

WITNESS' background Statement

Born: London, 10th April, 1908.

Educated: Charterhouse; Brasenose College; M.A. Oxon.

Resident in Japan - 1931 to 1940.

Studied Japanese language and history 1936 to 1940. Passed three annual examinations in Japanese at the British Embassy - 1937 to 1940.

Author of "Purchas His Pilgrimes in Japan", Kegan Paul, London, 1939.

T.A. Commission 1929.

Rejoined Oxfr. and Bucks Light Infantry 1940

G.S.O.3. 3rd Indian Corps, Malaya, 1941.

G.S.O.2. 3rd Indian Corps Malays, 1942.

P.O.W. at Singapore 15th February, 1942.

Major E. Group S.A.C.S.E.A. engaged on War Crimes Investigation from 1st September, 1945.

Promoted Colonel, War Crimes Liaison Officer A.L.F.S.E.A. 9th February, 1946.

Wild

PROOF of -

CYRIL HEW DALRYMPLE WILD, Colonel, British Army, War Crimes Liaison Officer, Allied Land Forces, S. E. A.

1. On the night of 7/8th December, 1941, I was on duty in the Operations Room of Headquarters 3rd Indian Corps, Kuala Lumpur, as G.S.O.3. Operations of that formation. Shortly after midnight I received a signal from Headquarters 8th Indian Brigade at Kota Bahru to the effect that unidentified ships had been sighted off the Coast. About half an hour later, i.e., about 0030 hours 8th December, I received another signal from the 8th Army Brigade stating that an enemy attack had just started and that our beach defences had gone into action. The time of origin of this second signal was just after midnight on the 8th December. I was in immediate telephone conversation with the Headquarters Malaya Command at Singapore regarding both these signals and at that time they had no information of any declaration of War. At the Corps Commander's Conference a few hours later, I heard him state that two other enemy landings had taken place almost simultaneously at Singora and Patani in Siam. These landings were not more than an hour or so after the first landing on Kota Bahru. I recall that air reconnaissance on 8th December proved that the enemy were already in possession of the aerodrome and beaches at Singora.

2. On 15 February, 1942, I was serving as G.S.O.2. Operations, 3rd Indian Corps in Singapore. At the capitulation of Singapore I was taken a P.O.W. on that day.

3. At about 1700 hours on 15th February 1942, I was present with Lt. Gen. Percival, Brig. Torrance and Brig. Newbiggin at the Ford Motor Factory, Bukit Timah, when the British surrender to Gen. Yamashita was signed. Lt. Col. Sugita Ichiji was present with Gen. Yamashita. I was acting as Lt. Gen. Percival's interpreter. After the surrender had been signed, with Lt. Gen. Percival's permission I asked Gen. Yamashita to extend his protection to the women and children in Singapore. He promised to do this.

4. Prior to the capitulation there had been attempts to evacuate part of the civilian population, but as the Japanese had command of the sea, most of the craft in which they were evacuated were sunk with heavy loss of life. The result was that at the time of the capitulation there were approximately 3,500 European nationals of over 20 different nations on the Island.

5. After the capitulation the 3,500 European nationals were confined in Changi Gaol. Of the 3,500, a large proportion were women and children. The gaol had been built to accommodate approximately 700 Asiatic convicts and was, therefore, greatly overcrowded. These civilians remained there till April, 1944, i.e. for over 2 years.

6. The P.O.W. after being ordered to lay down their arms were concentrated in areas on Singapore Island while conferences took place between the Japanese and the British as to the question of the general hand-over of the surrendered personnel.

7. The Japanese refused to allow the British Officers serving with the Indian units to remain with their Indian troops. All Indian troops were concentrated in Farrar Park where they were addressed by a Japanese officer and invited to join the Indian National Army. At that time very few of the Indians joined the Indian National Army. Those who did join were separated, put into a different camp, given better food and treatment, and some of them were put in charge of British P.O.W. as guards. Those who did not join the Indian National Army were subjected to increasingly bad treatment including floggings and starvation, to induce them to join. I was told this by Indian Officers.

Officers.

8. I was detained in Fort Canning for a few days as Liaison Officer between Lt. Col. Sugita representing the Japanese and Lt. Gen. Percival. I was given a Liaison Officer's arm-band and pass to put on a car and was allowed to drive myself freely round Singapore and out to the East of the Island where most of the British troops were then being concentrated.
9. During this time I myself saw the Japanese cordoning off sections of Chinatown with light tanks and interrogating large numbers of male Chinese in these areas. I did not personally see any Chinese shot on Changi beach, but while I was at Changi on or about 22nd February, 1942 Brig. Newbiggin and I went to the Changi Conference House and I heard Brig. Newbiggin make a very strong protest to Lieut. Col. Sugita concerning the shooting of more than 100 Chinese men on the beach just outside the Changi Camp. Brig. Newbiggin also complained that members of the Volunteer force had been ordered by the Japs to go to the beach to bury the bodies. Lt. Col. Sugita did not deny that these shootings had taken place and merely said that the Chinese whom the Japanese had shot were "bad men". Brig. Newbiggin asked that the Japanese would not shoot any more Chinese and Lt. Col. Sugita said angrily that they would shoot them whenever they wanted to if they were "bad men".
10. I was informed by British Officers detained by the Japanese on Blakang Mati Island in Singapore Harbour, that during the week after the capitulation they saw the Japanese daily taking hundreds of Chinese out to sea in lighters with their hands tied. They told me they also saw the Japanese throwing these Chinese overboard and machine-gunning them in the water. Many of the bodies of these Chinese were washed up on the beach of Blakang Mati Island and were buried by British P.O.W.
11. From records now compiled by the War Crimes Investigation Team in Singapore, it is known that not less than 5,000 male Chinese were executed by the Japanese on Singapore Island during the first two weeks following the capitulation. The majority of these were British subjects
12. I saw Gen. Yamashita in Manila on or about the 29th October, 1945 I then asked him who was responsible for killing these Chinese in Singapore in February 1942. He replied that the Colonel commanding the Kempeitai was responsible, and he said that he himself had known nothing about it except that those found looting or in possession of arms were to be executed. I said "many thousands of them were executed for no reason whatever except that they were young and Chinese". He did not deny this, but said that he had not been informed of it. I have recently learnt from one of Yamashita's commanders and from a female member of his staff that this was quite untrue. Yamashita, who was himself in Singapore at the time, approved in advance of the plans for the massacres and even encouraged his subordinates to continue the slaughter when they had stopped. The Japanese had not even the excuse of having stormed the city. It was surrendered by Gen. Percival when the military situation was hopeless and in response to Gen. Yamashita's written appeal "to spare the lives of the Asiatic Civilian population". Only the Kempeitai and the Keibaitai were allowed to enter the city, as Yamashita told me and as I thought for myself, and they started this deliberate extermination of Asiatic Civilians three days later.
13. A few days after the capitulation all the British and Australian troops, except some of the wounded, marched out to the Changi area on the East of the Island where they were accommodated in barrack buildings and in huts which they built themselves.
14. On or about 20th February 1942, I left Fort Canning for Changi P.O.W. Camp. By this time some 50,000 P.O.W. were concentrated there. This was the only British and Australian P.O.W. Camp on the Island at this time. I remained at Changi P.O.W. Camp for about 3 weeks. During

this time the accommodation was not too bad as the majority of the troops were accommodated in permanent structures.

15. All P.O.W. at this time were ordered by the Japanese to salute all ranks in the Japanese Army including Indian guards who were members of the Indian National Army, some of whom were former members of the Indian Army. Failure to salute invariably resulted in severe face-smacking or beating-up with rifle-butts or sticks. Throughout the period of my captivity all Allied P.O.W. irrespective of rank had to salute all Japanese soldiers and Korean civilians employed as guards. In many camps P.O.W. had to bow if they were not wearing their caps. Between February 1942 and about April 1944, all British and Allied Officers in Changi and other camps on Singapore Island were forbidden by the Japanese to wear their badges of rank.

Build
Roads

16. On 13th March, 1942, by order of the Japanese, a working party was sent from Changi to River Valley Road where a P.O.W. working camp was opened. I think this was the second party to leave Changi for a working camp. Other working camps were opened shortly afterwards at Farrar Park, Adam Road, Bukit Timah and the Great World. I went to River Valley Road with 1,500 British officers and ORs including 200 Australians. I was the official interpreter and was also in command of all Allied troops for the first day or two. More parties came to River Valley Road from Changi during the next few days until the numbers reached 4,500.

