

Dohihara

The particulars with regard to him are on page 319 of Appendix B. In addition he is mentioned in the following pages of the record:- 2024, 2028/9, 2034, 2036-8, 2041, 2104/5, 2113, 2120, 2124-6, 2130-3, 2139, 2284 (Ex 197), 2312-6, 2334-7, 2336/7, 2362/3, 2367-70, 2374, 2381, 2436-40, 2442/3, 2448, 2794, 2815/6, 3018, 3102/3, 3211/2, 3231/3, 3237, 3729, 3730, 3756/9, 3816, 3962, 4124, 5491, 14273-8, 15713-30 (Ex 2190A), 15857, 15921-15937 and 16258 (Ex 2282).

Prior to 1931 Dohihara had spent almost 18 years in China. In July 1931 he left Tokyo to take charge of Special Service Organisation at Mukden and to investigate death of Captain Nakamura. He arrived in Mukden on 18 August but was again back in Tokyo early in September (Ex 2190A). There he was quoted by the press as "the advocate of a solution of all pending issues if necessary by force and as soon as possible" (Ex 57 Lytton Report at page 66). Dohihara was then a Colonel.

He arrived back in Mukden a few days after the Incident had broken out and was made Mayor of Mukden, a position which he held until 26 November 1931.

At the end of October we find him at Tientsin with instructions from Kwantung Army to interview Pu Yi and to tell him that the Kwantung Army would welcome his return to Manchuria (Ex 2190A). If these were his only instructions he greatly exceeded them. A series of consular telegrams to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA (Exhibits 181, 288-294, 300 and 303) show him as actively engineering the return of Pu Yi and family to Manchuria against the wishes of his government and its national policy; they show him as admitting that the state of affairs in Manchuria had been brought about by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria; they show him hinting that, if the government intervened in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army would separate from the government and assassinations would break out in Tokyo, and they show him as



engineering an outbreak at Tientsin to prevent evacuation of Japanese forces therefrom. Exhibit 57 Lytton report at pages 75/6 shows that trouble did break out in Tientsin on 8 and 26 November 1931.

At the end of November he took charge of the Special Service Organisation at Harbin (Exhibit 2190A). Shortly after this he is endeavouring to arrange for Chinese General Ma Chan-Shan to accept the post of Minister for War in the Changchun puppet government (Powell 3231 et seq.) In April 1932 his work in Manchuria completed for the time being he returned to Japan where he remained until July 1934.

Ching Teh Chin at p. 2334 characterizes him as the instigator of the Mukden Incident and on p. 2438 tells the Tribunal that a week before the Incident mutual friends of DOHIHARA and himself had told him that DOHIHARA was going to Manchuria to embark on some big project. Pu Yi, who would be in a position to know, states that at the time of the Incident he was reliably informed that for whatever accident or incidents that then happened DOHIHARA was the man who was pulling the strings behind (p. 4124). His own government in 1934 was happy to give him the credit of playing an important role as, on the 29 April, he was "decorated with the Order of Double Rays for Meritorious Service in the Incident between 1931 and 1934" (Ex 104). But from April 1932 to July 1934 he was a Major-General commanding a Brigade at Hiroshima, Japan, so obviously the services that were being requited were those rendered before May 1932.

From the foregoing it appears that DOHIHARA was an instructor and very active participant in the Manchurian Incident. So far is he from a soldier carrying out his duties that many of his actions were in defiance of and against the wishes of the government by whom he was employed.

In July 1934 he is back at MUKDEN with the Special Service organisation and again attached to the Kwantung Army. Throughout



the period from 1931 to 1935 the control of opium was vested in the Special Service Organisation of the Army. Large revenues were delivered from it, and these presumably remained with the Army until 1935 when Opium Control Board was set up and revenue went to Manchukuo Government (record pp. 15,855-8). After the Chahar Incident of June 1935 he goes to Peiping and represents the Japanese in negotiations to settle the incident. The final terms were such as to greatly weaken the Chinese National Government in Chahar (p. 2313). On the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Army he endeavoured to set up an autonomous regime in North China. To do this he attempted to estrange the local government from the National Government. He succeeded in setting up the Hopei-Chahar Regime and East Hopei Regime in November 1935, but failed to establish the North China autonomous government (2028-2034). He exerted pressure on General Sung to proclaim a North China autonomous government and made political and economic demands the rejection of which according to the evidence of General Ching Teh Chun (2323-2334) led up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Confirmation of attempt to form autonomous government in North China is contained in consular telegram to Foreign Minister Hirota on 2 October 1935 (Ex 197).

In February or March 1936 he returned to Japan where he remained as Lieutenant-General commanding a Division until 25 August 1937. He then went to North China as Commander of 14th Division and took part in drive from Peiping towards Hankow. He went to Japan on 1 June 1938 but was sent back to China by his government from August 1938 to June 1939 to see what he could do about settling the war. As Chief of the Mission he conducted some negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek through intermediaries but nothing came of them. From that time onwards he commanded 5th Army in TAONAN, Manchuria until June 1940 (Ex 2190A).



On 29 April 1940 he was decorated with the 2nd Class of the Golden Kite for meritorious service in the Chinese Incident.

He became Supreme War Councillor on 28 September 1940 a post which he seems to have held sometime concurrently with other appointments until March 1944. He was promoted to General on 28 April 1941, appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General on 9 June 1941. On 17 May 1942 (Exh. 1272) he was recommended for the German Grand Cross and I quote from the citation: "By constant close and friendly co-operation with the Air Attache he has in a leading position contributed, in the true sense of the Tripartite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the military alliance". He became Commander of the Eastern District Army on 1 May 1943 (Ex 104). This Army Command embraced an area around Tokyo (Ex 2282) in which prisoners of war camps were situated. There is evidence of his having visited the NAOETSU POW Camp in NIGATA prefecture in September or October 1943. At this camp 60 prisoners died from starvation and ill-treatment. Conditions did not improve after his visit (p. 14270-14280). Article 3 of the Prisoner of War Internment Camp Ordinance (Ex 92) places responsibility for administration of Camp on Army Commander, and therefore DOHIHARA has a direct responsibility for conditions at this camp and others in his area of command and deaths that resulted therefrom.

In March 1944 he became Commander of 7th Area Army at Singapore and retained that appointment until early April 1945 (Ex 104). This Command embraced MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA and Borneo (Ex 2282). It is sufficient to direct attention generally to evidence given as to treatment of prisoners of war in those areas and the thousands of murders and unnecessary deaths that took place there. For the reasons stated above DOHIHARA must take direct responsibility for treatment of prisoners of war in those areas between March 1944 and early April 1945. Examples are Exhs. 1513A - 1516A, 1518A, 1528A, and Colonel Wild's evidence p. 5491.



It is submitted that DOHIHARA was an active participator in the conspiracies alleged at least from some time prior to the Manchurian Incident, that he continued to participate in them until the end, and that he was one of the instigators of the Manchurian and Marco Polo Bridge Incidents, that as a professional soldier he furthered the conspiracies and committed the crimes alleged against him sometimes by exceeding his instructions and duties and at others, notably in connection with treatment of prisoners of war, by failing to carry out the obligations imposed on him by virtue of his military command.