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#14

Document No. 1632-P

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Oct. 7 (Wed.) -- at 7 p. m. HARADA came to my house and we went to see Marquis INOUE at Uchidayama. We heard the opinions of the current problem of the Army Department from Lt. Colonel SUZUKI. Activities, in which Lt. Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to carry out the national reformation immediately, but it is to save the situation if something does happen in the future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the young officers. On the way home, I reported to Prince KONOYE about the above matter.

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1931

October 14 (Wed.) -- At noon I went to Count Tadamasa SAKAI's house and had a conference with Masatoku YASUOKA, Chokei OKABE, Manabu MATSUMOTO, Shigeru YOSHIDA, and Fumio GOTO regarding the current problems. According to Mr. YASUOKA, the plots of the Army are progressing rapidly and students and Ronins are participating in it. Something must be done regarding this matter, he said. Our opinion was that Shashokukai /TN. an association/ which had been previously planned by YASUOKA and others, should be materialized as a permanent counter measure.

1931

October 15 (Thurs.) -- At 1.30, I attended a tea party of the managing staffs of the newspapers. The Chief of the Information, SHIRATORI, Chief of the Maintenance Bureau, HAYASHI, and I had a conference on the situation.

HAYASHI, upon a premise that it was his own assumption, gave the following statement:

"It will be unwise to take time in solving the Manchurian question, from the Army's point of view in governing disciplines. It requires prompt solution. In order to reach prompt solution, it will be necessary to create a new regime in Manchuria. If the Central Authorities should give the agitators of the movement a tacit approval to do so, it will facilitate the solution of the problem."

He indicated by his statement the fact that the militarists still stuck to its plan to establish a new regime in Manchuria. On the other hand, it is said that the attitude of the militarists suddenly stiffened, taking advantage of the rumor that Count UCHIDA, the President of South Manchuria Railway Company, had the intention to settle the pending question by one effort--the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria.

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1931

July 11 (Sat) - On the way home about 10 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA at his home. Heard the information that the Army during the past week had stiffened its attitude in regard to the reduction of the armaments and especially in regards to economizing which is the latest plan of the Finance Department. We are worried that the Army as a last resort might take further steps to appeal to the throne.

1931

July 13 (Monday) -- At noon, had lunch with Messrs. HARADA, TAKAGI, SAKAI and OKABE at Tokyo Club. Mr. HARADA reported to us that the Army was more unyielding than ever and that the War Minister is going to see the Emperor on the 14th or 15th. I thought that I should report this matter to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and left Shinbashi at 2:25 for Kamakura to relay this message. Ordered to relay this message to the Grand Chamberlain in Hayama, I immediately left by automobile and called on the Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI at Chojaen. I relayed to him the message and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's view in regard to it and came home at 6:30.

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1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8.19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col. SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.

2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the above-mentioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.

3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.

4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget.

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1931

September 9 (Wednesday) - At 6:30 P.M., held a conference in respect of the present aspect of affairs, at the residence of Prince KONOYE, including the prince, ARIMA, OKABE and myself. Mostly, ARIMA explained in details about the secret plot which had been planned by a certain group of militarists and the OKAWA's faction in the middle part of last March, by such connection as he had been requested to participate in executing the plot by OKAWA, Shumei through SHIMIZU.

"ARIMA. 'This plot has been suspended once. However, a thought of this kind will not disappear altogether, but will reappear whenever an opportunity presents itself, because the motives of planning this plot were

(1) that the permeation of Communism has been so noticeable recently that this country might fall into Communists' hands if the agitation was left unchecked.

(2) No movement will attain its object, unless it is carried out under the Imperial rule.

(3) Wherefore, the OKAWA's faction advocates Socialistic Nationalism under the Imperial rule and the establishment of an Autocratic government in place of the present political party system.

(4) A certain militarists' group has responded to this and shook hands with the OKAWA's faction for the purpose of creating such a Fascists' government as existing in Italy.' "

In view of the above reasons, we shall have to think up an adequate counter-measure. Especially, the Imperial Household should have full understanding of the situation and take necessary steps about it. We found the point of agreement in our opinions, and we arranged that we meet and discuss this matter as frequently as possible.

