

Record of the Conversation Between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the Presence of the German Foreign Minister and State Minister MEISSNER in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

* * * *

Then MATSUOKA reported on his conversations with Duce and the Pope. With Duce he had had a general conversation on the state of Europe and the war and on the relations between Italy and Germany, as well as on the future development of the world.

* * * *

Finally the Italian Chief of State talked about Soviet RUSSIA and America. It was necessary to clearly understand the strength of one's adversaries. America was Enemy No. 1, with Soviet RUSSIA ranking next.

* * * *

He (MATSUOKA) agreed with these thoughts.

* * * *

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request that the FUEHRER instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions.

* * * *

Berlin, 4 April 1941

Signed: SCHMIDT.

879

Tojo

Excerpt from "TOKYO GAZETTE", Vol. V, No. 8, February, 1942

THE 78TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET

-Ministerial Addresses of December 16, 1941-

ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

I have been profoundly impressed with the Gracious Message from the Throne granted today at the opening ceremony of the Imperial Diet. In respectful response to the Imperial Wishes, it is my intention to overcome this difficult situation, unprecedented in history, by devoting myself heart and soul to service to State, and thereby to put His Majesty's mind at rest.

At the previous 77th session of the Diet I asked for your cooperation, by frankly laying before you the Government's convictions with regard to the execution of national policies. Since then, the Government had continued their negotiations with the United States of America. As already explained on that occasion, the negotiations were conducted for preventing third Powers from interfering with the successful conclusion of the China Affair which Japan has in view, for making various Powers surrounding Japan not only to refrain from giving direct military menace to Japan but also to remove such hostile measures as an economic blockade against Japan and to restore normal economic relations with us, and also for preventing the European war from spreading to East Asia. Bearing the unbearable and enduring the unendurable, the Government redoubled their efforts to attain the said purpose through diplomatic negotiations. The United States, however, took Japan's patience and prudence for a sign of weakness. She not only refused to listen to Japan's just contentions but furthermore withdrew her original proposals, and in collusion with Britain she submitted her new arrogant proposal to Japan. Details of the American proposal have already been made public by the Government. Three points of the American proposal which Japan could by no means accept were as follows:

- 1) Withdrawal of all Japanese military, naval, air and police forces from China and French Indo-China.
- 2) Withholding of support - military, political and economic - from any government or regime in China other than the Chungking regime.

3) Agreement that no agreement, already concluded with any third Power, shall be interpreted in such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

In other words, the United States demanded Japan to withdraw all her armed forces from China and French Indo-China, to repudiate the Nanking Government, and to renounce the Three-Power Pact. It became clear that the intention of the United States was to challenge Japan with a rupture of economic relations and military intimidation, and thereby to bring Japan to her knees. Had Japan accepted the American demands, not only the strenuous efforts of Japan for long years in the stabilization of Greater East Asia would have been brought to naught, but also, Japan's very existence would have been jeopardized and Japan's honour would have been lost by being compelled to break her pledge given to her allies for cooperation in restoring world peace. Such a thing could never be borne by Japan under any circumstances. When things came to such a pass, Japan, though ardent in her desire for peace, had no course left to her but to rise up with arms to safeguard her prestige and existence. This is the reason why the Imperial Rescript was issued on the eighth of this month, declaring war upon the United States of America and the British Empire. I am overwhelmed with emotion and inspired by the Imperial Will and Vision. Once hostilities were opened at the Imperial Command, the gallant officers and men of our fighting services have speedily broken through the enemy key positions within less than ten days. The bulk of the American fleet, which had its base in Hawaii, is destroyed. The main body of the British Far Eastern fleet is crushed. The encircling front against Japan, whose strength the enemy has exaggerated and given wide publicity in an attempt to intimidate Japan, is shattered at various places. The Anti-Japanese encircling front is already on the fair way to collapse. These great military achievements have become a wonder of the world, enhancing our Empire's prestige both at home and abroad. This is entirely due to the August Virtue of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, which is the source of my profound inspiration.

We owe the officers and men of the Army and Navy debts of heartfelt gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they have been silently going through hard training in preparation for this day. Once war starts, they go to the front, with no thought of returning alive, for the cause of the State.

At the same time I feel keenly that the Government and people on the home front are shouldering increasingly heavy responsibilities. On the outcome of this war depends the destiny of the Japanese Empire. History clearly shows that the Japanese people, when confronted with a great national crisis, get united like one man and successfully overcome all difficulties, by giving full play to their self-sacrificing spirit for the cause of the State, thereby enhancing national fortune. The secret of winning a war lies in an abiding faith in sure victory. I am firmly convinced that the entire nation, in keeping with national polity and recalling the glorious history of the Empire, which has never been sullied with a single defeat in war during its twenty-six centuries' existence, will endure whatever hardships and privations they may have to undergo with unshaken faith in sure victory, and will bring the present war to a glorious termination by performing their duties in their respective functions.

However, our enemies are the United States and the British Empire who boast of extensive territories and abundant resources and by those means are intent on realizing their ambition of holding the world hegemony. It is the task of Japan to settle the disturbances in Greater East Asia and to defeat these powerful opponents. We are prepared that the war will be a long one. We must, therefore, definitely bear in mind that our country will hereafter meet many difficulties, and endeavour to exploit the brilliant successes won at the beginning of the war by increased efforts for the annihilation of enemy forces, and at the same time undertake a grand construction work in all fields embracing various regions of the South which will newly participate in the task, and thereby speedily perfect a structure capable of withstanding such a long-term war. The war remains rather to be fought hereafter. We people should not be intoxicated with individual victories; nor should we worry about any individual phenomena; we must all the more invigorate the inherent spirit of Japan, and help one another in guarding against negligence at home and preventing the infiltration of evil thought from the outside, and thus with a firm faith in our victory, exert ourselves resolutely to attain the objective of the war with the thought of giving ourselves to the cause of our Empire.

I wish here to express our profound gratitude to our Allies, Manchukuo and China, with which Japan's inseparable relations are evermore cordial, and which have, since the opening of the war, been rendering to us cooperation in

every possible way. It is also gratifying that Japan has previously concluded the joint defence agreement with French Indo-China and has also reached an agreement of views with Thailand concerning the conclusion of an offensive-defensive alliance with that country, and that these two countries are going forward together with us toward the construction of the New Order by further strengthening their collaboration.

That Japan has been obliged to take action at this time in the regions of the South is for no other purpose than to bring to an end the tyrannical policies of the United States and the British Empire and enable all regions of Greater East Asia to restore and develop their inherent character as well as to undertake construction work on a grand scale. It is earnestly hoped that several hundred millions of people of Greater East Asia will understand the real intentions of Japan and, without needless opposition, will participate rather as our partners in the consecrated task of constructing the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. It is very deplorable that the Chungking regime is at present still continuing its resistance. If it persists in offering resistance hereafter, Japan will not in the least relax her pressure upon it. As a matter of fact, however, the fountain-head of its power of resistance is now on the verge of complete collapse. A settlement of the disturbances in China is, I believe, forthcoming before very long.

It is a source of mutual gratification at this time that our allies, Germany and Italy, have joined the war immediately after Japan's declaration of war and have, together with us, pledged themselves with an inflexible determination to take all forceful means and never to lay down arms until a victory is won against the common enemies of world peace. They have also agreed with Japan not to conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States or the British Empire without a complete mutual understanding among the three countries and to cooperate more and more closely in future for the realization of a new order characterized by justice and equality. This agreement has resulted in a further consolidation of the bond of alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. I desire here to express the firm determination of the Japanese Empire never to sheathe the sword until the United States and the British Empire are brought to submission. I also wish to take this opportunity to express our heartfelt appreciation of the enthusiastic display of patriotic spirit of our nation since the outset of hostilities. The budgetary and legislative measures submitted at this session are all confined to matters of urgent nature for the prosecution of the war. I earnestly hope that you will speedily deliberate and give your approval upon them.

The Investigation Committee on the Conclusion of a
Treaty Between Japan and Thailand Concerning Thai
Territory in Malaya and Shan Areas.

Held in Room 3, East, in the Palace on the 18th August, 1943 (Wed.)

Those Present:

President	HARA
Chief of the Committee, Vice President	SUZUKI
COMMITTEE MEMBERS	
Councillor	ARIMA
"	KUBOTA
"	SHIMIZU
"	MINAMI (Hiroshi)
"	NARA
"	SUGAWARA
"	MATSUURA
"	USHIO
"	HAYASHI
"	FUKAI
"	FUTAGAMI
"	OBATA
"	TAKEGOSHI
"	MITSUCHI
"	IKEDA
"	MINAMI (Jiro)
"	MOTOJI
"	HIRAO

ABSENTEES

Councillor	ISHII
"	MATSUI
"	MANO
"	OSHIMA
"	IZAWA

STATE MINISTERS

Prime Minister and War Minister	TOJO
Greater East Asia Minister	AOKI
Foreign Minister	SHIGEMITSU

Handwritten signature

EXPOSITORS

Director of the Bureau of Legislation
MORIYAMA

Secretary of the Bureau of Legislation
SATO

" " " MIYAUCHI

Director of the Bureau of Administration, Foreign Ministry
KAMIMURA

Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry
ANDO

Secretary Foreign Ministry
SONE

" " " MATSUDAIRA

" " " SUYAMA

Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry
SATO

Chief of the Military Affairs Section, Bureau of Military
Affairs
SAKAKIBARA

Director of the Navy Affairs Bureau
OKA

Director of General Affairs Bureau, Greater East Asia Min:
TAKEUCHI

Director of the Bureau of Southern Affairs, Greater East
Asia Ministry
MIZUNO

Secretary of the Greater East Asia Ministry
" " " HAGIWARA

" " " YAMADA

" " " MIYAKE

Chief Secretary of the Privy Council
HORIE

Secretary of the Privy Council
" " " MOROHASHI

" " " TAKATSUJI

(OPENED AT 9 A.M.)

SUZUKI, Chief of the Committee, called the meeting to order. Premier TOJO explained the circumstances that led to the conclusion of this treaty while Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU explained the contents of this draft. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU then reported the recent international situation centering upon Italy.

KUBOTA, a member of the committee, raised a question concerning the exchange document referred to in the draft, and AOKI, Greater East Asia Minister, made the reply. SHIMIZU, a member, asked whether there was any dissatisfaction on the part of Burma due to Japanese approval of the annexation of the two Shan states by Thailand, and whether there was any request on the part of Thailand for the re-acquisition of Penang Island and the State of Wellesley, both of which she had lost in Malaya but had not been included in the present annexation plan. In reply to this question, Premier TOJO related the circumstances when he had made the propos-

in his interviews with BA MAW at Singapore and Phibun at Bangkok during his trip South. He stated that although Ba Maw had shown no sign of dissatisfaction regarding Thailand's annexation of the two Shan States, uneasiness might be entertained by the natives, and that therefore nothing should be left to be desired in Japan's future policies. He further explained that because only a few years had passed since Thailand's cession of the territories which she was about to reacquire, her desires had been very strong. He explained that it was for this reason that Japan was trying to recognize Thailand's reacquisition of these territories, and that the present measures taken toward the four Malay states seemed to a surprise to Thailand, Phibun's face was full of joy.

either

SHIMIZU further asked which would be the authorized text in case a difference of interpretation should arise in the Thai and Japanese texts. ANDO, Director of the Treaty Bureau, replied that though it would be decided through diplomatic negotiations, in reality it should be decided according to the Japanese text.

Then MINAMI, a member of the committee, inquired what meaning such an action would have by International Law. MORIYAMA, Director of the Bureau of Legislation, replied that it was the popular opinion according to International Law that occupying nations had no territorial rights in occupied areas, and therefore such treaties for territorial cession in the occupied area should not be concluded. However, on the other hand as an occupying nation was conducting the administration for occupied areas, in other words, military administration, and as there was no special regulation stipulating that we should continue this condition forever, it should be perfectly all right to agree that there would be no objections to our abolishing the military administration in the occupied areas and letting a third power annex such territories. He explained that the treaty between Japan and Thailand would be concluded in this spirit. A reply was made by Premier TOJO to the effect that the Japanese Army already firmly believed that this was Japan's territory and that the measure for this draft should be taken according to this firm conviction.

Minami further questioned why the Government had not asked the Emperor for consultation at this Council on the Exchange Document referred to in this draft. In reply to this question, AOKI, Greater East Asia Minister, said that as it was agreed in detail in Article V of the Treaty, there was no need to take such a proceeding. USHIO, a member of the committee, questioned why the date of enforcement, date of sealing, and the date of signature were separately stipulated in Articles III, IV and VI, respectively, in this treaty. ANDO, Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry, replied that though the three different dates would be the same in the end, they had just observed the conventional phraseology used in international treaties.

HAYASHI, a member of the committee, asked whether the Government intended to consider such measures provided in the Treaty as not being contrary to International Law. Premier TOJO answered that International Law should be observed so long as the enemy observed it; but that International Law should be interpreted from the viewpoint of executing the war according to our own opinions, and that he considered the present measure as being perfectly justified by International Law.

FUKAI, a member of the committee, asked a question as to the Exchange Document referred to in this draft. AOKI, Greater East Asia Minister, made the reply. FUTAGAMI, a member of the committee, stated that the expressions in Article I and II would be very weak if the Government was to cede the occupied areas to Thailand by considering these areas as part of Japanese territory, and he demanded the Government's opinion on it. Premier TOJO answered that the Government had used such expressions to avoid needless friction.

MITSUCHI, a member of the committee, inquired about the Exchange Document referred to in the draft and Premier TOJO made the explanation.

MOTOJI, a member of the committee, questioned as to the relation between the proposition formerly made by the Premier to Thailand and the conclusion of this Treaty. Premier TOJO answered that it was the cardinal point in politics not to lose an opportunity and therefore he had obtained the Emperor's sanction beforehand for making a proposal to Thailand. He said that a draft treaty had been prepared as a promise between the two countries and that the Emperor was being consulted at this Privy Council. He replied that the proceedings taken in the meantime were believed to be lawful.

After this, The Chairman of the Committee, SUZUKI, considering that all interpellations had been concluded, requested the withdrawal of the Ministers and Expositors.

