

Get names + list 1/351

My name is Klaas A. de Weerd. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands nationality. *Tonari Sumi P 42*

After having studied law at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

In 1938, after having been on leave in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra).

On the 12th of December 1941 I was mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java.

After the capitulation of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of war of the Japanese and was confined in several camps in West-Java until the middle of September 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted as Camp translator of the Java newspapers in the Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought into the camps until the end of January 1944.

As the situation in the islands interested me in particular I spent much time in translating these items extensively into Dutch and, together with several friends, I indexed these data according to personalities and to subjects.

Our intention was to prepare several studies concerning the Japanese occupation, treating subjects such as Administration, Propaganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour, Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data about Japanese authorities

Econ - plans 9-14.

I had already prepared notes for several of these studies when it became increasingly difficult to keep this work secret from the Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became clear that we would shortly be moved to another camp we soldered copies of our compilations and indexes in tins and buried them in various places in the camp grounds.

From February 1944 until September 1945 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Netherlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated) Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese local broadcasts in Malay. During that period I continually exchanged information and observations with new arrivals and through every other channel available.

After 15 August 1945 I once more regularly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of my compilations and indexes from their hiding place. In the middle of the same month I was released from the prison camp and was assigned to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), later called the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in order to complete my work of collecting data about the Japanese occupation. A special section with a staff of twenty was created for this purpose under my direction; this section became a special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

In close cooperation with the Japanese Affairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C. (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps) and other offices and bureaus I collected such data regarding the Japanese occupation as were available. These data were contained in, inter alia, the practically complete newspapers and the complete Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army in Java, and a fairly complete

set of the official gazettes of the other islands, edited during the occupation period, further reports and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and other military and civilian authorities and private persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese and Indonesian authorities, etc.

In May 1946 I joined the Office of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the special task of collecting such documents as would be needed for the preparation of the Prosecution of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this capacity I continued my work of collecting data on the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

In the middle of September 1946 I arrived at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for further data here.

From this collected information I have prepared the attached report, entitled: "the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies".

PREPARED STATEMENT

of

K.A. de WEERD, Attorney-at-Law,
Major R.M.I.A.

Subject: (The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.)

International Prosecution Section
Netherlands Division
November 1946.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies for convenience has been chronologically divided into five phases,

- I. The period from March to August 1942, which can be designated the transition period.
- II. The second phase, which is characterized by the consolidation of Japanese rule, lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
- III. The period from July 1943 to September 1944, which is governed by an attempt at winning over the population by promises.
- IV. The period from September 1944 to the beginning of August 1945, involving further development of the policy of promises.
- V. The period from the beginning of August 1945 to the end of September 1945, involving at the last moment an attempt to create a state, friendly to Japan, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been more and less arbitrarily divided into periods and consequently these limits must be treated as being approximate. Occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases, even if the events in question extended beyond a particular phase.

Japan's policy in regard to the Southern Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions alike, so that only insignificant local modifications were made, and then solely in the application and not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened in Java is treated as basic and mention will only be made of modifications in other regions of the Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations from events in Java.

I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

Beginning of 1942 to approximately August 1942.

Throughout the East Indies, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

In addition a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of ^{their past support of} the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few local exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born in the Netherlands Indies who still showed ^{apparent} affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and those Asiatics, too, who were "suspected" of having Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945, 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java. Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave labour elsewhere.

Of the former Western community, only three groups were still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their "freedom" in many other ways.

This non-interned Occidental community was subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial were such that the victims were deprived of all rights, and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

Occidentals were, whenever possible, dismissed from their official and private positions and appointments, thus depriving the greater part of this section of the community of its means of livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen, Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were faced with practically no alternative than gradually to sell all their possessions. They were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these communities.

Along with this, the use of Western languages was soon forbidden in public and business communications, and in certain places the speaking of Western languages was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that organization.

At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools. During the second period Occidental schools and education remained definitely banned.

In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated. This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei, tortured and sometimes tried.

The possession of certain numerous specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

Old monuments, - reminders of former Occidental influence - were carried away, partly destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

In most places, the names of streets and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes Malay.

Names of shops, commercial concerns, trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese or Malay.

Since the Kempei-methods were practised not only on the Occidental community, but also upon members of the other communities, all expression of democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

All existing Councils wherein, hitherto, the opinion of various communities could be freely expressed on problems of administration were abolished.

The first to be dissolved was the Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised legislative and budgetary functions.

Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative and budgetary powers, were abolished.

In regions outside Java, too, the various councils which had been established on a democratic basis to give the people an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, were liquidated.

By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law courts were abolished, and in their stead Japanese "Law Courts of the Military Government" (Gunsei Hoojin) were established. This new judiciary was provisional and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

There was no provision for appeals. The decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associations.

The only associations excepted were those concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific, cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activities; they were subjected to police supervision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining permission from the police, and registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the police.

In practice, activities were permitted only those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport League).

From the outset, the Japanese authorities built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

Along with the first troops to land on Java, came the vanguard.

These Japanese propagandists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese politicians, known to be disaffected. With the assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April 1942 the so-called "Tiga A" movement was established. Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no function other than to carry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

These propagandists immediately seized control of all means of public expression. All public and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic activities as well as the entire Press were immediately placed under their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers were still permitted to be transmitted and to appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were introduced in the Malay language under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay language daily paper in Java, the "Asia Raya" (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda. At first it was under Japanese direction;

but after the Indonesian staff had proved themselves "matured" the direction was officially handed over to them; but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese hands.

Other places in Java soon followed suit, so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

In addition a Japanese language paper, the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

In her propaganda Japan referred to herself as the "liberator", come to establish a "New Order". It stated, that "New-Java" was to be educated to become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese instituted a rigid censorship, which not only affected all postal-, telegraphic- and telephonic-communication, but also extended to all photographs given to professional photographers for development.

Furthermore, all public utterances were subject to censorship. This did not alone extend to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda service.

The publication of books was also subject to censorship, and only works emanating from the propaganda service appeared during the period of occupation. By these methods the Japanese had control of all expressions of public opinion.

During the period now being treated Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun. For instance, the use of Japanese words was immediately introduced for designating official services, offices, etc. and this usage gradually became prevalent during the occupation, so that ultimately the reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely possible without knowledge of the offices, services, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japanese words.

The Japanese authorities introduced the Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time system and the Japanese budgetary year.

The police wore the Japanese flag for cap badges. Emperor worship - offensive to Mohammedans - was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings began with the obligatory bow in the direction of the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the words: "Tenno Heika - banzai". All Japanese days of celebration were introduced. The display of any flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private buildings under strictly prescribed rules.

Portraits of members of the Dutch and Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to be handed over and were burned.

The possession of portraits and other pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no "lese-majesty".

Postage- and revenue- stamps were marked "Dai Nippon", and later new stamps were issued with texts in Malay and Japanese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japanese at once began to establish schools which taught only the Japanese language. When later schools for Indonesians were reopened the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese requirements and important subjects in the new schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs and dances, etc.

Economics In the fields of finance and economics the programs applied in the East Indies were similar despite the fact that some areas were administered by the Army, and some by the Navy.

Java and Sumatra were occupied by different Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese Navy, with practically no contact with each other. Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these regions were administered were entirely similar in reality.

The first Ordinance of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1, introduced Japanese military paper currency with the text in Dutch, reading: "The Japanese Government. One half guilder". Paper money was issued similarly in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper money already in circulation was retained; but later, when this old currency had considerably greater value in the open market than the Japanese occupation money, it was withdrawn and its possession constituted a punishable offence. The Japanese paper money revealed differences in the various occupied areas. In Sumatra, which was originally under the same military administration as Malaya, the same text appeared on the same background as in the case of the paper money issued in Java, but in English, whereas in the other regions of the East Indies, and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

currency

In 1944, new paper money was designed and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese and Malay.

This paper money was issued in unlimited quantities without backing, which soon led to inflation, which began early in 1943 and continued to increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth of its original purchasing value.

3 | All banks, both official and non-official, were closed
down at once. During the course of 1942 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and private banks were liquidated. The Post Office Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened under Japanese names and under Japanese direction, but the balances due at the time of the closing remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners remained frozen, and were transferred to the Japanese established Enemy Property Administration Bureau (Tekisan Kanbibu), which

*same as orig**Banks*

was charged with the "custody" of enemy property. This institution liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and credited in its books the owners thereof, when known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

Bank
+
currency

Later, after May 1945, this liquidation was hastened. In Batavia the Kenpei and its members were frequently the purchasers at so-called public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the real price for the same article in the same paper money in the open market.

All stocks of Occidental importers, as well as private possessions in the form of movables and claims for payment (when capable of realisation) owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan Kanribu. Possession of "enemy property" constituted a punishable offence and the holder was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese. Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japanese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

Property

Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies, big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals, had been invested in agricultural enterprises and industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting sugar-factories, which were organized in the "Java Togyo Rengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This organization had charge of the administration of "enemy" agricultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the control over all other agricultural enterprises including those operated with Indonesian or Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the interests of owners. This body executed a policy directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort and to the maintenance of production required by the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises and industries which were of no importance

to the immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched over to other production, or when that was not feasible, were retained if such retention were deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea- and rubber-plantations suffered seriously, because the Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation, gave precedence to foodcrops. Tea-plants and rubbertrees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates being parcelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foodcrops.

A large part of the Western-owned agricultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire sugar industry was allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was exploited by them under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

Sugar production was reduced considerably and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar-factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when the factories were not switched over to produce other commodities more important for the war effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The possession of immovable property belonging to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was transferred by the Japanese to the "Hudoosan Kanrikoodan" established by them, which handed over the property as required to the Japanese military or civil authorities for business and for personal purposes.

Ownership of immovable property was drastically changed by the Japanese.

The so-called "private estates" were appropriated by the Military Government without the payment of any compensation to the owners, under Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expropriations took place, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtue of an Ordinance No. ii of the Minseifu (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March

Property

Public utilities, including those privately owned, were seized by the Military Administration and were operated without compensation, and in some cases were allotted to private Japanese companies.

Private railway, tramway and bus companies were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equipment of private railway companies was for a large part shipped to the Burma Siam railway. Direction of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former independent operation by private companies was obliterated. The personnel of these companies was pooled and Japanese rank designations and terminology were introduced.

Private or semi-governmental gas- and power- companies as well as privately owned mining concerns were taken over and operated by either the Military Government or Japanese companies.

The policy of exploitation of natural resources of the East Indies ^{was} carried on partly by the Military Administration itself, partly through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese business concerns and partly by Japanese "national policy companies".

The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government owned and operated bank had as its chief function the financing of the development and exploitation of natural resources in the Southern Regions and the control of circulation and finance in those areas. This bank was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to the Japanese Army.

The Japanese Government also divided up natural resources in the Southern Regions between the various Japanese applicants and allotted each of them part of those areas, usually according to their monopolies.

Get names

RR

Gas - Power mines

NAMES ?

NAMES ?

NAMES

Domei

Domei was granted a news service monopoly although a local agency had started first.

Press monopolies in the Southern Regions were divided among various big Japanese newspaper concerns. Asahi Shimbun (Slo)

In the field of banking, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to operate in Java, and took over the functions of private Occidental banks.

The liquidation of these banks and the introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts were declared to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

The old debt was consequently paid off with the new

credit. The Java Sugar Industry has already been mentioned as an example of the division of the natural resources of Java amongst the big Japanese Companies.

Get

Domei
Asahi
Yokohama Specie Bank
Taiwan Bank

II. THE SECOND PHASE

August 1942 to July 1943

During the period just discussed the Japanese administrative machinery was relatively simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted by a simple "central organ" and by three Army officers each administering his respective area in East, West and Central Java. Administration was carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occupational detachments.

Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envisaged sending out parties consisting of Japanese experts in colonial administration, technical sciences, and economy, immediately following the occupational troops. It was not, however, until the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

The Military Government, which at first was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed into a separate body.

The gist of its functions was laid down in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all powers which hitherto had been exercised by the Governor-General. The military administration (Gunsei) was divided into nine Departments under the supervision of the Gunseikan. The Departments were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and policy making body; Naibunbu (Internal Affairs); Zaimubu (Finance); Sihoobu (Justice); Keimubu (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyojibu (Economic Affairs); Kaikoi Kantokubu (Audition); and Sendonbu (Propaganda).

In addition from time to time a number of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without the standing of the Departments but under the Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-building Bureau), the Tokisan Kanribu (Enemy Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kai (Sugar Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time some changes were made, which did not affect the system.

The structure of the pre-war Central Administration was changed thoroughly and in its entirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police were under the Internal Affairs Department, while Public Health, Education and Labour (now under Waimubu) were handled by separate Departments or Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious Affairs had been handled by the Education and Religion Department.

The Government Secretariate, the Council of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Departments of general administration, corresponding in name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

All leading positions in the Departments were occupied by Japanese.

According to official Japanese information, on 1 September 1945 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military Government in Java, amounting to half the number of service personnel proper stationed there.

Legislative powers were exercised by the Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java, and the Chief of Military Administration (Gunseikan). The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were not published locally, although thousands were arrested, tortured and sentenced under them, while those of the two last mentioned organs were published in Java, in the Osamu Kan Po, the official bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay. Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese edition.

The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not affect the legislative position in any way.

Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an entirely new system of local administration. Under this Java was divided into 17 "Syuu", comparable geographically to the former "Residencies" and one "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City Area") comprising Batavia. The four Sultanates in Central-Java were administered by two "Kooti Zimu Kyoku" (Sultanates' Bureaus).

The former "Provinces" of West-, Central- and East-Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three "Gunseisibu", coinciding geographically with the former Provinces but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

All these local bodies supplanted the former decentralized and autonomous local administration, and were placed directly under the Gunseikanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local councils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular participation in local administration came to an end.

The Syuu were subdivided into smaller units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku, Si and Siku. During this second period the organic laws governing the functions of administrative bodies under the old system were abolished, and replaced by Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new administration was based.

The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable to the former "Resident") and of other local officials was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on the other made far more dependent on the Central Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced. These officials, responsible only to their superiors, had a large measure of liberty in the execution of their duties: they had powers of dismissal and appointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers over their staffs.

They were empowered to issue regulations to implement ordinances promulgated by higher authority and also regulations concerning matters not yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were subject to the authority of their superiors and were responsible to them in all cases. According to statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authorities, the object the Japanese had in mind was to build up an administration which in its final form should be on the same lines as those followed in their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

The four ruling Sultans were maintained, not, as having hereditary title to their positions, but as newly invested Rulers called "Ko" owing allegiance

to the Japanese Army in the same way as all civilian officials did.

All key-positions in the new establishment were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The Benteng, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by Japanese advisers.

The composition of the Administrative Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister Tojo's promises. However, leading positions remained in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held an important post there was always a Japanese who was the real executive.

It was not until the end of August 1945 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority to their Indonesian colleagues.

According to the biographies of the Japanese officials, published by the propaganda service, this corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative functions in Japan proper.

The establishment of a new administrative system in islands other than Java developed along the same lines.

In the initial stage, Sumatra along with Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed under a separate Gunseikanbu.

The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Headquarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages by Itagaki, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under the Southern Theatre commanded by Field Marshal Terauchi.

The Military Administration operated pursuant to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While the terminology varied, the system was not substantially different. The same principles of centralized administration were applied and relations between Japanese and Indonesian officials were the same.

Administration in territory under Naval Occupation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters) at Macassar (Celebes).

The Minseihu at Macassar was under the command of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th Southern Squadron at Singapore.

Parallel with reorganization of the Administration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In addition to the Gunsei Hooiin (Courts of the Military Administration), set up in the first period to replace the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army Ordinances.

The Gunsei Hooiin itself had jurisdiction to try violations of Military Government Ordinances and Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Hooiin their final form.

Eight type of courts were set up, all bearing Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Hooiin (Final Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Hooiin (Intermediary Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts comprised the Police Court, the District Court and other local courts corresponding to the local administrative subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

To each court a Kensatu-kyoku (prosecution Section) was attached. This system was strongly centralized under the Justice Department. At a later stage it was detached from the Justice Department, and combined with the police force under the Police Department which was renamed Public Security Department (Tianbu).

In criminal courts with Indonesian members a representative of the Korpai attended the sessions, seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.

In the initial stages the former Penal Code was maintained. Having determined that this criminal law was based on excessively democratic foundations the Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment were introduced for special offenses.

During the Japanese occupation interference by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions, who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

During the session only Japanese and Malay languages were allowed.

Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was seldom available.

In the other islands of the East Indies judicial powers were administered in the same manner. Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts established.

At the outset of the occupation the Japanese authorities took over the Police School at Sukabuni, Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, permanent courses for the training of police personnel, led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda courses for personnel already in the service were conducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East Asia and Japan's right were taught. A system of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for the settlement of minor infractions was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant offences was seen daily in the streets. A certain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted the tactics of the Kempei.

A separate Police Department, later the Public Security Department, was established along centralized lines and all executive functions were taken over by the Japanese.

The existing Force was felt to be insufficient by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy this situation were attempted.

The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei methods, was organized. It was both feared and hated by the people.

In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Village Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police force in all villages and municipalities. This reinforced the regular police by approximately 1,300,000.

The Keiboodan had a variety of duties. It had to go into action in case of fire or other calamities, it had to assist the regular police in apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, paratroopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in its area, turned out in force during public propaganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of spying, chiefly in a general campaign against enemy spies.

In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to train the population in guerilla action, such as cutting lines of communication, destruction of small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inadequate weapons such as bamboospears. This training taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display of cruelty to these foreigners.

A third force auxiliary to the police, was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai, which operated only in towns and served the same purposes as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruited chiefly from among the Chinese.

The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei, while both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the official Army organization. The members of the two latter were "volunteers", if the required numbers were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

The prison system was similarly reorganized under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for the training of newly recruited personnel as well as for the "improvement" of personnel with previous service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was inhumane.

The Military Government proceeded to lay down a revised educational program with a view to reopening schools for Indonesians.

Elementary education in the People's Schools was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language, songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical training was introduced. Instruction in reading and mathematics, was substantially reduced and the remainder of the curriculum abolished.

The several types of intermediate schools, with their varied curricula, were abolished to make place for one standard type of intermediate school with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum was very much simplified with foreign languages and general history dropped to make place for Japanese language and history. Textbooks on the history of the islands were burned and a new textbook was introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and ties of common destiny with Japan.

An entirely new subject was the "Seisin" (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the Spirit should be able to overcome all material obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo spears if necessary.

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

Batavia Medical College was reopened on 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

The students pledged themselves to enter the Japanese Military Government service after graduation. Students were billeted and were subject to a strict and semi-military regimentation under specially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The curriculum of the Medical College was reduced from six to four years.

The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a limited program covering three years was opened. Students were subjected to the same routine.

Law College was supplanted by one year courses for the training of civilian officials and lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideals and the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of students was in force. Instruction in the Japanese Language played an important part.

Private education remained taboo for a long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to the official program.

Western teaching and education to Occidentals were prohibited throughout the occupation. This prohibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve the suspect with the Kempeitai.

Considerable numbers of Indonesian College students as well as graduates and prominent personalities from the Indonesian community were sent to Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Journalists' Conference.

All sections of society were organized into corporations along fascist lines.

The organization and political coordination of society was carried out among all racial and political groups as well as among practically all professions and trades, practically all economic sections of society, all cultural groups, all religious groups, the younger generation, sports organizations, and women's movements. The Japanese authorities kept a close grip on a particular social group through these organizations and used them to command aid and support from its members for the Army or the Military Government. The corporations were required regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings. They were utilized for disseminating propaganda among the members. The Japanese used these corporations to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct espionage.

The Propaganda Department maintained close relations with these organizations. Addresses by Indonesian officials in these organizations were not only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by the Propaganda

Department. These corporations were under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu. The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same for practically all corporations, and stated that the corporate objective was support to the Japanese Military Government.

The executives in these corporations were appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives were responsible to the central executive; Both were assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with approval of the Japanese authorities.

The executive body within a corporation was authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its members and membership was obligatory for all within a given group.

A typical example is provided by the organization of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Service by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance No. 28, of the Commander in Chief in Java, dated 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

"Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is established with the purpose of coordinating those engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise their capability in curing, and the care for sanitation, so that in this way they can give their contribution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical affairs.

"Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medical experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals, must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except enemy nationals.

"Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special work necessary for conducting the Military Government at the order of the Gunseikan.

"Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai can issue orders and instructions necessary for carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 to the members after obtaining

approval from the Gunseikan.

"Article 21.: The Izi Hookookai is supervised by the Gunseikan.
The work of the branch officers is supervised by
the Syuutyookan (Japanese Local Governor)."

The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not all, other professions were similarly organized into single corporations.

In all fields of economic activity there was the same picture of obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and Japanese executives.

All artists and scholars were organized in the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

The importance of a truly Oriental artistic expression was emphasized and Occidental influences were considered inimical. Paintings and other artistic expressions were to be and were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This organization, established in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as the other corporations: Japanese executives, obligatory support to the Army and the Military Government, etc.

The Japanese attached much importance to the spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter into their own hands completely. The Indonesian Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized, was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training of the younger generation to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese concern. The organ of control was established by the creation in April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims were laid down as follows:

"In order to convince the youth of Java so that they will energetically cooperate with the Military Government and render assistance in the building up of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia, it is necessary that they be given guidance and training."

In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for local instructors was established, and a Central Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the direction of Japanese.

Later, a Seinendan was organized in every Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength. Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military government.

Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The official training comprised instruction in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual and military training, Japanese physical training, air raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

The manpower for the Booei Giyu Gun (Defence Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after its establishment all other youth organizations were prohibited.

Sports were also brought in line. On 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other corporations. In the official explanation of the applicable Ordinance it said: "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java, from office-employees to school-children, and also that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering how important sports is for our spiritual and corporal training, for learning and developing discipline, and for strengthening the spirit and the determination to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to the War of Greater East Asia."

In every Ken and Si a branch was established; these branches were organized in their respective Syuu and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa Iku Kai.

FUJIN

The Indonesian women of Java were organized in the Huzin Kai, founded in August 1943.

Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

"The purpose of this organization is to help the Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position of the women of the original inhabitants and also to raise the women's virtue.

In order to assist in the conduct of the Military Government, the Zigyoin (Working Section), is created within the Hujin Kai; this body has to carry out work necessary for the improvement of conditions behind the front-line and in the field of savings, education, public safety and public health.

In order to deepen the conviction of women in their duties towards the efforts of the defence of the country in wartime, in the first place to give instruction in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish a close contact with the Seinendan and Heiboodan in conducting exercises so that in future when there is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as possible."

Developments in the other islands, were roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with a lower standard of efficiency among their own Japanese personnel, and at the same time less dependent on the cooperation of the local population than they were in Java, their chief granary and supply base, they tackled the process of political coordination more sketchily.

III. THE THIRD PHASE

From July 1943 until September 1944.

As early as in the first period, there was some activity by Japanese authorities in the political field, but the policy adopted locally was characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at Batavia as a policy of "wait and see."

Immediately after the occupation a prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March 1942, which read as follows:

"Until further notice it shall be strictly prohibited to commit the following acts:

"a. participation in any organization; attending any meetings; conducting propaganda in favour of the enemy; the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss, engage in activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning the organization and structure of the Government."

By virtue of these prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only released much later.

In December 1942 to January 1943 a large scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activities of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not released until September 1945. Even after January 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very large number of victims.

In 1942 the Japanese initiated the "AAA" Movement. This name was announced on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Protector of Asia)

Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of Asia)

Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of Asia)

The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more striking colour than the other letters. The themes which this movement elaborated were "Asia for

the Asiatics" and hate against "foreigners belonging to the white race" and against the "Western exploiters". The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The language "the Indonesian people who have the same ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese," appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7 March 1942. Western influence was represented as being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under the "paternal" leadership of Japan was represented as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the slogan "New Java" or "a New Order in Java", the meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not defined. Use of the word "Indonesia" in a political sense was not permitted. In most official publications the Indonesians were referred to as "the original inhabitants."

While the AAA Movement was in full swing, further contact was sought with the Indonesian world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied with the former rule and the rate at which that rule prepared for independence.

Chief among these was Sukarno, who was brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and who formed the so-called "Ampat Serangkai" (four-leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese promises a means of attaining the early independence for which they were striving. They believed in these promises and advocated complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Government.

The Japanese also sought to approach the group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not discontented with the former rule and had held high office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems): "in order to survey and study the customs and the former governmental systems of the country, and to contribute towards the Administration of Java." Nine Japanese including the chairman

and ten Indonesians, including the "Four-leaved Clover" and certain former Chiefs of Departments, former professors and members of the former People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never played an important role and was abolished by the Japanese in November 1943.

The first request to the Japanese authorities made by the "Four Serangkai" was to be allowed to form a party. This request was considered until 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia, and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that a single party for Indonesians only would be permitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to wait for a decision from Tokyo.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Movement was created, deriving its name from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rakyat" denoting "Center of the People's Spiritual Power," while "Putera" means "knight's son."

Its aims and policy were approximately similar to those of the previously discussed corporations, except that the name of this people's movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera was not a party, but only a "movement" with leaders and advisory councils.

The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council in which there were approximately equal numbers of Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan. Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with Japanese approval.

The organization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, and its aims were officially described by the Japanese as follows:

"The object in arousing the strength and efforts of the people is
"no other than to support all measures for winning final victory in
"the Greater East Asia War. Since the work of this Movement is very
"closely linked with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Govern-
"ment, all leaders must bear in mind that they should have a
"profound knowledge of, and faith in, the aims and objectives
"of the Dai Nippon Army."

Doc. No. 2750

In this address the Putera leaders were further urged:

"Do your utmost always to be fully aware of the existing limitations
"in the present situation, and never lead the common people astray.
"I hope you will do your best to fulfill the aims and objectives
"of this Movement, and that you will cooperate in the establish-
"ment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and build
"a New Java to be a member in the family of nations within the
"Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia."

The functions of the Putera were officially set out in the following ten points:

1. To impress upon the Indonesian population their duties and responsibilities in regard to the establishment of a "New Java."
2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
3. To participate in the defence of Greater East Asia.
4. To foster self-discipline in bearing all mental and physical privations necessary for winning ultimate victory.
5. To deepen mutual understanding between the Japanese and Indonesians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japanese language.
7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

The Putera was only for Indonesians. The new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the "original inhabitants", were treated as a privileged category, while groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.

About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called "foreigners" were strengthened. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. "Forbidden zones" were introduced, covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern and Western extremities of Java, where no "foreigners" were allowed to enter and for which even Indonesians needed a pass.

The first great enthusiasm for the Putera dwindled when it became apparent that the activities of this body, to which the population had looked forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda service. There was great disappointment when the originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead their own youth movement.

Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from an offensive into a defensive position and lines of communication were seriously threatened.

Against this background, on 16 June 1943, Prime Minister Tojo made a speech in the Diet wherein, inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that the people of Java had shown their readiness to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration, they should be given participation in the government. On this occasion Tojo also promised so-called independence to Burma and to the Philippines.

In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person.

Enroute to Java, Tojo called at Manila and Singapore, repeating the promise of "independence" for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no "independence" was promised, but only participation in the government. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete co-operation with the Japanese Military Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

Following this promise, in August 1943, an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and two others were appointed Syuutyoo (Chief of a Residency) in the two smallest Residencies of

Java, with actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief. Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially appointed to lower positions, which they had held before, and were incorporated into the Japanese Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding Japanese rank.

The "San-yo Seido" (Adviser System) was introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when questions were referred to him for advice.

In all Residencies and also in the Special Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sangi Kai, was established to advise the Resident in matters of local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to be appointed and elected, respectively. The "elections" were indirect with nomination of the candidates not public and the ballot not secret. The function of the Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

The sessions were only public for the opening address, which was drafted and censored beforehand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper were held behind closed doors. At the final session motions, discussed and settled during the closed meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo. Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuuo Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

This was established on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the Military Government." Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the remainder, eighteen were "elected" by the various Sangi Kai, and two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They were only empowered to offer advice in respect to questions put by the Commander-in-Chief

or the Resident, and to make suggestions relating thereto.

The actual direction of affairs rested with the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuuoo Sangi-In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also the other officials of his office. The function of this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing correspondence as well as to exercise internal supervision over the activities of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In. The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secretary of Prime Minister Tojo.

Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office. From the very beginning these organizations were used as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit labour and "Volunteers" for the military organizations and to encourage the population to increase agricultural output and to deliver the crops to the Military Government.

As a further local participation measure wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans of Central-Java in elementary education, local government at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

Almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese Military Administration took the view that the Indonesian population of Java ought to give concrete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister Tojo's promise now that it had been translated into fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their preparedness to support the Japanese Military Administration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

The Propaganda service ensured that it should appear to the outside world that the inhabitants themselves were desirous of having their own army.

At the end of August 1943, an old friend of Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed "with his own blood," to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permission to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that he considered, moreover, that the population of Java was very rightly desirous

of offering some return for Tojo's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Booei Giyu Gun (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland). The aim of the Corps was "to call upon the original inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence of Greater East Asia."

Art. 4 laid down:

"The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake in the defence of the home country in the respective Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the Dai Nippon Army."

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers, but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It would not be used outside Java and would consist of volunteers.