17. I was in River Valley Road Camp till December 24th, 1942. The accommodation in River Valley Road Camp consisted of long narrow huts roofed with atap ~~pati~~ with double-decker plank stagings running the full length of the hut on either side of an earthen passage. Access to the top floor was by vertical ladders. I had been ordered by the Japanese to put the officers in the same huts as the men, but I successfully disobeyed this order and established an officers' hut. The huts were grossly overcrowded. The size of the huts was about 120 ft. long by 18 ft. wide (including of the 6 ft. passage). Upwards of 200 men were placed in each hut. The Japs allowed 2½ ft by 6 ft per man. No bedding or sleeping mats of any sort were provided. The walls were made of palm leaves which soon rotted away till no walls were left. The huts were so infested with bugs that hundreds of men preferred to sleep on the bare ground outside. There were no cook-houses when the first party arrived and we had to build our own. The area in which the 4,500 men were accommodated was approximately 180 yards by 130 yards. No provision had been made by the Japs for sanitation inside this area and the troops were forbidden to leave it. For the first week no spades were provided to dig latrines. The camp was built on reclaimed laterite soil like red clay. There was no drainage. It rained almost continuously for the first week and the mud became ankle-deep. When I asked the Japanese O.C. for spades to dig latrines, he said we must scratch a fresh hole in the ground every day for this purpose. When I told him that after a week all the open ground would be fouled if we did this, he replied that after a week we must dig up the old holes with our hands and use them again. After the first week we approached the Municipal authorities ourselves, and latrine-buckets were supplied by them and emptied every day. Already a serious dysentery-epidemic had broken out. Within six weeks more than 100 men had to be evacuated to the P.O.W. hospital at Changi with dysentery. In about June 1942, there was a serious outbreak of scrotal dermatitis, and I myself inspected one afternoon over 1,200 men who were suffering from this painful complaint which is a deficiency disease.

18. The number of P.O.W. in River Valley Road Camp had increased from about 4,800 to about 6,000 by July 1942, and by the same date another working camp called Havelock Road had been opened on the other side of the Singapore River and contained about 3,500 P.O.W. who were in exactly the same type of accommodation as we had and were equally crowded. By order of the Japanese these two camps totalling 9,500 P.O.W.

were commanded by Lt. Col. C.P. Heath, D.S.O., R.A., under whom I served as "Brigade Major" and interpreter and Liaison Officer with the Japanese.

19. Altogether, while I was in River Valley Road Camp, 15,000 P.O.W. English, Australian and Dutch - passed through the two Camps between March 1942 and December 1942. Of these more than 3,000 were evacuated to Changi Hospital during this period. Approximately 7,000 were sent from these two camps to the Burma/Siam Railway or to Japan. Both these camps were closed in December 1942 when about 5,000 P.O.W. including myself returned to Changi.

20. While I was in River Valley Road Camp the food supplied was lacking in vitamin content. The amount supplied was adequate. Applications for rice polishings, which are a certain cure for beri-beri, were refused. There was no excuse for this as there was an abundant supply at the Johore Bahru rice mills from which other P.O.W. camps on Singapore Island, including the Great World P.O.W. Camp $\frac{1}{2}$ mile away from us, were permitted to draw regular supplies. The lack of vitamin content resulted in deficiency diseases. No clothing at all was supplied by the Japanese until, in August 1942, some International Red Cross parcels were delivered. This was the only large supply of Red Cross goods ever distributed to P.O.W. on Singapore Island. During the whole of my captivity the total amount of Red Cross goods I personally received amounted to $1\frac{1}{2}$ food parcels of the type issued to P.O.W. in Germany weekly, and I was in captivity for $3\frac{1}{2}$ years.

21. On 29th July, 1942, the Japanese O.C. of River Valley Road and Havelock Road Camps at about 1415 hours, ordered all the men (probably more than 200) to parade in a field outside River Valley Road Camp. These included all the cooks, Medical orderlies and sick, and the men who could not go out to work because they had no boots. The O.C. made a speech to them in which he said they were lazy. The men were then marched to the car-park which had an uneven surface with broken bricks on it and all of them were ordered to double round this. Most of the men had no boots. The Japanese officer superintended this punishment and his guards stood inside the circle and struck men on the back with sticks and rifle butts when they did not run fast enough. I saw this myself and continued to ask the Japanese Officer to stop this punishment. Lt. Col. Heath was the Senior British Officer present. The doubling went on for about half an hour, and at the end the Japanese Officer said to the men through his Japanese interpreter, "I have proved that you can dance in bare feet - therefore, you can work in bare feet".

22. From March 1942 to December 1942, most of the P.O.W. from River Valley Road and Havelock Road Camps were working in the docks, including military stores and supplies. I recall interpreting for Lt. Col. Heath when he made a complaint to the Japanese about this, which was disregarded. They used to march to and from work and had to work in the sun for approximately 8 hours per day without shirts. They had not got enough shirts to go to work in. Lt. Col. Heath was able to prevent men being sent to work if they had no boots.

23. During this period all P.O.W. in Singapore were infuriated at hearing that some of their Generals had been subjected to illtreatment by the Japanese. An example of this was the illtreatment of my Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Lewis Heath. He told me at Changi P.O.W. Camp in about August 1942, when I was there on a liaison visit, that the Japanese had interrogated him at Changi Gaol regarding the defences of India. When he refused to answer their questions he was taken to Fort Canning where he was struck a violent blow in the face by a Japanese Major and was then confined for about 48 hours in an underground room, without light or ventilation, with water on the floor, and full of mosquitos. The Japanese Major himself turned off the water-supply outside the cell and Lt. Gen. Heath was given no food. At this time Lt. Gen. Heath was about 57 years of age and suffering from dysentery.

24. The Japanese attitude towards the P.O.W. who were sick was to leave them to be treated by the British Medical Officers. The Japs never had anything like monthly medical inspections. At this time they were generally accepting the opinion of our own Medical Officers as to the physical condition of our men.

25. A few weeks after the surrender complete nominal rolls of the 50,000 P.O.W. at Changi were handed to the Japs on their demand together with lists of those known to have been killed in action or to have died of wounds. The Japanese stated that these lists were wanted for transfer to the United Kingdom and Australia. Of course we were not in a position to know whether these lists were ever so transferred, but for the following reasons I very much doubt if they were. From letters received from home by P.O.W. it was clear that few relatives knew that particular prisoners were alive until at least six months after the surrender, and in some instances the gap was as long as two years. From relatives' letters many P.O.W. learnt that the first news received of them had been a Postcard which P.O.W. were allowed to write in August 1942. A namesake of mine - Major Wilde - died in Changi Camp in about June 1942. His death was officially reported by us to the Japs as soon as he died. I continued to receive letters addressed to him by his relatives and delivered to me in error until approximately May 1945. His relative were therefore, unaware even in 1944 that he had died. In about October 1942, the first card-index of P.O.W. was made by the P.O.W. themselves under the orders of the Japanese in Changi, River Valley Road and Havelock Road Camps.

26. In January 1943, I introduced Mr. Guest, the Australian Red Cross Commissioner, who at that time was being treated as a P.O.W., to the Japanese Commandant of Changi Camp. I interpreted for Mr. Guest on this occasion. I obtained permission for Mr. Guest to visit in Singapore Mr. Schweitzer, the Swiss representative of the Red Cross, but our request that Mr. Schweitzer should be allowed to visit Changi Camp was refused. Up to this time Mr. Schweitzer had not visited any of the P.O.W. Camps on Singapore Island. Mr. Guest reported to me after his visit to Singapore that Mr. Schweitzer had told him that he had made continual requests to the Japs to visit P.O.W. Camps, but that these had been refused. On this occasion Mr. Guest was able to obtain some money from Mr. Schweitzer and also a quantity of spectacles for the P.O.W. Shortly after this Mr. Guest was forbidden by the Japanese to see Mr. Schweitzer. I saw Mr. Schweitzer making his first visit to Changi P.O.W. Camp on about August 23, 1945. He was then being escorted by the Japanese. This was some days after the Japanese General commanding P.O.W. in Malaya and Sumatra - Major Gen. Saito - had informed us that the war was over and we were no longer prisoners. No other Red Cross representative ever visited any of the P.O.W. camps on Singapore Island or, so far as I am aware, any of the P.O.W. Camps on the Burma/Siam Railway during the whole 3½ years of our captivity. Mr. Schweitzer was living in Singapore without being interned during the 3½ years of the Japanese occupation. He was, therefore, in easy reach of all the camps on the Island and could and would presumably have visited any or all of them had the Japanese not forbidden him to do so.

27. During the whole of my captivity we were forbidden to have any official communication with our own Government regarding our conditions or requirements - in the way of medical supplies, books, etc., If we had any complaint or request to make it had to be made to the Japanese and they took such action as they thought fit (if any). There was no question of our being allowed to complain as to the nature of our work or otherwise (except to the Japanese), or to correspond freely with the military authorities or the Protecting Power. The only correspondence I was permitted was to send five Postcards of 25 words each during the 3½ years. These Postcards were, of course, censored, and we were told that they would be destroyed if any reference was made to the Camp or area in which

we were confined, or to illtreatment, shortage of food, drugs etc.,

28. I have no personal knowledge of incoming mail being deliberately withheld. The Japanese used to want to censor all incoming mail. For this work the Japanese had an insufficient staff which resulted in delays running into several months. Letters received were usually from 6 months to over a year old.