(Ministers and Expositors withdrew)

Then, after deliberations among the members of the committee, this draft was decided on as it was and approved unanimously. The preparation of the investigation report was left to the Chairman.

Chairman SUZUKI declared the meeting adjourned.

(Adjourned at 11:25 A.M.).

Item 11
 Telegram (Open) To be kept in locked file.

Special Train EUROPA	5 July 1941	0.17 hours
Arrival	5 July 1941	1.10 hours

No. 598

- 1.) Code Bureau
- 2.) German Embassy Tokyo
 (Telegram Cipher, secret cipher process)

Remark: Sent to Tokyo under No. 981, Tel. Ktr., 5.7.41.

At the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, I wish to rectify below for your own orientation what MATSUOKA has told you at the time concerning my conference, with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression or Neutrality.

As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of 6 May 1941, MATSUOKA told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Neutrality. He said he had even brought this up in his conversation with me merely stating his willingness to accept in case Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By talking to you in this way, MATSUOKA obviously wanted to say that I would have had to reckon with the conclusion of the Treaty after the conversations at Berlin.

After agreement had been reached on the conclusion of the treaty and immediately before it was formerly signed, MATSUOKA also informed Count SCHULENBURG in Moscow in a similar vein. At this occasion Mr. MATSUOKA described his conversations with me at Berlin as follows: He had told me that while at Moscow he would probably not be able to avoid touching upon the long pending question of a Japanese-Russian treaty of neutrality or non-aggression. He would, of course, show no empressment whatever, but should the Russians comply with Japan's wishes, he would be obliged to do something. I had consented to this trend of thought.

Neither the description made to you nor that made to Count SCHULENBURG corresponds to the facts. The subject of a Japanese-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality has been touched upon by MATSUOKA and myself in our conversation of 28 March 1941, in the following way, according to the memorandum made immediately after the conversation by Minister SCHMIDT:

Following^a remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long-term trade agreement, MATSUOKA asked me directly whether during his return trip he should stop over in Moscow somewhat longer, in order to negotiate a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact. He stressed that the Japanese people would not allow a direct admittance of Russia into the Tri-Partite Pact, which would cause one cry of indignation all over Japan. I replied to MATSUOKA that the adherence of Russian to the Pact was out of the question and recommended that he not broach the previously mentioned question, i. e., the question of a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact with the Russians in Moscow, since this would not fit into the frame of the present situation. On MATSUOKA's further remark that the conclusion of a trade and fishery agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no objections against the conclusions of such purely commercial treaties.

Hence, what I said to MATSUOKA at the time unmistakeably revealed that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact to be suitable. The news of the conclusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I refrained at the time from making this known to MATSUOKA.

Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to MATSUOKA the incorrectness of the statement which he made to you at the time as well as to point to the fact that with the concluding of the Pact, he has surprised the German Government with a fait accompli. I am nevertheless informing you of the actual course of events because during your future political conversations, there may arise the chance to rectify this point to MATSUOKA in a suitable way, should it be deemed useful.

In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further course of events to remind MATSUOKA that during the same conversation in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Treaty with you, he made the following noteworthy statement: "Should Germany come to blows with the Soviet Union, no Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral. In this case Japan would be driven by the force of necessity to attack Russia at the side of Germany. No Neutrality Pact could alter any of this."

Should you deem it advisable occasionally to draw attention to both of the points, please do it in a very gentle manner so that MATSUOKA will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to task on these matters.

RIBBENTROP

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062 G.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

880
End case
Big McWron Fortfather

THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE ARMY

<u>Period</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
1 Jan. 1930	17	4	250.000
" " 1931	17	4	250.000
" " 1932	17	4	300.000
" " 1933	17	5	330.000
" " 1934	17	5	350.000
" " 1935	17	5	380.000
" " 1936	17	5	400.000
" " 1937	17	5	450.000
" " 1938	26	5	950.000
" " 1939	35	15	1130.000
" " 1940	43	16	1240.000
" " 1941	53	24	1350.000
" " 1942	56	25	2100.000
" " 1943	68	25	2400.000
" " 1944	80	41	2900.000

Note

1. The number of division shows the total of infantry divisions, tank divisions, flying division groups, flying divisions and flying training divisions.
2. The number of brigades shows the total of independent mixed brigades, independent infantry brigades, cavalry brigades, artillery brigades, independent tank corps, task brigades on sea and the Karafuto Mixed Brigade.
3. "Total Strength" shows the permanent establishment, so the number is roughly estimated.

4. The necessary materials to the estimation of the above numbers were lost on account of burning up and so on at the termination of the war. So, this is the best record that the 1st Demobilization Bureau can offer at present (July 16, 1946) through various remaining records (and a part of them was collected from memories).

July 16, 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

Haruyoshi Saito certifies as follows:

(A) I, as an official of the Japanese Government who has the qualification of Demobilization secretary, have the power of making this certificate.

(B) I, as the Government official, has the right of keeping a part of the records and documents concerning the strength of the Army. And the larger parts of them was lost at the termination of the war by burning up and so on.

(C) The annexed papers concerning the strength of the Army were compiled by making the best use of the above remaining records and documents which could be available. (And some of them were collected from memories).

/s/ Haruyoshi Saito

Haruyoshi Saito

Secretary of 1st Demobilization Bureau

880

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF
K. A. SMETANIN, THE USSR AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN
of June 25, 1941

I asked Matsuoka the basic question concerning the attitude of Japan towards the war; I asked him whether Japan would remain neutral, the same way as the USSR was, in accordance with the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan of April 13 of the current year.

Matsuoka evaded a direct answer to this question and said that his attitude to this problem had already been expressed (on April 22 of the current year) in his statement made by him upon his return from Europe. At the same time he emphasized that the Tripartite Pact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the present war and the neutrality pact happened to be at variance with that basis and with the Tripartite Pact, the neutrality pact "will not continue in force."

* * * * *

The copy is correct:

N.I. Generalov, Chief of the Second Far Eastern Department
of the People's Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
THE EXERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, V. KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

V. KAPLAN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I. ,

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify
that the attached document -- "An extract from the diary of Smetanin
the Soviet Ambassador to Japan about the talk with Matsuoka, the
Japanese Foreign Minister, of June 25, 1941, in Tokyo.
was delivered to me by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

on or about 20 April , 1946, and that the original of the
said document may be found in the Central Archives of the U.S.S.R.
in Moscow.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. Taranenکو /s/
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 30 , 1946 .

EXCERPT FROM "JAPAN YEAR BOOK 1941-42"

CHAPTER XLIII

SOUTH SEA ISLANDS

UNDER JAPAN'S MANDATE

Geographical Features

The South Sea Islands mandated to Japan, numbering over 1,400, with an aggregate area of 2,148.80 square kilometers, are the Mariana, Marshall and Caroline groups, between 131° 10' and 172° 10' of east longitude and between 1° 15' and 20° 32' of north latitude. The Hawaiian Islands are to the east; the Philippines and Celebes to the west; the Bonin Islands to the north, and New Guinea to the south. Only one island among them, i.e. Guam, belongs to the United States.

The Mariana archipelago starts close to the southern end of the Bonin Islands, stretching toward the equator, and the Marshall and Caroline groups extend to the east and west along the equator, forming an inverted letter "T" with the Marianas. About 740 miles south of the Bonin Islands lies Saipan, the largest of the Marianas, and about 180 miles farther south is Truk, one of the largest of the Carolines, which marking the crossing point of the inverted "T", is the center of the mandated territory. The line of 148° east longitude divides the Carolines into the West Carolines, with Palau and Yap, and the East Carolines, with Truk and Ponape. Because of the distances between the islands and the extensive area covered by them, communications are difficult. The fact that each group of isles uses different words peculiar to itself sufficiently demonstrates the degree to which they are separated.

881

Doc. No. 4052-H
Item 5

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Tokyo 15 July 1941 1230 hours
Arrival 16 July 1941 8.23 "

No. 1248 of 15 July

Most urgent!

Director European Section informed me that the Soviet Ambassador, on Saturday, announced himself to MATSUOKA for an urgent conversation in order to ask, in the name of his government, whether the neutrality pact would be applied, on the part of the Japanese, to the present German-Russian war. MATSUOKA replied that the neutrality pact could not be applied to the German-Russian war. It was concluded at a time when the German-Russian relations were essentially different.

Russian Ambassador, who had expected a statement that would set his mind at ease, was much taken aback by this declaration.

OTT.

Marginal Note:

Sent on to Special Train without number
Tel. Ktr. 16 July 1941.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4052H.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

√
88 ✓

Telegram (To be kept in locked file)

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 June 1941 1235 M
Arrived 22 " " 2215 hours

No. 1012 of 22 June Most urgent!

In answer to telegraphic instruction Multex No. 401
of 21 June,

For the Reich Foreign Minister

Today at 1900 Japanese time, after receiving the telegram instruction mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I explained to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Fuehrer.

The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation appreciatively and told me that Ambassador OSHIMA had been informed by the Reich Foreign Minister, after 0400 German time, corresponding to 1100 Japanese time, that war with the Soviet Union had begun. He thereupon requested me for information whether there had been a formal declaration of war. I answered in the negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where mention is made of the removal of a threat made against the German Reich. MATSUOKA described my explanation as valuable, but requested me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the Japanese Government. However he requested precise information on the German point of view.

MATSUOKA remarked further:

1. A meeting of the Control Committee of the cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, the Army Chief and the Finance Minister will take place tomorrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to be able to inform the German Government expeditiously of the opinion of the Japanese Government.

2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich.

VC 3. For himself he could once again assert that the United States would not be in a position to deliver military supplies to the Soviet Union by the Pacific route. The Japanese cabinet would certainly be of the same opinion.

4. He had requested all departments to refrain from giving their own views on the situation through spokesmen; the Japanese press was recommended to be reticent by the Bureau of Information.

MATSUOKA then asked me for information whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime, as he had for some time been able to see danger in it only through an external war. When I answered that the German considerations were not known by me in detail he requested information from Berlin.

VC MATSUOKA continued that he had gained the impression from the report of Ambassador OSHIMA, that the Fuehrer and the Foreign Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the Soviet Union on the basis of the Tri-Partite Pact. He personally was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run Japan could not remain neutral in this conflict. In the event of the entry of the United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo-German war, he personally considered that the Tri-Partite Pact would apply to Japan.

VC Towards the end of the interview MATSUOKA received another telegram from OSHIMA wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far East. MATSUOKA explained spontaneously that he would immediately propose counter measures. MATSUOKA was thoroughly positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied emphatically that the existence of the cabinet was in danger, and he repeatedly expressed his confidence that a quick success would be the lot of the German proceedings.

With regard to the current economic negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily.

Request telegraphic answer to the question brought up by MATSUOKA.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

883

Date 16 March 1946.

I, Manuel Blanco, I.D. No. 14492, Labor No. _____, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, ~~Public Department~~ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

John Kaven Smith
1932
I, Manuel Blanco, was born on Saipan on 13 November 1906. I worked for the N.K.K. as a blacksmith from 1934 to 1944. During this period the Japanese Navy's most important military construction projects were the buildings of ASLITO Naval Air Base commenced in 1932 and it was never completed. At the beginning of 1940 anti-aircraft, coastal batteries, and other type of ordnance were installed at the ASLITO Air field. I saw at that time the NKK train bring plane parts and guns, bombs, etc., from the pier to the Aslito Naval Air Base. I helped to build a bomb shelter at Aslito Field in 1938. The hangars as well as other installations were camouflaged with grass, trees, and plants beginning in the later part of 1938.

The Japanese used forced labor in a very small degree before August 1939 but from that time on forced native labor was used extensively. The native forced laborers received 80 sen a day and this was not adequate. In my opinion the Japanese Govt. used forced labor without sufficient remuneration.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Vincente de Leon Guerrero in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or

pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Manuel Blanco

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

WITNESS: s/Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 16th day of March,
1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR

Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

883

Item 8

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

Tokyo 3 July 1941 3:55 m
Arrival 3 July 1941 6.30 hours
No. 1109 of 2 July 1941

Most Urgent!

For the German Foreign Minister
Re Telegram of the 1st, No. 942 (Foreign Minister)

Immediately upon receipt of the above telegraphic order I have called on MATSUOKA, personally, transmitting the message of the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA stated that he had already received from Ambassador OSHIMA the announcement of the message already before today's Cabinet Session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut decision. He was thankful for the message with which he would tomorrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the trend of thought set forth by the German Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not prevailed for the moment. During the Cabinet Session he had warningly pointed out to Premier KONOYE and other Cabinet members that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government action against the SOVIET UNION. Antagonistic forces, who now are in the foreground, will in the long run be unable to carry their point.

He requests to assure the German Foreign Minister that he will adhere to the previous way /an alter Linie Festhalten/.

I brought to MATSUOKA's attention that the resolution of the Cabinet will certainly not be understood by the people, who will in the future heavily blame the government for the missing /their opportunity/.

(Matsuoka said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the SOVIET Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present SMETANIN was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the SOVIET UNION as is hinted at in the government resolution transmitted to us.)

He has furthermore informed SMETANIN that, as far as was known to Japan the USA had not promised armed assistance /Waffenhilfe/ nor had the SOVIET UNION asked for it. He wished to give the earnest advice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind since, at the request of her Allies, Japan would not tolerate shipments.

I told MATSUOKA that JAPAN's attitude could not satisfy us. MATSUOKA replied that he had expected this, personally regretted the Cabinet resolution, but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness

would

would be eliminated as fast as possible, and that the army was preparing for all eventualities.

OTT

Remark: Transmitted to Special Train under No. 2129

Tel. Ktr. 3 July 1941

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus _____, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062E

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cuning, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cuning
W. P. CUNING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. GARDE
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGO
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

884

I, Wakamatsu Makoto, I. D. No. 9804, Labor No. F-272, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Wakamatsu Makoto, was born at Oita Ken, Kyushu Japan, on 13 June 1907. I first came to Saipan in 1935 to work as a Chemical engineer for the N.K.K. I observed various military installations in the vicinity of the Aslito field on which construction was commenced in 1933. Two years before the outbreak of the war, the Japanese military built a series of concrete trenches and shelters around the Aslito Air Field, which were designated to serve as means of protection in case of air raids. In 1940, I happened to see some Japanese Navy Men storing a huge amount of ammunition in some warehouses in Aslito Air Field. These warehouses were situated in a forested section and were camouflaged to look like trees. They were coastal guns located on AGINGAN Point and NAFUTAN Point. I heard after from NKK officials that there was an anti-submarine net in Tanapag Harbor placed there just before December 1941.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Ens. Charles D. Sheldon in the Japanese language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Wakamatsu Makoto

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Japanese language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Japanese language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon,
Ens., S (1), USNR

WITNESS: /s/ Charles D. Cook
Ens. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
16th day of March, 1946.

