Hull 1106, Ballantine 1245, Grew 1105 and 1224, Craigie 1236, Byrnes 1233, Sargent 1231.