

Extract from Tokyo Gazette, Vol. III, No. 10.

April 1940 Page 396

"Occupation of Hainan Island"

February 10 Hainan Island, off the South China coast, is surprised by the Japanese landing forces under Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo, Commander of the Imperial Naval Forces in South China. Kiungchow and Haikow fall into the hands of the Japanese.

Japanese Consul-General Miura lodges a protest with the Shanghai Municipal Council in connection with continued terrorism.

H. H. Pope Pius XI passes away.

February 13 The House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet consents to Budgetary Bills for 1939, including the Budget for the General Account amounting to 3,694 million yen.

The French Ambassador, Charles Arsene-Henry, makes representations to the Japanese Government in connection with Japanese occupation of Hainan Island.

A treaty of commerce between Germany and Italy is concluded.

American naval manoeuvres commence.

February 14 British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie makes representations to the Japanese Government in connection with Japanese occupation of Hainan Island.


A Japanese naval force occupies Samah, Yulinkan and Ai-hsien in Hainan Island.

The House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet adopts decision to maintain Japan's fisheries rights in Russian waters.

February 17 American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew adopts steps similar to those taken by the French and British ambassadors regarding Japanese occupation of Hainan Island.

Doc. 2647

Trench positions before entry into city
(However, detailing was changed in the
in the early part of March.)



The OSAKA ASAHI Newspaper

Extra No. 2

10 February 1939

Forces landed in the face of the enemy make a bold dash; the flag of the rising sun floating high above Haikow.

Kiungshow too has already fallen. (Announced by the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters at 6:00 P.M. on the 10th).

Forces engaged in the Hainan Island operations were already approaching Kiungshan, the capital of the island and Hainan at 10:00 this morning, and the fall of these two cities is only a question of time. (Announced by the Naval Information Bureau of the Imperial Headquarters).

Outline of the development of the landing operation on the Hainan Island is as follows:

1. The South China Naval Unit under the command of Vice-Admiral KONDO, and the convoy carrying the army units which is cooperating with it left from "X" base on "X" day of this month and arrived at midnight of the 9th at "X" bay on the northern coast of the Hainan Island under the close guidance and protection of the Fleet. The landing units immediately started landing and successfully completed the surprise landing at 3 o'clock in the morning. The wind was rather strong but the sea was calm on this day.

2. The naval escort unit is assisting the landing operation of the landing units and at the same time is handling the sea and air security in the vicinity of the landing point. A part of the vessels, collaborating with the naval air unit, heavily bombarded and suppressed the Siuyang Fort west of Haikow at about 10:45 A.M. During our bombardment, the enemy fort fought back, but we suffered no damage. According to the air reconnaissance of about 11:00 A.M. today, our army units have continued to make rapid advances in all areas, occupied at 10:00 A.M. the Suiyang pier, "X" kilometers away from the landing point and reached Kiungshancheng at 10:45 A.M. The Naval Air Units, responding to the advances of the said army units are attacking the confronting enemy and their rear with all their might and are inflicting considerable damages.

("X" Base, 10th Domei)

According to the air reconnaissance at noon on the 10th, our forces are now advancing along the road between "X" and Kiungchow, and

Document No. 1923-A

the flag of the rising sun is fluttering over Kiungchow and Haikow, the two biggest cities on Hainan Island.

(10th DOMEI)

The advance unit of our landing units entered the city of Kiyngshan, the important base of the enemy on the Hainan Island at 10:45 A.M. on the 10th. Other powerful units also have penetrated into Hainan at 10:00 A.M. and have hoisted the flag of the rising sun.

OSAKA ASAHI SHIMBUN (Extra)

February 11, 1939

The Imperial Forces landed at Chengmai Bay developing operations throughout Hainan Island.

An auspicious occasion of our national fete Inhabitants Steadily
Returning to their Homes

/Press release by Army Section of the Imperial Headquarters/

at Noon, February 11

The Japanese troops who captured Kiung-Shan and Haikow within the first day of landing are today, the 11th, developing their operations in various directions without a moment's rest.

/Haikow special dispatch February 11/

Press release by the Information Section of the Expeditionary Forces in Hainan (at noon February 11)

The warships detailed to Hainan Island entered into Chengmai Bay, breaking through the pitch of the midnight of February 9; at 2:30 a.m. of the 10th, the landing ships were plowing the waves of the bay under the twilight of the crescent moon, and not later than 2:50 a.m. our troops already landed in masse at a point in Hainan Island. With the break of day our troops continued to push forward vigorously in conjunction with the roar of huge naval guns pounding the Hsiuying Fort and the land buzzing of our Army and Navy planes and at 10:40 a.m. their vanguards already entered and occupied Kiung-Shan, the capital city, after putting several hundred of the enemy to rout. Simultaneously both Army and Navy troops occupied Haikow by their close cooperation. The strategic point of Hainan Island was thus occupied by our troops within half a day of their landing, and on their triumphal entry into the city, the inhabitants most of whom had remained there, joyfully welcomed our troops by waving the Japanese flag. At night, electric lights in the city were lit so brightly that it gave no semblance of a new battlefield.

With the sun rising on the following day falling on the auspicious occasion of Kigensetsu, our occupied areas were bedecked with Japanese flags, and the ensigns of our warships fluttering in the wind domineered over Haikow Bay. Inhabitants who had returned there crowded into the streets following on the heels of one another and the dawn of New Hainan Island is just about to brighten.

LANDINGS, BOLD DASHES, TRIUMPHAL SHOUTS, BIG WAR
RESULTS OF BLOODLESS LANDING IN CHENGMAI BAY

At HAIKOW, Special Correspondent TAKEDA dispatched
on February 10.

At last I have just arrived at HAINAN Island, where the Southern Cross can be seen. How many men who adored the sea and dreamed of the sun have been longing from olden times to see this star! In the night sky of HAINAN Island the Southern Cross is at present twinkling through the leaves of coconut trees. The South China Tactical Units have certainly come to a distant spot. The tension which the several ships experienced in advancing silently in line ahead on the South China Sea in the night of Feb. 9, still prevails. Did not our destroyers have to struggle against the rough seas with the men aboard taking no food nor drink due to their being unable to boil rice. It was 12:00 A.M. at Feb. 10, when the grim naval vessels, with all lights extinguished, slid silently into the HAINAN Straits. Our brave marines have gulped their saliva with deep emotion in their ecstasy of this symphony of silence. The sky which was beclouded until now suddenly cleared up and the star-spangled sky came into sight. Sea-winds blow warm and it is like summer of our homeland. Soldiers are murmuring: "It is a clear sky indeed!" "Each of them can be seen distinctly." Then a certain commanding officer mutters: "Just before the first landing in the face of the enemy, I have taken a bath of fresh warm water to-night for the first time since my leaving JAPAN Proper. I really feel fine." Saying so he is enjoying his first bath in 19 days. After the night had passed by in this manner, the military units landed in Chengmai Bay without the loss of even a single man.

Beginning from 5:00 A. M. just before the dawn, the ships of our Navy pointed their guns towards Hsiuying Fort in which the enemy took utmost pride as being a modern fortress. Caught in a tumult by our surprise attack, the enemy fired two shells only to make huge columns of water in the sea. Encouraged by the report of the arrival of the army units at Haikow, the Navy first line, Itagaki unit, after putting on their steel helmets and embarking on steel boats, executed its landing under enemy fire, and after exploiting shoals and mines, they landed at Haikow, the principal city in Hainan Island, on the opposite shore, surrounded by coconut forests and where even some buildings can be seen. In the sky, some naval airplanes are flying about engaged in bombing and scouting. Dense summer clouds are floating in the amazingly clear sky. Sunbeams are shining brightly over us. A soldier who just stepped on the shore, discovering some papaya trees, shouted: "I say, they bear fruits!" He seems to be perfectly unconstrained. Beneath the flags of Britain, America, France and third powers which are flying in the thick growth of trees, the marines exchanged emotional smiles with the Army soldiers who had overcome the marching and intense heat since their landing.

The occupation of Hainan Island was achieved by the men of both the Army and Navy forces who are as vigorous and strong as the tropical plants which are growing thickly in the island.

The spirits of the soldiers are running higher than ever in this southern island of everlasting summer.

→ Thanks to Grace of Heaven
as told by Army Authorities.

Regarding the successful landing operations on Hainan Island, the Army authorities stated on February 11 as follows:-

"The present landing on Hainan Island was executed successfully, resulting in bloodless landing and capture, under perfect secrecy regarding the movements of our forces from the eyes of the Chinese as well as from the network of the third Poers' intelligence service, thanks to our efforts made, in consideration of the experience with the Canton operation of last autumn, in keeping our operation in secret by confining the liaison staffs in charge to an extremely limited number.

We cannot but profoundly thank our entire nation as it may be said that while this success is partly due to the laborious pains taken by the parties concerned, it is in a large measure ascribable to the proper understanding on the part of many of the civilians who took part in the current operation, and to the restraint and self-consciousness of our nation. The key-point of operations lies in making a drive in betrayal of what the enemy anticipates; and for this purpose our plans as well as our military strength should be kept completely secret. Regarding this point we, the Army authorities, earnestly hope that the nation will deepen its understanding on the matter in the future, and thus accomplish its end.

Everyone believes that our operations have been always backed by the grace of Heaven.

Hainan Straits, the spot of our present landing operations, is so intensely foggy that even a single vessel can hardly steam through without much difficulty; incidentally, it is even known as the Sea of Evil Spirits. That our group of transports could sail safely without any hitch and enter into the places of anchorage as scheduled; and that we were able to accomplish a no-blood landing, was only due to the timely wind which had driven the mist away. We have to be thankful to Providence because it was nothing but the Grace of Heaven that, although a wind was blowing the sea was nevertheless not rolling high so that the landing was executed without experiencing any inconvenience whatsoever.

X { Thunderous Roaring of huge shells and bombs
from sea and air shakes the southern China
Seas--One hour's fighting. An account of the
battle regarding the occupation of Hsiuying Fort.

(Dispatch by special correspondent TAKEMORI aboard a certain warship, February 10)

The Army unit which landed at a certain point to the west of Haikow,

passed speedily through Kiung-Shan, the principal city in Hainan Island, at 11:30 A.M., Feb. 10, and at noon accomplished the complete occupation of Haikow. During this operation, the Naval unit which had been fighting with the enemy fort in cooperation with the military force, finally effected a dramatic liaison between the Army and Navy forces after they had silenced the enemy by their vigorous attack, and had skillfully surmounted the difficult voyage on the shoals of Haikow harbor.

At 7:00 A.M., Feb. 10, the main strength of our naval vessel unit advanced side by side with the military forces, aiming at the capture of Hsiuying Fort, situated to the west of Haikow Harbor, and which suddenly opened fire on us yesterday evening. From this time on, the dense fog began to gradually clear up, and a slightly elevated hill on the opposite shore, which looked like Hsiuying Fort, could be seen distinctly even with the naked eye. A certain number of Navy planes took off with a load of bombs and flew with a sweep towards the Fort on seeing that a certain flag-ship and other warships set in row, displaying their majestic features ready to open fire.

With the firing of the huge guns of a certain warship, a glorious three-dimensional attack was started by the naval and air forces. The very moment that a horrible roaring and the shock of firing were heard, fiery shells whizzed with a roar through the air. On watching the opposite shore, ~~black~~ ^{thick} black smoke columns rising sky-high as the shells hit their targets, and our naval aircraft, without a moment's interval, dived low into the enemy positions, each turning its nose towards the ground; then instantly a volume of black smoke rose up again in the thick clouds, and the explosion went off with terrific report as if it were breaking up the sky of Southern China.

Against our fierce attack the enemy was impudent enough to begin returning fire and the whizzing sound of shells grazed over the deck of a certain warship.

In the black smoke, we saw a lightening flash, then in a second or two there arose a water spout with the sound of waves between certain warships, only to disappear in an instant. After about one hour's fighting the enemy was completely destroyed by the attack from sea and air.

At that time, certain units of marines who had been in readiness, embarked on a certain number of a certain type of ship and began to push into the air from the sea, and taking advantage of the exceedingly calm sea, they advanced, pushing their way up the stream of the Nan-Tu River, at the entrance of Haikow Harbor, with the naval ensigns in bright display! Lo and behold! the Army vanguards, bearing the sun-flag can already be seen marching on their way to Haikow city. The upstream unit speeds its way along the waterway so as not to lag behind. The lofty building of the only department store in Haikow City already stands just in front of us. They at last landed at the city at noon, thereby effecting the complete occupation by contacting the Army forces. New sand lies scattered about here

"Six that they're almost clear ship."

and there on the pavement as the enemy had stopped half-way in the construction of several anti-tank moats, thereby manifesting how the enemy had run away helter-skelter. The city is surprisingly quiet and calm, and crowds of dazed refugees are looking up to the Imperial troops. The enemy is continuing his flight and has lost his fighting spirit altogether.

Chungking Government is Stricken

—(Domei Hongkong dispatch of Feb. 11)

According to a report from a foreign source in Chungking, the Chungking Government authorities cannot conceal the fact that they are fairly panic-struck in spite of their ostensible attempt to maintain a calm attitude at the sad news of the landing on Hainan Island by Japanese forces followed by the occupation of Haikow and Kiung-Shan. It seems that the Government authorities are at present racking their brains so as to devise some excuse, as usual, in order to obtain the sympathy of Third Powers by spreading particularly exaggerated propaganda about the international relations regarding Hainan Island.

France Sends Two Squads of Reinforcements to Reconstruct Chiang's Clique's Air Force MANOEUVRE FOR SAKE OF SOUTH CHINA INTERESTS

Our Army of Justice has been making advances as well as chastising the anti-Japanese Chinese by engaging in hot pursuit of the enemy and carrying everything before themselves in the Southern area since the day when it set foot on Hainan Island. France, who had been extending its powerful influence there, has suffered unexpectedly heavy damages by the present attack and feels very uneasy, all the more so as the French have been relentlessly bleeding the local inhabitants.

It is said that the Right wing party in France has already started to run a strong opposition against the policy of the French Government. Since around the end of last year, the Chinese Government, taking advantage of the said situation in France, had been trying to receive aid from the French Government for the reconstructing of her own air force which was on the verge of complete destruction.

According to information received by a certain reliable source, this campaign already has been making steady progress and has become realized in the following form.

About November of last year, Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched a cable instruction to Kou, Ambassador to France, to secure as many aircraft pilots as possible in France proper. On receiving the cable instruction, Wellington Kou worked upon some influential French persons, and secured the cooperation of Mr. Cotte, former Air Minister, who was deemed to be the leader of the Pro-Chiang group, and continued his activities for obtaining pilots. It is reportedly stated that he succeeded recently in having two squads of Pro-Chiang air force units despatched to China. One group (the advance party) commanded by Roland /phonetic/ ex-lieutenant-colonel of the French air force,

"He def claim we love the army Hata -
Even the Japs could tell them apart -
they were all the time getting them mixed up."

experienced in actual warfare by having participated in the previous European war, left Marseilles by French boat with 18 members at the end of last year. Lt.-Col. Roland had been acting as adviser on aircraft to Schneider, the famous munition company after he had been placed on the reserve list. The second group, commanded by the famous civilian pilot Baumgarten /phonetic/ ex-Major of the French air force, with a total of 16 members, has already left by the "Carturan" /phonetic/, a French vessel, from Marseilles for Saigon in the middle of January. It is reported that another group commanded by reserved air major Audier /phonetic/, ex Major of the French air force, with over 10 members will also leave on Feb. 17 from Marseilles for Saigon.

It seems that Chiang Kai-Shek is laying his vain hopes on these French air squads as he could not expect any aid from the Soviets who are too busily occupied recently in expanding their own air force.

France also recognizes the military necessity of Japan. The occupation of HAINAN Island and the Powers (FRANCE) /Paris special dispatch, Feb 10/. Owing to the three reasons i.e. the demise of Roman Pope, a great event for the Roman Catholic countries; the acute development of the Spanish trouble; and the recent inclination of adopting an amicable attitude towards Japan by the French diplomatic authorities. The news of the Japanese occupation of HAINAN Island is not being given much prominence by the press in Paris. They only commented that France rather regrets that this operation had been executed without any advance information to France who has great interests there despite the fact that Japan had informed Germany and Italy on the matter. Special mention is made of the Japanese previous declaration that Japan entertains no ambition for INDO-CHINA.

Special attention might be called upon the following comments made by the "Journal" dated February 11 as it in a large measure reflects the views of the French diplomatic authorities:

"The only thing that came to the French Government as a shock is the fact that the Japanese occupation of HAINAN Island was effected without any advance notice given to France. As the Island occupies an important position by holding the key of TONKING Bay, France has been entertaining a desire towards Japan since the beginning of the China Incident to give France a notice in advance in case Japan takes military operations there. The occupation in itself has been insisted for its necessity in the Japanese Diet even by the parties which are deemed to be different in their views from the military authorities. The trouble relates only to the problem of smuggling of arms which involved the trouble concerning the question of the agreement for Mr. TANI, candidate for the Japanese Ambassadorship to FRANCE. The occupation of the Island is nothing but a step aimed at cutting off the railway communication between HAIPHONG and YUNNAN which have so far been left as the only entrance to CHINA. Despite the guarantee given by the French Government, JAPAN has not been satisfied in regard to the smuggling of arms via INDO-CHINA. Considering from the standpoint of International Law, the occupation of HAINAN Island is not illegal because it was only compelled by military necessity. FRANCE has no intention to make any official representation because JAPAN has only given us a pledge on HAINAN Island but has not concluded any treaty with FRANCE there on. The attitude which FRANCE should take is to merely watch the development of the situation just like ENGLAND, who feels danger at HONGKONG. FRANCE and BRITAIN are in perfect alignment in respect of their interests in the Far East.

(BRITAIN) London special dispatch Feb 10.

Regarding the landing operations on HAINAN Island executed by Japanese forces. Among others in the London Press, firstly the "Standard", an evening paper of Feb 10, quoted a TOKYO cable of U. P. - Reuter and the explanation of FOREIGN UNDER-SECRETARY BUTLER made in June last year in the House of Commons, who revealed the opinions of BRITAIN and FRANCE that the occupation of HAINAN Island by Japanese troops would cause undesirable trouble, and that should such trouble unfortunately occur, the ENGLISH and FRENCH Governments would probably adopt mutual measures to ensure security in accordance with the situation. However, as almost all the space of the newspapers, is filled with the news about the demise of the Roman Pope, the problem of HAINAN Island does not seem to attract the various attention of the public.

The "Times", however, reports on Feb 11 that HAINAN Island is an important strategic point, and although Navy Minister YONAI stated in the Diet on the 8th that JAPAN possesses no intention of establishing a naval base in CHINA, the word "CHINA" used in this case would seem to refer to the China Continent and seems to exclude the various islands belonging to CHINA, and reports that the occupation of HAINAN Island is a matter of concern to all naval powers. Moreover, this paper seems to be concerned over the fact that the statement of the Japanese naval authorities have not given any clear guarantee on the point that the occupation is of a temporary nature; also that Japan obscures the future of the occupation, as Rear-Admiral KANAZAWA states that this occupation would possibly be continued until the termination of its strategic necessity, whereas Chief of the Intelligence Section KAWAI contends that, as JAPAN's action is aimed at destroying the Chinese military strength on HAINAN Island, it has no relation with the treaty between JAPAN and FRANCE for the guaranteeing of peace. Moreover, the matter is reportedly of great concern both for BRITAIN and FRANCE, as one of the objects of the present operation is regarded to be the preventive of the transportation of munitions passing through INDO-CHINA, and, according to a Paris report, there are views that support the need of reconsideration of the problem of the national defense of FRANCE.

At any rate BRITAIN is about to decide her attitude after a thorough consideration as to what relation the situation which the Japanese operation has brought out between the interests of BRITAIN and FRANCE and the guarantee previously given by the Japanese

Government that JAPAN had no territorial ambitions on HAINAN Island.

(U.S.A.) (Washington Special dispatch Feb 10)

The news of the landing on HAINAN Island executed by Japanese forces is not attracting so much attention as the capture of CANTON last Autumn, due to same being crowd out by the news of the demise of the Roman Pope, but the "New York Times" and others contain detailed news in the matter by styling same a bold movement.

According to the observations of the authorities in WASHINGTON, FRANCE might not go further than merely lodging a protest in case JAPAN should not install permanent defense preparations on HAINAN Island, and BRITAIN would most probably back up FRANCE in her protest, but not bring pressure to bear upon JAPAN for this.

They also seem to observe that the U.S.A., having fewer interests when compared with BRITAIN and FRANCE, will most probably not attempt any gesture towards JAPAN, although JAPAN would be seemingly menacing the PHILIPPINE Islands from HAINAN Island and FORMOSA as the result of the occupation of HAINAN Island.

It is said that advocates of large-scale military preparations and the anti-Japanese element in Congress may make use of the landing on HAINAN Island by the Japanese forces as a good reason for expediting the strengthening of defenses on Guam Island.

~~place~~
Tribunal today ~~opened~~ Japanese aggression antifrend indochina
~~presented by~~ French Prosecutor read opening statement

Language barriers snarled Tribunal today necessarily two
45 minute delays stop. French prosecutors read opening
statement in French with ~~so~~ approval Tribunal of Japanese
aggression antifrend into Clira stop - although French
translated into English via headphones Sirinellum Webb worried
at language frenal usage - stop. at once Joseph Keenan american
chief prosecutor said refusal to permit French would be quite
discriminatory. unquote. para

Septimom Will reversal stand say re prosecution quote
the Court insist on use of Cyril throughout unquote when
French Robert Oneto repeat Robert Oneto announce French
prosecutor rose to explain court adjourned forty five minutes
early stop. this third three quarters hour delay today para
Oneto told Reuter court sudden reversal of decision
since smearing language use quite very surprising as friend
recognized diplomatic for centuries stop. at that the not question
of timesaving ~~stop~~ the trial ^{one} historical event unquote para
became here outpoint that ~~this precedent~~ although an
effort to force this sets precedent as session phase uncover
next stop. all judges except ~~which~~ at Russian understand English stop
this could be sign of provincialism ex

(Hague at 5 days) intentional - part. reverse stand - Bot
(well frequently Kramers)

Imperial Troops hold first grand parade at Canton.
Military Glory Enhanced on Auspicious Day.

(Canton, Special Correspondent SHIATSUCFI, despatched Feb. 11).

On Feb. 11, the fete day of KIGIN SITSU (annual celebration of the founding of Japan) the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Southern China held a grand parade for the first time since the capture of Canton to celebrate the landing and drive on Hainan Island, thereby demonstrating the military strength of the Imperial Army to the inhabitants who had returned to the city.

The Army units started their march at 10 a.m. through the principal streets, including PAIWA Middle Road, PAI AI West Road and LUNG-CHIN Road, then reaching the Bund they crossed over the SWAMEN River and continued to march on triumphantly, with the CHUKIANG River in sight to their right glittering in the everlasting summer rays, and through the streets closely lined with numerous tall buildings. The citizens who crowded along the streets waving sun-flags cheered and admired the orderly marching of the Imperial troops.