(Seal)

/s/ Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (J.G.) USNR
Legal Officer, U. S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M. I.

885

Date March 16, 1946

I, Ignacio Benavente, Farmer and Village Chief Assistant, I.D. No. 20220, Labor No. B 728, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

As far as I can remember the ASLITO Airfield was built in 1935. I saw a wireless station and gasoline tanks at the same airfield before I left for Yap in 1937 and another military wireless station north of Susupe, site of present Signal Supply. I heard at that time that an ammunition dump was being built and also a large tank in 1935 near the harbor.

PRICE

When I came to Yap in 1937 I heard that Mr. Price and his wife had been there sometime in 1935, but they were not denied any equal rights. They were watched everywhere they went. During my stay in Yap I did not see any Americans there except after the surrendering of the Japanese.

I have written all the material on this page.

/Signed/ IGNACIO BENAVENTE

WITNESS: CHARLES D. COOK /s/
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

16th day of March, 1946

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON, Lt. (J.G.) USNR
Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Gov't. Saipan, M. I.

(SEAL)

885

Doc. No. 4062-H
Item 13

Page 1

Secret State Matter

Berlin, 6 July 1941

Pol I M 2107 g.Rs.

Six copies were made
This is No. 1

Ref.: LR. KRANARZ

MEMORANDUM

(The Army High Command has informed us on 6 July:

v 8
"Colonel YAMAGUCHI, assistant of the Japanese
Military Attache, in Berlin called on Colonel
von LAHOUSEN, Chief of Counter Intelligence
Section II, on 4 July 1941, accompanied by Major
HIGUCHI, and said the following:

"The Japanese General Staff has commissioned
him to communicate /to us/ that the Japanese
General Staff is ready to carry out sabotage
attacks against SOVIET RUSSIA in the Far East,
especially from MONGOLIA and MANCHURIA and, primarily
against the area adjoining Lake BAIKAL."

KRANARZ.)

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062H.

's/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Date March 16, 1946

I, Elias P. Sablan, I. D. No. 1899, Labor No. C-850, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Elias Sablan, was born on the 8 of November 1899, on Saipan, M. I. I worked as foreman loading and unloading cargoes. This work was carried on at Tanapag harbor in 1931. Aslito Field in 1935 was started. In 1939 Banadero construction began. The Japanese brought in about 10-inch guns stored them in warehouses. This occurred around 1937. They were set up in 1939 and 1940. The forced labor started in 1939 and they took Saipan chamorros up to a reef to fortify it. Keeping forced labor there for 6 months. These people were paid two yens a day. Early 1931 the Japs started bringing in cement, lumber, many airplanes. In the summer of 1941, they started to bring in fighters, bombers, and many drums of gas. Forced labor used to help to fortify Saipan was used by the Japanese.

VG
Guam
About 18 November 1941 ten young Chamorros 21-²⁵ who could speak English were picked forcibly and another group one which later were told they were to help the Emperor and Japan. On 6 December they were sent to Guam on unknown mission. Second group was sent to Guam on 8 December 1941. They were used to search the island for gun positions to help the Japanese but after being turned loose to watch they hid in the jungles.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page typewritten after I had written it in English.

/s/ Elias P. Sablan

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook

Ens. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
16th day of March 1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR
Legal Officer, U. S. Nav. Mil. Govt.
Saipan, M. I

(SEAL)

886

Doc. No. 4062C

Page 1

Item 22

Telegram (Secret cipher process)

Tokyo, 12 July 1941	1025 hours
Arrival 13 July 1941	1.00 "

No. 1200 of 12 July

✓

For High Command of Armed Forces.

A. I believe the following individual measures for Japanese preparations for war seem to have been taken:

- 1) Numerous officers called to new jobs.
- 2) Reserves of 24 years to 27 years allegedly called up.
- 3) Additional car drivers called up.
- 4) Requisition of tractors in Manchuria.
- 5) Students not allowed to travel far.
- 6) Russian speaking persons called up.

B. Allegedly only three divisions are kept in readiness for the occupation of Saigon which is expected on 17 July according to rumors.

C. Replenishment of the Kwantung Army for a war against Soviet Russia which is not yet imminent, evidently via Shanghai and Tientsin where reservists (cf. A2) and, to begin with, about two Japanese divisions including the 16th, are being sent.

D. In China major Japanese operations are unlikely at present.

Kretschmer

OTT

Note: Sent on to the code clerk of the Armed Forces High Command via the teletype office.

Tel. Ktr. 13.7.

Certificate

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062C.

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

889

Date 16 March 1946

I, Mariano Pangelinan, I.D. No. 1, Labor No. 849, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer ~~RukinaxBuzarkmark~~ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

Free Labor

I, Mariano Pangelinan, was born on November 1880 in Guam and came to Saipan in 1901. From 1903 to 1945 I served as district chief of District #2. Under the Japanese I was a labor foreman. In such capacity I had an opportunity to observe the conditions under which native labor worked. The Japanese government definitely used forced native labor. If a man did not work, he was beaten or thrown into jail. Even children of seven years were forced to work. Adults were poorly paid, native children were not paid at all. These youngsters carried baskets of sand, bricks and building materials and worked in road construction. The only thing that they obtained was food, and that was insufficient to sustain them. In my opinion the Japanese definitely forced laborers to work for them without remuneration.

The Japanese were very careful to hide from the native population all military installations and fortifications, but I saw many signs of Japanese rearmament in Saipan before 1941. This rearmament started gradually around 1935 with the building of the Aslito air field on the present site of Isley Field and made rapid headway by 1940. I noticed during this period the construction of ammunition dumps, military barracks, and other military installations.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Ignacio Benavente in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a

complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Mariano Pangelinan

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Ignacio Benavente

WITNESS: /s/ Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
16th day of March, 1946.

/s/ Theodore M. Adelson, Lt.(JG) USNR

Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

(Seal)

Telegram
(Secret Cipher Process)Tokyo, 1 August 1941 11:05 S
Arrival, 2 August 1941 1:00 o'clock

No. 1415 of 1 August

Most Urgent

Minister Secretary YAMAMOTO commissioned with the affairs of the Vice Foreign Minister, gave me the following information about the situation at our initial talk today.

Upon the announcement of the agreement, concluded between the Japanese and the French Government concerning Indo-China, the English Government had defended itself in a sharp protest against the argument, which was delivered to the former, that Indo-China's security is threatened by Great Britain, and declared that a further advance of Japan in the Southwest Pacific would necessarily lead to serious consequences. The Government of the United States of America delivered the same declaration.

YAMAMOTO did not contradict my remark that both governments obviously put up with the Japanese measures under protest and warning and limited themselves, at present, to economic reprisals. He strongly underlined that Japan made the Anglo-Saxon powers very uneasy by her newly won position of power and that she has strengthened her pressure a great deal in favor of the Axis powers.

VG
1
JP
The mobilization works in the same way, which is being carried through with the intention of destroying the Russian military forces in the Far East. The Soviet Government is officially reserved, but according to reliable informations, is watching the mobilization with increasing anxiety and will hardly decide to move more troops to the West. When I, because of rumors, which SHIRATORI, whom I visited again during the past days in his place of convalescence, had pointed out to me as being serious, anticipatedly asked whether Japan intended to start her active advance with demands on the Soviet Government, the Vice Minister /Remark of the translator: Apparently a mistake, should be MINISTRY SECRETARY/ marked this way as the best method of finding a defensive excuse for a Russo-Japanese attack in face of the neutrality agreement. He is personally thinking of demands of such sharpness that the Soviet Government could not possibly be able to accept them, whereby he seemed to have territorial cessions in mind. In regard to my remark that the Soviet Government might then delay Japan's entry into war by delaying negotiations and in coopera

tion with the progressive pressure of the Anglo-Saxons, until the beginning of winter and thereby perhaps prevent it entirely, YAMAMOTO asserted that he personally believed that a quick entry into war would be the right thing.

OTT

/147741/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Date 16 March 1946

I, Antonio Angailen, I.D. NO. 313, Labor No. C-851, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on Saipan 24 November 1889. I was elected District Chief of Carolinians in 1912 while under the rule of the Germans. At present I hold the same job. The Japanese ordered me to retain the same position. In 1935 a Naval Air Base at Tanapag was started. In 1937 Aslito (Isley) air field was built. In 1940 Japanese emplacements were put up. Children and adults were forced to level the air strips without only 7 ounces of rice a day to eat.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Carolinian language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ ANTONIO ANGAILLEN

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Carolinian language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Carolinian language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS P. SABLAN

/s/
WITNESS: / Charles D. Cook
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON
Lt.(jg) USNR, Legal Officer
US Nav.Mil.Govt.
Saipan, M.I.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO 4 September 1941 1050 S
Arrival 5 September 1941 505 hours

No. 1713 of 4 September 1941. Most urgent!

The attempt of Prince KONOYE to avoid, by a direct message to President ROOSEVELT, a clash with the ABCD Coalition, and possibly the SOVIET Union, resulted from the following situation.

VC
Even after MATSUOKA's dismissal, The Third KONOYE Cabinet was set to undertake a far-reaching mobilization as a result of the decision of 2 July which was adopted in the presence of The Emperor; by its very nature this mobilization was directed against the SOVIET Union. Accordingly, KONOYE considerably strengthened impeding elements of the new Cabinet, and, to a great extent, placed the responsibility upon The Navy. Thus a cover of the rear to the North was greatly impeded. As reported, the Army Command in recent inquiries has become more reserved as to a clash with the SOVIET Union. It is being argued that the Japanese Army, tied up and weakened in the war against CHINA, was not in a position to start on a winter campaign against the SOVIET Union. In view of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such as the German, the Japanese General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving a decisive success against RUSSIA before Winter sets in. Moreover, it is probably guided by the thought of NOMONHAN, still vivid in the memory, notably of the KWANTUNG Army. The exaggerated conception of Russian strength is partly based on the misleading argument that even in view of the collapse of the UKRAINE front the Soviet Union still disposed of sufficient fighting forces for taking the offensive against PERSIA on the nearby CAUCASUS front.

VC
In view of this appraisal of the situation, the KWANTUNG Army allegedly pressed for a decision of the Imperial Headquarters. I learned from a usually reliable source that the Imperial Headquarters in the last days came to the decision to postpone action against the SOVIET Union. A new decision was contemplated, to be taken as soon as clear signs of the decomposition of the Far Eastern Army appear or when a great numerical superiority of the Japanese army is established.

While consequently the Army, for the time being, adopts an attitude of readiness in the North, the activist elements of the Navy have again come to the fore to a greater extent, demanding a Southern advance. As to the plans existing in these circles (occupation of SIAM, ensuing blockade of SINGAPORE, attack on BORNEO, elimination of MANILA) I have already reported. The younger Navy officers corps are entertaining hopes that recent shifts in the Navy Command, notably the fact that activist VIVIANI KONDO, until now Chief of the Navy General Staff, has taken over an important field command and was replaced by Rear-Admiral ITO, likewise an activist, will be beneficial to these plans. Weighty reasons are brought forth by

this group for an early advance in the South. The Navy still has oil stores for two years. The imports from The Netherlands Indies have ceased and there is no hope that they will be resumed. These stores (*4 groups missing*) lies (*handwritten on bottom of page) must be used up if JAPAN does not wish to submit helplessly to the dictates of Anglo-Saxons. The Navy activists are convinced that the United States will probably resist an attack on BORNEO immediately and will certainly not allow a peaceful Japanese exploitation. Any attempt to divide the United States and England is doomed to failure from the outset. After the outbreak of the German-Russian War the surrounding countries were welded into a psychological unit against isolated JAPAN. The press chief of the Imperial Headquarters, Colonel M. BUCHI (cf. DNB No. 212 to 216, 1 September) and Admiral KONDO have expressed themselves to the same effect. The result is that in case Japan must clash with the coalition, she must fight the United States directly. The impossibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United States psychologically and materially; without reaching a clash, has induced the circles influencing KONOYE to make the primitive attempt of approaching ROOSEVELT directly. I am told by a reliable source that at first KONOYE wanted to carry on the negotiations secretly. When, however, the fact of NOMURA's visit to ROOSEVELT was published by the American press on the very same day, KONOYE hurriedly convoked the Cabinet for an extraordinary meeting and had to admit, whether he liked it or not, that JAPAN had initiated the talks despite American provocations. As I could gather from unanimous opinions during the last days, it has been suggested to the Navy and the other activist circles that the KONOYE message constitutes a last, not even seriously meant step to convince the Japanese people of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement. It is, however, obvious that this is not the intention of the circles surrounding KONOYE, but that, at least for the time being, a modus vivendi is sought with the United States. I am of the opinion that in view of the very real and far-reaching conflicting interests, this attempt to bring about a detente that is not merely temporary, also cannot be successful. The inner political situation has become even more tense during the last weeks, so that the outbreak of a crisis must be reckoned with at any time. As I reported, the Third KONOYE Cabinet did not know how to provide the Japanese people with unequivocal leadership in face of the grave inner political and foreign political questions which are awaiting a solution. The Cabinet rather tends to avoid any decision and to paralyze the activist groups by playing them off against each other. The attempt on the life of HIRANUMA, the demonstrations of nationalist organizations and the resignation of Admiral SUETSUGU, well-known nationalist leader, from the presidency of The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, sponsored by KONOYE, must be regarded as symptoms of crisis. The negotiations with the United States could possibly drag on for some time, but a compromise, which can be had only by maximum concessions on the part of JAPAN, would at once result in grave inner convulsions. This is confirmed to me by all circles which the Embassy is constantly influencing in accordance with telegraphic order of 25 August, No. 1383.

