

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

SPECIAL SET NO. 4

BOOK NO. 1

FROM 1 TO 549



Record of Proceedings  
of the  
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

Court House of the Tribunal  
War Ministry Building  
Tokyo, Japan

The United States of America, the Republic of China,  
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of  
Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of  
the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and the Commonwealth  
of the Philippines

-Against-

ARAKI, Sadao; DOHIHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO,  
Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIRO-  
TA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KAYA,  
Okinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuni-  
aki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MINAMI,  
Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi;  
OKAWA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHI-  
GEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATO-  
RI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGO, Shigenori; TOJO,  
Hideki; UMEZU, Youshijiro;

-Accused-

Official Court Reporters

Jack Greenberg, Chief  
Fred T. Abram  
James F. Barton  
Antoinette Duda  
Samuel Goldberg  
Robert B. Morse  
John J. Smith  
Daphne Spratt  
Elvira Whalen  
Julian Wolf  
Lorraine Yelden



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1

11 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Japan's Decision to Fight. Research Report prepared by ATIS, based on captured Japanese documents and interrogations of prisoners. (Preliminary draft)

Date: No date    Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language:  
English

Has it been translated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_;

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Numerous Japanese Navy, Army and Government officials.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Deals primarily with the naval and intelligence preparation for war with the U. S., Britain and the Netherlands. It shows that Japan had committed herself to war by the end of Oct 1941. Part translations of Combined Fleet Secret Operations Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 3, providing for the naval attacks are included. Translations from several diaries of naval and military personnel are included. These show the extent of preparations, course of the fleet units before and during attacks and the units involved.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 1



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2

11 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Extract from personal notes of  
Marquis KIDO.

Date: 1941 Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language:  
Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ☒ No ☐

Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☒

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Dr. Tsuru on authority of Marquis Kido.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Prince Konoye, Tojo, Kido and the  
Emperor.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Starting of the war.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Gives circumstances surrounding the resignation of  
the Konoye Cabinet and the reasons therefor. Also de-  
scribes the appointment of Tojo as Premier.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 2



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3

11 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Extracts from notes of Prince  
Konoye.

Date: 2 July (apparently 1941) Original ☒ Copy ☐  
Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ☒ No ☐ Translation  
Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☐ attached to  
original.

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document Division

• SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Dr. Tsuru on authority of Marquis Kido.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Prince Konoye, Marquis Kido, and the  
Emperor.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Starting of the war.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. That Japan will make preparations for war against U. S. and Britain.
2. The Empire will not avoid war against U. S. and Britain in order to achieve its objective.
3. The War Minister believed that "First we must strike Russia".
4. The War Minister was objecting to continuation of negotiations with U. S. and was most suited to receive Premiership.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 3



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4

11 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Chart, Japanese Military System.

Date: Not Dated    Original (x)    Copy ( )    Language:  
English

Has it been translated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Government

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Gives positions and not names.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Gives organization of the military system from the  
Emperor down to the bureaus and sections.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 4



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 5

11 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Chart showing the Navy Chain of Command as of 30 June 1942, prepared by the Japanese Government.

Date:	Original ( )	Copy ( )	Language:
			English
Has it been translated?	Yes ( )	No ( )	
Has it been photostated?	Yes (x)	No ( )	

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Gives office or department and not personal names.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The chart shows the Naval Chain of Command in accordance with standing orders. The principal government officers and various forces are included as a matter of reference.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 5



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 6

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack," by the Navy Ministry, Questionnaire submitted by Col. Munson.

Date: 22 Oct 45 Original ☒ Copy ☐ Language: Japanese  
Has it been translated? Yes ☒ No ☐ Attached to  
Has it been photostated? Yes ☐ No ☐ original.

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 12 Jan 46:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Navy Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Rear Adm. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Rear Adm. KUROSHINA, Kameto; Capt. FUCEIDA, Mitsue; NAGANO, Osami; CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO, Isoroku.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

All orders relating to the attack on Pearl Harbor were burned at the time of surrender, but the essential points in such documents are given according to the recollection of three navy officers.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 6.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 7

24 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Functional Chart of Japanese Government's organization as of 31 July 1941, with annexed Report on the changes in the Japanese Government's organization from Sept. 1940 to Dec. 1941.

Date: Not Given Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prepared by Japanese Government for General Liaison Office to Legal Division, to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains 23 charts showing graphically the organization and breakdown of all branches of the Japanese Government.

The accompanying report on changes from Sept. 1940 to Dec. 1941 is to be read in conjunction with the chart.

Note: Document #432 shows the organization of the Japanese Government as of 1 Aug 45.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
(W.S.A.)

Doc. No. 7



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 8

24 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "Opinion on Reform of the Army"  
A report to the Japanese Ministry of War on activities of  
army cliques, based on information supplied by Inf. Capt.  
Takatsugi MURANAKA.

Date: 11 July 1935 Original ( ) Copy (x)  
Language: English translation of selected excerpts  
from attached Japanese document.

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
2 Jan 46:

CIC

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Members of SAKURA KAI, TOSEI Party, and  
SEIGUN Party, including Maj.Gen. TETSUZO, Gen. UGAKI, Dr.  
OKAWA, Shumei, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, and Lt. Gen. TATEKAWA.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: GUMBATSU Insurrection  
plots to overthrow government by coup d'etat.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Capt. MURANAKA, an active member of the SAKURA KAI,  
was imprisoned for participation in the KOKUSO (20 Nov 31)  
Incident and this document is an expose by him of that in-  
cident and others involving various military cliques. The  
translation contains six excerpts from his complaint to  
the War Ministry, each of which is analyzed briefly:

1. Report on Investigation of the KOKUSO Incident:  
Describes the plan for this incident and names participants.  
No big names implicated.



SUMMARY Cont'd

2. Shows inter-relationship of TOSEI and SEIGUN Parties, their personnel and rationale. Names these two parties as instigators of the March (1931) Incident and the October (1931) Incident in which "the entire progressive group of the SAKURA KAI" (p.3) was also implicated.

3. Outline of SAKURA KAI: Contains a short history of this society and a description of its aims, mentioning names of prominent members.

4. March (1931) Incident: This was a plot to attack the Diet and to install Gen. UGAKI as head of a new cabinet in the midst of the ensuing disorder. Dr. Shūmei OKAWA was to support this insurrection with 10,000 men of the Proletariat Party. Three hundred bombs were distributed to the insurrectionists before the uprising was postponed, because the time was inopportune for its success.

5. October (1931) Incident: The March plans were revised and incorporated in this new plot with the SAKURA KAI assisting. Proposed cabinet named on p.6 This incident also failed to materialize due to the apprehension of its leaders after the Vice Minister of the Army, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA was informed of the plot.

6. Supplement: Incidental names and facts relating to above incidents.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
(W.S.A.)

Page 2 of Doc. No. 8



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 9

24 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Japanese Officials of the Cabinet Advisory Council, the Manchurian Bureau, and North Eastern District Bureau, from 14 Oct 37 to 1 Jan 42.

Date: 17 Jan 46 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: S. IGUCHI, Central Liaison Office, Tokyo to GHQ, SCAP to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Lists: (1) The members of the Cabinet Advisory Council from the time of its establishment (14 Oct 37) to 1 Jan 42 with their date of appointment and retirement.

(2) Principal officials of the Manchurian Bureau from the time of its establishment (Dec 1934) to 1 Nov 42 with their date of appointment and retirement.

(3) Officials of the North Eastern District Bureau from the time of its establishment (Oct 1936) to 1 Nov 43 with their date of appointment and retirement and the office held.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
(W.S.A.)

Doc. No. 9



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 10

31 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Collection of telegrams and memoranda concerning prisoners of war, copied from files of the Department of State.

Date: 30 Nov 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Department of State

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Department of State

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violations of treaties and agreements concerning treatment of POWs.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document is a portfolio of telegrams and memoranda sent between the U.S. and Japanese Governments through the agency of the neutral governments of Switzerland and Spain. The chief concern of these telegrams, which cover the period from 18 Dec 41 to 24 Aug 45 was the treatment accorded to prisoners of war and civilian internees. The great bulk of these messages were sent by the U.S. Govt. and there are relatively few answers from the Japanese to the increasing number of accusations of violations of existing treaties and the laws of humanity.

The evidentiary and background value of this document would seem to lie along the following lines: (1) Early messages establishing the fact that the Japanese Govt. committed itself to adhere to the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 on a mutatis mutandis basis despite the fact that it was not a signatory of that



agreement. (The U.S. Govt. continually affirmed its intention of abiding strictly by the terms of these treaties and answered all Jap protests in detail. In this connection see pp. 28, 63, 150, 176, 283 ff, 290 ff, 311, 380 ff, 392, 407-429) (2) Continued Japanese evasions of their agreement to permit neutral observers to inspect their places of detention. (3) Notice by U.S. Govt. to the Japanese Govt. of the commission of acts directly violating their agreements and of the non-performance of their obligations to feed, clothe, adequately house, and provide medical care for American nationals and POW under their control. (4) Notice by U.S. Govt. to the Japanese Govt. that it would hold all officials and members of the military, responsible for these misdeeds and this negligence, strictly to account at the close of the war.

On this basis, certain of the messages that seem to be directly in point are analyzed briefly below:

1. Messages establishing commitment of Japanese Govt. to terms of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention (1929) to which it was not a signatory power, as well as the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Red Cross Convention (1929) which it had signed:

P.14. Telegram (30 Jan 42) from Swiss Minister, Tokyo, stating that the Japanese Govt. had informed him (1) that Japan is strictly observing the Geneva Red Cross Convention as a signatory state; (2) that, although not bound by the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, Japan will apply mutatis mutandis provisions of that convention to American POWs in its power.

P. 19. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Swiss Govt. that it would apply the same provisions as above to civilian internees on condition of reciprocity (24 Feb 42). It added that neither POWs nor internees would be forced to perform labor against their will.

P.22. Memo #94 Re: Treatment of Civil Prisoners, sent through the Spanish Embassy to the U.S. Govt., reaffirmed the above with respect to applying the Geneva POW Convention though not bound thereby.



Doc. No. 10 - Page 3 - SUMMARY Cont'd.

P. 143. Japanese reply to American protest of 12 Dec 42 again states policy of following its previous commitments. (28 May 43)

The following two texts were submitted to the U.S.Govt. through the Swiss foreign office (2 Sep 43):

P.157. Text of Japanese Regulations of 21 April 43 regarding treatment of POWs in Japan. Although these regulations fail to prohibit maltreatment specifically, they do provide for adequate medical attention (Articles 20-24, p.160).

P.164. Text of Japanese Regulations on Treatment of War Prisoners of 14 Feb 1904, with revisions up to 21 April 43. These regulations were still in effect, despite the above-mentioned regulations of April 43:

"Art.2: War Prisoners shall be treated benevolently and shall never be insulted or maltreated." (P.164)

P. 211. In note to Spanish Embassy (3 May 44) the Japanese Govt. again states its intention "on purely humanitarian grounds" to apply mutatis the terms of the Geneva POW Convention, and mentions that it is bound by the terms of the 1907 Convention relating to law and custom of land warfare.

P.390. American memo through Spanish Embassy (no date) quotes Domei dispatch dated 12 Feb 42, Tokyo, and printed in Manila Tribune 14 Feb 42, giving speech of Vice Foreign Minister Haruhiko NISHI who affirmed Japan's intentions of abiding by the terms of the Geneva Conventions before the lower house.

Also refers to another Domei dispatch dated 14 Feb 42, Geneva, and printed in the Manila Tribune 17 Feb 42, to same effect.

2. Messages indicating Japanese unwillingness to permit neutral observers to visit places of detention:

P. 25. Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegram, 9 Mar 42, states that, despite assurances of favorable treatment of American civilians, Japanese authorities "create difficulties for visiting interment camps".

P. 37. Japanese Govt. refuses to permit Swiss rep-



representatives to visit prison camps "in territories occupied by Japanese armed forces". (8 Aug 42)

P.38. U.S. requests Japanese Govt. to permit visits by neutral powers to all places of detention in compliance with Art. 86 of the Geneva Convention. Such requests appear at frequent intervals throughout these documents. (e.g. see: pp. 149, 178, 203, 245, 267)

P. 41. U.S. telegram through Swiss Govt. observes that visits by representatives of the Protecting Powers and the International Red Cross are restricted to camps in Japan proper and Shanghai. (27 Aug 42)

P. 44. Japanese Govt. forbids visit of Swiss representative to POW camps in Indo-China due to "provisional character of installation". (29 Aug. 42)

P. 259. Japanese assure Swiss representative that he will be able to visit POW camps without limitations as to location, then restrict these visits to Japan proper.

3. Messages, usually in the form of a protest by the U.S. Govt., indicating that the Japanese Govt. was made aware of the continuing violations of its commitments in the form of illegal punishments, mistreatment, starvation, etc., of American prisoners of war and civilian internees.

P.35. POW escapees sentenced to prison terms exceeding provisions of Title III, Sec.5, Ch.3, of Geneva POW Convention. Upon receipt of U.S. protest, Japanese Govt. stated that it intended to apply the terms of the Geneva Convention "without in any way changing effect of Japanese laws in force". (p.84) This was the first mention of such intention (11 Dec.42) and the U.S. Govt. protested against this usage, requesting the Japanese to send text of applicable legislation. (p.100)

P.136. In reply to this request Japanese Govt. sent provisions of law dated 9 Mar 43 modifying law 1 Mar 05. Specifies punishments for disobedience, insulting guard (5 years), group escape (death penalty for leader). (3 Apr 43)

P.48. American protest against failure to report POWs in contravention of Art.77 POW Convention and Art.4 of Red Cross Convention.



P.60. Digest of report made public 19 Oct 42 by the Japanese General Staff and sent unofficially by Swiss Govt. to effect that American pilots will be tried and will suffer the death penalty if guilty of "cruel and inhuman acts".

Resume of NICHI NICHI article of 21 Oct: "....all enemy aviators who fall into our hands after defacing this blessed land of ours shall be beheaded without discrimination".

P.68. 17 Nov.42. Detailed account of atrocities, related to U.S. Govt. by repatriates, sent to American Legation in Bern for its information.

PP.86-97. U.S. protest against conditions in specifically named places of detention, mentioning several instances of mistreatment and torture, and deaths resulting therefrom.

P.122. Note from Japanese Minister TANI to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, dated 17 Feb 43, states Japanese intention of killing members of April 18 raid who were found guilty of "cruel and inhuman acts".

P. 135. In reply to a Swiss enquiry about the above-mentioned aviators, Japanese Govt. refuses to divulge names or permit visits on grounds that these men are not to be treated as POWs.

P.137. American Govt. enters strong protest against this treatment of air POWs.

PP.171-179. American protest listing Japanese violations of the Geneva Convention and mentioning Articles contravened.

PP.180-194. Specific incidents supporting above-mentioned charges: includes instances of infliction of corporal punishment and torture, subjection to insults and public curiosity, malnutrition, compulsory performance of labor, denial of medical care.

PP.210-224. Japanese answer to this protest: Denies most of accusations, says some instances date back to early occupation of the Philippines making investigation difficult.

P.243. 27 June 44. Swiss notified by Japanese



Govt. of execution of three American POWs in Manchurian camp on charge of murdering police inspector while attempting escape. (Violated Convention stipulation of notice to Protecting Power.)

P.251. Japanese Govt. alleges increase in prisoners' rations after Swiss Legation protests that many POWs dying due to malnutrition. (16 Aug 44)

P.252. American protest against treatment of American civilians in China. Emphasis on food deficiencies, lack of sanitary measures, medical care, clothing, etc.

P.261. Telegram from State Dept., 31 Aug 44, charges Japanese officers and civilian (names are included) with murder of American pilot at Aitape on 24 Mar 44.

P.313. Japanese reply: Investigation difficult .....no such force present at Aitape at that time.

P.264. U.S.Govt. protests movement of civilian internees on Luzon to vicinity of an ammunition dump. (Violation of Art.9 of Geneva Convention.)

P.266. U.S.Govt. calls attention of Japanese Govt. to fact that failure to notify U.S. of the shooting of American POWs until a year and a half later, and then only upon specific request, constitutes a violation of Art.77 of the Convention.

P.304. 5 Jan 45. U.S. telegram alleging that three American Women internees have been compelled to perform coolie labor in Foochow.

P.322. Protest to Japanese Govt. based on testimony of American prisoner-survivors of sunken Jap. vessel as to mistreatment by Japanese captors -- wanton shooting of prisoners, horrible conditions on board ship, etc.

P.326. Second telegram based on statements by these survivors about maltreatment and starvation of prisoners at Lasang Air Field detention camp.

P.333. U.S. telegram charging murder of four American civilian internees at Santo Tomas internment camp. Bodies were later exhumed and identified by U.S. Govt. (6 Apr 45)



P.338. Olori POW camp and Shinagawa POW hospital located in bombardment areas near industrial and port installations when visited by Swiss representative. (4 May 45)

P.344. American protest quoting: (1) Captured secret order of 14th Army Hq (12 Jan 44) prescribing the murder of persons in the Philippine Islands surrendering to or captured by Japanese armed forces. (2) March 1944 order from Hq Dei Unit, stating that prisoners are to be dealt with at Regimental Hq where they will be put to death. (p.345)

P.347. Murder of George J. Louis, 28 Jan 45, who was shot in cold blood at Los Banos Internment Camp for purchasing food outside the camp. Implicates Major IWANSKA, Camp Commandant.

P.349. U.S. protest of massacre of 150 American POWs, 14 Dec 45, on Palawan by personnel of Ogawa Tai Construction Corps. POWs were forced into air raid shelters and gasoline was poured in upon them and ignited. Men attempting to escape from shelters were machine gunned.

P.353. Further documentation of offenses at this camp.

P.355. Telegram protesting movement of civilian internees to camp in heart of Shanghai industrial area. (22 May 45)

4. Messages from the U.S. Govt. to the Japanese Govt. indicating our intention of punishing the officials responsible for the above-mentioned violations of Japanese commitments.

P.142. "....the American Govt. will visit upon the officers of the Japanese Govt. responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment they deserve." (In connection with announcement of execution of American air *POWs* (5 April 43)

P.339. "Declaration is made by the Govt. of the U.S. that the Japanese authorities responsible for .....failure to remove from danger zones prisoner of war camps .....will meet with the most serious consequences."



P.346. "The Government of Japan is solemnly warned ...that should the military authorities shamefully violate the solemn commitments of the Japanese Government by continuing to perpetrate these atrocities (specific reference to orders directing execution of prisoners) or commit any other criminally barbarous acts.....they will be held completely responsible and will be brought at the appropriate time to full, just and complete punishment by the Government of the United States."

P.364. "The Government of Japan is solemnly warned by the Government of the U.S. that the Japanese Government and the individuals concerned will be considered responsible for any failure to apply the provisions of the Hague Convention and of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention in the treatment of American prisoners of war....."

P.367. "The U.S. Government hereby solemnly declares that it will hold personally responsible for this crime (starvation of American civilians in China) all of the officials of the Japanese Govt., regardless of position or status, who have participated therein either through neglect or from wilful intent and will in due course bring them to judgment....."

P.383. "The U.S. Govt. declared that the Japanese Govt. and its officers will not be able to avoid responsibility for the starvation of Americans in Jap custody."

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 10

Page 8

(End)



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 11

1 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Documents from the German Foreign Office: translations of memoranda and secret telegrams concerning Japanese activities.

Date: 27 Nov 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English translations

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Department of State

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Department of State

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SATO; KURUSU; DES GAIMUSHO, Funuchi; MATSUOKA; OHASHI: General OSHIMA; Naval Capt. MAEDA.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Preparation for war;  
Violation of treaties.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

These messages, taken from the files of the German Foreign Office, disclose Japanese behind-the-scene preparations for acts of aggression immediately preceding the war and subsequent acts in violation of existing treaties.

Each message is analyzed briefly:

8 July 40. Memo of conversation between Foreign Minister of the Reich and Japanese Ambassador SATO in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU: SATO states that Japan has been holding the attention of the English, French and

Doc. No. 11

Page 1



U.S. Govts. for three years, thereby helping Germany. He attributes Japan's differences with the U.S. to Japan's struggle against "the system of the Nine-Power Treaty" -- "the so-called rule from Washington", asserting that Japan wishes to be the host in Eastern Asia while the other nations are only guests. (pp.4-7)

4 July 1941: Secret code from Tokyo relaying confidential information from the Japanese Secretary of Embassy, Furuuchi des GAIMUSHO: (1) Japan's entry into war with Russia, with a view to gaining the coastal provinces, is imminent. (2)..... (3) Should Japan's negotiations with the Netherlands-Indies fail, she would be obliged to take over oil resources there by force. But first there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo-China as a jumping-off area against the NI.