Marine units on the SWAMEN River gathered at the lower stream side of HAICFU bridge and started their cruise at 10:00 a.m., flying sun-flags in the breeze, for the upper stream under the command of the unit commander KOYAMA, and turning back from the upstream of the SWAMEN, entered into the southern channel and, turning back proceeded to the gathering place passing under the HAICFU bridge.

(Certain number of Army planes flying about in the ever bright sky of Southern China gave a strong impression to the streets of revived Canton.

On Feb. 11, the day of KIGIN SITSU (annual celebration) In this way the epoch-making grand parade of the Army, Navy and Air Forces came to a complete end at noon. Since the capture of Canton to celebrate the landing and drive on Hainan Island, thereby demonstrating the military strength of the Imperial Army to the inhabitants who had returned to the city.

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China Press raises voice of alarm trying to agitate Third Powers.

(SHANGHAI Special Dispatch, Feb. 11).

The Chinese newspapers in Shanghai have reported the landing of our troops on HAINAN Island with great prominence simultaneously in their morning issues of Feb. 10 by adding comments thereon all of which represents propaganda towards foreign countries as follows:

"The occupation of HAINAN Island by Japanese troops does not affect in the least the actual resisting power of the Chinese Army in the future. There is no influence to be felt by the Chinese Army by the occupation, as the Chinese Army has never utilized this Island as a military base.

"On the other hand, JAPAN will hereafter probably find herself placed in an extremely grave situation as a result of the Japanese occupation of HAINAN Island because JAPAN has ventured on this action in wilful violation of the treaty concluded between JAPAN and FRANCE in 1907. Moreover, the occupation of this Island by Japanese troops cuts off the SINGAPORE-HONGKONG route and serves also as a serious menace to the PHILIPPINES.

"In short, the action of the Japanese forces is not aimed at dealing a blow to CHINA but in reality, constitutes nothing but a challenge to BRITAIN, the U.S.A., and FRANCE."

By this it may be seen that they expect BRITAIN, the U.S.A., and especially FRANCE to make some kind of demonstration against JAPAN, and are seizing this opportunity in clamoring for the putting into action of effective international aid.

(DOMEI, SHANGHAI, Feb. 11.)

According to a CHUNGKING despatch, the military authorities of the CHIANG regime, who are concealing the severe blow suffered by them and who are unwilling to acknowledge their defeat by the occupation of HAINAN Island by stating that the Japanese

occupation of HAINAN Island does not have the least effect on their long-term resistance policy, announced on Feb. 10, the following opinion, and are frantically endeavoring to appeal in a hurry to FRANCE and the other Powers:

"The spokesman of the Japanese Government states that the Japanese landing on HAINAN Island is an action of strategic need, but this is utter nonsense. The securing or loss of HAINAN Island would in no way affect the development of the warfare on the China continent. If we should seek any significance from the landing of Japanese forces, we may say that it possesses strategical value in that it brings pressure upon the various ports of FRENCH INDO-CHINA and also cuts off HONGKONG and SINGAPORE, and some reactions of Third Powers against the present Japanese bold action can, therefore, be expected.

"Especially between JAPAN and FRANCE there exists a treaty concluded in 1907 for the integrity of Chinese territory. Furthermore, Mr. DALADIER, French Prime Minister, has recently delivered a speech stating that FRANCE should protect the integrity of Chinese territory.

"There exists too, however, the fear that the European situation may somewhat affect the French attitude concerning the occupation of HAINAN Island. Moreover, as the National Government of CHINA has never installed military bases on HAINAN Island, the Japanese occupation will have extremely little effect on the future of the war between JAPAN and CHINA. On the other hand, we consider that the Japanese forces have been compelled to exhaust their strength extraordinarily by having encountered the stiff resistance of the volunteer defense units on their way towards accomplishing the complete capture of the said island.

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Document Relative to the Maneuvers
for Total War.

August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.

Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 2

11 June (16 SHOWA) 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for total war,

IIMURA, Yuzuru

We have decided on the enforcement plan of the first
theoretical maneuvers for total war for 1941 as per the
attached.

(partly revised on 11, July)

Attached List of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war,
No. 2.

The Enforcement Plan of the First Theoretical
Maneuvers for Total War.

Month	Date	Day	Morn- ing	After- noon	Term	Imagi- nary	The Outline of Operations	Remarks
June	Middle		Delivery of problem		The first phase of man- euvers	Inter- nal & Exter- nal situa- tions	The following personal work are given to all of the post-gradu- ates: 1. The in- vestigation of our na- tional policy. 2. strateg- ic plan- ning for total warfare. 3. The judg- ing of situa- tion neces- sary for the above.	The maneu- will be di- rected most by the assi- stant super- visor MATSUDA. 2) Each mem- ber of the Bureau will give neces- sary in- structions.
		end				main- tain their pres- ent condi- tion.		
July	first							
July	middle		Delivery of problem.		The second phase of man- euvers	"	The principle organs of Blue land will be con- stituted by all of the post-gradu- ates and they will be re- quired to do the following work: 1. The	All the mem- bers of the Bureau will participate in directing the maneu- vers accord- ing to par- tial charge (designated separately).
		end						
August	middle							
		and						
		last						

					planning of total war strategies. 2. Preparations for the development of total war strategies.	Review-period.
Sept.	4 Thurs-day	Judgement	Third Term of Maneuvers.	The period of trained national relations.	Imaginary situation is given to the principal organs of Blue land, & the management of the situation will be studied. 1) Completion of preparation for total warfare within and abroad. 2) Preparation of armed warfare. The directing of psychological and economic warfare. 3) The decision for war. 4) The directing of total war after this decision. 5) Directing the outbreak of war. 6) Directing of total war immediately after the outbreak of war. 7) Directing of total warfare during wartime according to circumstances. 8) The maneuvers will be suspended on the morning of the 20th.	Henceforward the maneuvers will be directed under the following organization: 1) Supervisory Div. Super-Head 2) The judging division for armed warfare. 3) The judging division for diplomatic warfare. 4) The judging division for psychological warfare. 5) The judging division for economic warfare. 6) The judging division for international situations. (Note) The respective divisions constitute of the members and part-time member of the Bureau and government officials outside the Bureau. The particulars will be decided separately.
	5 Fri-day					
	6 Satur-day	Judge-ment off	The Fourth Phase of Maneuvers.	The period of trained national relations.		
	7 Sun-day	Holiday				
	8 Mon-day					
	9 Tues-day	Judgement	The Fifth Phase of Maneuvers.	The period when war is inevitable.		
	10 Wednes-day					
	11 Thurs-day	Judgment	The Sixth Phase of Maneuvers.	Half a month after outbreak of war.		
	12 Fri-day					
	13 Satur-day	Judge-ment off	The Seventh Phase of Maneuvers.	A month after.		
	14 Sun-day	Holi-day				
	15 Mon-day					
	16 Tues-day	Judge-ment	Eighth Phase	Three months after.		
	17 Wednes-day					
	18 Thurs-day	Judge-ment	Ninth Phase	Six months after.		
	19 Fri-day					
	20 Satur-day	off				

Sept.	21 Sun- day	Holiday	Tenth	1) Drafting of criti- cism.	
	22 Mon- day	Judgement	Phase of	2) Prepara- tions for the Research Meeting.	
	23 Tues- day	Holiday	Maneu- vers.		
	24 Wed- nes- day			1) Research Meeting.	Outside officials
	25 Thurs- day			2) Criticism (After this the maneuvers will be concluded.)	will be requeste to parti- cipate in the meet- ing.
	26 Fri- day				
	27 Satur- day		The arrange- ment of	1) The arrange- ment of the results of the maneuvers.	The arranger
	28 Sun- day	Holiday	the re- sults of the	2) Research for the future.	of maneuve records, and the arrangemen of the re- sults of research by each member of the Bureau
	29 Mon- day		the maneu- ver.		
	30 Tues- day				

Remarks:

- (1) Judgment stands for judgment conference.
- (2) Graph shows the operation of all the members concerned.
- (3) The prescriptions for the carrying out of maneuvers and the principles of instruction (items for investigation) will be decided separately.

Prescriptions for the Execution of
the First Theoretical Maneuver for
Total War.

Part I. The Object of the Maneuvers

Article I. The object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-graduates of this Research Bureau practice definite measures for total warfare, as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing researches on it as superior executives.

Article II. The following are the principal items which should be studied and practiced during the maneuvers:

- 1) The national policy and object which should be propagandized within and abroad.
- 2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire.
- 3) The points in drafting part of the various plans necessary for the execution of total warfare.
- 4) The main points of consolidating and strengthening positions for total warfare.
- 5) The outline for directing total warfare.
- 6) Part of a definite policy for the execution of psychological, economic and diplomatic warfares against a specific country.
- 7) Directing organs for total warfare, and directing organs for psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare.
- 8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution of total warfare by Japan.

Article III. The particulars of items for investigation and practice mentioned in the preceding articles are prescribed separately in the outline of maneuver instructions.

Section IV.

Article 9. When the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvers are over, the Supreme Commander will comment on it for the benefit of those who participated in the maneuver.

The main points on which comments will be made are approximately as follows:

1. Whether the plans set up beforehand were suitable or not.
2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or not.
3. Whether ex post facto research was carried out properly or not.
4. Whether proper discipline was maintained during the maneuvers or not.
5. Instructions for the future.

Article 10. Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimated situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term maneuvers), each umpire department shall submit materials for comment to the Supreme Commander. Each umpire department, however, must adjust beforehand the opinions of the umpires belonging to that department regarding the materials for comment

The draft of the comments shall be made by the critics' council. The members who are to attend the council meeting shall be specially designated.

Section V. - Gathering the Results of the Maneuvers.

Article 11. Each staff member of this Institute shall, depending on his assignment, arrange and preserve the records of the maneuvers as well as the opinions, etc., on the items for research and matters which should be improved concerning the plans of the maneuvers, or report them to other organizations which require such information.

Section VI. - Specific Symbols.

Article 12. In order to preserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations and places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers:

A. U. S. A.	B. Britain	C. China
D. The Soviet Union	E. Dutch East Indies	F. French Indo-China
G. Australia	H. Hawaii	I. India
J. Inner South Sea	K. Canada	L. Central & S. America
M. Manchukuo	N. Japan	O. Borneo
P. Philippine Islands	Q. Malay	R. Far Easter Regions of the Soviet Union.
S. Singapore	T. Thailand	
U. Vladivostok	V. Burma	
W. Aleutian and Alaskan regions	X. The Axis Powers	
	X ₁ , Germany.	
	X ₂ , Italy.	

Program for directing the Third to Ninth Term Maneuvers, inclusive, in the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

The Term of Maneuvers	Imaginary Time	"Date of Enforcement Date (Day)"	Hour	Functions for directing the maneuvers	The assembled empires	The principal maneuver items.
Third Term	August 16 Shawa 1941	6 Wednesday	08:30	The opening of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation for the third term. Explanations concerning the Empires will follow in the same way.	C scope	(1) Negotiations with A and the economic demands thereof.
			09:30			
		7 Thursday	09:30	Secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country to the supervising section.	D scope	(2) The reply to A and D
			13:00 14:00			
The Fourth Term	September	8 Friday	08:30	The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism regarding this. Discussion of the situation for the Fourth Term.	A scope	(3) The preparations of war against D and (A).
			10:30			
			14:30 15:00			
		9 Saturday	11:00	Secret report to the supervisors of the general policy of the Blue country.	C scope	(1) Continuation of No. 1 in the preceding term.
The Fifth Term		11 Monday	08:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 September. The criticism regarding this. Announcement and explanation of additional situations.	D scope	(2) The response to A concerning the "A" Treaty.
			10:00			
		12 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of September. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation for the fifth term.	A scope	(3) Measures against the stiffening attitude between A and N.

The Fifth Term (cont'd)	September	12 Tuesday	14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation	C scope	(1) The reply to X.
	October	13 Wednesday	09:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against the suspension of the commercial relations with A, B, E and L.
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 October. The criticism regarding this. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope	
The Sixth Term	November	14 Thursday	08:00 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Oct. The criticism thereof. The announcement and discussion of the situation of the sixth term.	A scope	(3) Measures in regard to the resolution to advance into E.
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the sixth term.	C scope	
		15 Friday	10:00	The secret report to the supervisory section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	
			14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Nov. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.	B scope	
	December	16 Saturday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Nov. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the seventh term.	A scope	(3) Measures for commencing the advance into E.
			13:00 13:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the seventh term.	C scope	
18 Monday		10:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope		
		14:00 15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Dec. The criticism thereof. The announcement of the additional situations.	B scope		
19 Tuesday		08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Dec. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.	A scope	(3) The measures in accordance with the outbreaks of war between N and A, B.	

Doc 1622

The Eighth Term

From
January
to March
17 SHOLA
(1942)

20 Wednesday

14:30
15:00
10:00
14:00
15:00

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the eighth term.

The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Feb. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.

C scope

D scope

B scope

- (1) The measures against the air-raid on Tokyo.
- (2) The measures towards the diet.
- (3) The measures towards D and L.
- (4) The economic and political measures towards E, F, T, P and Q.

21 Thursday

08:30
10:30

The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of March. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.

A scope

From
April
to
October

22 Friday

14:30
15:00
10:00
11:00

The announcement and explanation of the situation of the ninth term.

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of June. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.

C scope

B scope

B scope

D scope

- (1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term.
- (2) The measures in relations with D.
- (3) The resolution of war against D.
- (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country henceforward.

The Ninth Term

23 Saturday

08:30
09:00
12:00

The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.

The presentation of the works of each participant. Maneuver to be stopped.

REMARKS:

The assembled judges: A scope - all the judges if possible. B scope - the principal judges of each section. C scope - the concerning judges of each section. D scope - judges having special concerns.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 3

No. 098 of the 100 volumes

24 July, Showa 16, 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for the total warfare:

IIMURA, Yuzuru

(1) The Situation. As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Command of the Government on July 24th regarding the strategy of total warfare, we have agreed on the following unanimously.

1. Blue land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancing into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 5

(Secret)

No. 98 of 120 volumes

Designated Distribution	
Maintenance of Secrecy	only for those concerned with the maneuvers.
Disposal	To be returned on conclusion of the maneuvers

The 1st Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War for
1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Report on Activities in Regard to the Subjects
Given for the Second Term of the Maneuvers.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propagandized internally and abroad.

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land.

Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Government of Blue land

(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau)

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3 of No. 13 -- Total War Table Top Maneuvers (plan)
 August 23, 1941 (submitted at 0830)
 Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers
IIMURA, Minoru

Additional Situations and Problems of
 9th Period Maneuver of First Total War
 Table Top Maneuvers.

I. Situations up to the latter part of September 1942.

1. The Cabinet meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D and the military operations were commenced on August 1. Substantial fighting occurred in many places along the M-D frontier, but thereafter there has not been a great resistance. As a result of speedy pursuit by N army, a greater part of the Far Eastern army and a large part of its navy and air forces were destroyed and the important area of "R" was occupied and secured by the latter part of September.

D retired its front and has declared long-term resistance, but its sustaining power is doubtful.
 (pp. 13-10 - 13-11)

- - - - -

7. The great offensive by X against D and B since the spring gained conspicuous effects correlative to N's operations, but is not yet decisive. The present situation does not allow anyone to make any assumption as to the conclusion of the world confusion. (p. 13-12)

Part II Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land

Classification I - Programme for Total Warfare for the Blue land (plan)

No. 1 - The object of total warfare

- (1) The object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as well as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East Asia.
- (2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A, B (including E) and C (Chungkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D.
- (3) The center of the Greater East Asia Sphere is comprised of N, M and C, R, V, and the areas east of them, also the areas north of G (G itself exclusive), and those west of 180° East Longitude enter into the Greater East Asia sphere. (p. 21001)

No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Total Warfare

- (1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C Incident according to established principles; while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be completed and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately wars with other hostile countries.
- (2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing of materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures.

However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the circumstances demand. When a war with A and B becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and declare war. We will exclude their influences in East Asia, and at the same time endeavor to make them give up their hostilities against us.

(3) Regarding the North, we shall by force of arms facilitate X's disposal of D; and supervise the fulfillment of the neutrality pact between N and D. We shall devise economic advancement by diplomatic means, and avoid armed warfare as far as the situation allows. However, if it is inevitable according to the situation, we shall resort to arms.

(4) Through cooperation with X, we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with her, while completing every possible preparation for an initiative war against A and B as a precaution against A's participation in a war with X.

(5) Thereafter, we shall decide on our different plans in accordance with the transitions in the situation, thereby anticipating the achievement of the purposes of total warfare.

The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare

1. Against C. By avoiding the expansion of occupied areas, we shall execute repeated and active armed actions against the Chungking Regime to destroy her armed power. At the same time, we shall take measures to deprive her people of their will to fight by destroying her establishment and strengthening our economic blockage of her. In the presentation of war against other hostile countries, the principles enumerated in the preceding article shall be strongly maintained in the hope that the consequences will contribute to the surrender of Chungking Government.
2. Against F and T. The spirit of joint defense with F will be strengthened. When the attitude of T is unfriendly towards N, and she does not comply with our demands, and also when A and B try to exclude our influences in T we shall make military advances into T.
3. Against E. If E's attitude towards N is to be aggravated and especially if she refuses to supply us with the necessary materials, we shall make military advance on a favorable occasion with a resolve for war with A and B. In case a war with A and B is inevitable, we shall advance into E.
4. Against A and B. If a war with A and B becomes inevitable, in the event of, for instance, A participating in the war against X, or A completely cutting off all commercial relationship

with N, or danger of armed collision with A and our country, or N being threatened with military invasion by A, we will take the initiative in starting a war and immediately occupy P, Q and E, thereby strengthening our strategic and economic situation; and at the same time, we shall plan to destroy the enemy's military power and to make them abandon their hostilities towards us.

5. Against D. We shall strengthen our defense against D in North M. Although we shall avoid as far as possible any armed warfare until our move in the South is finally concluded, we shall occupy the strategically important areas in R by executing armed warfare at a favorable occasion; that is, when D is near collapse in the D-X war, or when D is about to take hostile action against N, or when A tries to make military advances into R, or whenever war becomes inevitable under any other condition.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 10

No. 98 of the 120 volumes.

14 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

(delivered at
1430)

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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers
for Total Warfare

IIMURA, Yuzuru

The circumstances and subjects for the Sixth Phase of
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

- (1) The circumstances in the middle and end of November.

A. The international situation.

1. With the approach of the severe cold of winter, the D-X war is gradually nearing a stalment in the areas east of the River Don, Moscow and Leningrad.
2. There is not much change in the BX war except that there is an indication of advance towards the Suez and Gibraltar.
3. There is also no great change in the A-X war. It seems part of A's forces in the Atlantic seem to have commenced a move to the Pacific. A declared war against X on the 1st of November.

4. Although the A, B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense programs with what troops they have stationed in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propaganda activities to divert N's movements. Part of Blue land's plans seem to have been intercepted by A, B and E.
 5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propaganda activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A, B and C.
 6. Although conditions in the R district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either to M or A.
- B. The conditions of the supreme command and the army.
1. The supreme command of Blue land desires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible.
 2. The preparations of the supreme command for action against E is now under progress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3

No. 98 of the 120 volumes

15 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

Supplementary situations for the sixth phase of the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare.

Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of November.

- (1) The troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 November; and after making sudden attacks, they have secured effectively several important areas in E. (Names of places and the war situation stated orally, now and hereafter.) The casualties of the Blue land are slight.

- (2) E has declared she will "resist to the utmost the invasion of N", and is asking for the aid of A and B. Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually being pushed back by Blue land's army. Of the economic installations in the territories of E Country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been exposed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent.
- (3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as follows:
- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Vessels | 80,000 tons |
| Crude oil | 210,000 kilolitres |
| Ordinary benzine | 97,000 kilolitres |
| Heavy-oil | 186,000 kilolitres |
- (4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A. It seems that a part of A's naval forces in the Atlantic are being rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N, the true intention of the government is not clear.
- (5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own.
- (6) _____ thousand soldiers and _____ thousand tons of vessels have been newly mobilized in preparation for operations against A.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 16

No. 98 of the 100 volumes

28 August 1941.
(SHOWA 16)

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Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

The Criticism of the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

In concluding the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare, I shall hereby state my opinions regarding the important matters in the maneuvers, and thereby contribute to future researches by participants.

The first term of the maneuvers

- (1) Although I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their presentation of their

studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations. I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration.

At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours were short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies.

- (11) In the third period of the maneuvers the diplomatic policy of the government of Blueand is to take advantage of the noticeably easier contemporary international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and I am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain the object of the measures by diplomatic means. For instance, in our relation with A and B, I think it was a failure of ours to have taken a diplomatic policy aimed at evading war with them.
- (12) In the third period of the maneuvers, I think the judgment that the proposition of A resulted from its weakness is appropriate, but I cannot approve of a passive diplomacy based on the propositions of A. We should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by taking advantage of her weakness and presenting positive proposal of our own. Therefore, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthening the relations with N and X.
- (14) In the fifth period of the maneuvers a more careful and deeper consideration will be necessary in the advance into E. For instance, we should not concentrate merely on the period concerning the completion of preparations. It will be necessary to make a thorough-going investigation into our knowledge of the general trend, the limit of our present aim, the mutual cooperative relations of the political and military strategies just before the advance, the actual domestic situation and the policy concerning them, etc.
- (15) Concerning the judgment on the ability to execute war against A, B and E, it was an attempt at a partial outline only as it was restricted by shortage of materials and time, but, to this extent I acknowledge it to be a comparatively fair work, and I especially approve of the sincere attitude taken in the investigation.

However, in reality, we must carefully study the material scope and connection of military and civilian needs in all phases, such as labor and material, static or dynamic, as well as to plan all these as an overall geographic unity involving N, M and C, and from the standpoint of time including the whole length of the war. Moreover, the assessment of the period until the commencement of all the activities in the above plan is insufficient and is altogether too short.

- (16) The cooperative activities of the political and military strategies prior to the advance into E are gravely insufficient. After the decision is made for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic, psychological and economic warfare should be actively developed under a single policy so as to facilitate operations. That is, to put A and B off guard, to facilitate their individual destruction, and to catch E napping to get a chance for a sudden attack. In particular in order to complete the concentration of the nation's total power by keeping the plan secret and imaginary, it will be necessary to develop for a plain and definite object all the activities of the total power of a united nation.
- (18) It is wrong to have treated lightly the matter of declaring war on A and B under the circumstances in the last stage of the sixth period. It will be necessary to study carefully whether there can be no last measure to avoid war with A and B, and to consider prudently the serious results arising from the outbreak of war, although it must always be kept in mind that there is advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.
(Note) In order to facilitate study, we have executed this maneuver on the supposition that N's participation in the war by virtue of the NX treaty is not automatic.
- (19) However, I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circumstances detaining in the early stages of the seventh period maneuvers. There has been a rapid development in the situation, and the intentions of A and B towards N have become clear. The general situation demands our finding independently a way out of our impasse. Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders as we do today. This must be considered a good chance to make our decision for starting war against A and B.
- (20) The measures taken by the Government of Blue land on the basis of the studies made beforehand by the Second Committee about the measures to be taken toward foreign countries in connection with the outbreak of war, were as a whole quite suitable.
- However, there is still room for study in regard to war aims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of troops and peace terms) and representations to X about not concluding a separate peace.
- (25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had been generally expelled from the EPQ districts and the main force of A's army had been destroyed, I think it was necessary to study and determine the policy for the subsequent direction of the war against A and B.
- (26) It is good to note the improvement in the way you assessed the national strength in the war against D compared with that of the war against A and B, but I desire to see further creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency measures to cope with the situation at a time when the national existence is at stake.