[OTT.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Date 16 March 1946

I, Juan M. Ada, I.D. No. 2685, Labor No. _____, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born in Guam on October 24, 1886, and came to Saipan in 1890. In 1937 I was elected Head Chief of Garapan Village. In administering the village I was forced to take orders from the Japanese. In 1935 the Japanese bought up the farms in the area of Tanapag Village and immediately started building a Naval Air Base. From 1939 to 1944 the Japanese forced all the Chamorros who were able-bodied to work at about 87 sen per day when the average wage was 2 yen per day for others. In 1943 in order to build the Susupe Air Field the Japanese forced all Chamorros from little school boys and school girls to old men and old women to work for no wages, giving them only 7½ ounces of rice for adults and half of that for a child per day.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ JUAN M. ADA

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS P. SABLAN

WITNESS: /s/ CHARLES D. COOK
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON
Lt.(jg) USNR. Legal Officer,
US Nav.Mil.Govt., Saipan, M.I.

889

889

(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

Japan

#985. (Part 1 of 3)^a

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured -- broken.
 (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986^c.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

*Woy
✓ 6*

- a - Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553.
- b - Not available.
- c - See S.I.S. #25554 and 25555

SECRET

25552

JD 6943

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might: however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ William J. Welsh, Jr.
William J. Welsh, Jr.
Captain, Inf.

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Date 16 March 1946.

I, Concepcion Blanco, I.D. No. 17283, Labor No. B-311, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, ~~Relieved Department~~ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I CONCEPCION BLANCO age 27 was born on Saipan on 13 December 1918. I worked as a clerk and telephone operator in the Japanese Naval Construction department at Tanapag Harbor Saipan from 1938 to 1944. In this capacity I had the opportunity to observe the construction of Japanese military fortifications and installations before December 1941. Six underground tanks were constructed in 1937. I saw fuel installations at the seaplane base. There were five barracks housing about 3000 military and naval personnel. The construction of these began in 1938. There were two radio stations constructed in 1938. There were five signal stations operated by Kasuga butai at Garapan, Shabata butai at Garapan, Nafuten, Agranhan, Tanapag, Magacienne Bay. A Navy Rear Admiral was in charge of all these signal stations.

The natives were forced to work before 1941 by the NKK but not extensively. They were generally used at the pier. They were paid 80 sen a day. The average single laborer needed 120 sen a day. In my opinion the Japanese used forced labor and did not pay them the amount needed to live on.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Vincente De Leon Guerrero in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read

the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Concepcion Blanco

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 16th day of March,
1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt.(JG) USNR
Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

890

Excerpt from *Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages
sent by the Japanese Government between
July 1 and December 8, 1941* pp. 15 - 16

(Secret)

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin.
15 August 1941
#739 (Separate message)

✓ R

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war, to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuo had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.

21175

JD-1: 4637

(Date 15 March 1946)

(I, Vincente de Leon Guerrero, I. D. No. 2663, Labor No. C-884, do hereby make the following statement) to the _____

freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

(I was born on the 9th October 1898 in Garapan, Saipan. Since the age of 7 I entered the Public German School up to the age of 16, when I was graduated in April 1913. On December 1913, I was sent to Yap to the German Dutch Cable & Co. to work at the station as a Operator.) During August 1914, the World War I broke out, and met then in Yap, the landings of the Japanese Navy in October 7, 1914. I miss my job as a Operator, and ~~it~~ was turned back to Saipan in February 1915. Since then I work at my father's farm in helping my father supporting us, up to the time when I got married at the age of 25. My job is still a farmer, when in 1937 I was choosed as a foreman by order of the Chamorran Administration, to go with a party of 30 natives to work at the underground tanks installations at Tanapag Harbor for 3 month. There were 6 underground tanks (4 big ones and 2 small). Each tank of the big size are approximately 1300 Feetis round. We are informed by the authority that we chamorros to have to carry some jobs; because a war might happen in the very near future, and these installations must be done before too late, those tanks when completed are to be filled with oil and gasoline, for the ships that have to come in Saipan. We are informed to ~~keep~~ ^{keep} the words very secret. Anybody who tells such things must be punished by the authority. The deepness of each of such tanks are 50 feet. The concrete around ~~each~~ ^{plates} tank are 3 feet thick and iron ~~planks~~ ^{plates} are riveted in concrete. Iron ~~planks~~ ^{plates} and concrete were used for roofing. In the inside of such tanks there were iron posts constructed to hold the roof. Many pipelines were constructed in connection of all the tanks. A big pipeline were crossing from the tanks to the pier. Plants and trees were used as camouflage. The location of such tanks are between what is now Hot Plant No. 3 and Pipe Plant. At the beginning of the year 1939, the Chamorran Administration are informed from the authority to conscript labor to send to Kainan to "(Marcus Is.) for another installation for a plane base. The laborers have to be sended over there for a three month period. Another bunch of laborers were sended at the beginning of 1940. The wages are \$1.50 per day and is under the Japanese Naval Operations.

There were installed gun placements in 1939 here in Saipan (AAA Battery behind the Japanese Naval Headquarters in Garapan, several coastal defenses guns in Larhan, Naftan Point, Agingan Point and Mirshot Point). On the Island in front of Tanapag Harbor were also installed a gun placement (Naniagasa). In every gun placement were Navy personnel attached; (Units of the *Shikata Butai*.)
Shibata

I have written all the foregoing material on this page.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the _____ language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the _____ language to the person who signed same.

WITNESS /s/ Charles D. Cook

Eng. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

16th day of March, 1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR
Legal Officer, U. S. Naval Military Government,
Saipan, M. I.

Excerpt from "Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages
sent by the Japanese Government between
July 1 and December 8, 1941" p. 16

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
15 August 1941
#740

(Secret)

On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739*. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.

*JD-1: 4637 S. I. S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory, in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok.

21219

JD-1: 4656

(F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)

Date 16 March 1946892
PELEIU

I, Francisco de Borje, I.D. No. 20764, Labor No. _____ do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on April 3rd 1887 on Guam, I came to Saipan in 1899 went to Angau in the Peleiu Island group and returned to Saipan in Feb. 1946. I worked as foreman for 800 workers in the Phosphorus Company there, first for the Germans then the Japanese. I knew of the building of an airfield on Peleiu in 1939. On Angau people from the surrounding islands were forced to dig phosphorous for the company for 50 sen plus 3 meals of rice per day. When I was in Yap in 1940 I knew of no Americans (civilians) there.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ FRANCISCO de BORJE

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS P. SABLAN

WITNESS: /s/ CHARLES D. COOK
Ens. D(1) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON
Lt. (jg) USNR
Legal Officer, US
Nav. Mil. Govt.,
Saipan, M.I.

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

892

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
December 6, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

Japanese

#1003

Re 2 of your #1418^a.

U e 1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985^b, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it: and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIEBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a ---- statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 and 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

25925

ARLY

SECRET

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

a - Not available.

b - Parts 1 and 3, S.I.S. Nos. 25552; 3. Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

25925

ARLY

Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

*Eugen Ott*Tokyo, January 29, 1942 - 7:00 A.M.

Received, " 29, 1942 - 10:15 P.M.

No. 245 of January 27.

Secret!

Debates in the Diet last week brought out several basic declarations by leading Japanese statesmen, especially by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, about Japanese political and war aims, the texts of which are known there. The declarations are especially noteworthy because of their programmatic character and the time at which they were made, namely, shortly before the attack upon the fortress of Singapore, after the successful beginning of the attack on Burma in the direction of Rangoon, the start of the operations against the Netherland Indies, the progressive occupation of the Philippines and the first actions against the outer defenses of Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea and Torres Strait. According to confidential information, Prime Minister General Tojo himself desired the programmatic determination of Japanese politics and put it through against opposition. This emphasis, resulting from his own initiative, shows Tojo as a leading statesman, politically, who is advancing beyond the stature of an exponent of the army. His aim was obviously to lay down Japanese war policy along a line which is removed both from the limited wishes of the circles which formerly hoped for an understanding with the Anglo-Saxons and on the other hand from the very extensive tendency toward expansion on the part of certain radical groups.

From the explanations of Tojo and Togo can be seen, firstly, the outline of the future building of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership and, secondly, the program of the government for future policies and conduct of the war.

I.) The Building of East Asia.

1.) The inner core of the new organization is formed by Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking-China, to which are added Thailand and Indo-China, which are voluntarily cooperating with Japan. Around this core the other regions of the new empire Grossraum are to crystallize under various sovereignties. The active support of allied Thailand was especially cordially mentioned by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, its requests for revision not mentioned, however.

2.) The remaining countries of Greater East Asia are divided into three categories.

a.) Previous bastions of British imperialism which served to oppress and dominate East Asia, namely, Hongkong and the Malayan Peninsula.

This region will have to be changed into a bastion for the defense of Greater East Asia and therefore placed under the direct control of Japan. This principle was given practical application in the appointment, reported elsewhere, of General Isogai as Governor General of Hongkong.

b.) Regions to which independence is to be granted, if they cooperate loyally with Japan: the Philippines and Burma. As the Military Attache hears confidentially from the army, their independence is to be patterned after that of Manchukuo.

c.) Regions which are to be militarily overcome if they continue opposition to Japan: the Dutch East Indies, Australia and Chungking-China.

Declarations of Tojo and Togo showed that the original hope for the yielding of the Dutch East Indies without resistance no longer exists, and military action is considered as indispensable. Both speeches contained an insistent appeal, addressed to Chungking, to turn away from the Anglo-Saxons and come to an understanding with Japan, which was also especially emphasized by the declaration, already reported, of the Prime Minister before the Budget Commission on January 23.

3.) General principles for the future Organization of Greater East Asia.

In this respect the speeches of Tojo and Togo as well as the declarations of Tojo and the President of the Planning Bureau, General Suzuki, before the Budget Commission on January 23, contain some interesting statements. The program is decidedly moderate. New regions were not to be exploited after the destruction of Anglo-Saxon rule. Instead of that, economic cooperation, no racial strife. Freedom of religion, no economic exclusivism, but direction and regulation of production, in certain cases also limitation of certain branches of production (sugar and rubber were mentioned in confidential conversation) according to the needs of the co-prosperity sphere directed by Japan. The aim of the present measures is the securing of the raw materials necessary for waging war and the foundation later of the autarchic co-prosperity sphere. The present program:

a.) Securing important sources of raw materials.

b.) Stopping the flow of raw materials from the South Sea regions to the enemy powers.

c.) Assuring the self-sufficiency of the army in the theaters of operations.

d.) Cooperation with Japan of the existing enterprises in the occupied regions.

II. Further Policies and Conduct of the War.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister strongly emphasized the inseparability of the Tripartite Pact Powers and the close inner cooperation of Japan with Germany, Italy and its other European Friends.

ve
Attack toward the south appeared as the military aim: Dutch East Indies and Australia. According to confidential military information, Port Darwin is to be taken first of all in Australia. For the present the Japanese war leaders can be contented with the possession of this base in Australia. This emphasis in the direction of the south explains the failure to mention India, toward which great restraint can be observed here. The government and the army hold the viewpoint that Japan cannot attack Australia and India at the same time but, rather, must halt after the fall of Singapore and Burma, since the push toward the south is more important and more useful. According to a confidential remark of the Director of the European Division of the Foreign Ministry, the Indian Congress is inimical to Japan. Indian Nationalism, even in the case of a successful revolution, would not be capable of building up an independent, orderly state. The control of such an immense region, containing 400 million inhabitants, would be scarcely possible for Japan along with its other numerous difficult tasks. Under these circumstances there would be danger that India would become a victim of Bolshevism.

Toward Soviet Russia the Foreign Minister emphasized that relations are unchanged and are still determined by the neutrality pact. In the Budget Commission, Togo reported that the yearly renewal of the Japanese-Russian fishing agreement is imminent.

According to very confidential information, however, military preparations against Russia are underway in Manchuria. Influential circles here are of the opinion that after the conquest of Port Darwin Japan must turn against Russia and seize Vladivostok, the coastal province and North Sakhalin in order definitively to make itself also secure in the north.

I have reported separately about the Japanese attitude toward South America and the Rio Conference.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(7).

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus

Date 15 March 1946

I, Jose S. Pangelinan, I.D. No. 2902, Labor No. C-900, do hereby make the following statement to the _____ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on Saipan, 27 March 1904; I was 10 years old in 1914 on October when the Japanese took this Island (Saipan) from the Germans, I entered the Japanese School, and at the same time, they gave me a job as Messenger in the Japanese Milt. Govt. Head office: In 1916 they change my job and put me as an Interpreter in Japanese & Chamorro: In 1919 I quit work and went to Japan (to school) study music and business course, until 1923 when the big earthquake destroyed Tokyo, I returned and work with my Father at the farm (after I returned from Japan never had a chance to get a job): In 1926 I went to Guam trying to get permission from the Governor of Guam to reside on the Island, but I failed; I married a Guam girl and returned to Saipan the same year (I was in Guam for 3 months) and running my 50 acre sugar plantation using Okinawans tenants, about 11 farmers, until 1934 when the Japanese Government took my plantation away from me and gave it to the N.K.K. (South Sea Development Co.) the reason they said is "NO NATIVE AUTHORIZED TO USE A JAPANESE AS TENANTS" I know what they mean, and I gave up. In 1935, I went to Ponape, started my own business (using native laborers) as a copra trader, and sea transportation also. In 1940 they took my motor boat and sampan to use for transporting materials from mainland to the small islands around Ponape for installation; I returned again to Saipan early in 1940 and on May the same year I found my job at the seaplane base, using a bull cart, as a material transporter from the Navy Ware Houses to the contractors that working at the Seaplane Base. I worked till September the same year, and during this time, I noticed that there was 2 hangars, ware houses containing a big quantity of food, lumbers, nails, wires of all kinds and construction materials, small air planes, big air planes, etc: 1 Big overground heavy builded concrete shelter containing all kinds of explosives, bullets, bombs --- etc.: 2 or 3 repair shop for servicing airplanes; about 8 or 10 Big Barracks that can hold about 350 to 500 men each. During this time (my working time) I became very acquainted with many of the Navy Boys and they told me openly that all of this work is for the military purposes.