Recruiting for the first levy started immediately, but with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many "volunteers" were required in order to bring formations up to strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps. In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started and lasted three months.

The object was to form one or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu. At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. Weapons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills, and training mostly took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army, an intelligence organization, was charged with training, and at the same time made use of it both for spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them as spies.

Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly recruited and partly compelled to serve as a "Heiho" (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho were sent off the island.

The Japanese Navy similarly made use of Indonesian Heiho.

Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese, and the regulations were written in Japanese. They wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit).

One of the important aims of Japanese propaganda was the increase of farming crops and their delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The island of Java had to provide large quantities of food for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting in the East. Besides the Japanese army of occupation was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which before the war had barely been able to meet the essential food requirements of its own population, was expected to produce more. This increase in production was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the climate and geographic conditions. All this further reduced the area available for food crops.

It became less and less advantageous for the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Japanese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Government to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level. As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fell far below its former value relative to other commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

The Japanese authorities ordered that 60% of the harvest of food produce had to be delivered to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat the black market in rice and other food products, such as the imposing of closed regional economic areas, enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing of rice - except for individual consumption - in other than "coordinated" mills was prohibited.

The propaganda service exerted all its powers to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in order to obtain more produce. It also tried to persuade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the Japanese Military Administration.

Not only in Java, but throughout the Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for the building of military fortifications, airfields, strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propaganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlistment of these coolies. In this at first the Japanese were successful. When the inhabitants learned how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their desire to work for them practically disappeared. This became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not return, and no news whatever was received from them.

The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription, whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself, and for labour outside that island.

In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these was that the houses of relatives left behind were provided with a sign "Prajurit Pekerja", and it was pointed out to the public that one should honour such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee special protection. Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed certain privileges in the distribution of scarce commodities, such

as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all government officials had received their share.

These labourers received less care than the prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions and medical care. While the correct figures of those who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not known, the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since the war's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent altogether. During certain periods, "romushas" who had died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

In religious matters the propaganda service made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from the population.

These activities were especially directed at influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large majority of the population, while propaganda among other religions was of far less importance. Priests and preachers of an "enemy race" were forbidden to conduct services except for people of an "enemy race". If an "enemy" priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among the congregation he was to see to it that the latter left on penalty of very severe punishment.

From the very outset the Japanese made an effort to establish one organization for the Islamites to convey the Japanese aims to the people and to induce a maximum war effort through voluntary cooperation. Several attempts in that direction by the Japanese failed at first because of discord in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles. In November 1943 the Japanese succeeded in uniting the Moslem unions into one mother organization, the "Mashumi" (abbreviation for "Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia" - Consultative Council of Indonesian Islamites).

This coordinated the Mohammedan intellectuals. In addition there was a large number of Oelamas (expounders of the Koran) and Kiais (teachers on religious matters), not closely connected with Islamic intellectuals, but who exercised a considerable influence in the villages.

From the very beginning the Syuumubu tried to obtain influence amongst the population through these kiais and oelamas. As far back as July 1942 the then Japanese Head of the Syuumubu began to travel about Java and held meetings in each Syuu (Residency) for about 500 or 600 kiais and oelamas who had been ordered to attend by the local administration in each place. He spoke on Japanese views and aims in the usual vein and then tried to sound the opinion of his audience. He was assisted by five Japanese in Arabian dress bearing the title of Hadji in combination with Arabian and their own Japanese names. Following this tour there was a great meeting of representatives of all scholars and teachers on religion from all residencies at Batavia on 7 December 1942. The Gunseikan made a speech in which the Japanese policy in regard to the Islamites in Java was explained.

This policy embodied three principles. First, the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be respected.

For the second point the Gunseikan declared that religious associations would soon be authorized to carry on their activities and that they had the noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

For the third point, the Gunseikan declared that the cooperation of the Islamic community in respect to education was acceptable in so far as it was directed at full support to the Japanese Army and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious education would be permitted and officially supported with books and other facilities.

The Syuumubu established a permanent training centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty kiais and oelamas each.

These courses were also used to test whether Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a means of selecting suitable collaborators. These accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural population, and were responsible for the production and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient supply of labourers and for enlistments as "volunteer" or heiho.

The Japanese adopted the old device of working on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to persuade the kiais and oelmas to declare the Greater East Asia War as a "sabil" (holy) war against the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the "common ancestry," the "common race" and the "destiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians" were pointed out.

In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his religious institution, leaving the direction of the Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

From November 1943 the Mashumi became the organization through which the Japanese authorities ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded public opinion and executed espionage.

The relationship between the Mashumi and the Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the Syuumubu.

Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under locally prominent Kiais. They had the duty of making Military Administration policy understood in the villages. These agencies were gradually extended even to the smallest local subdivisions under a local Kiai.

The Syuumubu issued a publication called "Asshu'lah," edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, but printed in Arab script, the only script the orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was distributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

The Japanese also made several efforts to coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class. The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials of the many Chinese associations (which had all been dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization, but the effort completely failed.

The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few prominent pro-Nanking Chinese.

The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the customary lines, with its leaders appointed by the Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration as the prime object. No action was taken on their own initiative and the organization was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda and as an espionage organization.

At the same time the Japanese made certain concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese private school education, and for sending small remittances to their families in Japanese-occupied parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle strata of technical and administrative occupations, were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

The first effort to secure the cooperation of the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The Eurasians who had been regarded as "aliens," gradually began to be treated as belonging to the indigenous population next to the Indonesian group. The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians had to realize that from then on they were to feel and act as members of the Greater East Asia community under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce their Western ancestry.

The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit a number of their children to village schools which had so far been reserved for Indonesian children. Separate schools for Eurasian children remained forbidden.

In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided to dissolve the Putera and to replace it by an organization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

According to the Japanese it had failed to reach the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the total population of Java and supplied the manpower for army and labor services and the production of food crops for the Japanese. The movement became too strongly nationalistic.

Tonari Gumi

The new organization followed a pattern used in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with the organization for the distribution of essential supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of Java was divided into small communities of about 20 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Associations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on centralized lines. They were headed by a kumityoo, who was appointed from above and who was responsible for the execution of the orders given to him. All existing associations, social, fire precautionary, agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

The duties of this institution were very extensive. Not only distribution, but also regular training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the community had to lecture at least once a week to his people on Japanese ideology and the practical application thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims in regard to the population were extolled according to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service. This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

Other meetings were held for larger units (called aza; a village was divided into two or more aza) once a month. One member of each family had to attend these meetings.

All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi, including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members of the organization. Only membership gave distribution facilities.

On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially dissolved and the "Jawa Hookoo Kai" (Corporation for Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic groups was officially installed. This corporation remained as the instrument of Japanese control until August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

According to the official explanation accompanying the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the Military Administration to carry out its instructions in an atmosphere of 'friendly cooperation' with all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to see that these instructions reached all the people and it was to work in close relationship with the Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for

seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive support of the Military Administration. According to this explanation the Jawa Hookoo Kai was in fact an executive body, based on the principle of complete coordination of all inhabitants and was, therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

The central direction of the Jawa Hookoo Kai was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and consisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau under the supervision of the central direction had several Indonesians. Branches were established in all localities. The Ku Hookoo Kai, the smallest union, supervised one or more Iza which in turn supervised a number of Tonari Gumi.

The leader of these local Hookoo Kai was the head of the local administration, assisted by a council (Kaigi), appointed by him. A session of the Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when ways and means of promoting assistance to the Military Government had to be discussed.

The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the Jawa Hookoo Kai. Their task was:

- a. active support to police and Keibodden (village guards) in the defence of their country and during air raids, against enemy parachutists, enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.
- b. to make the inhabitants understand the aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military Administration.
- c. stimulation of increased food production; encouragement of delivery of these products to the authorities; the distribution of daily necessities.
- d. general support to the Military Administration, e.g., by protecting members of families of Heiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romashas (coolies) who had left their villages.
- e. mutual help and assistance.

The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, including the Japanese. The Huzin Kai (Women's Corporation), the Washumi (the Islamic Corporation), the Kakyoo Sookai (Corporation of Chinese), the Tai Tku Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Sidosya (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

The activities by the Eurasians for their mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in prison during the occupation as a result of ill-treatment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or sentences by courts martial.

Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured in such a way that false confessions were a daily occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the local nobility, were executed on an entirely unfounded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei. Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases where people of all races were most cruelly tortured on the strength of reports of a usually entirely innocent conversation, by means of the "water-cure", electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa constrictors, etc.

Outside Java the same policy was adhered to in regard to political and religious activities. Here again, following Tojo's promise, a number of prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to the Sangi Kai (local Advisory Councils) were established but this process was considerably slower than in Java. Territories administered by the Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes, Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuso Sangi-In for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in February 1945. No organization similar to the Putera was permitted in spite of requests from Indonesian intellectuals.

Compared with Java, propaganda in the other islands was more concentrated on the younger generation.

"Volunteers Corps" similar to the Giyu Gun were established.

The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were given full play during the course of 1944. Using the slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" and teaching

religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all sections of society by holding courses of instruction. The first group to be dealt with was that of school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads of villages, minor officials of the civil service, higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and personnel of all government offices. Even the smallest group was given attention in turn.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.

DOC. NO. 2750

IV. FOURTH PHASE

September 1944 - August 1945.

The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile had considerably changed. The break-through at Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very foundations of the Japanese defense. The TOJO cabinet was succeeded by the KOISO cabinet, which recognized that it had to face the isolation of the Southern Regions, and the necessity for the Japanese troops there to stand by themselves, and that it was more and more important to gain popular cooperation.

When the way in which TOJO's promise was going to be realized became known in August 1943, disappointment was expressed rather clearly among those prominent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in Japan's promises. The Japanese were warned that they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspirations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain the full cooperation from this group.

On 7 September 1944, in the Diet, Prime Minister KOISO, after having promised Korea and Formosa equality of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, made a promise of independence for the East Indies. (Exhibit No. 277).

In this speech it was not made clear exactly what region would gain independence when granted.

The promise of independence was conditioned on the people defending their own territory for the support of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence was only defined by reference to membership in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.

Previously, towards the end of August 1944, the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed confidentially of the contents of this statement, and issued certain secret orders to various Japanese organizations. Those orders, Prosecution documents Nos. 2756 and 2757, were recovered in the building, used by the Gunseikanbu during the Japanese occupation of Batavi

The promise made on 7 September 1944 by Premier Koiso was announced in Java by the Commander-in-Chief in the following words:

"As for the nation that will be set up in the future, it will be a just and true nation that will become a link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere and has the duty to contribute in the development of Greater East Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon.

"Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise the standard of the nation that will be set up so that it will become one of the Greater East Asiatic nations in the true sense, then it is very necessary that they train themselves ceaselessly to become a Greater East Asiatic people until the final victory is achieved, i.e., by thoroughly convincing themselves as a Greater East Asiatic people.

"Suppose the final victory will not be won, then the construction of Greater East Asia can not be materialized, and as a matter of course, the East Indies will not get their independence.

"Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all their efforts to win the final victory in a sphere of perfect friendship between all nationalities.

"They must patiently endure all hardships and they also must remove all obstacles that might come up in the future.

"And therefore, while waiting for the arrival of the moment of that glorious independence, all the inhabitants must work hard for the continuance of this war. With such an attitude the duties for the future can be fulfilled."

The "gratitude" of the Indonesians for Koiso's promise remained the theme on which the Japanese propaganda continued to play for months to come.

Doc. No. 2750

At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters were instructed to advise the Ministry of War as to what area should be declared "independent" the date on which it was to take place, and the form of the new government and state.

The Military Government of Java in reply submitted a report entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence", in which it was proposed to make Java independent first. Measures suggested to strengthen the national consciousness were the creation of the Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State), and increased participation in the administration.

Only two practical steps were taken at first to carry out Koiso's promise. On 8 September 1944 the population was allowed henceforward to fly the Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag but only on certain specified holidays, subject to strict regulations as to place and size. On Government buildings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was to be flown. On that same date permission was given to sing the "Indonesia Raya"-song (Song of Great Indonesia) as the national anthem.

On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief convoked a special session of the Tyuwoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the question of how the Indonesians could show to Japan and her army their intense gratitude for the promise of future independence, and how the will of the people "to fight to bring about the destruction of America and England could still further be enhanced."

Another extraordinary session of the Tyuwoo Sangi-In was held on 17 November 1944, and a motion was adopted to lay down a so-called "Pancha Dharma" (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a "compass" for the Indonesian population.

This "Pancha Dharma" reads as follows:

"For the Indonesian people, to wit:

- "1. We, along with other nations in Greater East Asia, are in this war one in life and death with Dai Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all sincerity because this present war stands up for justice and righteousness.

Doc. No. 2750

2. We found an Indonesian State that is independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous and that always will value the spiritual merits of Dai-Nippon, and that will live as a true member in the family-sphere of Greater East Asia.
3. We will sincerely endeavour to achieve a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's culture.
4. While maintaining strong and lasting friendly relations with the nations of Greater East Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart and with an unwavering mind while we will always believe in God Almighty.
5. With a united and burning desire we strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting World Peace based on the family-conception of the whole mankind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu."

On 1 December 1944 participation in the Administration was extended to the appointment of Indonesian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vice Governors) in several Syuu, and of more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) to the various Departments of the Gunseikanbu. A Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established to meet regularly to advise the Gunseikanbu in the periods when the Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was not in session.

Meanwhile the propaganda service had introduced a new slogan for the "Benteng Perjuangan Jawa" (Java One Fortress). The object was to bring the population to the maximum war effort in view of the threat of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air Raid Defence and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine but besides, the population was worked upon by the powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla fighting. They were instructed in the methods of destroying small enemy formations with primitive weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass action.

During a propaganda meeting in Batavia offigies of Roosevelt, Churchill and Van der Plas (a prominent Dutch administrator) were burned after having been paraded through the whole town. American, British, and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration. Religious propaganda urged the Mohammedans to declare Holy War on the Occidental Powers.

Three new semi-military organizations were established during this period, and the Tonari Gumi, finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboodanin the defence of the village. On no occasion were these simple villagers ever told that such action on their part in war time would constitute a violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the opposing party to treat them as 'francetireurs'.

This training had an unintended result. One night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer Defence Corps at Blitar (East-Java) made a surprise attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured the arms as well as key-points in the town, e.g., Kempoi HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, etc. Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued, the victims being all non-Indonesians and included Japanese. In the course of the next days the movement was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out by violence and bloodshed.

There was also increasing resistance against Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially against the delivery of agricultural produce and the recruiting of native labor.

In order to overcome this resistance, strong measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian officials who were held responsible for the poor results in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substituted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite politicians. Those new officials had come to the fore through the Java Hookoo Kai, or through the religious courses. The new arrivals in the Indonesian administrative corps were not fully competent, and they always had Japanese advisers. Approximately one-third of the corps was staffed with nationalists favourably disposed towards the Japanese. Required delivery of foodstuff and recruitment of coolies and volunteers were not achieved by many Ken.

The Japanese realized that they were increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the people and that they would have to bear the consequences of their own propaganda.

In September 1942 already, Count Hideo Kodama, then adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of Java visited Tokyo to try to arouse interest in local views concerning the East Indies. In November 1943 Sukarno was sent to Japan and pressed Premier Tojo to grant independence, but obtained no definite answer. At the end of 1944, Hayashi, the then highest civil adviser to the Java Military Government went to Tokyo with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief in Java to try and persuade Japan to support puppet-independence for the East Indies.

A Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State) was instituted on 29 April 1945 with the object of influencing the minds of the future "leaders" of the "independent" state and of imbuing them with ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this leadership.

Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945, a conference took place at Singapore, attended by Chiefs of General Affairs Departments of all areas under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising Java and Sumatra and commanded by Itagaki. At this conference the Soemubutyoo of Java explained to what extent the national consciousness of the Indonesians had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact that there was no other way to regain the confidence of the population but by carrying out the promise of independence.

Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Headquarters on "independence." Java promptly responded with a proposition to declare the whole of the Netherlands East Indies independent within a year. Singapore dodged the issue and said that it was not yet time to initiate independence.

Subsequently, on 26 May 1945, at the instigation of Itagaki, a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed to convene a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This committee was installed on 28 May 1945,

and took a solemn oath of loyalty to live and to die with Japan.

"Naval" territories (Borneo, the Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented at this conference, and measures discussed only related to "Army" areas which narrowed down to Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged behind that of Java, and it was not until February 1945 that a Central Advisory Council for Sumatra was installed.

The Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence consisted of approximately 60 members, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. A Japanese was Deputy Chairman, and seven others were "special members". The Committee had an Administrative Bureau with a Japanese Deputy Chief.

The Ordinance founding this Committee required that its findings had to be reported to the Gunseikan. Later, a new "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" would be formed. It was clearly stipulated that the "Committee for Study" was to confine itself to study and was not empowered to make any decision.

The Committee met twice, from 29 May to 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings were not open to the public. Among other things, a constitution resembling that of the Philippine puppet-state was drafted.

There was disappointment when it was learned that the Committee had no power to make decisions and had to restrict itself to Java.

On 17 July 1945, the Supreme War Direction Council decided to adopt the policy of granting "independence" to the East Indies as soon as possible. (Pros. Doc. No. 2759, Court Exhibit No. ____).

This decision reached Java on 21 July 1945. According to directives from Tokyo, the territory of the new state was to comprise the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a "Committee for the Preparation for Independence" was to be set up in the near future.

Emphasis was laid upon the necessity for safeguarding the requirements for military operations. The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon, which had submitted in June 1945 that the establishment of the puppet state should not take place before the middle of 1946, and that the abovenamed Committee should at the earliest be set up towards the

end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned. At this Conference a scheme was drawn up for guiding preparations for so-called independence, wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

V. THE FIFTH PHASE

August-September 1945.

In the beginning of August 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to create this state in September 1945. In pursuance of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for the Preparation for Independence).

This was effected by proclamation of the same date, reading as follows:

"Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese Southern Army).

"Concerning the 'Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia'.

"Based on the proclamation of the Japanese Government of 7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun has consistently been taking measures to guide the Indonesians. Owing to the spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they have all succeeded in achieving much and fast progress in their training for government and for the defence of the country with burning enthusiasm.

"In response to the activity and the wholehearted efforts of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the installation towards the middle of August of a Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee shall accelerate all measures concerning the final preparations for the installation of the Government of an independent Indonesia.

12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal Terauchi was published in Java, the Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-in-Chief) of Java also

issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stated:

"The desire to become an independent nation has now reached a high point and is flaring up all over Indonesia. It was in response to the expression of this desire that the Dai Nippon Teikoku solemnly promised to grant her independence, in accordance with the basic principle of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the ideals of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole population has exerted itself to its utmost to honour the national obligations and the stronger became their determination to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that the foundations for their independence could be built up fully and speedily. And now, as an independent nation, constituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place in the battle-line for the common defence of Greater East Asia."

The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government) on this occasion stated the following:

"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, is based upon humanitarian principles so as to contribute in the formation of a new world order. Therefore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesians and their intense enthusiasm conform with the basic ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit of Hakko Ichiu.

"A new nation will have to meet some essential requirements: it must have sufficient strength, while its administrative machinery should be organized in a smooth and simple way. Therefore, the first duty is to bring the war now being faced by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To this end the Indonesian nation must develop its war-potential to its full extent, and together with Dai Nippon fight unceasingly to achieve final victory in this Greater East Asia War."

A few days of silence on the subject of independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between Japan and Indonesia: "To live or die with Japan".

Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, was flown to Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11 August. They were told by the latter that it was originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese Government. On account of difficulties and dangers of communications and pressure of time, the Field Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The main points were:

- a. The Japanese Government had been pleased to institute a Committee for the Preparation for Independence.
- b. The territory of the New State would include the entire Netherlands East Indies.
- c. The date when independence would be proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon as preparations were completed.
- d. The independent Government would be installed first in the island where preparations had been first completed. Subsequently this Government would be gradually extended to include areas where preparations had been completed.
- e. All Japanese demands in connection with the military situation were to be complied with.
- f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the Committee, which further consisted of thirteen representatives from Java, three from Sumatra and five from territories under naval occupation. Those members were appointed on nomination by local Japanese military commanders.

On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java reported the news of Sukarno's return, and he was welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the Commander-

in-Chief and many of the military and Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile, the Committee members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali, whose names were now published, were flown to Java, after having received their instructions from the military or naval authorities of those areas.

Originally the first meeting of the Committee was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August, however, members of the Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation.

During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945, the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth leaders, prominent during that period, met at the residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Maeda. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred with the Soomubutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department) and Maeda. It was decided to proclaim independence the next morning.

The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for the Study of Preparations for Independence) was hastily altered, and on the following morning the Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda service on the verandah of his house.


The population of Java was still uninformed, except through rumour, about the capitulation of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been unfitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat secret.

The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese propaganda service, and the local broadcasting stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no mention of anything but the announcement of independence and the proclamation of the constitution.

On 21 August 1945, the papers published, next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia, the following words:

"Dai Nippon is and will always be a friend to Indonesia, immutably and forever. We never will forget our oath; united, in life and in death."

Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese authorities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has been called the "stolen week".



Kamban
on

"no diff - this a copy not in pay on a copy not in pay
this is being in pay for copy not in today"

Journal - People

60 - 30 Dute
1 Pres Dute
20 Indo elec
10 - 5/11/11

- ⑦ The propaganda of the surprise attack
- ⑧ the propaganda of the hatred and a revenge for Japan
- ⑨ ~~the~~ propaganda for victory
- ⑩ The many kind of propaganda for a Japanese strategy
- ⑪ The True story of a propaganda for a homeland in U. S.
- ⑫ the ~~true~~ ^{substance} of a war-propaganda and adventure
- ⑬ Propaganda's technique and ~~physical~~ ^{effect} physical effect
- ⑭ analogical propaganda for a war and peace
- ⑮ the kind of ^{the} war slogan
- ⑯ the war's title (term) and 6th, 7th rang
the each kind of the people movement

④

The war propaganda of the enemy
American

ASAHI correspondent in
N.Y. GORO NAKANO

publish by New Sun Co
(SHIN. TAISO SHA)

Pub-1945
May 15

Index.

- No I The war propaganda of the enemy
American
- 1 United States claims against all in propaganda
 - 2 a proclamation of war - U.S.
 - 3 F.D.R. tricks peoples about war
 - 4 war time propaganda strategy of F.D.R.
 - 5 sweat and poisoned words to increase war spirits for the issue of the war
 - 6 strategy's propagator of the outbreak of the war. (7) Next page
- No II the newspaper propaganda
of enemy & American
- 1
 - 2

Doc. No. 2885

WAR CRIMES DEATH VICTIMS

戦争犯罪ニ依リ死亡セル犠牲者

OF

U.S. & FILIPINO ARMED FORCES & CIVILIANS

米国軍及フィリッピン軍並ニ市民

AS KNOWN AND ESTIMATED BY THEATERS

判明セルモノ及戦場別予想数

U.S. ARMED FORCES VICTIMS 米国軍ノ犠牲者 23,039
 FILIPINO ARMED FORCES VICTIMS フィリッピン軍ノ犠牲者 27,258
 U.S. CIVILIAN VICTIMS 米国市民ノ犠牲者 595
 FILIPINO CIVILIAN VICTIMS フィリッピン市民ノ犠牲者 91,184

GRAND TOTAL 總計 142,076*

* POPULATION OF TULSA, OKLA. AS OF 1940

ソネマノタノヲ1940年ノ人口

	ETO† ヨーロッパ 作戦地域	MTOT‡ 地中海 作戦地域	PACIFIC AREAS** 太平洋地域			CHINA 支那		INDIA*** BURMA 印度 緬甸	TOTAL 合計
	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U.S. & FILIPINO ARMED FORCES 米国軍及ビ フィリッピン軍	U. S. CIVILIANS 米国市民	FILIPINO CIVILIANS フィリッピン市民	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U. S. CIVILIANS 米国市民	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	
A.1 MURDER 殺人	7,096	110	2,253	317	89,818	46	3	13	99,656
B. CRUELTY & TORTURE 残虐及拷問	202	5	1,646	25	1,258	7	0	0	3,143
C.1 STARVATION & NEGLECT 餓死及怠慢	1,872	0	35,092 (12,000 U.S. ARMED FORCES + 23,092 FILIPINO ARMED FORCES 米国軍 12,000 + フィリッピン軍 23,092)	244	7	181	2	153	37,551
D.2 OTHER ASSAULTS & MISTREATMENTS 其他暴行及虐待	896	0	267	0	101	458	4	0	1,726
SUB-TOTAL 小計			39,258	586	91,184	692	9		
TOTAL 合計	10,066	115	131,028			701		166	142,076


* DOES NOT INCLUDE YUGOSLAVIA. ユーゴスラヴィアヲ含マズ
 ESTIMATE OF VICTIMS FOR YUGOSLAVIA, 150. ユーゴスラヴィアノ予想犠牲者数150

** INCLUDES CELEBES AREA. セレベス地域ヲ含ム

*** DOES NOT INCLUDE CELEBES AREA. セレベス地域ヲ含マズ

† DOES NOT INCLUDE U.S. CIVILIANS ESTIMATED AT 200. 200ト予想サル米国市民ヲ含マズ

Copy By:



Signal Corps

U.S. Army

Doc 2885

書類番号二八八五号

証明書

余即チ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部法務部副指
揮官歩兵少佐(TD)ティ・アール・シー・キング／
キング／ハ添附セル海図ハ法務部ニ依リ同部ノ電報即
チ国際檢察部書類番号オミエ三〇号中ニ提供
サレタル資料ニ基キ在ワシントン陸軍省ニ依リ作
製セラレタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス

署名／歩兵少佐(TD)ティ・アール・シー・キング

／T. R. C. KING

証人／署名／ジョン・アール・プリッチャード

／JOHN R. PRITCHARD

一九四六年／昭和二十年／十月廿九日日本 東京
ニ於テ余ノ面前ニテ宣誓セリ

署名／即決裁判所 歩兵大尉ジョン・アール

プリッチャード／JOHN R. PRITCHARD

Doc. No. 2885

WAR CRIMES DEATH VICTIMS

戦争犯罪ニ依リ死亡セル犠牲者

O F

U.S. & FILIPINO ARMED FORCES & CIVILIANS

米国軍及フィリッピン軍並ニ市民

AS KNOWN AND ESTIMATED BY THEATERS

判明セルモノ及戦場別予想数

U.S. ARMED FORCES VICTIMS 米国軍ノ犠牲者 23,039
 FILIPINO ARMED FORCES VICTIMS フィリッピン軍ノ犠牲者 27,258
 U.S. CIVILIAN VICTIMS 米国市民ノ犠牲者 595
 FILIPINO CIVILIAN VICTIMS フィリッピン市民ノ犠牲者 91,184

GRAND TOTAL 總計 142,076*

* POPULATION OF TULSA, OKLA. AS OF 1940

シタマハルモノハ1940年ノ人口

	ETO† ヨーロッパ 作戦地域	MTOT* 地中海 作戦地域	PACIFIC AREAS** 太平洋地域			CHINA 支那		INDIA*** BURMA 印度 緬甸	TOTAL 合計
	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U.S. & FILIPINO ARMED FORCES 米国軍及ビ フィリッピン軍	U. S. CIVILIANS 米国市民	FILIPINO CIVILIANS フィリッピン市民	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	U.S. CIVILIANS 米国市民	U.S. ARMED FORCES ONLY 米国軍ノミ	
A 1 MURDER 殺人	7,096	110	2,253	317	89,818	46	3	13	99,656
B 2 CRUELTY 殘虐 & 拷問 TORTURE	202	5	1,646	25	1,258	7	0	0	3,143
C 3 STARVATION 餓死 & 怠慢 NEGLECT	1,872	0	35,092 (12,000 U.S. ARMED FORCES +23,092 FILIPINO ARMED FORCES 米国軍12,000 + フィリッピン軍23,092)	244	7	181	2	153	37,551
D 2 OTHER ASSAULTS 其他暴行 & 虐待 MISTREATMENTS	896	0	267	0	101	458	4	0	1,726
SUB-TOTAL 小計			39,258	586	91,184	692	9		
TOTAL 合計	10,066	115	131,028			701		166	142,076

* DOES NOT INCLUDE YUGOSLAVIA. ユーゴスラヴィア含マズ

** ESTIMATE OF VICTIMS FOR YUGOSLAVIA, 150. ユーゴスラヴィアノ予想犠牲者数150

*** INCLUDES CELEBES AREA. セレス地域ヲ含ム

**** DOES NOT INCLUDE CELEBES AREA. セレス地域ヲ含マズ

† DOES NOT INCLUDE U.S. CIVILIANS ESTIMATED AT 200. 200ノ予想ナル米国市民ヲ含マズ

Doc 285

書類番号ニハ五号

証 明 書

余即チ聯合國最重指揮官總司令部法務部副指揮官步兵少佐(T.D)ティ・トール・ニー・キング/T.R.C. KING/ハ添附スル海圖ハ法務部ニ依リ同部電報即チ国際檢察部書類番号オニエ三〇五中ニ提供サシタル資料ニ基キ在リニ陸軍省ニ依リ作製セシタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス

署名/步兵少佐(T.D)ティ・トール・ニー・キング

T.R.C. KING

証人署名/ジョントール・プリッチャード

JOHN R. PRITCHARD

一九四六年/昭和二十一年/十月廿九日日本東京ニ於テ余ノ面前ニ直壇ヤリ

署名/即決裁判所、步兵大尉ジョントール・プリッチャード

JOHN R. PRITCHARD

9 JULY 1946

CINCAFPAC 0907471

WASHINGTON (WDSKA). . . PRIORITY

PAREN Z 07232 PAREN REURAD WILLIAM SUGAR LOVE TWO
THREE EIGHT TWO FIVE PD FIGURES GIVEN ARE THE CLOSEST
ESTIMATES THAT CAN BE ARRIVED AT HERE PD NUMBER OF VICTIMS
IN UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES PAREN THIS INCLUDES UNITED
STATES ARMY AND FILIPINO ARMY PAREN PD MURDER CLN TWO TWO FIVE
THREE SCLN CRUELTY AND TORTURE CLN ONE SIX FOUR SIX SCLN
STARVATION AND NEGLECT CLN THREE FIVE NAUGHT NINE TWO SCLN
OTHER ASSAULTS AND MISTREATMENTS CLN TWO SIX SEVEN PD
FIGURES FOR AMERICAN CIVILIANS PD MURDER CLN THREE ONE SEVEN
SCLN CRUELTY AND TORTURE CLN TWO FIVE SCLN STARVATION AND
NEGLECT CLN TWO FOUR FOUR SCLN OTHER ASSAULTS AND MISTREATMENTS
CLN NAUGHT PD FIGURES FOR FILIPINO CIVILIANS PD MURDER CLN
EIGHT NINE EIGHT ONE EIGHT SCLN CRUELTY CLN ONE TWO FIVE
EIGHT SCLN STARVATION CLN SEVEN SCLN OTHER ASSAULTS AND
MISTREATMENTS CLN ONE NAUGHT ONE PD

OFFICIAL

APPROVED BY:

/s/ John B. Cooley
JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

/s/ Frank E. Meek
FRANK E. MEEK
Lt. Col., FA,
Executive Officer.