W. D. C. No. _____
I. P. S. No. 1622

Statement of Source and Authenticity.

I, Rempei Kuriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated August, 1941, and described as follows: File re "First Table Top Maneuvers", published by Total War Research Institute and marked "Top Secret"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Rempei Kuriyama
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Hiramatsu, Kajumichi

Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt AUSMI

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 5 June 1939 1940 hours
 Arrival 5 June 1939 1515 hours
 No. 235 of 5 June

Most Urgent!

For the State Secretary.

Secret

Re: Telegram No. 232 of 3rd.

*May with
US-Br
agreed to
6/5/39*

The Deputy Minister for War confirmed to me that the Army and Navy had come to an understanding. However, he added, weakening, that the army had not prevailed in all matters. Informant of the Foreign Ministry let me know that the Premier and the Foreign Minister have assented to the understanding, forwarding of which to BERLIN and ROME is impending. Participation in the war against ENGLAND and FRANCE has been conceded, though still with certain reservations by which JAPAN wishes to secure the right to choose a favorable time for entering the war. The steps taken by the powers in KULANGSU as well as the speech by MOLOTOV did not fail to make an impression on the navy and has resulted in certain progress which, however, the informant believes to consist more in wording than in substance. He added that the corps of younger officers in the navy shares the army's new standpoint, and that the trend of politics along with the attitude of the powers is working in the direction of our wishes.

Today's DOMEI report according to which the Prime Minister has lectured to the Emperor on the guiding principles of JAPAN's European policy and that the Foreign Minister is to be authorized to carry out the measures resolved upon, enables one to perceive the government's intention to stress the significance of the understanding.

OTT

Top Secret!

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4034 D.

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus

Doc. No. 6910

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RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND THAILAND
AGGRESSION AGAINST FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

OPENING STATEMENT

ROBERT ONETO
Associate Prosecutor
for FRANCE

Assistants: Major Roger DEPO

Lt. Louis MERIE

Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal:

We shall now present that phase of the case dealing with Japan's act of aggression against France and French Indo-China and show how Japan planned, prepared, initiated and waged a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances. This evidence will relate to Counts 1 to 5, and even more particularly to Counts 15, 23, and 33 of the Indictment.

It will be proved that Japan deliberately included French Indo-China in the territories which she wished to conquer, in order to realize a triple aim: to accelerate the conclusion of her military operations against China; to direct her policy of expansion towards Southwest Asia; to seize the riches of Indo-China, especially rubber and rice.

We will demonstrate that Japan decided to carry out this program by the use of force and that by 1939 the policy of war with France had been established.

We will set forth the circumstances and means by which Japan put these designs into execution by taking advantage of the military reverses in France and the weakness and isolation of Indo-China and the manner in which this policy of oppression was put into effect with the close cooperation of Germany, thus giving practical expression to the Tri-Partite Pact which had just been concluded.

I.PREPARATORY PERIOD

French Indo-China occupies a strategic position of the highest importance in Southern Asia. Her northern frontier skirts the southern frontier of China and joins that country with Siam and Burma, thus establishing a line of communication with Peiping, Hankow, Canton, Hanoi and Bangkok.

On the other hand, French Indo-China is the focal point of territories in which Japan was equally interested. These were Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch Indies and the Philippines. French Indo-China, therefore, constituted a naval and aerial base highly advantageous to the future expansion of Japan towards these territories, especially for sudden military attack. Lastly, Indo-China being rich in the production of rice, rubber, and other raw materials was of vital assistance to Japanese economy in her preparation for war.

If these facts are assembled and considered as a whole, it is clear that the territory of French Indo-China was of great importance to Japan in her plan of action and this importance increased as the Japanese Army advanced into Southern China where fresh difficulties were encountered each day.

The ever growing clouds of war in Europe diverted the attention of the Western Powers and, seizing her opportunity Japan advanced step by step in the direction of French Indo-China.

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On the 10th February 1939, the Island of Hainan was taken by a surprise attack and occupied. In reply to the protest raised by the French Ambassador, the Japanese Foreign Minister, HIROTA, stated: "The occupation is one dictated by military necessity both in its nature and duration and Japan has no territorial designs on the island". The occupation of that island, in the close vicinity of the coast of Tongking, constituted a permanent menace to the security of North Indo-China.

Doc #683

On March 31, 1939 the Spratley Islands, a French possession off the eastern coast of French Indo-China, were occupied by Japanese troops. An official communique of the Japanese Foreign Ministry explained this action in the following way: "The desire of the Japanese Government is to avoid any quarrel with France".

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The success of these operations convinced the Japanese Government that the use of force was efficacious and they decided that, in the future, this should be the means by which they would assure the hegemony of Japan in the Far East.

On the 5th June 1939, OTT, German Ambassador to Japan, notified his Foreign Ministry in Berlin that the Japanese "are agreed to participate in a war against England and France, but with certain reservations by which Japan wishes to assure herself of the decision of the favorable moment for entry into war". This favorable moment was soon to appear.

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II.AGGRESSION AGAINST AND OCCUPATION OF NORTH FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Since 1937 Japan reproached France with allowing the traffic of war material destined for the Chinese Army of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek to pass through the territory of Tongking. Having blockaded the Chinese coast, the Japanese Government intended to isolate western and southern China from neighboring countries whose lines of communication could still send help to the Chinese Army. This was particularly true of French Indo-China where the Haiphong-Lungchow and Haiphong-Kunming Railways provided excellent means of reaching the provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi.

The protests of the Japanese Government about this state of affairs became stronger in 1939 and were repeated in 1940. Over this matter, however, France acted in conformity with the resolution of October 6, 1937 adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, which "expresses its moral support for China and recommends that members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China".

Between August 1939 and February 1940, the Japanese bombed the Yunnan Railway in North Indo-China, killing and wounding many people, while simultaneously a violent campaign of threats was launched in the press and on the radio.

The military reverses in France in June 1940 brought Japan her "golden opportunity" and on June 19th, 1940 Japan requested Germany to give her a free hand in Indo-China and thus disclosed her true intentions towards this country. On the same day, through the medium of the French Ambassador in Tokyo, Japan demanded that the Indo-China frontier be closed in order to prevent the transportation of gasoline by road and of certain other materials by rail; also that Japan be permitted to place Imperial officers along the frontier to ensure that it remained closed. The acceptance of these demands was requested for the evening of the next day, June 20th, 1940.

This was the first ultimatum that Japan delivered to Indo-China. At that time, Indo-China had only a small armed force at her disposal and owing to events in Europe it was impossible for her to obtain support from the other democratic powers who were anxious to avoid a conflict in the Far East. For these reasons, General Catroux, then Governor-General of Indo-China, was compelled to comply with the Japanese demands which were as follows:

1. The sending to Indo-China of a Japanese Commission which would supervise all the operations of rail, river and air traffic into China.

2. Total closing of the frontier between French Indo-China and China, both ways. This provision, applicable to merchandise of all kinds, was temporary.

The Japanese Mission, under General NISHIHARA, arrived in Hanoi on 29 June and immediately set up control centres in Haiphong, Ha Giang, Lao-Kay, Cao-Bang, Lang-Son and Fort Bayart.

On August 2nd, 1940 MATSUOKA, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in the KONOYE Cabinet, transmitted an ultimatum to the French Ambassador in Tokyo as follows: "The Japanese General Headquarters considers as vital necessity the pursuit through French Indo-China of the hostilities against China. Consequently, the Republic of France is hereby requested to give assistance to the Japanese armed forces by agreeing to their passage through the province of Tong-King; the use of airfields in that province; the stationing of the necessary garrison of troops and also the provision of facilities for the transportation of arms and ammunition".

The ultimatum pointed out that if no immediate answer was received, the Japanese Government would feel compelled to order their army to obtain right of way by the use of force.

The support which would enable French Indo-China to resist Japan's unjustified demands could not be obtained from any of the other Powers which were France's Allies, and owing to the military debacle in Europe it was equally impossible for France herself to send any assistance.

On August 30th an agreement was reached between MATSUOKA and the French Ambassador, Charles Arsene Henry, on the following terms: Japan would obtain, temporarily, exceptional military facilities in Tong-King, the terms of which were to be settled at a later date by joint agreement of the French and Japanese military authorities. In this agreement, concluded on September 4th, 1940 the Japanese Governmen

gave its assurance that it would respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East and especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereign rights of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

The events which followed showed in true measure the flagrant way in which the Japanese leaders violated their obligations as soon as the Agreement was signed.

The military agreement was to become effective only after the approval of the governments concerned, which might necessitate a certain delay. The Japanese Government anxious because New Caledonia and New Hebrides successively joined General De Gaulle, wanted to settle, without delay, the terms permitting the passage of their troops through Indo-China. Following fresh demands, an ultimatum was presented on September 19th to the Governor-General of French Indo-China by General NISHIHARA. In the course of a visit made to him on September 20th, 1940 by the Ambassador of the United States, MATSUOKA was obliged to acknowledge the fact.

During all these negotiations, MATSUOKA on numerous occasions requested the German Government to support the Japanese demands by bringing pressure to bear on the Vichy Government. At the same time, perfect synchronization was established between this diplomatic pressure and the military duress exercised on French Indo-China.

The Japanese forces manifested their impatience and on September 6th, 1940 a Japanese batallion crossed the border,

while on the night of September 20th, 1940 more Japanese forces penetrated into the region of Dong Dang. At the same time, the claims of Siam and the disturbances caused by her along the border of Laos caused the French troops to disperse. After having in vain launched a fresh appeal to the Government of the United States, Indo-China was compelled to yield to force on September 22nd, 1940 and agree to the Japanese terms.

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On the same day, September 22nd, the Japanese Army started the attack on the Tongking border. This constituted the first act of military aggression committed by Japan against French Indo-China. One division, including armour, after storming the isolated outposts of Dong Dang, Pho Binh-Gea and Than-Moi, besieged the citadel of Lang-Son, which can aptly be described as the bolt of the border of French Indo-China.

On September 26th the Japanese forces bombed the harbor of Haiphong. The French forces, deprived of all help, were overcome a few days later after stubborn resistance. Japan's aims were reached. Despite that resistance and those losses, Japanese propaganda spoke of "Friendly and peaceful penetration into Indo-China", and termed the battle of Tongking a "local skirmish due to a misunderstanding".

The Japanese military aggression had been successful by taking the frontier of Tongking by surprise; by attack-

ing Lang-Son, the bolt of this frontier, they had rendered impossible further resistance in Indo-China.

Lacking personnel and war material; forced to divide its troops to meet the double threat of Japan and Siam; deprived, in spite of numerous appeals, of all external aid, French Indo-China was compelled to give way to force.

France was thus the first of the Western nations to fall a victim to Japanese aggression.

The acts of violence which, at a later period, were to be repeatedly carried out by Japan, were the consequence of this aggression.

III.THE SIAMESE AGGRESSION.

Informed of the weakness of Indo-China's power of resistance, encouraged and supported both diplomatically and materially by Japan, Siam considered the time favorable to put forward her claims against Indo-China.

On June 12th, 1940 Siam signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression with France, but refused to ratify it as soon as the armistice in France was known, and at the same time started a campaign of claims on certain territories in Cambodia, Siam Reap, Battambang, etc. and also on a part of Laos.

In July 1940, the Siamese Army was concentrated on the frontier of Cambodia and on August 19th Marshal Pibul Songgram, Minister of Foreign Affairs, disclosed the territorial claims of Siam. On September 28th, Siamese planes bombed French troops in Cambodia and land, naval and aerial hostilities continued until January 1941.

Without even attempting to conceal the help given to Siam, Japan signed a Treaty of Friendship with her in December 1940 and transferred 38 fighter planes and 25 bombers to her. Japan then intervened to impose her mediation and the conclusion of an armistice.

Japan had, from the beginning of the French-Siamese hostilities, taken advantage of the circumstances to land important contingents of troops in Hanoi and Haiphong in January 1941, and these units were further strengthened during the truce between France and Siam. It was, in fact,

under constant coercion that the French delegation had to negotiate in Tokyo and this coercion was particularly exercised through the presence of Japanese warships in the Gulf of Siam.

In a report to the throne, General USHIROKU, Supreme Commander in South China, explained the preparation for operations in connection with the Japanese mediation: "On February 4th, in conformity with the General Headquarters' indications, we have given careful consideration to the case that we may be obliged to exercise our armed force against French Indo-China in accordance with the future change in the relations between Japan and French Indo-China. One district army (Japanese garrison in Tongking, Indo-China) had collected information, established plans of operation and completed the liaison with the Navy in order to leave nothing to be desired in the preparation of operations, imposing a silent influence, thus contributing to the Japanese mediation".

A record of the session of the Privy Council of July 3rd, 1941 is also significant. In the course of that sitting, Councillor ISHII manifested his joy over the Japanese mediation, which he termed a "diplomatic victory". Councillor FUKAI, although he agreed, made, however, the following reservations which laid stress on the pressure to which France was submitted; he stated that he also shared the opinion of ISHII but "to look upon ourselves as the stabilizers of East Asia may mean nothing but to be taken by a third country as a symbol of an aggressive policy".

Negotiations having failed, MATSUOKA summoned the French and Siamese delegations on February 24th and handed them a new plan of mediation, stating that this was the final plan and that there could be no further discussion on the matter.

An answer was expected on February 28th at the latest. That plan was rejected by the French representatives. MATSUOKA threatened to reconsider his whole policy on Indo-China and to denounce the agreement of August 30th, 1940.

On March 11th, 1941 the French Embassy accepted the solution imposed by Japan. The terms of the letter of acceptance showed in their true light the methods by which the French agreement was obtained to a plan proposed by the Imperial Government to unconditional acceptance by the French Government.

"The French Government is ready in the present circumstances to comply with the Japanese insistence even though neither the local situation nor the fortune of arms compel it to abandon the benefit of the treaties freely negotiated and concluded with the Siamese government".

The solution of the conflict imposed by Japan represented a cession of territory of some 69,000 square kilometers and 334,000 inhabitants, while claims formulated by Siam, previous to February 7th, did not exceed a territory of 23,000 square kilometers and 64,000 inhabitants. Moreover, Japan imposed the establishment, under Japanese supervision, of demilitarized zones.

On May 9th, 1941 an agreement was signed in Tokyo but, in payment for its good offices, Japan imposed a protocol of political guarantee and understanding. "Japan guarantees the final and irrevocable character of the French Siamese settlement. France binds herself to conclude no agreement, concerning Indo-China, with a third power which might imply political, economic and military collaboration involving direct or indirect opposition to Japanese interests".

IV.TOTAL SEIZURE OF INDO-CHINA.

The occupation of north Indo-China had enabled Japan to bring an end to the substantial help given by French Indo-China to the armies of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek.

The plan to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere included British and Dutch territories and to realize this plan, the total occupation of Indo-China was essential.

The conquest of the southern part of Indo-China was necessary for the next stage in Japan's military operations, but the anti-Japanese sentiment which existed there, coupled with the sympathy for General De Gaulle's Government, caused Japan considerable anxiety. This anxiety was alleviated when she occupied the country.

The decision to acquire military positions and to advance into southern Indo-China, even against the opposition of the French authorities, was expressed on July 14th, 1941 to the Vichy Government through the medium of the Japanese Ambassador.

The Japanese Foreign Minister gave detailed instructions to the effect that the Japanese troops would advance on July 20th, 1941 and said: "If the French accept by then it will be a peaceful advancement; if not, an armed advance". In effect, on July 20th, the Vichy Government was informed that, whatever the decision of the French authorities, the Japanese Government was determined to carry out its plans.

The French answer was expected in Tokyo on July 22nd at 6 o'clock but the Japanese Government stated that their troops would cross into Indo-China regardless of the contents of the French answer.

This was the ultimatum with which Indo-China was confronted at a time when she stood alone and was unable to rely on any help from the outside.

The Vichy Government, under the duress of Germany and pressure from Japan, complied with these demands.

Japan obtained the right to send into Indo-China the troops, as well as the naval and air units, which she considered necessary. Thus, the plan for the complete occupation of Indo-China by the Japanese was realized and Japan obtained the necessary springboard for a rapid attack against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.

On July 28th, 40,000 Japanese landed in the south of Indo-China but, as early as the end of September, Tokyo announced its intention of sending 50,000 men into Tongking by October 5th, 1941. The negotiations then in progress between Japan and the United States temporarily halted this plan. On December 8th (Japanese time), 1941, the precise day of the attack against Pearl Harbor, and immediately after the French National Committee of General De Gaulle declared a state of war against Japan, the latter nation imposed a new military agreement upon Indo-China which completed the Japanese control over the occupied territories by her military, naval and air forces.

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The same agreement ensured Japanese control over all means of communication, broadcasting systems and information services. Japan was, from that moment onwards, the master of Indo-China.

AGGRESSION AND ECONOMIC PLUNDER.

The occupation of the north and later of the whole of Indo-China was to allow Japan to realize her economic ambitions in this country. Under cover of making this territory an integral part of the Co-prosperity Sphere, a methodical system of control, absorption and economic and financial plunder was to be established and developed in an ever increasing manner.

This operation was to be effected in true Japanese fashion, under the cloak of bilateral contracts which would appear to give equal benefit to both parties. In reality, the result of these agreements was to confer the lion's share of rights to the aggressor.

The Pact of Establishment and Navigation of May 6th, 1941 followed by the Laval-Mitani financial agreement of January 20th, 1943, which established a special yen currency, were the principal means by which the aggressor was to realize his aims.

We shall further explain how Japan virtually imposed payment for the costs of occupation under the qualifications of a loan. We shall also set forth under what conditions Japan forced Indo-China to deliver certain raw materials, especially rubber, using Germany as an instrument of pressure on the Vichy Government.

VI.THE SITUATION IN FRENCH INDO-CHINA DURING THE LAST PHASE OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC.

Finally, in the early part of 1945 the Japanese forces were held in check on all fronts, - North Pacific, the Philippines and Burma. In French Indo-China, however, this period was marked by a whole series of incidents provoked by the excessive demands of the occupying power.

In order to consolidate her position and to prevent any revolt being attempted by the local resistance movements combined with the landing of allied forces, the Japanese government took fresh military measures in Indo-China. These measures were decided upon during a conference of the Supreme Council of War, February 1st, 1945.

On March 9th, 1945 the Japanese Ambassador handed an ultimatum to the Governor-General of Indo-China at Saigon, stipulating that the Japanese Army should have complete command of all the French Armed Forces in Indo-China and sole administration of all means of transport and communication. This ultimatum, which was remitted at 1900 hours, was to expire at 2100 hours.

The rejection of this ultimatum brought about the immediate intervention of the Japanese army, which launched a surprise attack against our troops. At the same time, the various French authorities were arrested and replaced by Japanese staffs which had been formed in advance.

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During the days which followed, while French elements continued to resist, a series of measures taken by the Japanese abolished French sovereignty throughout the states which composed the Union of Indo-China. From this moment onwards, deprived of the protection of their own authorities, the French and native population were subjected to lawlessness and violence.

The French prisoners of war and the civil population were the victims of atrocities throughout the whole territory. The worst massacres took place notably at Lang-Son, Thakkek, and Ha Giang. These facts are mentioned merely as a reminder, they pertain to Part 3 of the Indictment and are contained in a later part of this phase.

These events prove that the Japanese Government paid no heed to the solemn warning which the Government of General De Gaulle addressed to them on April 11th, 1945. This warning held the Japanese governmental authorities and the High Command definitely responsible for any attempt on human life and for any acts of violence against the security of the French and Indo-Chinese populations. It was also declared that any individual held responsible for such acts and convicted of the same would be considered and treated as a War Criminal.

During the days which followed, while French elements continued to resist, a series of measures taken by the Japanese abolished French sovereignty throughout the state. From this moment the Union of Indo-China. From this moment the French and native populations were subjected to lawless-ness and violence.

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These events show that the Japanese Government paid heed to the warning which the Government of General De Gaulle addressed to them on April 11th, 1945. This warning held the Japanese governmental authorities and the High Com and definitely responsible for any attempt to human life and for any acts of violence against the unity of the French and Indo-Chinese populations. It was also declared that any individual held responsible for such acts and convicted of them would be considered and treated as a war criminal.

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AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

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"Business Report of 1939 published by the Board of South Seas 1941".

/p.31/ Section 3. The China Affair and French Indo-China.

/pp 31-33/ Item 1. The readjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and French Indo-China in regard to the bombing of the Yunan Railway and the transport of munitions via French Indo-China.

(a) Japan's decision to bomb the Yunan Railway.

Our negotiations with France for prohibiting the transport via French Indo-China of munitions destined for Chiang-Kai-shek were continued from the previous year. Our side patiently and prudently urged time and again reconsideration of the matter by the French so that the issue might be settled peacefully by voluntary measures from the French. However, the French while speaking of maintaining strict neutrality in the China Affair and of enforcing a policy of prohibiting the transportation of arms destined for Chiang Kai-shek, tolerated the transportation via French Indo-China of large quantities of arms for Chiang Kai-shek, which would promote Chiang's resistance powers on the pretext that such goods had been already contracted for. To our representations of displeasure of October 26 of the previous year, the French not only denied the fact of arms transportation, but also refused to adopt the measures we demanded, declaring that this was a definite answer. In the final analysis, the situation was such that our side had no alternative but to bomb the Yunan Railway. In the beginning of December 1938 the Japanese Naval authorities, stating that, whereas they had recognized some time ago the operational necessity of bombing the Yunan Railway, asked for this Ministry's opinion in order to draw up a united plan of the Navy and Foreign Ministries in regard to this case on the occasion of the transfer of the high officers of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in South China. Thereupon we immediately studied the various conditions, such as the legal question of defending this bombing, the efficacy of the bombing, and its influence on our international relations, especially on the attitude of France. As the result of inquiring into its advantages and disadvantages, we reached the following conclusion: that the fact that the Yunan Railway is being used for the military purpose of aiding China justifies under international law its bombing by our side, and, our country will not be liable to indemnity for its destruction; that the operational and political effects of the bombing will be very great; and that the influence it will have on France and also Britain and the United States will not necessarily be alarming. After obtaining the approval of the

of the Minister, Chief ISHIZAWA of the Third Section of the European and Asiatic Bureau replied orally on December 9 to Lt. Commander KAMI of the Navy Ministry as follows:

"As for the Foreign Ministry, it considers that there is no objection to the bombing of the Yunan Railway within Chinese territory in so far as the Army and Navy require it from an operational standpoint."