NANYO
KAITAKU
KAISHA

current

I did not working direct to the Navy, but for the contractors, and my working hours is from 0600 to 1700 with one 30 minutes during the morning and another 30 minutes in the evening, 1½ hour at noon recess time. They feed me 3 times a day and paid me ¥ 5.00 (five yens) p.d.

I noticed too that there was always 15 up to 25 Big 4 propellers Seaplane and some fighting and scouting plane. When they stopped me working at the Seaplane Base, I helped my father who was a chief of Section #2 in Garapan, issued Laborers for the Air Strip at Aslito and also for the load and unloading of Ships at Tanapag, Chalan Kanoa & Tenian.

All laborers that went out to work to the Air Strip was by force and every able man must go.

At 0400 they blew their bugle to wake up the workers, at 0500 they got their breakfast, and then March out in line to their working place. Around 1100 or 1130 they get their lunch and a rest for about 40 minutes then started to work untill evening; No one alouded to go to his home except on day off at every days for hours day off. We had many, many claims from the workers about foods and clothing, that they did not get enough and sometimes they slipped out from their quarters, and went to their family to get clothes and food.

This was the most worse situation we ever had; Our Chiefs and their helpers explained the matter to the peoples; We gave out all we could do to help them; Bananas, bread-fruits, Yams, potatoes and many other things that produced on our own farms, or sometimes we bought it from the Japanese Store and send it up to the Airfield once a week, so they can get more food. The pay rate for the workers at this time was 80 cents Japanese p.d.

I have written all the foregoing material on this page.

/s/ JOSE S. PANGELINAN

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook, Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON Lt.(jg) USNR
Legal Officer, US Nav. Milt.Govt.
Saipan, M.I.

894

1455
(010)--gcl

HEADQUARTERS,
OCCUPATION FORCES,
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and * of Alfred Milo, assistant
military installations in the Truk * chief, Moen Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use *
of forced native labor without *
adequate remuneration, and denial *
of equal rights to Americans on Yap. *

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.
Date: February 25, 1946.
In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.
Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
A. Alfred Milo, assistant chief, Moen Island.
Q. How long have you lived on the island of Moen?
A. Forty-five years.
Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
A. Forty-five years.
Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Moen Island prior to December 1941?
A. Yes.

- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations?
- A. During the latter part of 1938 the Japanese started constructing a lighthouse on the eastern tip of Moen. Prior to the construction of the lighthouse a dock was built along the eastern tip and then a road from the dock to where the lighthouse was to be erected. It required approximately one year to complete the dock, road, and lighthouse. Upon completion of the aforementioned project the Japanese commenced building caves, gun emplacements, and a searchlight platform. Six gun emplacements were built. The guns appeared to me to have an eight or nine inch bore. These installations were all in the immediate vicinity of the lighthouse. During November of 1939 on the mountain of Uitibiu the Japanese dug a concrete emplacement similar to a hut in which they installed radar and erected two gun emplacements for the installation of five or six inch guns and two smaller ones for anti-aircraft. In the same section two platforms were constructed and searchlights placed thereon. Two caves were dug into the mountain and ammunition stored therein. Upon the completion of this project in 1940 further development thereabouts was unknown to us because it was then made a prohibited area. On the eastern end of the island a radio station was installed during 1939. This building was constructed of concrete. In 1940 on the northwest tip of the island the Japanese commenced building an airstrip. This strip was completed after December 1941. On the southwestern tip of the island at the same time another airstrip was under construction and completed after December 1941. In 1940 on the northwestern tip of the island on the side of the mountain close to the airfield two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed there. They appeared to me to have eight or nine inch bores, also a platform and searchlight was installed there.
- Q. Were any revetments built along the airstrip prior to December 1941?
- A. On the airfield on the southwestern tip one was built before December 1941.
- Q. When were all the pill boxes along the shore of Moen Island constructed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. I notice on the mountain of Uitibiu many big guns, machine guns, range finder, cave housed flat trajectory guns, and anti-aircraft guns, other than the ones already mentioned by you, when were these constructed?
- A. After December 1941, I believe for we were not allowed to go there after the initial construction in 1939 and 1940.

- Q. I notice on the southern tip, slightly in rear of the airfield, anti-aircraft guns, cave housed guns, and machine guns, when were these placed there?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. I notice throughout the island quite a few barracks to house the army and navy, when were they constructed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. How many Japanese troops were here before December 1941?
- A. A great number of Japanese personnel were here on the island, and they had some barracks here at that time also, most were built after December 1941.
- Q. Do you know of any installations built on any islands in the immediate vicinity of Moen?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about those installations.
- A. On the island of Mor during 1940 a concrete reinforced dock was built. Two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed thereon, appearing to be about three inches in diameter. Also buildings were built for the men and one searchlight was installed there. Telephone communication was installed between that island and Moen. The island has flat terrain and in one section a lookout tower was built.
- Q. Were there any other installations built on this island?
- A. No.
- Q. On what other islands you know of installations being placed?
- A. On the island of Pisemau during 1940. The exact construction was made there as took place on Mor.
- Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.
- A. From January 1942 until the end of the war I was forced to furnish the Japanese commander on Moen Island one hundred fifty women and two hundred men per day. One day per month we were forced to furnish labor without pay. The day without pay occurred on the eight of each month.
- Q. Are there any other cases where forced labor was used without adequate remuneration?

- A. At different times when the Japanese were in need of more help they would come to the village and call for any number they wished and refused to pay for the work performed. We did not keep a record of the number of times this occurred or the dates.
- Q. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Is there any other information relative to the subjects on which you have been questioned that you wish to report?
- A. No, sir.

/s/ Alfred Mailo
Alfred Mailo,
assistant chief,
Moen Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Alfred Mailo, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Alfred Mailo
Alfred Mailo

Subscribed and sworn to me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

Moan Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Alfred Milo, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Alfred Milo read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,
Truk and Central Caroline
Islands.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 4, 1946

TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.)

From Berlin May 15th 2:20 P.M.
To Tokyo May 15th.

Tokyo Embassy
No. 1197/9 of May 14th.

To be kept under lock and seal
For the Ambassador personally.

Re: Telegram of the 6th, No. 1412.

With respect to the question dealt with in your telegram on Japanese-Russian relations, the following should be taken under consideration: without doubt the opportunity to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Vladivostok, so vitally necessary to Japanese security, will never be as favorable as at present when Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. In this situation the following exists:

1) If Japanese estimates of Russian forces in Siberia are accurate, and she is able to overcome Russian resistance in Vladivostok and penetrate into Siberia in the direction of Lake Baikal, then such an undertaking would be very significant to the subsequent development of the war. Japan can not evade the threat to her rear from Russian coastal provinces, it would therefore be best if she would arrive at a decision to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest. There is no question that this intervening time is used by the Russians in cooperation with the Americans for the sole purpose of fortifying the Siberian Coastal areas in order to provide air bases which will constitute a threat to Japan. Therefore, the earlier the push against Vladivostok takes place the less progress will have been made in these preparations. However, this is all based on the premise that Japan is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature and will not have to free other forces which would weaken her position against England and America, as for example, in Burma.

2) If Japan lacks the necessary strength to successfully undertake such an operation then it would naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations with Soviet Russia.

VE This also eases our burden since in any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict. Above all any Japanese assurance to the Russians must be avoided. By maintenance of neutrality,

the risk of a long drawn out war with insufficient forces and particularly with danger of air attacks against the Japanese Home Islands will be avoided. In this respect, Japan must undertake the offensive in some other direction, as for example, India or Australia, in order to contribute effectively to the joint conduct of the war.

In summing up, the following is to be said from the German standpoint: a sudden and successful attack against Soviet-Russia might prove a great boon for the further conduct of the war to the Tripartite Powers, but this should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

I request that you stress the following considerations and perhaps put less emphasis on the advantages which may accrue from a Japanese attack on Soviet Russia to the United States as it appears in your telegram. The most important point which should be constantly brought to the attention of the Japanese are:

1.) that the situation was never as favorable as it is now.

2.) the longer one waits all the more airfields will be built in Siberia and.

3.) the Americans will be able to render the Russians more effective support once these installations are completed than is possible today. With reference to III., 4, of your telegram in which you mention that a Russian-Japanese war would be welcomed by America since it would weaken Russia, I wish to note that this argument is somewhat devious since at the present moment the Americans are actually strengthening Russia by the delivery of war materials, etc. in order to strengthen her as much as possible, and by no means think of weakening Russia. On the other hand, I agree with your views expressed in II., 3 that the Americans in the light of coming presidential election will try everything to bring about a Soviet Russian Japanese War as a solution and so it must be reckoned that the Japanese will try to avoid such a conflict.

All in all our tactics must be such as to make Japan aware of these points of view without directly forcing the issue.

RIBBENTROP.

EXHIBIT I.

A witness, JOSEB UERBELAU, called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation, duly sworn and declared through the interpreter, MASAO MOTOOKA, as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. What is your name?

A. JOSEB UERBELAU.

2. Q. What is your date of birth?

A. 1908, I do not know the day.

3. Q. Where were you born?

A. NGERBECHED, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU.

4. Q. What is your present home address?

A. NGEREMID, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU.

5. Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am the native Chief of Police for military government on KOROR ISLAND.

6. Q. Prior to the occupation of this area by the Americans what was your civil occupation?

A. I worked for the JAPANESE government and was in charge of three hundred (300) natives at IIBELIK Village on BABELTHUAP. I was not paid.

7. Q. Did you bear military arms?

A. No, I did not.

8. Q. How long did you do this work?

A. From February, 1945 to August, 1945.

9. Q. Do you know of construction of fortifications or military installations prior to December, 1941?

A. Yes.

10. Q. Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned?

A. I know of a gun emplacement constructed at NGEREMLENGUI, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.

11. Q. Did you witness this construction?

A. Yes.

12. Q. Did you work on it?

A. No.

13. Q. Did you see the gun in the finished emplacement?

A. No, the area was restricted by the JAPANESE after its completion.

14. Q. Was forced native labor used on the gun emplacement on BABELTHUAP?

A. Yes.

15. Q. How do you know this was a gun emplacement?

A. I saw the gun being brought from a boat at NGEREMLENGUI Harbor to the area of the gun emplacement.

16. Q. Do you have knowledge of construction work before 1941 other than that mentioned?

A. No.

17. Q. Do you know of other cases of use by the JAPANESE of forced native labor?

A. Yes.

18. Q. Did they force you to work?

A. Yes.

19. Q. Who forced you to work?

A. The South Seas Government officer, KAJISHIMA.

20. Q. Is KAJISHIMA a JAPANESE civilian or a member of the military?

A. I do not know.

21. Q. What did they make you do?

A. They made me work on the airstrip at AIRAI, BABELTHUAP.

22. Q. What are the inclusive dates of your work on the airstrip?

A. From March 3, 1944, to August 5, 1944.

23. Q. What did they pay you for this work?

A. One (1) yen per day.

24. Q. How long was your working day?

A. From 6 a.m. until 5 p.m. with a 30 minute rest period at 10 a.m., 1 hour for lunch, from 12 a.m. to 1 p.m., and another 30 minute rest period at 3 p.m.

25. Q. Did the Japanese provide you with food?

A. Yes.

26. Q. Did you pay for this food?

A. No, it was provided free of cost.

27. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide a place for you to live?

A. Yes.

28. Q. Did you have to pay for it?

A. No.

29. Q. During this period of work on the airfield did you have any days off?

A. No, we worked every day.

30. Q. Could you take a day off if you wanted to?

A. No, we were put in jail if we did.

31. Q. Were you ever put in jail for taking a day off?

A. No, I never took a day off and was never put in jail.

32. Q. Did you ever see anyone put in jail for taking a day off?

A. No, I did not.

33. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide you with clothing?

A. No, they did not.

34. Q. Did you buy your clothing from the JAPANESE?

A. Yes.

35. Q. What did they charge you for clothing?

A. The prices varied. I paid from 5 yen to 30 yen for a pair of pants.

36. Q. While you were doing this work were you treated well by the JAPANESE?

A. Yes, I was well treated.

37. Q. Were all the natives working on this project treated well by the JAPANESE?

A. No, some were mistreated.

38. Q. What mistreatment did you see the JAPANESE inflict upon the natives?

A. They were beaten with sticks.

39. Q. Who beat them?

A. A JAPANESE Navy Gonzoku known as KAWAHARA.

40. Q. Can you describe this man?

A. He weighed about 18 kahn and was about 5 feet 8 inches tall.

41. Q. What means did they employ to make you work on the airstrip?

A. I received a written order.

42. Q. Do you still have the order?

A. No.

43. Q. To the best of your knowledge what did the order say?

A. It read, "Tomorrow morning at 8 a.m. report to the South Seas government building, KOROR. Those failing to report will be punished."

44. Q. What work were you forced to do on the airstrip?

A. I broke stones. Natives did all types of manual labor.

45. Q. Who supervised the work?

A. Navy Gonzokus.

46. Q. While you were working on AIRAI airfield did any air raids occur?

A. Yes, there were air raids.

47. Q. During these air raids were you allowed to take shelter?

A. Yes, I was permitted to take shelter.

48. Q. Do you as an individual consider the pay given you as adequate remuneration?

A. No, it was not adequate.

49. Q. Before you were forced to work on the AIRAI airfield, where did you work and what pay did you receive?

A. I worked at the lumber yard at MADALAI, KOROR. I received 1 yen 70 sen per day.

50. Q. Do you have knowledge of other incidents of forced native labor and if so relate same?

A. The gun emplacement at NGREMDIU, URUKTHAPEL was constructed with forced native labor.

51. Q. When did this take place?

A. In February, 1941.

52. Q. Previously you said the construction of the gun emplacement on BABELTHUAP was the only fortification or military installation that you yourself knew was built before December, 1941. Is the date February, 1941, correct?

A. Yes, it is correct. When I answered before I did not know what you meant.

53. Q. Did you work there?

A. Yes.

54. Q. Who ordered you to work there?

A. The PALAUAN Government, a branch of an subordinate organization of the South Seas Government.

55. Q. What are the inclusive dates of this period of labor?

A. February, 1941 to July, 1941. ||

56. Q. What did they pay you?

A. 1 yen 50 sen per day.

57. Q. What was the length of your working day?

A. The length of the working day on this project depended entirely on the individual laborer and the effort he put forth. The average working day was from 5 a.m. until 2 p.m.

58. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide shelter?

A. Yes, tents.

59. Q. Did you pay for shelter?

A. No.

60. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide food?

A. No, they did not provide food.

61. Q. During this period of work were you allowed any days of rest?

A. One day a month was allowed.

62. Q. Did the JAPANESE treat you well while working on this project?

A. No, I was mistreated. I was not whipped but I was not permitted to leave the area and return to my village.

63. Q. Did you see any natives mistreated by the JAPANESE on this project?

A. No.

64. Q. Where did you work prior to this period of forced labor and what pay did you receive?

A. I worked for the PALAUAN Government as a small boat operator. The pay was 1 yen 40 sen per day.

65. Q. Did you see them place the gun in the emplacement you worked on?

A. Yes, I saw them and helped the Navy Gonzokus put the gun in place. The gun moved around and up and down while I sat on it. ||

66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of YAP ISLAND?

A. No.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages.

Verification by witness:

I, Joseb Uerbelau, having previously testified, was called in by the investigating officer, informed that my oath formerly taken was still binding, and having my testimony read to me in the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct.

Joseb Uerbelau (signed)

Verification by interpreter:

I, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being duly sworn depose and say:

That after being duly sworn I translated the questions propounded by the investigating officer to Joseb Uerbelau in the Japanese language, and that I translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanese language, into the English language.

That I have read the foregoing transcript of testimony to said Joseb Uerbelau and declare that it contains all the information I received from said Joseb Uerbelau.

Masao Motooka (signed)

Verification by reporter:

I, Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being duly sworn, hereby certify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and transcribed by me and I declare the same is true and correct.

Richard L. Koll (signed)

We, Joseb Uerbelau, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, and Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly sworn and subscribed our names to the foregoing transcript this 26th day of February, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

Emery M. Perry (signed)

Emery M. Perry,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine
Corps Reserve,
Investigating Officer,
at Island Command, Peleliu,
Palau Islands.

The testimony of this witness was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness, interpreter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read to the witness by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, as well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter.

Emery M. Perry (signed)
Emery M. Perry,
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine
Corps Reserve,
Investigating Officer,
at Island Command, Peleliu,
Palau Islands.

895

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
July 31, 1941
Purple (CA)

✓G
P2

#433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)


From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1300. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

a - Not available.

NOTE: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office. It used the CA code transposed according to J-19 keys and the resulting transposed code was then enciphered in the purple machine. This is the first solution of such a system that has been effected.



(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
July 31, 1941
Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into

(Item No. 3)

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

896

EXHIBIT II

A witness, AUKST RIUMD, called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation, duly sworn and declared through the interpreter, MASAO MOTOOKA, as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. What is your name?
A. AUKST RIUMD.

2. Q. What is your date of birth?
A. March 24, 1913.

3. Q. Where were you born?
A. At MELIKTIK village on BABELTHUAP Island.

4. Q. What is your present home address?
A. NGEREMID Village, KOROR Island, Palau.

5. Q. What is your present occupation?
A. I am a native policeman for Military Government on KOROR Island.

6. Q. Prior to the occupation of this area by the Americans, what was your civil occupation?
A. I was a policeman for the South Seas Government at IMELIHK Village on BABELTHUAP.

7. Q. Did you bear arms?
A. No.

8. Q. How long did you do this work?
A. From December 1, 1944, to December 2, 1945.

9. Q. Do you know of the construction of fortifications or military installations by the JAPANESE prior to December, 1941?
A. Yes.

10. Q. Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned?
A. I know of a gun emplacement constructed at OIGUL Village, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.

11. Q. Did you work on it?
A. No, I did not work on the emplacement. I was a supervisor of native labor called in to do the manual labor. The natives were ordered to do the work.

Palau

SAMAR

12. Q. Who ordered this work?
A. A vice-admiral of the JAPANESE Navy, not Admiral ITO.
13. Q. Was this a written order?
A. Yes, the written order was brought to the village chief by a navy man and the chief in turn ordered the natives to work.
14. Q. Did this order state there would be punishment for those who did not comply with it?
A. Yes, the order said the gun emplacement was to be finished by a certain date and we want so many natives. Those failing to report will be punished.
15. Q. Did you see this order?
A. Yes, the village chief showed the order to me.
16. Q. Do you have the order?
A. No, the Navy man took it away with him after the chief and I had seen it.
17. Q. Can you describe the vice-admiral who issued this order?
A. I cannot describe him. I know that he left these islands in 1939.
18. Q. Did you supervise the entire construction of this gun emplacement?
A. No, I supervised the natives who carried boxes to the gun emplacement.
19. Q. Did forced native labor build the gun emplacement?
A. No, the Navy Gonzokus built it.
20. Q. Did you see the contents of any of the boxes the natives carried to the gun emplacement?
A. No, I did not see the contents. The natives carried the supplies to the site of the gun emplacement which had not been built at that time.
21. Q. Did you see the completed gun emplacement?
A. Yes, but the gun was not in it yet.
22. Q. Do you remember what date this was?
A. No, only that it was 1939.
23. Q. Did you see the gun placed in this fortification?
A. No, I did not see a gun placed there but later in March, 1944, I saw a gun there.
24. Q. For the forced native labor which hauled the supplies prior to the completion of the gun emplacement, what was the daily individual wage?
A. We received no pay.

25. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide the natives with food?
A. Yes, breakfast and supper.
26. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide you with shelter?
A. No, we lived at our village of OIGUL, on BABELTHUAP.
27. Q. Were JAPANESE guards present to force you to do this work?
A. Yes, there were Navy guards who carried rifles.
28. Q. What was the length of the working day?
A. From 5 a.m. to 6 p.m. We had 1 hour for lunch from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. We took lunch with us or went to our homes to eat.
29. Q. Can you give the inclusive dates of this labor?
A. No, but we worked for about three (3) weeks.
30. Q. Did you receive any days of rest during this period?
A. Yes, we asked for and received one half day of rest during this period.
31. Q. Did the JAPANESE mistreat you?
A. Yes, they mistreated me once.
32. Q. What mistreatment did you receive?
A. I was slapped on the face three times by a Navy guard because I was late for work.
33. Q. Was this the only case of mistreatment you know of?
A. No, two natives told me the guards had hit them with their fists.
34. Q. Do you know the names, rank, and organization of the JAPANESE who hit you and the natives?
A. Their names were Leading Seaman TAKEMURA and another Navy man whose name was SHINOHARA. They were both members of a SASAKI Unit.
35. Q. For this forced native labor was the village chief given any remuneration?
A. No, the guard just thanked the chief upon completion of the work.
36. Q. Besides the above mentioned gun emplacement, do you know of other fortifications constructed prior to December, 1941?
A. Yes, I worked on the PELELIU Airfield from January, 1936 to March, 1936.
37. Q. Were you forced to do this work?
A. Yes, I was ordered by the South Seas Government Officer, KAJISHIMA, to take the place of a man who became sick.

38. Q. Was this a written order?
A. Yes.
39. Q. Do you still have this order?
A. No, I returned it when I reported for work.
40. Q. What did the order say?
A. It read, "On _____ (date) _____ you, RIUMD, report and bring this order to the South Seas Government Officer, KAJISHIMA. If you fail to do so, you will be punished.
41. Q. Can you describe this man KAJISHIMA?
A. He was a civilian who worked for the South Seas Government.
42. Q. What type of work did you do during this period?
A. I carried stones and dug holes to place the dynamite in.
43. Q. What was the length of your working day?
A. From 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. We were given a 15 minute rest period at 10 a.m. and 1 hour for lunch at 12 a.m. We were given another 15 minute rest period at 3 p.m.
44. Q. What was the daily wage received?
A. 1 yen 50 sen per day, 75 sen of which was deducted by the JAPANESE for food and shelter which they provided.
45. Q. Were you mistreated during this period of labor by the JAPANESE?
A. No.
46. Q. Did you see anyone mistreated?
A. Yes, I saw a Navy Gonzoku beat a native on the back with a stick about three and one half ($3\frac{1}{2}$) feet long and about one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) inch in thickness.
47. Q. Were there JAPANESE guards present to force you to work?
A. Yes, there were Navy Gonzoku supervisors who carried pistols.
48. Q. Were there any airplanes in the area at that time?
A. No, the airfield wasn't finished.
49. Q. Were there any guns or fortifications around this area?
A. No.
50. Q. What work were you doing prior to this period of labor and what pay did you receive?
A. I was working as a department store clerk on KOROR Island and received 1 yen 30 sen per day.

51. Q. Besides the above mentioned information, do you know of any other fortifications or military installations constructed prior to December, 1941?

A. I have heard of others but these were the only ones I worked on.

52. Q. Do you have any knowledge of YAP Island?

A. No.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages.

Verification by witness:

I, Aukst Riimd, having previously testified, was called in by the investigating officer, informed that my oath formerly taken was still binding, and having my testimony read to me in the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct.

/s/ AUKST RIUMD

Verification by interpreter:

I, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being duly sworn depose and say:

That after being duly sworn I translated the questions propounded by the investigating officer to Aukst Riimd in the Japanese language, and that I translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanese language, into the English language.

That I have read the foregoing transcript of testimony to said Aukst Riimd and declare that it contains all the information I received from said Aukst Riimd.

/s/ Masao Motooka

Verification by reporter:

I, Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being duly sworn, hereby certify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and transcribed by me and I declare the same is true and correct.

/s/ Richard L. Koll

We, Aukst Riimd, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, and Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly sworn and subscribed our names to the foregoing transcript this 27th day of February, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

/s/ Emery M. Perry

Emery M. Perry,
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine
Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer,
at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau
Islands.

The testimony of this witness was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness, interpreter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read to the witness by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, as well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter.

/s/ Emery M. Perry

Emery M. Perry,
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine
Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer,
at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau
Islands.

2/18/1942 --- 896

Excerpt from: "Establishment of East Asia," a symposium of
the Institute of Total War

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.


(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

UG (

note



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621BStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takehashi, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takehashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

SEAL
Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

897

1455
(010)-gcl

HEADQUARTERS,
OCCUPATION FORCES,
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

Truk
Caroline

Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and * of Ichiro Moses, assistant
military installations in the Truk * chief, Uman Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use *
of forced native labor without *
adequate remuneration, and denial *
of equal rights to Americans on Yap. *

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.

Date: February 23, 1946.

In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.

Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.

A. Ichiro Moses, assistant chief, Uman Island.

Q. How long have you lived on the island of Uman?

A. Forty-five years.

Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?

A. Forty-five years.

TRUK

Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Uman Island prior to December 1941?

A. Yes.

- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.
- A. In 1939 on the southern section of Uman Island the Japanese commenced building roads and fortifications. Houses were built to billet troops, a searchlight was installed, emplacements for big guns built, and two big guns and four small ones, installed. They dug a cave, reinforced it with concrete, and stored ammunition therein. This construction was under the direction of the navy. The officer in charge of the troops billeted there was Taicho. Second in command was Buntaisi. During 1940, prior to December of that year, on the island of Otta, eight miles south of Uman, the Japanese Navy erected a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores of about two or three inches in diameter, and several machine guns were installed. During 1941, prior to December of that year, on the island of Salat, eight miles east of Umar, the Japanese Navy constructed a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores appearing to be about three inches in diameter, and erected a radio station.
- Q. On the map which I have before me of Uman I notice a northeast battery, consisting of one Armstrong type forty caliber fifteen centimeter gun, two twenty-five millimeter dual mount machine cannons, and a northwest battery, consisting of one Armstrong type forty caliber fifteen centimeter gun, could you tell me when these were installed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. In the center of the island I notice one quadruple thirteen millimeter machine gun, do you know when that was installed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. When was the radar station in the center of the island constructed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. Were all the guns in the southern part of Uman installed in 1939, 1940, and prior to December 1941?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the construction of the buildings what material did they use?
- A. For the buildings they used concrete foundation and the rest was lumber. The cave was concrete reinforced and all emplacements were concrete based.
- Q. How many caves did they build before the war?
- A. Only one.
- Q. Did you see ammunition stored in the cave before the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they have a great quantity of ammunition there?
- A. Yes.

Q. What was the size of the cave?

A. Twenty-four feet long, twelve feet wide, and nine feet high, and this cave was full of ammunition and provisions, mostly ammunition.

Q. Before December 1941 did the Japanese ever practice shooting their big guns?

A. Only to test them.

Q. Was the searchlight built into a cave?

A. It was built on a platform and covered over with canvas.

Q. Did they have any other equipment close to the searchlight?

A. They had a range finder.

Q. On the island of Otta what did they have there beside guns and searchlights?

A. They had a warehouse there in which they kept ammunition and provisions.

Q. Did you see the provisions and ammunition?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they have on the island of Salat beside the searchlight and guns?

A. A warehouse for ammunition and provisions.

Q. Was all this construction on Otta and Salat prior to December 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. During 1939, 1940, and 1941, prior to the war, did the Japanese ever mention waging a war against the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they say?

A. We are going to install fortifications and military installations before we start the war against the United States.

Q. Do you know of any natives who were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.

A. In 1939 when they were installing guns and the military installations on the southern part of Uman we were forced to furnish fifty men per day of eight hours, six days a week for about a year and a half. The wages at this time were eighty sen per day. During

1942 we were forced to furnish the Japanese one hundred natives a day for two months for construction of a road. None of these men were paid any salary. However, when we were through they gave us twenty bags of rice of one hundred pounds each, ten bags of barley of one hundred pounds each, one hundred loin cloths, one hundred towels, twelve bottles of saki each holding about three quarts. We were forced to furnish fifty men per day for the construction of barracks and a radar station for approximately five months. They paid us eighty sen per day and furnished our people with three meals per day. We furnished twenty-five men per day to work on the northern tip of Uman constructing a dock, wireless station, and houses. This continued for six months and the wages received was eighty sen per day. In 1944 the Japanese Army came to Uman. They took our houses for themselves and paid us half of what they were worth. After the war the houses were returned to us but they were all in very poor condition. Commencing in January 1944 we furnished the Japanese Army one hundred women and one hundred fifty men per day. From January to the end of the war we were forced to furnish this number every day. The workers we furnished ranged in age from thirteen to fifty. The men received one yen and twenty sen per day. The women were paid eighty sen per day. One day each month we were forced to work without pay.