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ John R. Pritchard
JOHN R. PRITCHARD,
Captain, Infantry,

IN THE CLEAR
PRIORITY

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true copy of a cablegram sent by Legal Section to the War Department in Washington, based in part on the results of investigations conducted in the field.

/s/ T. R. C. King
T. R. C. King,
Major, Inf. (TD)

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 29th day
of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

Secret
OSAMU

SAN Jo Ko No 142
Notification regarding measures ensuing
from the Proclamation of Admission of the
Independence of the East-Indies.

From: Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps

To :

7. September 1944

We hereby notify you that, based on the Prime Minister's proclamation regarding the granting of the independence of the East-Indies at the 85th Special Session of the Diet today, the 7th of September, it is decided that the army will meet the situation properly generally in accordance with the following stipulations:

1. The purport of the granting of independence shall be thoroughly understood (based on the Prime Minister's speech).

2. It is not permitted to touch upon the time /T.N. of the granting of independence/ the sphere of the East-Indies nor the form of government until these are finally decided.

3. National consciousness must be raised to the highest degree; especially during the execution of the war this must be utilized to strengthen defence, co-operation with Military Government, and to make Japan and Java one and inseparable.

4. There shall be no great alterations in the operations and the business structure of the Military Government. However, participation in the Government shall be enlarged and strengthened, and political training shall be carried out.

5. Nationalistic speeches and activities shall be actively allowed; for that purpose the following measures shall be taken:

a. Permission to sing the national anthem and to use the national flag;

b. The use of nationalistic terms such as "the Indonesian people" shall not be restricted.

c. The appointment of nationalists.

d. Those advocates of independence who are connected with the Communist Party shall not be allowed to exist.

6. Investigation and study necessary for independence executed by the local inhabitants under the guidance of Military Government shall be recognized.

7. Thorough measures shall be taken for the spreading of the Japanese language, the adoption of Japanese institutions and the infusion of the Japanese culture.

8. There shall be no distinction between the natives and other races, especially those who are to be treated as local inhabitants, but they must be made to understand the elemental point that they must participate in the construction of a new society, and must co-operate with all their might.

9. All Japanese must realize and put into practice the mission of this new era in which the divine work of Hakko-ichu (T.N. Same as "ichibu") (T.N. the whole world one family) is to be carried out. Especially the idea of colonial subjugation has to be banned; and towards the natives we must be like parents and elder brothers and sisters, approaching them with affectionate feelings while instructing and guiding them sternly. Haughty and arrogant speech or behavior shall not be allowed under any circumstances.

10. In guiding the public opinion stress shall be laid on the raising of national consciousness, the intensification of war-mindedness, confidence in and reliance upon Japan and the desperate determination to win complete victory ensuing therefrom, and on the manifestation of leadership in carrying out these things.

11. Looking at the other side of the joy on the granting of independence we naturally anticipate the confusion accompanying shifts and changes of powers, but it is absolutely forbidden to meddle in these; we must guide them always standing aloof.

12. Although the insatiability which springs from the Indonesian character may sometimes provoke our resentment, we must not be hostile, but guide them, sternly indicating the established policy; a so-called flattering attitude is not allowed.

13. As for the instruction of the Volunteer Defence Corps, on this occasion particularly we must scrutinize the attitude of officers and men towards them, and the main points of the instruction in order to deepen the feeling of unity; and we must not let them get the feeling that they form an independent army.

Special attention shall be paid to the training of instructors. This also applies to the Pei-Fo (T. N. auxiliary troops).

14. In observing the real situation of the people we must not fall into the superficial view that the aim of securing their confidence in Japan and raising their war-mindedness has been attained, by judging from their enthusiasm and festive excitement; but we must observe them, guiding them firmly and continually according to our principle of guidance.

15. Planning and execution in the field of general direction shall be the duty of Military Government, and others must co-operate with it. There must be no inconsistency whatsoever in carrying out the policy.

16. In general the several functions will be as follows:

a. The 7th day of September is designated as National Independence Commemoration Day, and the week from the 7th until the 13th shall be the National Festival (temporary name) and thanksgiving functions will be performed at that time.

b. On the 7th the Provincial Governors shall assemble and the Commander-in-Chief will indicate the policy to cope with the new situation.

c. On the 8th it is anticipated that a ceremony will be held at which the representatives of the inhabitants will express their gratitude.

d. On the 9th or the 10th a special session of the Council shall be convened in every province and the special municipality, and on the 11th, a special session of the Central Council.

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned W. F. GOUT, first lieut. RNIA, acting head of the section "Japanese Affairs" of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed photostat is a full, true, complete and accurate photographic copy of the original Japanese document entitled:

OSAMU SAN SEI KO No. 142.

"Notification regarding the measures ensuing from the proclamation of Admission of the Independence of the East-Indies"

From Chief of Staff OSAMU Army Corps - 7-9-44,

which original Japanese document No. 65 is a part of the official records of NEFIS.

signature: /s/ W. F. Gout

Batavia, September 6th, 1946

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. de WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA, Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

signature: /s/ K. A. de Weerd

1353

*confidential**copy*

Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlightenment
attendant on the Proclamation re Recognition
of the Independence of the EAST-INDIES.

anti-Semitism

GUNSEIKAMBU (Inspectorate of
Military Administration).

September 7, 1944. (Showa 19)

Policy.

Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-Chief, to promote the racial consciousness of the INDONESIANS and to incite this into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

Outline.

1. The promotion of the racial consciousness of the INDONESIAN Race by the establishment of racial ideals shall be planned.

2. The responsibility and efforts of the race shall be stressed, in addition to which they shall be made to realize their aggravated mission for the complete prosecution of the War, and the inspiration which may be aroused shall be incited into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

3. Measures necessary for the Independence shall be left entirely to the ARMY, and they (T.N. the people) shall be made to understand the necessity of offering themselves entirely for defense and services to the Military Administration during the War.

4. They shall be made to look back upon the process of the glorious spreading of creed of "Hakko-iu" (T.N. same as ICHI-U, i.e. making the whole world as one family) and the realization of the national policy of the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) by means of the independence and participation in the government of BURMA and the Philippines; in this way they shall be induced to increase their confidence in and reliance upon the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) and also

to manifest their deep emotion for the August Virtue of His Majesty and the sincerity of their devotion to the Emperor.

5. Those who have blamed persons co-operating with the Army or those who have been negative in their co-operation with JAPAN while maintaining a dubious attitude, shall be ostracised, and the fact that co-operation with the Military Administration implies the prosperity of INDONESIA shall be clarified, thereby forcing out and checking all critical speech and actions.

6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the GREAT EAST ASIA Conference and the Joint Declaration of GREAT EAST ASIA, and by the process of realization (T.N. of the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to become conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding the construction.

7. In order to check the enemies' counterpropaganda beforehand, they shall be reminded of the past when they groaned for ages in misery under Jewish Oppression under the external appearance of dazzling splendour, by tracing back the history of the atrocities of the U.S.A., BRITAIN and HOLLAND.

8. The co-operation of the CHINESE Residents, HALF-CASTES and AFABS is also worthy of attention. It shall be emphasized that these people too, while basking in the new glory similar to the INDONESIANS, must, together with the latter, exert themselves towards the construction of a new society; and the policy of concord of all the peoples with the INDONESIAN Race as the nucleus shall be adhered to.

9. The new policy shall be glorified by utilizing the actual results and the present condition of the co-operation of the people, the policy of the organization of the Volunteer Defence Corps and the participation in the Government as the background.

Measures.

1. Every kind of information-organization and primitive method shall be utilized.

2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins; there shall be no suspension of publication on Sundays; and on the first and second days four page newspapers shall be issued.

3. As for movies, the functions during a week after the official announcement shall be filmed and edited, by also taking into consideration the effects in foreign countries.

4. In the broadcasting the text of the official announcement in TOKYO, the statement of the Commander-in-chief and the talks of the Authorities of the Military Administration, etc., shall be repeated, accompanied by clear and cheerful music. Moreover, the inspiration and the determination of the native inhabitants shall be put in the daily programmes.

5. The national flag of Great JAPAN shall be hoisted for one week from the day of the Official Announcement.

6. The details of this Outline shall be planned and executed by the Department of Propaganda in co-operation with the Bureau of Native Affairs.

To be distributed for office-purposes to:

Department of Propaganda (including news correspondents),
Bureau of Native Affairs,
Bureau of Japanese Affairs.

CERTIFICATE

The undersigned W. H. GOUT, first lieutenant RNIA, acting head of the section "Japanese Affairs" of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed photostat is a full, true, complete and accurate photographic copy of the original Japanese document, entitled:

Basic main points of Propaganda and Enlightenment ensuing from the Proclamation of Admission of the Independence of the East-Indies. Gunseikanbu (Military Administration) 7.9.44,

which original Japanese document No. 66 is a part of the official records of NEFIS.

Signature:

(s) W. H. Gout

Batavia,
September 6th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. A. DE WEEED, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA, Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

Signature:

K. A. DE WEEED

SEAL

SCHEDULE OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE TOTAL
WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

I, KURT STEINER Second Lieutenant, Army of the United States and Assistant Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section do hereby certify as follows:

1. ___ This Schedule is submitted in accordance with directions given by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is respectfully referred to pages 8871, 8872, 8875, 8876, 8877, 8909 and 8910 of the Transcript of the Proceedings of the Tribunal held on Wednesday 30th October, 1946.

2. ___ Full enquiries have been made by me from the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (ATIS) and from other sources and the Schedule comprises a list of all the publications of the Total War Research Institute of which I have been able to obtain information.

3. ___ All those publications (a total of 71) which are shown in the first column of the Schedule as having an International Prosecution Section Document number are held by the Section (excepting those which are indicated as having been produced to the Tribunal as exhibits) and will be made available to the Defendants on request being made.

4. ___ Those publications (a total of 27) which are not shown as having an International Prosecution Section Document Number were sent by ATIS to the Document Centre at Washington some time ago, it being considered that they would not be required for the purposes of these proceedings.

Signed at Tokyo by the said KURT STEINER)
this 22 day of November 1946)

Kurt Steiner, 2d Lt.
(Signed) AUS

Witness to the Signature of the said
KURT STEINER:

) Turner D. White (signed)
) Capt. AUS
Summary Court Officer

SCHEDULE OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE
TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.
	(1)	"Policy on Imperial Total War" (Classification "Military Top Secret").	1941
1355 *	(2)	"Reports on 1942 Total Research" (Classification "Secret").	1942
690-A	(3)	"Total War on Imperial Transportation" (Classification "Secret").	May 1942
1660 *	(4)	"Opinion of Research Items" (Classification "Top Secret")	
1583	(5)	"Reports on 1943's Total Research" (Classification "Top Secret").	
1548 *	(6)	"Data Pertaining to Petroleum" (Classification "Top Secret")	1942
1524 *	(7)	"Summary on Total War" (Classification "Secret").	July 1941
	(8)	"Guide on Wartime Trade". (Classification "Top Secret").	1941
1594 *	(9)	"Discussion from the Standpoint of Total War regarding Present Situation of Japan". (Classification "Top Secret").	January 1944
	(10)	"Research on Important Matters from the Standpoint of Total War". (Classification "Top Secret").	March 1944
	(11)	"Resources, Manpower and Transportation from the Standpoint of National Defense" (Classification "Secret").	1941
1401 *	(12)	"Fundamental Investigating Reports on Wartime Industry" (Classification "Part Military Resources Confidential").	March 1943
	(13)	"Table of 1943 Steel Production Plan" (Classification "Specific as General Mobilization Top Secret").	April 1943
1604	(14)	"Summary on Adjusting Japan and China's New Relationship" (Classification "Top Secret").	November 1938

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
1521 *	(15)	"Table Discussion Pertaining to Complete Remaining Business" (Classification "Secret").	1941
1521 *	(16)	"Suggestions for Implementing the Decision for the Round Table Conference". (Classification "Top Secret").	1941
2224	(17)	"Files Pertaining to Train People for Total War" (Classification "Confidential").	1942
	(18)	"Outline on War History" (Classification "Confidential").	June 1942
	(19)	"Soviet Russia's Fighting Power" (Classification "Secret").	August 1942
	(20)	"Long Range Estimate of the Future of the Great East Asia" (Classification "Secret").	1941
2408	(21)	"Current Five Year Special Plan for Exports and Imports" (Classification "Top Secret").	(October 1938 (recopy-October 1941
1543 *	(22)	"Special Plan for Export and Import under State of War" (Classification "Top Secret")	April 1938
1832	(23)	"Plan for Allocating Ship Bottom Required for the Export and Import Trade Plan" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1938 October 1941- recopy
	(24)	"Estimates of the Power of Germany, United States, Great Britain, Russia and China (Chungking Government)" Volume I, ("Military and Unmilitary Top Secret"), Volume II "Top Secret", Volume III ("Military Top Secret").	September 1943
	(25)	"Estimates of the Power of Imperial Japan including the Occupied Areas" (Classification "Military Secret") Volumes I and II : -	August 1943
		(a) Volume I : Military and Politics	
1651		(b) Volume II : Economics	
2418	(26)	"National Preparations for War" (Classification "Top Secret").	December 1941
1549 *	(27)	"Documents pertaining to the Change of the Educational System" (Classification "Confidential").	September 1943

IPS Doc. No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute
	(28)	"Analysis of USSR Supply and Demand of Natural Resources". (Classification "Secret")	1941
	(29)	"Analysis of Great Britain Supply and Demand of Natural Resources" (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
	(30)	"Actual Conditions of Greater East Asia Sphere" (Classification "Secret")	1941
	(31)	"Agreements Carried out among Europe, Africa and the United States" (Classification "Secret")	December 1941
2401	(32)	"Research pertaining to estimation of National Economic Strength" (Classification "Top Secret")	October 1941
1679	(33)	"Reference Material for the Estimation of National Economic Strength" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
2208	(34)	"Research Pertaining to Supply and Demand of Laborers and Technicians" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1620	(35)	"Reference Materials for the War-time Financial Programme" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
	(36)	"Statistical Materials relating to World War I and the Aftermath" (Classification "Top Secret").	November 1941
1507 *	(37)	"Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1522 #	(38)	"The Policy for an Expansion Programme of the Principal Industries" (Classification "Top Secret").	September 1941
1544 *	(39)	"Plan for Replenishing Technicians, Skilled Laborers and General Laborers for Expanding Productive Power" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1546	(40)	"Study re Self Sufficiency of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as its Leader". (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
	(41)	"Analysis of North America's Supply and Demand of Natural Resources" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941

IPS Doc. No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute
	(28)	"Analysis of USSR Supply and Demand of Natural Resources". (Classification "Secret")	1941
	(29)	"Analysis of Great Britain Supply and Demand of Natural Resources" (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
	(30)	"Actual Conditions of Greater East Asia Sphere" (Classification "Secret")	1941
	(31)	"Agreements Carried out among Europe, Africa and the United States" (Classification "Secret")	December 1941
2401	(32)	"Research pertaining to estimation of National Economic Strength" (Classification "Top Secret")	October 1941
1679	(33)	"Reference Material for the Estimation of National Economic Strength" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
2208	(34)	"Research Pertaining to Supply and Demand of Laborers and Technicians" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1620	(35)	"Reference Materials for the War-time Financial Programme" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
	(36)	"Statistical Materials relating to World War I and the Aftermath" (Classification "Top Secret").	November 1941
1507 *	(37)	"Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1522 #	(38)	"The Policy for an Expansion Programme of the Principal Industries" (Classification "Top Secret").	September 1941
1544 *	(39)	"Plan for Replenishing Technicians, Skilled Laborers and General Laborers for Expanding Productive Power" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1546	(40)	"Study re Self Sufficiency of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as its Leader". (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
	(41)	"Analysis of North America's Supply and Demand of Natural Resources" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
	(42)	"Study of Economic Resources of United States and Latin American Countries and their Future Potentialities". (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1472 *	(43)	"Outline of Economical Warfare" (Classification "Secret").	December 1941
2402	(44)	"Plan for Establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Classification "Top Secret").	January 1942
1471 *	(45)	"Estimating the Future of East Asia from an Economic Standpoint of View" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
	(46)	"Data on the Trend of National Defense of the Powers" (Classification "Top Secret").	January 1942
1344	(47)	"Presumption of the Future Wars from the Standpoint of Arms and Technical Science" (Classification "Secret").	January 1941
1473 *	(48)	"Study on Total War Pertaining to National Strength of Imperial Japan and Foreign Powers" (Classification "Top Secret").	September 1944
1621 *	(49)	"Establishment of a Greater East Asia - First Phase in the Total War Plan" (Classification "Top Secret").	February 1942
	(50)	"History of Economic Warfare" (Classification not specified).	July 1942
1578	(51)	"Records of Studies on Governing and Post-War reconstruction History of Occupied Countries" (draft) (Classification "Confidential").	July 1942
1367 *	(52)	"Daily Log on Training Affairs" (Classification "Confidential").	July 1942
	(53)	"Document Pertaining to Training Affairs" (Classification "Top Secret" and "Confidential").	March 1943
2598	(54)	"Preliminary Research Reports on the Draft Plan for the Establishment of GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Plans for carrying out the First Phase of Total War for the Establishment of Hegemony over East Asia". (Classification "Top Secret" and "Confidential").	January 1942

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
2264	(55)	(a) "File of Programme for the Carrying Out of Combined Studies" (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
	(b)	"Long Range Financial ^{Economic} Programme for a 5-Year period starting 1942" (Classification "Top Secret").	
	(c)	"Projects on assigned problems for use at the combined studies of 29 October 1941" (Classification "Confidential").	
	(d)	"The Policies of various nations in connection with East Asia" (Classification "Top Secret").	
	(56)	"Critical Observation on June Lectures" (Classification not specified).	July 1943
1368 *	(57)	"Estimates of the Domestic and Foreign Situation under simulated Total War in the early part of 1941". (Classification "Top Secret").	1941
	(58)	"Impressions of the Inspection Tour within the Country for the Purpose of Total War Research" (Classification "Confidential").	1943
	(59)	"Observation and Impressions of Summer Bivouac Training". (Classification "Confidential").	1943
1566 *	(60)	"Studies Concerning Organization and Direction in National Total War". (Classification "Secret")	February 1941
1668	(61)	(a) "Critical Observation Pertaining to the Summary of Emergency Disposition in Decisive War". (Classification "Top Secret").	February 1944
	(b)	"Memorandum in Regard of Inflation" (Classification "Secret").	September 1944
	(c)	"Counter Plans for the strengthening of Surface Shipping Strength" (Classification "Secret").	August 1944
	(d)	"Items for Investigation in Connection with Long Term War" (Classification "Confidential").	March 1944

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
	(61) (e)	"Memorandum on the Administration of the New Cabinet" (Classification "Secret").	July 1944
	(f)	"Tentative Plan for the Greater East Asia Almanac" (Classification "Confidential").	June 1944
	(g)	"Study on Decisive Organization of Enterprises" (Classification "Secret").	September 1944
2269	(62)	"Outline of Progress of Economic Warfare Studies in First Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification "Top Secret").	
2228 # *	(63)	"Records of Progress of First Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification "Top Secret").	June-August 1941
	(64)	"Outline of National Total War" (Classification "Top Secret").	December 1941
1622 #	(65)	"Documents Pertaining to First Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification " Top Secret").	August 1941
	(66)	"File of Documents on Economic Warfare in First Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification " Top Secret").	August 1941
1356 #	(67)	"File of Assigned Problems and Disposition of Studies in the Conditions of Third to Ninth Phase in First Exercises in Planning of Total War". (Classification "Top Secret").	August 1941
2265	(68)	"Final Project in the Ninth Phase of the Exercises" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1942
1605 *	(69) (a)	"Documents Pertaining to 1942 Exercises in the Planning of Total War" (Classification "Military Top Secret").	January 1943
	(b)	"Effects of 1942 Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification "Military Top Secret").	January 1943
	(70)	"Documents Pertaining to First Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification "Military Top Secret").	January 1943

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
1669 *	(71)	"Documents Pertaining to Second Exercises in Planning of Total War" (Classification "Military Top Secret").	October 1943
1331 *	(72)	"Outline of Diplomatic Warfare in Total Warfare" (Classification "Secret").	January 1942
1334	(73)	"Statistics of Resources, Production and Trade of China" (Classification "Confidential")	October 1940
1341 *	(74)	"Asiatic Relations".	December 1941
1326	(75)	"Estimate of the Greater Asia War Centering Around an Examination of the Economic Striking Power of England and America and the Countermeasures of Imperial Japan" (Classification "Military Secret". Foreign: "Top Secret").	August 1942
1342 *	(76)	"Documents Pertaining to the Research Association in 1942 Exercises in the Planning of Total War". (<i>Military secret</i>)	January 1943
1337	(77)	"History of Governing Occupied Territories and Post-War Reconstruction" (a, b, c, d, e) (Classification "Confidential").	June 1942
1343 *	(78)	"Data on the 1942 Basic Researches Total War Institute". 2 Volumes. (Classification "Part Military Resources Confidential" "specified as General Mobilization Top Secret" 1 Volume Classification "Secret").	August- September 1942
1278	(79)	"Table Showing General Plan for the Supply and Demand of Industry Concerning Movement of Material in 1939" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1216	(80)	"Supplementary Tables Showing War-time Financial Programme" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1229	(81)	Reference Material in Estimating the National Economic Strength (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
1225	(82)	"A Table of Comparison of Supply and Demand of Essential Resources and Measures of Supplementation" (Classification "Top Secret and Specified as General Mobilization Top Secret").	October 1941

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
1257	(83)	"Chart Showing Five-year Plan of Export and Import Trade" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1256	(84)	"Trade Statistics of Greater East Asia" (Classification "Top Secret").	January 1942
1260	(85)	"Statistic Chart of East Asia's Self-Supporting Ability" (Classification "Top Secret").	January 1942
1280	(86)	"Estimates of Future Demands for Essential Resources in East Asia" (Classification "Top Secret").	February 1942
1277	(87)	"Chart of Estimating Future Demands on Resources in East Asia Area" (Classified "Top Secret").	October 1939 October 1941 - recopy.
1294	(88)	"Investigation Concerning Food Supply and Resources, etc. in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (Classification "Top Secret").	March 1942
1279	(89)	"Analytical Chart Showing Demands and Supply on Essential Resources in the United States" (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
1183	(90)	"Chart Showing the Studies of the Economic Strength of the United States and the Pan-American Nations" (Classification "Top Secret").	October 1941
1184	(91)	"Basic Resources Trade Plan Analysis on International Trade" (Classification "Secret").	
1198	(92)	"Charts Concerning Maritime Transportation" (Classification "Top Secret").	June 1942
1295	(93)	Analytical Charts Showing Demand and Supply of Principal Resources in England (Classification "Secret").	October 1941
1325	(94)	"Principal Products of the various South Seas Countries and Research Materials pertaining to Japan, Manchuria, China, Great Britain, the United States and France's Reliance on these Products" (Classification "Secret").	October 1941

IPS Doc.No.	ATIS 15022 Item	Title	Date of Compilation by Total War Re- search Institute.
1324	(95)	"Economic Statistics in Occu- pied Area in China" (Classi- fication "Top Secret").	November 1941
	(96)	"Analytical Chart showing De- mands and Supply of Principal Resources in USSR". (Classifi- cation "Secret").	October 1941
	(97)	"The Demand of Resources by the Powers" (Classification "Top Secret").	November 1941
1211	(98)	"Critique on First Exercises in Planning of Total War". (Clas- sification "Top Secret").	August 1941

Indicates IPS Documents introduced into Evidence
as follows: 1522 (Exhibit 842); 1622 (Exhibit
686A); 1356 (Exhibit 870A); 2228 (Exhibit 871).

* Indicates documents listed in Exhibit "E", IPS
Document No. 2548 (Exhibit 869).

1355

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

#1355-1461

APC 500
13 May 1946

*Philippine
atrocity*

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
1	Investigation of Filipino Civilians Massacre at Dapdap, Ponson Island, Camotes Islands, P. I.	52
2	Mutilation of the Bodies of Pvt. Frank B. Williams et al at Noemfoor Island, Dutch New Guinea	44
3	Investigation of Alleged War Crimes Involving Miss Carolina Corona Committed in Manila, P. I. on or about 10 February 1945.	49
4	Investigation in the Case of Kunio Yunome (PW JA (USA) 147469) Alleged to Have Beheaded a Member of the Allied Armed Forces	146
5	Investigation in the Case of the Mutilation of the Body of Alexander H. Fogle, Pfc. 35038058, Co. F., 186 Inf., APC 41.	22
6	Murder of Eugene Andreewitz Kremleff, Julian Jawai and Alfredo Gana and Mistreatment of Mrs. Helen Kremleff, Pasay, Rizal, P. I.	21
7	Mutilation of the Body of Maurice F. McHattie, Pfc 33701357, Co. K, 132d Inf.	31
8	Attempted Murder of Mr. Benjamin Bolado, Santa Ana, Manila, P. I.	37
9	Murder of 21 Civilians at the National Psychopathic Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal, P. I., on 6 - 8 February, 1945.	47
10	Mistreatment and Torture of Sister Mary Trinita Logue. (Sister Trinita)	14
11	Massacre at the Philippine Red Cross Building, Manila, P. I.	83
12	Investigation of the Alleged Torture, Murder, and Mutilation of Pvt Wade E. Gensemer, 35607676, Troop "C", Tth Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division in the Municipality of Carigara, Leyte, P. I.	13

1453

*Beaten by
Harvard
Squad.*

~~#1453~~
~~Beaten by~~

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
13	Investigation of the Alleged Shooting, Bayonetting and Burning of Civilians at the Terrace Rubio Residence, 150 Vito Street, Singalong, Manila, P. I., on February 12, 1945.	40
14	Investigation of the Murder of Candido Jabson and Attempted Murder of Mrs. Raymunda Jabson and Delfina Jabson, Filipino Civilians, All of Pasig, Rizal, P. I.	43
15	Investigation of the Murder of George James Louis, an American Citizen, The Los Banos Internment, Laguna, P. I.	17
16	Investigation of the Murder of Arsenio Escudero, Jr., and Jose Herman Jr., and Attempted Murder of Jose Herman Sr., Filipino Civilians, All of Pandacan, Manila, P. I.	36
17	Attempted Murder of Miss Genoveva V. Pozon, a Filipino Civilian, of Lopez, Jaena, Pasig, Rizal, P. I.	18
18	Murder of Boris Somonovich Gurevich, his Son, Leonid Borisovich Gurivich, and Victor George Vantchurin, Russians, 610 Kansas Street, Manila, P. I.	28
19	Investigation of the Murder of Barolomi Pons Rosario Garcia (Pons), Eva V. Garcia (Pons), Pacita King, Edward King, Delfin Marquez, and Three Filipinos Identified by their First Names as Candida, Virginia, and Isaac, At Paco, Manila, P. I.	84
20	Investigation of the Murder of Messrs. Braun, Robert Merkus and Alexander Farmakowski in Manila, P. I.	21
21	Investigation of the Violent Deaths of Mira Kishinchand, Peri Kishinchand and Rahi Kishinchand, Indians, in Paco, Manila, P. I.	8
22	Investigation of the Death of Lachman Udham, A British Indian, at 1760 Donada Street, Pasay, Rizal, P. I.	3
23	Investigation of the Death of Nine Unidentified Filipinos in the Vicinity of the Airport Studio, 2 Soler, Azcarraga, Manila, P. I.	8
24	Investigation of the Murder of Kishinchand Mirchandani, Devjimal Changomal	22

REPORT NO.TITLESNO. OF PAGES

	Lalwani, British Indians, Thelma Parrish, Jr., Filipino-American Negro, at 515 Dakota Street, Malate, Manila, P. I.	
25	Investigation of the Murder of Henry Dalland, Tony Dalland, Jacinto de la Vara, Gregorio Mendez, Cipiring Alaysa and Romula Daro, At 190 Leve-riza Street, Pasay, Rizal, P. I.	79
26	Investigation of the Murder of Fathers Peter Fallon, John Henaghan, Patrick Kelly, Joseph Monaghan, Irish Nation-als, and Eight Other Civilians in Malate, Manila, P. I.	60
27	Massacre of Forty-one Civilians; At-tempted Murder of 15 Civilians; Rape and Attempted Rape of Four Filipinos At the De La Salle College, Manila, P. I.	110
28	Murder of Fifteen Filipino Civilians In the Singalong District, Manila, P. I., on 12 February 1945.	12
29	Killed by Shrapnel when Japs Fired on Civilians.	6
30	Two boys saw Below-named victims and 3 Filipinos tied up and shot. VENSIMAK, Kimatrai; POKARDAS, Vassanmal; PARAMA-NAND Lachmandas; HASSARAM, Hotchand.	30
31	Beaten & kicked-fatal injuries-deter-mined no war crime.	47
32	Killed by shrapnel when running from burning home.	7
33	Made to kneel before a common grave-shot in back bayonetted & buried. Chinese Cemetery, Manila, P. I.	48
34	News item with Manila date line sub-mitted by Cine India Burma theater under date of 16 Mar 45. 334 Ten-nessee St., Malate, Manila	11
35	36 Chinese & 2 Filipinos herded toge-ther at the house of Ang Kai. Later 28 of these were taken to a neighbor-ing barrio & bayonetted. All but two of them dying.	110
36	Shot by Jap snipers while running from	38

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
	burning home. Manila, 55 F. Roman St., San Juan.	
37	Mrs. Enriquez raped in presence of husband. 1163 Dart St., Paco, Manila, P. I.	12
38	Neighbors told witness that they saw victim beheaded by the Japanese. Agno Street, Manila, P. I.	37
39	Burned to death when Japs burned her home. ABRAMOFF killed by shrapnel.	5
40	Mother and son found dead in area that had been under heavy shell fire. No evidence of the commission of an atrocity.	9
41	Victims after escaping from the St. Paul's College massacre, (rept 53) hid in an attic room, into which a grenade was deliberately thrown severely burning them. Angel Cajo died as a result, the others survived. Feb. 45.	30
42	Report of Investigation of Alleged Atrocities by members of the Japanese Imperial Forces in Manila and other parts of Luzon, Philippine Islands, dtd 9 Apr 45, by Emil Krause, Col., I.G.D., Hqs, XIV Corps.	9
43	BARROS and his family on 9 Feb 45 took refuge in a shell hole. Barros went away from the group, passing a Mr. Tan on the way. Tan heard two shots shortly after, and saw 3 armed members of the Jap Imperial Navy go by. Later, Barros' body was found, mouth gagged and hands tied behind back, and a bullet thru his head.	13
44	Extract of letter from E.E. Sollosi, Swedish Consul at Manila to Mons. G. Sochard, Paris, France, dated 2 March 1945, as submitted by Civil Censorship Det, under date of 24 Mar 45.	55
45	Victims were with others in house near Paco Church. Constant shelling was in progress. Victims hit by shrapnel and died of wounds. No atrocity.	23

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
46	Col. Guido and his 3 sons were executed at the paper factory, Pennsylvania Ave.	260
47	Massacre in home of Luhrse in Pax Court on 12 Feb 45.	34
48	Transmittal letter G-2 on statement of Mrs. Guido and David Day.	260
49	PWs herded into air raid shelters, and then gasoline and torches thrown on them. As the PWs attempted to flee the explosion and fire, they were shot by machine gun fire or bayonnetted. Also individual atrocities.	22
50	Result of Investigation. Children of family taken from home and not seen again. Others killed in home on a subsequent visit, by bayonetting and burning.	103
51	Japanese Naval Forces, compelled 15 civilians to leave house at above address and assembled in the garden where they were massacred by gunfire. Survivors were bayonnetted.	22
52	Civilians took refuge under a porch during period were under shell fire. Eight Japanese ordered them out, separated the men and shot them. All killed except Jesus Quintero.	38
53	250 civilians herded into a dining room the doors shut and barred. Food and candy were placed in center of room to concentrate the people there and then grenade bombs in chandeliers were set off. St. Paul's College, Malate, Manila, P. I.	347
54	Tacloban, Leyte. Beaten, hung up by the arms tied behind them, imprisoned 58 days.	30
55	Iloilo City, Iloilo Province, Panay. Dr. Cullen was beaten with ciub, toenail pulled out with pliers, hung by his thumbs, and his ankles.	28
56	Manila, P. I. (Mistreatment and Murder of Genrych, Jerry Rubak, Carlos Infante, and Vicente (Vic) Concepcion.)	88
57	Judge tied in Manila in the sun for $\frac{1}{2}$ hr.	11

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
58	Massacre of 36 civilians, wounding of 9 other civilians, attempted murder of 13 other civilians of various nationalities.	213
59	Beheading Chamber. "Paco Massacre."	272
60	Philippine General Hospital, Ermita, Manila (Rape of Maria Mercedes Cristobal; use of hospital as military installation.	23
61	Women and girls rounded up and taken to Bay View Hotel, Boulevard Alhambra Apartments and Miramar Apartments and raped.	Vol 1-767 Vol 2-767
62	Torture and possible murder of members of the Enriquez family at the Cortabitarte Garrison.	51
63	Over one hundred (100) civilians, including twenty six (26) identified Filipinos and four (4) French Civilians and the murder and attempted murder of others. Manila, Pedro Campos Residence, 1462 Taft Ave.	34
64	115 Civilians (men, women and children) bayoneted or sabered to death. (Some admittedly were guerrillas but generally this was not the case.)	266
65	San Marcelino Church Massacre	6
66	Massacre at the German Club	34
67	Tabacalera-Shell Service Station Case	85
68	Murder of Felix ISLA, Angel FRANCISCO and 3 other Filipino Civilians and attempted murder of Silverio T. BRANGANZA.	23
69	Buan Massacre.	21
70	Price House Case.	45
71	Bombing of Manila, Dec. 1941	12
72	Murder of 2 American prisoners of war (Cebu City)	31
73	Burning of Nanipil, Mt. Province	11
74	Murder of 39 Civilians, Rosario, Batangas.	9
75	Offenses Committed by Japanese at Camp O'Donnell	211
76	Crimes Against Allied Prisoners at Bilibid Prison, Manila, P. I.	182

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
77	Cabanatuan Prison Camps (9 Oct 44-Jan 45, Yamashita Phase)	16
78	Cabanatuan Prison Camps (18 Apr 42-30 January 45) (Case #H, Homma Phase)	8
79	Torture of 13 Igorot-Filipino civilians at Atok, Mt. Province during March 43 and March 44.	15
80	Burning of Downtown Manila	22
81	Execution of Lt. Bullock	17
82	Execution of Filipino civilians	12
83	Pasay School Prison Camp	257
84	Lipa, Batangas Case	7
85	Pinga's Massacre	36
86	Murder of Civilians, Baguio	7
87	Death March Case	10
88	Dr. Moreta's Massacre (417 Isaac Peral, Manila, P. I.)	26
89	Palacio's Case	12
90	Teal, Batangas Massacre (Murder of non-combatant civilians)	15
91	Santo Tomas Case	246
92	Execution of 5 American PWs at Barrio San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Luzon, P. I.	11
93	Cabanatuan Prison Camp (Case No. H. KURODA Case)	198
94	Intramuros Case	375
95	Murder of three American Aviators at Batan Islands, Philippines	78
96	Murder of 300 civilians of Cuenca, Batangas, P. I.	53
97	Killing of Ten American Prisoners of War, Lumban, Laguna, P. I.	23
98	Omega Case, Case #A-16 (e)	3
99	Cabanatuan (Tanaka Phase)	185
100	Mankayan, Mountain Province	35

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
101	San Jose Case	57
102	Madrigal Plantation Murders	55
103	Floridablanca	8
104	San Pablo Case	8
105	Murder of Cpl Wendell Morgan, American Prisoner of War.	23
106	Massacre of 194 Filipino civilians at Santo Tomas, Batangas, and the unnecessary burning of part of the town.	50
107	Murder of three Filipino civilians at Danao, Cebu, P. I.	22
108	Murder of Palicte Family	15
109	Fort Santiago Case	29
110	Beating, torture and probable mur- der of approximately fifty male Filipino civilians of barrios of Buting and San Joaquin, Pasig, Rizal, P. I., on 3 Dec 1944 by members of the Japanese Armed Forces.	37
111	Murder of the JAGUREN family	12
112	Tubog Atrocities	66
113	Murder of Civilians at Naguillian, La Union, Luzon, P. I.	36
114	Torture of Tic TIAN	8
115	Murder of 9 Chinese civilians at the Chinese Cemetery on 15 Apr 45	49
116	Mistreatment of civilians at the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, San Juan, Rizal Province, P. I., on 24 November 1944.	62
117	Massacre of more than 1000 civi- lians at Lipa, Batangas, P. I.	34
118	Murder of 5 American POW near Calumpit at Lipa, Batangas, P. I.	41
119	Murder of Civilians, destruction of property in the town of Calamba, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I., dur- ing February 1945.	90
120	Tanauan Massacre, Luzon	59

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
121	Imus and Dasmarinas Massacres	73
122	Murder of Jaime DIOSO at Jaro Central School, Iloilo City, Iloilo, Panay, P. I.	10
123	Supplementary report of Fort Santiago atrocities.	47
124	Mahayag Massacre (Davao, Mindanao)	11
125	Massacre of 120 Filipino civilians on the island of Lafu, Lallo, Cagayan, Luzon, P. I., on 7 April 1945.	49
126	Massacre of Filipino civilians at Tapel, Gonzaga, Cagayan, Luzon, P. I., on 1 July 1945.	119
127	Bugey Atrocities	44
128	Massacre of civilians in Miagao and Tigbauan, Panay, P. I.	30
129	Murder, torture and attempted rape at Cordova, Mactan Island, Cebu, P. I., on 19 and 20 Aug 44.	47
130	Murder of Filipino civilians at Miagao, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I.	21
131	Murder, torture and rape in the towns of Ajuy and Sara, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I., between 13 and 29 September 1943.	48
132	Murder, attempted murder, torture and attempted rape of civilians at Carcar, Cebu, P. I., May 1944 and Aug 1944.	29
133	Report of the unlawful use of the Japanese hospital ship Tachibana Maru in carrying troops, guns, munitions and other military equipment.	26
134	Tarlac Bridge Detail	13
135	Murder, attempted murder, rape and unnecessary burning of homes at Tiaong, Tayabas Province, Luzon.	31
136	Mistreatment and massacre of civilians at Barili, Cebu, P. I., on or about 2 September 1944.	83
137	Murder of 5 civilians and subsequent cannibalism in Sitio Lilong, Barrio Dinwiddie, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur,	36

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
	during Aug 45 and the killing of 3 civilians in Sitio Penidet, Presidencia Dakun, Mt. Province, Luzon, P. I., on 6 August 1945.	
138	Murder of SALAK family at Tarlac, Tarlac, Luzon, P. I., on 12 January 1945.	13
139	The murder and torture of Filipino civilians by members of the Japanese Military Police in February 1942 and in October and December 1944 at Bambang, Tarlac, Luzon, P. I.	5
140	Punitive expeditions on Panay Island by Japanese forces against civilians in September 43 and October 43.	26
141	Murder of sixteen identified Filipino civilians in Barrio Cutcut, Angeles, Pampanga Province, Luzon, P. I., on 25 January 1945.	7
142	The murder of eleven American Baptist teachers of the faculty of the Central Philippine College and the murder of six other Americans at Camp Hopevale near Tapaz, Capiz, Panay, P. I., on 20 December 1943.	12
143	Beating, murder and attempted murder of Filipino civilians and the wanton burning of private homes at Barrio Nagbalan, Marilao, Bulacan, Luzon, P. I., on 6 January 1945.	70
144	Torture and murder of Filipino civilians in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Luzon, P. I., on 6 January 1945.	26
145	Killing of Pvt. Inocencio ROMERO at Danao, Cebu, P. I., in June or July 1944.	37
146	Killing of three identified Filipinos at Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P. I.	32
147	Murder and torture at Talisay and Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P. I., on 19 April 1944.	47
148	The killing of Vicente TORRES and two others and the torture and beating of Filipinos by Japanese from Kabankalan and Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P. I., between 27 February and 22 January 1945. <i>21 January May</i>	35
149	Murder and torture of Filipino civilians at Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, Luzon, P. I., from September 1942 to March 1945.	96

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
150	Murder and rape at Bacaca, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on 2, 3, 4 and 5 May 1945.	33
151	Murder and attempted murder of Filipino civilians and the wanton destruction of private property in various barrios of Malvar, Batangas Province, during January, February and March 1945.	44
152	Murder and disappearance of civilians at Bacaca, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on 3 May 1945.	10
153	Murders at Ilang-Ilang and Bunawan, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., between 14 May 1945 and 15 June 1945.	24
154	Murder and attempted murder of Filipino civilians at Biao, Calinan, Davao Province, Mindanao, P. I., on 5 May 45.	12
155	Los Banos Internment Camp Atrocities	203
156	Additional murders at Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P. I., between 19 July 1944 and 25 July 1944.	24
157	Imprisonment under improper conditions of American Prisoners of War at Capas Bridge Detail, Capas, Tarlac, Luzon, P. I., April-July 1942.	21
158	Murder of 5 Filipino civilians by Kempei-tai at Iloilo Garrison, Panay, P.I., on 23 Feb 44.	11
159	Additional murders by Japanese Kempei-tai at Iloilo City, Panay, P. I., in May 1944 and December 1944.	5
160	Murder of sixteen civilians at La Castellana, Occidental Province, Negros, P.I., on 22 August 1942 and 24 August 1942.	20
161	Additional torture and murder by Kempei-tai stationed at Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P.I., in February and March 1945.	24
162	Murder of sixteen (16) Filipino civilians and torture of others at Bacolod, Negros Occidental on 7 December 1944 and 20 January 1945.	18
163	Murder of 4 Filipino citizens of Ilang, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., and looting on	29

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
	28 December 1941.	
164	Burning of barrios in San Fernando, La Union, Luzon, P. I., on 19 December 1944.	58
165	Torture of fifteen Filipino citizens by Kempei-Tai at Aparri, Cagayan, Luzon, P. I., in September 1944.	5
166	Murder of approximately 89 Filipino citizens near Tugbok, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on 14 May 1945.	16
167	Torture of Panfilo W. ALPUERTO, at Dumanjug and Cebu City, Cebu, P. I. in March 1944.	3
168	Murder of 44 Filipino civilians in May or June 1944, near Fabrica, Negros Occidental, P. I.	9
169	Murder of one Filipino in February 1944 at Hinundayan, Leyte, P. I.	14
170	Murder of 3 American POWs and 1 Filipino by members of the Iloilo Kempei-Tai near Mandurriao, Panay Island, P. I.	22
171	Murder of twenty-seven identified Filipino citizens at Buenavista, Guimaras Islands, P. I., between August 1943 and January 1945.	19
172	Murder of six Filipino civilians at Manuel Plantation, Guianga, Mindanao, P. I., on 30 May 1945 and 1 June 1945.	13
173	Torture and probable murder of Demetrio FORNILLOS at Palo, Leyte, P. I., in March 1943.	5
174	Executions at Calbayog, Samar, P. I., on July 1943.	10
175	Murder of 82 identified Filipino residents of Leon, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I., in August 1943 and April 1944.	12
176	Murder, beating, and imprisonment under improper conditions of American prisoners of war at Bontoc, Mountain Province, Luzon, P. I., in May - June 1942.	58
177	Murder of ten Filipino civilians in August 1943 at Leon, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I.	10
178	Murder of 24 Filipino civilians at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., April and May 1944.	63

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
179	Torture of 2 civilians at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., July 1944.	10
180	Torture and murder of Filipino civilians at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., August, 1944.	17
181	Torture and murder of Filipino civilians at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I. March 1944.	20
182	Murder of 1 Filipino, attempted murder of another and burning of home at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., 1 September 1944.	10
183	Torture and murder at Hilongos, Leyte, P. I., in July, 1944.	9
184	Torture of civilians at Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., by Kempei-Tai members in March and April 1944.	11
185	Torture and murder of residents of Bay, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I., on 9 February 1945.	21
186	Execution of one American and seven Filipino citizens at Magugpo, Mindanao, P. I., in July 1942.	41
187	Insular Lumber Company Dock Murders, Negros Occidental.	36
188	Beheading of American flier in northern mountains of Negros, P. I.	23
189	Mistreatment and Imprisonment under improper conditions of American prisoners of war at Corregidor, P. I., during summer of 1942.	37
190	Execution of five Filipino civilians at Baguio, Mountain Province, P. I., on 6 October 1942.	40
191	Murder of Filipino civilians at Inopacan, Leyte, P. I., March 1943 and March 1944.	7
192	Negros Camps.	29
193	Killing of American prisoners of war after the torpedoing of the Shinyo Maru, a Japanese prison ship, off Lilloy Point, Zamboanga on 7 September 1944.	69
194	Killing of civilians of Baguio, Mountain Province, Luzon, P. I., in 1942 and in March 1945.	18
195	Killing of seven Filipino civilians at Toledo, Cebu, P. I., September 1944.	14

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
196	Execution of 3 civilians at Carcar, Cebu, P. I., in October 1944.	14
197	Murders, looting and burning of the town of Calauang, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I., in February 1945.	40
198	Mistreatment of Hitolio FIDELIS at Davao, Mindanao, P. I., in March 1945.	11
199	Torture of two civilians at Hilongos, Leyte, P. I.	6
200	Torture of civilians at Lucena, Tayabas Province, Luzon, P. I., May 1944 - December 1944.	7
201	Massacre of two hundred civilians at Tuba (Irisan) Benguet, Mt. Province, Luzon, P. I., 10 April 1945.	20
202	Mistreatment of two Filipino civilians in Massin, Leyte, P. I., in June and July 1944.	13
203	Murder of American flier near Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, P. I., 13 September 1944.	15
204	Mistreatment of Father DOUGLAS at Paete, Laguna, Luzon, P. I., on 24 July 1943.	4
205	Burning and killing in San Juan, La Union Province, Luzon, P. I., on 19 January 1945.	79
206	Torture of Olimpio PANSEPANSE at Carcar, Cebu, P. I., on 20 May 1944.	7
207	Deaths of thirty-seven American prisoners of war at Gapan, Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon, P. I., in May and June 1942.	22
208	Murder of three Filipinos near Manuel Plantation, Tagakpan, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on 18 May 1945.	8
209	Bataan General Hospital Nos. 1 and 2.	198
210	Transportation of prisoners of war under improper conditions from Davao Penal Colony, Mindanao, P. I. to Manila, P. I. from June 6 to June 26, 1944.	61
211	Torture and Murder of Presidential guards and others at Baguio, Mt. Province, Luzon, P. I., about 20 Jan 45.	21
212	Baguio Kempei-Tai - Torture on 30 December 1942 to April 1945.	127

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
213	Torture and murder of Filipino civilians at Pangil and Siniloan, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I., in 1943 and 1944. (Case Nos. Q-33 and G-64)	17
214	Los Banos Massacres. (Case No. I-89)	56
215	Killing and Looting of Joaquin NACUA, a resident of Carcar, Cebu, P. I., on or about 14 March 1944. (Unnumbered case)	7
216	Killing of Amando SATORRE in Carcar, Cebu, P. I., on 15 April 1944. (Unnumbered case)	6
217	Severe torture of Roberto E. SATO on 25 April 1944 in Carcar, Cebu, P. I., (Unnumbered case).	11
218	Killing of 5 Filipino men, looting and burning of the FLORETA home, and the torture of another in October 1944 at Carcar, Cebu, P. I. (Unnumbered case)	8
219	Murder of Filipino civilians in Sitio Soccoc, Barrio Santiago Sur, San Fernando, La Union, Luzon, P. I., on 22 February 1945. (H-17)	33
220	Murder of Macun PANONDIONGAN on 15 July 1942 at Barrio Dimayon, Dansalan, Lanao, Mindanao, P. I. (Unnumbered case)	3
221	Lapoy Plantation murders, Davao, Mindanao, P. I. (Case No. P-63)	12
222	Murder of approximately 30 Filipino civilians at Biao, Davao Province, Mindanao, P. I., on the 17th of May, 1945. (Case No. L-97)	7
223	Murder and attempted murder at Lipata, Mingianilla, Cebu, P. I. (Case unnumbered)	27
224	Sagay atrocities, Negros Occidental, P. I. (Case No. B-77)	293
225	Murder of Chinese in Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., May 1945. (Case No. P-77).	3
226	Murder of nine civilians at Davao City, Davao, P. I., on 21 May 1945. (Case No. P-79)	3
227	Burning and killing in Barrio Rayah, Wabo, Lanao, Mindanao, P. I., in August 1942 (Case No. Part of C-88)	3

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
228	Murder of two Filipinos at Daliao, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I. (Case No. P-67)	8
229	Murder of five Filipinos at Digos, Santa Cruz, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on 25 October 1945. (Case No. P-51)	3
230	Murder and torture of Filipino civilians at Mauban, Tayabas, Luzon, P. I., from July 1943 to February 1945. Case No. Q-8	15
231	Atrocities at San Carlos, Negros Occidental, P. I., on 17 September 1942. (Case No. J-89)	3
232	Lucban atrocities in January 1945. (Unnumbered case)	10
233	Davao Penal Colony and Davao City Civilian Internment Camp. (Case No. B-1)	155
234	Murder, attempted murder, rape and disappearance in Silay, Negros Occidental, P. I., on 8 March 1945. (Unnumbered case)	11
235	Atrocities at Calinan, Davao City, December 1941 (Case Unnumbered)	25
236	Murder of a Filipino civilian in Mintal, Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on or about 29 December 1941. (Case No. O-63)	10
237	Torture and murder of Hayden LAURENCE, an American prisoner of war at Angeles, Pampanga, on 23 September 1943. (Case No. B-39)	26
238	Torture, attempted murder and murder of fourteen Filipino civilians at Alcala, Province of Cagayan, P. I., during the period from 8 January 1945 to 14 March 1945. (Unnumbered case)	32
239	Murder of Filipino and American prisoners at Mintal and neighboring area, Mindanao, P. I., on 10 September 1944. (Case No. M-89)	55
240	Bunawan Murders, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., May 1945. (Case No. O-98)	17
241	Murder of Japanese babies in Cebu. (Unnumbered Case)	41
242	Murder of five Chinese civilians at Tungkalan, Davao City, P. I., on 18 May 1945. (Case No. M-14)	4

DOCUMENT 2747

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
243	Murder of two Filipinos and attempted Murder of another at Gatungan, Davao, Mindanao, P. I., on or about 19 May 1945. (Case No. P-58)	3
244	Murders near Tigato, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I. (Case No. M-15)	31
245	Murder of four American fliers on Fuga Island, Luzon, P. I., on 20 June 1945. (Case No. Q-6)	39
246	Murder of four Filipino civilians at Manay, Davao, P. I., on 2 November 1942. (Case No. P-81).	8
247	Camp Murphy and Zablan Airfield. (Case No. G-66)	92
248	Torture, attempted murder of three and murder of approximately 35 Filipinos, including a woman and eight children at Ayungon, Negros Oriental, P.I., on 5 May 1944.	7
249	Murder of Mrs. Agustina Gadoatan CONNILLY and torture of Antero JAMORA at Silay, Negros Occidental, P.I., on 8 October 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	6
250	Mistreatment of American and Filipino civilians, looting and burning in Negros from 24 November to 18 December 1943. (Case No. I-43)	33
251	Murder of five Filipino civilians and the attempted murder of another at Luzuriaga, Negros Oriental on 10 September 1944.	6
252	Atrocities in Victorias, Negros Occidental, P.I., August and September 1943. (Unnumbered case)	20
253	Atrocities at Bogo, Cebu, P.I., August to November 1944.	54
254	Murder of PEREZ and MIYEGAS families at Bunawan, Davao City, Mindanao, P.I., on 13 May 1945 and 14 May 1945 respectively. (Unnumbered case)	37
255	Murder and attempted murder at Barrio Bagakay, Tacloban, Leyte, P.I., on 30 April 1943. (Case No. K-3).	25
256	Killing and mistreatment of Filipino civilians in Bacolod, Negros Occidental, between 16 January and 4 April 1945.	33

DOCUMENT 2747

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
257	Rape at Palo, Leyte, P.I., December 1943. (Unnumbered Case)	17
258	Torture and murder of sixteen Filipino civilians at Isabela, Negros Occidental sometime during September 1942. (Case No. B-75)	8
259	Murder of Simeon CANQUE, Naga, Cebu, P.I., 28 December 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	11
260	Atrocities in Ayuguitan, Negros Oriental P.I., in April and May 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	33
261	Torture and Killing of Emilio RAFOLS at Davao City, Davao, Mindanao, P.I. (Unnumbered case)	3
262	Mistreatment and torture of civilian prisoners by Japanese Kempei-Tai at Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, P.I., during the period June 1944 to March 1945. (Unnumbered Case)	38
263	Murder of approximately ninety Filipino civilians on the shores of Taburos River, Palawan Island, P.I., on or about 1 March 1945, and murder of three Filipino civilians at Irauan, Palawan Island, P.I., on 4 March 1945. (Unnumbered Case)	18
264	Murder of sixteen civilians and attempted murder of another at Wangan, Riverside, Calinan, Davao, P.I., on 4 May 1945. (Case No. P-65)	37
265	Murder of three Filipinos, attempted murder of another and burning of Barrio Umagos and the hospital therein, at Mandampog, Balingasag, Oriental Misamis, Mindanao, P.I., on or about 1 October 1944. (Case No. M-58-a)	6
266	Torture and bayonetting of Juliano BAILO and three Filipino civilians at Balingasag, Oriental Misamis, Mindanao, P.I., on or about 30 September 1944. (Case No. M-58-B)	3
267	Execution by machine-gun fire and burning of twenty-one Filipinos at Barrio Angad, Bangued, Abra, P.I., on 16 November 1944. (Case No. H-34)	22
268	Killing of a Filipino civilian and beating and disappearance of another in Dulao, Bago, Negros Occidental, P.I., on 7 March 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	22

DOCUMENT 2747

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
269	Murder of a Moro at Kabakan, Cotabato Mindanao, P.I., on 10 May 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	4
270	Murder of Mamerto PINO at Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, P.I., on 23 November 1944 (Unnumbered Case)	7
271	Massacre at Mulig, Davao City, 5 May 1945. (Case No. O-63)	12
272	Murder of three Filipino civilians at Calut, Butuan, Agusan, Mindanao, P.I., during the early part of March 1945. (Case No. A-7)	10
273	Mistreatment and killing of Filipino civilians at Langtand, Naga, Cebu, P.I., on 8 November 1944. (Unnumbered case)	8
274	Cotabato Airfield murders, 12 September 1944. (Case No: J-3)	24
275	Murder of twenty-one Filipino civilians, attempted murder of another in Barrio Calindagan, looting and burning in Barrio Banilad, Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, 10 November 1944, and torture of Severino PASTOR in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, in October 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	37
276	Torture and murder at La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, P.I., March - October 1944. (Case No. O-55)	68
277	Murder of Angel MERCADO in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, 3 March 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	7
278	Atrocities in Barrio Guadalupe, Makati, Rizal, P.I., February 1945. (Unnumbered Case)	30
279	Murder of Filipino civilians in Siaton, Negros Oriental, July and August 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	30
280	Chinese murders at Davao City, May 1945, (Case No. J-46)	14
281	Murder of twenty-nine civilians at Ranao-Pilayan, Cotabato, Mindanao, P.I., on 7 June 1944. (Case No. F-79)	16
282	Atrocities at Barrio San Roque and Sitio Bitute, Zamboanga City, Mindanao, P.I., March 1945. (Case No. A-6 and another unnumbered case).	86
283	Atrocities in Siquijor Island, October and November 1944. (Unnumbered Case)	80

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
284	Disappearance of three American prisoners of war in Camp Keithley, Lanao, Mindanao, P.I., between 1 June and 4 July 1942.	10
285	Death march of prisoners of war from Camp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, Mindanao, P.I., 4 July 1942.	9
286	Disappearance of Brig. Gen. Guy O. FORT.	26
287	Arson, rape and robbery at Balilihan and Sikatuna, Bohol, P.I., after 2 September 1945.	49
288	Murder and mistreatment at Valencia and Garcia Hernandez, Bohol, P.I., April 1945 - August 1945.	32
289	Murder of Chinese and Bagobo civilians and arson in Catalunan Grande, Davao, Mindanao, P.I., 5 May 1945.	8
290	Murder, rape and torture in the vicinity of Tagbilaran, Bohol, P.I., June - September 1942 and July 1944.	51
291	Murder and rape near Jagna, Bohol, P.I., April - October 1945.	45
292	Murder of two unidentified American fliers at Sarmi, Dutch New Guinea, October 1944.	16
293	Murder and rape near Sierra Bullones, Bohol, P.I., June - December 1945.	38
294	Rape of two Filipino women at Barrio Kawit, town of Pilar, Ponson Island, Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I., 30 November 1944.	12
295	Murder of the Mayor and torture of the Chief of Police of Asingan, Pangasinan, P.I., in August 1943.	22
296	Killing and torturing of Filipino civilians in 1944 and 1945, at Sipalay, Cawayan and Ma-ao, Bago, Negros Occidental.	63
297	Atrocities at Mandawe, Cebu, P.I., August 1944 - March 1945.	68
298	Massacres in Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I. December 1944.	89
299	Execution of Capt. TODD and Sgt. GOURGET at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, P.I., 11 August 1943.	49
300	Murder of thirty-five and attempted murder,	32

<u>REPORT NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>
301	Murder of five unidentified Americans at San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, P.I., 9 May 1942	45
302	Atrocities in and around Vigan, Ilocos Sur, P.I., 10 December 1941 to 3 April 1945	62
303	Murder of 30 Filipinos at San Carlos, Negros	156
304	Execution of Charles PUTNAM, Thomas DAGGETT, Captain Vicente Pinon and six other unnamed Filipinos on 19 March 1944 at Alaminos, Pangasinan, P.I.	11
305	Torture and murder of civilians in and around Mankayan, Benguet, Mountain Province, P.I. in May and June 1, 1944.	12
306	Execution of five American fliers at Singkang Celebes about 4 Aug 45	126
307	Murder of four American airmen at Maros Airfield near Makasar, Celebes in July 1945	56
308	Execution of eight American Airmen at TOLITOLI CELEBES Sometime in Oct. or Nov. 1944	28
309	Execution of five American airmen at Kendari Celebes about 24 Nov. 1944.	67
310	Murder of five American Fliers at or near Tomchan, Celebes in Sept., Nov. and Dec. 1944	77
311	Massacre and torture of Civilians at Pdo and Obando, Bulacan, P.I. 19 Dec. 1944	45
312	Atrocities in Bomblan Island, P.I. Dec. 1944, Jan. and Feb. 1945	21
313	Looting, Murder and attempted murder and abduction of civilians at Infanta, Tayabas, P.I. in Feb., Apr. and May 1945	111
314	Torture and mistreatment of Civilians at the Japanese M.P. Garrison in Quezon City, P.I. during the Period of March 1942 to Dec. 1944	38
315	Killing of Graham, Eugene Sterling, an American Flier at CONCEPCION, Tarlac, P.I. sometime in Oct. 1944	19
317	Execution of 3 Unidentified US Airmen at Ambon (Amboina) N.E.I. on 29 Aug. 1944.	24

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that immediately after the liberation of the Philippines roving teams, comprised of military personnel from the Judge Advocate Service of the United States Army, were sent out to conduct investigations throughout the Philippines on reported and known cases of atrocities committed by the Japanese Army and Navy personnel; that many of those cases have been thoroughly investigated in the immediate vicinity of their occurrence; that witnesses who had first-hand knowledge of the atrocities were interrogated and their affidavits taken and ocular inspection of the place where the crimes were committed were invariably made; that reports have been submitted regarding those atrocities investigated and are now on file in our office and that the attached document, consisting of twenty-one pages, is a list of reports submitted so far regarding these investigations, together with their report number, title and number of pages each contain.

/s/ Alva C. Carpenter
Alva C. Carpenter
Chief, Legal Section

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 28th
day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

Capt. Doc are 1438 to 1447 - Constitution
1464 - 1466

Doc. No. 6913

PHILIPPINE CASE

1355 TO 1466

Opening Statement

of the

Associate Prosecutor of the Philippines

on

Class C Offenses in General and
Class B and C Offenses in the Philippines

International Prosecution Section

Tokyo, Japan

December, 1946.

THIS IS A Duplicate
opening Statement

Mr. President, Members of the Military Tribunal for the Far East:

From living witnesses and from Japanese documents, this Tribunal has heard and seen abundant prosecution evidence portraying the basic policy pursued by the defendants and other leaders of Japan to produce a war-like master race dead set on world conquest. It will be recalled, that in order to implement that policy, the combined resources of the state-controlled press, radio, schools, stage, movies, literature and religion were marshalled to indoctrinate the Japanese people with fanatical martial spirit, blind worship of totalitarianism and ultra-nationalism, love for aggression and burning hatred and contempt for all potential and actual enemies.

Our present phase will show the flowering and results of that policy in terms of thousands upon thousands of innocent persons butchered, maimed, starved and degraded; of innumerable cities, towns and villages sacked, and of homes and farms pillaged. Sine qua non to a proper assessment of our evidence is the understanding that this insidious internal propaganda of hate succeeded somehow in poisoning

Doc. No. 6913

the mind and heart of many a Japanese to such a degree that in the ensuing military campaigns their character and nature swung like a pendulum from the extreme of kindness and courtesy to the other extreme of cruelty and indecency. Without this understanding, it will be difficult for anyone, who has come in contact with the average Japanese in the streets and public places, in their homes and offices, and has observed their civility, to give due weight to the mass of our proof demonstrative that either in their moments of arrogance born of victory or desperation in the face of impending defeat, countless propaganda-misled Japanese perpetrated in the fields of operation barbarities, the full extent of which would shock the world.

We will prove that Japanese atrocities were not isolated incidents of individual misconduct, but were general in the whole Pacific and Asiatic war theatre; that the technique and method used in the wholesale murder, torture, and rape, and the wanton destruction of property followed throughout a consistent and similar pattern; that the stronger the resistance offered the more abominable became the

invaders; that the strategy of terror was in time identified as part of the Japanese form of warfare calculated to crush the spirit of resistance and the will to fight of the people of the over-run countries. Secondly, those atrocities, launched on large scale for the first time at Nanking in 1937, and climaxed with the Rape of Manila in 1945, covered a period of eight long years. Thirdly, the situs of their commission comprised one-fourth of the territorial space of the globe, including Burma, China, Indo-China, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, Hongkong, Philippines, New Guinea and various islands in the Pacific Ocean. Fourthly, the multitude of perpetrators came from both enlisted men's and officers' ranks and from all branches of the Japanese armed services. Fifthly, the victims were legion, including both civilians and prisoners of war, the well and the infirm, the young and the old, men and women, and even children and babies.

Finally, indignant official protests from aggrieved governments poured on the government at Tokyo. Allied radio broadcasts, regularly monitored by the Japanese Foreign Office for the information

Doc. No. 6913

of the inner government circles, widely publicized and severely condemned the massacre and mistreatment of Allied civilians and prisoners of war. Even without those protests and denunciations, the leaders of Japan would have undoubtedly known of the rampant atrocities committed by so many of their misguided compatriots on so many helpless peoples of so many lands and for so many years. Instead of heeding the protests, they dismissed and branded them as instruments of false propaganda. And instead of investigating the charges, determining, trying and punishing the guilty, or taking other effective measures necessary to deter or prevent the repetition of the atrocities, they permitted or tolerated their continued perpetration.

A part of the pattern of these crimes has already been delineated with the presentation of the Chinese case and the extensive testimony of the late lamented Colonel Wild. We shall now proceed to unfold more of that pattern with evidence relating to how a staggering total of more than 131,028 Americans and Filipinos met horrible death by murder, cruelty, starvation, assaults and

mistreatments at the hands of a sadistic enemy. This figure does not represent the war casualties; it does not encompass those who died in the fields of battle. Neither does it include the infinitely larger number of Americans and Filipinos who escaped death but went through the ordeal of indescribable sufferings and humiliations.

We shall by proof establish that Japanese atrocities on Philippine civilians were not confined to Manila, the heart of the nation, or a few other cities like Cebu and Iloilo, but in all cities and in almost all big towns and in numberless villages, in all of the main islands of the archipelago, ranging from Basco, Batanes, in the far north, to Davao City, in the extreme south; from Puerto Princesa, Palawan, way out west, to Tayabas, farthest east. They were committed by Japanese Kempei-tai, Marines and Army and Navy men on all sexes, ages and classes of Filipinos in all stages of Japanese occupation from December 1941 to August 1945.

Outstanding of the massacres that took the lives of ^{91,184}~~89,000~~

Filipino civilians may be mentioned those at Manila where 800 men, women

and children were herded into the building of St. Paul's College. They were drawn toward the center of the hall with candies enticingly placed on tables set under five overhanging covered chandeliers.

A Japanese Navy man pulled a string, and the grenades concealed in the chandeliers exploded with such power that it blew off the top of the building and instantly killed a great number of those in the hall.

Panic-stricken survivors fleeing from the burning inferno were mowed down with machine-gun fire by sentries strategically posted outside.

At Calamba, Laguna, revered by Filipinos as the birthplace of their foremost national hero, Dr. Rizal, 2,500 men, women and children were shot or bayoneted. Only a few survived. At Ponson, Cebu, in central Visayas, the whole population of the village was ordered to assemble in the barrio church. One hundred were machine-gunned and bayoneted to death within its sacred walls. The rest were hunted down from one corner to another of the village and murdered in their homes and in the swamps. Three hundred died in the massacre. At Basco, Batanes, 80 civilians were arrested, and while in confinement some were hung

from the rafters and flaming fluid applied to their skins, others were beaten, breaking their hands and losing their eyesight, but all were eventually executed. At Matina Pangl, Davao, 169 men, women and children were murdered in cold blood.

Evidence will be offered showing that the Japanese in the Philippines, especially the Kempei-tai, displayed great ingenuity and sadism in inflicting the cruelest forms of torture on their victims whose number ran into thousands. They converted Fort Santiago, an old Spanish stone bastion overlooking Manila Bay, into their leading torture chamber and death hole. Fort Santiago became a synonym for torture and a symbol of Japanese brutality. Here hundreds suffered slow and painful death in dark, foul and lice-infested cells, for whom the quick, scientific mass extermination in the lethal gas chambers at Camp Dachau would have been a welcomed alternative.

Prominent among the many forms of torture used were hanging by the neck, by the thumbs, or by the limbs, and burning the feet or other delicate parts of the body as it hung suspended; the water cure,

with several variations depending on the savage bent and imagination of the torturer; placing ammunition between the fingers and squeezing them until the bones broke; pulling out tongues and prying out toe- and finger-nails with pliers; searing the flesh with lighted cigarettes and pieces of burning wood; slapping and kicking and boxing with bare hands or with steel knuckles; beating with long bamboo poles, wooden clubs, baseball bats and iron rods; jiu-jitsuing and hurling the subject repeatedly to the ground; twisting and breaking the hands, arms, or legs; lashing with rope, thorn switches or barbed wire; smashing with gun butts; shocking with electricity; applying gasoline on the skin and hair and igniting it; forcing small bamboo splints under the toe- and finger-nails; crucifying by nailing through the wrists and skull; lopping off the ears and nose and gouging out the eyes; killing either by bayonetting through the eyes, and other vital organs of the body, chopping the heads off with razor-sharp bolos or samurai swords, drowning, choking, shooting or burying alive, or by starving to death.

Before proceeding further, we pause to beg the indulgence of

this Court for the precise language we have been and will be using in describing the nature of these atrocities. While realizing our duty to express ourselves here at all times in temperate and restrained terms, the crimes committed to my country and my people were so shocking, so brutal and so revolting that resort to euphemisms would only do violence to the truth.

Of the manifold instances of such torture and sadism in the Philippines, our proof will point out that in February 1945 in Manila, in the home of Bartolome Pons, a pregnant woman with an 11-month old baby in her arms, was shot and killed. The Japanese started to leave, but hearing the baby cry, returned and killed it with two shots. At the Campos residence, the breast of one woman was hacked out. At St. Paul's College a baby was hurled into the air by a Japanese soldier and impaled on the bayonet of another. At Fort Santiago, a piece of skin was sliced off the back of a prisoner's hand and he was forced to eat it. The skin on his face and arm was twisted with a pair of wooden pliers.

At Palo Alto, Leyte, in the Vasayan Islands, three members of the Palacio family, including a woman, were arrested in February 1942, their hands tied behind their backs and hung by the arms from the branch of a tree for five hours. They were beaten with thorn switches until they bled. On the arm pits of the two male members gasoline was poured and set on fire. In Inopacan, Leyte, Eufresina Payot, a 24 year old girl was caught, her clothing stripped, her breasts slashed with a saber, and burned. In Iloilo, on 18 September 1943, Lucas Doctolero was crucified on the ground, three six-inch nails driven through each wrist and the base of his skull. In Romblon, on 17 November 1943, a blind woman was dragged out of her house, stripped naked. She was hog-tied and then hung from a tree head down.

At Kabayo, Mountain Province, in northern Luzon, Tayambong Chagsa was forced on two occasions, in March 1943, to drink a four-gallon can of water. A Japanese bounced on his distended belly, then with hands tied behind his back was hung. While hanging, his G-string was set on fire consuming all but two feet of it. The remaining portion

Doc. No. 6913

was wrapped around Chagsa's head and again ignited. At Bacolod, Negros Occidental, a man was beaten with a club, thrown across the floor and the next evening was forced to jump from a window to the asphalt pavement twenty feet below. The fall dislocated his hips and prevented him from walking for four months. Another was strapped to a table and his wrists burned with an alcohol flame until the odor of burning flesh filled the room. A third man had a bayonet thrust through his arm progressively deeper as he was questioned. At Dumanjug, Cebu, a three-and-a-half year old child was bayoneted and thrown into the sea.

Our proof will bear out that Japanese depravity in the Philippines, recurring in varying degrees throughout the occupation, reached its lowest ebb during the last dying days of Manila in February 1945. Lack of time prevents a full recital of specific cases, but for our present purposes it suffices to state that at Bay View and three other hotels the Japanese went on a wild orgy of debauchery that culminated in the rape of many young girls, prominent in Malate society. At the German Club women were disrobed, raped and

murdered, as the rest of the crowd of about 500 civilians huddled in the basement helplessly looked on. One young girl was decapitated when she resisted advances made on her; even her lifeless body was violated.

Women taking sanctuary in the Manila Cathedral were assaulted. In Tanauan, Batangas, a pregnant woman had her unborn child carved out of her stomach and beheaded. In Obando, Bulacan, the niece of Juan Etuijera, along with eight other women, was abused and bayoneted and, as her intestines came out, she was thrown into a fish pond.

On 22 September 1943, in Iloilo, the hands of two young girls were bound behind their backs, their clothing stripped and they were later raped. On 2 February 1942, at Santa Ana, Pampanga, an elderly lady and her maid were assaulted. In Bansic, Hermosa, Bataan, the men in a house were forced to leave while a girl who was left behind was raped. She subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to a child. During the first week of Japanese occupation of Manila, in January 1942, two American girls, among many others, were raped. Three Japanese soldiers went out into the street naked and raped two women in broad

Doc. No. 6913

daylight at the busy intersection of Espana and Quezon Boulevard, in the commercial section of the city.

Our evidence will further disclose the appalling destruction caused by Japanese aggression on public and private properties in the Philippines with an aggregate value of approximately \$1,370,263,324.50. Most of the destruction was far in excess of the exigencies of the situation and the limits of military necessity. This evidence will disclose how churches, hospitals and residential buildings were mined and destroyed, or doused with gasoline and set afire--how cities, towns and villages were burned without military rhyme or reason; how homes were looted and farms ravished of their crops, draft animals, poultry and livestock, and how the people were plundered of their money and jewelry. The Japanese did a thorough job of wrecking and devastating the Philippines beyond recognition.

To complete the over-all picture of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines, proof will be presented describing the indignities, the degradation, the suffering and deaths of American, Filipino and

other allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, imposed by the Japanese in the Philippines in violation of every important provision of the Hague Convention No. IV of 18 October 1907, to which Japan was one of the signatories, and of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 27 July 1929, by which Japan solemnly committed herself to be bound mutatis mutandis.

Typical of the treaty breaches were failing to accord to those who surrendered, the status and treatment of prisoners of war; subjecting the prisoners of war to public curiosity, to insults and inhumane treatment; not treating the women with the regard due their sex; coercing the prisoners and internees to reveal information regarding their army and country; confiscating their effects and objects of personal use, such as watches, fountain-pens, shoes; confiscating money in their possession without giving receipts therefor; evacuating them from the zone of combat on foot at excessive distances per day; placing them at certain points so that their presence there would give protection from bombardment; lodging them in barracks without safeguarding

their hygiene and health; not providing them with quarters and bedding equal in quantity and quality to those furnished Japanese base camps; not providing them with sufficient potable water; not furnishing them with clothing and footwear when they needed them; not taking all sanitary measures necessary to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and other places of detention and to prevent epidemics; not furnishing them with sufficient water for their bodily cleanliness; refusing them to take physical exercise and enjoy the open air; not maintaining adequate infirmaries for their benefit; requiring them to pay for their medical care and failing to have them examined by doctors at least once a month.

Also requiring officer prisoners of war to salute all members of the Japanese armed forces, regardless of rank; transferring sick and wounded prisoners of war when their recovery might be endangered thereby and when the conduct of military operations did not require such transfer; requiring officers who were prisoners of war to do manual labor and non-commissioned officers to do other than super-

visory work; compelling them to work an excessive number of hours per day and requiring them to do manual labor even when physically unfit; requiring them to work seven days a week and performing manual labor directly related to war operations; requiring them to perform unhealthful and dangerous work; aggravating their conditions of labor by disciplinary measures and requiring them to perform manual labor under conditions less favorable than the conditions under which Japanese troops at Japanese base camps were required to perform similar labor; not affording facilities to enable them to write to their families regarding their capture and the state of their health; refusing to permit them to receive parcels containing food and clothing; looting the parcels intended for them; being cruel to them, inflicting corporal punishment and torturing them; imposing collective punishment against them for individual acts; imposing punishment, which included killing, upon escaped prisoners of war and civilian internees who were recaptured, in excess of arrest for not more than thirty day; not seeing that those who died in captivity were honorably buried

and that their graves bore all due information, were respected and properly maintained; and not affording properly constituted relief societies for prisoners of war every facility for giving food, clothing and medical supplies to them when military necessity did not require refusal of such aid.

Most shocking of the atrocities committed against prisoners of war in the Philippines was the Bataan Death March wherein 11,000 American and 62,000 Filipino troops, exhausted, gaunt remnants of a small brave army whose long heroic resistance on Bataan had drawn the admiration of the civilized world, were forced to march 7 to 11 days without food or water approximately 120 kilometers under a scorching tropical sun. Throughout the march, many of these prisoners were slapped, boxed, beaten, bayoneted or shot. About 1,200 of their American and 16,000 of their Filipino comrades were thus murdered and left in the dusty and bloody road to rot. Throughout that time, the U. S. Army had enough motor vehicles and supplies of gasoline which the Japanese could have used to transport all the Fil-American forces

that had surrendered on 10 April 1942.

The end of the march was by no means the end of the martyrdom of the heroes of Bataan. At Camp O'Donnell, by not providing them with enough food and medical care, by forcing them to labor while sick and physically unfit; by subjecting them to punishment and torture for minor infractions, and by crowding them together in a filthy, small place unfit for human habitation, the Japanese further accomplished the indirect mass annihilation of the cream of the American-Filipino army. Every day in the camp Americans and Filipinos were dying like flies. Up to 1 August 1942 alone, 1,522 Americans and 29,000 Filipinos died there.

The Bataan march had a counterpart in Mindanao. On 4 July 1942, about 600 American and Filipino prisoners of war were grimly reminded of American Independence Day when compelled to march under a blistering sun from Camp Kiethley to Iligan, a distance of 38 kilometers. Many were without shoes and hats. On the way many were badly mistreated, and several were shot and killed. On 6 May 1942,

Doc. No. 6913

between 8,000 and 10,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war were loaded at Corregidor into the holds of ships with no latrine facilities, given no food, and in a state of exhaustion were disembarked not at the pier of Manila but near Dewey Boulevard and from there forced to march 15 miles to Old Bilibid Prison under a hot sun.

On 14 December 1944 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, 150 American prisoners of war were herded into three air raid shelters each about 75 feet by 4 feet by 3 feet. Suddenly the Japanese poured in buckets of gasoline which they set on fire with torches. They laughed as they fired into the shelters with their rifles and machine guns. Screaming American prisoners were shot as they ran out of the shelter. Five escaped by dashing successfully toward the beach and swimming five miles across the bay.

In May 1942, 300 emaciated American prisoners of war were sent out from Bilibid Prison to build a road through the almost impenetrable malarial jungles of Tayabas. These men who were almost dead from malaria and dysentery were forced to work in the sun without

Doc. No. 6913

clothing, shelter or shoes, with wheelbarrows, picks, and shovels. They were frequently beaten with pick handles and bayonet scabbards for pausing to relax. They were dying from dysentery, malaria and exposure and the survivors were sleeping on the ground in the rocky creek bed, drinking filthy water from the creek, and living in the open without cover. Japanese guards were living comfortably in tents. Not enough food and no proper medicine were provided. Only 75 men, starved, ragged, and sick, went through that project alive.

At Fort Santiago, three American pilots who were shot down during the bombing of Manila received sword thrusts through the shoulders or were scorched with lighted cigarettes. Holes were drilled through their fingers, wires inserted through them, and they were then suspended by the wires. The body of one pilot was burned, that of another paralyzed.

At Panay, American prisoners of war were forced, after their surrender in May, 1942, to locate the sites of ammunition dumps and food caches. For six days they were made to hike up and down the

Doc. No. 6913

hills without water and eating only rice crumbs left over by the Japanese guards. American officers were made to work like coolies, loading and unloading cargo to and from Japanese vessels.

At Nichols Field, sick American prisoners of war were made to push and haul heavy cars laden with rock and dirt one kilometer across the airfield at least eleven times a day, and failure to make the minimum number of trips required before the day was over meant severe beating and flogging. Water cure and hitting with pick handles and rifle butts until the prisoner became unconscious were the forms of punishment usually administered. Another kind of torture was to make a person stand at attention in the hot sun with a bucket full of water on his head. If any of the water was spilled, he would get a terrific beating. In September 1943, Sergeant James Edward Strawhorn's hands were tied behind his back, and hung from a tree for 24 hours. Deprived of food or water, he was exposed to the sun all day and to the rain at night. He was then beaten with a plaited rope and hit about the face and head with a pistol butt.

We will show that before, during and after the commission of these atrocities, the Japanese Government and its leaders assured that American prisoners of war and civilian internees were and would be well treated and well fed. For instance, on 24 February 1942, the Japanese Government through the defendant TOGO, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that American civilians will be treated in a manner "more favorable than contemplated by the Convention," and their "provisioning in bread, butter, eggs, meat, heating oil, coal and fats assured by Japan." On 9 March 1942, the Japanese Government through the defendant TOGO assured the United States Government that its nationals were being afforded indulgent treatment by the Japanese military authorities. "Apprehensions of the American Government based on information from unknown source and citing no exact facts are therefore without foundation."

We shall show, however, that specific "exact facts" of atrocities and mistreatments were, by formal protests, opportunely brought to the attention of the Japanese Government and its leaders

Doc. No. 6913

who were repeatedly warned by the American Government that punishment would be visited upon those who were responsible officially and personally for them either by neglect or by willfulness, regardless of their position, status and rank.

In the Hull note of 12 December 1942, the United States Government directed attention to and protested against the barbarous conditions at Fort Santiago where Roy Bennett and other Americans were reported imprisoned; the bad conditions existing at Santo Tomas, Davao and other internment camps in the Philippines; the Death March from Bataan to Camp O'Donnell; the atrocious conditions at Camp O'Donnell. In that note the American Government lodged with the Japanese Government "a most emphatic protest" and expected "that the inhumane and uncivilized treatment accorded American nationals, both civilians and prisoners of war, will be made a matter of immediate investigation and that the Japanese Government will give assurances that treatment inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Geneva Convention is not now and

Doc. No. 6913

will not in the future be inflicted upon American nationals."

In the Hull note of 5 April 1943, the United States Government warned "the Japanese Government that for any other violations of its undertakings as regards American prisoners of war or for any other acts of criminal barbarity inflicted upon American prisoners in violation of the rules of warfare accepted and practiced by civilized nations as military operations now in progress draw to their inexorable and inevitable conclusion, the American Government will visit upon the officers of the Japanese Government responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment they deserve."

In an undated Hull note, which was incorporated in the letter of the Swiss Minister of 5 February 1944, the United States Government again protested against the mistreatment of American and Filipino prisoners of war and civilian internees, charging that at Baguio civilian internees were forced to labor without shoes and garbed only in loin cloth; that prisoners of war from Corregidor being taken to Manila were not landed at the port of Manila but out-

Doc. No. 6913

side the city and forced to walk through the city to Bilibid Prison about 23 May 1942; that prisoners of war at Davao Penal Colony, suffering from grave vitamin deficiencies, could see from their camp trees bearing citrus fruit but were not allowed to pluck them; nor were they allowed to retrieve lemons floating down a stream running through the camp; that American officer prisoners of war were being compelled to perform all kinds of labor including menial tasks such as scrubbing floors, cleaning latrines used by Japanese troops, and working in the kitchens of Japanese officers; that 10 American engineers were required to go to Corregidor in July 1942 to assist in rebuilding the military installations in that area; that the condition of health of prisoners of war in the Philippines was deplorable, citing that at San Fernando in April 1942 American and Filipino prisoners were held in a barbed wire enclosure so overcrowded that sleep and rest were impossible and that the many who were sick were given so little care, that human excrement covered the whole area; that many of those who were made to march from Bataan

Doc. No. 6913

to San Fernando, a distance of over 100 kilometers, were shot or bayoneted by the guards; that at Camp O'Donnell conditions were so bad that 2,200 Americans and more than 20,000 Filipinos are reported to have died in the first few months of their detention; that at Cabanatuan there was no medicine for the treatment of malaria until the prisoners had been in the camp for five months; that at Los Banos camp, recognized as the established endemic center of malaria, no quinine was provided and the internees were not allowed to go outside the fence to take anti-malarial measures; that at Camp O'Donnell many of the men had to live without shelter during 1942, 23 officers were assigned to a space 14 by 20 feet in area, drinking water was so scarce that it was necessary to stand in line six or ten hours to get a drink, and officers had no bath for the first 35 days in the camp; that in late October 1942 approximately 970 prisoners were transferred from the Manila area to the Davao Penal Colony on a transport vessel providing only twenty inches of sleeping space per man; that at Camp Hay at Baguio 20 to 30 civilians were assigned

sleeping accommodations in a room which had been intended for the use of one person; that at Cabanatuan Lt. Col. Lloyd Biggs and Lt. Col. Howard Breitung and Lt. R. D. Gilbert, for attempting to escape, were severely beaten and tortured and Filipino passersby forced to beat them on the face with clubs; and that at Baguio Mr. Gray was beaten and given the water cure.

In the Hull note of 11 September 1944, the American Government protested against the removal of certain American internees from Los Banos camp to Fort McKinley where a major ammunition dump was maintained.

In the Acheson note of 6 April 1945, the United States Government protested against the murder of four American citizens, Grinnell, Duggleby, Larsen and Johnson, all internees in the Santo Tomas internment camp. In the Grew note of 19 May 1945, the American Government protested against the massacre of 150 American prisoners of war at Puerto Princesa on 14 December 1944. The note ended with a warning that "the Japanese Government cannot escape

responsibility for this crime."

We will further prove that contrary to the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government in these notes, American and Filipino prisoners of war and civilian internees continued to be deliberately humiliated, starved, mistreated, abused or murdered. These assurances were so obviously hypocritical that on 10 March 1945 the United States Government sent a note through Mr. Grew, Acting Secretary of State, asserting that; "These most gross and shocking violations of elementary human decency are highly inconsistent with numerous professions of the Japanese Government that it is according humanitarian treatment to prisoners of war. The Japanese Government has stated in justification of other violations of its undertakings and of human decency that the United States Government has based its protests on misunderstandings of the facts. The United States Government has not misunderstood the facts, the persons who reported these outrages themselves suffered them."

The "provisioning in bread, butter, eggs, meat, heating oil,

coal and fats assured by Japan" was a far cry from the actual starvation diet of about 300 grams of rice and 10 grams of vegetables which the prisoners of war and civilian internees ordinarily received daily during their internment. While camps in the Philippines were located in places where food was plentiful and while their Japanese guards were eating truckloads of rice, carabao meat, cattle, pigs, chickens, fresh and dried fish, soya sauce and paste, and drinking beer and whiskey, the prisoners and internees were suffering from loss of weight and dying from such malnutritional diseases as beri-beri, pellagra, scurvy and elephantitis.

Finally, our closing evidence will pierce the sham and hypocrisy of the pious protestations by the Japanese Government that humanitarian treatment was and would be given to American prisoners of war and civilian internees. Our evidence will cast light on a top secret policy directive emanating from Tokyo in July 1942. This directive ordered commanders of prisoner of war camps

Doc. No. 6913

to use white prisoners for labor in a manner to impress the people
of the localities in which the camps were located with the
superiority of the Japanese over the white people.

Tokyo, December 1946.

1359
S E C R E THEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

FEJA 000.5

APO 501
8 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report of War Crimes Branch on Atrocities.

TO: The Judge Advocate General
Washington 25, D. C.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

Briefly summarized, the evidence adduced by the Investigator-Examiners is to the effect that:

The headquarters of the Philippine Red Cross at the intersection of Isaac Peral and General Luna streets near Taft Avenue in Manila during the early part of 1945 and many years prior was located in a building prominent both as to place and size and on all dates referred to herein, bore large Red Cross emblems on its walls and roof and in every window of the building (R 2, 44, 45). To its south and west lay the campus and buildings of the University of the Philippines, a police station, and a high school, all of which were occupied during the early part of February 1945 by Japanese Forces, most of whom were marines (Exhibit A; R 1, 5, 6, 15, 21, 27).