Entry of the U.S. into war against Japan is expected. (pp.8-9)

10 July 41. Secret code from Tokyo referring to remarks made by MATSUOKA: Japanese action against Indo-China is imminent. Japan will demand immediate possession of strong points from the French Govt. and if U.S. or Britain should take military measures to prevent this, Japan will take up the fight. (pp.10-12)

15 July 41. Confidential information from Japanese Vice Foreign Minister: Japanese Govt. has instructed its ambassador in Vichy to secure permission to station troops in South Indo-China and to establish two naval bases and several air bases there. Japan is resolved to oppose unconditionally any English or American intervention. (pp.13-14)

22 July 41. Japan expects the French Govt. to accept its Indo-China demands unconditionally. (p.15)

17 Nov.41. Telegram from Berlin quoting General OSHIMA's personal views on the possibility of future Japanese aggressive action: Advance to the South is unavoidable due to economic losses from war in China and economic boycott of the Anglo-Saxon powers.

OSHIMA envisages the seizure of Borneo -- "An attack on Borneo would be easiest; an attack on Singapore would be most effective", and, in connection with such an invasion, he adds that Japan could proceed against the Philippine Islands "should there be a cor-



Doc. No. 11 - Page 3 - SUMMARY Cont'd.

respondingly unfavorable American attitude".

He also discusses the possibility of a Jap invasion of Thailand which would be used as a springboard for Singapore and says that if U.S. naval units were then sent to strengthen the Pacific fleet Japan could easily dispose of them. (pp.16-19)

10 Feb 42. Secret code from Tokyo, Naval Capt. MAEDA quoted as saying that the occupation of Portuguese Timor was a prerequisite to the elimination of Port Darwin and that the Japanese armed forces were prepared to seize Timor despite expected Portuguese objections. (pp.20-21)

23 Feb 42. Portuguese enter formal protest against Japanese occupation, but Japanese Govt. does not expect diplomatic relations to be severed. (pp.22-24)

29 Jan 42. Secret code from Tokyo: Statements by TOJO and TOGO outlining Japanese war policy.

"According to very confidential information .... military preparations against Russia are under way."  
(---.25-29)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 11  
Page 3  
(End)



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 12

1 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Secret Record of Japanese Renovation Movements.

Date: Aug 1938 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: Jap.

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Home Ministry through Investigation Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Infra; especially MAZAKI, Jinzaburo.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Instigation to aggressive warfare.

CLASSIFICATION: Secret.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document was written for the "Section for the Maintenance of Public Peace" of the Bureau of Police Affairs of the Home Ministry. It is classified as "Secret".

It contains very valuable background material regarding ultra-nationalistic or militaristic organizations, including the names of the founders and a list of charter members. It also contains detailed descriptions of such incidents as those of March and October 1931, the "May 15th Incident", the "February 26th Incident", and others. In particular, it contains an investigation into the position of General MAZAKI in the Incident of February 26, 1936.



The following is a synopsis of the document:

Section I: Outline.

This section contrasts the trend towards the left, after the First World War, with the national renovation movements on Japanese principles. These movements, working inconspicuously but steadily, had such passive aims as anti-socialism and preservation of the "national structure" (KOKUTAI). Among those who looked toward a reform of Japan, considering her own, peculiar situation, were the founders of such associations as "ROSO-KAI" (1918) and "YUZONSHA" (1919). In 1919 "NIHON KAIZO HOAN" ("Fundamental Principle of Japanese Renovation Methods" by KITA, Ikki, was secretly distributed and the assassin of YASUDA, Zenjiro, found the reason for his act in reading it. In 1930, with the so-called "infringement on the supreme prerogatives" as an added momentum, the whole situation began to show radical progress. When the incident of the "Bloods Brotherhood Association (KETSU MEI DAN) and the May 15 Incident occurred "to our utter astonishment", a new division was established in the "Section for the Maintenance of Public Peace" and we could succeed in preventing "Shimpeitai" and the "Saitana Young Volunteers" from causing serious trouble. In the latter affair, it was observed that the schemes of young army officers were causing danger to society. Progressing from such minor incidents as the November 20 Incident and the Lt.Col. AIZAWA affair, they reached their climax in the February 26 Incident.

If we are asked, whether we could have stopped then, we can only say: "It was impossible at that time, since all the troubles originated in the existence of the Inspector General of Military Education, MAZAKI".

Replacement of the Inspector General of Military Education made matters worse. Finally, it came to the killing of Lt.Gen. NAGATA in broad daylight.

The trial of the naive Lt.Col. AIZAWA gave much trouble to his comrades, causing one division to be sent over to Manchuria.

We anticipated some serious affair to occur, but none of us expected it to be more serious than the May 15 Incident.



We repeatedly heard the formula "dispatch of troops, martial law, coup d'etat, establishment of military government", but none of us believed that it would come true. We had a firm belief that there could be no revolution in Japan.

Section 2: Reform Movements of the Earlier Period.

- (1) "ROSO-KAI", founded in 1916 by OKAWA, Shumei, and MITSUKAWA, Kanetaro. (p.4)

This group, which conducted discussions and lectures under the motto "Studies on social reformation on Japanese principles" is significant because it marks the beginning of cooperation between militarists and radical associations of civilians. A list of charter members will be found on p.8.

- (2) "YUZON-SHA", founded in 1919 by OKAWA, Shumei, MITSUKAWA, Kanetaro, and KITA, Ikki. (p.9)

This organization was no longer satisfied with studies and discussions, but wanted to start actions, whenever there was a chance. KITA, Ikki, published "NIHON KAIZO HOAN TAIKO" (Fundamental Principle of Japanese Renovation Methods) in 1923, which became the sacred scripture for all illegal movements of the right wing.

They tried to prevent the Prince Regent's (HIROHITO) visit to Europe and attempted to kill SAIONJI, Hachiro.

This association was divided into two parts: one with OKAWA, Shumei, as its leader, and the other one with KITA, Ikki, as its head.

It had great influence on ASAHI, Heigo, who killed YASUDA, Zenjiro, and on the "TENKEN-TO" (see below), and gave rise to disquietude in and around 1932. Important members are mentioned on p.14.

In July 1920, they published a paper named "Otakebi" (War Cry), in which following passages are found:



"We, the Japanese race, must be the whirling center of the war for the liberation of mankind. Accordingly, the Japanese nation is the absolute entity that makes us fulfill our ideals of world revolution. The idealistic fulfillment and fighting organization of the Japanese nation is the work of God himself, created for this absolute aim. .... We must not be satisfied only with the reformation or revolution of Japan herself. As we believe in the destiny of the Japanese race as the great missionary of the war for the liberation of mankind, we want to set about liberating Japan herself first."

The seven principles they advocated were as follows:

1. Establishment of revolutionary Japan.
2. "Idealistic fulfillment" of the Japanese people.
3. Rational organization of the Japanese nation.
4. Movement for liberating the races.
5. Prosecution of a moral foreign policy.
6. Communication between reform movements.
7. Spiritual cultivation of fighting comradeship..

(3) Assassination of YASUDA, Zenjiro.

YASUDA, Zenjiro, was killed by ASAHI, Heigo, for being one of the wealthiest men who robbed people of all their wealth, thus making the people more poor and miserable. In an address he wrote two weeks before he killed YASUDA, he said: "Therefore I recommend the 'one man killing one man principle'. I will be the first, and I shall be satisfied if, what I do, makes those villains realize their crimes."

Section 3: "TENKEN-TO"; "OSUI-KAI".

- (1) "TENKEN-TO"; founded by Lt. NISHIDA, Chikara.  
(p.25)

This is a secret society for national reformation, and its members are both military men and civilians with "NIHON KAIZO HOAN" (above) as their Koran. This is the systematic movement for realizing concretely the content of "NIHON KAIZO HOAN". It seems that Lt. NISHIDA started this movement in 1923, but it was discovered only in 1927.



Among the principles of "TENKEN-TO", which are stated in full, are the following:

(a) Our object is to make the Japanese people realize their mission toward the world, and to become the fundamental power for enforcing Japan's rational reformation.

(b) "TENKEN-TO" has military men as its central members and aims at organizing all the leading fighters of Japan, expecting some day to give orders to the whole of Japan.

(c) We are afraid of nothing except the judgment of the righteousness.

In its "points to be observed in leading the fighting" are the following passages:

"The army is the essence of national authority. .... When you think of the importance of an army in a revolution, you will realize how important it is that we should league together preparing for the coming revolution in Japan." (p.28)

"TENKEN-TO" is the divine sword from above. .... Japan shall be led, destroyed and re-constructed by this divine sword of ours. Our object is the rational reformation of Japan and the establishment of the New World with Japan as its centre." (p.30)

"Our object is to regain the nation from the hands of a group of degenerate men who have robbed the Emperor of his sovereignty and are treating people with injustice and arrogance." and ".... to liberate the nation and the people with super legal movements ..... to dissolve the Diet ..... to place the country under martial law and to establish a new nation under the righteous dictatorship of our party." (p.31)

"We must not just sit and wait for the reformation to come. It is just like trying to catch fish on a tree ..... Against our enemy, we must fight constantly with mob-uprising, commotion, assassination, sabotage, destruction, occupation, denunciation and propaganda." (p.32)

The following is the statement made by NISHIDA, Chikara:



"The Tokyo Military Police approved of what I am doing, and gave every support to me and my comrades. .... The military authorities tell us: 'It is impossible for us to act like you. You must understand that we can only help you inconspicuously..... We hear that there is a big secret society of young officers with Prince CHICHIBU as their leader, and that they are exerting themselves in furtherance of national affairs and national reformation.'" (p.46)

A list of members will be found on p.37.

- (2) "OSUI-KAI": Founded in 1928 by Lt.Comdr. FUJII, Hitoshi. (p.54)

FUJII, Hitoshi, had had the idea of the "Greater Asia principle" from the time when he was only a naval cadet. He had joined "TENKEN-TO" immediately after its foundation, but in 1928 he organized an association of navy officers. Quite a few officers of the May 15 Incident had been under FUJII's influence.

The following are excerpts from their principles, which are stated in full in the document: (p.55)

"Love and train your subordinates so that they would willingly go through fire and water in case of emergency."

"Destroy all the evil practices of the Japanese Navy; make every officer and soldier realize the situation and make our navy the strongest in the world."

"Accomplish the Meiji Restoration as Heaven ordered, and establish the Greater Japan."

"Establish the Great Japanese Empire in conformity with the spirit of the foundation of Japan and unify the world with morality and righteousness."

Excerpt from its proclamation:

"We must administer the continent, and cultivate the ocean with our magnificent national spirit, and free the colored races by destroying the white people .... and unite the whole world under the Emperor. ...."(p.58)



A description of the organizational structure is given on p. 65, containing the number of persons in various key positions.

Section 4: "HEIKA" (Soldiers' fire), "YUKOKU-GAIGEN" (Word of a patriot), written respectively by Lt. OGISHI and Lt. FUJII. (p.68)

These are the two pamphlets distributed at that time among the army and navy officers. The writers are members of "TENKEN-TO".

Sections 5 and 6: The consequences of London Treaty in 1930: (p.86)

The so-called infringement on the prerogatives connected with the treaty gave direct cause to the assassination of Premier HAMAGUCHI in November, the "KETSU MEI-DAU" affair and the May 15th Incident. The political powers at that time were monopolized by the political parties which had capitalists as their supporters. Since their attitude was weak toward the outside and severe toward the inside, the military men had been very dissatisfied. It was natural that the "Japanese principle" advocates supported and cooperated with the militarists.

The so-called infringement on the prerogative:

The government issued orders to General TAKARABE (the Navy Minister) in London without consulting the Navy General Staff, who considered it an infringement and violation of the 12th Article of the Constitution.

A great number of dangerous writings were circulated at this time and moved SAGOYA, Tomeo, to such an extent that he shot and killed Premier HAMAGUCHI. There were many other attempts at assassination.

Section 7: Shooting of Premier HAMAGUCHI: (p.140)

On the 14th of November 1930, Premier HAMAGUCHI was shot by SAGOYA, Tomeo, on the platform of the Tokyo Station. He died later of this wound. SAGOYA had attributed the depression to the wrong policy of Premier HAMAGUCHI, when the treaty was signed. However, the significance of this incident was disregarded at that time, because "MINSEI-TO" was in power at the Parliament.



Section 8: "SAKURA-KAI": Founded in 1930 by Lt.Col.HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Lt.Col. SAKATA, Lt.Col. HIGUCHI, and Lt.Col. TANAKA, Kiyoshi. (p.141)

Its members were army officers below the rank of Lt.Colonel and "in the list of the members these names of army officers who are now in important positions of the government are found". (The writer's comment in August 1938.) Their object: National reformation, with force, if necessary. (p.143)

The members: Army officers in active service who are interested in national reformation without any selfish designs.

Preparations: (1) Make every effort in making army officers realize the necessity of national reformation; (2) increase and strengthen the members (it had 105 members in May 1931); (3) make a concrete draft for national reformation.

The second section of the General Staff Headquarters has come to the conclusion that "if they wanted to solve the Manchurian problems, they must necessarily reform the nation". Their arriving at this conclusion owes much to the fact that Lt.Col. HASHIMOTO and Lt. Col. NEMOTO and other members of "SAKURA-KAI" were in the section. (p.145)

Its prospectus and a list of members will be found on p.151.

#### Section 9: March Incident in 1931:

They planned to overthrow the existing government consisting of parties, and to establish a military government. Radical officers of the General Staff Headquarters, with the War Minister UGAKI, Issei, as their head, and OKAWA, Shunpei, planned the incident. Their scheme was not realized because UGAKI, who was to become Premier, changed his mind. (p.154)

A list of people concerned will be found on pp.155 and 219.



Section 10: October Incident in 1931: (p.166)

Young army officers who were dissatisfied with the non-realization of the March coup d'etat, some navy officers and men of the right wing under OKAWA, Shumei, and NISHIDA, Chikara, had been very active since April, when the Manchurian Incident happened. The weak attitude of the government so infuriated them, that they planned to put into practice their illegal national reform movement. Lt. Gen. ARAKI, Sadao and Lt. Gen. MAZAKI, Jinsaburo, were their heads. The reason for the failure of this plan was the difference of opinion between the OKAWA group and the NISHIDA group. But this incident gave cause to the "KETSUMEI-DAU " Incident and the May 15th Incident, mentioned below.

The names of people who participated in it are to be found on pp. 168, 174, 188 and 220.

Section 11: YONETSU Incident: (p.275)

GOTO, Hidenori, was very much influenced by Lt. SUGANAMI, Saburo, one of the important members of "TENKENTO" (above). GOTO, with the students at the Army Officers School, organized a secret association in the school. They distributed radical pamphlets among the students, and their organization was discovered when the staff read YONETSU's diary. Ten members of this organization joined the May 15th Incident later. A list of people concerned is given on p.276.

Section 12: "KETSUMEI-DAN", May 15th, <sup>1932</sup> "SHIMPEI-TAI" Incidents:

1. "KETSUMEI-DAN" (Blood Brotherhood Alliance).

Finance Minister INOUE was assassinated in February <sup>9</sup>1932, and only one month later, Baron DAN was shot and killed. Assassins in both cases were young men, 20 years of age. Through the desperate efforts of policemen, the organization of "KETSUMEI-DAN" was disclosed. The organization was founded by INOUE, Akira, in January 1932. INOUE, Akira, and his comrades participated in the October Incident, but, as they were not satisfied with the hesitant attitude on the part of the officers, they decided to take action for themselves. (p.279)



2. The May 15th Incident. (Analyst's note: The writer does not elaborate on this incident.)
3. "SHIMPEI-TAI" (Divine Soldier Corps) Incident:

The articles describe the plans of these incidents and give names of some of the planners. (p.281)

Section 13: SAITAMA Young Volunteers' Corps:

The significance of this incident lies not in the unsuccessful assassination of President of the "SEIYU-KAI", SUZUKI, but in the fact that its central members were influenced by Lt. KURIHARA, Yasuhide, who later participated in the February 26th Incident. This incident was a prelude to the February 26th Incident. (p.283)

Section 14: The November 20th Incident, NAGATA Incident.

1. The November 20th Incident:

A number of radical cadets were dubious as to the real intention of their superiors, and they wanted to start action immediately. (p.286)

2. Replacement of MAZAKI, Inspector General of Military Education.

The so-called "KODO-HA" (Imperial way group) insisted that this was a case of "infringement upon the prerogative", and distributed a number of agitating pamphlets. (p.296)

3. Assassination of Lt.Gen. NAGATA: <sup>Aug 12</sup> - 1935

Lt.Gen. NAGATA, Tetsuzan, who held the post of the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, was killed in broad daylight by Lt.Col. AIZAWA, Saburo. This incident gave stimulation to the radical officers. (p.297)

Section 15: The Consequences of the February 26th Incident:

1. General conditions prior to the Incident:



In December 1935, YAMAGUCHI, Ichitaro, who worked under NISHIDA, Chikara, planned with KUHARA, Fusanosuke, to "establish a reform government by leading the present cabinet to downfall, through presentation of non-confidence bill by the 'SEIYU-KAI'". Major Gen. YAMASHITA, Tomobumi, approved of this plan. But as the "SEIYU-KAI" did not consent to present the bill, this plan was not realized. (p.358)

We must take notice of the fact that Gen. MAZAKI encouraged Capt. KODA by telling him, "I am strongly opposed to the replacement of Inspector General of Military Education"; that he told Lt.Col. MITSUI on 11 Jan 1936 about the three governors' conference and declared, "I was discharged because I did not agree." Besides, Gen. MAZAKI is known to have given five hundred yen to ISOBE on 28 January. (Analyst's note: ISOBE is named as one of the leaders of the February 26th Incident in the document.) (p.359)

## 2. Outbreak of the Incident:

In the early morning of 26 February, about twenty radical officers illegally mobilized fifteen hundred soldiers and attacked government authorities. Their plan was very prudent. (p.366)

A summary of their actions is given on p.371.

## 3. Major KATAKURA's Statement:

He tells how he came to be shot at in front of the War Minister's official residence. (p.415)

## 4. The Spirit of the Revolt:

There is nothing to prove the rumor that this incident was caused by the schemes of the left wing. They used the strategy of the left wing, but their spirit was not that of the left wing. (p.417)

## 5. General MAZAKI's Situation:

The following are parts of this chapter dealing with Gen. MAZAKI's statement made on the



26th of March, translated from the document: (p.435)

"At about 6:30 in the morning of February 26th, I had a telephone call from the War Minister requesting my immediate presence. I was wondering what could have happened, when KATO of the Navy told me on the phone that the army had started a serious affair.....' (He met ISOBE on his way to the War Minister's room, and told him, 'I know your spirit very well. I will take such measures as I think best.' Here is a contradiction.) 'I asked KAWASHIMA (War Minister) how he was going to save the situation, but he had no idea about it. Therefore, I told him, "As it is the army that has started it, it is up to the army to prevent it from getting more serious. There is no time to waste. You have enough authority to summon the Supreme War Council. And if OKADA also is killed, the cabinet naturally will resign; in that case, you must summon the cabinet ministers and hold a cabinet meeting." Upon this, he immediately set about summoning the Supreme War Council. Then I had a phone call again from KATO. He told me to come up to the palace of Prince FUSHIMA, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, to explain the situation from the army's viewpoint. I went without delay and explained to the Prince what I had seen and what I thought would come of it.

"As soon as I had finished, Prince FUSHIMI left for the Imperial Palace to explain the situation to the Emperor. I followed him.' (General MAZAKI told Gen. KAWASHIMA, 'The uprising troops would never listen to us if we told them to disband; and Imperial Edict must be issued.' .....

"In the morning of the following day (Feb 27), the commander of the garrison came to see me and said to me, "We hear that they are willing to listen to your word. Please come out and appease them." I answered that personally I would not like to do it, but I would do it if some others also would be present ..... We found eighteen young officers at the Premier's official residence ..... There were only few whom I personally knew.....'" (Analyst's note: This ends the quotation from MAZAKI's statement on March 26.)



6. KITA, Ikki's Movements:

On the 15th of February, KITA was told by NISHIDA, "If the judge of the AIZAWA trial should reject the witness proposed by the solicitor, young officers might rise." This was the first time that KITA was told about their plan.

At 9:00 in the morning of the 26th, NISHIDA phoned him, telling that everything had been carried out according to the plan. In the afternoon he told the policemen who came to see him, "I lay in bed till late this morning, and as the telephone was cut off, I knew nothing about it until 10 o'clock when the press surprised me with the news. .... A number of the officers who took part in the incident belong to my system of thoughts. .... but I have not seen any of them recently and I have nothing to do with the incident .... I do not know who is going to put an end to this incident .... The other day I heard someone say that UGAKI, MINAMI, KOISO and TATEKAWA should be killed. I am afraid they might be attacked ...."

It is a known fact that KITA sent a telegram to Lt.Gen. YAMAOKA, Shigeatsu, saying that the time for materializing "NIHON KOISO HOAN" (mentioned above) came at last.