Q. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Otta?

A. We were forced to furnish thirty men during 1939 for the construction on Otta for approximately five months. These men were paid eighty sen per day.

Q. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Salat?

A. We were forced to furnish thirty men per day for construction of installation on the island of Salat for approximately six months. The men received eighty sen per day.

Q. Are there any further details you wish to report?

A. No, sir.

Q. Are you aware of any circumstances concerning the denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?

A. No, sir.

/s/ Ichiro Moses
Ichiro Moses,
assistant chief,
Uman Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Ichiro Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ichiro Moses
Ichiro Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 4 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 23, 1946, personally appeared before me Ichiro Moses, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ichiro Moses read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,
Truk and Central Caroline
Islands.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 11, 1946

897

Affidavit of Examination of the Witness Nohara Komakichi

Moscow, February 15, 1946.

Nohara Komakichi, born in 1899, a native of Yokohama (Japan). A Japanese subject, Non-party member. Family: Wife and son. School and university education received in Europe, graduated from the faculty of philosophy at the University in Basle and Berlin. From 1922 till 1939 he lived in Europe, the United States of America, South America and Japan. He was a journalist. Has never been tried. From the 1st of September 1939 till the 21st of April 1945 he was an assistant of a press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. At present he is in the U.S.S.R. as an internee.

I have been warned of the responsibility for false testimony. I am informed of the contents of Chapter 25 of R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

The examination is being conducted in the Japanese Language, with translation into Russian by the interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. The interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. is warned of the responsibility for the correctness of the translation, according to Chapter 98 of the R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Question: When and where were you detained by the units of the Red Army?

Answer: I was detained by the units of the Red Army on the 21st of April 1945 in the suburb of Berlin, in Shtrausberg, 40 kilometres to the East of Berlin.

Question: Why were you in the area of military operations and not at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin on the 21st of April, 1945?

Answer: It happened, because I always lived in Shtrausberg, where my family was. I didn't want to part with them in such troublesome time. Last time I worked at the Japanese Embassy on the 16th of April, 1945, later on I was not able to go to Berlin, because the railway between Berlin and Shtrausberg was destroyed.

Question: Explain the origin and nature of the present German and English documents, which were found about you by the Red Army officer at the time of your arrest and explain why those documents were on you.

✓
UC
Answer: The present documents on four sheets of paper which were actually found on me, belonged in the past to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. As I was a convinced antifascist I was against the war of Japan and Germany against the Soviet Union and her allies. I deliberately kept these documents and intended to use them in the interest of the allies, as I was sure that the day would come when these documents would to a certain extent expose the Japanese war criminals, who had provoked the war against the peace-loving countries and brought their country and their people to a catastrophe. Therefore, I kept those documents and made no attempt to hide or destroy them. When on the 21st of April 1945 I was taken in Shtrausberg I handed them over to the Soviet officer. The greater part of these documents were secret. Though it was not my immediate duty, as a press-agent, to deal with documents of that kind, yet I was made to be concerned with secret work by the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara Sin. My duty was to work at the documents of military and other secret information. The work was considered to be top secret and nobody but Ambassador Oshima, the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara and me were initiated in it. The greater part of the present documents which were found about me are copies of memorandums, containing secret information about the number and disposition of the units of the Red Army, its equipment and supplies, the state of the war industry of the Soviet Union and its production: planes, tanks and also man-power of the U.S.S.R. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin received military information of similar nature about the Soviet Union from Japanese Ambassadors in Moscow Tatekava and Sato in the form of ciphered telegrams, at which the Counselor Kavahara and me worked afterwards and translated into German. Afterwards the Japanese Embassy in Berlin passed that information to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Question: You are being shown the document of the 19th of January 1945, headed "War potential of the Soviet Russia", in which figures of planes, tanks, oil, etc., produced in the Soviet Union, are omitted. By whom and when was the document drawn up and what does the omission of the figures mean?

Answer: This document was drawn up by the Counselor Kavahara and me in January, 1945, on the ground of the information, received from Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. The omission of the figures is made by the Counselor Kavahara; he wrote them in hand in the 1st copy and handed the copy as it was, to the Germans. This information Kavahara considered top secret.

Question: Among the documents found about you, there is a document under the title of "On the strength of the Red Army". There is a mark, made in your hand on this document, stating that on the 21st of January, 1942, the military attache in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, through us, handed the following information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Under the document it is written in your hand that "on the 22nd of January, 1942, that information was in the hands of the German Commander-in-Chief". Explain what those marks on that document mean.

Answer: This document is a record of secret information received by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin from the Japanese attache in Moscow on the 21st of January, 1942. That's how the origin of this information was explained to me orally by the Counsel of the Embassy Kavahara. The record is reproduced by me in this document on the ground of draft copies. The next day, on the 22nd of January, after Kavahara and me had worked up this document, the Counselor Kavahara personally handed it to the German Foreign Office. As to the delivery of secret information about the Allies to the Germans by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, I want to say in addition that from 1939 till 1945 the Japanese Embassy handed, as far as I remember, about 40 communique to the Germans whenever they were coming from Moscow, London and Tokyo. The contents of those materials, mainly, refer to war-economic power of the U.S.S.R. and her Allies. Part of the materials were summaries of certain investigations concerning different problems, other materials were results of personal observations of the Japanese who passed through the Soviet Union in war-time.

Question: Was anything known to you about the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941?

Answer: Yes, I, as well as the rest of the Japanese Embassy staff in Berlin, knew of the existence of such an agreement.

Question: By whose orders did the Japanese Embassy in Berlin pass the secret information about the U.S.S.R. to the Germans?

Answer: By the order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador Oshima.

Question: In this case, how will you characterize the actions of the Japanese authorities and their representative Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin?

Answer: Since there was an agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, the delivery to Germany of secret military and other information about the U.S.S.R. helped to a certain extent Germany in her war against the Soviet Union and, consequently, was a breach of the agreement of neutrality. Ambassador Oshima, as a representative of the Japanese Government did not want to consider and fulfill the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union. In his practical activity he was guided by the ideological alliance, the so-called "anti-komintern pact", a military union between Germany, Japan and Italy. Oshima being an active partisan and conductor of the Japanese Government's anti-Soviet policy, in this respect his activity directly contributed to the latter.

Question: Characterize the activity of Oshima Hiroshi, as Ambassador of Japan in Berlin.

Answer: The activity of Oshima, as well as his political face, have been sufficiently described by me above. I only want to add the following: Oshima Hiroshi is a convinced partisan of fascism of the German type and an irreconcilable enemy of the U.S.S.R., England and the U.S.A. He contributed to a large extent to conclusion of a military agreement between Germany, Japan and Italy, being the Japanese military attache in Berlin. During the celebration of the anniversary of the Mukden battle (the victory of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905), Oshima said at a banquet in Berlin: "I am drinking Russian vodka and think that I am drinking Russia". The complete Oshima's confidence in power of Germany was well-known not only at the Embassy but

to the Germans as well. Goering, Keitel, Himmler and other notorious leaders of Germany were often invited by Ambassador Oshina to banquets at the Embassy. Hitler was once present there. Goering was reluctant of visiting the Embassy (he did not conceal his unfriendliness towards the Japanese, but Himmler and other leaders of "S.S." frequently called on Oshina and in their turn invited him to them. Oshina knows the German Language quite well and therefore he never took an interpreter along while visiting the Germans. In this way his talks with the Hitlerites were held in privacy and their topics are unknown to me. With the help of Himmler and his assistants Oshina travelled in Germany a lot and the Germans trusting Oshina showed him very much. It was also with their assistance that Oshina, accompanied by the Japanese military attache in 1942 or 1943 made a trip to the Soviet-German front. He was in the Ukraina, I think in Kamensk or Kamenka. The fact that he was an Ambassador of Japan, which had an agreement of neutrality with the U.S.S.R., did not embarrass him in the least. He thought it quite appropriate to stay on the Soviet territory, occupied by the Germans. Oshina has always been an advocate of a joint military attack of Japan and Germany on the U.S.S.R. In this respect the following episode is characteristic. Immediately after the attack of Germany against the Soviet Union on the 22 - 23rd of June 1941, a ciphered telegram was received in Tokyo, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the meaning of which was approximately the following: "In connection with the present situation Japan would guard the Pacific Ocean in the spirits of anti-konintern pact." Oshina summoned the counselor Kavahara and me and asked for our opinion. Kavahara and I declared that, according to the meaning of the telegram Japan will not attack the U.S.S.R. Oshina tried to prove the opposite, pointing out that "the guard of the Pacific Ocean" meant war of Japan against the U.S.S.R. Oshina, infuriated by vagueness of the telegram, ordered the telegram to be sent to the Germans in the form it was received, without paraphrasing the text and translating it from English into German. The reply of the Germans is unknown to me. Oshina completely shared the so-called "theory" of racial domination, exposed in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf". When other Japanese made hints to Oshina that Hitler spoke about the Japanese as well as of inferior creatures, Oshina answered that it was Hitler's mistake and that he would ask the author to introduce correspondent corrections in the book. Oshina ignored facts that were

were not beyond me.

VG. main Kampf.

Blah some months ago.

Sen Unyga. wate matsomun

W/ Situation somewhat novel - nothing

K. repeated unfortunate experience

Doc. No. 2074
Page 5

*"offshoot of Jap." with me offshoot
were not an unfortunate experience
when they get on the internet stand"*

V 6
common knowledge about the Hitlerites' atrocities within their own country and on the occupied territory of the Soviet Union. He considered these to be false, saying that they were only lies and enemy propaganda. As a matter of fact, obligingness and servility of Oshina towards the Germans were boundless. The case of a Japanese professor Sakimura may serve as an example of it. Being sent on commission by a Japanese Metallurgical concern to Germany Sakimura in 1943 or 1944 left for Sweden, where in an interview given to an English correspondent declared that Germany would lose the war through shortage of iron and on the whole he denounced German fascism. In connection with the protests of the Germans there was an exchange of notes between Oshina and the Germans three times. In his last note Oshina informed the Germans that he did not object to the delivery of Saki-Mur to the Gestapo. This is an indisputable fact, as I myself put the technical touches to the note. This action of Oshina caused great indignation even among pro-fascist Japanese. I don't know what has become of Sakimura, as he did not live in the Embassy and I lost sight of him. Military attaches generals Banzai and Komatsu and navy attaches Iokoi and Kodzima were the most intimate people, with whom Oshina had close connections. He constantly kept company with them as all of them cultivated profascist sentiments. Finally, the last stage of Oshina's career in Germany was also connected with Oshina's complete confidence in strength and possibility of the Germans. When in April 1945 the situation became alarming in Berlin, Oshina accepted the Germans' offer to move to the South of Germany as he believed the Germans that they would be able to continue a lasting resistance in the South. On the 14th of April 1945 Oshina with the Embassy went to Bad Gashtein, to the south of Salzburg in motor cars. Since then I haven't heard anything new about Oshina. In Berlin, the Counselor Kavahara, a diplomatic attache, the Japanese consul and two or three officials were left in Berlin to contact with separate members of the German Cabinet. I stayed because of the pointed out at the beginning. The testimony is written from my words correctly and is translated into Japanese to me.

Nohara

The examination began at 5 o'clock
The examination ended at 9 o'clock.

Examined: Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov.

The interpreter Rosenbaum

Hepebeus Kejobs

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: _____

19 January 1945

ConfidentialWAR POTENTIAL OF SOVIET RUSSIA

Favorable development of the military status of Soviet Russia and the reconquering of her lost regions has resulted not only in the moral but also in the material strengthening of the war potential of Soviet Russia.

The production of aircraft, tanks, vessels, coal, oil iron, steel, and other war materials has increased though the basic industries have not yet reached the pre-war production level. Rebuilding in reconquered regions has already begun, but still Soviet Russia, in restoring her war industry, relies on the aid from abroad to a large extent.

As far as food-stuffs are concerned, restoration in the reconquered territories is comparatively rapid and therefore in view of last year's good harvest, the breakdown of the Russian war potential due to the lack of food-stuffs is unthinkable. Russian armed forces and workers can maintain their former efficiency.

The patriotic movement in Russia, the friendly attitude of the government towards religion, as well as a number of economic measures have led to the revival of the national spirit. On the whole, it can be confirmed that the war potential of Soviet Russia has notably increased.

PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALSAIRCRAFT

Production per month in December 1944 _____

Number of aircraft received from abroad until April 1944 _____

(Average monthly delivery: _____)

Number of aircraft in disposition on the first front against Germany _____

Number of aircraft in use in the eastern regions of the USSR _____

TANKS

Production per month in December 1944 _____

Number of tanks imported from abroad
until April 1944 _____

(Average monthly delivery: _____)

Number of tanks on the fronts: _____

Against Germany _____

In eastern regions of the USSR _____

VESSELS

Number of vessels built in 1944:
10 with the total tonnage of 120,000 tons.

COAL

The restoration of coal mines in the Donetz Basin has not made any noticeable progress. At the end of 1944 the daily output of the Basin amounted to from 75,000 to 100,000 tons. However, there are possibilities of increasing the output in the Alaganda and Uzbekistan regions. The output of coal in Soviet Russia in 1944 amounted to 130,000,000 tons.

OIL

The production of oil in 1944, including the Rumanian and the Polish oil fields amounted to 38,000,000 tons. The amount of aviation petrol imported from abroad before April 1944 _____
(Average delivery per month: _____)

IRON and STEEL

Iron industry of the Donetz Basin has not been restored in full measure, though there are possibilities of increasing production in the Urals and in Uzbekistan. The production of steel in 1944 amounted to 11,500,000 tons.

ALUMINUM

Production in 1944 - from 100,000 to 120,000 tons.
Importation from abroad before April 1944 _____
(Average amount per month _____)

COPPER

Production in 1944 - 200,000 tons. Importation of copper and copper wares from abroad before April 1944 - 240,000 tons.

AUTOMOBILES

Production in 1944 - 200,000. Importation from abroad before April 1944 - 220,000.

MANPOWER

Number of mobilized forces _____ men.

Total losses since the beginning of the war - 11,000,000

Reserves able to be mobilized: from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 men.

Manpower in use on the Soviet-German front _____ men.