1931

August 12. (Wed.) -- 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE and Marquis INOUE. We heard and studied the details of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day about the under-handed activities of a section of the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the leader, was that of March 20. (x) certain SHIMIZU of Taikosha was supplied with thirty bombs (Those were only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless). However, it was told that the bombs were taken back to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because the plot was called off and to pay off the men that had been assembled, they collected ¥ 100,000 from among the Tokugawa nobles.

(x) The above-mentioned fact centering around Ugaki as the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about March 20, when a certain -----

1931

September 10 (Thurs.) -- Had lunch with Mr. OKABE, Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau, at Prince KONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion was that self defensive action might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. I agree with it, in general.

Document No. 1632-E

Excerpt from the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1931

September 12 (Sat.) -- At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and talked in detail about the latest under-handed movement of the Army.

1931

Sept. 19 - At 1.30 the Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation but would stop any further action when it found itself in an advantageous position.

A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA telling me to meet at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household, at 8.30.

The Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr. HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime Minister at about 6.30 and that he was asked about the state of affairs. He said that the Army's attitude was very strong. He added that in regard to the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driving it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore, wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army. Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should ask the "GENRO" to stay in Tokyo. But I told them that the Premier should not depend on others in the solution of this situation at this critical time. I emphasized that there was no other alternative but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm opinion of its own for the unification of national opinion.

1931

September 21 (Mon.) -- At 9.30 I went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and conferred about the China and Manchukuo conflict.

Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking if there were any further developments in the situation, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA 'phoned me again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

At 7.30 p.m. after dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message. On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But I could not see him, as he was on a business trip.

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1931

Sept. 22 (Tues.) -- At 1.30 I visited Mr. HARADA's house again. KONOYE, SAKAI, OKABE, and TAKAGI came there. Discussed and studied various things coming from various directions.

The Army is so strongly determined in its positive policy toward Manchuria that orders given by the Central Authorities may not be carried out.

① The Emperor has expressed satisfaction and approval to the Prime Minister and the Minister of War for the governmental policy to strive not to extend further the Manchurian Incident. However, the Army is reported to have construed and to be indignant, that the Emperor's opinion had been so induced to form by his personal attendants.

② In view of such circumstances, it was decided among us that the Emperor had better not say anything further about the Manchurian policy, unless he is necessitated to do so, and that the GENRO (Meaning Prince SAIONJI) against whom the Army harbors antipathy, had better not make a trip to Tokyo unless there is an important change in the situation, because it would intensify the militarist's antipathy.

1931

③ September 23 (Wed.) -- At 2.00 p.m., attended tea party thrown for Gentlemen of the Press at KASUMIYAMA Club. Heard the course of events in the Manchurian Incident from HAYASHI, the head of Maintenance Bureau of the Department of War. However, as the cause of the railway explosion, the most important point of the whole affair was not explained clearly, I asked him the question. To this, he replied that he had not as yet received the report. It seems very strange to me. It is regrettable also, not to be posted and informed on this point, especially when people are talking with skepticism about the cause of this accident.

1931

Sept. 29 (Tues.) -- At 9 o'clock, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and reported what I had heard from HARADA last night; namely, what the Chief of the Army General Staff had told to the Premier, "Chances are the Army is compelled to send troops to the Yangtze River area. If this happens, he does not want the trouble regarding the reversion of Supreme Command--that is to say, the Government shall not interfere with the prerogative of the Supreme Command of the Army."

1931

Oct. 1 (Thurs.) -- At 4 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA. Also present were Prince KONOYE and Mr. SHIRATORI. We discussed and consulted upon the militarist's secret plot. The combination of the middle class elements of the Army is likely to be pretty tight, and the plan to break down the present political party system by means of effecting coup-d'etat and to administer national affairs under dictatorship has been made secretly ever since the 2nd year of Showa era (1927). This is a serious problem indeed! It will be impossible for our statesmen and politicians to realize the danger of such a problem. It is very difficult to devise a counter measure. Anyway, it will be necessary to guide those militarists so that they won't cause the nation a serious damage and unnecessary sacrifice. It is a national calamity.

1931

Oct. 5 (Mon.) -- At 4.30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE. We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its intrigues. We gave him all information available and asked him to think up the best solution to this matter.

1931

Oct. 6 (Tues.) -- The Prime Minister seemed to have talked about the serious situation to the Lord Keeper. The thing worrying the Prime Minister is that there is a risk of head-on collision with the Army about the question of the other party with whom to negotiate the Manchurian problem.