On the 27th, KITA ordered KURIHARA and MURANAKA through telephone that they must leave the matter entirely to Gen. MAZAKI. Upon hearing that they have decided to do so, KITA and NISHIDA insisted that they should never give in until the realization of the MAZAKI cabinet. (p.446)

7. Activities of KAMEKAWA and his Group:

KAMEKAWA had been on the post of the inspector in the Communications Bureau, before he wrote a treatise on financial economics. After that, he approached such generals as ARAKI, MAZAKI, HAYASHI, YANAGAWA, and so on. He also came to know the radical young army officers through MITSUI and NISHIDA, and in 1936 got acquainted with KUHARA, Fusanosuke. (p.448)



In connection with the trial of Lt. Col. AIZAWA, Kanekawa, took an important part in the background. (p.449)

Ten days before the Incident, he notified KUHARA of the outbreak of the Incident, and received five thousand yen from him on the 23rd. He gave fifteen hundred yen to MURANAKA, and one hundred yen to NISHIDA on the 25th, hearing that they would take action on the following day. (p.449)

In the evening of the 25th, he reported in detail to KUHARA, and at about 4:30 on the 26th, he called upon Gen. MAZAKI at his house and said to him, "This morning, the 1st and the 3rd regiments are to rise and attack important men of the government. We expect you to exert yourself in saving the situation." (p.450)

8. Various pamphlets after the Incident:

A great number of pamphlets were circulated in connection with the incident.

9. General Situation Immediately after the Incident: (p.459)

There were two opinions rather in favor of the participants: The one was: "It is an inevitable phenomenon in the evolutionary process of history" and the other was: "Their action was wrong, but their spirit is sublime." However, the majority of the people took this for a riot started by the whole army and navy, and the tendency was toward anti-militarism. With some of the young officers passionately reacting to this tendency, the situation seemed serious. However, as the military authorities took severe attitude toward the people who participated, public feelings were unified and settled down.

The three results of the incident are:

1. The so-called restoration influences, that is, the political influences of nationalistic organizations decayed.



2. The influences based on liberalism came into power.
3. Opposition between the established political parties which represent liberalistic ideas and the militarists which represent so-called reforming influences became more apparent.

10. Re-examination of Illegal Strategies after the Incident:

Radical reformation movements in the past had believed in the formula of coup d'etat, martial law and establishment of a military government, and totally disregarded the support of the people, when this Incident occurred to prove the failure of the hitherto esteemed strategy. (p.462)

Section 16: The China Incident and the Renovation Movements:

The members of the renovation movements were dissatisfied at first with the negative policies of the government, but, nevertheless, they supported the government on the whole by joining the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement.

During the one year after the outbreak of the Incident, they expressed many complaints and dissatisfactions concerning the attitude of the government, but they refrained from taking radical steps, realizing deeply the complicated and difficult situations in which Japan stood.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 13

5 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Magazine entitled, "TAIYO DAI NIPPON", organ of the "DAI NIPPON SEINEN TO", later called the "DAI NIPPON SEKI SEI KAI". (2 Volumes)

Date: 17 Dec 1936 to 25 Nov 1943 Original (x) Copy ()

Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Home Ministry, Uyeno Library

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Col. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Incitement and Preparation of aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The above magazine, originally published twice monthly and later three times a month, is the organ of the "DAI NIPPON SEINEN TO" (Greater Japan Young Men's Association), later called, "DAI NIPPON SEKI SEI KAI", of which HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, was President. TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu, figures as advisor.

The document was first scanned from the viewpoint of references to

- (a) "Asia for the Asiatics"
- (b) Manchuria
- (c) China
- (d) Incitement to war vs. U.S.
- (e) Evidence of axis collaboration

Doc. No. 13

Page 1



References to these points were found in the following articles, having in part evidentiary value:

1. Dec 1, 1937: The article is entitled, "Expel Crafty and Arrogant England from Asia" and describes the demonstration of the "DAI NIPPON SEINEN TO" on the occasion of a national assembly, celebrating the Tri-partite Pact. The presence or absence of HASHIMOTO himself is not indicated. After the assembly, the participants, numbering about one hundred and fifty, proceeded to the British Embassy, shouting "Hail to the principle of destroying England", "Expel England, the vampire of the human race, from Asia."

2. May 1, 1939: Excerpts from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky":

"The cardinal point in the solution of the China Incident lies in solving the problems, connected with England and the Soviet Union, who are giving assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. Without solving these problems all our efforts in destroying Chiang Kai-shek would be fruitless ..... Chiang is a puppet fed and manipulated by England and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key to the solution of the Chinese problem lies in the destruction of those supporters of Chiang.

"The chief supporter is England rather than the Soviets. She has great interests in China, and, since her retreat from China will necessarily lead to her retreat in India and in her other territories in Asia, it is perfectly natural that she is making desperate efforts to stock to China. ....

"When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union will be left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural and impossible for the Soviet Union to make an alliance with England. Communism, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union, advocates a challenge to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy to have made Russia intent on the oriental affairs. If we show our decision to attack England, the Soviet Union will immediately turn the point of her spear toward India, the treasure-house of capitalism. ... We must defend on the north and advance toward the south. Our destiny will be decided in the south.



"I have heard recently of the need of strengthening axis collaboration. From the viewpoint that the success in solving the China Incident depends entirely upon the expulsion of England, the policy of Germany and Italy to destroy England and France are on the same foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial Tri-Partite Pact, including democracy as well as communism as the object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, it is easy to put an end to England and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy will eliminate communism and democracy, the two enemies of human civilization; and in Asia, in the area east to India at least, Japan will expel those countries which are founded upon communism and democracy."

3. May 15, 1939: Excerpt from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "Expel the British Influences from the Far East".

"Under the present condition, it is very easy to beat England. We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hongkong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East? The British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore. For, we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100,000,000 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if we need one hundred airplanes to sink a warship, the account is entirely on our side.

4. June 1, 1939: Short, cutting remarks on the present situation by HASHIMOTO:

"It is a humiliation to have a talk with England."

"Define England as the enemy!"

"Our way is one: Expulsion of England."

"Arm the axis!"

"The enemy that blocks our way to the south is England."

5. June 20, 1939: Excerpt from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "The Solution of the Incident depends upon the Expulsion of England."



"If it had not been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the Incident will be brought to an end immediately.

"The Premier and the Foreign Minister have told us that it is necessary to strengthen the axis collaboration, but they have been hesitating to conclude the military alliance. It is because they are afraid of England. If the Tri-Partite Military Alliance is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must instantly proceed toward it.

"The foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack. Because the whole nation have recognized its necessity, the government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack instantly. The attack should not be stopped at Tientsin, but extended to Shanghai and to Hongkong. This is the only possible solution of the China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England!"

6. July 10, 1939: Excerpt from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "Organize a Class-A War-time Cabinet that has no fear of England and the Soviet Union."

"Now our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there is only one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic blockade? Even if it should be enforced, it is only a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole can make her way through with a complete war-time system in which every subject returns his property to the Emperor.

"A government without policy and decision is a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion, power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear. What we need now is a war-time cabinet with the highest authorities."

7. July 20, 1939: Excerpt from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its Leader".

"The public opinion of the whole people has taken an anti-British turn. This is natural and satisfactory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do not know what to do with China.

"My opinion is as follows:



"1. The thorough destruction of the old order is necessary. We must destroy the Kuo-ming-tang government, and the economic, political and ideological influences of England and Russia.

"2. China and Manchukuo should organize a state union with Japan as its leader.

"We must organize a self-supplying bloc within the Far East, and that economical, defensive bloc must be led by Japan, the savior of East Asia. We should then have friendly terms with those countries that recognize our union state, and allow no commercial relations with other countries."

8. September 25, 1941: Excerpt from an article by HASHIMOTO, entitled, "No More Compromise:"

"I have often pointed out that England and America have been hostile to us throughout the China Incident. The government authorities also have recently warned the nation of this fact. Moreover, have they not been taking such challenging attitudes as to give birth to the term "A B C D bloc?" The abolishment of the commercial treaty by England, America's freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is no hope of re-adjusting the friendly relations between Japan and the two countries. Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with America. What Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact.

"The Incident will come to an end when the leaders of China become aware of the true facts and become oriental again. If we should put an end to the Incident now, by compromising with England and America, China will be left as she has been -- dependent on England and America. If this should happen, how could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed themselves for the cause?

"The government seems to be taking the attitude of an opportunist. It is not a good attitude. We Japanese must decide ourselves. It is up to us to create our own victorious history."



Other articles with valuable material:

Dec. 17, 1936: Predicts outbreak of a revolution in Japan in the near future; urges strong extension of the Emperor-idea and pledges absolute loyalty to the Emperor for himself and for "our youth".

Jan. 17, 1937: Attacks the system of having a cabinet based upon political parties as unconstitutional.

March 17, 1937: Declares that interference in the government by militarists is justified and proper from the standpoint of national defense.

July 1, 1937: Emphasizes the necessity of an air force.

August 1, 1939: "Grasp the lead in reconstructing the world."

Nov. 5, 1939: "Don't hesitate to establish the Asiatic bloc. This is not an infringement on the Nine-Power Treaty. If others think it constitutes such an infringement -- renounce the treaty."

Oct. 5, 1941: "Rise, Japanese people, and be the leading player!"

Jan. 5, 1942:

Great East Asia Imperialization Sphere.

Unification of the world under the Emperor.

The territories will include: Japan (the leader), Manchukuo, China, far eastern part of Soviet Russia, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, Dutch East India, British East India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and islands on the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

General Principals:

(1) All peoples are to be independent except those people who have no power to be independent.

(2) Those territories important from a military viewpoint should belong to Japan: Hainan Island, Hong Kong, Malay, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Ceylon, Australia, New Guinea, New Zealand, and islands on the Pacific and Indian Ocean shall be Japan's Dominion.



Doc. No. 13 - Page 7 - SUMMARY Cont'd.

Manchukuo, China, Burma, French Indo-China, India, Philippines, Afghanistan, Thailand and Java are to be independent.

Governor-generals will stay in the dominions and advisors in the independent countries. Japan will take the military and diplomatic leadership.

Analyst: 2d Lt. Steiner  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 13  
Page 7



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 14

5 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Letter marked "Confidential -- Destroy by Burning", from TANAKA, Giichi, to DOIHARA, Kenji, introducing AIKAWA, Gisuke.

Date: None Given Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 31 Jan 46: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Obtained at residence of Gen. DOIHARA, Kenji.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TANAKA, Giichi; DOIHARA, Kenji, AIKAWA, Gisuke; KUHARA, Fusanosuke; SAKANISHI.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Japanese expansionist activities in China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

TANAKA introduces AIKAWA as an emissary of KUHARA, "the greatest business man in Japan in the mining industry", and requests that he be introduced to the appropriate people in China. Although the specific nature of AIKAWA's mission is not mentioned, TANAKA describes it as "an enterprise on a large scale and upon a solid foundation to further the Empire's interest in China."

Mention is twice made of a Mr. SAKANISHI, in whose absence DOIHARA is instructed to "pay special attention to the movements of Mr. En (Jap. reading of Chinese name) and of the ambassadors of various countries."

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 14



✓

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION  
SECTION

Doc. No. 15

10 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Document No. 15 is a Joint Committee print, marked PEARL HARBOR and contains intercepted diplomatic messages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941. The following are digests of the intercepted Japanese messages referred to, by page number, source, etc.:

P.1: Tokyo to Berlin, Circular 1390, 2 July 41:

Part 1: At Imperial Conference 2 July, the principal points in the Imperial policy for coping with the changing situation were adopted. First part is the "Policy"; second part "The Principal Points".

The Policy, Part 1:

1. Japan will adhere to establishing the "Great East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity" regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. Japan shall endeavor to dispose of the China Incident and move southward to establish firm base for her self-protection and self-existence.

The Principal Points, Part 2:

1. To defeat China pressure will be increased from the south by fighting, propaganda, and diplomatic negotiations re vital points.

2. Advance south shall be reenforced and policy decided re Indo-China and Thailand executed.

3. Re Russo-German War, spirit of Three Power Pact shall be maintained and every preparation made now and situation dealt with in our own way with extreme care meanwhile in diplomatic negotiations.

4. Though every effort will be made to avoid war with the U.S., if need be Japan will act according to 3-Power Pact and decide when and how force will be employed.

P.2: Tokyo (MATSUOKA) to Washington, No. 255, 14 July 41:

1. Recent mobilization order expresses irrevocable decision by Japan to end Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her expansion.

2. Occupation Fr. Indo-China to: (a) achieve our purposes there, and (b) base to launch a rapid attack.



Next will be ultimatum to Netherland Indies: In seizing Singapore Navy will play principal part, Army one division, but two to seize Netherlands Indies.

Air arm in Spratley Islands, Parao, Singora, Portuguese Timor, and Indo-China; sub fleet in South Mandated Islands, Hainan Islands and Indo-China, will at once move to crush Anglo-American Military Power

3. Troops to soon occupy Indo-China will reorganize as 25th Army Corps:

P.3: Tokyo to Berlin #669, 19 July 41:

Cabinet shake-up only to expedite National Affairs.

Japan's Foreign Policy unchanged and she will remain faithful to principles of Tri-Partite Pact.

P. 3: Washington to Tokyo #545, 21 July 41:

WAKASUGI called at Welles request on 21st to discuss negotiations of past months between NOMURA and Hull. Welles pointed out that reports from various sources indicate Japan is planning steps at variance with NOMURA's objective

Recently NOMURA claimed Britain, the U.S. and other nations were "encircling" Japan, an expression identical with one used earlier by Germany, but that this was a misunderstanding by Japan according to Welles and not the U.S. policy.

Reports indicate, said Welles, Japan plans to occupy South Indo-China by force next few days.

WAKASUGI attempted to pin source to U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and posed hypothetical question to determine action U.S. would take if reports were true.

Welles avoided this and said U.S. would await to see what Foreign Policy of new cabinet was.

P.4: Tokyo to Washington #397, 23 July 41:

1. I have not as yet determined a definite policy as I have not been in office long.

2. Our occupation Indo-China unavoidable - decided before I assumed office.

3. Should U.S. unduly excite Japan (close Panama Canal, freeze assets), a critical situation would develop.

4. Please reread messages 368 and 396, and attempt to improve situation.

P.5: Washington to Tokyo #555, (two parts complete)

I called on Welles and said that:

Occupation Indo-China essential to Japan's National Security and Economic Safety and occasioned by Embargoes.



It is peaceful and by agreement with Vichy.  
Considerable repercussions would follow oil  
Embargo.

New cabinet anxious for an "understanding  
Pact".

Welles in reply:

Could not reconcile Indo-China with plans being  
discussed by NOMURA and Hull. U.S. believe Vichy capitulated  
to pressure from Hitler and Japan intends Indo-China as base  
for Southward move.

P.6: Tokyo to Washington #406, 24 July 41:

I hope U.S. leaders display high degree of states-  
manship to maintain Pacific peace.

Reported plan of freezing Japan assets, oil Embargo  
would have adverse effect in Japan and lead to retaliation, a  
breakdown of economic relation and in turn hasten develop-  
ment of the worst situation.

Work with NISHIYAMA on request that U.S. favor-  
ably treat this situation.

P.7: Tokyo to Net (circular 1616) 26 July 41

Depending on how Jap relations with U.S. and Britain  
turn out, we may have to consider divesting the two countries  
of all interests in China.

Be ready if the worst come to take steps in this  
direction.

P.7: Tokyo to Washington (circular 1622) 27 July 41:

In retaliation for U.S. and British freezing of Jap  
assets, the rules restricting foreign business in Japan in-  
cluded in rules governing foreign exchange will be put into  
effect on the 28th.

Manchukuo will take similar steps.

Ample study made to counter any measure the op-  
position should actually take.

P.8: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo, #609, 30 July 41

Re my 608:

Today I (NOMURA) knew from their faces they  
meant business and we must answer or they will take drastic  
steps.

In my opinion we must without hesitation take  
some appeasement measures.

P.8: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) to Washington; #433, 31  
July, 41



Part 1: After conferring with the military on aid to Germany against Russia these are our views: act accordingly:

1. Gov't adheres to policies determined 2 July (circular 1390)

2. With China Incident 4 years old and new situation in the North and South we must arm to teeth for all-out war.

Part 2: (P.9) Germany understands our position.

3. With our Anglo-American Economy unendurable, we must secure the raw material of the South Sea. That is why we took Indo-China. Jap-U.S. relations move on the evil road.

Part 3: (P.9) 4. We have excellent opportunity to settle Northern question and must prepare but choose our chance well.

5. Germany dislikes our U.S. policy, but we wished to avoid war and have profoundly impressed U.S. with our determination.

Part 4: (P.10) 6. We do our best for Germany but the Tri-Partite Pact must have a flexibility. Trust is necessary while both reach their aim, even though thru divergent means. Thus all measures we take are to reach the objectives of the Pact.

P.10: Tokyo to Washington, #447; 5 August 1941

Part 1: We give attention to U.S.-Japan relations. Roosevelt and Hull are in agreement and proceed cool-headedly despite U.S. public opinion. We however must contend with our antagonists.

Part 2: 2. Economic pressure will not coerce Japan but will have the opposite effect.

3. The impression future negotiations are the result of economic pressure must be avoided.

4. Based on plan of last cabinet, we propose a plan to improve U.S.-Jap relations in reply to Roosevelt's plan of 24th. It is submitted after thorough consideration and you must stress this.

5. Our motive is to include this plan in the final agreement and to continue negotiations stopped by French Indo-China.

P. 12: Tokyo to Washington #452, 7 August 41.

1. Japanese-U.S. relations critical: direct conferences of leaders suggested.

2. Prince KONOYE willing to meet Roosevelt in friendly talk.



3. If they hesitate over Indo-China, or our increased armament, argue:

a. Prime Minister will break precedent to leave country to confer.

b. Only every effort for peace will fulfill duty to our peoples.

4. If they are agreeable inquire as to earliest date for such conference.

5. Top secret till agreement is reached, when we will publicly announce it.

P.13: Washington to Tokyo; #663, 7 Aug. 41

U.S.-Jap relations extremely critical. General U.S. outlook is as follows:

1. U.S. believes Axis partners are out to conquer world and talk with Japan is out of the question. While Sec'y of State was ill, Japan occupied Indo-China, and unofficial discussions were ended then and there.

2. U.S. Policy towards Japan is not unfriendly, they explain. U.S. is only taking measures to counter Japan's Southward or Northward expansion attempts. When Japan occupied Indo-China, U.S. retaliated with freezing order and export Embargo. No doubt U.S. will take drastic action in event of a Thailand move.

U.S. and Russia are close and U.S. would not watch from sidelines in event of move Northwards.

3. Note that Germany has gone far in dealing with U.S. and even issued peace terms to ease public opinion.

P.14: Washington to Tokyo; #674, 9 Aug. 41

Re your #465

Will arrange to see Roosevelt on his return and strive for favorable impression.

As I have pointed out the pursuit of our present policy will result in U.S. following trend it has already established. U.S. assumes our occupation of Indo-China indicates Japan has set her course and fear our offer to have the Prime Minister come to the U.S. will have little effect.

Unless we can draw up some plan to persuade the U.S. from its present policy, I am pessimistic as to our present attempts to break the present critical situation.

P.15: Tokyo to Berlin; #739, 15 Aug 41

Conversing with Ambassador SMETANIN I mentioned our desires re North Sakhalin and removal of danger zones



in Far East.

Since then Russia asks our attitude to Russo-German War, to which we say we propose to continue friendly relations to Russia and observe neutrality; but whether we can continue this depends on Russia's response to:

(a) Possibility of Russia ceding, selling, or leasing any territory in East Asia to a 3rd Power, or offered as Military bases, and

(b) Possibility of Russia permitting any 3rd Powers Military Movements to extend to East Asia, or conclusion of a 3rd power alliance that would have the Empire as its object.

To this Russia replied that nothing of the kind was considered nor would be in the future.

I took opportunity then to call attention to rumor that the U.S. would be shipping munitions to Soviet via Vladivostock, saying it would violate the Tri-Partite Pact relation.

I reaffirmed MATSUOKA's assurance that we respected and adhered to the spirit and objectives of the Three Power Pact.

P.16: Tokyo to Berlin; #740, 15 Aug 41

On the 15th I told German and Italian Ambassadors confidentially of my conversation with the Russian Ambassador along lines of my separate message #739. Ambassador Ott to understand the basic problem, said he understood the meeting of July 2 did not preclude Japan joining Germany's war on Russia.

To this I replied that the Empire's present military expansion presently dictates this Russian policy.

Ott asked if this was the first step toward future operation against Russia and a restraint until preparations for Russia are complete.

I replied affirmatively.

P.17: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #703, 16 Aug 41

Re your #480

Part 1: As I have successively reported Jap-U.S. relations are critical and likely to grow worse at next Jap move, such as occupation of Thailand

U.S. has not attained unity re European War, but the Americans are unanimous for a strong hand in the Far East.

Part 2: U.S. President and Naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific War would be. Britain would welcome it however as a prelude to U.S. participation in the European War.

Doc. No. 15

Page 6



Americans believe that while Germany may defeat Russia it will be a long war, and their success against submarines gives confidence of ultimate victory

Part 3: Sec'y of State gave negative reply to proposal of conference. They believe Japan is conducting an appeasement policy and that my country has fobbed me.

Part 4: (P.18) Meanwhile Jap papers print scorching criticisms of U.S. Gov't. Situation gets worse. Believe U.S. wants a pledge on the 3 critical points:

1. Question of self-defence.
2. Withdrawal of troops from China.
3. Non-discrimination in trade.

Situation needs smoothing out and with rejection of conference proposal I need instructions on these 3 points to be ready for the President who returns in a few days.

P.18: Tokyo to Washington; #487, 20 Aug 41

For your information:

Part 1: We must prepare for the possibility of Russia's defeat and resultant chaos in the maritime provinces, by having sufficient military strength in Manchukuo to deal with such an eventuality.

Part 2: If U.S. questions increase of troops in North explain as your own view of matter what I said above.

I recently advised Soviet Ambassador that so long as Russia lives up to the treaty Japan will be faithful to it.

If it becomes definitely known the U.S. is shipping iron, planes and other materials via our coastal waters the reaction here will be most unfavorable. Will you call this to the attention of the U.S. Gov't as I have to its Ambassador.

P.20: Tokyo to Washington; #504, 26 Aug 41

Re my 503

That message contains the maximum concessions we can make to the President's proposal. Whether you can convince them of this is another matter. The situation is strained to the point where we pin our hopes on a conference between KONOYE and Roosevelt.

Please try to convince Roosevelt and Hull of this.

P.21: Tokyo to Washington; #505, 26 Aug 41

U.S. diverting petroleum products to Russia that should come to us, despite our repeated representations. This deals a terrific blow to our relations.



Tell Sec'y of State this causes grave concern in War Ministry and is at variance with our neutrality pact with Russia.

If U.S. says it cannot change, request the transportation route be shifted. If they refuse try to have U.S. revive shipment to Japan at once.

P.21: Washington to Tokyo; #756, 29 Aug 41

gist of conversation with Hull on 28th:

(a) Since disagreement between KONOYE and Roosevelt would be unfortunate preliminary conversations should come to an agreement first.

(b) U.S. maintains agreement between U.S.-Japan can be reached without considering question of China.

(c) U.S. will not settle with Japan at China's expense or without consent and approval of Britain and USSR.

(d) Re China and withdrawing troops I had nothing to add but said Prince KONOYE would make every effort to settle this.

(e) I make following suggestions re "Leaders" conference.

1. While we desire Hawaii we should consent to Juneau.

2. Conference date should be from Sept. 21st (?) to \_\_\_\_\_

3. Five persons each from Foreign office Ministers of Navy of War Embassy and consulate: that is 20 or less.

P.23: Batavia (ISIZAWA) to Tokyo; #902, 25 Sept. 41

Re 1st part circular 261 from Ambassador HONDA:

1. Our military invasion of Indo-China has stimulate anti-Jap tendencies in these islands.

2. Rofinck, Chief of Far Eastern Section, Netherlands Gov't believes

a. Japan must settle China incident by compromise with Chiang Kai Shek.

b. All Chinese here support him and Dutch recognize his regime.

c. Head of Nanking Gov't opposed because he is anti-white.

d. Martial law here to protect 1,500,000 Chinese residents.

3. I tried but could not refute Rofinck who was adamant, so I need propaganda organs to help me.

4. Till Indo-China and Thai are safely in our sphere, request influential Nanking representatives here who



can preach doctrine that Japs and Chinese are one and who can sway Chinese here,

P.25: Tokyo to Washington; #524, 3 Sept. 41

Opposition waving Tri-Partite Banner since existence of Premier's message inadvertently made known to public Fleisher's Herald Tribune story of Leaders conference unfortunate.

Speed meeting to middle Sept. if you can.

Convey this to Hull and if he does not answer immediately we plan to issue a public statement on our position.

P.25: Tokyo to Washington; #528, 4 Sept. 41

Re your 556:

Part 1: U.S. Gov't proposes agreement first on (a) self-defence (b) occupation of China, and (c) equal trade treatment. If we continue to argue the legal angle of these we cannot be ready by end September, and we have already expressed our views. Let us find out what we can agree on in preliminary discussion and issue joint statement to create a more wholesome atmosphere.

Part 2: Points requiring special explanation as told Grew, are:

(1) We expect matters Japan is pledged to re Tri-Partite Pact to win approval of U.S. Gov't.

(2) Avoid impression freezing measure has proven damaging, and convey that Jap. people believe it punishment for occupation Indo-China. Stress that the importance of Japan's pledges must bring U.S. reciprocation.

(3) By ceasing military measures, we mean for example, to stop sending planes and submarines to Philippines, and acquiring military bases in Southwest Pacific, China and Far East Russia.

P.27: Washington to Tokyo; #819, 15 Sept 41

Re your 561 and 563 Points that occur to us here:

1. We must satisfy Hull to satisfy Roosevelt. They are accord.

2. Expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse caution; words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave doubt as to its meaning.

3. U.S. wants China peace terms and will not mediate if terms unfair doubt U.S. will agree to confer if we avoid outlining our terms.

4. If both sides do not agree at preliminary conference the leaders will never meet.

5. U.S. has no objections to making this a



U.S.-Jap affairs but want to have understanding with Britain, China, etc. to avoid impression of trading others off.

6. Have done all in my power to carry out instructions, etc.

P.28: Wash. (NOMURA) to Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Parts 1&2: (1) At White House I said we agreed on 2 out of 3 main points. As to troop evacuation I said KONOYE was confident of an agreement in requesting a meeting with Roosevelt.

(2) The "understanding" put in words 24 June was result of over a dozen conferences with Hull, who worked very hard many months on it. In my opinion U.S. will be more likely to come to terms if its general terms are followed.

Part 3: In view of above I doubt preliminary negotiations can come about by 4 Sept. Meanwhile we must find terms acceptable to both sides on the 3 points, particularly troop garrisons. If preliminary negotiations are OK, Roosevelt will confer.

P.29: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #839, 22 Sept 41

Part 1: Feeling here is to aid destruction of Germany. All assistance possible to Russia. No undue alarm over submarines.

Part 2: Re Jap war, U.S. people say "Why worry, its inevitable". Believe Navy can cope with Japan as Japan's economic strength cannot stand war. In diplomacy they feel to reach Jap agreement at expense of China is wrong. Attempts to ameliorate situation deadlocked.

Part 3: Many in U.S. feel Italy's discontent will eliminate her. None think this war will destroy the U.S. If war comes few anticipate large expeditionary forces. Isolation policy is on the decline.

Part 4: Should Japan abandon forceful aggression, U.S. trade relations could be restored and U.S. would go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

P.31: Washington to Tokyo; #842, 23 Sept 41

Part 1: On 23rd I gave Hull your messages 562 and 564 and China peace terms per your message 590, pointing out: That these notes and our various statements contain all we have to say: that anything re Tri-Partite Pact be decided by the leaders in their conference; that these proposals are not intended to show down U.S. original proposals, but to enlarge their scope. I emphasized our interest in an early "leaders" meeting.

Part 2: Hull said he was interested too in last and



asked my opinion. I said that Tri-Partite Pact and U.S. Jap relations could be parallel.

Part 3: Hull said he was studying TOYODA-Grew meeting report and would reply soon, he would not be definite about leaders meeting. Hull said U.S. and Japan are ideally situated to lead world to peace but doubted the 2 countries statesmen were capable of coping with the task.

P.32: Tokyo to Washington; #597, 26 Sept 41

In conversing with Roosevelt did he not mention a promise on our part not to increase troops in Indo-China during negotiations? When he stated we might occupy Thailand while KONOYE and he were talking did he refer to such a promise? I believe he did and want you to question them again.

With Germany becoming so aroused, do not rehash things. Needless to say there will be no changes in my 595 of today-tell them this.

Note: 595 is text of proposed agreement

P.33: Tokyo to Washington; #604, 27 Sept.

Press for "leaders" meeting and emphasize importance of holding it immediately. Our proposal is not to be construed as absolutely final.

P.33: Tokyo to Washington; #605,

To Grew- Part 1: 1. Europe is in flames but U.S.-Japan hold key to peace in Pacific. Recently incidents happened and relations are sensitive.

2. That is why KONOYE is so anxious to meet Roosevelt.

Part 2: 3. Japan is connected with Germany and Italy by alliance and her willingness to be misunderstood by them is proof of her sacrifice in asking for this meeting. Never before has a Jap Premier left the country.

4. Peace is Japan's motive, but Japan will never bend her knees.

Part 3: 5. U.S.-Jap relations are complicated and may not be settled in a day. We believe leaders conference would settle them but believe fearsome results would follow failure.

6. Japan has announced the proposals she will make and U.S. is aware of Jap viewpoint.

7. We have decided on all arrangements and personnel and are ready to start conference now.

Part 4: 8. Japan therefore awaits U.S. earliest reply.

9. Time is of the essence, and respect for each others reliability and sincerity imported.



P.36: Washington to Tokyo; #865, 27 Sept 41

Part 1: U.S. insists on complete preliminary agreement.

Part 2: Submitting further papers will endanger conflicting inconsistencies.

Part 3: U.S. fundamentals in her proposals of 21 June.

Part 4: U.S. attitude to Europe war is stiffening.

Part 5: U.S. moves re Europe war based on self-defense.

Part 6: We must agree on China before we can agree on U.S.-Jap relations.

Part 7: Our stationing troops to more and more a threat to continued talks.

Part 8: It will be difficult to make U.S. swallow new doctrine of "especially close relation."

Part 9: Difficulty will be met on "new matter".

Part 10: Suggest that "trade" proposals follow U.S. proposal of 21 June.

P.39: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) to Wash; #606, 28 Sept 1941.

Part 1: Re my talk with Grew I do not mean all questions are now useless, but with anniversary of Tri-Partite Pact, support of Axis strengthens and move for U.S. accord weakens.

Part 2: We need quicker results than ever before. A month has passed since KONOYE's message and the Gov't is worried British Ambassador says America lacks confidence in attitude of Jap Gov't-Surely KONOYE must be deemed reliable.

P.40: Washington to Tokyo; 29 Sept. 41

On 29th I asked for secret interview with Roosevelt, but he is at Hyde Park. Hull seemed familiar with your 604 and 606, and I pointed out that the government, the army and the Navy accorded on proposals discussed, but it would take time to influence the public. Many cannot understand why U.S. poses Monroe Doctrine and then meddles in Asiatic Affairs.

P.41: Washington to Tokyo; #870, 29th Sept. 41

Part.1: Believe it well not to deliver documents to Grew in Tokyo and also here-Translations differ and in vague documents are often contradictory.

Part 2: U.S. believes we shifted negotiations to Tokyo to delay, and watch Russo-German War for favorable opportunity to launch northward drive.

Part 3: For 6 months during negotiations U.S. stand has been set down clearly with no indication of backing down. We feel too many approach Premier with wishful thinking.

Part 4: Constantly pressing the U.S. for a reply shows over-anxiety and we should avoid this.



P.42: Tokyo to Washington; #614, 30 Sept. 41

Part 1: Prepared my proposal of 4 Sept. to harmonize with that of U.S. No changes to be made in its substance and we're ready to negotiate.

Part 2: Indicates Jap consent to changes in form and expression. Nothing of major interest.

Part 3: Principle of economic non-discrimination applies to 3rd countries as well as U.S.-Japan. We will reconsider Hull's pet stipulations re stability in Pacific.

P.44: Rome to Tokyo; #627, 30 Sept. 41.

U.S.-Jap negotiations make us appear faithless to Tri-Partite Pact. At anniversary of Pact German and Italian flags only hung out. Italy dissatisfied.

P.45: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #881, 30 Sept. 41

Part 1: Troops in China damage negotiations and China Incident must be settled before an accord can be reached. U.S. will not strike Japan-can only defend in a 2 ocean war.

Part 2: Not available

P.45: Tokyo to Washington; #618, 1 Oct. 41

Part 1: Perhaps you are justified in complaining of our numerous notes which were meant however to clarify, and not to "slow down", as Hull suggests.

Part 2: We were unaware you submitted changes to be approved here and regret this as it complicates an already complicated situation.

Part 3: KONOYE's cabinet is strong and can reach a binding agreement despite U.S. suspicion to contrary. Our political situation misunderstood.

Part 4: Foreign newsmen place too much importance on speeches of those opposed to cabinets. It is natural we are impatient for leader's conferences.

Part 5: Washington will be central locale of meeting with some necessary talks in Tokyo where unavoidable. Time is important and the situation serious.

P.48: Berlin to Tokyo; #1198, 1 Oct. 41

1. Ribbentrop dissatisfied with Jap diplomacy
2. Same true of German Foreign Office Staff.
3. Foreign diplomats feel Japan avoids war due to impoverishment thru China incident.
4. If Japan takes "wishy-washy" attitude and negotiates without consulting Germany there is no telling what Germany will do without consulting Japan.



P.49: Tokyo to Washington; #625, 2 Oct. 41  
Special Intelligence #330 from N.Y. quotes an AP dispatch as declaring KONOYE Cabinet will face crisis in about 2 weeks

Hull appears gravely concerned over public opinion in Japan. Tell them public opinion is calm and that our Gov't would like to issue a statement on U.S.-Jap negotiations at earliest opportunity.

P.50: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #889, 2 Oct 41  
Saw Hull today at 0900. He handed me U.S. reply. His Gov't feels leaders conference a precarious affair without complete clear-cut preliminary understanding- Not a "patch up".

I said my Gov't would be much disappointed.

P.50: Tokyo to Washington; #627, 3 Oct. 41  
Talked to Craigie, British Ambassador, who feels it important that U.S. and Japan agree to immediate conference.

P.51: Tokyo to Washington; #628, 3 Oct. 41.  
1. With resignation of MATSUOKA chance of swinging from Axis to democracies considerably enhanced.  
2. With Japan speed is needed and she can only enter a temporary understanding at this time.  
3. KONOYE's reversal of policy brings strong opposition and failure to produce an agreement without delay endangers cabinet.  
4. Grew and I feel the opportunity for a U.S. - Jap accord is now and should not be lost thru suspicion.

P.51: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #894, 3 Oct. 41.  
Part 1: U.S. memo permits hope situation not hopeless. Public favorable to President's Foreign Policy. European outlook more optimistic due to Soviet showing and all aid given to prevent separate peace. Britain's increased air power and sea strength insurance against invasion.

Part 2: All not perfect for Germany and Italy weakens daily. If Germany does succeed in separate peace with Russia, England's position will again be critical, and U.S. may realize danger of war Thru loss of ships in German concentration against England. Such would have favorable reaction on U.S.-Jap relations as U.S. would be more conciliatory.

Part 3: The KONOYE's message smothered U.S. sentiment for war, U.S. has not relieved her economic pressure one iota, and she may gain her ends without resort to war by this. Only sudden world change offers chance U.S. will alter this policy of economic pressure.

Part 4: Evacuation of troops in China alone blocks U.S. agreement. Consider this further and see if this is not a possibility.



P.54: Tokyo (TOYODA) to Washington; #637, 4 Oct. 41.  
Re your 890:

1. Since U.S. insists on preliminary agreement, are we right in assuming an accord on all except the 3 disputed points? Check this.

2. Premier approves 4 basis points in principle, but foreseeing differences of opinion in their application, would like to consider such differences at time of conference. Would like U.S. to have a clear understanding of this.

P.54: Tokyo to Washington; #643, 7 Oct. 41.

Part 1: I requested U.S. Ambassador's opinion of U.S. Memo of 2 Oct. He replied he had only received a resume and could not form an opinion without reading the complete text, but believed U.S. wanted a preliminary agreement.

Part 2: Grew advised that on 5th wrote 3000 word memo on Jap conditions. U.S. memo corrected to show agreement "in principle" and not "in full" on 4 main points and a correction sent to Washington thru NOMURA.

Part 3: I questioned Grew as to why passages from the Ministers private message should be quoted in an official document and he assumed it came about thru mishandling in the state Department.

Grew questioned our correction of the U.S. memo saying he understood NOMURA's acceptance of the 4 points had been unconditional.

P.56: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) to Wash.; #873, 8 Oct 41.

Message to Berlin: Re my 708:

Part 1: U.S.-Jap negotiations beginning during 2nd KONOYE cabinet were ruptured by occupation of Indo-China which we hoped would hasten end of China Incident and break Anglo-U.S. encirclement. Then England and U.S. used economic blockade and Jap-U.S. relations deteriorated extremely. Then the European war deadlocked and now with Soviet going into Allied camp, communication with Europe is for the time being severed.

Part 2: Message to Berlin: Seeing no means of concluding China Incident Japan decided to settle it diplomatically and establish East Asia Area of co-prosperity to conserve our resources for the future. We feel it necessary to open a way to a U.S. compromise.

When we concluded 3 Power Pact we hoped while maintaining U.S. friendship and thru it to settle China Affair, to win the Soviet over to the Axis, and by guaranteeing goods from South Seas to Germany and Italy to receive



mechanical and technical assistance. Now unexpected events have taken place and only U.S.-Jap relations are unchanged, and that is the only thing that could be patched up.

Part 3: Message to Berlin: Germany could spare no effort to prevent U.S.-Japan clash and even offered to help improve that relationship. Both Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the U.S. from entering the war.

The object of the Tri-Partite was to prevent expansion of the war in Europe, but it has now spread till only in the Pacific is there peace. The need is to perfect this peace by establishing U.S.-Jap harmony. This it is felt is in the spirit of the 3 Power Pact.

Part 4: Message to Berlin: It was with this view that former cabinet began U.S. negotiations and we feel need to continue. It is not that we are divergent with the Tri-Partite Pact but that we seek to end the China Affair.

The 3 principles of KONOYE Envision:

- a. End of China hostilities thru basic treaty and use of U.S. to coerce Chiang regime.
- b. Establish area of East Asia Co-prosperity to procure raw materials
- c. Seal peace in Pacific and prevent U.S. from entering war.

Of course we expect our ups and downs. This is for your private information.

P.58: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; 907, 8 Oct. 41.

Part 1: U.S. opinion unanimous on 4 principles as basis of adjustment, and are dissatisfied you avoid detailed discussion. They insist on unanimity and desire further clarification of our views.

Part 2: In our proposal of the 6th we limited and narrowed what we had discussed and equivocated on guaranters against armed aggression. Further, re evacuation of troops, U.S. demands somethings that we in principle have objections to. Moreover, the want to be surer of our attitude to 3 Power Pact.

Part 3: Their plan is to first agree on questions in dispute between us and gradually to turn to other matters. To do otherwise they feel is futile.

Part 4: Re 4 Principles: U.S. ambassador spoke like I had reached agreement with Hull, but I wassas you know in no position to accept them without instructions from my home Gov't.

Nevertheless these are abstract principles I figure will be elastic in their application, and since U.S. is prudent in discussions I do not feel you need be troubled over this.



P.61: Washington to Tokyo; #915, 9 Oct. 41.

I called on Hull today and relayed your instructions and at same time mentioned points discussed at White House on 3 Sept. Hull said non-discriminatory treatment should extend over entire Pacific, but promised U.S. interpretation of geographical proximity.

Referred to evacuation of China and after discussing our views on political situation there pointed out need of keeping troops in certain areas.

Also mentioned that Prime Minister has accepted the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull seemed aware of this.

P.61: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #917, 9 Oct. 41.

Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on instructions and I tried to ascertain their intentions. They minutely explained that U.S. attitude is explained in memo of 2 Oct and that:

1. U.S. wants Pacific Peace on basis of the 4 Principles.

2. U.S. views re Japan's forced advances North and South; indiscriminatory treatment in Pacific; withdrawal of troops in China, and Tri-Partite Treaty, have their origin in a concern for the future, and that these principle apply to the entire Pacific Area.

3. This memo contains the full U.S. position.

4. The U.S. does not wish to enter discussion beyond an attempt for accord thereon, after which other problems will more naturally be solved.

Believe we can proceed along assumption mentioned in my 907.

P.62: Tokyo (TOYODA) to Washington; 10 Oct. 41.

1. Situation reached decisive stage. To decide our policy I need not you opinions, but those of the U.S. on points in my 637.

2. You do not tell me if we have a chance to parley or what Hull answers. Here after when you interview Hull take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and wire without delay complete minutes of what transpires.

P.63: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #923, 10 Oct. 41.

I have read your 650. What they want in Pacific peace and say our policy is semi-pacific and semi aggressive.

They say our 6 Sept. proposal diverged greatly from preceding statements and agreement on its basis is out of the question.

They have other objections I do not understand and which they won't clarify, but they do demand we compromise on basis of Oct. 2nd memo, else no leaders conference.



P.63: Tokyo (TOYODA) to Washington; #654, 12 Oct. 41.  
Spoke to Crew on 10th and want you to lead U.S. to clear proposal.

1. On 3rd we received U.S. memo of 2nd and gave it our most cordial consideration, and as we best grasp it, the important points are: (1) garrisoning and evacuating troops. (2) English-Jap-U.S. attitude on European War. (3) Non discrimination in China trade.

2. Feel sure if we lay cards on table an accord can be reached, but we must start with leaders conference.

3. If we can agree on such a conference, public opinion in both countries will calm down.

4. I passed on to the Army your communication re Indo-China but so far have no reply.

P.64: Tokyo to Washington; #658, 13 Oct. 41.

Re my 657

Assume your talk with Welles will cover U.S. Jap negotiations in full. Advise us at once. Situation critical and only leaders conference can adjust relations.