Afternoon
Session

29. In February 1942, I heard of the massacre at Alexandra Military Base Hospital on Singapore Island. I know Major James Bull, R.A.M.C. who was at that time the radiologist in the hospital. Major Bull is now in practice in London. Major Bull told me, while we were both in Changi, that on 13th February 1942, the British line was withdrawn to new positions on the outskirts of Singapore, thus leaving the hospital in an undefended locality (I already knew this, as I was a Staff Officer on Singapore Island at the time). On the afternoon of 13th February, 1942, a large number of Japanese infantry entered the hospital, which was covered with Red Cross flags. They went down the corridors and into the downstairs rooms of the hospital bayonetting and shooting everyone they saw, including many who were wearing Red Cross Arm Bands. In the operating room Japanese soldiers bayonetted and killed the patient on the operating table and the surgeon who was carrying out the operation. They also bayonetted the anaesthetist and dresser in the operating room, but both of these survived. I knew the anaesthetist, who was later Medical Officer in Changi Camp. He confirmed this story and had the scars of bayonet wounds on his hands and chest. Major Bull told me that he went on to the balcony on the top of the hospital and saw a Japanese officer, and a soldier standing with a rifle, below. Major Bull then held up a Large Red Cross Flag in front of himself for the Jap Officer to see as a further proof that this was a hospital. A bullet then passed through the flag and struck the wall behind Major Bull who then lowered the flag and saw the Jap Officer pointing at him, and the soldier raising his rifle to fire again. Major Bull told me that he then went downstairs and saw many dead bodies of Medical personnel and patients lying in the corridors. The Japanese then collected a large number of Medical Officers, medical orderlies and wounded men from beds in the hospital wards. They ordered the men to get out of bed and took away those who could walk. Another officer told me that more than 160 of these people were taken by the Japanese to some small houses almost $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the hospital, where they were crowded into a few rooms so tightly that five of them died of suffocation during the night. On 14th or 15th February, the Japanese took them out of the house in parties of five and then shot or bayonetted them outside. When only a few were left, a British shell exploded close to the house in which this officer was kept and blew the door open. He and about nine others ran out under fire from the Japanese, and he and about four others escaped and later became P.O.W. Many other officers and ORs who were in the hospital wards at the time that the Japanese came in have also told me similar stories. In one case an officer whose leg was in plaster of paris was struck on it by a Japanese with a rifle butt. Capt. Allardyce, R.A.M.C., was a medical Officer in the hospital at the time. He spoke Japanese as he had been a doctor in Kobe, and I knew him well. Capt. Allardyce suggested to Col. Craven, the O.C. at Alexandra Hospital, that he should himself go to find a responsible Japanese Officer who could stop this slaughter. He left the hospital with a Japanese Private on this errand, but he was included in those confined in the small houses and was one of those executed outside them. Medical Officers at Changi informed me that those killed by the Japanese in or outside Alexandra Hospital were approximately 20 Medical Officers, 60 Medical Orderlies and 200 wounded.

30. With regard to the massacre at Parit Sulong, in January 1942 I was a Staff Officer of Headquarters 3rd Indian Corps in Johore. A battle took place between our forces and the Konoye Guards Division at Muar, including fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between the 18th and 22nd January. We were aware that the Australians engaged in this

battle were having difficulty in evacuating a convoy of wounded. I know that this convoy was never seen again. Lt. Ben Hackney, late of 2/29 Bn. AIF, is known to be the sole survivor. He was subsequently a P.O.W. with me in Changi and on the Burma/Siam Railway. In June 1945, Lt. Hackney made an official oral report to me about this massacre. He told me that the Japanese captured the convoy at Parit Sulong Bridge on 22nd January 1942. Lt. Hackney was himself at this time in an ambulance suffering from four wounds. The Japanese removed all the wounded men from the trucks in which they had been travelling and forced them to walk or crawl along the road and across a bridge. During this time the wounded were repeatedly struck with rifle butts and jabbed with bayonets. Those who could not move any further were bayoneted or clubbed to death. The wounded were then compelled to strip themselves naked. There were approximately 110 Australian officers and men and approximately 35 to 40 Indians. All these were suffering from wounds received in action. The Japanese continued to strike the wounded savagely with rifle-butts. Many were knocked unconscious. All the prisoners were then driven into two rooms of some coolie-quarters. During this move many more were killed by clubbing or bayonetting and some were shot. The wounded were all lying on top of one another in heaps on the floor of these two rooms. The Japanese refused to give them any water. They were then inspected by a senior Japanese Officer who arrived in a motor convoy escorted by tanks on the road. On leaving he gave orders to a Japanese Officer outside the building. All the prisoners were then taken outside and tied together with wire or rope and were driven away to a little distance from the building. Lt. Hackney, whose hands were tied behind his back, fell down, as he had a broken bone in one leg, and pretended to be dead. While lying on the ground he was struck several times with rifle butts and pricked with bayonets. He heard a long burst of rifle and machine-gun fire from the direction to which the prisoners had been taken. Japs then went past him to the road and returned carrying tins of petrol. Shortly afterwards there was loud screaming from the direction of the prisoners. After the Japanese had gone, Lt. Hackney crawled under the building and rubbed the rope off his wrists against the brickwork. He was joined there by an Australian Sergeant and an Australian private whose clothes were soaked with petrol. The private was wounded in many places and soon died. The Sergeant told Lt. Hackney that all the wounded had been machine-gunned and had been burnt with petrol. The Sergeant himself had rolled away into the bushes after petrol had been poured over him just before a pile of bodies had been set alight. Lt. Hackney showed me the scars on his head from the blows received from rifle-butts and the wounds on his body and legs. The remains of the men who were massacred on this occasion were found in the position described by Lt. Hackney a few months ago, and have been collected for burial.

31. In May, 1942, Lt. Col. C.P. Heath, R.A., arrived in River Valley Road Camp from Changi. He told me that in March 1942, he had been ordered by the Japanese to attend the execution of three of the men of his Regiment, Gunners Hunter, McCann and Jeffries. He said that Lt. Gen. Percival had made strong protests to the Japanese, saying that the proposed execution was quite illegal. He said that the three Gunners had attempted to escape and that Lt. Gen. Percival had been unsuccessful in preventing their execution. Brig. Newbiggin, Lt. Col. Heath, another of his Officers and a Chaplain were then taken to the beach near Changi where these three gunners were shot dead in front of them by the Japanese.

32. In September, 1942, the Japanese Officer commanding River Valley Road Camp and Havelock Road Camp gave me orders that all P.O. there must sign a form promising on their word of honour that they would not attempt to escape. Lt. Col. Heath made a strong protest to the Japanese Officer through me as interpreter, in which he said that by International Law a parole of this sort could only be given

their clothes thrown back at them. They were told to put them on. Lt. Hackney & officers tied up on the veranda outside

Heath allowed to speak to the gunners

voluntarily and that not one of his officers or men was willing to give his parole. The Japanese Officer said that he would punish everyone severely by confining them in a narrow place without food or water until they signed, and he sent Lt.Col. Heath and me to Changi Camp to learn from the P.O.W. there what had already been done to them. On arrival at Changi Camp, Lt.Col. Heath and I had an interview with Col. Holmes, the senior Officer of the Allied P.O.W. there. He told us that, on the P.O.W. at Changi refusing to sign the parole-form, the Japanese had confined over 15,000 of them on the barrack square at Selarang in an area which normally accommodated a single Bn. of about 800 men. They were kept there for about 4 days and were obliged to dig their own latrines through the asphalt and concrete of the barrack square. They were extremely short of water. Finally, on the Japanese threatening to move the infectious cases from the P.O.W. Hospital for confinement at Selarang with the other men, Col. Holmes, on the advice of his Medical Officers, had himself ordered all the troops to sign the forms under protest. Col. Holmes said that, while the negotiations were proceeding with the Japanese regarding the parole, he and the other senior Officers had been ordered to go to the beach near Changi where they saw two British and two Australians shot by Indian guards under the direction of a Japanese Officer. These four men had been caught by the Japanese several weeks before, outside the wire surrounding Changi Camp. They had since been living in the Camp as ordinary P.O.W. and had not been tried. One of them was taken from the P.O.W. Hospital to the place of execution in his pajamas. The Australians were called Cpl. Breavington and Pfc. Gale.

33. At the time of the execution of these four soldiers, Lt. Gen. Fukuye Shimpei was G.O.C., P.O.W. in Malaya and Singapore, and the four men went to execution from his Headquarters at Changi. In the spring of this year Lt. Gen. Fukuye was brought to trial by the War Crimes Commission in Singapore. I was present at the trial and gave evidence. One of the war crimes alleged against him was the execution of these four men. Lt. Gen. Fukuye was convicted upon this charge and has since been shot.

34. Although the only working-camps on Singapore Island in which I was stationed, apart from Changi Base Camp, were River Valley Road, Havelock Road and Sime Road Camps, I had regular contact with officers and men from the other working-camps on Singapore Island, and I can testify partly from what I was told and partly from what I saw on occasional visits that the general conditions prevailing were approximately the same in each of the working-camps on Singapore Island. Except for the period April 1943 to December 1943, when I was in Siam, I was on Singapore Island all the time. The other working-camps in which conditions were approximately the same are the following:- The Great World, Adam Road, Normanton Camp, Kranji Camp, Bukit Timah Camp and Tanjong Pagar. However, the rations supplied by the Japanese deteriorated steadily both in bulk and quality as the war went on, until the last eight months of the war, when everyone was on a starvation diet. I myself, without having acquired any disease except skin ailments, was 3 stone below my normal weight on release. I regarded myself as a fit man compared with most of my fellow-prisoners.