At the same time SUGIMURA, Ambassador to France, was advised by telegraph to that effect and instructed to explain the justification for the bombing and make appropriate rejoinders to any protests which the French might make in case the bombing was carried out.

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/pp 33-35/ (b) The growth of opportunity for adjusting Franco-Japanese relations in the light of the serious war situation in Europe.

As stated above, the Franco-Japanese negotiations regarding the issue of the transportation of arms via French Indo-China had come to a standstill. Moreover, the relations between the two countries had been lacking in harmony over various issues which had been pending since the outbreak of the China Affair, such as the /French/ rejection of the agreement of our Ambassador to France, our occupation of Hainan Island, the declaration of our possession of the SHINNAN GUNTO, our territorial claim on the Paracels Islands, and the prohibition of the export of iron ore from French Indo-China. However, since the conclusion of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, and especially after the outbreak of the European War, the attitude of the French Government and people toward Japan had greatly improved. This tendency was manifested not only in the editorial tones of the French press, but in the acts of the French Government, which at the end of August hastily acceded to our demands on the three pending issues, namely, the export of iron ore from French Indo-China, the establishment of a Japanese consulate at Noumea, and the passage through French Indo-China of the regular air-line between Japan and Thailand. Furthermore, in the early part of September France, saying that she heartily wished to arrive at an understanding with Japan on the basis of their traditional peaceful policy, sounded our opinion about the initiation of Franco-Japanese conversations for the purpose of settling all pending issues. Moreover, the acting Governor-General of French Indo-China stated to Consul-General SUZUKI at Hanoi that, if Japan would really pursue a policy of non-intervention in the European War, France would respond to it by adopting a conciliatory policy toward Japan. Thus the French Government gradually began to address itself actively to the adjustment of Franco-Japanese relations.

/p.34/ (3) Our first proposal regarding diplomatic rapprochement.
(Conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador
HENRI of Nov. 30)

pp.34-35/ Taking advantage of this tendency, Minister NOMURA decided to
solve favorably at a stroke the various problems pertaining to the
French dependencies, especially French-Indo-China, which had
important bearings on the disposition of the China Incident and the
establishment of the East Asiatic New Order. On Nov. 30, he summoned
the French Ambassador in TOKYO and told him as per the following:

/p. 35/ (A) Of our intentions concerning Japan-French diplomatic rap-
prochement desired by the French, and also as per the following
(B) pertaining to the dispatching to HANOI of a Staff member of
our home department and a military expert for liaison and
negotiation in connection with the suspension of acts to help
Chiang through French-Indo-China. The French Ambassador promised
to transmit the matter to his home Government and give a definite
answer later on, as he could not reply on the spot.

/p.35/ (A) Since the outbreak of the China Incident, Japan-French diplomati-
c relations have lacked amicability, but the fact that the French
recently complied with our requests in regard to a few pending matter
is greatly appreciated by us. We thoroughly sympathize with
recent French expressions of desire to readjust mutual relationship
between the two countries.

However, it is a matter beyond our apprehension that the French,
while desiring diplomatic rapprochement on one hand, is assisting
the Chiang regime on the other, for the overthrow of which we are
straining every effort. If diplomatic rapprochement with us
is actually desired, we consider that the French should give up
such dubious attitude and break with the Chiang regime and also take
a sympathetic attitude toward our settlement of the China Incident.
Further, it is a well-known fact that the French dependencies in
the South Seas and Oceania, especially French-Indo-China are main-
/p.36/ taining various economic barriers against us. Unless such fundamen-
tal obstacles for mutual friendly relationship be actually removed, we
deem it impossible to bring about the realization of mutual
diplomatic rapprochement.

Regarding the acts of aiding Chiang via French-Indo-China,
large quantities of munitions destined for the Chiang regime are
still being transported via French-Indo-China despite our repeated
requests to stop them. Traffic of anti-Japanese Chinese with
military and political objectives is frequent, with the result that
French-Indo-China has apparently become the base of aid-Chiang and
anti-Japanese activities. The French-Indo-China authorities explain
that although traffic of regular arms and ammunitions is prohibited,
the other commodities cannot be barred even if they are serviceable
for military purpose, so long as they are transported as general
merchandise. But the fact is beyond doubt that even regular arms
and ammunitions are being transported as heretofore. With regard

to foodstuff, trucks, petroleum and various machinery, although they do not fall under the category of regular arms and ammunition, they invariably tend to keep and enhance the anti-Japanese fighting strength so long as they are applied to the Chiang regime.

/pp.36-37/ This argument is quite warrantable when we review the list of war contrabands promulgated by France in her war against Germany.

/p.37/ In this connection, it is of no practical consequence whether war has been declared or not. Should France discard the argument of legal technicalities and take a decisive step from the viewpoint of practical politics to bar all freight traffic destined to the Chiang regime which is detrimental to the settlement of the China Incident in which Japan is now engrossed, and should she further convince the Japanese people by some adequate measures to intercept the aid-Chiang route with concrete results, it would undoubtedly contribute to no small degree the enhancement of Japan-French friendship.

pp.37-38/ Our current military operation in KUANGHSI is due to the continued transportation of munition and other commodities destined to KUANGHSI, despite our frequent protests. The reason for the trespassing of the French-Indo-China border line and the dropping of bombs by Japanese military aircrafts, as frequently protested by the French during the past few months, is that CHENNAMKUAN in Chinese territory near the border line has become the distribution center of munitions consigned to the Chiang regime transported via French-Indo-China. For strategic military reasons, there was no alternative but to resort to bombing with the result that some of our military aircraft may inevitably have trespassed the border or accidentally dropped bombs. Such undesirable affairs would cease to happen, should the French stop aiding Chiang.

Concerning the anti-Japanese economic barriers set up in the French dependencies in South Seas and Oceania, especially in French-Indo-China:

(a) The French-Indo-China authorities impose heavy duties and import quotas on Japanese merchandize which is in contradiction to the spirit of the current commercial agreement. It is unsatisfactory and we request its abolition or alleviation.

/pp.38-39/ (b) heretofore, as in the French-Indo-China iron ore embargo case, which was recently settled, French authorities in French-Indo-China and Caledonia have frequently barred the supply of resources to us, restricted the entry of our nationals, and obstructed the business operation of Japanese. We hope that in the future, similar cases will not recur but also further conveniences and assistances be positively afforded

(B) In connection with our current KUANGHSI operations, it appears that the French authorities are entertaining uneasiness and suspicion in view of our army's sphere of activity extending near

the border of French-Indo-China. In order to dispell the uneasiness or suspicion, and also for liaison and negotiation between the Japanese consul-general in HANOI and the French-Indo-China authorities, we wish to dispatch to HANOI within a few days an official-in-charge for the Foreign Ministry for a few days. He shall be accompanied by a military expert of field officer class to inform the French authorities of our military activities in South China and to hear the French viewpoint regarding the situation in the border districts. We thus hope to come to a better understanding. We therefore hope that the Ambassador would consent to our intention and transmit the matter to the French Local authorities so that necessary conveniences and assistances would be afforded.

/p.40/

(4) The French interim reply to our proposition (the conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador HENRI of Dec. 12)

At the second interview of the two on Dec. 12, the French made the following intermediate reply.

(1) The French Government deeply regrets that the Japanese Government again gave vent to dissatisfaction at the alleged transportation via French-Indo-China of munitions destined to China, which report was previously denied and proven as entirely groundless by the French.

(2) Regarding the various pending matters such as the occupation of HAINAN island, the annexation of SHINNAN archipelago, the obstruction of navigation on the YANTZE River, the infringement on commercial freedom in the occupied territory, and all the other damages sustained by the French interests in China, the French Government has no objection in the intention of the Japanese Government to have a conference with the French Government to exchange frank opinions.

/pp.40-41/

(3) Inasmuch as there is a Japanese consul-general stationed in HANOI, it is beyond apprehension that there should be any necessity of specially dispatching a staff member of the Foreign Ministry and a military expert to French-Indo-China. Needless to say, the French Government would have no objection to the Japanese Government dispatching couriers in order to arrange for special contact with the consul-general in question.

(4) The military operations of the Japanese Army in KUANGHSI districts are liable to contradict the political equilibrium, which was the object of the Japan-French agreement of 1907. The French Government wants the Japanese Government's explanation on the object, nature and the duration of the operations. In reply to the above proposition, Minister NOMURA told the French Ambassador as follows:-

(1) According to information received by us, it is a plain fact that munitions are being transported via French-Indo-China. For instance, the information recently received from reliable sources in China confirms the fact that the CHUNGKING Government, in view

of our military operations in KUANGHSI requested French assistance to have its military material and other stuff stocked in that district sent back temporarily to French-Indo-China. The source confirms that the French promised to make favorable arrangements to a certain extent.

(2) The Japanese Government is fully aware that since war has not been declared by neither Japan nor China, the French is not legally obligated to suspend traffic of commodities consigned to China. But the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the French would recognize the extensive hostilities now under way
 /pp.41-42/ between Japan and the CHUNGKING Government and take steps to suspend the freight traffic via French-Indo-China, which tends to help the CHUNGKING Government.

/p.42/ (3) The military operations in KUANGHSI are executed in parallel with the blockade of the Chinese coast line to bring about the collapse of the CHUNGKING Government by cutting off the commissary line. Consequently until these aims are realized, the duration cannot be definitely stated.

Notwithstanding the foregoing explanations, the French Ambassador repeatedly emphasized the absence of munitions traffic to China via French-Indo-China. Since the premise of solving the Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement was the suspension of munitions traffic, a divergence of opinions already existed.

(5) Interview between Minister NOMURA and Ambassador HENRI of Dec. 21.

On Dec. 21 the French Ambassador called on Minister NOMURA and conferred chiefly on the opening of YANTZE River traffic. At that time, the French Ambassador voiced his Government's hope that in view of the urgent necessity of opening parleys regarding Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement, negotiations on the TIENTSIN problem should be started in parallel with the Japan-British parley. Minister NOMURA replied that the French views regarding the Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement are now under consideration by our authorities and that in the near future negotiation could be opened on an equitable basis. Minister NOMURA added that the negotiation should be carried on a constructive basis.

/p.43/ Item 2. The dropping of bombs on THA KHE, French Indo-China by Japanese Navy Planes.

8/26/39 When Acting Consul-General URABE at HANOI called on Chief Administrator DE TASTE in the afternoon of August 26, 1939 /SHOWA 14/ at the latter's request, the Chief Administrator informed him, after remarking that the protest was being made under instructions from the Home Government, that about 11:00 a. m. of the 26th Japanese seaplanes flew over French-Indo-China territory from the direction of the Chinese border and that one of these planes dropped two bombs in the vicinity of THA KHE near the border of French Indo-China and China, causing about thirty casualties.

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/p.48/ With reference to this, Consul-General SUZUKI, in an interview with the Governor-General of French Indo-China on September 25, expressed the Japanese Government's regret and its desire for a local settlement of the incident. The Governor-General appreciated it and requested that negotiations regarding indemnity be conducted with the Director of the Political Affairs Bureau.

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/p.49/ According to the report of the Consul-General of October 14, the Governor-General made a written demand /for indemnity/ as follows:

- (1) 50,020 piastres for 76 persons killed (about ¥ 658 per person)
 - (2) 10,410 piastres for 34 wounded persons (about ¥ 300 per person)
 - (3) 550 piastres for 55 lightly wounded persons (about ¥ 100 per person)
 - (4) 1,570 piastres for burial expenses, survivors' relief fund, and damage compensation.
- Total 62,550 piastres.
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/p.50/ On November 17 the above total indemnity of 62,550 piastres was advanced by the Foreign Ministry and remitted by telegraphic transfer to Consul-General SUZUKI. Subsequently the Consul-General reported that the Governor-General, in a letter dated November 29, acknowledged receipt of this sum and recognized the incident as closed.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1027

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office - - - and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 134 pages, dated Dec. 1941, and described as follows: Business Report for the year 1939, published Dec. 1941 by the South Seas Bureau.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this

20th day of Sept., 1946

K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Chief of Archives Section of

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Foreign Office

SEAL

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

23 day of Sept., 1946

RICHARD H. LARSH

Name

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS AND REPORTS
ON
THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE
SINCE
THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT
OF
JULY 7TH, 1937

II. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 6th, 1937.

The Assembly:

Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan (documents A. 78, A. 79 and A. 80. 1937. VII)

-- Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports (document A. 80. 1937. VII) and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922;

-- Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

-- Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorise the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests.

THE FRENCH INDO-CHINA NEGOTIATIONS

(1) The Foreign Office Statement, September 23, 1940

With a view to settling the China affair and thereby facilitate the establishment of a new order in East Asia, the Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, held conversations in a friendly spirit with the French Ambassador, Charles Arsene-Henry, on basic matters regarding the question of French Indo-China at Tokyo during the month of August of this year.

As a result of these conversations, France agreed to afford in French Indo-China all such facilities of a military nature as are required by the Japanese Army and Navy for executing their campaign for the settlement of the China affair.

On the basis of this agreement, negotiations were conducted on the spot--at Hanoi--for the purpose of deciding upon concrete matters between the Japanese and French military authorities, which resulted in an agreement in the afternoon of September 22.

(2) The Foreign Office Spokesman's Statement,
September 23, 1940

Despite the understanding reached between Japan and France with regard to French Indo-China after prolonged negotiations in which Japan manifested consistent patience and forbearance, a local skirmish has occurred in the border region of French Indo-China. This is entirely due to a misunderstanding on the part of French Indo-China. Therefore, it is expected that the agreement concluded between Japan and France will be smoothly and peacefully carried out with the French misunderstanding naturally dispelled.

Inasmuch as the present agreement between Japan and France has been based on peaceful talks between the two countries, there could be no objection to it from any other foreign country.

C E R T I F I C A T E

1.P.S. No. 39

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document here to attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 23 Sept. 1940, and described as follows: The French Indo-China Negotiations
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this
20th day of Sept., 1946.

K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, RICHARD H. LARSH, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of Sept., 1946

RICHARD H. LARSH
NAME

Witness: T/4 Taguchi Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of agreement between Japan and France concerning the advancement of the Japanese army into French Indo-China.

(July - September 15 Showa /1940/)

2nd section, South-Sea Bureau of the
Foreign Ministry.

1. The political agreement/~~concluded~~ between Japan and French Indo-China by CATROUX, the Governor of the same.

Statement regarding hopes for its conclusion.

Since the arrival in French Indo-China of the observation party /consisting/ mainly of our military experts who were sent in the latter part of June, 15 SHOWA /1940/ in order to inspect the situation of the embargo on materials intended for CHANG KAI-SHEK via French Indo-China, the Governor, CATROUX, and the military commander of French Indo-China repeatedly announced with sincerity that they would enforce the said embargoes and cooperate in the execution of the duties of the observation party.

According to the reports from the observation personnel sent to various parts in French Indo-China, the embargoes were actually being carried out. The French Indo-China authorities furthermore endeavored to show us their good offices to the utmost by (a), prohibiting the inflow of Chinese exports into French Indo-China for one month starting July 7th, and (b), recognizing the construction of a submarine cable between HAIPHONG and HAIKOW, and the installation of wireless machines for our observation party.

The Governor who thus assumed a conciliatory attitude toward us, furthermore proposed to Major-General NISHIHARA who was the head of the observation party that if Japan respects the territorial integrity of French Indo-China, she shall be ready from the military standpoint to conclude with Japan a defensive treaty against CHANG KAI-SHEK and shall be able to cooperate with Japan in a wider sphere than at present, and at the same time from the economic standpoint are prepared to adopt friendly measures in regard to Japan's expansion in enterprises and promotion of exports into French Indo-China, therefore request that a proposal for the conclusion of an agreement of the above nature be made by the Japanese Government. However, regarding the passage of the Japanese army and the use of aerodromes in French Indo-China to which our army attaches great importance in operations toward China, he stated that these matters exceeded the authority of the Governor of French Indo-China and requested that negotiations be formally opened between the Japanese and French Governments.

2. The attitude of the French Government concerning the action taken toward Japan by the Governor of French Indo-China.

On July 15th, the French Foreign Minister told Mr. SAWADA, the Japanese Ambassador who called on him as requested, the following: When Major-General NISHIHARA and Governor CATROUX met recently, discussion was completed and they mentioned the political alliance relations between France and Japan. However, Major-General NISHIHARA is understood to have been sent for the purpose of observation over the embargoes on the materials to be transported and as the Governor of French Indo-China also has no authority to discuss political problems of the above nature, I feel that both sides have gone a little too far. But, by saying this I have entirely no intention of expressing dissatisfaction, rather I feel pleased to know that both sides were able to talk so candidly and freely. From my relation with the French Indo-China Bank, I have hitherto advocated that in so far as the Far East is concerned, France cannot but cooperate with Japan. But for the last two or three years the Japan-Franco negotiations have been complicated by theoretical disputes far from actual reality and I believe today is the time to discuss frankly in order to unfasten the complication, namely (1) to make the economic relations of ministering each other's wants closer between Japan and French Indo-China, and (2) to promote more intimate political relations. The resolute steps taken by French Indo-China to enforce embargoes on the transportation of weapons via the YUNNAN railway enduring great losses of the railway company are the expression of my hopes to accomplish my belief that we can confer with only Japan in the Far East and not minding China's enmity, which we may incur. However it is impossible to allow the losses of the company to continue without limitation. I hope that you will make some consideration to compensate these losses. Therefore I hope my candid opinion will be conveyed to the Japanese Government and hope you will make sure of Japan's views.

The Japanese Ambassador said that concerning the NISHIHARA-CATROUX meeting he had not yet received any official information, but in view of the recent talks between Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs TANI and French Ambassador HENRY regarding economic problems to be negotiated on the spot, I understand the Japanese Government is intending to dispatch delegates to French Indo-China in order to confer with the French Indo-China authorities. And asked, that, in spite of the above, do the French authorities intend to negotiate at the French home/government/?

The Foreign Minister replied that as to the details they can be left to the authorities on the spot, but the vital problems relating to politics and economics he wishes to negotiate at the French home /Government/.

3. The decision of our policy toward this problem.

Concerning this, our Government, after consulting with the army and navy, reached a definite plan to propose to the French /Government/ but it was decided that after the approval of the succeeding Foreign Minister concrete negotiations, in regard to political and military agreements will be held mainly in Tokyo, while those of an economic nature, in HANOI. For the time being, in the later part of July, the following instruction draft and explanation draft were sent to consul-general SUZUKI in HANOI, and at the same time instructed Ambassador SAWADA to report to the French Government that Japan's attitude shall be determined as a result of the decision of the foreign policy by the new cabinet (on July 22nd, the YONAI cabinet was succeeded by the second KONOYE cabinet).

(I) The instruction draft.

Concerning the political, military and economic agreements with French Indo-China.

1. Policies concerning the political, military and economic agreements with French Indo-China.

As a result of consultation with the army and navy authorities, our Government has decided to propose to France the conclusion of political, military and economic agreements which contain the following contents and that the negotiations concerning the political and military agreement will be held in Tokyo with Ambassador HENRY, and the negotiations for the economic agreement between you and the Governor of French Indo-China. Therefore, upon understanding the explanation detailed in the attached (otsu)/B/ sheet you are to commence negotiations directly with the Governor, and in connection with the military agreement assist Major-General NISHIHARA in order to permeate our views to the Governor and endeavor to make him suggest to the home Government to accept our requests.

II. The contents of the agreement.

(1) The political and military agreement.

(a) French Indo-China shall cooperate with Japan in the construction of a New Order in East Asia and especially, for the time being, recognize the passage and the utilization of aerodromes (including the stationing of ground forces for guard purposes) in French Indo-China by the Japanese Army which has been sent for the China operations, and provide the various facilities which are necessary for the transportation of arms and ammunition and other materials of the Japanese army.

(b) Japan shall respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(2) The economic agreement.

As stated in the attached sheet (ko) /A/ of the "trade and economic negotiations' policy toward French Indo-China", which is in the possession of secretary HAGA (the "business" stated in paragraph 1 in the said attached sheet includes banking business.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Conclusion
of Agreement between Japan and France.

(2) Draft of Explanation re Political and Military Agreement and
Economical Agreement with French Indo-China.

1. Considering the present position of France and the relation between Japan and France, the Japanese Empire expects to make French Indo-China, at this time, not only promise to co-operate in establishing the New Order of East Asia, and in settling the China Incident, but to also have her support the Empire in both military and economical lines by, at the moment, for the sake of the afore-mentioned object, accede to the Empire's demands forming the contents of the political and military agreement and economical agreement.

Strategically, we shall place our demand before French Indo-China as mentioned on attached sheet number A-2, Article Ia, not only with the purpose of making her suspend the transportation of goods for the Chiang regime so as to destroy the Chungking Government, but from the standpoint of strategical necessity against the Chungking Government.

(II) Considering the fact that French Indo-China has been eagerly wishing to secure a pledge from us regarding the integrity of her territory as she is apprehensive of the security of her territory, we shall prove her our just and upright attitude in giving her our pledge to that effect in some appropriate manner, and that would be by declaring that we have no intention of invading the territory of French Indo-China, but that we shall not hold any responsibility for protecting the integrity of French Indo-China even from invasions by Third Powers. As an invasion of French Indo-China by a Third Power, however, would be an obstacle in establishing the New Order of East Asia, needless to say, we could not disregard such a matter, but the measures to be adopted against same shall be decided from our own independent standpoint.

(III) In case France brings up the questions about Hainan Island, Spratley Islands, Hsi Sha Islands, etc., we shall, of course, reject her objection flatly by pointing out the fact that same have no direct relationship with the present agreement relative to French Indo-China.

(IV) Should, by any chance, the French Government reject all our demands which are to be the contents of the Political and Military Agreement, we shall, obviously, have no reason to give her any pledge respecting the integrity of her territory, but our attitude to be taken in such a case shall be decided after careful study by taking her attitude and the international situation, etc. into consideration.

(V) The Economical Agreement is aimed at the establishment of economical co-operation between Japan and French Indo-China, and we have no intention of monopolizing the economical interests relating to French Indo-China by totally ignoring the interests of France and other countries. As we shall demand being treated in the same way as France, the French people and French commodities in regard to matters pertaining to commerce (trade), enterprises, and entry into the country, etc., we believe that French Indo-China will show her disapproval on account of our foregoing demand exceeding the contents of ordinary commercial agreements, but, as we, on our part, are even going to pledge our respect for the integrity of French Indo-Chinese territory by virtue of the Political and Military Agreement, it will of course be necessary to realize our economic demands to the utmost limit. The negotiations for the Economical Agreement shall, in view of its nature, be conducted separately from the Political and Military Agreement.

(VI)(a) As far as the persons in charge of the negotiations of the Political and Military Agreement are concerned, the conclusion of the agreement shall, as per the request of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, be effected after the negotiations between our government and Ambassador Henri at this place as this agreement includes such an important political problem as integrity of territory. As regards the formality, same shall be considered later on.