As a result of the opening of the American bombardment of South Manila, Mr. Modesto FAROLAN, former Manila newspaperman who had served as general manager for the newspapers published by General ROMULO, found it necessary on 5 February, as acting manager of the Philippine Red Cross, to convert the building into an emergency hospital and sanctum for refugees. This was not discussed with any Japanese officials beforehand but they were acquainted with this institution and when, at noon on 10 February, a non-commissioned officer with a squad of six or eight Japanese came to the headquarters, they refused to permit the hanging of an "Emergency Hospital" sign on the front of the building and a Red Cross flag on the flag pole, and appeared displeased with the arrangement, inquired as to the number and identity of the refugees there and looked about the building while Mr. FAROLAN explained through Miss Corazon ABELLARA, a Filipino girl who could speak Japanese, the purpose and necessity of caring for the injured and homeless (R 2, 3, 27).

Later in the same day, at about 1800, when approximately seventy persons, including seven patients, five members of the staff and the remaining refugees, were in the building, Miss Gliceria ANDAYA, a nurse, and some others, unidentified, were at the rear of the premises preparing to eat their evening meal when they heard shots at the back gate and an unknown woman entered screaming that a child had been shot and behind her came four marines, one of whom was an officer who began firing his revolver at the children in the building. Miss ANDAYA ordered everyone to lie flat on the floor and almost everyone obeyed except one unidentifiable crying child who was silenced when three bullets were fired directly into its mouth (R 47). Through the interpreter, Corazon ABELLARA, the Japanese were advised that Miss ANDAYA was a Red Cross nurse and that they were in a Red Cross building and were asked what they wanted. They answered by pointing a gun at her and she got behind the nurse who was then bayoneted in the chest, causing her to fall on the floor. She did not faint until after she had seen

them enter the other room and bayonet and shoot the patients lying on the cots (Ex. B; R 45, 46, 47, 59).

The commotion and the shrill cry given by Miss A. DAYA as she was bayoneted were heard by Mr. FAROLAN who had been at his desk on the other side of the partition separating them, talking with Dr. German de VENECIA who was preparing for an operation (R 4, 52). Mr. FAROLAN hid under his desk just before one of the marines entered the room and killed Dr. VENECIA with two shots from his rifle. A volunteer attendant known only as Lydia, attempted to protect the doctor by saying, "He is our Doctor; please save him," and the marine thrust his bayonet at her, missed, and she feigned death. The assailant continued, bayoneting six other patients who were lying on or hiding under cots in that room, among whom were Mrs. Juan P. JUAN, her daughter Paulina ZABALA, and her ten days old baby, Rene ZABALA (R 4). Following this the lone marine left the room and could be heard going through other parts of the hospital killing and bayoneting the victims (R 4). When Mrs. ZABALA's husband found the bodies two days later, that of his wife showed that she had been bayoneted in the mouth and abdomen and shot through the chest, while the condition and position of the child's body indicated that he had been bayoneted in the right arm and had bled to death or suffocated under his mother's body (R 39).

Patrocinio ABAD, a movie actress, whose screen name was Corazon NOBLE and who had taken refuge at the headquarters, was in the downstairs corridor along with some twenty-five or thirty others when the Japanese came, and attempted to hide behind a medicine cabinet with her ten months old baby, Maria Lourdes VERA. The cover was insufficient and she was shot in the right elbow, fell and lay prone with her baby under her. The marine was not satisfied and stabbed her with his bayonet nine times on her side and back (Ex. B, C, I; R 14, 16). Later she gave the child to her brother to take to a doctor but it died as a result of three bayonet wounds.

Nine German Jews, refugees from Germany and evacuees of devastated Manila areas, took shelter at this time in the Red Cross building at the direction of a Japanese sentry posted nearby (R 65) and eight of them were killed in the general massacre. The women's latrine had been converted into living quarters for this group and one of them, John K. LEWY, had just started on a personal errand when he saw the Japanese enter who began shooting and followed him. Because of past experiences he turned to warn the others, but two of these enlisted men and one officer, despite pleas for mercy by the Germans, after saying "Escusi" (R 45), began shooting and bayoneting them as they lay prostrate on the floor of the latrine. LEWY also dropped to the floor and was bayoneted at least twice (Ex. G). Apparently the marines thought him dead but before he fainted he saw his fellow citizens killed (R 63). The GRAETZ' house maid, Isabel TABAQUE, who was with them on the floor of the latrine was not harmed. The passports of Mr. and Mrs. GRAETZ had been examined by the squad which came to the headquarters that morning (R 64), and they appeared to be satisfied (R 79). The documents did not indicate their religious background and when asked by the Japanese which they preferred, Japan or America, they answered "Japanese, tomodoti (Japanese friend), Heil Hitler" (R 69).

The carnage covered the entire ground floor and continued for twenty or thirty minutes, after which the Japanese departed (R 42). cursory examination of the premises that night revealed numerous bodies and after the building was burned 13 February, ashes, bones, and bodies were found piled in corners, along the corridors and in the latrine, identifiable only because some survivors were able to point out the locations where various victims had cowered for protection (Ex. E; R 31,

40); similarly, record files and safes together with their contents were destroyed by fire before they could be examined (R 7).

The estimates as to the number killed vary considerably, two of the nurses placing it at twenty (R 52, 56, 59); another, at approximately thirty (R 31); the surviving German at eighty (R 64); the manager, fifty (R 6); while another survivor thinks there were thirty or more (R 71); and a witness who entered the building the night of the massacre said he saw twenty bodies in the hallway and did not look into the rooms (R 30).

Like confusion prevails as to the identity of the perpetrators, some witnesses saying they were soldiers, others that they were sailors, and still others that they were marines, but the uniform and insignia described in each instance most closely resemble those of the Japanese Imperial Marines (R 6, 15, 52, 75) some of whom were quartered in the buildings of the University of the Philippines, Hugh Wilson Hall, Bordner High School Annex, the YMCA, the Department of Agriculture and Commerce Building, Department of Finance Building, the Legislative Building, the Jai-Alai Building and the Bay View Hotel (R 6, 32, 33, 47).

None of the witnesses could identify any of the individuals by name and attempted descriptions of personal characteristics are almost hopelessly vague (R 47, 82). One of the Japanese marines who was five feet three inches tall, and thought to be an officer, wore on his left chest "some kind of insignia, silver and red," carried a sword, a pistol, and had leather boots (R 65, 78) and it is possible that he was the officer who entered the gate at about 1800 hours firing his revolver at the children there (R 46). One of the privates is described merely as to approximate height and weight and none appears to have had any peculiarly distinguishing features (R 5, 78, 79, 82).

* * * * *

1371

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
6 December 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 117)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Massacre of more than one thousand civilians at
Lipa, Batangas Province, Luzon, P. I.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

At about 2100 hours on 5 March 1945, about one thousand Filipino men, women, and children were required by the Japanese to assemble in the Barrio of Bulihan, Lipa, Batangas, Luzon, P.I. The men were separated from the women and children and led away in small groups to the edge of a cliff. Here they were blindfolded and tied and then bayoneted to death. Their bodies were pushed over the cliff into a stream which ran at the foot of the embankment. The Japanese then disposed of the women and children in the same manner (R 1, 4, 7, 10, 26, 27). The slaughter continued for four hours (R 4). Five or six hundred dead bodies were seen later along the edge of the river (R 18, 22).

On the same night five or six hundred Filipino men, women, and children were assembled in the barrio of Suloc, Santo Tomas, Batangas, Luzon, P.I. Suloc is about two kilometers from Bulihan. About two hundred of them were released but the remaining three hundred were taken in small groups to the edge of a nearby stream and bayoneted to death, after which their bodies were thrown into or along the bank of the stream (R 13, 21, 22, 31).

Nineteen other male Filipino civilians were murdered in a similar manner on a mountain side near Suloc (R 17, 18).

* * *

APOLINARIA NAVARRO, after having been duly sworn, testified at Sabang, Lipa, Batangas Province, P. I., on 1 November, 1945 as follows:

Q Please state your full name, age, address and nationality.

A Apolinaria Navarro, 32 years old, Sabang, Lipa, Batangas Province, P. I., Filipino.

Q What is your occupation?

A Housekeeper.

Q Do you intend to remain at your present address, and if not, how can your whereabouts in the future be ascertained?

A I intend to stay here for some time.

Q Where did you reside during the Japanese occupation?

A We stayed at the barrio of Sulao, Sto. Tomas, Batangas Province, P. I.

Q Did you observe any cases of mistreatment to Filipino civilians by the Japanese?

A Yes.

Q Will you describe fully what you observed?

A We were living at that time on the outskirts of the barrio of Sulac. About the end of February 1945, we were ordered by the Barrio Lieutenant to concentrate inside the barrio of Sulac. The reason for this was that all those to be found on the outskirts of the barrio will be killed by the Japanese. Around a thousand of us were concentrated in the center of the barrio, in shacks we built for our own shelter. As soon as we have been concentrated, all men were gathered and taken on forced labor in the Malarayat Mountains, telling us that they will be returned in a week.

Afterwards, all the people were allowed to go back to their homes, but again on about the end of the first week of March, 1945, we were gathered for the second time in the barrio. About 500 of us, together with a few men, were taken to a school house. Out of this 500 people, 15 families grouping about 200 people were selected and placed in a different place. I was left behind with the remaining 300 people. Our group was then taken to the front of the house of Primo Quinto, a Jap collaborator. Arriving there, we were separated into families again. Each family were taken by four Japanese soldiers to the Moro river, a part of the Tehero river. I always tried to be in the farthest end of the group, so that we could be the last to be executed. Finally our turn came, and we were taken and conducted to the river. It was five o'clock in the afternoon when we were led to the river and on the way there, I saw about one hundred Japanese soldiers scattered near the river and I also saw some men with their hands tied at their backs.

As soon as we arrived at the place of execution, I saw a whole family - Maximo Mangubat, age 60; his wife, Maria, age 50; Aquilina Javier, age 30, and her two sons, ages 6 and 4, and two daughters, ages 12 and four months bayoneted to death. I saw it actually with my own eyes and I also saw that the four months baby of Aquilina was thrown up into the air and landed into two bayonets

plunged savagely by the Japanese. The baby was dead before it reached the ground. I also saw about 500 bodies all scattered around the bank of the river with blood oozing out of them, and they all seemed to be dead. They had not been removed yet but were allowed to stay on the place where they died.

At the bank of the river, the Japanese tried to wrench my two children from me, for I was holding them firmly. I was pregnant six months at that time. Finally, they succeeded in taking them away from me. Ludigario, age 10, was the first to fall down as soon as he had been bayoneted on his right side. Maria, age 6, was taken hold of in one arm and was plunged wildly into the air by one Japanese, while two Japanese soldiers thrust her back with their bayonets as soon as she landed on the ground. While watching the scene, I called for help from God and my face was looking up into the sky, when five Japanese soldiers came and bayoneted me at the back. I got five bayonet wounds - one on the upper part of my right arm, another on the upper right of my chest passing through my breast, another on my waist region passing through my right side, and another on my left shoulder. Because of the force of the bayonets that passed through my body, I automatically fell on the side of the river, on top of many dead bodies. It was about 6 o'clock in the evening when the Japanese covered us with coconut leaves. After waiting for about an hour, I tried to raise myself when there were no more Japanese around. I could hear many voices of agonies crying for help. I tried to crawl near a man, Daniel Reyes, who was calling for help. Over him was a dead body and I tried to push it away from him. As soon as I toppled the dead body from his own I fell unconscious because of my weakness from loss of blood. After regaining consciousness, Daniel Reyes was still there in the same place, dead. Then I crawled again and went to the river because I was thirsty. I drank a few draughts of water in the river and then fell unconscious again. Regaining my consciousness, I crawled to the same place where the execution had taken place, because that was the easiest way to go up the river. I went under the bushes and slept for a few moments. It was about 10 o'clock in the evening when I crawled again along the river bank and upon reaching a distance of about 25 meters I rest again. While I was resting, I looked around and found a naked dead woman, about 18 years old. I assumed that she had been raped and afterwards bayoneted. I crawled back to the barrio of Sulac, and reaching the house of Carlos, a Makapili, I was warned to go away because there were still Japanese soldiers around the place. I was given a bowl of rice but I was still too weak to eat. I crawled to a dugout and rested there. After a short time, I went to the group of fifteen families that were separated from us. I was fed there and again they warned me to go away. From there, I met an acquaintance, Maria Castillo, who took care of me. Mr. Pamfilio Navarro came and treated me. I stayed in the house of Maria Castillo till I came to Lipa on the 25th of April, 1945. Even though I was mistreated so inhumanly while I was pregnant, my baby was born in one piece.

Q Did you recognize any of the dead bodies that you have mentioned?

A Besides my two children and the Mangubat family that I have mentioned, the other dead bodies that I can remember are the following: my sister in law, Maria Rucafor, age 30, her daughter, Conchita Hernandez, age 6, and her son, Antonio Hernandez, age 3; my sister in law Juliana Rucafor Magsino, age 50; my nephew and nieces, Proferio Magsino, age 25, Presento Magsino, age 30; Conchita Magsino, age 13, Aurelia Magsino, age 6; my brother Agaton Navarro, age 33, his wife Maria Villanueva, age 28; my cousin Bibensio Navarro, age 50; my sister in law Cresenciana Rucafor, age 40; my nephews, Lazaro Navarro, age 12, Mena Navarro, age 10, Alejandro Navarro, age 4, Jose Navarro, age 2; my brother in law Eleno Rucafor, age 40; Juana Navarro, age 30; Tamasa de Leon, age 60; Sixto Kamintano; Eulogia Rucafor, age 26; Benjamin Rucafor, age 4; Carolito Dimafelles, age 2; Pastor Rucafor, age 30.

Q Do you know of any of the Japanese?

A I only know of Yamashita. It was common rumor in our town then that the Japanese General, Yamashita has ordered the killing of all Filipinos in the Philippines.

Q What happened to your husband?

A My husband, Maximo Rucafor, 50 years old, was one of those men who were taken by the Japanese on forced labor in the Malarayat Mountain. He was taken by 2 Japanese soldiers and 2 Makapili members - Primo Quintos and Dalmacio Bueno, in the morning and allowed to return at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. His job was to carry boxes of ammunition from the church where the Japanese had previously stored them to the foot of the Malarayat Mountain. This went on for almost two weeks. At the end of the second week, the same members of the Makapilis informed my husband to take the following day as a day of rest. But early the next morning the Makapilis returned and took my husband with them. Since then my husband never returned and I never heard news of him. Anxious to learn the whereabouts of my husband, I inquired from Mr. Quintos. He told me that my husband had some work to finish and will return soon. But after 3 days Mr. Quintos told me to pray for him because he will never return.

Q Can you tell us the number of Japanese soldiers present at the time of the execution?

A There were 20 officers and 100 soldiers.

Q Can you describe any of them?

A No sir, but I can tell you that the officers wore leather leggings and carried sabers, while the soldiers wore short-sleeved khaki uniforms and carried rifles and bayonets.

Q Do you know to what unit the Japanese soldiers belonged?

A No sir, I do not know to what unit the Japanese belong. We never talked with the Japanese soldiers as we were afraid of them. We always tried to stay away from them when we see them.

Q I hand you Exhibit G, will you describe it to me?

A It is a picture of myself showing the bayonet wounds
I received on my back.

Q I now hand you Exhibit G-1, will you describe it to me?

A It is a picture of myself showing four bayonet wounds
I received on the right side of my body.

Q Do you have anything further to add to your statement?

A No sir, that is all.

/s/ Apolinaria Navarro
APOLINARIA NAVARRO

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES)
)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS) SS
)
TOWN OF LIPA)

I, APOLINARIA NAVARRO, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read to me and understood the translation of the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein, consisting of three pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Apolinaria Navarro
APOLINARIA NAVARRO

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES)
)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS) SS
)
TOWN OF LIPA)

I, GUILLERMO F. MARIANO, residing at 96 Loreto, Sampaloc, Manila, being duly sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Tagalog and from Tagalog to English respectively, and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing three pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed her signature thereto.

/s/ Guillermo F. Mariano
GUILLERMO F. MARIANO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of November, 1945.

/s/ Herbert C. Likins
HERBERT C. LLIKINS, Capt., TC,
Investigating Officer, War Crimes
Investigating Detachment.

C E R T I F I C A T E

We, HERBERT C. LIKINS, Capt., ASN 0297351, TC, Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment, and NEIL OLIVER, 2nd Lt., Inf., ASN 01320736, Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment, certify that on the 1st day of November, 1945, personally appeared before us APOLINARIA NAVARRO, and according to GUILLERMO F. MARIANO, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein; that after her testimony had been transcribed, the said APOLINARIA NAVARRO had read to her by the said interpreter the same and affixed her signature thereto in our presence.

Sabang, Lipa, Batangas
Province, P. I.

/s/ Herbert C. Likins
HERBERT C. LIKINS, Capt., TC,
Investigating Officer, War
Crimes Investigating Detachment

21 November, 1945

/s/ Neil Oliver
NEIL OLIVER, 2nd Lt., Inf.,
Investigating Officer, War
Crimes Investigating Detachment

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of APOLINARIA NAVARRO is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.

/s/ Alva C. Carpenter
Alva C. Carpenter,
Chief, Legal Section.

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 29th
day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

1373

1.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
19 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 106)

THRU : Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: Massacre of One Hundred and Ninety-four
Filipino Civilians at Santo Tomas, Batangas,
Luzon, P.I., and the Unnecessary Burning of
part of the Town of Santo Tomas, Batangas,
Luzon, P.I.

* * * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

In the early part of February 1945, the inhabitants of Santo Tomas learned that the Mayor and the Provincial Governor were no longer living in town (R 1, 39). Upon learning this the townspeople became alarmed and began to evacuate their homes, some going to the mountains, and others gathered in groups in a few homes (R 1, 39). At about 2000 hours on 9 February 1945, a truckload of Japanese soldiers arrived in town and set fire to the house of the governor's brother in law (R 1). The next evening other Japanese soldiers came to the town ostensibly to learn where and why the inhabitants had fled (R 1, 2). On 11 February 1945, other homes were burned (R 35).

At 0500 hours on 11 February 1945, Japanese came to Santo Tomas and proceeded from place to place where civilians had gathered, taking their jewelry, money, and other valuables (R 7, 13), then killed many of the inhabitants, poured gasoline on the bodies of the wounded and dead and set them afire (R 17, 21). Men, women, children, and babies were murdered (R 8, 18, 22, 26). There is evidence that three of the victims were probably subjected to attempted or actual rape (R 8). Approximately one hundred and ninety-four residents of Santo Tomas were murdered on this date (Exhibit G). Some of the victims were able to escape and tell of the brutal and barbaric treatment received at the hands of the Japanese and the three Filipinos who were accompanying them.

At one home between sixty-five and seventy men, women, and children had congregated. About twenty-five were ordered out of the house and taken to a cemetery. Three men of this group were taken to a pit that had been used as a latrine by the Japanese soldiers, were bayoneted, and fell into the pit. One man who fell into the pit pretended to be dead and was able to escape (R. 12, 14). He does not know what happened to the others who had been left at the cemetery (R 14).

Another group of approximately fifty were taken from their place of hiding; all were bayoneted and stabbed, thrown into a pile, saturated with gasoline, and then set afire (R 17). The only survivor of this group describes how she was bayoneted four times in the back and three times in the front; one of the thrusts killing her five months old son that she was holding (R 17, 18).

Another group of fifty were tied and led to a field where they saw the bodies of twenty men, women, and children who had been stabbed to death (R 21.) This group was stabbed and other groups were led to the same spot and also stabbed. Afterwards gasoline was poured on the bodies and set afire (R 21). One woman suffered three bayonet wounds on her back, one on the left chest, one on the right chest, two on her thigh, two on her left arm, and one on her breast (R 21, 22, Exhibits J, K and L).

The Japanese bayoneted the fifteen year old daughter of one woman, who, while holding her one year old daughter, received six bayonet wounds herself. The Japanese were chattering and laughing as the pile of bodies on top of her were burning (R 25, 26).

From one group two Japanese soldiers with blood on their bayonets took three girls, the oldest of which was seventeen, into the bushes where the girls begged for mercy and pleaded not to be abused (R 8).

Another group was stabbed, thrown into a dug-out and covered with dirt. (R 31, Exhibit P).

* * * *

1375

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
2 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report #90)

THRU : Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT : Killing of three hundred twenty Filipino civilians and the wounding of four more by members of the Imperial Japanese Army in the vicinity of Taal, Batangas Province, Luzon, P. I. during February 1945.

...

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

Between 16 and 18 February 1945 members of the Imperial Japanese Army stationed at or near Taal, Batangas Province, P. I., pursued a definite plan of extermination of Filipino civilians in that vicinity. So broad in scope were the murderous activities of the Japanese that it was impossible to identify many of the victims. However, the murder of at least three hundred twenty identified Filipino civilians by the Japanese has been established either by the testimony of eye witnesses or by the discovery of the mutilated bodies of the victims.

About 0900 hours, 16 February 1945 the Japanese murdered the wife and two children of Desiderio BATHAN by bayonetting, at Dalig near the shore of Taal Lake (R-3).

At approximately 3830 hours, 16 February 1945 in the barrio of Cubama, Japanese soldiers murdered more than one hundred Filipino civilians by shooting or bayonetting, and burned all their houses (R-6, 7).

By 1000 hours, 16 February 1945, the Japanese had started to burn all the barrios in the vicinity of Taal. Approximately sixty Filipino civilians inhabitants of Taal hastened to take refuge from the Japanese in a ravine. At about 1400 six or seven Japanese threw hand grenades into the ravine (R-13). Ten or fifteen persons were killed by the hand grenades, and of the survivors, thirty-five to forty persons were machine-gunned by the Japanese and many others bayoneted. Their bodies were stacked in piles of ten or more (R-14). Milagros BARRION, a member of this group, received seventeen wounds in her body. Women and children were blown to pieces by grenades (R-19).

At about 0900 hours, 16 February 1945, approximately one hundred fifty Filipino men, women and children sought refuge from the Japanese in a ravine between Maabud and Malawin. At about 1400 that afternoon the Japanese began to fire into the ravine. They then proceeded to bayonet all the survivors whom they could find. Of one group of twenty in the ravine, there were two survivors (R-21). Of another group of sixteen, twelve were killed (R-23).

At about 1100 hours, 16 February 1945, six Filipino civilians fled to a bamboo grove near a sugar cane field belonging to Miguel MAYUGA at Maabud. Two women in this group were bayoneted to death and two were wounded (R-29, 30).

At about 0900 hours, 16 February 1945, sixteen Filipino civilians hid in a ravine approximately thirty meters east of Bagong Calle, Cubamba, Taal. At about 1100 hours five Japanese shot and bayoneted the entire group (R-32).

On 16 February 1945, at approximately 1530 the Japanese killed about forty men and one hundred and ten women and children who had hidden in a ravine between Luntal and Munlawin. The Japanese used machine guns, hand grenades and bayonets. The victims were all tied together with a long rope prior to their slaughter (R-35).

Approximately one hundred bodies of murdered Filipino civilians were discovered in the barrio of Luntal (R-44). More than one hundred bodies in a pile about five meters long, two meters wide and one meter high were discovered in a place between the barrios of Cultihan, Maabud and Luntal on 16 February 1945. These victims had been killed by machine guns, rifles, bayonets and hand grenades. Their hands were tied behind their backs (R-47).

At about 0800, 18 February 1945 approximately one hundred Filipino civilians took refuge in and around the hut of Severo MENDOZA, approximately ten paces away from the sugar mill of Mr. BADILLO in the barrio of Luntal. Approximately sixty Japanese opened fire on the hut with machine guns and rifles and then set it on fire. Only five people survived this massacre (R-57, 58).

...

1376

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
2 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report #96)

THRU : Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT : Massacre of Three Hundred Civilians of Cuenca, Batangas,
P. I.

. . . .

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

This investigation covers the murder of more than three hundred civilian Filipino men, women, and children of various barrios in Cuenca, Batangas, P. I., during February and March 1945. The official list of those massacred was prepared by the acting mayor of Cuenca at the request of the governor of Batangas Province (R 1; Ex. A). Typical of the methods by which these murders were committed by the Japanese are the following examples:

About 1930 hours on 3 February 1945, the Japanese herded twenty-one male civilians into a cave near the barrio of Tanque, ordered them out one at a time, and tied them together, with their hands behind their backs. They were then taken to an open field and in groups of three were led to the edge of a ravine, where they were shot and bayoneted and then rolled into the ravine. The Japanese then examined the bodies and any that showed signs of life were again bayoneted. Only two of the twenty-one escaped (R 7, 8, 11).

On 6 February 1945, approximately one hundred and seventy-five civilian Filipino men, women and children were assembled in the house of Graciano CASTILLO in the barrio of Mambug. The Japanese took the men out in groups of five and none of them were seen again. Later they took three women out but they were returned shortly stating that the grave was not yet finished. One woman and her child escaped from the house during darkness, but the rest of the one hundred and seventy-five were never seen again (R 14, 15). Screams and groans were heard from the CASTILLO house and the next day the house was silent (R 4).

On 13 February 1945, approximately fifty-two civilian Filipinos including two women were crowded under a house in the sitio of San Juan by the Japanese. One group of thirty was taken to Mateo PALMA'S house nearby and forced to admit they were guerrillas. They were then tied to trees and the posts of the house. At about 1900 hours they were taken in groups of three to the edge of a well, their hands tied behind their backs, and made to step up singly to the well. Each victim was held by one Japanese while three others bayoneted him. The victims were then thrown into the well. Only two escaped out of this group and one of them was wounded (R 18, 19, 21, 22). The remaining twenty civilians were marched to another house near a well and never seen again and it is believed they suffered the same fate (R 18).

On 19 February 1945, eleven men, women and children of Elisa MACPANTAY'S family were bayoneted to death in the back yard of their home in the barrio of San Felipe by Japanese soldiers (R 24). The same night, the mother and nephew of Agustin LUNAR were bayoneted to death in their home in San Felipe by Japanese soldiers and their house burned (R 27). On 20 February 1945, nine men, women and children of another family in San Felipe were bayoneted to death by the Japanese (R 50) and on the same evening eight men, women and children of still another family were similarly murdered by the Japanese and the home burned (R 33).

Early in March 1945, Ireneo HOCENA was wounded with bayonets on a trail near Poblacion by the Japanese for no apparent reason (R 36).

On 7 March 1945, eighteen male civilian Filipinos were brought to the barrio of Dita by the Japanese. Five young men were taken from the group and the other thirteen were given passes to return to their homes. En route home they were arrested by Japanese sentries, marched to a ravine and their hands tied behind their backs. They were then bayoneted by the Japanese and the bodies thrown into the ravine. Eleven were never seen again and only two escaped (R 4, 39, 40; Ex. H, I).

On 11 March 1945, nineteen civilian Filipino men, women and children were taken by the Japanese from a shelter in the barrio of Sablay and imprisoned in a tunnel for about a week. On 19 March the tunnel was opened and the civilians were ordered out in small groups. As they left the tunnel the Japanese bayoneted and shot them. Only about six of the victims escaped (R 42, 43, 48; Ex. B, C, D, E). One little girl about five years old was bayoneted through the neck as she ran from the tunnel and was lifted from the ground while impaled on the bayonet (R 45).

. . .

100-2334

1377

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
14 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 101)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: San Jose, Batangas Massacre

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

On or about 23 January 1945, a warehouse in the vicinity of San Jose, Batangas, used by the Japanese to store their supplies was looted and burned by guerrillas and civilians (R 1). On 27 January 1945 the Japanese rounded up the people of the town for questioning concerning this incident, and arrested a priest, the mayor, and two other town officials. One of these men escaped (R 1), but the remains of the others were later found and identified.

From that time on through March 1945, the Japanese carried on a program of burning and killing throughout the barrios of San Jose. At least one hundred and seven Filipinos including women and children were slain by the Japanese (R 1, Exhibit A). Many were tied, led away and bayoneted (R 29, 33, 47). Some of the bodies were mutilated; the hands and feet of one victim were cut off, and the right hand of another was severed (R 22). The burned and beheaded body of one man was found tied to a post (R 19).

Ten members of one family, in whose home the Japanese found a leaflet dropped by an American plane, announcing the landing of United States' troops on Leyte, were arrested and later found bayoneted to death (R 32, 33).

Anselmo ALABASTRO, Eutiquio ALABASTRO, and Felipe ALABASTRO were taken by the Japanese to the home of BALIWAG, a short distance from their own home. Here they were tied hand and foot with their backs to the posts of the house, and burned to death when the Japanese set fire to the house (R 19). Others were taken from their homes and bayoneted to death, and their houses burned to the ground (R 16, 44, 47). At least fifty-eight homes and buildings were burned by the Japanese (R 2).

1378
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
17 October 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report # 74)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Murder of Thirty-nine Non-combatant
Filipino Civilians.

.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCES:

Between seven and eight o'clock on the morning of 13 March 1945, approximately 15 Japanese soldiers appeared in the Town of Rosario, Batangas, P.I., and apparently without reason commenced shooting and bayonetting all of the people who could be found (R 1, 3, 5, 7). No effort was made to distinguish between men, women, and children, and due to the fact that many of the men were able to run away, most of the victims were women and children.

.

1379

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APC 500
14 December 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 126)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: Massacre of Filipino civilians at Tapel, Gonzaga, Cagayan, Luzon, P. I. on 1 July 1945.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

About 0100 hours on 1 July 1945 twenty three Japanese soldiers and one Japanese Officer, a Captain YUSHIDA, entered the home of Zacarias PALATAO in Mission, Buguey, Cagayan, Luzon, P.I., and bayoneted to death two male occupants. The remaining sixteen occupants were then led away and all of them were bayoneted many times. Only one young girl survived but she suffered several bayonet wounds (R 101, 106, Exs K-1, K-2, K-3).

About 0600 hours on the same day Japanese soldiers moved into Tapel, Gonzaga, Cagayan, about nine miles east of Mission. Tapel was the evacuation center at which residents of nearby towns had been concentrated by the Japanese to prevent their escape towards the American troops advancing from the west side of the Cagayan river. Approximately thirty thousand Filipinos were in or near Tapel (R 50, 57, 59).

Three or four small boats containing Filipinos who were trying to escape by sea were fired upon by the Japanese with rifles and machine guns. Three of the occupants were killed and two were wounded (R 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, Exs I-1, I-2, J-1, J-2).

The Japanese surrounded the nipa huts scattered along the beach, and when the Filipino civilians began to run, they machine gunned and bayoneted them. Two were seen bayoneted to death (R 87). One of another group of three Filipinos was beheaded and his two companions were killed with rifle shots (R 25, 90). Four other Filipinos had their hands tied behind them and were then bayoneted to death and their bodies thrown into an old well (R 57, 58, 76, 77, 81). Four others were killed in like manner (R 94, 98). Ten Filipinos were captured as they prepared to escape by boat, and the Japanese killed all of them with bayonets except one who was severely wounded (R 64, 65, 69, 70, 73). The dead bodies of three other Filipinos, one of whom had been beheaded were found near a small bridge (R 26, R 59, Ex L-2). Eight others were found beheaded (R 90, Ex L-1). The next day survivors saw more than one hundred dead bodies in Tapel (R 77, 81, 91), and much later many skulls and bones were found tied with ropes (R 85, Exs M-1, M-2).

* * *

1380

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

9 February 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 197)

THRU : Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch.

SUBJECT : Murders, looting and burning of the town of Calauang, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I. in February, 1945.

* * * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

On 11 February 1945, at the town of Alaminos, Japanese under the command of Captain OHNO, Hajime impressed fifty Filipino men into service. These men and approximately seventy Japanese started on a punitive expedition led by OHNO. At Barrio Del Carmen, Alaminos, some houses were machine-gunned, screams were heard and the houses were burned (R 2). They proceeded through the mountains to Calauang. Dead and wounded people were seen on the trail. Trench mortars were fired into houses at a sugar plantation (R 2). Shortly before the expedition reached Calauang, twenty Filipinos, who were evacuating the town were stopped and made to return with the Japanese (R 2). On 14 February 1945, these twenty people were herded into a theater which was then set on fire and the twenty were burned alive (R 3). On 13 February 1945, Japanese looted all the houses in Barrio Lumot, Calauang. For a period of three days the Japanese burned homes and killed many Filipinos in Calauang. On 16 February 1945, the Japanese left Calauang and part of them are believed to have gone to San Pablo, but OHNO and twelve other Japanese returned to Alaminos burning all the houses along the way (R 4).

While the Japanese were in Calauang, the following are examples of the atrocities committed. People taken from their homes or who were found in the vicinity were bayoneted to death or killed with sabers (R 7, 17, 20, 23, 26). One man was shot and killed as he was running away (R 11). A man, his wife and their one-day old twins took refuge in a shelter they had built. They were discovered and the man was struck with a saber and killed and then the baby he had been holding was killed. The woman and the daughter were unharmed (R 14). One family heard of the approaching Japanese and hid. A four-year-old girl innocently left the hiding place and was seen by the Japanese. The father picked up the girl and ran away. He saw the Japanese find the hiding place and kill the other members of the family. One of the victims was a 70-year-old woman and another a one-year-old boy (R 29). At another place nine women and children who were hiding were found by the Japanese and all but three of them were bayoneted to death (R 32, 33). A 61-year-old man who was convalescing from illness was found in his home and he and his house were burned (R 35). Another family in hiding was discovered. A 5-year-old boy was shot and killed as he ran away and his mother and grandmother were bayoneted to death (R 38).

JOSE HABANA

called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Hill) Will you state your name?

A Jose Habana.

Q Where do you reside?

A Calamba, Laguna.

Q What is your nationality?

A Filipino.

Q How old are you?

A Thirty-five years.

Q Were you residing in Calamba, Laguna Province, during February of this year?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you recall going to the Catholic Church in Calamba on 12 February 1945?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you tell the Commission the occasion for you going to that place?

A Well, it was in the morning of February 12, --

Q Speak a little louder.

A (Continuing) -- 1945, when a Japanese, four of them, went to our place -- our house, I mean. They talked with my father and say that there will be a meeting in the church. And we were around six that were taken --

Q Did this Japanese speak Tagalog?

A Well, they speak a little.

Q Enough so that you could understand what he wanted you to do?

A Yes.

Q Did he tell you why?

A They say there will be a meeting, and the captain wants to meet us there.

Q Did they take both the men and women of your household?

A No.

Q To the church?

A No; it is only the men that they have taken.

Q And what time did you arrive at the church?

A That is around, I think, eight o'clock in the morning.

Q And when you arrived there did you find other people gathered at the church?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long did you remain at the church that day?

A Until around 5:00 five to six o'clock in the afternoon.

Q And during the time that you were there at the church, can you give the Commission an estimate of how many people were gathered there?

A Well, to my estimation, sir, around 2,000.

Q Can you give the approximate dimensions of the church, or the space in the church where these people, these 2,000 persons were gathered?

A Well, this is only an estimate: Well, the length of the church, I think, is around about 50 to 70 meters in length, and the width is around, I think, around 20. But it is better -- I think they have taken the picture, and it is better.

Q We don't have the picture here. It is a very large church, in comparison with the churches here in the Philippines?

A Yes, it is a very large church.

Q Now, did the Japanese hold any kind of a meeting there at the church that day?

A No, but we expected that.

Q Did they tell the persons gathered there anything more about what they were going to do with you after you arrived?

A No. It is only -- our presumption was only --

Q Well, did they tell you anything?

A Nothing.

Q Then you say you left there about four or five o'clock in the afternoon?

A Well, in our bunch.

Q Had other persons left the church before that during the day?

A Yes, sir.

Q And tell the Commission about the people leaving the church during the afternoon.

A Well, it is after lunch time; there were trucks outside the church.

Q Were these Japanese trucks?

A Yes, sir. They take around about 30 to 40 persons, and have them brought in the truck.

Q Taking them away from the church?

A Yes, away from the church.

Q Did they all go in the same direction?

A Yes, sir.

Q And did this continue during the afternoon, that is, the taking of persons away in the truck?

A Yes.

Q Were all the persons gathered there in the church men?

A Yes, men.

Q And when they took you away at four or five o'clock in the afternoon, where did they take you to?

A We were taken to the Barrio of Real.

Q How far is that from the town of Calamba?

A It is around one and a half miles.

Q And can you tell the Commission about how many was on the truck that you were on?

A I think we were around 30 to 40.

Q Go ahead and tell the Commission just where the Japanese took you and what they did to you after you arrived at your destination.

A When we arrived in Real where the truck stopped, it is not far from the house where we were being taken, and we, each of us, were required to bow when the truck stopped, so that each of us were ordered to go down, one by one. In my case, when it was my turn, when I went down the truck --

Q You mean when you jumped off the truck?

A Yes. (Continuing) -- a Japanese took my arms and had me tied in my back,

Q Tied your hands behind your back?

A Yes, behind my back. And then blindfolded me with a cloth.

Q Had you seen the Japanese do the same thing with other persons that had jumped off the truck ahead of you?

A No, because we were taken one by one, and we can't see what is going on.

Q And where did they take you to then?

A Then I was taken in the house, farther from the place we were; we stopped. I was brought out by a Japanese to the stairs of the house, and then from the stairs there are Japanese that meet me there.

Q Were you taken upstairs to the house?

A Yes, I was taken upstairs of the house.

Q What did they do to you upstairs?

A When I was taken upstairs, then they let me seated in a bench, and that is what I feel: it is a bench. And there they begin to stab me, bayonet me.

Q How many times did they bayonet you?

A Several times.

Q How many?

A Well, after I have been massacred, about seven wounds.

Q And tell the Commission where those wounds are on your body.

A The principal thing is in the chest, near the heart.

Q How many?

A Here is about two (indicating), and one here near to my sexual (indicating), and one in the shoulder (indicating), two here.

Q Well, after you were bayoneted did you retain your consciousness?

A Yes.

Q Did you fall to the floor?

A I fell on some bodies.

Q On some bodies?

A Yes.

Q Well, after that were you able to get the blindfold off your eyes and remove the rope from your arms?

A Yes, it was after.

Q How long afterwards?

A It is about a half-hour.

Q And when you removed the blindfold, tell the Commission what you saw there in this room.

A When I removed my hands and the cloth that had blindfolded me, I saw five feet, around five feet of bodies. Some were still alive.

Q You mean bodies stacked five feet high in the room?

A Five feet high in the room.

Q How large a room was this?

A It is around about 15 meters long, about three to four meters wide.

Q A very large room?

A It is a house; there is no room, what they call. It is the whole from the sala up to the kitchen is one room.

Q Can you give the Commission an estimate of about how many bodies you think were in that room?

A Well, to my estimate it is around 500, because of the heaps of the bodies that are there.

Q What did you do then, after you were able to free your hands and remove your blindfold?

A I have to -- when I stood up somebody called me, and it is my brother, my youngest brother, and he is already loosing his tie, and I told him to keep low, because there is still Japanese around the house.

Q How long did you remain there in that house then?

A Well, we have to remain around about 15 minutes.

Q What did you do then?

A I have to wait for the fire to be big enough so that we will not be detected in jumping from the house.

Q You mean the house was on fire when you left?

A Yes.

Q Do you know how the house caught fire?

A Well, what I have heard is only the shot, and then the fire started.

Q You didn't see the house set afire?

A Yes.

Q Well, then, you were able to escape from the house?

A Yes. The fire was around about one and a half meters from where I jumped, when my brother and me jumped from the house.

Q Did you jump out of the upstairs window, you mean?

A No, in the back. We have to turn down the walls of the kitchen so that we could pass there undetected.

Q How many of your relatives were killed by the Japanese there at Calamba that day, if you know?

A There were four.

Q What are their names?

A There is my father, Doctor Habana; my brother, Mariano Escueta; Balbino Alejar; my younger brother, Foracio.

Q Now, of those 2,000 people, or about 2,000 people that you saw there in the church, were they civilians?

A Yes.

Q Were they armed in any way?

A Not even a single bolo.

Q Were they offering any resistance to the Japanese?

A No.

Q And the Japanese that you saw there in Calamba that day, and those that took you out to the Barrio Real, to which branch of the Japanese armed forces did they belong?

A Well, that is what I don't know, but they are with the regular stars.

Q Stars?

A Yes, with stars.

CAPTAIN HILL: Take the witness.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Reel) These 2,000 civilians -- do you know whether any of them were guerrillas?

A No.

Q You don't know?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know whether any of them helped the guerrillas?

A Help?

Q You don't know whether any of them helped the guerrillas?

A I don't know.

Q So you don't know that they were noncombatant civilians?

A I don't know

CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.

CAPTAIN HILL: That is all.

(Witness excused)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, T. R. C. KING, Major, Inf. (TD) Executive Officer,
 Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander
 for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2884
 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony
 offered by JOSE HABANA in the trial of the case against
 Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before
 a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record
 of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies
 taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are
 now on file with this Section.

/s/ T. R. C. King

T. R. C. King,
 Major, Inf. (TD)

Doc. No. 2884

C E R T I F I C A T E

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 20th day
 of November, 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

John R. Pritchard
 Capt., Inf.
 Summary Court

/s/ T. R. C. King

T. R. C. King,
 Major, Inf. (TD)

Doc. No. 2884

C E R T I F I C A T E

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 20th day
 of November, 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

John R. Pritchard
 Capt., Inf.
 Summary Court

1382
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
17 October 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report # 73)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Burning of Barrio of Nanipil, Mountain
Province, P.I., and Murder of Civilians
on Titig Mountain.

.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

Early in the morning of 15 April 1945, six male civilian Filipinos and one woman were captured while enroute from Paceda to Nanipil, Mountain Province, Luzon, P.I., by approximately one thousand (1000) Japanese soldiers who were members of the "Tiger Unit", commanded by a Major SAITO. After being questioned concerning location of guerrilla forces in the area, the seven civilians were forced to accompany the Japanese to Cabali Mountain, where they spent the night (R 1, 2, 3). Early in the morning of 16 April 1945, the Japanese troops entered the barrio of Nanipil and burned the village, destroying about thirty buildings (R 1, 2, 3, 7). Three dead Filipino civilians were discovered in the barrio about a week later. One of these bodies was identified as that of Alico PARLONOT. All three had been shot (R 7, 8). After burning Nanipil, the Japanese took the seven civilian prisoners to Titig Mountain (R 2), forced the men to remove their clothing, and then made all seven kneel at the edge of a precipice with their hands tied behind their backs. While in this helpless position, two Japanese attempted to behead them, one of the soldiers striking the victims across the neck with a saber while the other pushed the decapitated bodies over the cliff (R 3, 4). Apparently all of this group were killed except two. The bodies of four were later identified (R 8). One man survived the attempted beheading (R 2) and one man is believed to have escaped before he was struck (R 4, 10) but has never been found. There is no definite proof that the woman in this group was killed, but the survivor, Juanito ALIMES, heard her scream with pain (R 4). Though her body was not found with those of the four identified male victims, she has not been heard of since and must be presumed to have been killed (R 4, 8).

.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

4 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 267)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch.
SUBJECT: Execution by machine-gun fire and burning of
twenty-one Filipinos at Barrio Angad, Bangued,
Abra, P. I., on 16 November 1944.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

A number of Filipino paroled prisoners of war were summoned to a meeting at the Municipal building where the names of twenty-seven prisoners of war were read from a roster. These men were then grouped and marched to the Japanese garrison where they were questioned, after which six of them were released. The remaining twenty-one were tied, placed on a truck, and taken to a nearby barrio. Within a short time, machine-gun fire and screams were heard, and later flames and smoke were seen (R 1, 4, 7, 11, 14, 17, 20). Charred bodies were later seen by some civilians inside a burned house at the same barrio (R 7, 11, 14, 17).

* * *

1384

MARIANO BAYARAS
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Webster) What is your name?

A Mariano Bayaras.

Q Your age?

A 39.

Q Your nationality?

A Filipino.

Q Are you from Basco, Batanes Island?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you the Mayor of Basco, Batan Island?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long have you been mayor?

A Since January of 1941.

Q Were you given a list by the Japanese of persons
killed by them at Basco?

A Yes, sir.

Q How many were on that list?

A 34.

Q Were all of those people killed?

A No, all of them were not.

Q How many were killed?

A 74.

Q How do you know they were killed?

A Because it was pronounced, the proclamation was given
to me and the list of those persons were in that proclama-
tion.

Q Have you seen those persons whom are listed as killed
since that time?

A Pardon me?

CAPTAIN WEBSTER: Will you read the question, please?

(Question read.)

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

Q (By Captain Webster) Where did you see them?

A I saw them in the house where they were kept prisoners.

Q That is before the proclamation was made, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q And were they held by the Japanese at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see any of them mistreated?

A I did not see whether they were mistreated, but I saw they were suffering from bad treatment.

Q What makes you think that?

A Because I saw them with their hands tied behind, eating their food on the floor without using their hands because they could not use their hands. Some of them had broken hands, with bruises on their faces and some of them, one of them, had no more eye.

Q Was his eye out?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did the proclamation state which of these people were killed?

A According to the proclamation it stated that some of them were killed and some of them were imprisoned because of non-cooperation with the Japanese Army.

CAPTAIN WEBSTER; You may cross examine.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Sandberg) Was that proclamation written in English?

A Beg your pardon?

Q Was that proclamation you refer to written in English?

A Yes.

Q Were those the exact words that were used?

A No, sir.

Q Can you give us the exact words?

A I did not memorize the exact words of the proclamation.

Q Did the proclamation refer to guerrillas?

A What?

Q Did the proclamation refer to guerrillas?

A No, sir.

Q Do you know a Captain Valones?

A After -- long after the execution that I heard the name of Valones, it was long after.

Q And is Captain Valones the leader of the guerrillas on Batan Island?

A That is what they said, but I don't know in reality.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: That is all.

CAPTAIN WEBSTER: That is all.

(Witness excused.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, T. R. C. KING, Major, Inf. (TD) Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by MARIANO BAYARAS in the trial of the case against Tonoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: That is all.

CAPTAIN WEBSTER: That is all.

/s/ T. R. C. King
T. R. C. King
Major, Inf. (TD)

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 20th day of November, 1946, Tokyo, Japan

John R. Pritchard
Capt., Inf.
Summary Court

is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by MARIANO BAYARAS in the trial of the case against Tonoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: That is all.

CAPTAIN WEBSTER: That is all.

/s/ T. R. C. King
T. R. C. King
Major, Inf. (TD)

1385
DOCUMENT 2827

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

APO 500
21 May 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 304)
THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila.
SUBJECT: Execution of Charles PUTNAM, Thomas DAGGETT,
Captain Vicente PINON and six other unnamed
Filipinos on 19 March 1944 at Alaminos, Pangasinan:
P. I.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

On 19 March 1944, two Americans and some Filipinos were taken from the Japanese garrison at Dagupan, Pangasinan, to the garrison at Alaminos, Pangasinan. The following morning, the town chief of police saw the bodies of the two Americans and seven Filipinos in a grave within the garrison premises. The Americans had been beheaded and the Filipinos had been bayonnetted (R 4, 7).

* * *

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
OFFICE OF THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE
(WAR CRIMES BRANCH)A.P.O. 501
9 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of War Crimes Branch on the Investigation of the
Alleged Murder of Filipino Civilians at Dapdap, Ponson
Island, Camotes Islands, Cebu Province, Philippine Islands,
by the Imperial Japanese Army on 29 December 1944.

TO : The Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Office, Washington
25, D. C.

* * *

11. EVIDENCE:

Briefly summarized, the evidence adduced by the Investigator-Examiner is to the effect that:

At approximately 9:00 o'clock December 29, 1944, a patrol of about 50 Japanese soldiers, including two officers, entered the barrio of Dapdap, Ponson Island, Camotes Islands, Philippine Islands. On arrival, the soldiers, with the aid of two interpreters, Emilio Angos and Sofio Itaas, who were later killed by the Japanese (R. 4,16), went throughout the village commanding all families to gather at the town plaza immediately. It was explained that the purpose of the meeting was to issue passes to the inhabitants so they could be identified and would not be molested by other Japanese soldiers passing through. At first the people were reluctant to execute the order; however, after being told they would be shot for non-compliance, they readily obeyed. (R. 1,3,5,13,22,24,28,30,32,35,37,38,40,41,45,47,48,50)

Shortly after arriving at the plaza, the people, numbering about four or five hundred, were ordered to group themselves in families and congregate in the church so they would be unobserved from a plane which was heard in the vicinity. The excuse given was that they might be strafed. The people followed out the instructions without delay. One Japanese officer sat near the altar while the second stationed himself at the door. (R. 26) The former then called them to order, and through the interpreters, asked if anyone had seen or knew the whereabouts of three American soldiers who were supposed to have landed on the island that morning. All replied in the negative. He then directed all from Cebu to raise their hands. A few hands, probably not more than five or six, were shown. Likewise, he inquired who was from Leyte and no hands were raised. Finally, he asked who was from Dapdap and practically all signified they were. (R. 2,5,15,23,25,28,32,35,38,40,42,50)

By this time it was almost 12:00 o'clock so, at the request of the people, the interpreters asked permission from the officer in charge to return to their homes for food. He consented but directed them to depart one family at a time, accompanied by soldier guards who would search their homes. Each family was then told to form in line. (R. 2,3,5,6,30,32,38,39,42,45,47)

The Fortunato family (last name unknown) from Cebu, was the first to leave. It was first on a registration list of civilian residents previously prepared by the Japanese. As soon as they passed outside, their hands were tied and they were led away. (R. 1,2,6) Only one son, Perfidio, survived. (R. 7) Shortly thereafter, the Japanese soldiers returned and led another family group away. (R. 3)

Mrs. Fabiana Morelos and her three children followed, and about three hundred yards from the church, their hands were tied behind them, except Mrs. Morelos' whose hands were tied in front because she was holding her nursing child. Proceeding a little further, two Japanese guards began bayonetting them one after the other, one bayonet thrust passing completely through the baby's body into Mrs. Morelos' side, she being the only member of the family to escape alive. (R. 32)

Five Japanese soldiers then took out the Candido Rollo family of eight. About five hundred yards from the church they were tied and bayoneted, four being killed and the remaining four receiving many serious multiple wounds. The wife, Dolores, received nine wounds. She was holding in her arms her daughter, Maxima, age three years, when one Jap soldier thrust a bayonet through the child into the mother's left breast. (R. 40-43)

Basilio Gocela's family of seven was conducted to a place about one half kilometer away where they were tied and bayoneted by the Japanese guards. All were killed, except the sixteen year old daughter Perpetua, who was wounded in four different places. (R. 47)

Because the church was filled when seven members of the Lucenas family arrived at the plaza they were taken to a nearby house by six Japanese soldiers, and later to a banana grove, where all were tied and six were killed by bayonet stabs. While the others were being bound the daughter, Paulita, broke away and escaped but was shot at several times. (R. 37,38)

After several families had been disposed of by individual units, groups of three or more families were ordered from the church collectively. (R. 6,7)

At about one o'clock in the afternoon the Teofila Gocela family of nine members, and three other families, all living in the hills adjacent to the town, were brought down and placed in the church, at which time it was half-filled. They were accorded the same treatment as the others they joined. Shortly thereafter the family was taken therefrom, their hands tied behind their backs, and led to a shed in the near vicinity, where all were tied to one post and nine Japanese soldiers began their work of carnage by bayonetting the victims in their backs. The mother saw her eighteen months old daughter killed by a bayonet thrust which disemboweled her. She saw them kill her son Dominador, aged four. They also bayoneted the remaining seven, after which the ropes tying them to the post were cut and Mrs. Gocela fell to the ground unconscious. (R. 8,9) Later, one of the soldiers placed a lighted cigarette on her right temple to determine if she were still alive. She did not move and feigned death. The guards then wiped their bloody bayonets on the victims' clothes, covered the bodies with banana and coconut leaves, and departed. Her son Francisco, seventeen years old, who was wounded in eleven places, roused himself and untied the hands of the six who were living, hid them in the thick grass, and went in search of a house, but upon returning found that two had died. The remaining four went with him to a nipa hut where they subsisted for four days on unripe bananas and without water. Francisco died two days later, the others remaining two days longer when the stench of his decomposing body forced them to move. (R. 9) The survivors went to Babay, Leyte, and were hospitalized. Mrs. Gocela also saw the bayonetting of her brother's family of seven, named Lucenas, all of whom were killed except the seven year old daughter Victoria. (R. 9)

The Lacson family of six members and three other families were formed into a group of about twenty, whose hands were tied together, and led to a house in the barrio. Arriving there the Jap soldiers fixed their bayonets. The victims knelt on the floor

pleading for mercy, the father even begging to be a servant for the Japanese, but their supplications were ignored and they were set upon and bayoneted. Of this family only the thirteen year old daughter Norma and her brother Nicolas, age eight, survived. The father was severely wounded and died eight days later. (R. 6,7,10-12)

The Cornelio Tanza family group of twenty-five, including several nursing babies, was conducted to a bushy area and bayoneted. Of this entire group only four survived, each of whom suffered numerous wounds. Cornelio crawled into a coconut grove, and because of his weakened condition was forced to stay for four days subsisting on water alone. (R. 30,31; P. 2, Ex. 6 of Ex. A)

The third group of approximately twenty, including the Jorge Mari family of four, was led into the woods about one hundred yards away to a house where the soldiers ordered the men to come forward and be tied. Likewise, women and children were then brought forward and the entire group was bayoneted. Only two escaped alive, Jorge Mari and an old lady by the name of Cornelia, last name not known, and they too had been bayoneted and severely injured. Mr. Mari witnessed the killing of his wife and two children, the latter aged 3 years and 2 months respectively. (R. 23)

Magdaleno Jaballa and four of his children were in a group, all of whom were tied a short distance from the church and then taken about three hundred yards further where they were halted and bayoneted. Two of these children were killed and another died later of his wounds, while four of his other children, apparently in another group, were killed on the same day. Magdaleno received eleven wounds. (R. 38,40)

When the church was about half emptied (R. 13,45) the remaining people became apprehensive of their lives. Some saw blood running out of a nearby shack (R.2), a few noticed the soldiers washing their bloody bayonets at the artesian well nearby (R. 25), and others observed that as soon as the families were taken outside they were shackled with ropes. Eutiquio Lucenas then urged those remaining to fight for their lives and attempt an escape whereupon he picked up a rock, hurled it at the door guard, hitting him on the head, and knocking him to the ground. He also rushed another guard but was killed in his bid for freedom. Many then made a break for the door and were machine-gunned indiscriminately or stabbed with bayonets. (R. 25) Several pleaded and begged for mercy, but to no avail. The church resounded with the wails and cries of the wounded and those who feared death was imminent. (R. 45) Some escaped and were killed by rifle and machine gun fire while running toward the beach. A very small number escaped unscathed and found safety in the sea and swamps. (R. 49) Most of the victims showed numerous stab wounds, some babies in their mothers' arms were run through and the blades passed into the bodies of the mothers. One woman was found who had given premature birth to a baby and its dead body was beside her. (R. 49-51) Another victim, while pleading for mercy from the Jap officer at the altar, was struck by a sabre wielded by him, severing his shoulder and resulting in immediate death. (R. 13-16, 27-29, 46-51)

Each time the soldiers returned from escorting a family to its doom they talked with the officers and all laughed as if it were a gala occasion. The officer at the altar kept smoking while the massacre was going on and gave orders from time to time. One officer participated in the bayonetting. (R. 3,6,23,27,31,46; Ex. 13 of Ex. A)

About three or four o'clock in the afternoon, after covering their victims with banana and coconut leaves, the Japs departed. (R. 2,7-9; Ex. 12 of Ex. A)

The wounded, both from the church and family groups, after recovering some strength, went to the surrounding swamps and jungles. Some were so weak they had to crawl. They contacted friends and relatives and by various and devious means crossed the sea individually and in groups to Babay, Leyte, Philippine Islands, where they were hospitalized. Later, some of the wounded died. (R. 2,3,5-9,11,13,16, 23,26,28,31,32,36,39,40,42,45,47,49,51)

On 30 December 1944 Ciriaco Labiste and his brother, Sergio, were at San Juan, Pilar, Ponson Island, and hearing of the massacre, proceeded immediately to Dapdap to look for their family. On the way they met their father, two sisters, and three brothers. One sister was in much pain caused by two bullet wounds in her back. Proceeding alone to the barrio, Ciriaco saw many dead bodies in the church piled on top of each other and the remains of approximately onehundred lying outside, among which were the bodies of his mother and one brother. (R. 43, 44)

On 16 January 1945, Captain Gonzalo R. Sievert, Executive Officer of the 94th Regiment, 92nd Division, P.A., accompanied by Major Pete W. Scott, PCAN No. 15 Detachment, Captain Henry L. Guire, 5th Air Force, and a Sergeant William Young, photographer of the 7th Infantry Division, were ordered by a task force commander, Colonel Walker, 182nd Infantry, 7th Division, U. S. Army, to proceed to Dapdap, make an investigation, and dispose of the dead bodies. Before arriving at the town they met three survivors of the debacle, all of whom gave evidence of numerous wounds. Approaching the town the foul odor of dead bodies filled the air. They looked in two huts and saw approximately 30 to 50 and 15 to 20 bodies respectively in a bad state of decomposition. Dogs and other animals had eaten away large portions of the bodies making it difficult to ascertain whether they were men, women or children; however, the presence of long hair and small skulls indicated that there were some of the latter in the groups. Proceeding further into town they inspected huts en route and found similar conditions existing. Arriving at the church they saw about 100 bodies scattered on the ground in and around the building, about half of which were inside, and visible from the doorway. Here too, the dogs, hogs and other animals had devoured parts of the bodies. About 500 yards north of the church they observed approximately 50 to 60 dead bodies under an acacia tree, all in an advanced state of decomposition. Several dogs and pigs were eating the remains, and chickens picking the bones. They counted 230 dead and estimated there were 500 dead bodies in and around the barrio. (R 17-19) The photographer took various pictures, one of a shack where dead could be seen in the doorway, others showing the conditions inside and outside the church, one of numerous dead bodies in a lane a short distance away, and one of a decomposed body tied to the trunk of a tree and identified as Quentin Morelos. (R. 9, 20, 21; Ex. 2,3,4 of Ex. A)

One of the bodies shown in Exhibit 19-1 of Exhibit A was identified as that of a man known as "Masoy"; in Exhibit 19-7 of Exhibit A another body was that of a man named "Pecong". (R. 4, 6)

Exhibit 1 of Exhibit A is a translation of an undated company order captured on Ponson Island on or about 18 January 1945, which directs that the town of Pilar be exterminated at 2400, and sub-paragraph 5, paragraph IV recites the platoon formations. Opposite the 2nd Platoon appears the name "Kurazawa." This exhibit also contains a translation of a diary, belonging to either an officer or sergeant major, 4th Company, organization not stated, showing the following entry: "29 Dec 44 - Dapdap 900 men. Esperanza 150 men. Completion of subjugation. Departed San Isidro."

Witnesses testified that there were two officers with the Japanese soldiers at the church. The one at the altar was tall, large, with a long face, heavily bearded, clipped hair and about 40 years of age. He wore spectacles, a long sabre, revolver and a uniform with a patch on each breast with stars set upon a background of red lines. (R. 27, 33) The other, a Captain Cruzawa or Kurazawa, was of regular height, beardless and wore a cap with flapping back, common to the Japanese soldiers, a sabre and stars upon his uniform. (R. 26) One officer was killed by a civilian at the church. (R. 7)

* * * *

1387
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
24 December 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 137)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: The murder of five civilians and subsequent cannibalism in Sitio Lilong, Barrio Dinwiddie, Cervantes, Ilcos Sur, Luzon, P.I., during August 1945, and the killing of three civilians in Sitio Penidet, Presidencia Bakun, Mountain Province, Luzon, P. I., on 6 August 1945.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

In the early part of August 1945 (R 1, 8), six Japanese soldiers were seen going to the home of PITLUNGAY in sitio Lilong (R 2, 10). Two men fled and hid nearby as the Japanese approached but the Japanese bayoneted to death all five occupants of the house one of whom was a three-year old girl (R 1, 5). The six Japanese ate the flesh from some of the bodies of their victims during the two-day period that they stayed at the house (R 1, 3, 10). The first evening, the flesh of the little girl was cut into small pieces, put on the ends of sticks and roasted over an open fire (R 3). The next morning, the flesh of another victim was roasted or boiled with native vegetables (R 3). The flesh of three of the victims was consumed in this manner (R 3). The body of one of the victims was later thrown into the river that ran in front of the house (R 4). The bodies of the two other victims were not touched. After the Japanese left, the two observers went into the house and saw a piece of human flesh inside of a bag left by one of the Japanese and also inside of one of the kettles that had been used by the Japanese (R 4, 8, 11). Two days later, the remains of the victims were buried on the order of the barrio lieutenant (R 8).

On 29 July 1945, the organization of a Japanese soldier, ASADA, Kameichi, was practically annihilated by American forces (R 15). ASADA and four other Japanese apparently began to roam the country side (R 16). On 6 August 1945, they came upon three houses near a small stream at dusk and attempted to obtain food at one of these houses. When one of the Japanese approached the door, the man of the house killed the soldier with a knife (R 16, 23). Two of the Japanese then bayoneted to death the man who had killed their companion, and took his body outside (R 16, 23). There were eight persons inside the house and a woman and a girl about ten years old were shouting. The Japanese, fearing that the commotion would rouse the neighbors, covered the mouth of the woman with her clothes and two of the Japanese bayoneted her in the stomach and in back simultaneously, killing her instantly. The little girl was tied by her feet and was killed with bayonets (R 16, 17, 23). The Japanese then left (R 16).

* * *

1388

DOCUMENT 2725

ISIDRO CABUSAS, after having been duly sworn, testified at the Collaborator Internment Stockade, Subang-daku, Mandaue, Cebu, P. I., on 12 November 1945, as follows:

Q What is your full name, age and nationality?

A Isidro CABUSAS, 34 years old, Filipino.

Q Did you ever work for the Kempei Tai here in Cebu?

A Yes, I worked for the Japanese Kempei Tai as an undercover agent from about August 1st 1944 until the middle of February 1945.

Q How is it that you were an undercover agent for the Japanese Kempei Tai?

A I was captured by the Japanese Kempei Tai the last week of July 1944 and they made me work for them or else they would kill me.

Q Who did you work for?

A I was working for Sgt. T. YOSHIDA.

Q Did you ever go to Cordova on Mactan Island about the 19th of August 1944 on patrol?

A Yes, I went on patrol to Cordova on Mactan Island August 19, 1944 with about fifteen (15) members of the Kempei Tai and some Japanese soldiers from the garrison at Mambaling, Cebu, P. I. and from about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) Filipino undercovers.

Q Who were the members of the Japanese Kempei Tai that went with you?

A Sgt. Maj. T. YOSHIDA was in charge in our group; Cpl. MURAKI, was the second in-charge; and also in my group was Pfc. Suteo KOIDE, I do not know the first name. The other Kempei Tai that I remember but they were not in my group, were Sgt. TANIYAMA and T/Sgt. WATANABE, I do not remember the first names of these two. There was also another corporal named Iwao ISHIZAKA. Those are all the members of the Kempei Tai that I can remember.

Q Do you know any of the troops that you mentioned that came from the Mambaling group?

A I do not know any of them nor can I describe them, but I would remember them if I see them again.

Q Do you know to what unit they belonged?

A They were infantry soldiers and I think they came from the MIZOGUCHI Butai.

Q Were there any officers on this patrol?

A No, but Capt. TSURUYAMA came to the dock before we left Cebu and told T. YOSHIDA to arrest all the civilians and kill anyone resisting arrest or anyone suspected of being a guerrilla.

Q What were the names of the Filipino undercover agents that were along on this patrol?

A Cucufate ADLAWAN who is in the stockade; Genaro CABULONG, recently released from the stockade; Antonio RACAZA, now in the stockade; Francisco DUMAGUT, in the stockade; Filemon DELGADO, in stockade; Robert OCAMPO BAUTISTA, in stockade; and others.

Q Will you tell me in your own words what happened on this

patrol?

A At about 9 o'clock in the evening of August 19, 1944, we left Cebu for Mactan Island. When we arrived there, we landed at Opon and from there we went by truck to Cordova. As soon as we arrived at Cordova, the Japanese soldiers began to gather all of the civilians and brought them to the central school house. There they took the clothes of all the women naked and made them stand all night. They severely beat many of the men with clubs, baseball bats and rifle butts. The Japanese took all of the money, jewelry and valuables from the civilians. The next morning, I saw three men tied and beaten and then taken about three kilometers in the southwestern part of Cordova and there beheaded by three Japanese soldiers.

Q Do you remember the names of these Japanese soldiers who beheaded these three men?

A Cpl. Iwao ISHIZAKA, Cpl. MURAKI and another member of the Kempei Tai, I do not remember the name; each of them borrowed a sword and killed one of the men.

Q Do you know the names of the three men that were beheaded?

A I do not know any of them but the reason that they were killed was they were suspected of being guerrillas.

Q Were these men given a trial?

A No.

Q Did you see any other mistreatment of civilians?

A I saw Sgt. TANIYAMA take a lighted match and burn the hair of the womb of a young woman.

Q Do you know the name of that young woman?

A No, I can't remember her name.

Q Did you see any other mistreatment?

A I saw many of the men with their hands tied behind their backs hanging from a rafter and severely beaten with clubs as I described before.

Q Do you know the names of any of those that were beaten?

A The only one I know is the mayor of Cordova by the name of Martin FRANCISCO.

Q What did they do to Martin FRANCISCO?

A T. YOSHIDA personally man-handled and beat the mayor with a baseball bat until his body and face was bleeding and swollen and black and blue.

Q Did you see anything other than what you have told me?

A That is all I can remember of the incident.

Q How far were you standing from the place where the beheading took place?

A We were all on a truck about two hundred (200) meters away, but we could see what was going on.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "B", I ask you if you recognize any of the men on this photograph as the men you have described in the foregoing statement?

A Yes. Capt. TSURUYAMA is the man wearing white shirt who is second from the left in the front row.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "C", I ask

you if you recognize any men in this photograph as the same men you have described in the foregoing statement?

A Yes. T. YOSHIDA appears on the extreme right-hand side of the photograph; T/Sgt. WATANABE is the center man on the photograph.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "D", I ask you if you recognize this man?

A Yes. This is a picture of the Corporal Iwao ISHIZAKA whom I have named in this statement.

Q Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A That is all I know.

/s/ Isidro Cabusas
ISIDRO CABUSAS

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF CEBU)

SS

CITY OF CEBU)

I, ISIDRO CABUSAS, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read and understood the foregoing transcription of my interrogation, and all answers contained therein consisting of three (3) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Isidro Cabusas
ISIDRO CABUSAS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of November 1945.

/s/ Henry F. Marshall, 2nd Lt. Inf.
HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d Lt., INF
Investigating Officer, War Crim
Investigating Detachment

C E R T I F I C A T E

We, CLAYTON L. NELSON, 1st Lt, 02052600, JAGD and HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d Lt, 01332183, INF, Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment, certify that on 12 November 1945, personally appeared before us ISIDRO CABUSAS and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said ISIDRO CABUSAS read the same and affixed his signature thereto in our presence.

City of Cebu, Cebu, P. I.

/s/ Clayton L. Nelson, 1st Lt. JAGD
CLAYTON L. NELSON, 1st Lt, JAGD

12 November 1945.

/s/ Henry F. Marshall, 2nd Lt. Inf.
HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d Lt, INF
Investigating Officer, War
Crimes Investigating Detachment.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section,
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached
photostatic copy of the affidavit of ISIDRO CABUSAS
is a true and correct reproduction of the original
affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of
said affidavit is presently on file with this
Section.

/s/ Alva C. Carpenter
Alva C. Carpenter,
Chief, Legal Section.

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard

Sworn to before me this 29th

day of October, 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court

1389

DOCUMENT 2833

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

21 March 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 253)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Atrocities at Bogo, Cebu, P.I., August - November
1944.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

During August, September, October and November 1944 Japanese military forces maintained the garrison at the Medellin Sugar Central near Bogo, Cebu, P.I. In these four months civilians in this vicinity were beaten, shot, bayonnetted and raped.

on 17 August 1944 a Filipino fisherman was shot and killed because he refused to work at the sugar mill (R 23).

In September 1944 a suspected guerrilla in custody at the garrison was shot and wounded. As he ran outside the guard-house in an effort to escape, he fell and was bayonnetted to death (R 23). Three Filipino girls who had been seized by the Japanese and apparently raped repeatedly were led away from the garrison, after which, shots were heard. Six days later their dead bodies were found near the wharf (R 33).

On 12 October 1944 two women were bayonnetted to death in their home (R 22) and a third was severely beaten (R 52). Two other Filipino girls were raped, one of them by several Japanese soldiers (R 25, 28, 29). One of the victims then was forced to live with a Japanese corporal as his mistress for three weeks (R 29).

On 17 October 1944 Japanese soldiers burned houses and a warehouse (R 2). The same day twenty-five persons were bayonnetted to death, apparently in revenge for sabotage and guerrilla activities (R 17, 18).

During November 1944 two prisoners were bayonnetted to death by some twenty Japanese soldiers apparently for having worn khaki clothing (R 10).

1390

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

28 January 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 180)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: Torture and murder of Dumanjug civilians in August 1944.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

On 14 August 1944, members of the Japanese garrison at Barili and Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., seized approximately nine Filipino civilians in Barrio Canoco, about five kilometers from Dumanjug where they were beaten, slapped, kicked and burned. This treatment was apparently designed to force them to confess giving aid to the guerrillas (R 2, 6, 10, 14). One of the victims was also slashed across the throat with a bayonet (R 2). After two days of this sort of treatment, the Japanese took some of the victims to Palalong Cliff by the sea. Here, the Japanese bayoneted two women and threw a year and a half old child into the sea. One of the women was killed but the other, by feigning death until the Japanese departed, managed to escape (R 3). Two men were also reported to have been thrown into the ocean at the same place (R 3).

* * *

1391

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

23 January 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 174)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Executions at Calbayog, Samar, P.I. in July, 1943.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

During the summer of 1943, twenty to forty Filipino men were arrested as suspected spies and investigated by the commanding officer of the garrison at Calbayog, Samar, P.I. Two or three weeks later five of the men were singled out for execution by the Commanding Officer, who stated that this action was by order of his Commander stationed at Catbalogan (R 1). The head of the Filipino Constabulary succeeded in obtaining the release of two of the men, but the other three were marched to a cemetery and lined up before three freshly dug graves. They were then shot by a firing squad, and their bodies tumbled into the graves. The execution occurred in the presence of the Japanese commanding officer (R 2, 4). One of the prisoners was only wounded, but he was killed with a bayonet by a Japanese medical sergeant (R 4).

* * *

RESTRICTED

1392

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

APO 500
1 May 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 298)
THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila
SUBJECT: Massacres in Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I., December 1944.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

On 8 December 1944, Japanese soldiers rounded up about forty-five Filipino men, women and children in Sitio Canugkay, Pilar, Camotes Islands. The prisoners were tied together by the hands and were led to the seashore in Sitio Toong where they were separated into four groups and then bayoneted. Thirty-seven of the victims were killed while the rest survived despite severe bayonet wounds (R 57, 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66).

On 27 December 1944, eight Japanese soldiers took eleven men, women and children from a house in Sitio Cabahit, Pilar, tied seven of them to banana trees and bayoneted them to death. A young man who was slow in leaving the house died immediately after being bayoneted in the chest. Two victims were severely beaten until they fell on the ground unconscious and a Japanese soldier jumped on the body and neck of one of them several times. A three-year-old child was hurled by a Japanese soldier at a horse and fell to the ground unconscious (R 44, 45, 46).

On 29 December 1944, the slaughter of men, women and children in Camotes Islands reached its frenzied height. In Barrio Dapdap, Pilar, between eight hundred and one thousand civilians were assembled in the church, numbered and led out to the fields, coconut plantations and other secluded places where they were bayoneted by Japanese soldiers. Others who were left in the church were bayoneted and shot and then covered with dry banana leaves, coconut leaves and mats. At least seventy-three persons were identified as killed, twenty were wounded, while the rest were also probably killed (R 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21). In Barrio Esperanza, Pilar, more than three hundred people were assembled in the plaza. They were first soaked with water and then Japanese soldiers rushed upon them with fixed bayonets until all the victims fell to the ground. Thirty-seven persons were identified as killed and only about five survived the bayonetting (R 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37). And in Sitio Opao, Barrio Lanao, Pilar, about thirty-eight civilians were taken to the mountains and bayoneted. Twenty-eight of these civilians were killed and ten were wounded (R 40, 41, 48, 49).

* * *

1393

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APC 500
2 January 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 142)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: The murder of eleven American Baptist teachers of the faculty of the Central Philippine College and the murder of six other Americans at Camp Hopevale near Tapaz, Capiz Province, Panay, P.I., on 20 December 1943.

.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

Japanese officers and enlisted men under the command of a Captain WATANABE, engaged in one of the several punitive expeditions in Panay Island, left the township of Libacao, Capiz Province, on 18 December 1943 for Iloilo City (R 1). The next morning, they reached Camp Hopevale near Tapaz, Capiz Province, which was first surrounded, and then Captain WATANABE and his soldiers entered the Camp proper. Sixteen Americans along with three others who had been captured previously, were placed under guard without food or water (R 1). In the afternoon of 20 December 1943, one of the American women was seen kneeling with her hands tied behind her back and begging Captain WATANABE for mercy. Captain WATANABE ignored her pleas and drew his Samurai sword. An hour later, inside a house that was already in flames, were discovered twelve bodies and there was a strong odor of burning flesh. Some of the victims had been bayoneted and some had been beheaded (R 2). Three weeks later, another witness who was familiar with the names of most of the Americans visited the scene and was able to identify the remains of the victims from teeth, bits of burned clothing, hair, identification tags, and a truss. The remains were taken from two burned dwellings and buried in the church at Katipunan (R 5, 9). On the day of the execution, one Filipino who was in hiding reported that he had seen blood on the trousers of one of the Japanese guards (R 5, 6) and that one of the Japanese told Filipinos that the Americans whom they had feared were now gone and that the Filipinos should obey the Japanese (R 6). Another witness verified that she saw smoke coming from the Hopevale area on the date of the massacre (R 8) and that her brother and a cousin saw the bodies in three burned houses (R 9, 11). Some of the remains of the Americans were identified (R 11). Two of the bodies were not burned and were found outside (R 11). All of the victims except Mrs. Rounds, her son, Douglas, the Clardy family and Albert KING were members of the faculty of the Central Philippine College at Iloilo City, Panay (R 1).

* * *

1394

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500

30 December 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 140)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: Punitive expeditions on Panay Island by Japanese forces against civilians in September 1943 and October 1943.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

Under the command of Colonel WATANABE (R 11) a group of Japanese were stationed at Iloilo City, Panay, and from time to time smaller groups, commanded by himself or other officers, would be formed to go on punitive expeditions throughout the island (R1). One such group was under a Captain WATANABE, and his principal subordinates were Lieutenant OTSUKA, Sergeant HIRATA, Warrant Officer SHIN, Sergeant MATSUZAKI (R 1). This group left Iloilo City on 10 September 1943 and went to Passi by truck (R 1). A patrol brought back two Filipino boys and one girl who were questioned all night while tied to a stake. The next morning they were beheaded, after which the Japanese left (R 1). Two of the Filipino "cargadors" were beheaded by Sergeant HIRATA because they could no longer carry the baggage of the Japanese officers to whom they were assigned (R 1). In Barrio Lungao, Passi, many Filipino civilian men, women and children were questioned by the Japanese then killed and their bodies thrown into a fire. The whole barrio was burned (R 1). Many other civilians were killed in other barrios. The Japanese known to have participated in the beheadings are Captain WATANABE, Warrant Officer SHIN, and Sergeant HIRATA (R 1) and Lieutenant OTSUKA (R 2). SHIN and OTSUKA executed the family of Mariano LIM in barrio Jimomonua, Nueva Invencion, consisting of the man, his wife, and three children (R 10). In the same barrio the civilians were questioned and asked if they were any relation to the BALJEZA family. Many of those questioned answered that they were because BALJEZA was prominent family in the community. All of this group were shot and their bodies thrown into a fire (R 2). From the remaining civilians a woman and her six children, aged one to twelve, were questioned and denied being related to a certain man who had previously attempted to escape. Her youngest child was torn from her arms by Captain WATANABE and its body smashed against the road, the blood splattering onto the clothes of the witnesses (R 3). Other soldiers seized the other children by the feet and used them as clubs to beat the man and the woman. Then all of them were dragged into a fire, though the mother was still alive at that time (R 3). At another place two girls, one of whom was pregnant, were caught by the Japanese and made to dance naked until they were exhausted. The next morning Captain WATANABE ordered the girls bayoneted to death (R 3). This group of Japanese killed six hundred and fifty people (R 3). Another group traveled to the towns of Ajuy and Sara killing many civilians on the way (R 5, 6). Atrocities committed in these two cities by some of the same Japanese mentioned in this report is the subject of report number 131. Lieutenant OTSUKA was seen to have killed one person in Ajuy (R 11) and two others on the way to Sara (R 11). In Sara the Japanese sent a message to guerrillas to surrender with the promise that nothing would be done to them. Two guerrillas did surrender, but after questioning them, Sergeant MATSUZAKI beheaded them (R 6). The group of

Japanese continued their travels and beheaded bodies of many men, women, and children still gushing blood were observed along the way (R 6). In one barrio at least one hundred men, women, and children were beheaded by Captain WATANABE, Sergeant MATSUZAKI and others (R 6). Others were beheaded by SHIN (R 6, 7). At one barrio Lieutenant OTZUKA and two others beheaded thirty people (R 10), and fifty more were executed at another location (R 11).

On 17 October 1943 another punitive expedition of Japanese started from Iloilo City by motor launch and arrived at the town of Batan on the north coast of Panay Island on 18 October 1943 (R 14). All the civilians in the town were investigated by the light of a bonfire and during the investigation were beaten with clubs and made to walk through the fire (R 14). About three o'clock in the morning the Japanese received orders to proceed and approximately one hundred and forty civilians including two priests were beheaded by OTSUKA, KUWANO and other Japanese soldiers (R 14, 15, 19). Other officers of the expedition were Lieutenant Colonel TOZUKA, the Island commander, Captain WATANABE, who was second in command of the expedition and two Japanese named KUMAI and KAI (R 14, 15). The expedition lasted for sixty-four days and went to many towns, among them being New Washington, Balete, Libacao, Banga, and several towns on Tablas Island off the northwest coast of Panay Island. Part of the expedition then came back to New Washington, went through several small villages along mountain trails, and arrived in Banga on 1 December 1943. From there they went to Pandan and left Pandan on 18 December by motor launch for Iloilo City arriving on 19 December 1943. While in the town of Altavas, KUWANO and OTSUKA killed between thirty and forty old men, women, and children (R 16), and in Balete thirty men were killed by these two men (R 16). Other people were tortured and killed in various places (R 16). Lieutenant Colonel TOZUKA headed one patrol of Japanese (R 16, 20). The Japanese reasoning was that an old man was likely to be the father of a son or have a son-in-law in the Philippine Army, the women either had a husband or brother or son in the army and therefore all were considered guilty of guerrilla activities (R 16). While on the Island of Tablas the Japanese came across two people living in small huts in the mountain. They were investigated but did not give the proper answers, and the man, who was about seventy years old, was stabbed in the back with a bolo upon Lieutenant KUMAI's order (R 17). A blind woman, who had been unable to flee from the Japanese, was discovered the next day, taken from her house, and her clothes were stripped from her body. Some of the Japanese manhandled her private parts. She screamed and cried, but Lieutenant KUMAI had Japanese soldiers tie her hands behind her back, then tie her legs to her hands and suspend the woman from a tree with her head hanging down. The Japanese then moved on leaving her hanging on the tree (R 17). Another group of Japanese that started out on the same expedition executed hundreds of people in Batan, Altavas, Balete, Libacao and other places and returned to Iloilo City by boat from New Washington (R 19, 20). Another member of the expedition was Lieutenant FUJII (R 21).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

APD 500
15 May 1946

*Philippines
atrocities*

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 303)
THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila
SUBJECT: Murder of thirty and attempted murder of six
Filipinos at Barrio Calupa-an (Quezon),
San Carlos, Negros Occidental, P.I., on
29 August 1943 and 10-12 February 1944.

1453
Harmed
Grad
Beat me

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

a. On 29 August 1943, a Japanese force of about one hundred men went over the San Carlos mountain to the area around Barrio Cudcud, Calupa-an and Malaiba, for the purpose of suppressing guerrilla activities. In the course of this expedition, one civilian was killed with a sword (R 2) and four others were summarily shot on sight (R 4, 7, 10, 12).

b. On 10-12 February 1944, another punitive expedition was organized in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, and dispatched to the area designated by the Japanese Force as "bandit zone". They combed the barrios of Linothangan, Malaiba, Calupa-an (Quezon), Balabag and then returned to San Carlos. Twenty-six prisoners, some of whom were volunteer guards, were taken at Malaiba, questioned, beaten up, tortured and then brought into the woods where they were bayoneted. Four survived from bayonet wounds inflicted upon them. The next day, twenty-two bodies were identified and buried by the families and friends of the victims (R 109).

c. During this same period, another Filipino civilian was captured by some Japanese troops in Sitio Villa Iowa, San Carlos, Negros Occidental and brought to a house which was then burned (R 49). Another victim was captured in Barrio Pula, tortured, beaten up and then bayoneted to death (R 80). In Barrio Tutuboy, a Filipino volunteer guard was shot to death by members of the Japanese raiding party while fleeing from them (R 152).

* * *

1396

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

APO 500
3 May 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 300)

THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila.

SUBJECT: Murder of thirty-five and attempted murder of four
Filipinos at Barrio Malaiba, Vallehermoso, Negros
Oriental, P. I., 12 February 1944.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

a. On 12 February 1944, a group of more than one hundred Japanese soldiers undertook a punitive expedition to suppress guerrilla activities. In one locality, a number of Filipino men, women and children were arrested (R 18). The men were questioned, beaten up and then taken to a corn field where they were bayoneted. Only four of these men survived (R 19, 20).

b. On the afternoon of 11 February 1944, a patrol of about one hundred Japanese soldiers arrived at Sitio Pula, Barrio Malaiba. Civilians were seen running away from the Japanese. Early the next morning, fourteen identified dead bodies of Filipino civilians were found with bayonet wounds (R 15).

* * *

1397

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

29 March 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 263)

THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch

SUBJECT: Murder of approximately ninety Filipino civilians on the shores of Tagburos River, Palawan Island, P.I., on or about 1 March 1945, and murder of three Filipino civilians at Irauan, Palawan Island, P.I., on 4 March 1945.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

a. On or about 1 March 1945, Luis SABAN and a companion were taken by a group of sixty Japanese soldiers to the bank of the Tagburos River where they joined approximately thirty-five Filipino prisoners, among whom were women and children. These prisoners were divided into three groups, SABAN being in a group of twenty (R 1). He was struck with a saber, bayoneted and fell unconscious for fifteen minutes (R 2). When he regained consciousness, the Japanese had gone and he saw the dead bodies of the other prisoners in his group scattered around him. All had wounds on their bodies (R 3).

b. On or about 1 March 1945, about one hundred Japanese soldiers were seen with approximately seventy Filipino civilians, including women and children, near the Tagburos River. The victims were tied, lined up along the river and all were bayoneted to death by the Japanese (R 6, 7).

c. On 4 March 1945, Sofronio BOHOL heard screams coming from his wife and two grandchildren in his house. He saw five Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets going up the house, but believing there was nothing he could do, BOHOL ran away but came back the next morning to find the dead bodies of his wife and grandchildren. All the bodies bore bayonet wounds (R 12).

* * *

1398
DOCUMENT 2832

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

APD 500
24 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 291)

THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila

SUBJECT: Murder and rape near Jagna, Bohol, P.I., April -
October 1945.

* * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

A group of about thirty-two soldiers separated from the main body of Japanese troops after a battle with the Americans in April 1945 and hid in the forest near Jagna, Bohol, P.I. These Japanese frequently stole food from neighboring settlements.

On 21 April 1945, a Japanese shot at two Filipino men who had tried to flee. One was seriously wounded and the other killed (R 34). On the same day, Japanese retreating from an encounter with guerrillas bayoneted and beat a family whose house they looted. One of the children died of his wounds (R 27).

On 17 May 1945, Japanese captured five Filipino civilians, tied them and took them away. About a week later, their mutilated bodies were found in the forest toward which they were taken by the Japanese (R 21, 24).

In September 1945, two Japanese looted a home in Jagna and shot an eight-year-old girl (R 31).

In October 1945, Japanese raided a home in Jagna wounded the owner and carried away two Filipino women. The older woman succeeded in escaping from the Japanese camp the same evening, but the other was kept there until shortly before their surrender in February 1946 (R 13, 14, 15, 16). She declares that during this period she was raped by nineteen different Japanese all of whom she has identified from among those in custody, according to the investigator's report.

* * *

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION, MANILA

DSG

APD 500
24 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 290)

THRU : Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila

SUBJECT : Murder, rape and torture in the vicinity of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, P. I., June - September 1942 and July 1944.

* * * *

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:

During June, July and August and September 1942, Japanese forces in the island of Bohol carried out several executions and committed other crimes in the vicinity of Tagbilaran.

In late May or June 1942, the townspeople were ordered to assemble at the school to witness a public beheading (R 8, 11). A teacher who had been arrested previously was whipped (R-11). Then a black sash was tied around his eyes and upon the order of Col. MINI, one of the officers beheaded the teacher with a samurai sword (R 8, 11). Later another Filipino was similarly executed in the presence of the Colonel (R 12).

About the middle of June 1942, a young woman of Baclayan, Bohol was ordered by the puppet governor to go to the home of Col. MINI in Tagbilaran. When she refused, the governor and a Japanese captain who had accompanied him, threatened to kill her family and burn her home. Then they forced her into a car and drove her to Col. MINI's headquarters. The colonel told her to sit beside him and when she refused he beat her and slapped her and then he tore off her clothes and threatened her with his samurai sword. When she refused to submit to him, he tied her hands, fastened the rope to the head of the bed and then raped her (R 7, 8). The following night she jumped out of the window and succeeded in escaping to a nearby island (R 8).

One day in August, another Filipino was tied and taken to the cemetery where several Filipino officers held as prisoners by the Japanese were lined up to witness his execution. The victim was forced to kneel beside a pit while Colonel MINI demonstrated to a Japanese lieutenant how he wished the victim to be executed. Then the lieutenant beheaded the victim and his body fell into the pit (R 1, 15).

About 20 September 1942, three truckloads of Japanese soldiers stopped at a home near Loon, Bohol where they accused a woman of aiding USAFFE soldiers to escape. Her husband, hiding in the attic of the house, refused to come down and the Japanese set fire to the building. When he attempted to escape, he was bayoneted and shot to death by the Japanese (R 38).

On 11 July 1944, over a hundred Filipinos were locked up in the Municipal Building and separately interrogated. One of them was tied and suspended above the floor, beaten repeatedly with a baseball bat as a result of which he died two days later (R 35, 36).

About 26 June 1944, a Filipino civilian was arrested by the Japanese who accused him of being a guerrilla. He was questioned, beaten, tied and suspended from a beam under the house while the Japanese continued questioning and beating him. They left him hanging while they ate dinner. Then one of the Japanese cut the rope, dragged him outside and shot him to death (R 23, 27).

* * * *