35. From August 1942 to about May 1943, some 40,000 allied P.O.W. were dispatched from Singapore to work on the Burma/Siam Railway. These included over 10,000 Dutch troops transferred from the Netherlands East Indies. In addition a large number of troops sailed from Singapore to Formosa, Japan or Korea. Thus during my absence in Siam - April 1943 to December 1943 - there were only about 6,000 P.O.W. left on Singapore Island, and their accommodation at Changi Camp somewhat improved.

36. In April, 1944, the 3,500 civilian internees were transferred from Changi Gaol to Sime Road Camp where they remained until the end

- Note - Gaol - pronounced Jail

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of the war. In their place 5,000 P.O.W. were placed in Changi Gaol, and 5,000 more were confined in very crowded huts which they had to build for themselves round the Gaol walls. For the last 16 months of the war, Changi Gaol thus contained seven times as many people as it had been built to accommodate. Four men were kept in each single cell - one sleeping on the only sleeping platform provided, two on the floor and one across the open Asiatic latrine. I myself was living in Changi Gaol for three weeks in April and May 1944, and thereafter until the war ended I was living in a warder's quarter within a few yards of the Gaol and generally spent several hours of the day inside the Gaol on duty.

Recess

37. From sometime towards the end of 1942 or early 1943, most of the fitter men in Changi Camp were employed in the construction of a Japanese military aerodrome at Changi, which was completed a few months before the end of the war. From the beginning of 1945 till July 1945 some new working-camps were formed on Singapore Island, including River Valley Road (which was re-opened), Tanjong Pagar and Kranji and a Johore Bahru. P.O.W. in these camps, and approximately 1,500 of the P.O.W. at Changi, were employed for about 7 months entirely on the construction of Japanese defence-works, particularly entrenchments, weapon pits, tunnels, anti-tank ditches and gun-emplacements. A small party of P.O.W. were compulsorily employed by the Japanese at Alexandra Ordnance Depot in repairing Japanese guns and mortars. For the last two years of the war a party of several hundred P.O.W. were confined in Blakang Mati Island in Singapore harbour, handling and storing Japanese bombs. From 5th November, 1944, till the end of the war Singapore Island was being bombed at frequent intervals by the Allies, and the employment of P.O.W. in an Ordnance Depot and a bomb-store was definitely the employment of P.O.W. on work which was dangerous and work in dangerous zones.

38. It is true to say that on Singapore Island the supply of medical stores was always grossly below the reasonable requirements of the P.O.W. For instance emetine - essential for the cure of widespread amoebic dysentery - was never provided except in negligible quantities. Clothing and boots were always increasingly short of requirements.

From January 1944 not only the vitamin content, but also the bulk of food rations provided by the Japanese, were grossly inadequate. For example, at Changi during the last six months of the war, the daily allowance per man was 8 ozs. of rice or maize with a spoonful of dried fish, and about 2 to 3 ozs. of vegetables: several additional ozs. of vegetables were grown by the prisoners themselves. No meat was issued. Beri-beri became practically universal together with the other deficient diseases. On this diet all men lost weight rapidly, but in spite of this all who were not totally incapacitated were compelled to do manual labour for which the greater proportion were in no way physically fit. One ward at Changi during the last few months of the war was set aside for over 100 men whose weight had fallen below 100 lbs, and its occupants were kept alive by a voluntary contribution made from their own rations by the other men in the camp.

39. On 10th October, 1943. the incident known as the "Double Tenth" began. At this time I was in Siam, but the story has been told to me by several of the survivors including the Rt. Rev. the Bishop of Singapore and Mr. R. H. Scott now Counsellor to the Special Commissioner for South East Asia. On or shortly after this day the Japs ARRESTED about 40 British civilians, who were then interned in Changi Gaol, and transferred them to the Kempeitai Headquarters at the Y.M.C.A. Building in Singapore. Here they were confined for several months in communal bamboo cells, two ladies being put among men without any privacy whatever. The only sanitation provided was an open lavatory without any means of concealment in the middle of the cell or cage; and all prisoners, at a time when many were suffering from dysentery, had to drink the water out of the lavatory. The women were not tortured apart

one of the Ladies was a doctor from Singapore.

Next during
first year

Scabies + Partial
+ complete Blindness
also several Dermatitis

on the Siam R.R.
Aided
the Jail
+ took out
many
civilian
prisoners

from this gross humiliation, but some of the men were taken every day out of these cages and were tortured by the Japanese members of the Kempeitai. These tortures took the form of kicking, flogging and striking, electric shocks on the body and limbs and hanging up with ropes attached to the arms. One British civilian as the result of torture attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window; when his friends pointed out to an interpreter of the Kempeitai that he had broken his penis in the fall, the Japanese kicked him in the groin. Of the civilians who had been arrested 15 died under torture or as the result of it including the Colonial Secretary of Singapore and the Chief Legal adviser to the Government. I have interrogated since the war has been over, certain Japanese personnel who voluntarily admitted to me that they had taken part in these tortures and twenty of them who have since been brought to trial in Singapore have been convicted in respect of offences committed by them involving torture.

40. In about March 1942, the Japanese started to use Outram Road Gaol in Singapore as a prison for P.O.W. who were suspected or had been convicted by Japanese Military Courts of offences against the extraordinarily harsh regulations concerning P.O.W. Among those first confined in Outram Road Gaol were Major O'Neill, I.M.S., and Lt. now Capt. Marriott, Argyll and Sunderland Highlanders, who were put in Outram Road Gaol in April, 1942. These two had been captured in the north of Johore after being cut-off in the jungle since January 1942 in the Slim battle. The Japs who captured them said that they were being sent to Changi P.O.W. camp, but owing to a mistake on the part of their escort they were handed over to the Kempeitai in Singapore who kept them for one night at the Y.M.C.A. Building (Kempeitai Headquarter and then placed them in Outram Road Gaol. A few weeks later they were brought up for trial, were sentenced, on false grounds, to 5 and 4 years Penal Servitude, and were sent back to Outram Road Gaol. An officer and several ORs of their party were captured in Johore a day or so later by the same Japanese who said that Major O'Neill and Lt. Marriott had already been sent to the Changi P.O.W. Camp and that they were going to the same place. This second party duly arrived in Changi Camp a few days later and became ordinary P.O.W., whereas Major O'Neill and Lt. Marriott, who had been their companions in the jungle, were sentenced to be convicts for the rest of the war. I discussed this matter in detail with the Officer of the second party while in Changi and he volunteered to state these facts to the Japanese. Also early in January 1943, I received an official verbal report from Lt. Marriott in Changi P.O.W. hospital to which he had been temporarily released from Outram Road Gaol suffering from acute beri-beri. He was later sent back to Outram Road Gaol to continue serving his sentence. I also heard an official oral report from Major O'Neill about 20th August, 1945, he then having served some 3½ years of his sentence in Outram Road Gaol. In about February 1943, I put all the facts before Major General Arimura, G.O.C., P.O.W. Malaya. He said that obviously there had been a miscarriage of justice, particularly in the case of Major O'Neill, who had been looking after sick men in the jungle in accordance with his duty as a medical Officer. In spite of this Major O'Neill was left in Outram Road Gaol for 2½ more years as a convict.

41. As regards the treatment of allied P.O.W. in Outram Gaol during the period March 1942 to August 1945, I learnt the following from frequent conversations with about twenty of them who were sent back to the Changi P.O.W. hospital when very sick as the result of their confinement there. These men were inspected at intervals at Changi by a Japanese Medical Officer, who sent them back to Outram Road Gaol when they had somewhat recovered.

42. Japanese convicts were used as warders over Allied P.O.W.; these P.O.W. had to sit at attention in solitary confinement for upwards of 14 hours per day and slept under a naked electric bulb. Their rations were grossly insufficient and less than those given to the Japanese convicts. P.O.W. were severely beaten by Japanese warders

and convicts at frequent intervals for alleged and often imaginary offences. No medical inspections were conducted and two Japanese Medical Officers from Outram Road Gaol appeared as defendants at a War Crimes trial in Singapore on this charge in August 1946. I gave evidence at these trials and have not yet heard the result. Among the Defendants at this trial were also over 30 of the warders and Japanese convicts at Outram Road Gaol and two Commandants of the Gaol.

43. In the Asiatic civilian side of Outram Road Gaol 1,200 prisoners died during the last 14 months of the war. Their names have already been published in the Singapore press. The Japanese Commandant of the Asiatic civilian side of this prison was the first Japanese to be arrested by the Allied Forces in September 1945 and will be coming up for trial in Singapore in September this year.

44. In about June 1944, in my capacity as interpreter at Changi P.O.W. Camp I was ordered by the Japanese to go to the entrance of Changi Gaol to receive four prisoners temporarily released from Outram Road Gaol on account of sickness. I myself lifted these four men out of the bus in which they had arrived. Two were British and two were Dutch. They were so thin that they weighed only a few stone each and so weak that they could scarcely whisper. Their bodies were covered with scabies. I know that two of them died a few days later in the P.O.W. Hospital at Changi and I read the Post Mortem report by an Australian Medical Officer which stated that their bowels were as thin as tissue paper from starvation. There was left in the bus a rough wooden box. I lifted the lid of this and saw inside the emaciated body of an elderly European in civilian dress. His knees were drawn up and his hands were clasped across his shrunken body.