(b) The negotiations regarding the Economical Agreement shall be conducted between Your Excellency and the Governor-General of French Indo-China, and on the satisfactory conclusion of same, in view of the relationship with the Privy Council, the formality shall be adopted whereby you shall have the Governor-General of French Indo-China notify you one-sidedly of the measures taken by the French Indo-China authorities, by his letter addressed to you, and you shall then only "take note" of it.

All further procedures shall be transferred to this place, where proper steps shall be taken.

(Remarks

The attached documents regarding the concrete details of the Economical Agreement are omitted.)

4. Commencement of negotiations with France regarding a political and military agreement.

(Meeting between Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador Henri on Aug. 1st. The first Franco-Japanese Meeting).

On Aug. 1st, the Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, asked Henri to visit him, and as a preliminary statement told him that the Japanese Government highly appreciated the measures taken by the French authorities/ to prohibit the transportation of materials to the CHANG Regime through French Indo-China, and that Japan desired that the French Indo-China Government cooperate more extensively with Japan in political, military and economic affairs for the establishment of Japan's New Order in East Asia and to foster the settlement of the China Incident. MATSUOKA then requested as the concrete contents of the political and military cooperation, (note: as for the economical co-operation, refer to the separately drafted "resume" of the negotiations on economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China) recognition of the passage through and the utilization of air-bases (including the stationing of ground forces to guard them) in French Indo-China by the Japanese army which has been dispatched for operations against China, and the provision of all necessary facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other materials for the said troops. He also added that these requests were for the solution of the China Incident, and all measures being limited to within the scope necessary for the frustration of the CHANG Regime, but not based on the intention to violate intrusion upon her territory. Furthermore, he stated that he wished to hold the negotiations at TOKYO as it was so important a political problem, and in consideration of the urgency of the affairs, desired to get the reply of the France Government /as to this question/. To which the Ambassador replied that Japan's request was equal to demanding France, which was in a neutral position, to declare war against China, even though Japan herself had not done so yet. The Minister said that it was not a question of whether war was declared or not. France was requested to understand that hostilities were going on in large scale in China, and as for Japan, we have no intention to violate French neutrality, but as this request was a result of absolute necessity from the military standpoint it might happen that French neutrality may be infringed upon even though it may be in formality, if France did not accept this request. Therefore as Japan did not wish to have such an occurrence this proposal was made. Moreover, we want the

French to accept our request with the same spirit that Japan accepted the 1907 Franco-Japanese agreement in spite of the benefits enjoyed by France in comparison with almost none on our side. This measure was not taken because Japan preferred it so, but as a result of circumstances she was obliged to make such a request. /Finally/. MATSUOKA explained that as in those days unexpected and strange things often took place, there is no necessity to think that to accept Japan's request must necessarily mean the declaration of war against China. The Ambassador answered that although there were several comprehensible reasons in MATSUOKA's explanation, Japan's requests as to French Indo-China were only becoming greater and greater each time, and it could not be estimated what requests Japan would make /of French Indo-China/ if this request was accepted. Saying that he said he would transmit the request to the French Government, he took his leave.

The Answer from the French Government to the 1st Japanese proposal of Aug. 1st (Conversation between Mr. MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, and Mr. HENRY, the /French/Ambassador/ Aug. 6th, the second Franco-Japanese Meeting).

The French Government, becoming enlightened as to the contents and subject matter of the request of the Japanese Government, expressed their attitude, through Mr. SAWADA, the Japanese Ambassador to France, in the following manner. The present Japanese request, which further pins down France which has suffered a severe defeat in the war against Germany and also lost her prestige, cannot be accepted as it stands now. The reason being, not in the contents /of the request/ but its /diplomatic/ formality. That is to say, France has no objection as to its contents, but wishes it to take the form of an agreement reached by neutral agreement; rather than it being one forced /upon France/ by Japan. France does not expect a large compensation from Japan. At any rate France is ready to conclude an agreement quickly if it is in the form of respecting French sovereignty and honour; for instance, Japan should promise that the stationing of Japanese troops in Tongking is only a temporary measure, or that Japan wishes to promote economic and political neighborly relations with French Indo-China for Japan is anxious for friendly relations with France.

Nevertheless, on Aug. 6th, the French Ambassador in Tokyo visited Mr. MATSUOKA, the foreign minister, bringing with him the reply which the ambassador received from the home government and read the attached document no. 1, by which it is understood that France accepted the Japanese proposal, but desired that Japan does not injure her prestige in the form /of the agreement/, and further stressed that he desired to negotiate with the vice-minister in regard to the form of the agreement. To which the minister gave his consent. Moreover, as the ambassador repeatedly stated that Japan's request was trampling on France's prestige, & it was similar to that of an ultimatum. The /Foreign/ Minister explained that Japan has no intentions at all to injure France's prestige, and because she wished to avoid this and prevent the occurrence of such even in formalities, /Japan/ made the above request.

Draft for the First Official Exchange letter regarding the political and military agreement presented by Japan to the French Authorities. (Conference between the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador to TOKIO on Aug. 9th and 10th).

In accordance with the result of the conference between MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister and "HENRY", the French Ambassador, and on Aug. 9th the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the ambassador to visit him, and upon handing him the draft of this exchange of notes relating to political and military affairs which correspond to the attached documents Nos. 1 and 2, held the following meeting.

The Vice-Minister: This request of ours is according to absolute military necessity, and in consideration of the urgency of the request wish to obtain your approval as quickly as possible.

The Ambassador: As the Japanese request is so vague it would mean handing over a "blank cheque" if it were accepted as it is.

The Vice-Minister: The contents of the request is clear. It is clearly stipulated "for operations against CHINA"; there is nothing to be doubtful about.

The Ambassador: There would be no end to requests being brought forward under the cloak of operations. It is clear that our Government will not agree with it absolutely as it is, although I may transfer this draft to our government if you wish.

The Vice-Minister: Do you mean that you are doubtful about the non-aggression of your territory?

The Ambassador: No; As the draft stands at present there is a danger the utilization of air-fields and passage of troupes anywhere in French Indo-China may be requested. /Japanese Troops/ may land about "Cambodia" Saigon. That is why I wish to state clearly the places /Japan/ desires.

The Vice-Minister: This draft only stipulates the general principle and as to details they may decided through negotiations on the spot.

The Ambassador: It is not desirable to leave the decision of details to negotiations on the spot. Although, according to your plan the Japanese Army makes repeated demands and Indo-China is disposed of, that could not be helped.

The Vice-Minister: It is clearly stipulated "for operations against China". Needless to say that we have no intention to abuse it.

The Ambassador: In regard to this point the Foreign Minister has told me that, and I also understand that Japan has no such an intention, but as a practical question, if we agree to the agreement as it stands it cannot be said what requests, one after another, Japan may make. Nobody can guarantee this point. Upon reporting the result of today's conversation to the Foreign Minister please reconsider the matter. As a result, if you desire me to send the draft as it is to my government, I will. However, I think that my government cannot accept it unconditionally.

(Conversation regarding economical problems omitted).

On the following day, the 10th, the Vice-Minister again requested Ambassador HENRY to visit him, and presented him a revised draft which was rewritten as "Passing through the Province of "TONKIN", French Indo-China, and utilizing aerodromes in the same province" in the draft of the exchange of notes of the 9th; and the conversation exchanged was as follows:

The Ambassador: Although the province of "TONKIN" may be stipulated from our point of view, it is equal to issuing a "blank cheque" for the province of TONKIN; and we will not be able to oppose anything the Japanese forces might do. That is not "fair" play. If you are going to make such a request, please make yourself a little clearer.

The Vice-Minister: Although I understand your feeling, as to what points will be passed or what air-fields are to be utilized, they are military secrets, therefore cannot be announced beforehand. No matter how earnestly you may insist, from the maintenance of secrecy of the operations against China, we will not be able to answer by any means.

The Ambassador: Do you not trust the French Government?

The Vice-Minister: This subject differs from the ordinary item of secrecy, for no one other than the military authorities are aware of it. However, when the Japanese Army enters French Indo-China, unless cooperation of the FIC authorities is obtained matters will not progress smoothly, therefore discussion as to the details will be held between the Japanese and FIC authorities. /For instance/, if your excellency asks what places the Japanese Army will pass through or what aerodromes they will utilize, and if your government state where is good or where is unsuitable, then this will make our military operations impossible; and the value of France accepting our request

as a principle will become nothing; and in so far as it has been accepted as a principle, to ask of military secrets is going a little beyond the point, and if you still persist, it will be useless to argue with you any more, so please transfer our request as it is to your home government.

The Ambassador: (After agreeing with the above). The Japanese request is one-sided.

The Vice-Minister: That is natural. That is why we are able to negotiate. There is one thing to which we wish to draw your attention, that is Japan is doing her best to establish a new order in East Asia.

The Ambassador: By the words a new order in East Asia, what do you concretely mean?

The Vice-Minister: To make this clear a detailed explanation would be necessary, but if summed up in a few words, it means to establish a stable and dominant position of Japan in East Asia. As you know Japan and China should maintain friendly relations as neighborly countries, but as long as the CHANG Regime exists it forms an obstacle, and we are earnestly overcoming all obstacles and pushing forward towards the downfall of the regime. And for this reason, hope for the co-operation of France. We believe that as to settling the China Incident as quickly as possible and establishing a permanent peace in East Asia, France has no objection. For that purpose it is necessary to annihilate the Chiang regime as quickly as possible, and wish to use French Indo-China as a means /to achieve that objective/. If the Chiang regime had already been overthrown, we would not demand of you such a request. But as the same regime is continuing resistance, very reluctantly we have been obliged to make such a request. We hope you will especially consider this point.

(By this explanation, it seemed the Ambassador understood well).

Our present request is based on the above circumstances and have no intention at all of transgressing on FIC territory. When you transfer this official draft, will you also transfer the several points I have explained. I hope that the French Government will accept our request as it stands.

The Ambassador: (He agreed to transfer the above request).

7. France's reply to our first draft of the Exchange of Notes. (Conference between Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRY on August 15th).

On August 15 Ambassador HENRY visited Minister MATSUOKA, and after having read a document corresponding to attached document no. 3 as a reply to the said first draft of the exchange of notes according to the instruction from the home government, the following conference was held between the Ambassador and the Minister.

Minister: Didn't you say to me the other day that France would, as a principle, accept Japan's demands?

Ambassador: I didn't say that all Japan's demands would be accepted.

Minister: I think I am sure you told me the other day to the effect that although the French Government is willing to accept the military demands of Japan concerning French Indo-China as a general principle, but such measures as would not injure France's prestige be considered by Japan.

Ambassador: That is a misunderstanding. I meant to say that Japan's military demands would be accepted within the limits that France would be able to. Japan's military demands are concerned with the passage of troops, usage of airfields and other provision of facilities, therefore to accept these demands as they are would be equal to giving Japan a blank cheque. France wishes to accept the Japanese demands which are acceptable to France, after having obtained security and a promise as to territorial integrity.

Minister: Concerning those points, I said clearly the other day that Japan's military demands are not based on the intention to invade the territory of French Indo-China.

Ambassador: Without obtaining the promise of territorial guarantee and deciding upon, beforehand, clearly what the contents of Japan's demands are, all French Indo-China will be at the mercy of the Japanese army once it enters, even though that may be only the Tongking province.

Minister: In our demands it is clearly stated "for the operations against China", and it should be evident as to what points the Japanese army will pass through. Therefore it is unnecessary to worry that whole French Indo-China will be occupied by the Japanese army.

But if France doesn't believe my affirmation, and continues to assume such an attitude as to prolong /all decisions/,

Ambassador: That is a misunderstanding. I meant to say that Japan's military demands would be accepted within the limits that

it is useless to consult further, and as our military demands are so urgent, it may happen that we may have to discontinue negotiations and execute necessary military actions.

But . . . convey to the home government that such is not what the Japanese army as well as the Japanese government desires.

Ambassador: If we accept Japan's demands, Chiang's army will also come into French Indo-China, which will be turned into Sino-Japanese battle-field. This would be a great nuisance.

Minister: It is hard to understand why you say such a thing now. When you accepted in principle the passage of the Japanese army, you must have supposed that there is a possibility of the Japanese and Chinese armies clashing in French Indo-China.

We are doing our best to overthrow the Chiang regime, which is an obstacle in the establishment of a permanent peace in the Far East, and as the establishment of a lasting peace is(also)advantageous to France, we ask your cooperation to overthrow the Chiang regime, which is necessary for that purpose.

In short, whether the contents of our present demands are accepted by France or not, there is still the necessity to carry out this urgently. But as it is not agreeable for us to take military action without agreement, I wish you to consider that I am trying to achieve the objective by consulting with you. From a general point of view, I want you to persuade the home government to accept our demands as they are as soon as possible.

Ambassador: (Understanding fully the above, he took his leave).

(In a chat the Minister said that originally the security of French Indo-China territory had long been preserved in fact by the Japanese-France Pact of 1907, and if Japan didn't comply with the conclusion of this Pact, it is impossible to guess what would have happened to the territory of French Indo-China, but Japan complied with the conclusion of it, therefore it is France's turn to respond to our demands.)

8. France's first counter-plan to the First Draft of our Exchange of Notes and the Second Draft of our Exchange of Notes (Conference between /Foreign/ Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Henry on 20 Aug.)

On the 20th August, the French Ambassador in Tokyo called on /Foreign/ Minister Matsuoka and furnished to him, in accordance with instructions from the home government, the attached document No. 4, and draft of exchange of notes corresponding to attached document No. 5 and which is based on the purport of the above-mentioned document. In regards to the above, the Minister expressed his gratitude for the efforts taken by the French Government and the Ambassador, and at the same time stated that as to France's proposals Japan would reply upon consideration of the document and draft. But one thing I would like to mention is that although economic problems are included in the above /proposals/ we wish to resolve the military problems prior to economic problems as the former are of an urgent nature. However, it will be all right to discuss the details of the military problems on the spot. And as to the particulars of the form of the agreement wish the vice-minister to negotiate with your Excellency within today. Furthermore, when the draft of the exchange of notes No. 1 and 2 of attached document No. 6 in regards to the military question problem and which was prepared by us was submitted, the French Ambassador stated that the French proposal did not injure their prestige and also was fair. Furthermore, the Minister stressed the necessity to separate the economic problems in order to save time to solve the military problems. According to the French proposal, in regards to the economic problems only the recognition of Japan's predominant benefits in the Far East, and also a predominant position over the 3rd Powers in FIC is mentioned and is far from our request of French homeland treatment. If France persists in her proposals the negotiations are bound to reach a deadlock again. In regards to economic problems I think that you could reply that negotiations on the spot be instructed in order to respond as much as possible to the French homeland treatment request. Anyway the necessity to decide in advance on the military problem was advocated.

9. The third(draft of)the exchange of notes.
(Conversation on the night of August 20th
between Vice-Minister CHASHI and Ambassador
HENRY).

After immediate investigation of the French counter-draft, Vice-Minister CHASHI asked Ambassador 'Henry' to visit him on the night of the 20th, and the following conversation was held between the Vice-Minister and the Ambassador with the chief of the Western-Asia Bureau /SEIOAKYOKUCHO/ attending.

Vice-Minister: In the French proposal the Japanese-French Pact is introduced, but the situation has greatly changed compared with

that time when this Pact was concluded, therefore it is only complicating the settlement of this matter, to bring up such a Pact today.

Ambassador: Concerning the above, because /Foreign/ Minister MATSUOKA first mentioned it, we drafted this proposal with that /Pact/ as the basis.

Vice-Minister: The Minister only referred to the Pact in the course of his discussion, because he intended to show that it was evident Japan had no territorial ambition towards French Indo-China from the standpoint of the spirit the Pact was concluded in the past. In the French proposal, all military problems are left to the negotiations on the spot, and the passage of troops and two other items have not been given approval as a principle. /We/ object to this point. Moreover, what is the meaning of limiting the providing of facilities to the border zone between French Indo-China and China?

Ambassador: It is impossible to promise vaguely the provision of facilities over such a vast area like the Tongking Province, therefore, we limited it to the border line which is not so narrow. We cannot permit the stationing of garrisons in the air-bases which the Japanese forces may use.

Vice-Minister: Thus the provisions of facilities according to the French will be meaningless. And so we wish to settle the problem according to our plan, and to manage the economic problem separately.

Ambassador: As the French proposal was made after considering the objections of the Japanese (it is necessary to quote the Japanese-French Pact, and also, the economic problem may be compromised after some additional words are added to the French proposal), if you still object to this, it suggests that there are some oppositionists in the Japanese Government who are against settling the French Indo-China problem with the French Government and they are trying to postpone the settlement purposely.

Vice-Minister: That is a great misunderstanding, on the contrary, we suspect that the French are trying to delay the settlement. After that we took into consideration the desires of the French again. The Minister informed us this morning, that this military demand was of a temporary and exceptional character, all the expenses of the military action shall be charged to the Japanese /Government/ and concerning the details of the military action and expenses, the Japanese and French authorities on the spot shall consult secretly. We believe that there will be no other way to settle this matter than to add these above-mentioned points. Therefore I hope you will

kindly convey the amended draft handed over French translation of letter received and sent, Nos. 1 and 2 of attached document No. 7, to the French Government and endeavour to persuade the Government. In case France should further postpone the settlement /of the matter/ the responsibility will be with the French should an unforeseen incident occur in French Indo-China.

Ambassador: Anyway, I will convey your proposal to my home government.

10. The concrete military requests which were unofficially presented to the French -
(The conference between Ambassador Henry and Chief of Western Eurasian Bureau, held in the evening of August 21).

On the night of the 21st, the Chief of the Eurasian Bureau visited the French Ambassador in Tokyo and stated that although, actually, to notify /you/ of our secret military items is not preferable, and as we observed that the French were very doubtful -- much more doubtful than we expected -- as to our military demands, we conferred with the armed forces authorities, and as a result to speedily resolve the matter and dissolve the French suspicion we have decided to unofficially notify you the outline of the contents of our request. Saying this, he handed the following /to the Ambassador/ and said, as we have done all we can regards this matter we only hope that you will transmit our request to your home government and obtain the approval of it quickly without any alterations. Then, the Ambassador promised that he would transmit the above to his home government.

(a) The number of air fields in Tongking province which shall be utilized by the Japanese army and navy forces.

For the time being one place around the districts of Hanoi, Phulang Thuong and Phutho respectively shall be used as permanent air-fields. But according to the situation other air-fields near the FIC-China border may be utilized.

(b) The approximate number of Japanese forces to be stationed in TONKIN province. The units necessary for the guarding of the above-mentioned air-fields, the air force unit to use these air-fields and the supply units, (including guards for transportation) engaged in transporting supplies to the above-mentioned respective units and Japanese units in Chinese territory adjacent to French Indo-China, the total no. of Army and Naval units not exceeding 5,000 - 6,000.

(c) The route of passage for the Japanese forces in the Tungking province. According to the necessity of operations against China, the zone along the Haiphong, Hanoi and Laokay line and Hanoi and Langson line may be used for the passage of Japanese troops. The strength

(including that of the units necessary for the transportation of the above units and supplies to the same and guarding of the transportation) of the units shall be other than those mentioned in (b) but their number cannot be stated at present.

Note I: For the transportation of the Japanese Army or supplies or for guarding the transports several ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy may enter Haiphong.

Note II. Communications equipment (mainly wireless) for exclusive use /of the Japanese Army and Navy/ shall naturally accompany the above.

11. The 2nd French counter-proposal in regards to the draft of the exchange of notes (Conference between Vice-Minister OHASHI and Ambassador HENRY on August 25th).

On August 25th, Ambassador HENRY called on Vice-Minister OHASHI and according to instructions from his home government he presented the French draft concerning the military, political and economic matters as attached document No. 8 and asked our approval. The Vice-Minister pointed out that the acceptance of Japan's three military requests (1) the air fields in the Tongking Province to be used by the Japanese Army, (2) the number of Japanese troops to be stationed in the Tongking Province/which are such units/as the air-force units, the maintenance corps and other units to use the airfields and the supply units for Japanese troops now in Chinese territory near the frontier, (3) the course of passage for the units, had not been clearly mentioned. Though the/Vice-Minister/ insisted on specifically mentioning the above, the Ambassador stated clearly that to specify the above in an official letter is impossible from the French prestige point of view, but actually this is recognized at negotiations held on the spot, and insisted on the agreement as it stands.

The ambassador stated that he wished to keep in absolute secrecy and not to announce the agreements after the negotiations have succeeded to which the Vice-Minister gave his consent. Therefore, as a result of consulting with the military, it was decided to accept it in order to settle this matter quickly, and when in the night of the same day the Chief of the Eurasian Bureau showed to the Ambassador our draft letter which is attached document No. 9 vis-a-vis the French draft letter, the Ambassador had no objection, and to make sure wired it back to the home government for instructions.

12. August 30th. The exchange of official notes and the oral application offered from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to Ambassador HENRY to supplement the exchanged official notes.

Based upon the results of the negotiation between OHASHI and HENRY on the 25th, an exchange of official notes such as Appendix No. 10 (I) and (II) was made on August 30th, at the Foreign Minister's

official residence between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRI; and the present Franco-Japanese negotiation which saw much complications, came to a conclusion two months after the opening of negotiations.

Moreover, for the purpose of promoting an immediate agreement concerning our military requirements in French Indo-China, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA made an oral statement to Ambassador Henri at the time of the aforementioned official note exchange, as follows:

1.) In your letter there is no clear statement that France would accept our military requirements; the outline of its tangible contents was privately revealed to you by NISHI, the director of the Europe-Asia Bureau. But it seems that you have clearly stated on the 25th to Vice-Minister OHASHI that although France cannot clearly specify the aforementioned purport in writing from the standpoint of dignity, actually she has the intention of accepting all the aforementioned requirements. However, as far as the Imperial Government is concerned, she will place confidence upon the abovementioned statement of the French Government and will accept your letter.

2.) The Imperial Government feels that our military requirements can be filled immediately in French Indo-China. The Japanese troops is hastening to fulfill the requirements under pressure of various situation and the High Command has decided to designate Major-General NISHIHARA, who is the chairman of the Inspection Committee observing the situation of banning transportation of goods destined for the Chiang-Kai-Shek Government via French Indo-China, to become the representative of the Supreme Commander of the dispatched Army and Navy; combining both posts. They issued instructions to the said General to conclude a spot agreement at HANOI with the Commander of French Army so that our aforementioned requirements can be filled as quickly as possible, and, if circumstances allow, that this task be accomplished within the fortnight. Therefore, it is desired that the French Government inform the Governor-General of French Indo-China that France has substantially accepted the military requirements of Japan revealed privately to you by NISHI, the director of Europe-Asia Bureau, and issue instructions to conclude the aforementioned agreement immediately.

13. The 1st negotiation for agreement on the spot.

On August 31 Major-Gen. NISHIHARA called on the Governor General of French Indo-China and proposed to commence military negotiations according to the aforesaid MATSUOKA-HENRY Agreement, to which the Governor General did not respond, saying that he had not received any instructions from the home government. Thereupon, NISHIHARA decided to evacuate all the observation personnel and Japanese residents if the French /authorities/ failed to agree to our requests by the evening of Sept. 2nd, and in regards to the above asked the understanding of our Consulate-General. At noon on the following day, the 31st, the Maj.-General called on the Governor General again, but found no way to commence negotiations. As there were various conditions, strategically and diplomatically, which necessitate immediate opening of negotiations, this ministry /the Foreign Minister/ wired to Ambassador SAWADA in France to urge the French Government to give instructions to the Governor General of French Indo-China to commence immediately the negotiations on the spot. (Telegram received from Hanoi 2nd Sept. 15 Showa /1940/ No. 19 and Telegram sent to France 2nd Sept. 15 Showa /1940/ No. 401). In the night of Sept. 2nd, Major Gen. NISHIHARA again called on the Governor General, who stated that although he received instructions from the home government that evening, the message was rather long and had many points which were incomprehensible, so desired the negotiation to be postponed until the morning of the 3rd. Although the Maj. General demanded the immediate commencement of negotiations, the Governor General declined to accept it. Therefore the Maj. General handed the notification previously prepared as to the withdrawal of Japanese residents and the stationing of troops after Sept. 5th /to the Governor General/. Thereupon the Governor General stated that some reply shall be given in one hour's time, so the Maj.-General temporarily withdrew his notification. But at 10:30 P.M. a note from the Governor General was sent in which it was stated that the contents of the instructions from the home government as to the proposal for an agreement on the spot differed to quite an extent with that of ours, and advocated a revision and desired to commence from the 3rd. Major General NISHIHARA, judging that if the negotiation were commenced under such conditions, no conclusion could be attained in a short period, immediately proposed to the Governor General that the Commander-in-Chief of Japanese Expeditionary Force in South China has decided to advance his Army into French India after Sept. 5th. At the same time he also notified the Consulate-General of the above circumstances, consequently Consul-General SUZUKI immediately took steps on the 4th to retain the Bangkok Maru and the Saigon Maru which were at that time in Haiphong and Bangkok respectively and prepared for evacuation on 4th. (Tel. rcc. from Hanoi 3rd Sept. No. 197, 198. Tel. sent to Hanoi 3rd Sept. No. 200) As the endeavors of both governments have come to naught, again at Tokyo, Ambassador Sawada was instructed to persuade the French home government to give instructions to the Governor General to accept our demands (Tel. sent to France 3rd Sept. 15 Showa /1940/ No. 405; Tel. Rec. from France 4 Sept. No. 715, 717) at the same time, when the French Ambassador in Tokyo came to see

Vice-Minister OHASHI, he also requested that instructions be given to the Governor General of French Indo-China for the conclusions of agreements on the spot by the home government. This the Ambassador accepted. (Tel. sent to France 3rd Sept. No. 406).

On the other hand, Major Gen. NISHIHARA met with the Commanding General of the French Indo-China Army at 10 A.M. on the 3rd, at which time the Commander said that as he had wired to the Vichy Government yesterday evening that the negotiations had ended in failure, he has now no authority to negotiate, and that as a counter-proposal is being drafted, meeting with the Governor General is desired. Waiting for the said counter-proposal it was sent in the evening of the same day. Therefore Major Gen. NISHIHARA again requested to meet the Commanding General, to which he replied that he wished to postpone the negotiations until 9 A.M. of the 4th, because he was tired. (Tel. Rec. from Hanoi 4th Sept. No. 199). At 8 P.M. on the 4th an Agreement on the spot (Attached document No. 11) was signed between Major General NISHIHARA and Martan, the Commanding General. (Tel. Rec. from Hanoi 4th Sept. No. 200, 5th Sept. No. 301, Tel. sent to France 7th Sept. No. 411).

14. The Second negotiation for agreement of details
 on the spot.

Concerning the military pact which was signed on 4 September, agreement of details was expected to be concluded within the 6th, but a unit of the Japanese Army crossed the border at Liang-shan district in South China on the morning of the 6th, and on the following day, the Governor General proposed to Maj. General NISHIHARA to drop the negotiation on the pretext that the above incident was a contravention of the pact. In regards to the aforesaid, Major General NISHIHARA explained in length that it was an arbitrary decision taken by a front line unit which did not know of the conclusion of the military agreement and was by no means the intention of the Japanese military authorities. However, the Governor General would not change his attitude at all, and it seemed as if he were postponing the negotiations purposely. (Telegram from Hanoi: 8th Sept. No. 205, 9th Sept. No. 206. Telegram to Geneva 8 Sept. No. 84)

Therefore, the Japanese Government sent instructions to Ambassador SAWADA in France to propose to the French Government that in case the settlement of this problem should be postponed any longer, some unforeseen incident may happen, so the French Government should give instructions to the Governor General of French Indo-China to settle the negotiation with Japan immediately. (Telegram to France, 10th Sept. No. 417 Telegram from France, 12th Sept. No. 736).

After that, on 11th, the French Ambassador in Tokyo visited Vice-Minister OHASHI, and said that he had received information that the Thailand Army was also likely to invade French Indo-China, coordinating with the advance of the Japanese Army. Then the matter would be a hopeless case so he proposed that Japan stop Thailand's plan. On the 12th, the Vice Minister asked the French Ambassador to visit him, and told him this issue was one between France and Thailand and Japan had nothing to do with it, moreover, that the French proposal was nothing but her policy to postpone the negotiations. ISHIZAWA, the Chief of the Third Section of European Affairs, too, proposed to the French Embassy Secretary Dangeran /spelling approved by French Division/ to the same effect. (Telegram No. 2018 to Hanoi and Bangkok on Sep. 11; Telegram No. 194 to Bangkok on Sep. 12. Gist of the talk between Vice-Minister and French Ambassador on Sep. 11, Gists of the telephonic conversations between Chief of the Third Section of European Affairs and the French Secretary on Sep. 12. Gist of the talk between Vice-Minister and French Ambassador on Sep. 12).

On 13th, Maj. Gen. NISHIHARA had an interview with the Governor-General, who told him that in accordance with the instructions from the French Government to continue the negotiations, the Headquarters of the French Indo-Chinese Army was earnestly studying the details. The negotiations, nevertheless, have shown no progress since that time. (Telegram from Hanoi, Sep. 14, No. 212). In TOKYO, the French Ambassador called on Vice-Minister on the 16th and said again that the Japanese were responsible for the delay of the negotiations and that Thailand's movements were backed by Japan. The Vice-Minister contradicted and told him the actual situation on the spot is very serious, and as our army may commence advancement /into FIC/ at any moment without waiting for an agreement of the details, therefore wish the French Government to instruct the French Indo-China authorities to conclude the agreement of the details. (Telegram to France and Hanoi on Sep. 16, No. 2057).

On the 17th, the Governor-General and the Commanding-General of the Army gave us their general consent to our request. But even after the conclusion of an agreement and the Japanese Army makes a peaceful occupation some clashes with the French Indo-China forces are unavoidable so, for the time being, it has been decided to evacuate all Japanese residents on the 20th. (Telegrams No. 215, 216, 217 and 219 from Hanoi, Sept. 18. Telegrams No. 229, 233, 237, and 240 to Hanoi, Sept. 18. Telegram No. 81 from Saigon, Sep. 20.) The next day, the 18th, Commander of the French Indo-China Army replied, but, there existed a wide difference of opinion between the two. As it was deemed useless to continue the negotiations, Maj. Gen. NISHIHARA notified the French authorities that all the members of the Japanese Observation Party would leave Hanoi on the 20th. In TOKYO, too, the Vice-Minister informed the French Ambassador on the 19th that the Japanese forces would advance into TONKIN Province at any time after zero hour of Sep. 23rd, whether the agreement on details will be concluded or not. (Telegram No. 220 from Hanoi, Sep. 20. Telegram No. 236 to Hanoi, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 87

to Geneva, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 2080 to our offices in America, Thailand, and 8 other countries, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 433 to France, Sep. 19.) On the same day, several negotiations were held on the spot but without any results. The Japanese residents in the Hanoi area and most of the members of the Observation Party arrived at Hai-phong and embarked on the HAKKAI-MARU and the SURABAYA-MARU, and those in the Saigon area embarked on the ARIZONA-MARU. (Telegram No. 223 from Hanoi, Sep. 20. Telegram through Navy from Hanoi, Sep. 21). As soon as the ships started for HAIKOW at noon of the 22nd, the Japanese troops in CHENNAIKWANG area began to advance. At 14.30 hours of the same day, they /the French authorities/ suddenly adopted a compromising attitude and, at last, the agreement on details, as per attached document No. 12, was signed. (Telegram through Navy from Hanoi, Sep. 23, Telegram from HAKKAI-MARU, Sep. 23, Telegram No. 155 from HAIKOW, Sep. 23. Telegram No. 2125 (GO) to our offices in Britain, U.S. and 11 other countries, Sept. 22nd, Telegram No. 429 to France Sept. 22nd).

On the 24th final agreement was reached in regards to the military agreement between Major-General NISHIHARA and the representative of the Commander of the French Indo-China Army on board the battleship KAWACHI. It was decided that the main part of the expeditionary force will enter Haiphong harbour on the 25th and land on the 26th. (Telegram sent by Consul-General SUZUKI through Navy on 24 Sept.).

1. "Particulars concerning the evacuation of Japanese residents."

Consul-General SUZUKI in HANOI, who has been preparing the evacuation of the Japanese residents in view of the strained condition of negotiations between Japan and French Indo-China, issued private evacuation orders on the 18th to all Japanese residents. At the same time, he has reached an agreement with the Governor-General of French Indo-China as to the method of protecting the lives and properties of Japanese residents in the course of evacuation. Residents under the jurisdiction of the Consulate-General at HANOI reached HAIPHONG at 7 A.M. on the 20th by special train, and at noon boarded the HACHIKAI MARU (chiefly old people, children and women) and the SURABAYA MARU (chiefly men in the prime of life) and awaited development. Also, the Japanese residents under jurisdiction of the Consulate-General at SAIGON boarded the ARIZONA MARU on the same day at SAIGON. (Telegram No. 213 from HANOI dated September 16, No. 217 dated September 18, No. 219 dated September 19; telegrams No. 80 and No. 81 from SAIGON dated September 20; telegrams No. 229 and No. 233 to Hanoi dated September 18, and No. 237 dated September 19).

Various meetings were held concerning the execution of the evacuation. MARU and the SURABAYA MARU departed at 10 A.M. on the 22nd for HAIKOW. On the 20th, the ARIZONA MARU left SAIGON. (A telegram from HANOI via the Navy, dated September 21; a telegram from the HACHIKAI MARU at

HANOI dated September 22; a telegram from the ARIZONA MARU at SAIGON dated September 21; a telegram to HANOI via Navy dated September 21; telegram No. 240 to HANOI dated September 21).

All the members of the Consulate-General at HANOI and the Japanese residents totaling approximately 300 persons arrived at Kaikow at noon of the 23rd aboard the HACHIKAI MARU and the SURABAYA MARU. Members of the Consulate-General at SAIGON and the Japanese residents totaling 117 persons arrived at KAIKOW at 4 P.M. of the 24th. After conferring with the Central authorities and with military circles, it was decided that the Consul-General and a part of his staff were to return to HAIPHONG aboard the SURABAYA MARU on the 25th. The HACHIKAI MARU departed for NAGASAKI, and the ARIZONA MARU for Moji via KILUNG. (Telegram No. 155 from KAIKOW dated September 23; telegrams No. 157, No. 158, No. 161, No. 162, dated September 25; telegram No. 98 to KAIKOW on September 24). The HACHIKAI MARU arrived at NAGASAKI on September 30, and the ARIZONA MARU arrived at KOBE on November 2. Thus, the evacuation matters were completed. Requests for facilitating the customs clearance of the evacuees had been made previously to the authorities concerned. (Telegram No. 4366, OSANGO to Finance, Home and Welfare Ministry dated September 26; telegram No. 135 OSAN to Railway Ministry; telegrams to HACHIKAI MARU and ARIZONA MARU dated September 28; a telegram from ARIZONA MARU on September 29; telegrams from Vice-Consul URABE at NAGASAKI on September 29, 30; telegram to Vice-Consul URABE at Moji on October 1; telegram No. 1187 UN from Railway Ministry on October 1; telegram No. 43 to KOREA on October 1; telegram from Vice-Consul WATANABE at NAGASAKI on October 1; telegram from Vice-Consul URABE at KOBE on October 2).

On the other hand, Consul-General SUZUKI and his party arrived at HAIPHONG on the 28th, and returned to HANOI on the 29th, and resumed duties. Members of the Consulate at SAIGON that returned once to Japan, have gone back to SAIGON again, and resumed duties formally on October 28. (Telegrams No. 226 from HANOI on September 29 and 30, telegram No. 228 on November 2; telegram No. 260 to HANOI on October 9, telegram No. 267 on October 10; telegram No. 248 from HANOI on October 2, telegrams Nos. 83 and 84 from SAIGON on October 29).

Attached Document No. 1.

(Draft of) Exchange of Notes. (Notes sent).

Mr. Ambassador:

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and to furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

I have the honour to be

Your Obedient Servant.

* * * * *

Attached No. 2

Exchanges of Notes (Draft of) (Letter received).

I have the honour of acknowledging the following letter from Your Excellency.

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do its utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that province (including the stationing of necessary guards) and furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunitions and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

I, according to instructions from the home government, have the honour of replying that the Government of France well understand the spirit of goodwill expressed in your Excellency's letter cited above and also accept the desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant.

(Attached Document No. 3)

A tentative translation of the memorandum about the French Indo-China problem which was handed to/Foreign/ Minister MATSUOKA by Ambassador Henry on August 15th (already corrected).

The French Ambassador has conveyed to the home government the demands recently submitted by the (Japanese) Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and has received instructions from the home government to notify the (Japanese) Foreign Minister, in regards to the problem thereof, the following:

The French Government has fully understood with satisfaction the desire of the Imperial Japanese Government to open negotiations to deal with the problems which are important in view of the interests of both countries and not adverse to their happiness and prestige.

The French Government hopes the fact that, since the end of 1937, it has given Japan very important "concessions" with a friendly spirit to Japan without receiving any compensation will be recalled, that is, France has prohibited the transportation of war materials and munitions to China via Tongking province and this has been executed notwithstanding the fact that there exists no declaration of war and such a prohibition must be an infringement of formal agreements. Afterwards, the French government has, according to the new demands of Japan, added other materials and goods to the contrabands for China, has agreed to close the French Indo-China frontier completely and finally has consented to the dispatch of a Japanese observation committee to the actual place /frontier to investigate whether the French authorities have taken the required measures or not.

In conformity with all the evidence which proves friendship and goodwill, the French government demands that the Japanese government promise, before any further negotiations, to respect the status quo and territorial integrity of Indo-China, and other interests of France in the Far East. The French government will recognize in return, the special importance of Japanese interests in this part of the world. According to the opinion of the French government the interests of the two countries can be completely harmonized, which would be to the greatest advantage to both countries. There is another reason why France was convinced of the opinion of his Excellency MATSUOKA, in expressing in his conference with Mr. Arsene Henry on 26th of July, that he was considering an economic coalition between Japan and France which could be applied not only in Indo-China, but to whole China and MANCHUOKUO. Anyhow, the primary result of the recognition by France of the special importance of Japanese interests in the Far East can appear as the realization of close economic coalition between Indo-China and Japan. The French government thinks that no negotiation can be held effectively as long as the above declaration is not exchanged. Especially concerning the military demands, the French government desires to discuss the above after a formal recognition of French sovereignty over Indo-China and the territorial integrity of French Indo-China by the Japanese Government.

(Attached Document No. 4)

The tentative translation of the memorandum concerning the political and military problems in French Indo-China, handed to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA by the French ambassador in Tokyo on Aug. 20th.

The French government is greatly satisfied to acknowledge the following assurance given through the French ambassador by your Excellency the Foreign Minister.

Your excellency MATSUOKA has asserted that Japan desires to be faithful to the policies adopted since the conclusions of "the agreement" of June 10th, 1907. Those policies are, according to the text of the agreement, based on the maintenance of the position and territorial right of two high contracting Parties in the continent of Asia. Your excellency MATSUOKA has stated that Japan wishes to arrange and settle by negotiations the military facilities which she demands of the French government. This demand has as its only object the settlement of the hostilities between Japan and the CHIANG Kai-shek government, being cancelled after the said settlement is achieved and also is to be limited to the border between Indo-china and China.

Accordingly the French government considers that the Imperial government will not find difficulty in confirming to the French government the assurances and especially the acknowledgement of French sovereignty in Indo-china, which resulted from the agreement of June 10th, 1907. When Japan will give this confirmation to the French government, the same will be ready to acknowledge the predominant rights and interests of Japan in economic and military affairs in the Far East.

Concerning the end of the above-mentioned paragraph, the French government is ready to discuss without delay the method of assuring the superior position of Japan and Japanese in Indo-China compared to that of other foreign countries, according to the spirit of "the Declaration" of June 10th, 1907.

But the position given to the Japanese as a result thereof, cannot be the same as that of French nationals who have built the present prosperity of Indo-China through their efforts of more than sixty years.

Concerning the military problems, the French government agrees to both home governments issuing general instructions to their respective dispatched military commanders to hold meetings between themselves on the spot. When the Imperial government will accept this procedure, both countries shall send to their military commanders the following necessary instructions simultaneously.

The military commanders of both Japan and France, after declaring upon their word of honour as soldiers, shall exchange information which shall enable them to judge correctly the method through which the demand

of the Japanese Army may be carried out satisfactorily.

The above demand shall be connected only with the execution of operations in the border territory between Tonking and China.

The military commanders of both countries shall, as a result of the exchange of secret information, frankly confer in regards to the provisions of facilities which are considered to be necessary for the Japanese army.

The Japanese army and those serving with the army shall respect the regulations of hospitality given by a friendly country. All expenses shall be charged to the Imperial Japanese Government.

Movement and transportation shall be strictly limited to the necessity of military action, this being guaranteed and under the effective direction of the French military authorities.

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(Attached Document No. 5)

Tentative translation of the draft of the Exchange of Notes concerning the French Indo-China issues, which was presented by the French Ambassador in TOKYO to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 20.

The French Government proposes that military and economic negotiations, and the various assurances as to the respect of French sovereignty in, and the territorial integrity of Indo-China shall be given in the form of an Exchange of Notes. The French Ambassador has the honour of inserting the following draft of the note to be sent from your Excellency the Foreign Minister to the French Ambassador. The French Ambassador, in reply to the aforesaid note, shall send a note citing the original as it is and giving the approval of the same.

The Draft of the Letter

Mr. Ambassador,

I, /the Foreign Minister/ have had the opportunity of conveying to your Excellency, in the course of repeated conferences, that Japan desires to abide by the Franco-Japanese Agreement of June 10th, 1907, and maintain the policy decided and carried out since that day.

The objective of the above-mentioned agreement is in the maintenance of mutual position and territorial rights of both High Contracting Parties in the Asiatic Continent. Therefore, it is easy this day, to give

to Your Excellency the assurance that the Japanese Government desires to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France in the whole area of the Union of Indo-China.

On the other hand, I acknowledge your Excellency's letter to the effect that the French government recognizes Japan's predominant interest in the Far East in both the political and economic fields.

In the economic field I state that the French Government is prepared to consider a method to assure the predominant position of Japan and its nationals compared to that of other countries in Indo-China, according to the spirit of the announcement of June 10th, 1907, made by the French Government.

In regards to the provision of military facilities for which the Japanese Government intends to negotiate with the French Government to obtain their recognition, I deem it necessary to call to the Ambassador's attention that this request is based entirely on the desire to settle the dispute between the Japanese Government and Generalissimo Chiang-kai shek and that this exceptional and temporary provision of facilities will disappear in the event of the settlement of the above dispute, Furthermore, limited to the Indo-China and Chinese border zone.

The Japanese Government is prepared to instruct the Japanese army staff to negotiate with the French Indo-China Army staff in HANOI in regards to military problems.

The above negotiations shall be conducted under the following conditions:

Declaring upon their word of honour as soldiers the aforesaid military authorities shall exchange information enabling them to judge correctly the needs of the Japanese Army and the method to execute the same satisfactorily. The above requirements shall be confined to military operations in the TONKING and Chinese border zone.

In order to provide military facilities deemed necessary as a result of the above exchange of information, mutually trustworthy relations between Japanese and French military authorities shall be established.

It is needless to say that the Japanese Army which enjoys the aforesaid facilities shall respect the rules of cordial treatment which the friendly nation may offer without shouldering any financial expenditures and that the above facilities shall be strictly confined to the necessities of Japanese military operations and assured under the supervision of French military authorities.

(Attached Document No. 6, 1)

Exchange of Notes (Draft of)

(Notes sent)

Mr. Ambassador. The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the air-fields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

Furthermore, I wish to state that Japan has no intention at all to infringe on other territory of French Indo-China.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's Obediant Servant

* * * * *

(Attached Document No. 6, 2)

(Draft of) Exchanges of Notes

(Notes received).

Mr. Minister

I have the honour of acknowledging the following letter from Your Excellency.

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

Furthermore, I wish to state that Japan has no intention at all to infringe on the territory of French Indo-China.

I have the honour of replying that, according to instructions of the home government, the government of France together with approving the predominant position of Japan in the Far East and well understanding the spirit of goodwill expressed in Your Excellency's letter cited above, do hereby accept the desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(Attached Document No. 7, 1)

(Draft of) Exchange of Notes.

(letter to be sent)

Mr. Ambassador: The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

In regards to the above problem, I wish to add that the said desires voiced by the Government of Japan are based on the necessity from standpoint of operations against China; the contents of which are of an exceptional and temporary character; Japan has no intentions whatsoever of infringing upon the territory of French Indo-China; when the government of France approves the above desires of the government of Japan, the same shall shoulder the expenses resulting from military action taken by the Japanese Army in Indo-China; and wish the Japanese and French authorities on the spot to confer secretly as to the details of /military/action/to be taken/ and the responsibilities of the expenses resulting from the said activities.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's Obediant Servant.

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(Attached Document No. 7, 2)

(Draft of) Exchange of Notes.

(letter to be received)

Mr. Minister: I have the honour of acknowledging the following letter from your Excellency.

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-

China and recognize the use of the airfields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

In regards to the above problems, I wish to add that the said desires voiced by the Government of Japan are based on necessity from the standpoint of operations against China; the contents of which are of a temporary and exceptional character; Japan has no intention whatsoever of infringing upon the territory of French Indo-China; when the Government of France approves the above desires of the Government of Japan, the same shall shoulder the expenses resulting from military action taken by the Japanese Army in Indo-China; and wish the Japanese and French authorities on the spot to confer secretly as to the details of /military/action/to be taken/ and the responsibilities of the expenses resulting from the said activities.

I have the honour of replying that according to the instructions of the Home Government, the Government of France fully understanding the friendly spirit expressed by the Government of Japan in your Excellency's letter, do hereby recognize Japan's dominant position in the Far East, and at the same time accept the afore-mentioned desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(Attached Document No. 8)

Tentative translation of the letter received from the French Ambassador concerning the French Indo-China problem, which was presented to Vice-Minister OHASHI by the French Ambassador in Tokyo on 25th August.

Mr. Minister:

I have the honour of notifying Your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East. Therefore the Government of France expects the Government of Japan will give assurance(s) to the Government of France that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China, and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

In regards to problems in the economical field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, (and superior compared to that of other foreign countries,) to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands that the said provision of facilities is completely based on Japan's desire to resolve the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang-kai-shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary and will cease in the event such a conflict is resolved, and shall be limited to the boundary province/s/ of Indo-China facing China.

Under the above-mentioned conditions, the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indo-China to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. Demands submitted by the Japanese government shall not be excluded a priori from the said agreement, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the aforesaid authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following conditions. Both military commanders shall upon their word of honour as soldiers exchange information which would correctly clarify the necessity of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied.

The above-mentioned desires /literally translated "necessity"/ of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in boundary province(s) and of Indo-China facing China. Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the French and Japanese military authorities to provide the military facilities to the Japanese Army. The Government of France shall not take any financial

responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall be strictly limited to strategic necessities and shall be conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that enemy which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

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(Attached Document No. 9)

(Draft of the letter, relating to the French Indo-China Problem, to be sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs).

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honour of acknowledging the following note dated month day from your Excellency.

(Insert herein the complete letter of the French Ambassador).

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of Japan anticipating a speedy achievement of Japan's desires in the negotiations which are foreseen in your Excellency's letter do hereby accept your aforesaid proposals and simultaneously request that the Government of France urgently issue necessary instructions to the authorities on the spot.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant.

(Attached Document 10 - 1)

(Translation of letter from the French Ambassador)

30 August Showa 15 /1940/

Mr. Minister.

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East.

Therefore, the Government of France anticipates the Government of Japan will give their assurance/s/ to the Government of France, that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China, and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

In regards to the economic field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the promotion of trade between Indo-China and Japan, as well as the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, and superior compared to that of the Third Power, to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands the purport of the Imperial Government to be completely in the settlement of the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary, ceasing in the event such a conflict is resolved and shall be applied to only that province of Indo-China adjacent to China. Under the above-mentioned condition the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indo-China. to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. The demands submitted by the Imperial Japanese Government shall not be excluded a priori, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the above authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following condition

Both military commanders shall, upon their word of honour as soldiers, exchange information which would clarify the necessities of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied. The above mentioned desires /literally translated 'necessity'/ of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in those provinces in China adjacent to Indo-China.

Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the French and Japanese military authorities to provide the necessary military facilities to the Japanese Army. The

Government of France shall not take any financial responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall not be of a military occupational nature, but strictly limited to strategic necessities and conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that enemy which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

I have the honour to be with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,
Charles Arsene HENRY
French Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.

His Excellency
Yosuke MATSUOKA
Foreign Minister.

* * * * *

(Attached Document No. 10 -2)

(Copy of letter to be sent by the Foreign Minister)
Europe 3. Secret No. 38.

30 August 15 Showa /1940/

Mr. Ambassador.

I have the honour to acknowledge the following letter from your Excellency, dated 30 August 15 Showa /1940/

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East.

Therefore, the Government of France anticipates the Government of Japan will give their assurance/s/ to the Government of France, that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China,

and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

In regards to the economic field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the promotion of trade between Indo-China and Japan, as well as the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, and superior compared to that of the Third Power, to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands the purport of the Imperial Government to be completely in the settlement of the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary, ceasing in the event such a conflict is resolved and shall be applied to only that province of Indo-China adjacent to China. Under the above-mentioned condition the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indo-China to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. The demands submitted by the Imperial Japanese Government shall not be excluded a priori, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the above authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following conditions.

Both military commanders shall, upon their word of honour as soldiers, exchange information which would clarify the necessities of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied. The above-mentioned desires /literally translated 'necessity'/ of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in those provinces in China adjacent to Indo-China.

Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the French and Japanese military authorities to provide the necessary military facilities to the Japanese Army. The Government of France shall not take any financial responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall not be of a military occupational nature, but strictly limited to strategic necessities and conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that enemy

which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

In reply to your letter cited above, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of Japan are with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China; accept those proposals made by the Government of France; and desire that negotiations, with the objective of satisfying Japan's demands, be commenced without delay and anticipate the speedy achievement of the objective as well as the Government of France to issue, hereafter necessary instructions to the Indo-China authorities for this purpose.

I have the honour be, with the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

Yosuke MATSUOKA
Foreign Minister.

His Excellency
Charles Arsene HENRY
French Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary.

The Circumstances surrounding the conclusion
of agreement between Japan and France

Page 109-111

18/ 9/46

Attached Document No. 11

(Translated by the Army)

Basic data for the purpose of concluding the military agreement between the representatives of the commander-in-chief of Japanese Army and Naval Forces despatched to South China and the commander-in-chief of the French Indo-China Army.

These basic data originate from the instruction issued by the French Government and was communicated to the representative of Japanese military and Naval forces on September 3, 1940.

(1) General Remarks

The negotiations about to be opened should be conducted in a most amicable atmosphere. Particularly whenever the French Military authorities show any sign of friendliness towards the Japanese Army of assist in protecting Japanese Army establishment, Japan on the other hand will full appreciate the French intention of carrying out the terms of the agreement.

Regardless of the situation, whenever the French authorities give any facilities to the Japanese army it will not bear the nature of compulsion through military occupation. The convenience thus afforded to the Japanese Army will be strictly limited to the demand of strategical and tactical situation and it will be performed under the supervision and administration of the French Military authorities.

From the position on the seacoast selected as a landing place to the strategic zone transit is free but on no account troops should be stationed for any length of time between the landing place and the strategic zone.

(2) Basic Data

No Japanese troops whatever arms they may belong to are permitted to enter "HANOI" without the special authorization of the French Commander in Chief. Movements of Japanese troops are limited to the north side of River Rouje (phonetic).

In strategic zones both French administrative and military organs will remain in their place and retain their old authorities. Whenever there arises the necessity of Japanese Army coming into contact with the natives, it will be done through the intermediary of the former.

The numerical strength of the Japanese ground forces existing in the district of Tonkin including both its combatant and non-combatant personnel must not exceed more than two third viz - 25,000 of the mobilized forces in the district of Tonkin.

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The Japanese Army promises the following items:

1. It will bear all expenses arising from transportations of men and material, billeting and any other establishment.

2. It will compensate both the Indo-China government or any private individuals with regard to the damages accruing from the presence of the Japanese Army establishment or through the belligerent actions of both Chinese and Japanese forces in the Indo-Chinese territory.

(3) Strategic Base

The Japanese Army will select one or more bases for strategical purposes in the aforementioned strategical zone.

The positions of strategical bases are as follows:

The district of North and North East of the line (including the native settlement) connecting IENU (phonetic), BAICHIYUJENU (phonetic), KAN (phonetic), TAINU (phonetic), KUIENU (phonetic) and KEPU (phonetic).

(Pages 112 - 115)

The Japanese military authorities have complete freedom for the purpose of selecting one or several strategical bases which are to be chosen under the following conditions; that is, the French authorities will superintend the bases, strictly restrict the losses to be sustained by individuals and make requests for compensation for losses immediately.

The selected landing point is to be "HAI-PHONG". This port cannot be made a strategical base. The landing point is to be one, and is to be released in as short a period as possible after the landing of troops and military supplies.

(4) Lines of Communication

The Japanese authorities may use the following lines for military operations:-

Railroads

HAI-PHONG	---	GIA-LAM
GIA-LAM	---	LANG-SON
GIA-LAM	---	LAOKAY

Roads

HAI-PHONG	---	GIA-LAM
GIA-LAM	---	LANG-SON
GIA-LAM	---	YEN-BAY

According to circumstances the following line can be made available, after obtaining the special consent of the French military supreme commander.

GIA-LAM -- THAI-NGUYEN -- CAO-BUANG -- TUYEN-QUANG --
HA-GIANG Road

However, the abovementioned roads are to be used only according to the requirements of military operations and only during the period necessary for the operation of transport troops.

The method of carrying out this transportation is to be regulated by the agreement between the Japanese and French army authorities.

It is only the French military supreme commander who is qualified to determine the abovementioned course and to grant permission for the sake of reaching one or several strategical bases. The guarding of the communication roads shall be undertaken by French or Japanese troops according to the districts decided.

On principle the guarding of the part from "HAI-PHONG" to the selected strategical bases is to be undertaken by the French troops.

(5) Air Force

The three air-fields situated to the north of the "ROUGE" River /that is, "PHU-THO", "VINH-YEN" and "LAOKAY"/ can be used and equipped by the Japanese air force.

The military personnel applied for the guarding of these air-fields is to be reduced to the strictest possible minimum and the number of such personnel is to be decided by mutual agreement between the Japanese and French military authorities.

The French authorities are to decide the area where aviation is forbidden as well as aviation regulations in the territorial sky.

The French military authorities are to be informed of the movement of airplanes without the district of military operations 24 hours in advance.

(6) Warships and Transportation

The landing of the personnel and supplies of the Japanese military forces must be carried out only by transports. The warships conveying these transports must not enter within six nautical miles off the line connecting DOSOM /phonetic/ and APPOWANU /phonetic/. However, one Japanese warship not bigger than a torpedo-boat may enter the port of HAI-PHONG and stay there on the aforementioned conditions.

The French authorities must be informed of the arrival of all groups of Japanese transports and also of the number of soldiers to be landed at least 24 hours in advance.

The number of ships to be moored alongside the wharf will be limited by mutual agreement with the Japanese authorities. The number of the port establishments will likewise be limited and it is a matter of course that the use of these establishments will not be permanent.

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The anchoring positions of the Japanese transport ships will be decided by mutual consent.

The refuelling of ships along the coast of Indo-China must be strictly limited and carried on only in those anchorage harbors determined by mutual consent of both parties.

(7) Wireless telegrams

Powerful fixed wireless installations, excepting for field wireless apparatuses shall not be established in Indo-Chinese territory. This does not apply to ship wireless. The question of laying a submarine cable between the coast of TONGKING and HAINAN will be studied separately.

(8) Important matters that demand special attention.

Unless the final agreement is signed by both parties and unless the date of the coming into effect of this agreement is determined, the Japanese military, naval, and aerial forces cannot enter the territory or the territorial airs of Indo-China. In accordance with the consent given by the representatives of the Japanese Army and Navy no action whatsoever of any threatening nature may be resorted to.

The following will be considered as threatening actions:

Any attempt to cross the border.

Any gathering of troops near Indo-Chinese territory.

(Note) This implies that more forces than at present shall not be gathered for the purpose of the invasion of French Indo-China.

Actions of warships or transport ships in the offing.

Flying in the territorial airs. This does not apply, however, to cases where special permission has been obtained.

Unless the abovementioned conditions are observed by the Japanese forces, the French supreme commander shall suspend the negotiations already commenced and resort to freedom of action.

It goes without saying that the various basic items decided in these precautions must be kept in utmost secrecy until the time of signing of the final agreement.

Any breach of this secrecy by the Japanese authorities will be considered as a threatening measure by the French authorities and is liable to bring about the various abovementioned results.

Sept. 4 15th year of SHOWA at HANOI

(Signed) The representative of the supreme commander of the Japanese Army and Navy dispatched to South-China.

Major-General NISHIHARA,
The supreme commander of the French Indo-China forces.

General MARTIN

Attached Document No. 12

(Translated by the Army)

(Pages 119 - 121)

Agreement Concluded between the Commander of the Indo-Chinese Army and the delegates of the Japanese Army and Navy in Indo-China.

The following are dealt with in this Agreement.

- (1) Use of several air-bases in TONG-KING Province.
- (2) Stationing of a certain number of Japanese military forces.
- (3) Passing of Japanese troops through TONGKING Province in necessary cases.
- (4) Entry of Japanese advance guards into French Indo-China.

- (1) Use of several air-bases

Japanese air forces can use the following air-bases:-

GIA-LAM
LAO-KAY or PHU-LANG-CHUONG
PHU-TO

Japanese air forces can equip the said air-bases in conformity with the terms set forth in the agreement of September 4.

The number of military personnel for the guarding of the said air-bases shall be fixed by the mutual agreement of both Japanese and French authorities, and shall be limited to the irreducible necessary to carry out their duty.

(2) Stationing of a certain number of Japanese military forces.

The strength of the various Japanese troops whose duties are given as follows shall be fixed by the mutual agreement of both Japanese and French military authorities.

- (a) Guarding of the air-bases referred to in item (1).
- (b) Use of the said air-bases (fliers and ground force belonging to the Japanese air corps).
- (c) Transportation and guarding of supplies for the following Japanese troops.

The troops at the air-bases specified under Paragraph 1 and those now in operations in Chinese territory near the border-line between China and Indo-China.

- (d) Transportation through HAIPHONG Harbor and management of hospitals to be established in that district.

The said personnel strength shall be limited to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the above duties and shall under no circumstances exceed 6,000.

The stationing areas of the said personnel shall be decided with the joint consent of the Japanese and French military authorities.

A part of the said force limited to the irreducible minimum, as fixed by the agreement of both Japanese and French staff-offices, may utilize villages directly adjoining the air-bases.

This, however, is not applicable to FANOM. Neither the Japanese military headquarters nor any troops shall station at or pass through FANOM. This is not applicable, however, to the liaison officers between both staff-offices.

Equipments for the Japanese air corps and their guards at the various air-bases shall be installed by the Japanese military authorities.

HAIPHONG shall be used as a landing spot under the terms which shall be settled by the joint consent of both Japanese and French staff-offices.

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In any case, the warships shall not be permitted to approach within 6 nautical miles from the line which connects DOSON (phonetic) and ABOWAN (phonetic).

One warship not exceeding the class of torpedo boat, shall be permitted to anchor in HAIPHONG Harbor.

(3) The passage of the Japanese forces through TONG-KING State.

In case the commander of the Japanese forces wishes to conduct the attacking operation with his ground forces, starting from the northern boundary of TONG-KING State (the said commander is not considering this at present), or conduct replacement movement of the forces necessitating embarkation from HAIPHONG Port, the several traffic roads, decided by the commander of the French Forces, shall be utilized by the Japanese forces according to the operational needs.

The methods of executing the aforementioned transportation shall be prescribed according to the clauses provided in the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4, 1940.

The strength of the passing Japanese troops will be decided upon later according to the degree of necessity. However, the total strength of the passing troops and the troops described in the second clause will not exceed the number established by the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4th, 1940.

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(4) The entrance of the Japanese vanguard unit (into the country).

In view of the fact that 2200 hours on 22nd September is due to be observed strictly by the Japanese authorities, the first shipload of troops shall be authorized to enter HAIPHONG Harbor on the fixed time mentioned above.

However, unless special agreements as to the debarkation clauses of the landing troops and clauses concerning movement to the station points are concluded, the troops shall be detained within the ship and other transport vessels shall not enter the harbor.

(5) The transportation of the Japanese forces passing through TONG-KING State.

The Japanese forces now stationed in the vicinity of the border between China and Indo-China are permitted to be transported through the territory of French Indo-China for the purpose of embarkation at HAIPHONG Port, in accordance with the request of the Japanese authorities.

Since the transportation of these forces necessitates detailed studies, a special agreement is necessary between both General Staff Offices.

And unless this agreement is concluded, no Japanese corps forces will cross the French Indo-China border.

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General Matters

Except for the various matters prescribed in this agreement, it is only natural that all of the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4th, 1940, be effective.

Henceforth, in order to decide the methods of executing this agreement, the two General Staff-Offices will constantly keep in touch with each other.

September 22, 1940.

in HANOI.

Second Lieutenant NISHIHARA. Major-General

General Officer MARTAN. (phonetic)

-END-

Excerpts from "Business Report of South Seas Section
in 1940"

/p.19/ Section 3. The embargo on supplies aiding the Chiang regime and the matters concerning the occupational forces in French Indo-China.

(1) The suspension of transportation of munitions via French Indo-China and the dispatch of the Japanese observation party.

Despite the notification forwarded to us by the French Indo-China authorities in October, 1937 stating her decision to suspend the transportation of weapons to China via French Indo-China, according to information obtained the transportation /of weapons/ was continued as before, therefore we often filed protests against the French. However, every time the French denied our information always giving us deceptive answers saying that there was no change in their policy to stop transportation and the transportation of weapons now being continued was the fulfillment of a contract made between China prior to 15th July 1937. Japan, therefore, resolved early in 1939 to resort to force to carry out the interception of the transportation of weapons.

However, since the outbreak of the European War, France's attitude toward Japan showed some improvement. As she showed signs of her desire to adjust the relations between Japan and France by solving the pending questions, we, therefore, replied that we would negotiate to adjust the diplomatic relations provided France would be ready to stop the transportation of munitions, gasoline, trucks and all other commodities which might increase the resisting power of the CHIANG regime via French Indo-China. /p.20/ France (A) denying our information, stated that she had prohibited the transportation of genuine weapons and ammunitions, though she had no legal obligation to do so, and actually there was no truth of the transportation of the said supplies and, (B) not responding to our desires stated it regrettable that Japan should demand France to stop the transportation of such commercial goods as gasoline, trucks and others despite the fact that there was no declaration of war between Japan and China ever. Japan replied that (a) our information was obtained through a reliable source reveals that weapons and ammunitions have sometimes been sent to CHIANG KAI-SHEK by way of French Indo-China and that a large amount of such munitions other than genuine weapons and ammunition, as gasoline, trucks and airplanes have been transported. (b) The Japanese forces in the KWANGSI Campaign captured a large amount of

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arms, ammunition, gasoline and other munitions apparently from French Indo-China, (c) the amount of the transportation by the YUNNAN railway approximately doubled after the interception of the NANNIN route as a result of the KWANGSI Campaign. (d) In modern warfare, gasoline, trucks and airplanes like weapons and ammunition are munitions that increase the fighting power (e) in the CHINA incident, Japan refrained from placing any limitation upon the ships and cargoes bound for French Indo-China in view of the friendly relations between Japan and France, however, France in the European War in which she was a belligerent, afflicted upon us great losses in the various measures toward Japanese ships bound for Europe by extending the items of contraband of war. (f) The French authorities have roused resentment among the Japanese people by declaring they would aid CHIANG KAI-SHEK at the League of Nations and on various other occasions, and actually conducted acts of assisting CHIANG by transporting munitions and granting railway loans. Japan furthermore, notified France of her desires that she recognize the present situation of the large-scale hostilities existing between Japan and China, and that France voluntarily take resolute steps, to stop the transportation/of war materials/ from the political standpoint and the general situation irrespective of legal argument as to the existence of a legal obligation to stop the transportation of munitions or the existence of a declaration of war. As France, however, reiterated what they had said before and did not show any sincerity to achieve a political solution of the matter, Japan was obliged because of strategic necessity to bomb the YUNNAN Railway in Chinese territory since the end of 1939. Concerning the bombing France filed protests against Japan several times and demanded compensation. Japan, however, answered that the bombing was a self-defense measure and that as Art 24, clause 2 of the Sino-Japanese agreement concluded in 1903, concerning the construction and management of the YUNNAN Railway, stipulates that the railway shall lose its neutrality in the case CHINA becomes belligerent, there is no necessity for Japan to indemnifying France.

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Before long, the repair of the YUNNAN Railway was completed and freight transportation became possible, thereby necessitating our Army to once more resort to armed force. However, as negotiations for the adjustment of general diplomatic relations between Japan and France had at last just begun, it was preferred that France be persuaded to suspend the transportation of war materials to CHIANG voluntarily, instead of resorting to brute force. Then, in the middle of March, 1940, Japan proposed that France suspend the transportation of arms, gasoline and trucks destined for CHIANG KAI-SHEK during the time when the negotiations to adjust the general diplomatic relations between Japan and France were being

conducted and Japan shall also refrain from using military force during that period, and continued negotiations. France, however, failing to appreciate Japan's efforts showed such an undesirable attitude as to say that though she shall suspend the transportation of gasoline and trucks during the month of March, thenceforth, she shall decide on the matter of transportation in relation with other important problems. Therefore, Japan concluded that it would be impossible to continue further negotiations any longer even as a temporary measure as long as France adheres to such an attitude and instructed the Japanese Ambassador in France to notify the French authorities to the above effect. Thus the negotiations were suspended for a while (during which period the transportation of munitions to CHIANG was still continued while Japan also bombed the YUNNAN Railway late in April). In the meantime, with the advance of the German attack against France, the French Government, since the latter part of May, asked Japanese companies for airplanes and large amounts of various ammunition. Japan replied that she would endeavor to meet France's desire as far as possible if France would accept Japan's request of the pending Franco-Japanese problems, especially the suspension of transportation of munitions to CHIANG via French Indo-China. Since, the war situation in France proper showed a rapid progress, Japan notified France on June 19 through the French Ambassador in TOKYO, Mr. HENRY that Japan could no longer overlook the continuation of the transportation of munitions to CHIANG via French Indo-China, because of the growing dissatisfaction toward France among the Japanese people. The Ambassador replied that the Governor-General of French Indo-China decided on 17th June to suspend with his own authority the transportation of not only arms and ammunitions to CHIANG but trucks and gasoline. When we requested the acceptance of our proposal concerning the corroboration of the said decision, the Ambassador answered that as he had advised the Governor-General to enforce the complete blockade on the frontier between French Indo-China and China, the Governor-General had decided to corroborate this, and also decided to accept the dispatch of military experts for inspecting the circumstances regarding the transportation of supplies via French Indo-China.

Consequently, Japan requested France to maintain strict control over the activities of China, and the Chinese who appear to be planning the concealment and smuggling of stored supplies in French Indo-China as a result of the Governor-General's decision, and moreover requested that Major OBANA in HANOI who was to be sent as a temporary

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/p.24/

expedient prior to the arrival of the military experts in order to hurriedly inspect the circumstances of the suspension of transportation /of munitions/, be afforded /necessary/ facilities.

/p.25/ Simultaneously, on June 22, Japan proposed to France the following three items /pertaining to the dispatch of the Japanese observers/

(a) As we desire to dispatch thirty military experts and ten Foreign Office officials (three of whom shall be the staff members of the Japanese Consulate-General in HANOI), and several interpreters to French Indo-China to inspect the circumstances the suspension of the transportation of supplies, it is desired that an easy entrance and all necessary facilities for execution of their respective duties be afforded to the dispatched personnel and those liaison officials who may be sent to French Indo-China at any time from Japan or China.

(b) As we desire to dispatch an advance party of about seven army and naval officers and non-commissioned officers from China by a mine-sweeper, it is requested that similar facilities are afforded them.

(c) The list of the materials that Japan will request of the French Indo-China authorities to suspend the transportation to China, will be decided after the inspection on the spot by the said party, and up to that time, the French Indo-China authorities are requested to continue a complete blockade of the frontier between French Indo-China and China.

France accepted the above requests and the inspectors were dispatched as per schedule.

Subsequently Japan requested France that: (a) As far as the transportation of supplies for China via the leased territory of the Bay of KWANGCHOW are continued, the effects of the measures taken by France to prohibit the transportation of supplies to China will be greatly diminished, therefore Japan had previously requested the prohibition of the above route. Also although it is expected that steps to prohibit the above have been duly taken, Japan desires to dispatch two or three Imperial Japanese Naval officers and non-commissioned officers to that area from China in order to inspect the measures of prohibition, as well as liaison personnel who will be sent at any time from China in small war vessels, it is desired that easy entrance and all facilities necessary in executing their duties be afforded them. (b) The French Indo-China authorities are desired to ban the

/p.26/ importation of all materials from China
for a period of one month starting 7 July.

The above mentioned requests were also
accepted by France.

/p.27/ (2) The advancement of Japanese forces into
northern French Indo-China.

The observation party previously mentioned
consisting of forty officials of the Army,
Navy and Foreign Ministry headed by Major-
General NISHIMURA arrived at HANOI on the
29th June and started their work. The French
authorities enforced the blockade on the
frontier with sincerity.

(P 32) The bombing of the passenger-train on the YUNNAN Railway.

Regarding the negotiations adjusting the diplomatic relations between Japan and France, which have been continued since last year, we were studying various counter measures.

At that time when the YUNNAN-Railway was bombed for the second time by our naval planes, a bomb made a direct hit on a passenger train, which happened to be on the railway killing five French (two women and two children) and killing or injuring many ANNAMITE and Chinese. The French Prime Minister requested the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, Mr. SAWADA, to make a satisfactory explanation as to this incident, saying that, since 1937 the French Government had never transported arms upon the honour of France, however notwithstanding this, Japan had often bombed the railway without giving any evidence of the transportation of arms, and moreover, to even injure the lives of women is very regrettable from the standpoint of our diplomatic relations. On the assumption that he was not in a position to explain the incident since he had not yet received any official report, the Ambassador repeatedly explained Japan's policy toward the bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway and suggested the necessity of a voluntary suspension of all transportation of supplies to CHIANG via the YUNNAN-Railway to avoid the recurrence of such an unfortunate incident.

(P 33) Moreover, from the outset the French publicized that the bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway was conducted by the forces on the spot, not according to the orders from headquarters, and articles concerning the bombings appeared in the SHANGHAI newspapers, irritating the feelings of the Japanese forces on the spot. Therefore, Ambassador SAWADA was instructed to explain to the French authorities that the bombings of the YUNNAN Railway were not, as already often explained, only the activities of the forces on the spot, and hitherto it was decided that as a principle the bombing target was limited to railways or railway bridges, and so long as trains were not used for a military purpose they would not be bombed; this policy was adhered to by the forces on the spot. However, the bombing of the train was due to a mistake resulting from bombing in very difficult conditions while resisting heavy defense-fire from enemy fighter planes and the anti-aircraft batteries on the ground in that neighbourhood. None of the pilots had admitted the existence of a train in the vicinity of the targets, only later on, after examining the aerial photograph with magnifying glasses that an object similar to that of a stationary train in the direction of the tunnel to the north of the central part of the bridge, was distinguished.

(P 34) On February 5th, the French Ambassador in TOKYO called on vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, TANI, and handed the following protests:

(1) The French Government shall lodge a protest against the act of damages afflicted upon French property through the recent bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway.

(2) As a result of the bombing the casualties known are 40 killed (including 5 Frenchmen) and 84 ANNANESE, and Chinese wounded.

(3) The French Government shall reserve the right to demand compensation as soon as the circumstances of the damages are clarified.

Simultaneously stated that this incident will have a very bad influence on American public opinion, and similarly French opinion is greatly enraged. In reply vice-Minister, TANI, stated that as details have not yet been clarified Japan is ready to take fair and reasonable measures, after investigation, however, according to the information obtained, it is said that there are traces of the train being used for military purposes, and citing the following points, called attention of the Ambassador:

(1) As far as the transportation of munitions and other supplies are continued, from the strategic standpoint, Japan shall be obliged to bomb the YUNNAN-Railway.

(P 35) (2) France seems to be restrained by the "non-existence of a declaration of war", however, Britain has formally recognized that large-scale hostilities are going on between Japan and China, and though for the purpose of improving Franco-Japanese relation, discussions as to the separate problems which successively occur (for example, the joint investigation of the booty in KWANGSI) have been held, but with little avail. Therefore, it is necessary that France, too, like Britain, recognize the existence of hostilities between Japan and China and considering all problems from this standpoint we believe that today is the time to adjust the diplomatic relations between the two countries, basing such on a broad minded viewpoint.

(3) Although France has hitherto advocated her neutrality toward the China Incident, the Japanese people believe that France is adopting a pro-CHIANG policy in consideration of her official announcements at the League of Nations and at other places, or in her actions of granting credit to China, aid given in the construction of railways in China and the transportation of supplies to CHIANG, etc. Japan shall not ignore France's considerations toward her domestic relation or the third-countries relations, and not request France's official announcement as to the suspension of the pro-CHIANG

(P 36) activities. Japan will be satisfied with the actual suspension of all such pro-CHIANG activities, such as refraining from the repair of the damaged railway and report to CHIANG kai-SHEK or the third powers that the repair of the railway is impossible, and so forth.

(P 36) (4) Although Japan originally desired the transportation of all supplies to CHIANG to be suspended, however, when that is difficult, at least the suspension of the transportation of those articles mentioned below, which are already listed as "contraband of war" by France is desired:

- (1) Arms and ammunitions.
- (2) Airplanes and parts thereof.
- (3) Trucks, other automobiles and parts thereof.
- (4) Gasoline and other oils.
- (5) Metals, machines and other metal goods.
- (6) Locomotives, freight cars and railway materials.
- (7) Chemicals.

(P 37) (5) If France takes effective and appropriate steps toward our demands Japan will negotiate with the military authorities to stop the bombing of the YUNNAN Railway and moreover there is ground for consideration of not only the maintenance but also the promotion of French interests in both the new Chinese Government's and Japanese Army's sphere of influence. In reply Ambassador HENRY stated that the Japanese Government seems to be recognizing the actions of the militarists one after another, however, such an attitude will have a bad influence on American public opinion and that despite the denial of the French Government, the Japanese authorities make announcement as though the French authorities were transporting munitions to the CHIANG regime, however, it is regrettable, that the Japanese authorities do not present any evidence. Vice-Minister TANI retaliated that, the former was without basis, and as to the latter, our information was obtained through reliable sources and according to information from the various sources we are aware even of the existence of an entente concerning the supply of goods between France and China.

(P 38) Due to the comparatively slight damages of the railway itself and the few casualties among French nationals as well as the maintenance of the policy by the French Government to avoid the aggravation of the public opinion toward Japan, the bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway in the past did not become a problem of public interest in France, however, as French nationals, especially women, were killed public discussion of the problem has been permitted. But in handling this matter the Government seems to have unofficially instructed the newspapers the following points:

(1) It is surprising that the bombings were repeated while negotiations concerning the YUNNAN Railway were being held between the Japanese authorities and not only French Indo-China, but also the French home Government;

(2) According to the impression obtained in TOKYO, the bombings seem to have been conducted by the unilateral decision of the forces on the spot.

(3) However, the French Government intends to maintain the hitherto friendly relations between France and Japan.

- (P 38) The comments of the various papers were based on the above points in general and no specially radical comments were noticed. The criticism of the "TEMPS" concerning this issue was that although the matter was of a very important nature, great attention must be focused on the matter to prevent it becoming worse. Public opinion in Japan is easily aroused and moreover we must not forget that there are some who are plotting to stir up Japanese public opinion against Britain and America. France can expect a fair resolution of the matter through diplomatic measures without injuring the dignity of a great power. While in French Indo-China the "VOLONTE" (phonetic) strongly advocated that a strong protest be filed (with Japan), and not only is there a necessity to demand compensation for the casualties sustained by French nationals and ANNAMENSE, but also a guarantee for the future. Although the President of the YUNNAN-Railway Company made an address, stressing the same points, at the funeral of the French nationals killed, which was pompously held in HANOI, in general there was no radical opinions, thus reflecting the cautious attitude of the authorities toward this matter.
- (P 39)

Concerning this matter, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. SAWADA, called on vice-Minister, Mr. REDIE (phonetic) and stated that as long as the transportation of the munitions is continued Japan shall be obliged to bomb the railway, and that Japan heartily hopes France will recognize, like Britain, the existence of hostilities between Japan and China, and to stop at least the transportation of those above-mentioned items which were pointed out by Japanese vice-Minister, TANI. Vice-Minister, REDIE (phonetic) replied that although the French authorities had already voluntarily stopped the transportation of arms, it is unreasonable of Japan to make such a demand equal to suspension of all traffic on the railroad. As this was only a repetition of the old argument, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that it was not the time to adhere to legal theories, and of the necessity for France to make a decision for a political solution. The vice-Minister, Mr. REDIE, replied that in view of the fact that in the past France had persevered and only being flatly refused by Japan (literally translated as hit on the head), and out of consideration of domestic opinion, it is impossible to make such a resolution, in any case, France will reconsider the matter on receiving a formal reply from the Japanese Government as to their recent proposal.

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On February 20th, vice-Minister, TANI, asked the French Ambassador in TOKYO, Mr. HENRY, to visit him and handed him the following memorandum: "Railway bridge No. 7 was the main target of the bombing on February 1st and the bombing of the train was by no means planned from the outset. The bombing on that day was conducted under the most difficult conditions, of running the risk of unfavourable air currents and averting the attacks of enemy planes and anti-aircraft gun barrage from an altitude of 3,800 meters. And due to the railway-bridge, other constructions and shadows, none of the pilots were able to identify the train which was stationary on the railway-bridge at that time. It was entirely an accident that the bomb /

dropped

/P 40/ dropped by a plane of the Imperial Armed Forces hit the train, however, the Imperial Japanese Government regrets that as a result of the bombing there were French and Annamese casualties, and is willing to pay a reasonable sum of condolence money to the French nationals."

/P 41/ On May 7, Ambassador HENRY replied by letter that upon notifying the Governor General of the decision of the Japanese Government, he instructed him to request a compensation of 175,030 pesos (120,000 pesos for the 5 French nationals, 55,030 for the Indo-China victims), explaining that in determining the above, the social-standing of the victims were considered, and to obtain a thorough investigation several months have been required; and at the same time presented an explanatory note.

The authorities concerned were instructed to investigate as to whether this sum demanded was appropriate or not, while on the other hand this matter was being studied in connection with the French attitude toward the illegal firing on Japanese fishermen at French NEW CALEDONIA. However, on October 28th, the Ambassador repeatedly demanded the Japanese Government to pay the sum, saying that the compensation-money was urgently needed by the victims.

/P. 49/ (6) The bombing by the Japanese plane in HAIPHONG

At the time of the entry of the Japanese forces into French Indo-China, on September 26th a Japanese bomber dropped 4 bombs on the city of HAIPHONG killing 15 and injuring 18 persons and causing other material losses. On October 7th the Councillor of the French Embassy in Tokyo notified the Chief of the 3rd section of the Eurasian Bureau, Mr. ISHIZAWA the contents of the case. However, as it became evident that this bombing was due to the carelessness of the pilots, the forces on the spot expressed their regret and settled the matter by paying 33,000 peso as compensation money.

- /P. 67/ (5) The dispatch of a cruiser of the Imperial Japanese Navy to SAIGON.

A telegram was received from the Counsul General in HANOI Mr. SATOH stating that to assert Japan's power in southern French Indo-China and to control anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese residents in the SAIGON district, to facilitate the purchasing of rice and to prevent manoeuvres by Britain and America, an Imperial Japanese cruiser was scheduled to be despatched to SAIGON (expected around the middle of Dec.). Upon receiving approval from the Vichy Government as the Governor General had already agreed to it as a result of negotiations between the organ /literal translation/ SUMIDA who had previously planned the despatch of a Japanese warship to SAIGON and the Government-General and using this opportunity an exchange of good will was going to be held for about one week. However, later on the Government-General informed the organ SUMIDA that they had received instructions from the Vichy Government that this matter should be negotiated between the Japanese Ambassador in France and the French Home Government, and in view of the current situation believe it to be unappropriate to enforcethe program immediately and that they wish to postpone it for a while. As the organ SUMIDA accepted this proposal, the plan was naturally not realized.

- /P. 69/ (7) The dispatch of the French Indo-China military delegation to America.

The French Indo-China authorities dispatched a military delegation consisting of infantry brigade commander, Colonel JACOMY, Major BERITZRON and two others, to the U.S. in order to obtain support of America to resist Japan. The party arrived at San Francisco on July 21st. When it became apparent that they were endeavoring to purchase 200 military planes etc., the Chief of the Third section of the Eurasian Bureau Mr. ISHIZAW invited the Councillor of the French Embassy in Tokyo, Mr. FAN /phonetic/ on Dec. 3rd and orally proposed that although Japan appreciates the efforts taken by the French Home Government to maintain and promote friendly relations toward Japan, it is most unwarrantable for the French Indo-China authorities who are supposed to be under the control of the Home Government, to conduct such anti-Japanese manoeuvres, so in the future ask them to refrain from such enfriendly

acts. Simultaneously he instructed the Charge d'Affaires to the Vichy Government, Mr. HARADA to propose the same to the French authorities.

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On October 8th, the Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the French Foreign Ministry explained to the Charge d'Affaires to the Vichy Government, Mr. HARADA that the military delegation was dispatched to U.S. prior to the conclusion of the truce-agreement between Germany and France and the supplies to be purchased were scheduled to be transported to France, and later, on October 11th, as the director stated that in view of the attitude of the third powers, especially THAILAND, the French authorities are considering of transporting the supplies to French Indo-China according to the original plan, the Charge d'Affaires Mr. HARADA called attention of the French authorities concerning the bad influence the dispatch of the said delegation has made on Japan.

The French Ambassador in Tokyo also proposed to Vice-Minister OHASHI, with a verbal note, to a same effect and at the same time the Governor-General of French Indo-China stated that he only carried out the order of the Home Government and stressed that the sincerity of the Governor-General and his cooperation with the Japanese authorities be not obstructed because of unreliable information and continued that in order to check the menace of THAILAND, French Indo-China asked Japan to take suitable measures, however, despite our request, Japan refused to intervene so it is not uncomprehensible why French Indo-China is earnest in securing supplies necessary to defend herself by herself against attacks from THAILAND. However, if Japan were to take any measures as a mediator between THAILAND and French Indo-China, the concern of the defense of French Indo-China will not be so urgent and strong, and suggested Japan's assistance in the improvement of the tense relations between French Indo-China and THAILAND. (The verbal note of the French Embassy in Tokyo, dated on December 2.)

/P. 119/ (3) The frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

After the revolution of 1932 and 1933 in Thailand, the racial consciousness of the people became outstanding and the re-construction movement in the country developed into the demand of the recovery of natural power or lose territory.

Furthermore, in June, 1939 the name of Siam was changed to Thailand, and the movement of the recovery of lose territory developed more and more. In order to maintain neighborly friendship between Thailand and French Indo-China, the principle for opening negotiations about the non-aggression pact was recognized in October of the same year and on July 12th, 1940 the French-Thai non-aggression pact was concluded, so both governments appointed its commissioner to discuss the revision of the border of the Mekong River which was a condition of the pact. However, the French situation was extremely weakened owing to the defeat in the war against Germany in Europe, meanwhile, Japan's predominant interests in political and economic circles in East Asia were recognized by the MATSUOKA-HENRY Agreement concluded on Aug. 30, 1940. Thailand, stimulated by a sudden and serious agitation and change in international relations demanded in a memorandum dated 13 Sept., as a condition for the exchange of ratification of the non-aggression treaty, the revision of the Mekong River frontier according to the deepest part of the river principle stipulated by international law, and the recognition of the Thai-French Indo-China boundary along the R. Mekong north and south of Cambodia,

and south of Cambodia,
(p. 121)

by insisting that the circumstances in French Indo-China were no longer normal. This demand meant the cession of the areas along the right bank of River Mekong across from Luang Prabang and Bakuse (Note: ceded from Siam to France by 1904 Treaty) to Thailand. Thailand, in addition, expressed her hope to obtain a guarantee from the French that the territory of Cambodia and Laos would be returned to Thailand in the case when France renounces her sovereignty over Indo-China.

The French Government replied in a memorandum dated 19th Sept, stating that although she will agree to establishing a committee for the resolution of the pending questions, she will not be able to respond to any demand that may alter the territorial integrity of French Indo-China as there has been no change in the status thereof; thus flatly refusing Thai's demands. Therefore the Thailand Government again submitted a memorandum on the 28th Sept, repeating the above demands advocating that the R. Mekong constituted an appropriate and natural boundary between French Indo-China and Thai. But, in regards to Laos and Cambodia on the left bank of the R. Mekong she was satisfied in "demanding these when the position of French Indo-China is altered."

However, as the French authorities again refused these demands 11 Oct, asserting that they, like the previous demands were without legal or factual basis, Thailand's recovery of lost territory through direct negotiations between French Indo-China and Thai were, for the time being discontinued. Thus the situation between the two countries became tense, as a result Thailand concentrated troops along the French Indo-China border, while French Indo-China also increased her garrisons along the frontier, the tension being so great that it was on the verge of explosion. But as the advance of Japanese forces into French Indo-China being limited to the northern district, and the remainder of French Indo-China being guaranteed by Japan, the ensuing chaos which Thai anticipated did not occur, consequently Thailand was placed in a dilemma, and compelled to depend on Japan in the achievement of her aims.

In the beginning, Japan did not like Thai to adopt such an attitude regards the recovery of her lost territory when we were negotiating to enter French Indo-China. We did not think it the best policy to assist Thai in her demands for the recovery of lost territory immediately after we had entered French Indo-China and had to obtain the cooperation of the French. When in Sept and Oct 1940 the

Thailand Government sent a friendly delegation headed by Col. Plomu, Vice Minister of the Dept. of Defense to sound our new foreign policy and intentions towards the problem of the recovery of lost territory we adopted a neutral attitude.

The problem of the entry in Thai being settled it was essential that Thailand cooperate with Japan and an economic agreement be concluded for the acquisition of rice and other important raw materials and furthermore, to separate Thai from Britain in consideration of the southern problems of the future. As the U.S. and Britain have actively commenced maneuvers vis-a-vis Thailand, it is necessary that they are prevented. Therefore, it was decided that to take up the problem of the recovery of lost territory which Thailand earnestly desired would be to draw her on our side, and at the same time would stimulate the French Indo-China problem. At the Four-Ministers Conference held on 5th Nov., it was decided to agree to assist Thailand in her recovery of lost territory and plan to make Thailand cooperate both politically and economically in the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. This was conveyed to Thailand. Following, at the second Four-Ministers Conference held on the 21st Nov, it was decided that when Thailand accepts our demands we would immediately assist her in the recovery of LUANG PRABANG and PAKUSE. When we proposed this to Thailand, Prime Minister PIBUN completely accepted our demands, therefore we decided to assist her in the recovery of lost territory.

Prior to this, FIC-Thailand relations had gradually become tense regarding the problem of lost territory. Both countries gathered troops on the border, and airplanes infringing upon another's territory became frequent, in the end, on the 28th Nov. both forces clashed in the LAOS border district. Since then, both sides have clashed on a small scale, consequently, making use of this opportunity /Foreign/ Minister MATSUOKA unofficially stated to the French Ambassador in Tokyo Mr. HENRY that he was with the intention of a peaceful arbitration in regards to the recovery of lost territory of 1904 which Thailand desires. On the 19th Nov. the French Government replied that they greatly appreciate Japan's good intentions but from the standpoint of territorial integrity will not be able to make any cessions of territory. Consequently, we only requested the French Government to reconsider her unwise firm attitude as it would not be to her advantage, and observe the trend of events for awhile.

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Item 5

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file

— TOKYO, 2 August 1940

1320 hours

Arrival 3 " "

8.40 "

No. 765 - 2 August

Urgent!!

To the State Secretary

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA yesterday invited me to the first political conversation, informing me that upon a talk with the departmental minister, the first three Embassy requests out of its continuously collected material, which I had transmitted to him through a confidant, would be complied with:

1. Transit Shipments. The Foreign Minister stated that he had heard with regret that the former government had failed to show sufficient consideration for Germany in transit shipments. He had immediately caused the appertaining ministry to take the German requests into ample consideration.

2. Damages in China. The Foreign Minister promised to work hard for a final satisfactory settlement of the matter.

3. Press. The Foreign Minister confirmed that the constant anti-German inciting carried on by certain English language newspapers here was absolutely intolerable and promised more efficient control by the Ministry of the Interior.

Furthermore, the Foreign Minister assured me that the difficulties made of late by Japanese overseas authorities re. the repatriation of German nationals from American countries would be removed.

The Foreign Minister, touched upon the soy beans problem of his own accord, saying he was ready to actively support our wishes. I have asked Legation in Hsinking to report on the present state of the matter.

The Foreign Minister then turned to general questions concerning German-Japanese relations, carrying on the conversation in a most cordial manner; he asked, notably, what attitude Germany would presumably adopt towards Japan's well-known economic Great Sphere /Grossraum/ plans in the Far East. I showed a receptive attitude towards these utterances, explaining that a German point of view could only be expected if Japan presents a concrete plan which must assure Germany of tangible and valuable advantages. The Foreign Minister recognized the justifiability of this point of view.

V.S.:

In this connection the Foreign Minister gave as the reason for the lack of substance in yesterday's government declaration and of his own mediation proposal (cf. DNB TOKYO 199 to 204), the impossibility to reveal already now the real intentions of the government. In the meantime the severe action against the British propaganda organization in Japan has already proven by deeds which course Japan is navigating. MATSUOKA asked me to tell the German Foreign Minister that ever since Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations he had maintained the point of view that Japan's continuous self isolation is impossible and that consequently an association with Germany was the only apt course; he was therefore glad to be able to realize this idea now as Foreign Minister. He expressed his wish to maintain the closest contact with me at all times.

I left no doubt with the Foreign Minister that Japan had much to catch up with to bring about even a state of truly benevolent neutrality towards Germany.

The Foreign Minister told me at the end of the conversation that he had just received the French ambassador, asking him to obtain the consent of the French Government for the passage of Japanese troops through North Indo-China and the establishment of two airfields since an attack on the Yunnan railway and Kunming was possible in no other way. He had assured the French ambassador that Japan has no territorial ambitions in Indo-China and would later evacuate the area again. The Foreign Minister hoped that the French government would see the point of these demands so as not to put the Japanese army before the necessity of enforcing the passage by violence. The French ambassador had promised to pass this on, pointing out that France could not decide for herself after the armistice negotiations, and that the matter will have to be referred to the Armistice Commission for a decision.

The Foreign Minister said he would be grateful if the German Government would not object to the Japanese wish and would likewise influence the French Government in this sense. I promised to transmit this without committing myself.

[OTT]

Certificate

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(1)

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)