1. May we assume U.S. has no disagreements beyond the 3 points now under consideration? We are mainly interested in U.S. desires on garrisoning and evacuating troops.

P.65: Tokyo to Washington; #662, 13 Oct 41.

We have made arrangements for phone connection, Chief American Bureau of the Foreign Office TERASAKI to Minister WAKASUGI for noon (Japan time) of 14th on this occasion following passwords and codes will be used.

See listing

P.66: Tokyo to Washington; #663, 13 Oct. 41.

Re my 658:

Circumstances permit no delay. Please submit report on conference of WAKASUGI and Wells immediately, and then dispatch cable giving details.

P.66: Washington to Tokyo; #939, 13 Oct. 41.

Part 1: Tone of WAKASUGI-Welles talk of 2 hours friendly and frank. Roosevelt will meet KONOYE if 3 points are agreed on.

Part 2: Re evacuation of China. After years of war it would be a difficult process taking time. WAKASUGI asked Welles that if the U.S. were assured of such an evacuation, would the U.S. leave details up to China and Japan to decide?

Part 3: Welles said that would depend on Japan's sincerity. U.S. has no intention of proposals beyond those of 21 June and 2 Oct. Those were careful and well considered



U.S. objections to Jap proposals of Sept. and 25 Sept are that the restrict terms of the two U.S. proposals which incidentally contain terms of earlier Jap proposals.

P.67: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #941, 13 Oct. 41

Only Part 4 available (of 6 parts)

WAKASUGI says that in final analysis the stumbling block lies in U.S. desire to agree on basic principles first, whereas Japan insists that the matter of primary importance is clearing up of outstanding differences first and then discussing the qualities such as basic principles, etc.

WAKASUGI pointed out Japan's willingness to sacrifice a unanimous desire for a North and South move and asked, that the U.S. take such a bold step itself by way of concession.

Welles said he appreciated this as an encouraging thing but pointed to the disappointment of French Indo-China at the time of 21 June proposals.

P.68: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #943, 14 Oct 41

Part 1: Saw Admiral Turner who said: U.S. wants a definite promise, not a pretense. If during leader's conference Japan made a further advance, the President would be terribly embarrassed.

Japan speaks of Peace as though she could make independent decisions, so it would seem she could set aside obligations to the #Power Pact.

As to withdrawal of troops it would seem Japan and China could agree on details.

Part 2: He said should Russo-German war end suddenly and Germany offer England peace. it would be a German peace and England could not accept.

On other hand Hoover thinks that in this case should Germany offer England generous terms, that the war would end with unimaginable suddenness.

Rumor quotes Hull as saying U.S. proceeds with patience but Japan should not mistake this as a weakness.

One correspondent reports good basis for rumors of a cessation of Russo-German hostilities and 50-50 chance of U.S.- Jap war.

P.69: Tokyo to Washington; #667, 15 Oct. 41.

Re your 939 and 941:

Your messages clear up many points. Maintain in further contact and bear in following in mind:

1. If we quibble over argument you set forth in par 6 of your 941, it may give them opening to insist on having the 4 principles included in the text of the agreement.



2. Our proposal of 16 Sept. is nothing more than our proposals incorporated into theirs of 21 June.

3. Due to its nature we wish it handled between WAKASUGI and Welles for time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled by you and Hull.

P.70: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #950, 15 Oct 41  
Re your 667:

The military attache here has been instructed by the Hqs in Tokyo to advise us against yielding an inch on the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive we have not emphasized our stand enough.

It goes without saying we fully understand our governments stand on this question.

P.71: Tokyo (TOYODA) to Washington; #671, 16 Oct 41  
Germany and Italy demand we give the U.S. notice of fact that her shipping to Europe may lead to war, and that in such event Japan, under the provisions of the 3 Power Pact, might join them.

While Japan is desirous of meeting her obligations to the 3 Power Pact she is also desirous of making a success of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations.

Under the circumstances we can do no more than warn the U.S. at an appropriate time in such words as are contained in my separate telegram #372, and as would not affect U.S.-Jap negotiations one way or another.

P.71: Tokyo to Washington; #372, 16 Oct. 41  
Japan affirms to U.S. that aim of 3 Power Pact is to confine the European War. But if tension between U.S. and Germany be aggravated a danger of war would exist and Japan as a signatory would be deeply concerned.  
Accordingly it desires that German-American relations cause further deterioration and that the prevailing tension be alleviated as quickly as possible.

P.72: Washington (NOMURA) to Tokyo; #959, 16 Oct 41  
Part 1: TERASAKI spoke to Admiral Turner who said:

a. U.S. policy is to support England against Hitler, who, if he gains control of Europe, is a threat to South and Central America.

b. U.S. fears present Jap cabinet has not the backing of the Jap military and therefore cannot conclude a binding agreement.

c. Urgent U.S. and Japan compromise, but doubt Japan is willing.



NOTE: Since completing the analysis of the first 72 pages of this document, the Document Division has procured a number of additional pamphlets, sufficient to meet all expected demands. In view of this it is no longer felt advisable to complete this analysis, and in lieu thereof has decided to substitute a reference only to the more important documents by page number together with a very short memo as to their contents, as follows;

- P. 73- 962- First word of KONOYE Cabinets resignation.
- P. 76- 682- Notice to NOMURA of cabinets resignation.
- P. 81- 698- Assurance New Cabinet seeks U.S. Japanese accord.
- P. 81- unnumbered- NOMURA asks to be relieved from "hypercritical" position.
- P. 82- Unnumbered- NOMURA ordered to continue in critical situation.
- P. 89- 464- TriPartite Pact to be continued for 5 yrs.
- P. 94- 726- Proposal "A" of last Japanese offer.
- P. 96- 727- Proposal "B" of last Japanese offer.
- P. 97- 730- NOMURA told KURUSU leaves for U.S.
- P. 100- 736- Nov. 25th set as deadline for U.S. accord.
- P. 116- 762- Tokyo reaffirms Nov. 25th as deadline.
- P. 122- 528- Tokyo warns Vichy of intention to exceed Indo-China agreement.
- P. 126- 2319- Tokyo tells Hongkong that if U.S. does not agree U.S. and British power is to be destroyed.
- P. 137- 15 Nov.- Tokyo gives orders on method of destroying code machines.
- P. 165- 22 Nov.- Deadline extended to 29th "after which things will automatically happen".
- P. 179- 26 Nov.- KURUSU phones YAMAMOTO situation looks hopeless.
- P. 195- 28 Nov.- Tokyo tells NOMURA and KURUSU negotiations are ruptured, but to stall along to prevent this impression.
- P. 215- 2 Dec.- Order to burn all codes but one and machine.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 22 (Supp.1)

5 February 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Importance of Zaibatsu Investments in the Economic Life of Japan.

Date: 10 July 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Economic Administration

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic background.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains a table showing the investments of Japan's thirteen largest business concerns in war and war potential industries in Japan proper and an estimate of their investments outside of Japan, as of 1939.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No.22 (Supp)  
1



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 21

Date 26 December 1945

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Intelligence Research Report on the Intelligence Organization of Japan by M.I.S. of W.D.G.S.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated: Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

M.I.S. of W.D.G.S.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. Combined Japanese Intelligence Organization, with chart.
2. Relations between Japanese Secret and Combat Intelligence organizations and civil control, with chart.
3. Relations between the Army and the Military Police in the field, with chart.

Analyst Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 21

First 20 numbers reserved for special documents.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 22

Date 26 December 1945.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "A Preliminary Survey of the Holdings of  
the Japanese Economic Oligarchy."

Date: 18 June 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Economic Administration

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Economic Background.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Gives holdings of principal large concerns with charts by  
industry within and without Japan; also includes subsidiaries  
and controlled companies.

Analyst Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 22



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 23

Date 26 December 1945.

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Temporary Food Adjustment Law of Japan,  
Law No. 86.

Date: 10 Sep 37 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

C.I.S. Library

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Background material

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

An act authorizing banks and financial institutions to issue bonds, similar to our war bonds, for the financing of war industries for the Greater East Asiatic War.

Analyst Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 23



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
DOCUMENT DIVISION

2 January 1946.

Documents numbered 24 to 71, inclusive, relate to violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and are bound together. Accordingly, a description of these documents, together with a general statement of the contents of each, has been combined and is transmitted to the members of the Legal Staff herein. This is a departure from the practice which will generally be followed of submitting to the Staff an analysis of each document, separately. The document numbers and descriptions are as follows:

No.

24. Title and Nature: Treaty Series, No. 723, on the Nine-Power Treaty concerning China, entered into on 6 Feb 1922, published by Govt. Printing Office.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: The parties agree to respect the sovereignty of China, not to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects of other states nor support any agreements by their respective nationals to create spheres of influence or superiority of rights, and to have full and frank communication between the contracting parties on any situation that may arise which may cause one of the parties to desire such discussions.

25. Title and Nature: "Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations" on Manchuria. Govt. Printing Office, 1932, Publication No. 378. (Set of maps accompany Report showing areas concerned.)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Shows Japanese forces attacked Chinese garrisons and occupied various places. (pp. 66-88) Recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state by Japan. (pp. 88-111) Greatest measure of actual power was exercised by the Japanese in the government of Manchukuo. (pp. 99-111)

26. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of the U.S.-Japan, 1931-41" and from "The Japan Year Book, 1943-44."



SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan considered the Manchurian affair settled and would not countenance any intervention by third parties. Japan gave notice of its decision to resign from the League of Nations.

27. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41."

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state by Japan. (pp.96-98)

28. Title and Nature: Report adopted on 24 Feb 1933 by the Assembly of the League of Nations on "Sino-Japanese Dispute".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: After occupation of the Chinese territory known as Manchuria, by Japanese forces, civil administration was established, resulting in the formation of Manchukuo and its recognition as an independent state by Japan.

29. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41"; also copy of telegram received by the State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Proof of Japanese military operations in China.

30. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan recognized the "China Incident" as war.

31. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Seat of Chinese Government moved to Chungking. (p.417)

32. Title and Nature: Telegrams received by the State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese plans for the puppet governments of occupied territories.



33. Title and Nature: Extract from Manchuria Daily News.  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Shows Japanese plan to organize puppet governments.
34. Title and Nature: Copy of telegram received by State Department.  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Methods used by Japanese in maintaining order.
35. Title and Nature: Conference Report of Brussels, convened in virtue of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington.  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan refused to join in discussing with the other parties, signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty, the situation in China. (pp.9, 10, 53) Probable defense allegation - Japanese action in North China was a matter of self-defense as a result of anti-Japanese policy. (pp. 11-15)
36. Title and Nature: Excerpt from Japan Year Book.  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan executed a treaty giving Japanese nationals economic preferences. (p.209)
37. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. II, 1931-41".  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan executed a treaty with the National Government of the Republic of China giving Japanese nationals economic preferences. (pp.117-123)
38. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. II, 1931-41".  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan entered into agreements with France for the purpose of attacking China from the south. (pp.295-296)
39. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Contemporary Japan, Vol. IX, July-Dec.1940".  
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan entered into agreements with France for the purpose of attacking China from the south. (p. 1369)



40. Title and Nature: Department of State Bulletin. A translation, as prepared by the American Embassy at Tokyo, of the Franco-Japanese protocol signed at Vichy, France, on 29 July 1941, regarding the joint defense of French Indo-China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This treaty gave Japan a back door to China.

41. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, 1931-41, Vol. II".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Copy of the Tri-Power Accord between Germany, Italy and Japan. (pp.165-166)

42. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Shows Japan to be adviser of Manchukuo Government. (pp.134-135)

43. Title and Nature: Memorandum presented to Lytton Commission by V. K. Wellington Koo. Vol. II, Chinese Cultural Society, N.Y. 1932.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Shows Japan to be adviser of Manchukuo Government. (pp. 854-860)

44. Title and Nature: Japanese Government Annual Report on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs, 1936.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Foreign Office regulated and controlled narcotic trade. (pp. 16-21)

45. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Summation of violations of "Open Door Policy" and Japanese meaning of "Open Door", Japan as host, other nations as guests. (pp.136-139)

46. Title and Nature: Report to the State Department by M. S. Myers, American Consul General.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Violations of "Open Door Policy" by Japan in Manchuria.



47. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Establishment of monopolies in Manchuria by Japan. (pp. 142-143)

48. Title and Nature: Report to the State Department from the American Consulate General.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Report on the wheat situation in Manchuria with enclosed excerpt from Japanese newspaper relative to establishment of other monopolies.

49. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Discriminatory effect of Exchange Control Law and ministerial orders issued under it, by the Manchukuo Government controlled by the Japanese. (pp. 152-154)

50. Title and Nature: Copy of telegram received by State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese refused to grant permits for exports.

51. Title and Nature: Report to Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Report on administrative measures affecting import trade -- Manchuria.

52. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Preferences favored Japanese business -- Manchuria. (p. 156)

53. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in China -- salt administration.

54. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".



SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in China -- Yangtze river traffic controlled by Japanese Navy.

55. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in International Settlements in China.

56. Title and Nature: Copy of telegram to State Department

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in International Settlements in China.

57. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in China -- discriminatory effects of exchange control.

58. Title and Nature: Copies of telegrams received by State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with foreign rights in China -- discriminatory effects of exchange control.

59. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with American trade in China. (pp. 787-790)

60. Title and Nature: Copies of telegrams received by State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with American trade in China.

61. Title and Nature: Copy of communication from American businessman to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese interference with American trade in China.



62. Title and Nature: Report of Observations of the Japanese Government, submitted to the League of Nations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Sets up probable defense allegations, as follows: That Manchuria was not part of China; that Japan occupied a special position in China (pp. 17-18); that Japanese actions in Manchuria were in self-defense (pp. 21-22); and that Manchukuo was established by the free will of its inhabitants (pp. 25-28).

63. Title and Nature: Excerpts from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Sets up probable defense allegation that Japan is not responsible for the industrial policy of Manchukuo and any differences arising therefrom is not Japan's concern. (pp. 140-141; 146-147)

64. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: An anticipated defense allegation that the situation in China has so changed that the Nine-Power Treaty is no longer applicable. (pp. 895-900)

65. Title and Nature: Copy of agreement relating to Chientao region.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan recognized sovereignty of China over Manchuria.

66. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan recognized sovereignty of China over Manchuria. (p. 79)

67. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, Vol. I, 1931-41".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese rights in China were determined and limited by the Nine-Power Treaty. (pp. 83-86)



68. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan, 1931-41, Vol. I".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japanese and Chinese clashes took place on Chinese territory. (pp. 59, 75, 19, 20)

69. Title and Nature: Excerpt from "Foreign Relations of U.S.-Japan."

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan impliedly recognized Manchukuo as a puppet state.

70. Title and Nature: Commentary of Events in Manchuria.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Background commentary -- 1894-1937. Prepared by Eastern Division, War Crimes Office,

71. Title and Nature: Commentary on Violations of Integrity of China - 1937-1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Background commentary -- 1937-1941 -- on violations of Chinese integrity. Prepared by Eastern Division, War Crimes Office.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
DOCUMENT DIVISION

8 January 1946

Documents numbered 72 and 73 are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on the Versailles Treaty and relate to violations thereof in connection with the Mandated Islands. They are as follows:

No.

72. Title and Nature: Treaties, etc., between the United States and Other Powers.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Description and History of the Mandated Islands which explains fully the circumstances under which the mandate was conferred.

73. Title and Nature: Legal Problems Concerning the Status of Japanese Mandated Islands. Doc. R & A No. 1830.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Analysis of the legal problems concerning the status of the Japanese Mandated Islands. Includes:

- a. Facts relating to the problem
- b. Legal propositions
- c. Diplomatic history
- d. Effect of Japan's withdrawal from League
- e. Policy of U. S. toward Mandate.

Documents numbered 74 to 84, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on Japan-Thailand and together give a picture of Japanese force and duress accompanying the consummation of an agreement for the military occupation of Thailand in violation of the Jap-Thai Treaty of 12 June 1940.

No.

74. Title and Nature: Copy of Treaty No. 4791, League of Nations Treaty Series - The Treaty between Japan and Thailand - for friendly relations and mutual respect of territorial integrity.



Japan-Thailand (Continued)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Copy of treaty. Dated 12 June 1940, ratified 23 December 1940.

75. Title and Nature: Extract from Bangkok Times, December 9, 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Thailand explanation of Japanese ultimatum and consent thereto.

76. Title and Nature: Extract from Bangkok Chronicle, 8 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Newspaper account of landing of Japanese troops in Thailand and Malaya and launching of big scale offensive.

77. Title and Nature: Bangkok Times' extract, 9 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Newspaper publication of Imperial Japanese Declaration of Occupation.

78. Title and Nature: Bangkok Times 9 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Newspaper account of Japanese contention that troops were landed to preserve peace and the independence of Thailand. Contradictory statement of permission for passage of Japanese troops through Thailand. Account of landing of Japanese forces in Thailand.

79. Title and Nature: Extract from Bangkok Times, 12 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A communique on Japanese and Thailand Army Alliance.

80. Title and Nature: Extract from Bangkok Times, 22 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Terms of Japan-Thailand pact.

81. Title and Nature: Department of State Bulletin.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Extract from State Department Bulletin of Thailand's Declaration of War on Great Britain and the United States, as of 25 January 1942.



Japan-Thailand (Continued)

82. Title and Nature: Extracts from New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: New York Times' extracts showing that the Thailand-French Indo-China pact was Japanese plan.

83. Title and Nature: Extracts from New York Times, 22 February 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Accounts of Japanese mobilization of war ships and troops, together with Thailand denial of yielding bases to Japan.

84. Title and Nature: An historical commentary on Japan-Thailand Treaty.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This is a chronology of events leading up to the Japan-Thailand Treaty and occupation of Thailand by Japan. It describes the acquisition of what is now known as French Indo-China, describing the French taking of land from Thailand and China.

After the fall of metropolitan France on 17 June 1940, Thailand sent troops to the border and made demands on Vichy, France. Japan intervened as mediator and substantial territory was ceded to Thailand. See also Preliminary Trial Brief on French Indo-China.

Documents numbered 85 to 87, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on the Hague Convention of 1899 relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes. This Convention differs from an almost identical Hague Convention of 1907 in that Great Britain is a signatory power to it but not to the Convention of 1907.

No.

85. Title and Nature: Hague Treaty of 1899, relating to pacific settlement of international disputes.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Copy of the Convention.

86. Title and Nature: Extract from New York Times, 8 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Account of Japanese landings in Malaya and bombing of Singapore and Hongkong.



Hague Convention 1899 (continued)

87. Title and Nature: Commentary on Hague Convention of 1899, relating to pacific settlement of international disputes.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Commentary on the Hague Convention of 1899, relating to pacific settlements.

Document numbered 88 is attached as an exhibit to the trial brief on the U.S.-Japan Agreement effected 1908 through diplomatic exchanges.

No.

88. Title and Nature: Agreement effected by exchange of notes between U. S. and Japan in 1908.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Copies of notes exchanged in 1908 between U.S. and Japan. Basically they agree:

1. To encourage free commerce on the Pacific Ocean
2. To a non-aggressive policy to maintain the status quo therein and for equal opportunity in China
3. To respect each other's territorial integrity
4. To support the independence and integrity of China and equal opportunity therein
5. To take joint measures to preserve the above.

Document numbered 89 is a compilation of definitions of aggression used in treaty violation briefs on Japan. The brief itself is a collection of definitions from important sources which have been keyed by a cross reference title to the various and individual treaty violation briefs.

Document numbered 90 has been assigned to the preliminary trial brief on Japan-French Indo China as follows:

No.

90. Title and Nature: Collection of extracts from New York Times of various dates, reciting Japanese aggression against French Indo-China.



Japan-French Indo China (continued)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A compendium of newspaper reports reciting Japanese diplomatic and military activity with respect to French Indo-China, collected under a descriptive commentary or analysis.

The aggression is divided into three phases:

- I. Jap ultimatum of 3 Sep 40 and resulting agreement, military action, and limited Jap landings.
- II. Record of Jap forced mediation in Thai border dispute; cession of 20,000 sq. miles of territory to Thailand; cost of Jap mediation in important economic concessions.
- III. After violating original occupation agreement Japan insists upon and obtains a virtual military alliance with Indo-China.

Documents numbered 91 to 103, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on Hague Convention III of 1907 relating to the opening of hostilities and are as follows:

No.

91. Title and Nature: Convention between U. S. and other Powers regarding Opening of Hostilities (Hague III 1907).

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This is a copy of Hague Convention III of 1907 which provides among other things: "That hostilities \* \* \* must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditioned declaration of war." (Art. 1 p. 16.)

92. Title and Nature: Message of the President to Congress December 15, 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: An historical summary of the past policy of the U.S. in relation to the Pacific area and of the more important events leading up to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.



Hague Convention III of 1907 (Continued)

93. Title and Nature: The Japanese Attack - Statement by the Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Statement that the Japanese came at the moment when Japanese Government representatives were discussing with the U.S., at their request, principles and courses of peace.

94. Title and Nature: Declaration of War by the U.S. - Message by President to Congress, 8 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan organized a large scale surprise offensive weeks before the actual dates of synchronized attack, which was made at a time when at her request she was apparently soliciting for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

95. Title and Nature: Memorandum of a conversation between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: On 7 December 1941: --  
Japanese Ambassador asked for 1:00 P.M. appointment;  
" " postpones it till 1:45 P.M.  
" " and Kurusu arrive at 2:05 P.M.  
" " " received by Hull at 2:20 P.M.

N.B. - Attack on Pearl Harbor was at 1:20 P.M. 7 Dec 1941, Washington time.

96. Title and Nature: Memorandum handed the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador at 2:20 P.M. on 7 December 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This document, handed to the Secretary of State an hour after Pearl Harbor concludes that further Japanese - U.S. negotiations were useless. Hull branded it as containing "infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

97. Title and Nature: Extract from Diary of Ambassador Grew.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Kase called Grew at 7 A.M. on 8 December 1941 to say he had been trying to reach him since 5 A.M. and asked him to come see the Minister. Grew reached there at 7:30 A.M. and was



Hague Convention III of 1907 (Continued)

handed the same memorandum, dated 8 December 1941, that Nomura gave Hull in Washington at 1440 on 7 December 1941. Final paragraph reads:

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation."

After breakfast Grew first learned Japan was in conflict with the U. S. and Great Britain.

98. Title and Nature: Japanese Declaration of War vs U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: The Declaration of War was delivered to the American Embassy at 11:00 on 8 December 1941 (0900 on 7 December 1941, Washington time), but it did not reach the State Department in Washington until 0235 on 10 December 1941, at which time it became effective (see item #269 - document 99, being Exhibit I, Hague III 1907 brief).

99. Title and Nature: Telegram to State Department transmitting Japanese Declaration of War on U. S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This telegram was dispatched on 9 December 1941 from Tokyo through the Japanese Foreign Office after the American Embassy had been placed incommunicado.

100. Title and Nature: Extract New York Times 8 Dec 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Associated Press accounts of beginning of hostilities by Japan vs Great Britain with invasion of Malaya and bombing of Singapore and Hong Kong.

101. Title and Nature: Extract New York Times 8 Dec 1941.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Monitored Tokyo Radio broadcast of Jap invasion of Thailand which also predicts declaration of war by Germany against the U.S.

102. Title and Nature: State Department Bulletin.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Tabulation of nations at war:

Japan and the United States	p 557
Japan and Great Britain	p 557
Netherlands and Japan	p 558
China and Japan and others	p 559



Hague Convention III of 1907 (Continued)

103. Title and Nature: Commentary on Hague Convention III.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A commentary on technical aspects of the Hague III Convention of 1907, pointing out:

1. Its origin in Russo-Jap war of 1904
2. Lack of time element between a "declaration" etc., and war itself.
3. Probable inapplicability of Article 2 (Notice to Neutrals).

Documents numbered 104 and 105 are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on Hague Convention I of 1907 relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes.

Note: Most of the exhibits to this brief are duplications of documents heretofore numbered, and in such case a reference is made thereto by document number.

No.

104. Title and Nature: Hague Convention of 1907 Relating to Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A copy of Hague Convention (No. I) of 1907, which provides among other things for:

- Art. 1 - Pacific settlement of differences to obviate war (p. 36).  
Art. 2 - Mediation of differences by one or more friendly powers (p. 36).

- - - -				
Exhibit	B	is	Document	92
"	C	"	"	93
"	D	"	"	94
"	E	"	"	95
"	F	"	"	96
"	G	"	"	97
"	H	"	"	98
"	I	"	"	99
"	J	"	"	101

105. Title and Nature: Commentary on Hague Convention I of 1907 relating to pacific settlement of international disputes.



Hague Convention I of 1907 (Continued)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: It may be doubted that Japan's desire for Asiatic dominance is a "dispute" to which the treaty is applicable. Aggressive acts vs Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand excluded by reason of their declaration of war on Japan before she committed an "overt" act. French Indo-China excluded as France evidently made concessions, although indirect pressure is indicated. Portugal never recognized a war with Japan.

Documents numbered 106 to 117, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on Japan-Netherlands (historical). On 13 December 1921 Japan entered into a treaty with the United States, France, and Great Britain, commonly known as the Insular Possessions Treaty, whereby it was agreed that the signatories would respect each other's interests in the Pacific area and would, in the event a dispute arose that could not be amicably settled between any of the parties, invite the other signatories to a conference with the view of an amicable settlement. Portugal and the Netherlands never having been signatory to this treaty were included in the scope of its terms by identic communications sent to each nation. Exhibits to this brief are as follows:

No.

106. Title and Nature: Identic Communication to Netherlands by Signatories to Quadruple Pacific Treaty of 13 December 1921.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A four-power declaration that the Insular Possessions of the Netherlands in the region of the Pacific Ocean will be treated with similar respect as those of the powers a party to the treaty itself.

107. Title and Nature: Japanese Note of 18 November 1938 addressed to the U. S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Declares Japan's intention to establish a new order throughout East Asia, the attainment of which is indispensable to the very existence of Nippon. Its object to secure international justice, defend against Communism, create a new culture, and realize close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. The document deals also with repercussions in Britain and the U.S. - notice of abrogation of U.S.-Japan Commercial Treaty; its expiration on 20 January 1940; U.S. embargo of 26 Sep 1940.



Japan-Netherlands (Continued)

108. Title and Nature: Extract from Ten Years in Japan.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Grew's opinion that, unless isolated and reduced by economic and financial attrition to a 2nd or 3rd class power, it was only a question of time before Japan would continue her expansion to include the Philippines, Netherland East Indies, and other western possessions in the Far East. (pp. 304-489.)

109. Title and Nature: Excerpts from "Peace and War".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

- p 572-Grew, giving a complete analysis and multitude of reasons, writes that only a show of force, coupled with the determination it will be used if necessary can restrain Japan.
- p 623-Ambassador Nomura disparages the view that Japan was intent on military conquest, as Hull reads from events.
- p 693-Nomura explains unofficial report of Indo-China-Japanese agreement as step taken to insure Japan's rice supply.
- p 696-Welles - Jap occupation of Indo-China notice to the U.S. of policy of force and conquest. Tells Nomura U.S. sees no other reason for the Jap military occupation.
- p 710-Discussion on U.S. aid to Britain if Japs attack Singapore and Dutch East Indies.
- p 823-U.S. asks Japan its reasons for increasing forces in Indo-China beyond the number authorized by agreement.

110. Title and Nature: Excerpts from State Department Bulletins.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

- p 71-Japanese Military Demarche in Indo-China:
  - 1. Brands Japan an aggressor in Indo-China.
  - 2. Japan's interest there is in bases for further conquest in adjacent areas.
- p 540-Text of document handed Secretary of State by Nomura on 20 Nov 1941.
- p 465-6 Dec 1941 - U.S. feels that huge Jap concentrations in Indo-China are preparing to attack.



Japan-Netherlands (Continued)

111. Title and Nature: Extract from World Almanac 1945.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: 11 January 1942 - Japan invades Netherlands East Indies.

112. Title and Nature: Extract New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Establishment of a great East Asian chain of common prosperity declared the immediate cardinal point of Japan's Foreign Policy. Government pledged to greater armaments and settlement of the China affair.

113. Title and Nature: Extract from New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Matsuoka: - "I must appeal for a second time. We must establish a greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. That purpose we will not abandon. Whatever happens, we will be united and determined. We are not dreaming empty dreams. We have the power needed to attain our great ideal. This truth must be realized by the world."

114. Title and Nature: Extract from New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: U.S. and Britain freeze Japanese assets. Oil shipments halted. Chinese assets included. Freezing statement's text. Netherlands to act also.

115. Title and Nature: Extract from New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Tojo declares that American and British "exploitation" of Asiatic peoples must be "purged with vengeance". Tojo's statement on anniversary of declaration of Japan, Manchukuo, and Nanking for "a new order in East Asia". Jap press takes pessimistic view of U.S.-Jap relationships, saying Japan could not continue negotiations if U.S. continues to support the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty

116. Title and Nature: Comment on Background Material.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japan's inclusion of the Netherlands East Indies in her "co-prosperity" sphere and marshalling excuses plus the means for an unprovoked attack is in itself a violation of her Identical Communication. Japan was guilty of disrespecting the neutrality of the Netherlands East Indies.



Japan-Netherlands (Continued)

117. Title and Nature: Treaty of Arbitration, etc. Between Japan and the Netherlands.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This treaty provides that:  
Art. I - All disputes of any character not capable of amicable settlement shall be referred to a Permanent Conciliation Commission.

Note: - This treaty terminated on 12 Aug 1940 upon notice given by Japan. It is valuable to indicate a Japanese step to avoid its provisions in the light of action Japan was already contemplating.

Documents 118 to 146, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on the Four-Power Identical Communication to Portugal in 1922.

IMPORTANT: Attention is directed to communications from the State Department attached to and found at the beginning of the brief. These are letters which restrict the use of the documents identified therein to use and publication only in connection with war crime trials.

The documents attached are as follows:

Exhibit A -- See Document 106.

No.

- 118 Title and Nature: Extracts from the New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Tokyo - 20 Feb. - Imperial Headquarters announces invasion of Portuguese part of Timor Island. Jap forces land on northwest coast near Deli, capital of Portuguese Timor.

UP follows with an analysis of the strategic value of the Jap move and the political situation it has as a background.

Lisbon - 20 Feb. - Portugal learns of Jap landings through allied and axis broadcasts. Fear for Macao.

London - 20 Feb. - AP - Lisbon and London consult. Views of Netherlands Cabinet.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

119. Title and Nature: Telegram Received by Secretary of State from Lisbon.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Portugal learns of Jap occupation of Timor through German and British radio-- details lacking. Salazar addressed National Assembly today and made firm but categorical protest to Tokyo against this violation of Portuguese neutrality.

120. Title and Nature: Extract from New York Times.

Berne - 21 Feb. - Lisbon protests Timor occupation. Jap minister delivers note on Thursday (19 Feb) giving reasons and stating Portugal's sovereignty would be recognized.

Lisbon - 21 Feb - AP - Premier says Japs knew Portuguese troops were on way to Timor to relieve Netherland and Australian troops protecting island. Maintains attitude "that there can be no strategic reasons for the violation of the sovereignty of states".

121. Title and Nature: Lisbon dispatch #394 to Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Portuguese reaction to Jap occupation is pro-British as events substantiate British prediction of Jap designs on Timor. Salazar addressing National Assembly makes point of fact Japan for her action did not have justification of invoking the assistance of an alliance.

122. Title and Nature: Airgram #62 from Lisbon to Secretary of State.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This airgram is relative to Japanese policy in Timor as disclosed by Portuguese official in confidence to U.S.

1. Japan first professed to respect Portuguese sovereignty and the intention of occupying only certain strategic points for military purposes, but soon interfered extensively in Portuguese administration.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

2. Japan next interfered with radio communication and offered to permit only messages in the clear, and further demanded the dismissal of the Governor.
3. It is reported that Portuguese officials in Timor are being attacked by the natives who were considered to be anti-Japanese.
4. Jap refusal to permit code messages has practically denied communication.

123. Title and Nature: Radiogram, MacArthur to Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Information of natives firing on Portuguese. Proposed concentration of Portuguese at Mobora and Liquica.

124. Title and Nature: Confidential Report to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Page 1-Instances of Jap behavior including murder, mutilation, looting, confiscation, destruction, beating, etc.

Page 2-4k-Portuguese radio station taken over by Japs.

" 2-5a-Jap propaganda urges ejection of whites.

" 2-5b-Japs wreck hospital.

" 3-5e-Japs stir revolt against Portuguese authorities.

" 4-6b-Written report demanded by Japs that Portuguese administration had broken down.

This report generally gives the picture of Jap efforts to break down the Portuguese administration prior to stepping in and taking over themselves.

125. Title and Nature: Aide-Memoire.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A collection of all facts concerning Jap occupation of Portuguese as gathered from all sources to date (e.g., documents 123 & 124). It recites killings, mutilations, beatings, etc. It tells of Jap propaganda against the Portuguese administration in Timor and against all "whites" in general. It tells of the use of Jap "occupation money". It recites the inciting of the Timorese against the Portuguese and other aliens in Timor. In fomenting revolt the Japs armed 1,000 natives and trained them for this purpose.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

126. Title and Nature: Aide Memoire - British Embassy, Washington, D. C.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Discussions between Portugal and Japan concerning occupation of Timor have led nowhere. New Jap minister no better source for progress. Portuguese officials fleeing Timor ordered to return to posts and demand made on Japan for their protection. Japs demand that Governor of Timor adopt a proper neutral attitude. Dr. Salazar infuriated by this demand ends discussion. It is doubted however that Portugal will declare war or even break off relations with Japan, as this would open a direct threat to Macao.

127. Title and Nature: London Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Portugal warns Japan. Demands the evacuation of Timor.

128. Title and Nature: New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Portugal bids Britain and Netherlands to quit Timor. Both refuse. An account is given of questions and answers exchanged between Portugal and Britain with regard to their mutual alliance.

129. Title and Nature: Navy Department Memorandum to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Timor occupied by 230 Dutch and 120 Australian troops 17 Dec. In last four days two Jap submarines reported, one north and one south of Timor.

130. Title and Nature: Lisbon Telegram to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Advice that Portugal refuses to accept Britain's and Netherlands' explanations for violation of Portugal's neutrality in Timor. Salazar regrets Portugal's embarrassment by English action.

131. Title and Nature: Page 368 - Events Leading up to World War II.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: 12 Oct (1943). Portugal agrees to permit the United Nations to use Azores to protect convoys.

132. Title and Nature: New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Great Britain and the Netherlands will not withdraw from Timor till Portugal has a sufficient garrison to defend it against Japan. Italy openly invites Portugal to join axis to accompaniment of propaganda on freedom from fear U.S. can intervene in South America.

133. Title and Nature: New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: British assert threat of attack by Jap submarines on Timor justifies occupation by British and Netherlands troops.

134. Title and Nature: London Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Portuguese troops sent to Timor from Lourenco Marques in defense of the Portuguese part of that island. Great Britain in agreement

135. Title and Nature: Department of State Memorandum.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: British report reaching agreement with Portugal whereby Allied troops will be withdrawn from Timor on arrival of 800 Portuguese troops. Portugal to call on the Australians and Dutch for support in the event of Japanese aggression.

136. Title and Nature: Confidential Message to War Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Jap Minister at Lisbon is quoted as saying that only Dutch portion of Timor would be invaded. On 26 January 610 Portuguese troops sailed from Mozambique for Timor. G-2 comment says statement by Jap Minister is new information.

137. Title and Nature: Portugal to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Advice that escort vessel would leave troopship Joao Belo transporting Portuguese troops to Timor to refuel at Colombo and would then rejoin the Joao Belo.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

138. Title and Nature: Official British Communique on Timor

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This communique presents a full history and explanation of the allied occupation of Timor, including:

1. Diplomatic understandings prior to occupation.
2. Explanation of occupation's purpose.
3. Circumstances of withdrawal of allied troops.

139. Title and Nature: Telegram to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Information regarding shortage in number of Portuguese troops sent to Timor as previously agreed (450 instead of 700). British objection offends Portugal, but steps are being taken to arrange for additional troops.

140. Title and Nature: Telegram to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Satisfaction reached over Portuguese expedition to Timor (See document 139). 700 Portuguese troops to leave on transport Joao Belo. British accept expedition.

141. Title and Nature: Telegram to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Information that Portuguese troopship Joao Belo is returning to Colombo to await further developments in Timor.

142. Title and Nature: Air Mail to State Department.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Subject: Portuguese press comment on War in Pacific.

1. Portugal deeply impressed by rapidity and efficiency of Jap follow-up on Pearl Harbor.
2. It is clear that only control of the sea permits Japan to conduct such a widespread offensive coordinated as a surprise over such a dispersed area.
3. Japan now attacking Java with a view of breaking the second line of anti-Jap encirclement.
4. The political as well as the military unpreparedness of the Anglo-Americans is pointed out.

143. Title and Nature: Telegram to State Department.



Identic Communication to Portugal in 1922 (Continued)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Section One - Great Britain condemned for occupying Timor. Editorials criticize violation of alliance.  
Section Two - People and government of Portugal solidly united and calm in the face of unavoidable events. Hasty decisions to be avoided.

144. Title and Nature: Department of State Memorandum regarding attached memorandum from British Embassy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: British Memorandum: To effect that in view of Jap menace to Portuguese Timor, steps are arranged for "the immediate protection of this territory by a combined force of troops from Australia and the Netherlands East Indies".

145. Title and Nature: Treaty of Alliance Between Great Britain and Portugal.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: 16 June 1373 - Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance. Note: This treaty is marked "Subsisting between the Two Powers in 1814." This treaty is a pact of "mutual assistance" and provides that the Two Powers would be: Friends to friend enemies to enemies.

146. Title and Nature: Comment on Background Material.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A resume of the events leading to the ultimate occupation of Portuguese Timor including:

1. Japanese threat by rapid expansion south.
2. Defensive British-Netherland occupation.
3. Withdrawal on arrival of Portuguese force agreed
4. Jap invasion just prior to arrival of Portuguese force.
5. Jap invasion at variance with Jap diplomatic representations.
6. Violation of Portuguese neutrality by Japan.
7. Discussion of certain internationally legal aspects.



Documents numbered 147 to 165, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the Trial Brief on the U.S.-Japan Treaty relative to the Mandated Islands, as follows:

No.

147. Title and Nature: Japan's Mandated Islands, Description and History.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A description and history of the Islands mandated to Japan after World War I, describing:

- I Physical geography - p.1.
- II The People - p.1.
- III Resources - p.2.
- IV History.
  - 1. To 1919 - p. 3.
  - 2. American interests to 1919 - p.3.
    - a. American Missions - p.3.
    - b. The Scramble, 1884-85 - p.3.
    - c. American Change of Policy, 1898 - p.4.
  - 3. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919-20 - p.4.
  - 4. The United States - Mandate Controversy - p.5.
  - 5. The Convention of 11 Feb 1922 - p. 7.
  - 6. Withdrawal by Japan from League of Nations - p.8.

148. Title and Nature: Mandate from League of Nations to Japan.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Whereas by: Article 119 - Versailles Treaty - Germany renounces all rights over her overseas possessions, including Pacific Islands north of the equator, the Mandate provides:

- Art. 1 - Pacific Islands mandated to Japan
- " 2 - Full administrative and legislative power given
  - " 3 - Slave and forced labor prohibited, etc.
  - " 4 - Military training and fortification prohibited
  - " 5 - Freedom of worship provided
  - " 6 - Annual reports in full required as to 2, 3, 4, and 5
  - " 7 - Consent of League to modification required, and disputes submitted to Permanent Court of League.

149. Title and Nature: U.S.-Japan Treaty - Mandated Islands.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: As the U.S. did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles or agree to the mandate conferred thereunder, it was agreed:



U.S.-Japan Treaty Relative to Mandated Islands (Continued)

Art I Subject to this convention, the U.S. agrees to Japan's administration of the islands pursuant to the mandate.

Art II The U.S. shall have the benefits of Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the mandate and:

1. Japan insures freedom of conscience and worship
2. Vested American rights shall be respected
3. Existing treaties shall apply to the islands (U.S.-Japanese)
4. U.S. will receive a duplicate of annual report to the League.
5. U.S. must consent to any modification of the mandate.

Art III U.S. shall have equal footing on Yap with Japan

Art IV Relates to electrical communication on Yap.

150. Title and Nature: Map of Mandated Islands.

151. Title and Nature: Intelligence Report #78-83 - ONI.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A list of persons of importance, foreign, half-caste, and native, in the Marshalls and Carolinas as of 1941, with photos where available. The atoll or island where each individual is believed to be resident is indicated. Some islands may have been entirely cleared since 7 Dec 1941.

152. Title and Nature: Personalities.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A further discussion of persons in the Mandated Islands.

153. Title and Nature: Report on Mandated Islands.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

1. Although open ports have been designated, Japs refuse foreigners access. Information received indirectly and rarely confirmed.
2. Center of supplies is Truk; Engineers - Jaluit, Enybor, Emidj, Wotje, Eniwetok, Taroa, Kwajalein, Ponape, Truk, Palao, Saipan, Pelew, and Pagan.
3. Strength Jap Naval aircraft Oct 1941 reported 84 planes.
4. Fleet anchorages at Truk, Bikini, Helen's Reef, Jaluit, Marcus, Nomoi, Koror, Rongelap, Saipan, Ulithi, Wotje.
5. Radio stations at Jaluit, Kapingamarangi, Kusaie, Marcus, Pagan, Babelthuap, Koror, Ponape, Rota, Saipan, Soroi, Tinian, Tobi, Truk, Wotje, Wotho, and Yap.



U.S.-Japan Treaty Relative to Mandated Islands (Continued)

6. Landing fields at Saipan, Palau (3 fields) Truk (2 fields) Kusaie, Ponape, Yap, Jaluit (2 fields), and Sorai.
7. Fortifications reported at Jaluit, Kusaie, Palau, Ponape, Saipan, Tinian, Truk, Wotje, and Yap.

154. Title and Nature: JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report #31.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Report of preliminary interrogation P.W. (Jap Warrant Officer, Div. Commdr, Naval Construction Bureau), an extremely intelligent, quick, and apparently quite cooperative. He first went to the Mandates in 1934, and has been at Tinian, Truk, Saipan, Ponape, Palau, Pagan, Jaluit, Mille, Taroa, Kwajalein, Wotje, Majuro, Ulalu, Enizett, Emidj, Tarawa, Makin, Likiep and others. He states that he has been on projects such as:

1. Surveying -for all purposes as air fields, etc.
2. Building installations of all types
3. Conscripting forced labor
4. Searching for resources, such as lumber, etc.

155. Title and Nature: JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report #31.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A further screening of PW's statements to indicate he was principally concerned with constructing oil storage tanks. Details on the different types and sizes of tanks are given, as well as roads and other facilities appurtenant to them. In addition data is given on: Airfield construction, camouflage, naval construction, barracks, guns and emplacements.

156. Title and Nature: JICPOA Bulletin #46-44.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A directive to information on base installations at Roi, Namur, and Ennubirr Islands, Kwajalein Atoll.

157. Title and Nature: JICPOA Bulletin #17-44.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Lists fortifications at Palau in 1940.

158. Title and Nature: G-2, General Staff Report.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Oil tanks, docks, aviation facilities, installed since 1939 for purpose of:

1. "Springboard" vs West New Guinea and Molluccas
2. Support base for Truk and eastward.



U.S.-Japan Treaty Relative to Mandated Islands (Continued)

159. Title and Nature: Report on South Sea Islands, Budget for 1940-41.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Shows a budget of 4,036,728 yen for fiscal year 1940-41, of which following items are outstanding:

Aircraft Communication Facilities	1,186,225 yen
Navigation Subsidy	780,000 "
Estab. of Air Route Facilities	512,174 "
Harbor Construction at Palau	403,000 "

160. Title and Nature: Jap Document on Oil Tanks at Jaluit.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This translation shows prewar construction of oil tanks at Jaluit in the Mandated Islands.

161. Title and Nature: Quotation from Willard Price on Forced Labor.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Willard Price published two books on trips through the Mandated Islands, as follows:

1. Pacific Adventure - 1936.
2. Japan's Islands of Mystery - 1944.

The Japs periodically employ forced labor (native) on public works; viz., roads, bridges, etc., to the extent that on some islands the natives contribute one day a week without pay.

162. Title and Nature: Quotation - Letter of Harold B. James.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Regarding Anguar (Palau Group): - Jap town of 12,000 - no business - steal food from natives.

400 Jap officials - defy League Mandate by:

1. Fortifying the island
2. Establishing hydroplane base
3. Force natives to work 6 days a week - no pay - no food.

163. Title and Nature: French Intelligence Report.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Japs are detested because:

1. They employ forced labor
2. They organize what is necessary, convenient, or simply agreeable to themselves.



U.S.-Japan Treaty Relative to Mandated Islands (Continued)

164. Title and Nature: ONI Bulletin 30.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

1. Japs continue to use forced labor.
2. Excessive demands for same cause resentment.
3. Natives compelled to work Angaur phosphate mines.

165. Title and Nature: Extract - Civil Affairs Guide, OPNAV 50 E-6.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: "Though the natives are tractable, they have in the past been considered lazy and unreliable. However, they were not paid for labor on roads and public works supervised by the government."

Documents numbered 166 to 170, inclusive, are attached as exhibits to the trial brief on the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris) as follows:

No.

166. Title and Nature: Pact of Paris - Kellogg-Briand Pact.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

- p. 1 - Art I - Renunciation of War.  
p. 4 - Art II - Settle disputes by pacific means.

167. Title and Nature: Publication #468.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Text of the treaty, diplomatic notes exchanged, instruments of ratification and adherence, and other papers.

168. Title and Nature: Hackworth - Aggression and Self-Defense.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: A collection of opinions and interpretations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, including the "Budapest Articles of Interpretation" (p. 678).

169. Title and Nature: Self-Defense - Charles C. Hyde.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: This chapter illustrates and describes the application of the principle of Self-Defense to the Laws of Neutrality.



Kellogg-Briand Pact (Continued)

170. Title and Nature: New York Times.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: Hull describes the diplomatic situation existing at the time of Pearl Harbor.



Documents 171 and 172 are from the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany and of interest here in showing German and Italian collaboration with Japan in planning world-wide wars of aggression:

No.

171. Title and Nature: Trial Brief - Collaboration with Italy and Japan and Aggressive War vs U.S.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS: (A Nuremberg Brief.)

P.2 - German Basic Order #24 (signed by Keitel) in n/o Fuehrer:- Orders collaboration to induce Japan to active measures in the Far East (5 Mar 41).

P.3 - "c" - Japan should acquire those territories it needs for war.

"d" - Seizure of Singapore essential to decisive success and also other British bases: Attack on U.S. only if necessary.

P.7 - On 4 Apr 41, in meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop, Matsuoka declared Jap Army and Navy had to include preparation for war against the U.S. in their plans for attacking Singapore.

172. Title and Nature: Document Book regarding Collaboration with Italy and Japan, etc.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Document C-75 - Basic Order #24, 5 March 41 signed by Keitel.

" 1834-PS - On 2 Mar 41, Ribbentrop and Oshima talk over the world situation and agree on their final domination in their respective spheres. U.S. position fully covered.

" 1877-48 - On 29 Mar 41, Ribbentrop and Matsuoka discount America's military strength. Plan attack on Singapore, but agree (p.2) that England be reassured to insure surprise. Ribbentrop guarantees German military advice on the attack of Singapore (p.2):

" 1881-PS - On 4 Apr 41, Hitler, Ribbentrop and Meissner conferred in Berlin with Matsuoka. Latter requested that German authorities supply Jap Army and Navy with needed developments and inventions to conquer Singapore and stand off the American Navy:



International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany (Cont'd)

Matsuoka states that while he believes what has been discussed, he does not dare mention it in Japan, where thoughts have not advanced enough to accept.

Document

- " 2932-PS - Hitler receives Oshima and congratulates him (14 Dec 41) on the way Japan struck at America - "as hard as possible, indeed -- and not wasting time declaring war."
- 2987-PS - Extracts from Count Ciano's Diary:- 1941:--  
3 Dec .. Sensational move by Japan. Its ambassador recounts negotiations with America are a failure and asks that Italy declare war on U.S. immediately after the outbreak of hostilities and guarantee no separate peace.  
4 Dec - Berlin cautious about Jap move.  
5 Dec - After 2 days delay Ribbentrop submits plan for triple agreement regarding Jap intervention.  
8 Dec - Ribbentrop overjoyed at Jap attack on America.

NOTE: This document book contains additional material and the items above are selected to indicate the content of those probative of the Japanese situation. An index at the beginning.



Documents 175 and 176 are from the Preliminary Trial Brief on the Geneva Convention of 1929 for Sick and Wounded.

No.

175. Title and Nature: Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the field.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

The Convention was signed by 46 powers including the United States and provides for treatment of prisoners of war.

Chapter 1 provides for care of the wounded and sick;  
Chapter 2 provides for sanitary formations and establishments;  
Chapter 3 for personnel;  
Chapter 4 for buildings and material;  
Chapter 5 for Sanitary Transports;  
Chapter 6 for the distinctive Red Cross sign;  
Chapter 7 for the Application and Execution of the Convention.  
Chapter 8 for the Repression of Abuses and infractions.

Article 37 provides that a state of war shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited or adhesions ratified by belligerent Powers.

It is to be noted that Japan by her own declaration became a party to this convention.

176. Title and Nature: Affidavits of Prisoner's of war Specifications in Preliminary Trial Brief for the Red Cross Convention.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

This document presents a series of Photostatic affidavits of PW's interned in Japanese prison camps showing:

- (1) failure to provide food adequate in quantity or quality to sustain life.
- (2) failure to provide adequate clothing and shelter
- (3) depriving sick and wounded of clothing in their possession and needed for their protection
- (4) forcing sick and wounded to work beyond their capacity



(5) failing to provide medical and surgical care, needed drugs and supplies

(6) subjecting said wounded to unhygienic, unsanitary conditions.

(7) killing, torturing, maiming and inflicting physical violence of all kinds upon said sick and wounded.

(8) Insulting, humiliating and degrading said sick and wounded.

(9) Exposing said sick and wounded to the hazards of war by permitting them to remain in combat zones, and by transporting them through combat areas without the use of any distinctive sign or other indication of their condition.

(10) failure to see that large numbers of said bodies were honorably buried and the graves treated with respect by disposing of the bodies as common waste and to permit Japanese soldiers to eat the flesh.

(11) failure to respect sanitary personnel

The series of photostats further includes a letter giving figures on the number of Japanes-held American prisoners of war who were captured, died in captivity and were liberated.



177. Title and Nature: Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers. Signed at Versailles 28 June 1919.

SUMMARY - Treaty of Versailles.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 401

9 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Bulletin No. 2046.

Date: 27 May 45    Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language:  
English

Has it been translated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Crimes in occupied areas.

Conduct of war in illegal manner.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Translation of a document received by 8th Army at  
Conception, Luzon, 3 Apr 45.

Provides that anyone that inflicts or attempts to in-  
flict harm on a Japanese soldier shall be shot and if not  
found, that ten influential persons will be held as hostages.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 401

(Note: Nos. 105 to 400, inclusive, have been reserved for  
assignment to documents attached or to be attached to Pre-  
liminary Trial Briefs, Judge Advocate Treaty Study.)



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 402

9 January 1946

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No. 1),  
I.G. No. 6950, B.I.D. No. 0308, 0400. Allied prisoners of war in  
Japanese hands.

Date: 19 Nov 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

GHQ, SWPA

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured Documents, Statements of Prisoners  
of war.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violations of rules as to  
treatment of prisoners of war.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Supplements report of 24 Aug 44, giving information as to the  
locations of 48 prisoner of war camps and the treatment of allied  
prisoners of war in Japanese occupied territory. Detailed evidence  
from eyewitnesses covers 32 of the camps. Material is collated up  
to 1 Oct 44.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 402



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 403

9 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 76 (Part III), I.G. No. 6310. The warrior tradition as a present factor in Japanese military psychology.

Date: 30 Oct 44 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS - GHQ

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured documents and statements by prisoners of war.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background documentary information on all crimes of brutality charged against the Japanese soldiers.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Japanese leaders have instilled a callous disregard of human suffering characteristic of the Samurai, Japan's feudal warriors. The indoctrination emphasizes Japan's spiritual superiority which is made to appear as a greater force than the allies' material advantage. Further linked with the folklore of superiority is the traditional observance of ceremonial days which is exploited to develop patriotism and develop a fighting spirit.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 403



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMLANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 404

10 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 76 (Part II), I.G. No. 6310, 6590, B.I.D. No. 5501. The Emperor Cult as a Present Factor in Japanese Military Psychology.

Date: 21 June 44 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated: Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_;

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Statements by prisoners of war, captured documents.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Emperor

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Gives an analysis of rationale of Japanese aggression and superiority which is inextricably linked with the Emperor cult.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

World domination has been the aim of Japanese leaders since 1858. Inasmuch as the Japanese believe that the Emperor is divine, it is logical that they should believe him the inevitable ruler of the world. The people's belief in the divinity of the Emperor has unified the nation and given a divine mandate for a "holy war". The Emperor cult itself is integrated with the life of the Japanese soldier by every possible means and is a dynamic factor in Japanese fighting spirit.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 404



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 405

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 72.  
Japanese Violations of the Laws of War.

Date: 29 Apr 44 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS - GHQ

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured documents, statements by  
prisoners of war and Intelligence  
Reports.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Crimes against  
prisoners of war.

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (With page references):

Compilation prepared for and submitted under oath to the "Commission Regarding Breaches of the Rules of Warfare by the Japanese Forces". A record of violations of the laws of war noted in documents on file at ATIS, SWPA, up to 29 Apr 44, with photolithographic copies of pertinent sections. In all cases definite existence of violation of laws of war not proved, but data indicates its probability. Report shows evidence of 29 specific executions in the Southwest Pacific Area, 3 (including 2 prisoners of war vivisectioned while alive) in SWPA and 45 in other areas. Five allusions to cannibalism and 12 instances of rape. Also presented is evidence of ill-treatment of prisoners of war and civilians and of other breaches of the laws of war.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 405



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 406

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 72 (Suppl. 2), I.G. No. 6950, 6951, B.I.D. No. 3134. Japanese Violations of the Laws of War.

Date: 23 June 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS, GHQ, SWPA.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured documents, statements by prisoners of war and Intelligence Reports.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violations of the laws of war.

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Supplements with documented evidence in Japanese and English ATIS Research Report of 29 Apr 44 on Japanese violations of the Laws of War, containing information which became available between 12 Oct 44 and 28 Mar 45. Report adduces evidence of 194 executions in SWPA, burning of guerrillas in the Phillipine Islands, destruction of property; official Japanese admission of cannibalism; and ill-treatment of prisoners of war.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 406



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 407

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 86, I.G.  
6950. Allied Prisoners of War in Japanese Hands.

Date: 24 Aug 44 Original ( ) Copy ( ) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS, GHQ

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured documents and statements of  
prisoners of war.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background on treat-  
ment of prisoners of war by Japanese.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Information on location of 71 prisoner of war camps  
and treatment of allied prisoners of war in occupied terri-  
tory. Most of the information was obtained from Japanese  
prisoners of war who claim that the Japanese are well-  
treated in Japanese camps. However, evidence from non-  
Japanese sources is to the contrary. Official instructions  
for collection and treatment of prisoners of war are in-  
cluded, as are descriptions in varying degrees of detail  
on the routine, clothing, recreation and medical treatment  
in the camps.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 407



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 408

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 76 (Part IV), I.G. No. 6310. Prominent Factors in Japanese Military Psychology.

Date: 7 Feb 45    Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language: English

Has it been translated?    Yes (x)    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS, GHQ, SWPA

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Statements by prisoners of war, captured documents.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background material explaining and documenting Japanese military psychology.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Japanese as a race are emotionally unstable, a race of humorless fanatics. Thus indoctrinated, the people show an inability to understand the psychology of other races, resulting in brutality and alienation of natives in conquered country. Spirit in fighting springs from an inferiority complex which shows through in diary documentation. The Japanese distrust the "Individualism" of the occident. Corporal punishment is a large item in Japanese discipline -- also, military speech is deliberately different from ordinary speech. When contradictions arise between the real and the Bushido myth, the Japanese lie in conformity with the myth. However, low percentage of desertions testify to the success of the indoctrination.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 408



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 409

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 117, I.G.  
No. 3860, 6340. Infringement of the Laws of War and Ethics  
by the Japanese Medical Corps.

Date: Original ( ) Copy ( ) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS, GHQ, SWPA.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Statements of prisoners of war and  
captured documents.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Crimes against human-  
ity involving the killing of wounded men and abuse of in-  
ternational agreements regarding hospital ships.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Evidence shows that the Japanese not only arm their  
medical department personnel for self-destruction to pre-  
vent capture, but they have used the same personnel in  
combat. Japanese medical personnel have shown little regard  
for human life by the killing of prisoners and the vivi-  
section of prisoners of war. Japanese do not observe  
international agreements regarding the marking of hospitals  
and hospital ships. Instances of the abuse of hospital  
ships in transporting non-medical personnel and cargo.  
Evidence shows air ambulances have been misused.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 409



• GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 410

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 76 (Part I)  
Self-Immolation as a Factor in Japanese Military Psychology.  
(I.G. No. 6310, 6590, B.I.D. No. 5501)

Date: 4 Apr 44    Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language:  
English

Has it been translated?    Yes (x)    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Captured documents and statements by  
prisoners of war.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Gives background for  
phenomena of hari-kiri and explains deeds done and ration-  
ale of suicide.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Report gives a documented exposition of the Japanese custom of self-immolation showing the compulsions to self-immolation to be founded in tradition of religious and cultural background, dating back to early and barbaric times. Particular motivations such as fear of dishonoring family, fear of post war punishment and fear of allied treatment, were responsible for many suicides in the U.S.-Japanese War. Also responsible was hysterical reaction and the hopelessness of illness and starvation. As against these factors can be countered the desire to live which, despite thorough indoctrination against, such desire, persists, accompanied by a feeling of criticism against the officers and a desire to surrender. Starting on p. 35 are historical and allegorical allusions explaining further the rationale of hari-kiri.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 410



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 411

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS Research Report No. 76 (Part V)  
I.G. No. 6310. Superstitions as a Present Factor in Japanese Military Psychology.

Date: 24 Feb 45 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS, GHQ.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Statements by prisoners of war and  
captured documents.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Mainly background  
material showing how superstitions affect the life and  
culture of the Japanese.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Report gleaned from various sources collates evidence  
on superstitions important to the Japanese, mainly directed  
toward showing such superstitions in the soldier. Importance  
of superstitions in the Japanese culture is emphasized.  
Among the superstitions described are: those pertaining  
to time and date, fire and symbols, folklores, those surrounding  
the elements, and fortune-telling.

Analyst: E. Jackson

Doc. No. 411.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 412

10 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pac. Area Bulletin,  
No. 2062, dated 4 June 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

Document No. 18913

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nishibori, Keiji of ABE Force.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Executions --  
beheading of allied prisoners of war.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Page 1 of Bulletin:

2 Dec 44: 6 natives shot for stealing rice.  
11 Dec 44: 11 natives and girl beheaded as spies.  
Girl stripped of all clothing first.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 412



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 413

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin  
No. 2011, dated 6 May 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_;

Document 18492

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Handwritten diary -- owner and unit  
not stated.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Unknown.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Starvation and execution of prisoners of war. Palawan Island.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

See pages 16-17 of Bulletin:

19 Nov 44: Allied prisoner of war given no food for 4 days. "I couldn't stop laughing when I heard that he screamed in want of food."

25 Nov 44: Allied prisoners of war worked hard-- devote no thoughts to the fact that they are prisoners of war.

9 Jan 45: Numerous corpses in nearby garage and smell is unbearable. It gives me the creeps. Allied prisoners of war.

15 Dec 44: 150 allied prisoners of war executed. "They truly died a pitiful death."

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 413.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 414

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin  
No. 2047, dated 30 May 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document No. 18622 - pages 8 and 9 of Bulletin.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Unspecified member of TORII Unit.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Starvation of prisoners of war;  
Unsanitary quarters, etc.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

24 Oct (year not stated) (see pp. 8-9 of Bulletin)  
Report of visit to Muntinglupa Prison at 2200;  
Deaths of prisoners of war average 10 per day  
because of lack of food -- thighs and ankles  
same size;  
Visiting permitted at certain hours -- for  
those without visitors or presents, only  
death is waiting.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 414.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 415

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area, Bulletin  
No. 2018, dated 8 May 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English  
Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( ) (Partially)  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document No. 605074

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Notebook of PFC Matsuoka, Itoji of  
Ashabi, 1111th Force, 64th Inf. Regt., 23rd Div.,  
Tominaga Unit.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Massacre of natives  
in Galiand Area, La Union Prov., Luzon.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Extract: (Page 4 of Bulletin)

27 Mar 45: "Taking advantage of darkness, we went  
out to kill the natives. It was hard  
for me to kill them because they seemed  
to be good people. Frightful cries of  
the women and children were horrible.  
I myself stabbed and killed several  
persons."

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 415.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 416

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pac. Area, Bulletin  
No. 1551, dated 5 Nov 44.

Date            Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language: English

Has it been translated?    Yes (x)    No ( )    (Partially)  
Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_;

Document No. 15481, I.G. No. 6951.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Notebook of member Mamiya Commando Unit.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Illegal warfare --  
no quarter.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Extracts: (From page 20 of Bulletin)  
31 Aug (presumably 44)  
"c. Kill all PsW (Report to CO)  
Examine first and take all uniforms."

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 416



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 417

10 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Australian Military Forces, Weekly  
Intelligence Review No. 138, Week Ending 9 Jun 45.  
(165 Language Det. Translation No. 133)

Date                      Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language: English

Has it been translated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: PW and Diarist, both of 86 Airfield  
Battalion.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: 86 Airfield Battalion and witnesses.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Massacre of civilians  
(Filipinos)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Diarist wrote:

"Feb 45 - Every day is spent in hunting guerillas and  
native inhabitants. The killings I have done already  
exceed well over a hundred in number. The naivete I  
possessed at the time of leaving the homeland has long  
since disappeared; now I am a hardened killer and my  
sword is ever stained with blood. Although it is for  
my country's sake, it is nothing but brutality. May  
God forgive me. May my mother forgive me too."

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 417



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 419

10 January 1946.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: S/E Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, Spcl Bulletin No. 147, Item No. 1546.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

PW Sasaki, Masao (Michael), civilian attached to 33rd Army Hq, Mandalay -- 16 Mar 45.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Col. Tsuji; Lt. Sekimoto; Lt.Col. Tanaka; Maj. Abe; Maj. Noguchi, and 4 others.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Beheading, brutalizing and eating of captured American pilot by officers of 33rd Army Hqrs.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

TSUJI - Struck pilot in face with bomb fragment and ordered Lt. Sekimoto to "Finish him off". (p.1)  
Tsuji also ordered piece of pilot's thigh cut off and joined others in eating it. (p.2)

SEKIMOTO- Beheaded American pilot and was ashamed he could not do it in one stroke.

TANAKA, ABE, NOGUCHI, KOIKE, TAKAHASHI, KAMEI (all officers) and Sgt. KIMURA - All ate part of pilot's flesh. (p.2)

See second interrogation of PW for further details.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 419



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 420

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Interrogation Report No. 692,  
ATIS, S/W Pac. Area, Serial No. 853, 26 Apr 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prisoner Yanagizawa, Eiji; Australian  
No. JA 162002.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Maj. Gen. Aotu, 41st Div. Inf. Group  
Commander; Maj. Morimoto, 2nd Battalion Commander.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Illegal warfare --  
order to cannibalize enemy.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- P.1 - On 1 Nov 44 AOTU: State troops must fight allies  
even to extent of eating them. (See preceding ref-  
erence to order issued Nov 44 by Lt. Gen. Mano.)
- P.1 - On 10 Dec 44 order issued by 18th Army Hqrs per-  
mitting eating of allied, but not Jap, dead.  
15 Dec 44 - 4 men executed for disobeying this order.  
PW found 4 men of his unit stripped of flesh and  
presumably eaten by Japanese.
- P.1 - MORIMOTO: Executes 4 men for eating dead Japs.
- P.2 - MORIMOTO joins his troops in eating flesh of 2  
Australian soldiers killed in action.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 420



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 421

10 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Interrogation Report No. 329,  
ATIS, S/W Pac. Area, Serial No. 470, 6 Jul 44.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ATIS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Forced labor --  
starvation -- brutality -- beheading.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Questioning of 54 Javanese prisoners of war reveal  
deceitful employment methods of Japs who shanghaied group  
of 300 Javanese to New Guinea and forced labor under star-  
vation diet with stern punishments.

54 survivors tell of exposure to allied bombing raids,  
beheading of American PW, and describe conditions under  
Jap occupation at Soerabaja, Java, and elsewhere.

Mention made of SOEKARNO as rabble rouser demanding  
destruction of Britain and America.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 421



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 422

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Interrogation Report No. 741, ATIS,  
S/W Pac. Area, Serial No. 904, 29 May 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

ATIS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Cannibalism

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Jap PW relates how American attack at Biak completely demoralized Jap Infantry, ruined discipline and morale, and forced survivors to the hills where starvation led to savagery and cannibalism.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 422



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 423

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Collection of Japanese Economic Control Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable ) as of \_\_:

Foreign Economic Administration, Enemy Branch,  
Japanese Special Services Staff.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: See footnote to translations of the particular law.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Violation of: Open Door Policy; equal opportunity in China, etc.

CLASSIFICATION: Restricted.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Six general laws, together with the National General Mobilization Law (1938), constitute the basic economic control legislation of Japan. (p.1)

These six laws are:

1. Exports and Imports Temporary Management Law (1937): Control of production, distribution, and consumption in specific industries based on Article 2. (pp.1-2)

2. Major Industries Organization Ordinance (1941). Sets up the industrial Control Societies under Article 18 of National General Mobilization Law. (pp.1-2)

3. Transfer of Administrative Authority Law (1942). Also based on Article 18; gives governmental authority to Control Societies and other organizations. (pp.1 and 25)



12 January 1946

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS - Continued:

4. Transfer of Administrative Authority Ordinance (1943). Transferred specific authority to specific organizations. (pp. 1 and 29)
5. Essential Materials Supervision Corporation Law (1942). (pp. 1 and 27)
6. Industrial Equipment Corporation Law (1942). (p. 1 and footnote 2 on p. 27). Set up corporations to handle stockpiles and idle machinery for all industry.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 423



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 424

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin No.2088,  
dated 27 June 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (X) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

Document 605530

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Member FUJITA Unit, 3330 Force

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Mass killing of natives

Burning, looting, confiscation

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Dagumbangon, Laguna Province, Luzon (pp 4-5)

12 Feb 45 - We left for CALALBA for punitive operation against the town - killed 800 men.

13 Feb 45 - For security reasons, all inhabitants of town killed and possessions confiscated. There is nothing we can not obtain. Tremendous number of watches, rings, suits, dresses, and shoes we couldn't take back. We burned them with regret. Everyone has 3,000 pesos or more, and all we want to eat.

17 Feb 45 - Because 90% of Filipinos are not pro-Japanese, Army Headquarters issued orders on the 10th to punish them. In various sectors we killed thousands (young and old, women and children). Their homes have been burned and their valuables confiscated.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 424



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 425

11 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin 2071,  
18 June 1945.

Date: Feb 45      Original ( )      Copy (X)      Language: English

Has it been translated?      Yes (X)      No ( )

Has it been photostated?      Yes ( )      No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_ .

Document #605794

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:      Japanese Diary

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Illegal conduct of war. Killing - no quarter.

CLASSIFICATION:      Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Page 11 - Feb 45 - Every day is spent in hunting guerillas and natives. I have already killed well over 100. \*\*\* Now I am a hardened killer and my sword is always stained with blood. \*\*\* It is sheer brutality. May God forgive me.

Analyst:      Capt Williamson

Doc. No. 425



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 426

11 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin 2065,  
4 June 1945.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Diary - owner unstated Jap.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Illegal killing - conduct of war, Starvation.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

P-2 - Nov 44 - Eleven guerillas captured, bayoneted and killed.  
They had not eaten for 3 days since capture. With their  
hands tied behind their backs they stood in front of holes.  
First bayoneted by SUZUKI, Yukimatsu. My turn was next.  
When I bayoneted the victim said "Ah." He suffered but  
I had no emotion at all.

Analyst: Capt Williamson

Doc. No. 426



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 427

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin #2099,  
2 July 1945

Date: Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (X) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_

Document 606131

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Jap Diary - 164 Lang. Det - XI Corps

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Cannibalism

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references): (p.9)

24 Apr - Last night men returned with meat saying it was carabao.  
Actually I heard it was flesh from an enemy body. At any  
rate we had such a craving for meat that we even wanted  
to eat human flesh.

25 Apr - I heard the regimental and battalion commanders ate the  
flesh. It seems as though it was an Australian soldier.

Analyst: Capt Williamson

Doc. No. 427



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 428

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: ATIS, S/W Pacific Area Bulletin #2089,  
28 June 1945

Date: 13 Apr (45) Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: English

Has it been translated: Yes (X) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_

Document #605588

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: C.O., IJICHI Unit - Battle report.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references): (p.2)

4. No. of rounds ammunition expended -- 28 rounds (for killing natives.
5. At 1200 hours today, 22 natives passed --- all stabbed or shot to death.

Analyst: Capt. Williamson

Doc. No. 428



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 429

12 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Army Publication in pamphlet form. This is one section of an Army publication dealing with POW's, prison policies, captured airmen, etc. It bears no title.

Date: 1942-1944 Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Army (no more specific information in document)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Maltreatment of POW's.

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Trial and punishment of prisoners and residents of occupied countries.

Prison policy and rules for execution of said policy.

Punishment of enemy air crews (prescribes 10 years to life or execution for indiscriminate bombing).

Military laws and trials of Japanese forces in China.

Analyst: MATTISON

Doc. No. 429



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 430

16 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature:

Foreign Investments in Japan. Vol. 1 America  
Book 3 American Corps.

Date: Sept. 1941 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
16 January 1946.

File

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Finance Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: American Interests in Japan.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

List of U.S. firms in Japan with amount of investment,  
names of directors, etc.

This document is on loan from WDC and is  
supposed to be returned to them in 30 days.

Analyst: 2d Lt. Steiner

Doc. No. 430



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 431

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature:

- A. Law authorizing and defining OVERSEAS EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION (29 March 1927; Law No. 25)
- B. Regulations relative to the application of the above law (Home Office Ordinance No. 28; 30 April 1927)
- C. Articles of the OVERSEAS EMIGRATION ASSOCIATION
- D. Articles of the FEDERATION of the OVERSEAS EMIGRATION ASSOCIATIONS
- E. Law concerning the Government's Loan to the FEDERATION OF OVERSEAS EMIGRATION ASSOCIATIONS (Law No. 43; 5 April 1937)

Date: C and D not given - approximate date 1927 or 1928.

Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 15 January 1946:

Legal Division - E & S Section

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Government to Legal Division,  
E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Expansionist groups.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:



SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

- A. Defines the aims of the Emigration Associations as adopted in their Articles (See Documents 431-C and D) and provides for the establishment of a Federation of these Overseas Emigration Associations. (Articles 7 and 8)
- B. Regulations governing the actual operation of the law.
- C. Aim of the Overseas Emigration Association is to aid members desirous of emigrating abroad by loaning funds, obtaining lots and buildings through the Federation, obtaining passage, etc. Secondary aim of publicizing and encouraging overseas emigration. (Articles 1 and 2)
- D. Aim of the Federation of Overseas Emigration Associations is to loan funds, obtain lots, operate schools, hospitals and warehouses, etc. for the affiliated overseas emigration associations, and to act as a coordinating agency for these associations.
- E. Authorizes Japanese Government to contribute to Emigration Associations and empowers Government to issue orders involving their operation.

These documents indicate the Japanese Government's intention of exploiting "liberated" countries and of infiltrating them by government subsidized colonization.



CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 432

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: "Organizational Reports" is a breakdown of the Japanese Cabinet, Ministries, Boards, Bureaus, etc., as they existed on 1 Aug 45.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

Government Section - SCAP

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prepared by the Japanese Government for Commander Hussey of Govt. Sect., SCAP, who delivered a copy to this Section.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Gives names of individuals and positions held.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references)

Provides a good breakdown of the Japanese Government and supplies the names of the individuals holding the various positions. May be used to show criminal responsibility because of position held.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 432



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 433

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Corporation Law of the Central China Development Company and the Charter for same.

Date: Not Given    Original ( )    Copy (x)    Language:  
English Trans-  
lation

Has it been translated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

Has it been photostated?    Yes ( )    No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_\_:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Government to E & S and then  
to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of China. Treaty violations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Central China Development Company was organized by  
the Japanese Government for the economic exploitation of  
Central China and to assist in the execution of the Great  
East Asia War.

Analyst: Maj. Allen

Doc. No. 433



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 434

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Regulations of the Nanyo Takushoku Kaisha, Ltd. (Imperial Ord. No. 228 - 27 July 1932) and Articles of Association for same (31 Aug 1936)

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Division,  
E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of South Sea Islands.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Nanyo Takushoku Kaisha, Ltd. was a government organized corporation designed to foster colonization of the South Sea Islands, to promote the development of agriculture, marine product industries, mining and shipping, and to acquire land in this area. (Chap. III, Art. 9 of Regulations)

Its activities were subject to the close supervision of the Greater East Asia Minister.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 434



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 435

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Articles of Incorporation of the  
"Nichi-Nan" Industrial Joint Stock Company.

Date: 10 July 1937 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Division,  
E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of overseas areas.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The "Nichi-Nan" Joint Stock Company had as its avowed  
object "the supply of necessary funds for overseas exploita-  
tion". Its activities included the acquisition of estates,  
the supply of commodities to emigrants, and "other enter-  
prises indispensable for overseas exploitation". (P.1,  
Art. 3)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 435



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 436

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Agreement between the Japanese and Manchukuo Governments on the Creation of the Manchuria Development Company and the Articles of Incorporation of same.

Date: Aug 1937 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Division, E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KENKICHI, Ueda (Japanese Ambassador in Manchukuo; co-signer of Agreement)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation of Manchukuo.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Manchuria Development Company was created by agreement between the Japanese and Manchukuo Governments for the purpose of promoting emigration to Manchukuo and of developing the lands of Manchukuo. (P. 1, Art. 1 of Agreement)

To accomplish this it was empowered to loan funds and supply goods to the settlers, to acquire and dispose of land for settlement, and to finance business enterprises undertaken by emigrants. (Chap. I, Art. II of Articles)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 436



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 437

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Act creating the Southern Development Bank (20 Feb 1942; Act. No. 33) and the Articles of Incorporation for same (20 Mar 1942).

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Div., E & S  
to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of Southern regions.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Southern Development Bank was organized and subsidized by the Japanese Government for the purpose of advancing funds "necessary for development and utilization of the natural resources of the Southern regions" and of, regulating currency in these regions. (p. 1, Art. 1 of Act)

The entire capital was subscribed by the Government and the Bank was subject to the direct supervision of the Minister for Greater East Asia.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 437



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 438

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation Administration Act (Imp. Ordinance No. 460 - 20 Dec 1937) and the Articles of Association for same.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Division,  
E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of Manchuria. Preparation for war (creation of Industrial  
War Potential in Manchuria)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation had as its objective the "coordinated establishment of heavy industries" in Manchuria and government control of these industries. (P. 1, Art. 1 of Act) It authorized investment in iron and steel industry, mining, automobile and aeroplane manufacturing, coal and light metals, subject to the sanction and control of the "Minister of the Competent Department". (P. 6 of Act)

This seems to indicate a concerted effort at decentralization of Japanese war industry and the economic exploitation of Manchuria.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 438



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 439

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The North China Development Company Act (30 Apr 1938 - Law No. 81) and the Articles of Incorporation for same.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation  
Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Div., E & S  
to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of China.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The North China Development Company was organized by the Japanese Government to invest in enterprises involving traffic, transportation and harbors, communications, supply of electric power, mining, production of salt, etc. (Chap. 3 - XIV of Act)

The Act calls for government supervision and control "to defend the national security and ... to control .... the economic development of North China". (Chap. 6 - XX -- XXVII)

It further provides for the company's material assistance in the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War. (Chap. 6-XXV)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 439



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 440

18 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Imperial Ordinance authorizing the South Manchuria Railway Company (Ordinance No. 142 - 6 June 1906) and the Articles of same.

Date: Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English  
Translation

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 15 Jan 46:

Legal Division, E & S

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Japanese Govt. to Legal Division,  
E & S to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Economic exploitation  
of Manchuria.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

The South Manchuria Railway Company was organized by the Japanese Government to manage railway transportation enterprises in Manchuria and collateral enterprises such as mining, electrical industry, and water transportation.

The Government reserved the right to issue orders necessary for the supervision of the company's enterprises and empowered the Supreme Commander of the Kwantung Army to issue orders involving military strategy in case of war or "incidents comparable to war". (P. 6, Art. 13 of the Ordinance)

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer

Doc. No. 440



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 441

19 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Pictorial Review or Tabloid Magazine. ASAHI GRAPH (Tn: probably "Photographic Review")

Date: 25 July 1936 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of \_\_\_\_:

Document Division, IPS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Cabinet Secretariat by Investigation Sect.

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Leaders of the rebellion.  
(See appended Sheets)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Fomenting and executing the "Feb 26th Incident".

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This is a pictorial review with editorial comments and news accounts of the "Feb 26th Incident". The articles describe the political hysteria in Tokyo and the Incident itself. A list of the rebellion leaders is given.

Analyst: Lt. Mattison

Doc. No. 441



Note: Attach to Doc. No. 441 - 19 January 1946

NAME OF THE MAGAZINE  
ASAHI GRAPH  
EXTRA EDITION  
FOR  
THE FEB. 26 INCIDENT

THE PROGRESS OF THE INCIDENT

"CHIEF VASSELS BEING ASSASSINATED"

People of Tokyo were terrified when they received this horrible information. Their political leaders were assassinated while they were still asleep at a snowing dawn of 26 Feb 1936.

Soon they found out the fact that a body of armed soldiers led by some officers had attacked and assassinated General WATANABE, Financial Minister TAKAHASHI and Lord SAITO.

Communication was cut off, shops and theatres were closed, and at last the Army enforced martial law.

LIST OF THOSE WHO WERE ASSASSINATED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office</u>
TAKAHASHI, Korekiyo	Financial Minister
SAITO, Minoru	Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal
WATANABE, Jotaro	Inspector General of Military Education

LIST OF THOSE WHO WERE ATTACKED AND ESCAPED DEATH

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office</u>
SUZUKI, Kantaro	Grand Chamberlain (wounded)
OKADA, Keisuke	Premier
MAKINO, Sinken	Former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal

(Their photographs appear pages 4, 5, 6)

LIST OF THE BUILDINGS OCCUPIED BY REBELLION

War Office      General Staff Office  
Metropolitan Police Station (Appears page 23)  
Official Building of the Diet  
Official Residence of Premier  
SANNO Hotel (Appears page 22)



NEW CABINET WAS APPOINTED

<u>Office</u>	<u>Name</u>
Prime Minister	HIROTA, Koki
War Minister	TERAUCHI,
Naval Minister	NAGANO
Financial Minister	EABA
Minister of Commerce and Industry	KAWASAKI
Minister of Overseas Affairs	NAGATA
Railway Minister	MAEDA
Minister of Communication	TANOMOGI
Home Minister	USHIO
Minister of Justice	HAYASHI
Chief Secretary	HUJINUMA
Director of the Bureau of Legislation	TSUGIDA
Director of the Bureau of Investigation	YOSHIDA

(pp. 48-49)

EXTENSIVE LIST

LEADERS OF THE REBELLION

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Penalty</u>
Captain	NONAKA, Shiro	Suicide
"	KODA, Yoshimichi	Death
"	ANDO, Teruzo	"
1st Lt.	TAKESHIMA, Tsuguo	"
"	KURIHARA, Yasuhide	"
"	TSUSHIMA, Katsuo	"
"	NAKABASHI, Motoaki	"
"	NIBU, Seichu	"
"	SAKAI, Naoshi	"
"	TANAKA, Katsu	"
2d Lt.	NAKAJIMA, Kanji	"
"	YASUDA, Yu	"
"	TAKAHASHI, Taro	"
"	HAYASHI, Hachiro	"
Civilian	MURANAKA, Koji	"
"	ISOBE, Asaichi	"
"	SHIBUKAWA, Zensuke	"
"	MIZUKAMI, Genichi	"
2d Lt.	HUGIYA, Seisai	Life Imprisonment
"	TOKIWA, Minoru	"
"	SUZUKI, Kinjiro	"
"	KIYOHARA, Yasuhei	"
"	IKEDA, Toshihiko	"
Capt.	YAMAGUCHI, Ichiro	"

etc.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 442

25 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: House Rule of the SUMITOMO Family:  
the family code governing the conduct of the head of the  
SUMITOMOS.

Date: 21 Jan 46 Original ( ) Copy ( ) Language:  
English Translation  
Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prepared by SUMITOMO family for  
E&SS to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SUMITOMO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background of ZAIBATSU.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This is a one-page set of Rules determining the conduct  
of the head of the SUMITOMO family. The rules are quite  
general and formulated with an eye to maintaining the in-  
tegrity of the family and its interests.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
(W.S.A.)

Doc. No. 442



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 443

Date 22 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: The Constitution of the Yasuda Family:

Date: 18 Jan 46 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: English translation.  
Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of 21 January 1946: E&SS

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prepared by Yasuda HOJENSHA for E & SS to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED: Hajime YASUDA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background of Zaibats

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document, drawn up as a formal charter in 1880, defines the conduct of all members of the Yasuda family.

Part I contains the general rules of behavior to guide the members in their social and business relations.

Part II, the By-Laws, names the branches of the family tree and their holdings (page 2) and enumerates the restrictions imposed on family members in relation to their property holdings. It requires them to obtain the permission of "the head of the principal stock" if they wish to engage in their own business, move, build, or dispose of property (pages 3 & 4)

Parts III, IV, V contain rules governing family meetings, marriage, education, and pursuit of a career

The obvious intention of the Constitution is to perpetuate the Yasuda dynasty and keep it intact.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No 443



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 444

Date 22 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Mitsui Family Household Rules:

Date: 28 June 1900 Original ( ) Copy ( ) Language:  
English  
translatic

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )  
Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
\_\_\_\_\_.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prepared by Mitsui interests for E&SS  
to IPS

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Background of Zaibatsu.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

These household rules were crafted in 1900 for the guidance of the conduct and activities of the entire Mitsui family. By their provisions a Household Council is set up which meets monthly to decide upon all matters affecting the financial status of the family as well as related matters such as marriage, succession, divorce etc.

The unbroken continuity and the closely knit nature of the Zaibatsu holdings can probably be attributed in large part to strict adherence to household codes such as this.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 444



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 445

Date 23 January 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Guide for new employees of the  
Mitsubishi concern: A pamphlet distributed to newcomers.

Date: Dec. 1941 Original ( ) Copy ( ) Language: Jap

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable) as of  
\_\_\_\_\_:

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Takaya IWASAKI of the Mitsubishi Honsha  
to E&SS to IPS.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This pamphlet contains a short history of the  
Mitsubishi concern, a chart showing its holdings as of Dec-  
ember 1941, and the rules and regulations governing its  
employees. Since it was written for the purpose of orient-  
ing new employees, the material is presented briefly and  
in simplified form.

Analyst 1st Lt. Palmer  
W.S.A.

Doc. No. 445