BURMA/SIAM RAILWAY

45. The building of the Burma/Siam Railway was a military project undertaken to maintain and supply the Japanese forces in Burma, particularly for the Japanese proposed invasion of India. Without this railway the Japanese forces in Burma had to depend on hazardous sea communications liable to sea and air attack from India.

46. P.O.W. started to leave Singapore in large numbers by sea and railway from about June 1942 onwards. Most of these were sent to work on the Burma/Siam Railway, but none of them were told they were going to work there before they left. I first learnt that a Railway was being built in about December 1942 from a sick P.O.W. who had been sent to Changi from Outram Road Gaol where he had been sent to serve a sentence imposed upon him by a Japanese Court in Siam.

47. The Railway itself was built through mountainous rain-jungle. When completed it was about 300 miles long and formed a link between the existing Siamese Railway at Kanburi (Siam) and the Burmese Railway at Thanbuzyat (Burma). Work was begun in June or July, 1942 and the two ends were joined near Konkaita at the end of October 1943. Approximately 10,000 P.O.W. were sent by sea to Moulmein (Burma) and built the railway from Thanbuzyat to the Three Pagodas Pass between Burma and Siam. The rest of the P.O.W. built the Railway Northwards from Kanburi to the Three Pagodas Pass.

48. The first P.O.W. to go to Moulmein were all Australian except the interpreter who accompanied them who was a British Officer named Capt. W. Drower. This party was known as A Force. I met Captain Drower and Lt. Col. Anderson, V.C., of A. Force at Sonkurai Camp (Siam) in October, 1943 and they told me that since they left Singapore over 20 P.O.W. had been shot by the Japanese after recapture for attempting to escape. They said that this had happened at Victoria Point and other places. They also told me that at Victoria Point the P.O.W. had been building an aerodrome for the Japanese.

Tab

49. On completion of the Railway, the P.O.W. gradually moved south down the Railway into the plains of Siam apart from some who were retained on the Railway in maintenance squads. In December 1943, and April 1944, 6,000 P.O.W., the survivors of the F and H Forces were sent back to Changi Camp, Singapore; the remainder of the P.O.W. remained in Siam until the end of the war with the exception of some who were sent overseas. The casualties in F Force which I accompanied myself were 3,087 British and Australian P.O.W. out of 7,000 during the period April 1943 to April 1944. The casualties in H Force were 900 British, Australian and Dutch P.O.W. out of 3,000 during the same period. Accurate nominal rolls were kept in respect of both Forces which I myself saw and they showed the cause of death. During the same period F Force was being guarded and administered by about 250 Japanese and Korean guards, of whom one Korean died from cholera. There were no Japanese deaths. A Force to the north of us suffered 800 - 1,000 deaths out of 9,000 P.O.W. during approximately the same period. Out of about 300 Japanese and Korean guards, two only died from natural causes, and two others in other ways.

50. In addition to employing P.O.W. on the construction of the Railway, the Japanese employed Asiatic civilians of whom the majority were Indians, especially Tamils. There were also some Siamese and a large number of Burmese. The total number of P.O.W. employed was over 40,000 of whom over 16,000 died during 1943 to 1945. All these deaths are recorded generally with the place, date and cause of death. The total number of Asiatic labourers employed by the Japanese on the Railway and on other railway and road construction work in Siam will never be accurately known because the Japanese kept no proper records either of the Asiatics they employed or of their deaths. War Crimes Investigation Teams have been engaged in investigating the fate of these Asiatics since a year ago and estimates as to the numbers employed by the Japanese vary from 80,000 to 150,000 and of their deaths 50,000 to 100,000. I myself and other British Officers were in frequent contact with Asiatic labourers on the Railway between April 1943 and December 1943 and we received frequent complaints from some that they had been cheated by the Japanese into going there by promises of good working conditions and pay, from others that they had been kidnapped from their homes and places of work without time to settle their affairs or say goodbye to their families and had been taken by train to Siam.

51. In April, 1943, I myself received from the Japanese Staff Officer of the G.O.C. P.O.W. Malaya at Changi, orders for 7,000 British and Australian troops to prepare for an immediate move by train, which was likely to take 4 days. On instructions from the senior British Officers at Changi, I informed this Staff Officer verbally and with full written details, that only 5,000 reasonably fit men were left in Changi. After consulting his General this Staff Officer told me that 2,000 unfit men must be included in the 7,000 to make up the number. He gave me orders to pass to the senior P.O.W. officer in Changi Camp to the following effect:- (a) the reason for the move of the 7,000 men was that the food situation in Singapore was difficult and would be better in the new place; (b) this was not a working party and unfit men would have a better chance of recovery with good food in a pleasant hilly place and with good facilities for recreation; (c) there would be no marching except for a short distance from the train to a nearby camp and transport would be provided for baggage and men unfit to march; (d) musical instruments including 3 pianos were to be taken; (e) gramophones, blankets, clothing and mosquito nets would be provided at the new camps; (f) a good canteen would be available in each camp and (g) the force would include a medical party of 350 with equipment for a central hospital of 400 patients. I explained on two occasions to the Staff Officer that these 2,000 men were non-walking sick. He replied that the journey would entail no marching and that if the men were well enough to survive 4 days and nights in a train they would have a better chance of recovery as the food and conditions at our destination would be much better than on

Singapore Island. This party was therefore, composed of 3,600 Australians and 3,400 British including a total of 2,000 unfit men and was called F. Force.

52. F. Force started to entrain from Singapore on about 18th April 1943, and proceeded in thirteen train loads of about 550 men each leaving on 13 successive days. The railway journey from Singapore to Banpong in Siam lasted 4 days and 4 nights and was made in steel box cars which accommodated about 27 men in each sitting on the floor. Food and water were short throughout the journey and none was issued to No. 7 train, in which I travelled, during the last 24 hours. I was then a Major acting as Jap interpreter and Staff Officer to Lt. Col. S. W. Harris, O.B.E., R.A., who was recognised by the Japanese as the senior and representative Officer of the whole Force. Lt. Col. Harris's other Staff Officer was Lt. Col. F.J. Dillon, M.C.. There was no latrine accommodation on the journey and men were expected to relieve themselves on the track.

53. On arrival at Banpong my trainload (No. 7) was marched about 2 miles to a transit camp which was in a filthy condition having been used previously by many thousands of Asiatic labourers. All the heavy baggage brought with us was added by orders of the Japanese to that of the previous six train parties in an unguarded dump at the side of the road. I saw Siamese and Japanese stealing property from this dump. On arrival at this transit Camp we spoke to the Officers of No. 6 party who were making preparations to march their men out of the camp. They told us that they had to march to Kanburi some 50 kilos distant from Banpong and that the previous five parties had already left on this march the day after each of them had arrived at Banpong. I went with Lt. Col. Harris and protested strongly to a Japanese Lt. of the Malayan P.O.W. Administration who was giving orders for this march. He said that it could not be helped as there was no transport and that all the men would have to march 100 kilos to Tarsoe. Actually the distance covered by the whole of F Force on this march was 300 kilos and it was accomplished in about 2½ weeks. Apart from the fact that 2,000 men had been recognised by the Japs as non-walking sick, everyone was weakened by the four days train journey in great heat and most cramped and uncomfortable conditions and by the shortage of food and water. No. 7 party left Banpong the day after arrival and the men were in no condition to undertake this march, especially as they had to carry all their own kit, large quantities of medical stores and cooking utensils and support many of their weaker comrades.

54. While I was at Banpong, a Korean guard was responsible for issuing the food outside the Japanese Officers' quarters. I saw him strike several officers and men with the steel shaft of a golf club and I was informed by an Officer that he had broken a P.O.W.'s arm with it on the previous day.

55. On orders of the Japanese Officer I myself went by lorry with Lt. Col. Harris and two other Officers from Banpong to Tarsoe to set up the P.O.W. Headquarters there. At Tarsoe there was the Headquarters of the G.O.C., P.O.W. Siam. We went there immediately to try to ameliorate the conditions of the P.O.W. in F. Force who were being compelled to undertake this arduous march in contravention of the promises which Lt. Col. Harris and I had received at Changi. We were received by the Japanese interpreter of the Japanese Headquarters who said that F. Force was under the command of the G.O.C., P.O.W. Malaya and was not the responsibility of P.O.W. Siam. He refused to allow us to speak to any Japanese Officer. On our return to the staging camp at Tarsoe that evening, we found about 400 Australians of one of the earliest train parties of F. Force paraded ready to march; on the opposite side of the road about 20 Australians were sitting whose feet and legs were in such bad condition from blisters and ulcers, that they were unable to march having already marched 100 kilos during the last six days. I saw the

Japanese Corporal in command of the Tarsoe Staging Camp hitting these men with a bamboo to make them stand on their feet; I saw him then strike them on the bottom with his bamboo and when they walked two or three paces I heard him say, "You can walk!" and I saw him send them across the road to join the main party which had to march 30 kilos that night to the next staging camp. This was at 20,00 hours. I stopped this Japanese Corporal from beating the sick men and from kicking one on an open ulcer on his shin and made him send them all back into the staging camp. When the next party arrived the following morning having marched 25 kilos the previous night, I suggested to Major Bruce Hunt, A.A.M.C., who was the Medical Officer accompanying the party, that he should parade immediately as many of his men as he thought were unable to complete the rest of the night's march. At my suggestion the Japanese Corporal in command of Tarsoe Staging Camp then accompanied myself and these 50 sick men to a medical inspection which I had arranged should be held by the Japanese Medical Officer of the Headquarters of the P.O.W. Administration of Siam. He was a Lieutenant in the Imperial Japanese Army. This Lieutenant examined and treated the 50 men and at my request and in my presence gave orders to the Japanese Corporal that 36 of them should be allowed to rest in Tarsoe Staging Camp and should not be required to march that night. Among these 36 was an Australian Chaplain whom I had particularly indicated to the Jap Medical Officer as a non-combatant who was suffering from a weak heart. The Japanese Medical Officer gave these orders in my presence to the Japanese Corporal. We then marched back to the Staging Camp where I heard the Japanese Corporal give orders to the P.O.W. that only 14 out of the 50 sick men should be allowed to stay in Tarsoe Staging Camp that night and that the remainder must march. I immediately walked back to the Headquarters of the Siam P.O.W. Administration and reported what I had heard to the same Japanese Medical Officer who was extremely angry and wrote an order to the Japanese Corporal in command of the Staging Camp that 36 men should be excused from marching that night, which he handed to his own Sergeant Major who accompanied me back to the Staging Camp. He gave this order to the Corporal and then returned to me saying, "The Corporal is a very hard man. He says that only 14 men are excused by him from marching tonight". I said, "Do not Corporals obey the orders of Officers in the Imperial Japanese Army?" At his request I then returned to the Headquarters of the P.O.W. Administration Siam where both the Japanese Sergeant Major and I explained the situation to the Japanese Medical Officer. I requested that the Japanese Medical Officer or the Sergeant Major should come to the Staging Camp at 2000 hours to ensure that the 36 men were not required to march that night. The Japanese Medical Officer said, "We are too busy. You, Major Wild, must ensure that these 36 men do not march". I said, "I am a P.O.W. and cannot give orders even to a Japanese Corporal. If I do I shall be beaten." He said, "You will not be beaten. I have ordered the Corporal not to beat anyone". I then returned to the Staging Camp. At 2000 hours I paraded all the marching party except the 36 sick men whom I paraded on the other side of the road. The Japanese Corporal sent back to the Staging Camp 14 sick men and said that the other 22 sick men must march that night. When I explained to him again the order of the Japanese Medical Officer, I was severely beaten with bamboo sticks by the Corporal and five of his men. During this beating Major Bruce Hunt stepped in front of me and showed the Japanese his Red Cross Arm band. They struck him on the hand and broke a finger in his left hand; they threw him to the ground by ju jitsu and struck him on the head with bamboo sticks. The 22 sick men then voluntarily walked across the road calling out that they would not see their officers treated in this fashion. Three of them were carried back into the Staging Camp half an hour later having collapsed on the road and the Australian Chaplain died at the next camp after the march. I myself was ordered by the Corporal to stand to attention all night as a punishment. The three officers who witnessed the episode were Lt. Col. S.W. Harris, O.B.E., R.A., Lt. Col. C.T. Hutchins M.C., R.A., and Lt. Col. F.J. Dillon, M.C., R.A.,

56. On approximately 4th May, 1943, I arrived in Konkoita Staging Camp with the above three Lt. Colonels. I saw there several palm roofed huts

which were filled with several hundred Asiatic labourers suffering from cholera, as diagnosed by our own Medical Officers. I saw a party of approximately 500 Australian P.O.W. accommodated in the immediate vicinity of these huts on ground contaminated with faeces deposited by these coolies and heavily infested with flies.

57. The same evening I arrived at Lower Nieke Camp which was the first Headquarters of the Japanese Lt. Col. commanding F. Force. The same evening I went with Lt. Col. Harris to see the Jap Commander of F. Force. Lt. Col. Harris said to him in my presence, "Unless you bye-pass Konkaita Camp where many hundreds of coolies are suffering from cholera and allow the P.O.W. to sleep on the roadside rather than in that contaminated camp, you will infect the whole of F. Force with Cholera. As an alternative I suggest that the whole march of F. Force should be stopped for the time being". The Japanese Lt. Colonel did not agree and I know for a fact that everyone of the thirteen marching parties of F. Force was compelled to spend at least twenty four hours in Konkaita Staging Camp in the conditions I have described.

58. A few days later while I was still in Lower Nieke Camp, an Australian Medical Officer came to me and said "I have a cholera case on my hands this evening". Within the next three weeks, we had 1,500 cases of cholera in the six labour camps occupied by F. Force. To deal with this, as the Japanese had failed to bring up any medical supplies beyond those which we had carried for 300 kilos ourselves, we had only one cholera box. We P.O.W. saved the lives of about 600 of those who suffered from cholera by improvising cholera sets from pointed splinters of bamboo joined by rubber tubes from Doctors' stethoscopes to bamboo containers into which we put a mixture of stream water and table salt.

59. The conditions under which I saw F. Force during May/October 1943, were that almost every man who could stand on his feet was taken out to work from before first light until after sunset by the Railway engineers of the Japanese Army. I saw this happen in Nieke, Sonkurai, and Upper and Lower Sonkurai camps during this period. I myself knew scores of British and Australian troops who had not seen their camps in daylight for several months.

60. The monsoon rain broke during this march early in May 1943 and from then until early October 1943, rain fell almost continuously. The road was a rough jungle track capable of being used by motor vehicles only during the dry season. Conditions during the last six stages of the march were quite appalling as the men had to walk all night in pitch darkness through deep mud, heavily laden and carrying their sick comrades on improvised stretchers. Except for a few tents at Tarsoe no shelter whatsoever was provided at the 15 Staging Camps between Bampong and the final destination. Food supplies on the march consisted of inadequate quantities of rice and vegetable stew and there was insufficient drinking water. At Kanburi Staging Camp the P.O.W. had to buy their drinking water from the Siamese.

61. All the men were completely exhausted by this march of 300 kilos. The men who had started off sick had become seriously ill and even the fitter men had worn themselves out by carrying their weaker comrades. The destination of F. Force was six labour Camps spaced out along the road in thick mountainous jungle over a distance of about 40 kilos just south of the Three Pagodas Pass. These camps from South to North were Lower Nieke, Nieke, Lower Sonkurai, Sonkurai, Upper Sonkurai and Changaraya. I remained in Lower Nieke Camp and was for two months in command of it during the period May 1943 to July 1943. I spent three weeks in Nieke Camp - July 1943 to August 1943 - and from 3rd August 1943, until the middle of November 1943, I was in Sonkurai Camp and visited Lower and Upper Sonkurai Camps on duty at intervals during that time. Also as Lt. Col. Harris' Staff Officer, I saw all the official correspondence which passed between him and the senior British and Australian officers in the other camps and as interpreter I was in daily contact with the Japanese Officers, the Japanese and Korean guards and the Japanese

Railway Engineers. I can state that living conditions and treatment of P.O.W. in all these camps were approximately the same.

62. These six Camps contained large huts for the troops built of bamboo. These consisted of two split bamboo platforms each 12 ft wide running the whole length of the hut on either side of an earthen passageway. When F Force arrived in these camps in May 1943, none of the huts had roofs and material for roofing them did not arrive for several weeks. No roofing material was ever received in Lower Nieké Camp during May to July, 1943, except some rotten leaking canvas and enough atap palm to roof half of one hut. In consequence of this thousands of P.O.W. spent several weeks during the continual monsoon rains without any covering except their own clothing or banana leaves. The Japanese and Koreans always had good accommodation for themselves.

63. By the middle of July, 1943, that is to say about ten weeks after leaving Singapore, out of 7,000 men more than 1,500 had died and only 700 were still going out to work of whom half were sick men themselves. I stated the facts myself at that time to the Japanese Lt. Col. Commanding F. Force. All the remaining members of the Force were by then lying sick in the various camps except for a small number employed on medical and administrative duties. By November, 1943, seven months after leaving Singapore, 3,000 men had died out of the 7,000. In January 1944, at Changi, Singapore, I acted as interpreter for two Japanese Medical Officers conducting a medical examination of 3,000 members of F. Force who had returned from Siam in December 1943 or had since had six weeks complete rest. Out of the 3,000 the Japanese Medical Officers were able to find 125 fit for light duty only. At this time another 900 men of F. Force had been left in Siam either as too sick to survive four days in the train or as medical and administrative personnel in charge of them.

64. On 3rd August, 1943, I arrived in Sonkurai Camp and went into the largest hut in which over 700 P.O.W. were lying sick. It had no walls, the roof was leaking and a stream of water was running down the earthen passageway. These 700 men were packed as closely as they could lie with their bodies touching one another from end to end of the hut on the split bamboo platforms on each side of the passageway. They were clothed in rags, were very thin, and few of them had any blankets. In the middle of the hut about 150 men were lying together suffering from tropical ulcers. I saw some ulcers which extended from the ankle to the knee; in many cases the shin bone was visible. The stench of rotting flesh was overpowering and the dressings used were largely banana leaves wrapped round with puttees. 270 men died in this hut in August, 1943. During this month I went almost daily through this hut with a Korean guard to take morning roll call. It was a common sight to see a dead man lying among the live ones and I regularly saw from six to ten dead bodies lying outside the hut awaiting disposal having died during the night. They were then wrapped in a mat and slung from a bamboo between two men for carrying to the cemetery. Of the 1,600 British troops who marched into this camp in May 1943, more than 1,200 were dead by November 1943. I stayed myself in this camp for 3½ months.

65. In September, 1943, I was informed by the Japanese Officer in command of Sonkurai Camp that an order had come from the Regiment of Engineers for whom we were working that this hut must be evacuated and that the 700 sick men in it were to be put out into the jungle. He told me that the reason for this order was that so few men were going out to work and that the hut was going to be filled with Asiatic labourers who would arrive by the end of the week. They did in fact so arrive, but by a lucky chance I had succeeded in getting this order cancelled and they were accommodated elsewhere.

66. The work on which the P.O.W. were engaged at Sonkurai from May 1943 to October 1943, was the construction of a heavy timber bridge

across a river gorge. This bridge alone cost the lives of over 1,000 P.O.W. in six months. Working hours were invariably from first light until long after dark. One morning I remember the working party coming back into camp at 0230 hours and leaving again for work at 0630 hours. The working party used to stand in rags in the rain at the morning parade. Few of them had boots and trench feet became almost universal through working for such long hours in the mud. Over 100 men also worked in a quarry where their bare feet got cut and these cuts frequently turned into tropical ulcers. At the morning parade, the number of men appearing for work was always less than the Japanese demanded owing to the large number of sick. I recall that in early August, 1943, the total number of men in Sonkurai Camp was about 1,200 of whom less than 200 were able to go out to work. In order to make up the numbers at the morning parade, Japanese engineers used to look at sick men from the Hospital and generally took some of these out to work as well in spite of the protests of our medical officers, which were made through me as interpreter. I have seen sick men carried out to work by their comrades and many in the working party could only walk by poling themselves along with a bamboo. They called themselves "the Gondoliers".

67. The reason that so many of us were in rags was that during the seven months we were in the jungle we received no boots from the Japanese and no clothing except one pair of cotton drawers called "Tojo step-ins". We also received 1,000 sacks between 7,000 men to use as kilts and blankets. The result was that P.O.W. were constrained to go to work barefooted, hatless and wearing shorts or loin cloths only.

68. The P.O.W. were subjected daily to frequent beating and other ill-treatment by the Japanese Engineers under whom they worked. These beatings were not for disciplinary purposes, but intended to drive men to work when they were already below the physical limits of their endurance from under-nourishment and sickness. P.O.W. officers always accompanied their men to work and attempted to protect them from ill-treatment. They were frequently beaten themselves for doing so. I remember protesting to the Japanese Lt. Colonel in command of F Force in Sonkurai Camp in September, 1943, that a British Major had been beaten five times that day by the Engineers for trying to protect his men. As interpreter it was my duty to intervene whenever men were being beaten in the Camps where I was or to protest to the Japanese Officer whenever beatings were reported to me by the victims. I had to perform this duty on a great number of occasions and even several times in a single day.

69. In about October, 1943, the railway line was laid through Sonkurai Camp by A Force along the cuttings and embankments and over the bridge we had made. I saw a Japanese engineer standing on the railway truck in which the wooden sleepers were stacked. A continuous line of P.O.W. were walking up to this truck from which each pair of men lifted a sleeper and carried it down the track to lay it. During about ten minutes I saw the Japanese strike on the head with a stick every man who came up to the truck to fetch a sleeper. On another occasion about this time, a British cook in Sonkurai Camp was struck on the head with an axe by a Japanese guard. I showed this man and his wound to the Japanese Officer.

70. In about October, 1943, I received a report from the Senior Medical Officer of F Force to the following effect. On visiting Upper Sonkurai Camp that day on an official visit of inspection he had been informed by the P.O.W. Officer there that for the past week a large hut containing sick P.O.W. had been bombarded at irregular intervals throughout the day with broken rock from blasting in a neighbouring quarry. The sick men in the hut in which the death rate was then averaging about five per day, were in a state of nervous tension verging on hysteria as they never knew when the next blast would come and hurl broken rock among them through the flimsy palm leaf roof. The Senior Australian Officer had made several protests

to the Japanese Camp Commander without success. One man had already received a broken arm from a piece of falling rock and had died a few hours afterwards from a combination of this and his previous illness. Many of the sick men who should have been lying down were sitting upright on their bamboo sleeping platforms holding their sleeping mats over their heads. On hearing this report, I walked from Sonkurai to Upper Sonkurai where I confirmed the Senior Medical Officer's report myself. I noticed that the ground on all sides of the hut accommodating sick men was closely littered to a considerable distance with pieces of broken rock which, I was informed, had been hurled into the camp by these explosions.

71. Among the work which P.O.W. had to do was the lifting and carrying of heavy tree trunks. It was extremely difficult in view of the slippery and sodden state of the ground and the absence of boots. I received many complaints from the P.O.W. that the Japanese engineers frequently used just sufficient P.O.W. to lift a tree trunk from the ground on to their shoulders and would then take away half the men and make the remainder carry it. I have seen this happen myself. In about September 1943, I myself made a strong protest to a Japanese Officer to the effect that on that day while a party of Australians were carrying a tree trunk in this manner, one of them had slipped and the extra weight had been too much for his companions so that the trunk had fallen and killed him. His age was about 18.

72. There were no infirmaries for the sick in any of the six working camps. All sick P.O.W. therefore, had exactly the same accommodation as the others. Operations, including the amputation of 50 limbs on account of tropical ulcers, were generally conducted in the open air under a mosquito net. We made frequent requests to the Japanese to evacuate our sick down to the open plains of Siam by the river which ran through Nieke. During the whole period we were in the jungle this river was being used as the chief line of communication and barges frequently went down it. The river was in fact used for the evacuation of the sick by most of the other P.O.W. working parties south of Nieke. In August 1943, the Japanese informed us that an infirmary for the sick P.O.W. of F Force was to be established at Tanbaya in Burma about 60 miles to the north of us across the Three Pagodas Pass. On their orders we sent about 2,000 of our sick to Tanbaya in open trucks provided by the Japanese. Owing to the circumstances of this journey about 80 of the patients died during it. The so-called infirmary at Tanbaya was only a collection of huts similar to those in the working camps and no hospital equipment was provided except that which the P.O.W. took themselves. Of the 2,000 men at Tanbaya, approximately 800 died during the period August 1943 to December 1943. I was never at Tanbaya myself but know of these matters from the official reports sent to Lt.Col. Harris by the Senior Officers at Tanbaya and from conversations with the latter during the last two years of the war.

73. In November, 1943, all survivors of F. Force except some of the most seriously ill men at Tanbaya, were moved by train out of the jungle and back to Kanburi by the newly completed Railway Line. I myself was in charge of the last 300 men or more at Sonkurai Camp and I was ordered to parade these men by the Japanese Sergeant in charge for entrainment that evening in the Railway cutting, which by then ran through the camp. I divided the men up into truck loads in accordance with the Japanese Sergeant's instructions regarding the number of trucks. The Japanese Sergeant agreed to let me conduct the entraining without interruption from him or his Korean guards. When the train arrived there were 5 trucks less than the number promised and the train itself stopped 100 yards further down the line and the Japanese Sergeant and the Japanese engine driver refused to bring it back to the right position. A large number of my men were on stretchers and most of the others were sick and weak. With these I had to carry all the sick men down the line and put them into the steel box cars. We also had to put into the train a large quantity of

cooking gear, tools and heavy boxes as the camp was being completely evacuated. Although my men were doing their best, the Japanese Sergeant became greatly excited and under his shouted directions all the Koreans started pushing and hitting and kicking the men down the track. The Koreans then forced the men into the box cars and threw the cooking utensils, tools, boxes, etc., on top of them. I myself was violently threatened by the Sergeant when I protested. When the train left I counted 57 men in my own box car who were standing packed so tightly together that we could hardly breathe. Two men were lying on stretchers on the floor among our feet, one of whom had had his leg amputated at the thigh the previous day. This Japanese Sergeant has been sentenced to 4 years imprisonment since the war on my evidence. On arrival of the train at Nieke a few hours later we were successful in reducing the number of men on board to an average of 27 per box car. I saw the Japanese Medical Officer of F Force at Nieke Station and told him that many of the men remaining in the train were so ill that they would die before the end of the journey, which was expected to last 3 or 4 days. He said that that could not be helped and that they must go. I then asked him to order the Korean guards to allow me to bury any men who died. He said in the hearing of the guards, "You are forbidden to bury any of them until you reach your destination". I said that this would mean having stinking corpses in closed box cars with the living men. Three box cars in this train contained 15 men each in an advanced state of dysentery and it was among these that I expected most deaths. The Japanese Medical Officer again said, "It cannot be helped", and I said "You are a disgrace to the Imperial Japanese Army". Seven of my men did in fact die during the ensuing journey from Nieke to Kamburi. The bodies of six of them I gave to P.O.W. Camps at the side of the line for burial and the seventh I buried myself with the assistance of Major Tracey in face of strong opposition from two armed Korean guards. On arrival at Kamburi about three nights later all the sick men were placed on the ground in the open outside the station where they remained from about 2200 hours until about 1000 hours the following morning. It was a very cold night. Several of them were in a dying condition when they were moved to a neighbouring camp where a number of them died within the next few days.

74. The survivors of F. Force remained at Kamburi for about three weeks together with H Force. All except over 1,000 sick men with medical and administrative personnel were then sent in December 1943, by ship and train to Singapore. Two nights before Lt.Col. F.J.Dillon was due to leave with the last party, we were visited in Kamburi Camp by a Japanese civilian of the local Kempeitai. He told us that the Japanese Government had just ordered the Kempeitai to make enquiries in Siam into the treatment of P.O.W. there. He asked us to write a full account of the treatment received by F Force. I was surprised to receive this request, because the Kempeitai were there all the time and knew the facts. On one occasion in September, I had made a protest myself about the conditions in the camps to a member of the Kempeitai, following the suicide of one of my men, which he took down and read back to me. Lt. Col. Dillon wrote a long report that night with some assistance from me and we gave it to this Japanese next morning. In it we summarised the facts I have stated and some of the branches of the Conventions involved. The Japanese came to see us again in the camp and at the Station and thanked us for the report which he said had been welcomed by the Kempeitai Officer at Kamburi, who was forwarding it at once to the Chief of Kempeitai at Bangkok for onward transmission to the Japanese Government in Tokyo. A copy of the report is available and can be produced if required.

75. The belt of jungle in which F Force lived in Siam is extremely unhealthy. The following were the prevalent diseases from which P.O.W. suffered there - cholera, Amoebic and bacillary dysentery, smallpox, typhus, MT and BT malaria, wet and dry beri-beri, tropical ulcers and diphtheria. Of the 3,900 survivors of F Force 95% were infected with malaria during this period. I myself signed several death certificates

with as many as 4 different diseases showing the cause of death of one man.

76. The food supplied to F Force in Siam consisted mainly of rice and beans. The quantity was at times sufficient and at other times inadequate. The quality was very poor. I heard it said by the Japanese that P.O.W. were given the same rations as their Japanese and Korean guards. This was quite untrue during the 8 months I was in Siam. The Japanese and Koreans were regularly issued with tinned food which was not given to the prisoners and when an ox was slaughtered the usual division was half for about 50 guards and the other half for over 1,000 P.O.W. The rice and bean diet was most unsatisfactory for the many hundreds of men who were suffering from dysentery. The appalling ravages of tropical ulcers, which I have seen start from a small scratch and eat away most of the flesh on a man's leg within a few weeks, were attributed by our own Medical Officers to the gross undernourishment of the patients. At no time was anything in the way of hospital comforts received from the Japanese and the very rare issues of medicines which we received from them were insufficient to treat more than a few men among each 100 of the sick. On many occasions I had to protest to Japanese Officers concerning the sliding scale of rations whereby sick men were allowed much less food than even the inadequate quantities allowed to working men until they went out of the camp to do normal labour again. During long periods sick men were getting 200-250 grammes of rice, working P.O.Ws 400 and Japs were getting so much that they wasted it, and were eating about 600. The Japanese frequently stated that their policy was "No work no food". This cruel plan was designed to starve sick men into working. But there was no pretence about their illness and in consequence of this deliberate starvation, many hundreds of them died. For an example, on one occasion Major Bruce Hunt gave me a written note of a conference which he had had with a Japanese Officer concerning the sending of sick men out to work from Lower Sonkurai Camp. The Japanese Officer said, "in the past you have spoken somewhat boastfully about humanity and the Geneva Convention. You must realise that you are our prisoners and in our power and that in the circumstances these things do not apply". Another Japanese Officer when asked by a British Officer how Japan could hope to explain her treatment of P.O.W. after the war replied, "A victorious Japan will not need to explain".

77. I understand it had been stated that outside Japan P.O.W. were not under the control of the P.O.W. department in Tokyo, but under that of the local Army Commanders. This is entirely untrue, at least as far as Malaya and Siam are concerned. In each place there was a P.O.W. Commander who reported direct to and received orders direct from the P.O.W. department in Tokyo, and sent detailed lists of P.O.W. under his command and of deaths occurring among them. The local Army Command controlled the P.O.W. while at work and made demands upon the P.O.W. Commander for the number they required for work, but the P.O.W. Commander was responsible for the camp and general administration of P.O.W. Nominal rolls of the men who died in F Force were compiled by the Japanese Headquarters at Nieké with the assistance of British P.O.W. On the orders of the Japanese Medical Officer, the word "dysentery" when given as the cause of death of many hundreds of P.O.W. was invariably crossed out and the word "diarrhoea" was substituted. These nominal rolls were forwarded at regular intervals by the Japanese to the Headquarters of the G.O.C., P.O.W. Malaya at Changi and these Headquarters at Changi regularly forwarded lists of casualties of P.O.W. to Tokyo. I know this as a fact because the British Captain who was working at Changi for three years or more as an assistant on the Japanese records office told me so. Also a Japanese Lt. Colonel commanding a group of 10,000 P.O.W. in Burma and Siam at this time voluntarily informed me recently that the G.O.C., P.O.W. Siam was responsible for regularly reporting the condition of P.O.W. and their casualties both to the Japanese C-in-C of the Southern Army (Field Marshall Terauchi) and to the P.O.W. Information Bureau in Tokyo.

78. No Red Cross Parcels were received by P.O.W. on the Railway during the time I was in Siam. Some incoming mail was received on our return to Kamburi and we were allowed to write one Postcard, I think, of 25 words while we were there.

79. During the seven months in the Siam Jungle, I was in frequent contact with many thousands of Asiatic coolies whom I saw working there. In fact the men of F Force were normally working beside Asiatic labourers employed on the same work. The conditions of these Asiatics was even worse than that of the P.O.W., partly because they had no organisation of their own such as we Officers maintained among the P.O.W. and partly because the Japanese habitually treated them with the greatest inhumanity and worse than animals. I saw many of these Asiatics in a dying condition and the dead bodies of many of them lying unburied beside the road until the only flesh left on their bodies was the soles of their feet.

80. I left Kamburi by train on 20th December 1943 and arrived back in Singapore on 24th December, 1943. The conditions during this train journey were similar to those on the train journey from Singapore to Siam eight months before, but the effect of these was far worse in view of the broken health of the troops.

81. After we had been back in Singapore for several months four British Officers were sentenced to 9 and 10 years Penal Servitude for an attempt to escape from Sonkurai Camp in June, 1943. Of their party 4 including the leader, a Lt. Colonel, had died in the jungle. I saw the 4 survivors at Sonkurai in August 1943 after their recapture. They were taken from Sonkurai to Singapore where they were imprisoned for several months in Outram Road Gaol in solitary confinement before their trial. On arrival at Outram Road Gaol, the Japanese removed the bandages from the legs of one of them, which were covered with a very large number of ulcers. When I saw this Officer at Sonkurai previously I noticed this Officer could only walk with two crutches. He informed me at Changi after his final release at the end of the war that after the Japanese had removed his bandages they gave him no medical treatment whatever while he was in solitary confinement. In August 1945, as soon as we were informed at Changi by the Japanese G.O.C., P.O.W. Malaya that the war was over, we immediately demanded the release of all the Allied P.O.W. who were undergoing Penal Servitude in Outram Road Gaol. The next day the Japanese delivered to Changi Camp about 90 Allied P.O.W. from the gaol whom I myself saw on their arrival in Changi. They were very thin and weak and suffering from skin diseases, malnutrition and dysentery. Among them was the complete American crew of a B.29 shot down in a raid over Singapore in April, 1945. These Americans had been kept separate from the other prisoners for four months and had been subjected to a deliberate policy of starvation. Changi Camp was relieved by the Allies about two weeks later at the beginning of September, 1945, when I attended the official Japanese surrender of General Itagaki to Admiral Lord Mountbatten.

82. Since I have been engaged in War Crimes in South East Asia Command, more than 300 war crimes suspects have been brought to trial mainly in Singapore. Of these over 100 have been sentenced to death and over 150 to terms of Penal Servitude. About 70 are undergoing trial this month. Most of these war criminals have been brought to trial by the British, some by the Australians and a few by the Americans. The areas in which these War criminals have committed offences are Singapore, Malaya, Siam, Burma, French Indo-China, Hong Kong, China, British and Dutch Borneo, Sumatra, Java and the Andamans. These figures therefore, do not include the large number of war crimes suspects already brought to trial by Australian Courts in the S.E. Pacific, by Dutch Courts in the Netherlands East Indies or by American Courts in the Philippines, Japan and China or by Chinese Courts. I myself have no knowledge of the figures for these.

Records of the trials and convictions in South East Asia are available in Singapore.