In eastern regions of the USSR _____ men.

Number of workers engaged in war work --

71,600,000

Among them: 28,200,000 men
43,400,000 women

Reserves of labor power from 3,000,000 to 3,500,000

FOOD SITUATION

Cereal Production in 1944 - 46,800,000 tons

etc. etc.

(Written in handwriting) On 21 January 1942, the Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow let the following report go through us to the German Foreign Office:

Confidential

The Strength of the Soviet Russian
Armed Forces

According to information received by the Rumanian General Staff the aspect of the strength of the Red Army at the beginning of December 1941 is as follows:

Strength of Russian troops before the beginning
of the Russian-German war:

European Russia:

Infantry	146	divisions
Cavalry	27	"
Armored forces	35	"
Total	208	"

Far East:

Infantry	25	divisions
Cavalry	20	"
Armored Forces	5	"
Total	50	"

The strength of Russian troops increased by mobiliza-
tion since the beginning of the war:

Total strength - 340-350 divisions

Losses during the war:

(until the beginning of December 1941)

Infantry	215-220	divisions
Cavalry	15-20	"
Armored Forces	20-22	"

(Translator's note
corrected by hand;
originally types:
"10-20")

etc.

(Written by hand under the printed text on lower margin of the document)

"On January 22, 1942 this information was in the hands of the German commander-in-chief."

CONFIDENTIAL

Exhibit 4

1455
(010)-g&l

*Truk
Caroline*

HEADQUARTERS,
OCCUPATION FORCES,
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimon
construction of fortifications and * of Sona Monukit, Assistant
military installations in the Truk * Chief, Tol Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use *
of forced native labor without *
adequate remuneration, and denial *
of equal rights to Americans on Yap.*

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.

Date: February 25, 1946.

In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.

Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
A. Sona Monukit, assistant chief, Tol Island.

Q. How long have you lived on the island of Tol?
A. Forty-eight years.

Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
A. Forty-eight years.

Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on the island of Tol prior to December 1941?
A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these installations.
A. During 1939 on the southwest section of South Tol a road was built from the dock to the top of the hill. Around the edges of the top of the hill three gun emplacements were installed and three guns appearing to be about eight inches in diameter installed there. A platform was erected and a searchlight affixed thereon. A reinforced concrete cave in which ammunition was stored was dug in the side of the hill. Two barracks were built for the Japanese soldiers. During 1940 on the northern tip of North Tol a concrete wharf was constructed and a road from the wharf to the top of the mountain. At the top of the mountain one barrack and two warehouses were built. A concrete platform

was built and a searchlight placed thereon. Two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed appearing to be about four or five inches in diameter and a radio station built.

Q. On the western section of North Tol I notice on this map before me a cave housed gun and some barracks, when were these constructed?

A. These were built after December 1941.

Q. On the eastern section of North Tol there are quite a few barracks, when were these constructed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Did the Japanese place more guns and more installations on the northern section of North Tol after December 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any airfields built on either North or South Tol?

A. No.

Q. On the southeast section of South Tol we have a cave housed flat trajectory gun, generators, and searchlight, when were these put in?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the eastern section of South Tol I notice a hospital, when was that built?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the map of South Tol there are numerous buildings used as ammunition storage and barracks, when were these built?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Are there any other installations or fortifications on North or South Tol that you know of?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any military installations or fortifications built on islands near Tol?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.

A. During 1942 and 1943 we were forced to furnish three hundred men per day to the Japanese forces for labor. These men received eighty sen per day. Four days each month we worked with no pay. During 1944 and 1945 we were forced to furnish five hundred persons per day to work for the Japanese. The men were paid one yen and twenty sen per day and the women received eighty sen per day. During this period we were forced to work four days per month without pay.

Q. Do you know the names of the Japanese in charge here at any time the construction was in progress prior to December 1941?

A. The second in command of Tol Island at that time was Hansai of the Japanese Navy and Michuno was in command of the army troops. I do not know the names of anyone else at that time.

Q. Do you know the names of any Japanese in command when they were securing from you personnel for forced labor?

A. Matsuta and Nakashima were the army commanders during 1942 when we were forced to furnish personnel for labor purposes.

Q. Do you know any other names?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equal rights to any Americans on Yap?

A. No.

Q. Is there any information you wish to add to that already given relative to the subjects under question?

A. No.

(signed) Sona Monukit
Sona Monukit,
assistant chief,
Tol Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Sona Monukit, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Sona Monukit
Sona Monukit

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946.

(signed) T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

(signed) Artie Moses
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946.

(signed) T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Sona

Monukit, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Sona Monukit read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

(signed) T. Santamaria

T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Island Command, Truk.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,
Moen Island, Truk and Central
Carolines.

Date: February 28, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL.

899

MEMORANDUM

On the Discussion of the German Foreign Minister
with Ambassador OSHIMA on 6 March 1943

Ambassador OSHIMA declared that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report to the German Foreign Minister, by order of his government, the following:

The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a mutual conference between the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters, in which the question was exhaustively discussed and minutely probed. The result was the following:

The Japanese Government thoroughly recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and has full understanding for the desire of its German ally, that Japan, too, enters into the war against Russia. It is not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it is in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government will never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention to once again, in the future, take the offensive on the other fronts.

In the declaration of the Ambassador, the German Foreign Minister asked how one conceived, in Tokyo, the future waging of the war. At present, Germany is to a great extent waging war against the common enemies, England and America, alone, while Japan is taking a rather defensive stand. However, it would be more in order if all the powers bound by the Tripartite Pact joined all their forces to jointly defeat not only England and America, but Russia as well. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One should not overstrain the German people's strength. In secret he is concerned that forces could be at work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion -- and who also propagate it -- that Germany would conclude the fight victoriously anyway, and Japan should therefore further consolidate herself before it would make further and supreme efforts.

The U.S.A. and England were pursuing the strategy that the Allies should at first turn all their strength against Germany and Italy alone, and had also expressed this in CASABLANCA completely openly as their program. Actuality has confirmed this until now. Unfortunately, Ambassador SATO in KUIBYSHEV has apparently delivered to the Russians in this matter the assurance of the absolute neutrality

of Japan. However, we had to undergo the experience that on the Eastern Front -- especially in STALINGRAD also -- fresh Siberian division had fought. We would nevertheless attack the Russians again and again. The situation on the Eastern Front had stabilized itself and a stable German Front had been established except for a small, still existing, gap. However, at the same time we have to fight against England and America more or less by ourselves in Africa, in the air and on all the oceans as well.

Compared with this, Japan's share was small. Even the battle area in BURMA was small in comparison. Tokyo must therefore understand it when Germany raises the question of whether in the spirit of waging the joint war, it is the correct strategy for Japan not to make full use of her people's strength, while Germany's is strained to the limit. He would like to emphasize again that if Germany would ever become weak, Japan would find herself facing a world coalition which would consist not only of England, America and Russia, but the people's strength /VOLSKRAFT/ of all the countries on earth, as well as that of a bolshevized Europe. The question was therefore raised whether at this time so exceedingly decisive for the outcome of the war, the strength of the allies was properly distributed and was really being used in the spirit of a joint, total conduct of the war.

Ambassador OSHIMA answered that what decided the issue for Japan was whether she had sufficient forces and whether her armament capacity was sufficient in order to attack and defeat the Russians, in addition to the enemies Japan already has, without endangering her operations on the other fronts. Tokyo is afraid of splitting its forces. On the other hand Japan's attitude was in no way purely defensive and just waiting, but a new attack against the U.S.A. and the British will surely take place. Even though he has no detailed reports concerning this, he personally believes that this attack will come in the direction of the Indian Ocean. In any case, however, the belief in an inseparable mutual victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion for Tokyo.

* * * * *

The German Foreign Minister commented at this point that an infraction of mutual trust was naturally completely out of the question, since this was unshakeable between Germany and Japan. In the matter of the inquiry which was brought up, it was solely a question of the joint conduct of the war, the strategy which is to be jointly carried out, that is, the proper use of the common strength. Germany entirely understands that Japan must first finish constructing her newly won bases and positions and must consolidate her forces. Japan had done this for a year and now

when Germany is bearing the brunt of the struggle, Japan should be in a position to be able to apply a new decisive blow against the common enemy. It was in no way a question of mutual trust, but he sometimes is concerned that Japan has the intention of consolidating her forces for yet another year and only later starting a new attack.

Upon this the Ambassador replied that he did not think so. The intentions of the military leaders in his fatherland were unknown to him; nevertheless, he knew that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia. But for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one withdrew the front in the South and abandoned several islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the North, this could be possible. This would, however, mean a heavy defeat in the South. Both an advance to the South, and at the same time to the North was impossible for Japan.

* * * * *

The German Foreign Minister then once more brought up the question of a Japanese attack on Russia, by stating that the struggle on the Burma Front as well as in the South was more of a maritime problem and that actually only a few land troops were being employed on all fronts, excepting China. The attack on Russia was therefore in the first place a matter for the Army and the consideration was whether the necessary forces were nevertheless ready for this. OSHIMA replied that the bulk of the Japanese Army was bound in China and on the Burma Front the forces were by no means insignificant either. If Japan should want to attack Russia, she would have to bring almost all the troops from the South into Manchuria. In any case, one did not have enough troops in order to be able to attack Russia with the firm prospect in an early victory. In case the Russians are the attackers, one is naturally armed. But for an attack on them, insufficient forces were ready.

At the end of March or early April of this year, a few officers, cloaked as couriers and Embassy Secretaries, will come here from Tokyo in order to deliver particulars concerning the situation and Japan's military forces and plans. He will be able to draw a better picture of matters there when these have arrived. The ambassador emphasized again that Japan was unwilling to take up a defensive attitude.

* * * * *

Concerning the division of strength on the Russo-Japanese front, the Ambassador remarked that the Japanese fighting forces were greatly inferior to those of the Russians. The Japanese General Staff has a very exact view over the state of the Red

JSE
Far Eastern Army, on the basis of a carefully expanded /ausgebaut/ spy net on the Russian side where many Koreans were working for them as spies. One has an exact idea of the position of the bunkers, the thickness of the bunkers, etc. The general strength of the Russian Army amounts to 800,000 men. It was quite natural that the Russians left so many troops at the frontier, as in the course of their history they had always until now made extremely unpleasant experiences with surprise attacks on the part of Japan.

Concerning our reports on Russia's imports from the U.S.A. via VLADIVOSTOK, OSHIMA thought that Japan allowed the Russians only one seaway, and that on this seaway all ships are searched for arms and ammunition. The Japanese Government has no particulars concerning American delivery of war materials over this way. However, it was known to him that the Americans were maintaining an airline from Alaska to Siberia. This goes from FAIRBANKS, ANADYR, JAKUTSK to KRASNOJARSK and some material, of value to the Russians, would certainly be delivered over it.

* * * * *

In that the German Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Japan will soon be able to conduct an effective shipping war from her far advanced bases against the enemy lines of supply, and after Ambassador OSHIMA once again expressed his thanks for the German willingness in the name of his Government, the German Foreign Minister bid goodbye to the Ambassador

GOTTFRIEDSEN

Berlin, 9 March 1943

899

1455
(010)-gcl

HEADQUARTERS,
OCCUPATION FORCES,
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

Information relative to the date of * Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and * of Ater Era, chief, Fefan
military installations in the Truk * Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use *
of forced native labor without *
adequate remuneration, and denial *
of equal rights to Americans on Yap. *

Truk Caroline

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.
Date : February 25, 1946.
In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.
Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
A. Ater Era, chief, Fefan Island.
Q. How long have you lived on the island of Fefan?
A. Forty-nine years.
Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
A. Forty-nine years.
Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Fefan Island prior to December 1941?
A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.

A. On the island of Fefan during the year of 1940 the Japanese constructed a road from the dock on the east side of the island to the top of the mountain. Emplacements for two guns were built and guns appearing to have bores of about five inches were installed. A searchlight was placed there on a platform and a generator placed inside a small building. Three large buildings were erected, one used as a barracks and two for warehouses.

Q. On the north side of Fefan there is a caved housed flat trajectory gun, a machine gun, and two twenty-five milimeter twin mounts, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the south tip they have a cave housed flat trajectory gun and a machine gun, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. All over the island I notice numerous buildings, a hospital, barracks, warehouses, and guns, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Do you know of any military installations and fortifications placed on other islands thereabouts?

A. Yes, on the island of Faleu.

Q. What was built on this island?

A. After December 1941 they dug caves, built buildings, and installed guns there.

Q. When was the seaplane base built on the island of Tsis?

A. During 1943.

Q. When was the airfield built on Param?

A. Construction was started in 1943.

Q. Do you know the names of any of the persons in command or in charge while the building was going on prior to December 1941?

A. Iwai, Japanese Navy, was one of the officers in charge during that period.

Q. Do you know of any natives who were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.

A. From January 1942 until cessation of hostilities we were forced to furnish four hundred men and three hundred women to the Japanese for

employment purposes. The Pay received was eighty sen for the men, sixty sen for women per day. During 1942 and 1943 we were forced to work one day each month without pay. For the year 1944 we were forced to work two months without pay and during 1945 three months without pay. During 1944 and 1945 the men received one yen and twenty sen and the women eighty sen per day.

Q. What method did the Japanese use in forcing you to supply labor?

A. We were told to furnish certain amounts.

Q. Supposing you hadn't furnished this labor what would have happened?

A. We had to furnish a list and if the person did not make an appearance or didn't report for work they were whipped. Because we would be punished if we didn't supply the request for personnel by the Japanese forces we never disobeyed orders.

Q. Do you know the name of anyone in command forcing you to furnish labor?

A. The name of the military police master during 1942 and 1943 on Fefan was Sato, and during 1944 and 1945 the name of the police master was Aki. My people reporting for work had to report to these officials.

Q. Do you know of any circumstances of denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?

A. No.

Q. Is there anything you would like to add to the testimony already given?

A. No.

/s/ Ater Era
Ater Era,
chief,
Fefan Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Ater Era, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ater Era
Ater Era

before

Subscribed and sworn to/me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Ater Era, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ater Era read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,
Truk and Central Caroline
Islands

/s/ T. Santamaria
T. SANTAMARIA,
1st Lt., USMCR.,
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 4, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL