

NOTE TO TELEGRAM NO. 594, OF JUNE 19
FROM TOKYO RE: INDO-CHINA

"Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict have come pretty late; the sacrifices which we in fact made for Japan (stoppage of sending war supplies to China and consequently sacrifice of supply of important Chinese raw material) have as yet received no recognition from the Japanese, let alone economic compensation. Japan's desire for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat strange in view of the attitude Japan has taken re economic relations with Germany during the war.

"If this is to be used in countering the Japanese Ambassador in the forthcoming conversations, the following examples can be introduced:

(1) From the first, Japanese shipping has completely subscribed to the French and English blockade.

(2) For a long time the Japanese Government had not met German wishes for transit of goods through Japan and had only in the dark shown in recent months some obligingness. Thus an assignment of wolfram from Canton and an assignment of tin from Columbia was sent on to Germany. Recently the Japanese Government even offered us 100 tons each of wolfram and tin from its own stocks to be delivered without cost. However, there are still unfilled requests -- e.g. increasing the Japanese shipping service to Vladivostock which is only made the port of call three times a month by one Japanese steamer. Also, further shipment of tin from Columbia has not been possible up till now because of the refusal of the Japanese shipping company.

(3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a monopoly agreement with Manchuria for the supply of soya-beans without telling us anything, although we had been the biggest customers up till then, e.g. 800,000 tons in 1938. After our remonstrations, Japan has up till now only released 70,000 tons to be supplied to us from Manchuria.

(4) Japan still refuses to transport home in small groups from America the crew of the Columbus, nearly 500 men, because she regards them as combatants, following

the English interpretation, although in the American interpretation they are styled as shipwrecked survivors.

(5) It is true that Japan supplied us all the whale oil from the last haul of 75,000 tons. However, we know from confidential sources that it first offered half of this to England, and only decided to supply it to us, when it had received no satisfactory English offer.

"Hereby submitted to the State Secretary,

Berlin, 20 June 1940.

/s/ WIEHL."

/147549/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

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G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

MEMORANDUM

L. R. KNOLL

June 19, 1940

On 19 June the Japanese Ambassador drew me into a conversation regarding the future of German-Japanese relations. He began by referring to the expected visit of the former Foreign Minister Naotake SATO and seemed to want to make suggestions for the subject of the conversation with Mr. SATO. The Ambassador did not touch actual questions of German and Japanese policy.

The Ambassador stated somewhat as follows: "The knowledge that Japan's welfare depends not on the Western Powers, but that an approach to Germany is of significance to Japan, broke through even in circles which till then had been strangers to Germany. One indication for this is SATO's wish to come to Germany now. I am glad that he thus takes the opportunity to get to know the new Germany from close by and I am sure that his visit will be further material in /the process of/ winning over the circles which up to now had no interest in Germany to the idea of an approach to Germany. Today the building up of heavy industry is regarded as the most important task in Japan. The light industry is ready for the greater part; where this is not the case its further development is of no considerable political importance and can be put aside. If, in the field of development of heavy industry, a close cooperation between Japan and Germany is possible, which I do not doubt, Japan will gain freedom of action towards the United States. The question of raw material supplies from England and America I do not regard as so dangerous. The raw material countries are under export pressure, especially if England should now blockade Europe. Therefore we need not fear the boycott warnings. But if our economic circles see Germany's great industrial development and realize that Germany is not only not behind the United States, but has overtaken her in many fields, they will, in view of the unfriendly attitude of the United States, gladly switch over to Germany. The improvement of Japanese-Russian relations is, as long as the present war lasts, a pre-requisite for this switching. TOGO and I are feverishly working for it, and it becomes more and more clear in Japan that the future of Japan lies in the South, and that the enemy in the North must be made a friend. Certain military circles are opposed to such a turn, but there too OSHIMA will have acted for their enlightenment in the meantime.

4 POST-WAR
BLOCKS

"After the war the German-Italian, Russian, Japanese-Chinese and American blocks will remain. It is important for Japan as well as for Germany that close relations between Japan and Germany will then remain or be established. I see the way to that in the first place in the economic field mentioned before. Germany should consign to the Japanese block an ample position in her post war economic program."

Ambassador SATO could be told, in case the conversation with him is held on this or similar lines, that the contribution, which is expected of Japan, is to show a more obliging attitude concerning Germany's wants for raw materials in Japanese (oil sources) and overseas areas. Especially the argument of the export pressure on the raw material countries points against the reserve in transit questions which Japan showed until now. Japan should not fear boycott warnings or bring forth this fear as an excuse in regard to allowing transit businesses for Germany.

A promise of delivery for the expansion of Heavy industry after the war would today when Japan believes in Germany's victory, very probably lead to considerable giving-in in the bean (Manchukuo) and transit questions.

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Post War

Mr. Knoll will consider

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To be kept in locked file.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo	24 June 1940	10:10 hours
Arrival	25 June 1940	0230 hours

No. 614 of 24 June

I.) The head of the Central Division of the War Ministry, General MUTO has informed the Military Attache that the Japanese Army would welcome it, if Germany were prepared, if need be, to act as mediator in the already extended conciliatory talks between Japan and CHIANG KAI SHEK, in order to conclude the China conflict in a way acceptable to Japan. The General declared further that Japan is very much interested in Indo-China also for this reason. The Military Attache promised to forward this, and broached the question of Russia's attitude to such a development. The General replied that the Japanese Army considered conciliation with Russia to be necessary. General MUTO's inquiry is to be taken as the official proposal of the Army, according to Japanese custom,

II.) The Minister of Overseas Affairs, General KOISO, asked me in a conversation to which he had invited me, what Germany's attitude would be to the military activity of Japan in Indo-China and in parts of the Netherlands Indies. I pointed to the well-known declaration of the Reich Government, according to which Germany is not interested in the question of the Netherlands Indies and added that we would probably raise no objections to Japanese action in Indo-China, provided that Japan obliges herself to tie down America in the Pacific area, perhaps by a promise to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of Americas entry into the war against Germany. The Minister of Overseas Affairs replied that he would be pleased to pursue this idea further. Regarding a possible Japanese Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, the Minister thought that for this Russia would probably ask for certain territorial concessions in a northwestern province of China and Outer-Mongolia, which could be discussed. The Minister admitted that an agreement with Russia and the realization of Japanese colonial wishes in Indo-China and in the Netherlands Indies would not only gradually make Japan economically independent of America, but would offer to the expected KONOYE Government a promising starting point for an agreement with CHIANG KAI SHEK. I have the impression that the ambitious Minister of Overseas Affairs wanted to qualify himself for the next cabinet by putting out these feelers.

III.) Also Ambassador SHIRATORI, who is ever more frequently named as the coming Foreign Minister, advocated a Non-Aggression Pact with Russia in an interview yesterday with the YOMIURI.

IV.) Today's resignation of Prince KONOYE as President of the Privy Council indicates continuing internal political developments with the aim of formation of the new Government and a new unity party under KONOYE. Since leading personalities of the KONOYE circle are obviously trying to make contact with me, I ask for authorization to discuss with them confidentially the ideas of MUTO and KOISO, in order to establish what power is standing behind them and what possibilities result therefrom. My impression up to now that the possibility of the formation of a Pacific bloc of Japan, CHIANG KAI SHEK China and Russia in association with Germany, which ties down America in the Pacific sphere and could cripple her freedom of action vis-a-vis Europe is becoming prominent.

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OFFICE OF MILITARY
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V.P.

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MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAHER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSEIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several

years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more

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friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, SATO answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into making severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

X | The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would

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be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The Foreign Minister of the Reich then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSHIMA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

✓ 2 (The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed SCHMIDT
 Envoy

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. CUMMING

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the ambassador K u r u s u and the Consul-General S t a h m e r.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this third day
of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524

MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAEMER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several

years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more

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friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, SATO answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into making severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would

be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The Foreign Minister of the Reich then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

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The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSHIMA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed

SCHMIDT

Envoy

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945: and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. CUMMING

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

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6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the ambassador K u r u s u and the Consul-General S t a h m e r.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt

PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this third day of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524

Document No. 1590 D

General Telegram No. 23144 Tokyo, July 13th, 1940
To Special Envoy SATO,
c/o Ambassador KURUSU, Berlin, Germany.
From Foreign Minister ARITA.

Matter concerning Japanese-German Concert No. 445 (Urgent, Secret Code)

Referring to your cablegram No. 870

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(1) Your conversation with the Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP seems to have brought out clearly the spirit of German victory. You have informed me that RIBBENTROP showed you a "non-committal" attitude concerning Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Perhaps, he had no concern with these problems. But did you not disconcert his air to pursue something from Japan by utilizing Japan - for example, Japan's participation in European war?

You stated that he predicted the world would be divided into four Economic Blocks in the future. But, did you not receive the impression that Germany would not recognize the superiority of a certain stabilizing power in each Block indirectly, but has begun to hope for domination by Germany of the French and Dutch colonies in East Asia also?

(2) While RIBBENTROP expressed his optimistic opinion on the subject of Japanese-American relation, you spoke of the tendency of deterioration of Japanese-American relation and you hinted that, if war should come to exist between the two countries it would cause Germany an unfavorable reflection upon her European policy. Did you intend to call his attention by saying so, in the sense that the war with the U. S. A. would inevitably cause Japan to march on to the South Seas and thus bring out difficulties in accomplishing German object? Or, did you intend to warn him that the war with U. S. A. would have an unfavorable effect on the German war situation in Europe as a result of Japan's consumption of national strength and weaken the pressure on the USSR? Furthermore, did you go so far as to say in your conversation with RIBBENTROP that the Japanese-American war, if it occurred, would develop into a German-American war? Please reply immediately.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____

I. P. S. No. 1590 D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated July 13, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 445 dated 13, July 1940, from Foreign Minister ARITA to Special Envoy SATO in care of Ambassador KURUSU, Berlin Germany.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this
6th day of September, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Document No. 1590 D

General Telegram No. 23144 Tokyo, July 13th, 1940
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c/o Ambassador KURUSU, Berlin, Germany.
From Foreign Minister ARITA.

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Signed at Tokyo on this
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Signature of Official

SEAL

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Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Document No. 1590 B

General Telegram No. 20990

Berlin, July 15, 1940

To Foreign Minister ARITA,
From Ambassador KURUSU

No. 901 (Secret Code)

Referring to your telegram No. 445.
Ambassador SATO answered.

(1) It may not necessarily be that Germany does not embrace at all a hidden intention to utilize as tactics her noncommittal attitude to the Japan's demand in relation to Dutch Indies, etc., but, judging from the RIBBENTROP's attitude, at least, I did not find such an air to request Japan's participation in the war making a good use of it as a bait. I felt, rather, that Germany did not attach importance to Japan's national power at present, excepting her naval power. I cannot, also, say so far that Germany has already fostered an ambition on the southern colonies. Comparing with the days I sent telegram No. 527, today when Germany won the great victory in European continent, it must not be passed over that pretty large change arose in thought of Germany.

(2) What I said concerning the problem towards America was not intended to restrain Germany's ambition on the South Seas, nor intended to mean what was related to the consumption of the Japanese national power and decrease of Japan's pressure on the USSR. As seen in my telegram No. 870 and its supplementary one, I made RIBBENTROP pay attention, suggesting the possible development of the U. S.-Japanese war to the U. S.-German war. I talked him those, a little in a threatening way, supposing the participation of the U. S. in the war against Germany might be the great pain to her while she was engaging in the operations to Britain devotedly and she was endeavoring to avoid the long war. I guessed what he felt then was just this very weak point. However, I avoided to utter such a direct narration as to say it would develop to Japanese-American war, but used the expression as seen in my telegram.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1590 BStatement of Source and Authenticity

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Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Minutes of the Joint Conference of War, Navy, and
Foreign Ministries on Strengthening of Harmony
Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

12 July 1940

Those present:

War Ministry	Lt. Col. <u>TAKAYAMA</u>
Navy Ministry	Commander <u>SHIBA</u>
Naval General Staff	Captain <u>ONO</u>
Foreign Ministry	Section Chief <u>ANDO</u> Section Chief <u>ISHIZAWA</u> Secretary <u>TOKUNAGA</u>

"ANDO: 'The Foreign Office gave instructions to Ambassador SATO some time ago to confer with German authorities upon strengthening the coalition between the two countries, and Mr. SATO was able to exchange views with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. At that conference, RIBBENTROP said that he could not understand in the least what Japan was after. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to draw and present to him a more concrete and further penetrated draft and thereby intensify the coalition between Japan and Germany. The draft distributed among you is only a tentative plan made by our Foreign Office, but I want you to discuss it and let me hear your opinions.'

"(Upon request of Lieutenant Colonel TAKAYAMA, he explains the substance of the draft.)

"ANDO: 'This draft has been drawn with the aim of intensifying the coalition of Japan and Germany upon supposition that Germany will conquer England, have the hegemony of Europe and Africa, and establish New Order there. Regarding our Soviet policy, which is an important problem to us, we want to check Soviet through the influence of Japanese-German coalition. There is a probability of the formation of a U. S.-Soviet coalition, but we hope to check this likewise by Japanese-German coalition. As to the limit of Japanese-German coalition, it is deemed wise for us to avoid to participate in the European War, as is shown in the draft and in view of our present domestic and economic conditions as well as our relations with Soviet and the United States. (We have asked the opinions of the Army

and the Navy on this subject, and they both have expressed approval.) Our plan is to join hands with Germany to the fullest extent but within the scope of being driven into the war.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Is this plan merely to have the three ministries come to an agreement and to submit their opinions to the higher authorities for discussion?'

"ANDO: 'As this matter needs to be carried out promptly, I want to submit it to the higher authorities and have them put into practice as our national policy as soon as the three ministries arrive at an agreement.'

"(The Army and the Navy gave consent to his proposal, and ANDO goes into explanation of the substance.)

"ANDO: 'A plan has been proposed some time ago to the effect that Japan should have Germany recognize its free hand concerning French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Sea Islands. But as the meaning of free hand is somewhat vague, if it is expressed more definitely, it will be as drafted. I should like to hear your opinion on this point. The object of this draft is to have Germany understand that Japan has no territorial ambition over these spheres, but Japan wants to firmly establish not only the freedom of economic activities but also political leadership. In order to have this approved by Germany, it will be necessary to choose a form easy for Germany to approve.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'You say you want to make Germany recognize Japan's political leadership in the South Seas, but, what relation does it have with Japan's political leadership in China and Manchuria?'

"ANDO: 'As I regard our political leadership in China and Manchuria as a matter of course, I did not enumerate it here.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning British, French and Dutch territories, we will discuss the details later.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning German support to the settlement of the Chinese Incident, our attitude should be absolutely independent. For instance, concerning such matters as German mediation of the Chinese Incident which has recently almost come into question, we should have Germany mediate from a point of view that as a part of the general problem of Japan-German

coalition, the quick settlement of the Incident and the solidifying of Japan's position will become a favorable factor to Germany. We should avoid assuming a supplicatory attitude. It is also necessary to study concretely the recognition of the new regime and the prohibition of exports to CHIANG.'

"ANDO: 'The question of trade with Europe and Africa and on other economic matters has been raised, because, if Germany should resort to a closed economy in case of forming a block economy in Europe and Africa, Japan would fall into difficulties. To meet this problem we hope to maintain trade between the East Asia and South Seas economic sphere of Japan and the new economic sphere of Germany, and to make clear whether or not other economic relations should exist, as well as the difference /of Japan and Germany's position in the two spheres/.'

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"ANDO: 'The most important problem among Japan's promises to Germany will be the restraint of British activities in East Asia as much as possible in order to facilitate Germany's conquest of England (refer to Article (2)), and on this point I should like to request the Army and the Navy to study what practical measures exist. As far as I am concerned, oppression of British political rights and interests in East Asia or a secret assistance to the native independence movements in India and Burma, in accordance with the changes in the situation, may serve as restraining measures.'

"ANDO: 'Point 3 specifies compensation for Germany's recognition of our political predominance in the South Sea Islands. Germany craves for Wolfram rubber, and tin from China and the South Seas, and we will supply Germany with them. We will also give favorable consideration to Germany's economic activities (including investment and enterprises) in China and the South Seas. (a) and (b) will keep an even balance.'

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"ONO: 'After the conclusion of the war there may be occasions when Germany might carry out active economic operations towards the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and China, and especially after Germany makes France and the Netherlands somewhat like subject states, it is probable that she will dispatch active members of the Nazi Party to French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies and keep these two colonies under her political leadership even if she would not go so far as to make them her own territories. Therefore, Japan's policy toward French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies must be hastened in order to prevent such movement /on the part of Germany/ and she must also endeavour to sever French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies from European influence as soon as possible.'

"ANDO: 'As to our Soviet policy referred to in (2), it is equally favorable to both Japan and Germany to maintain peace with the Soviet Union at present. However, we cannot forecast to what direction Germany will turn its relations with Soviet after cessation of the European War. It will be necessary for us to make some sort of arrangement with Germany beforehand as Japan and Germany will be in the same position in their relations with Soviet. However, the relation between Germany and Soviet at the present moment is delicate, and there probably may be something which Germany cannot tell us unreservedly. For this reason, the latter part of article (2) may be dropped according to circumstances.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany would not like to see Soviet penetrate into Rumania. Should Germany request us to check Soviet in the East, what measures could be considered?'

"Concerning the above measures, discussions followed. Then the subject was turned to Japan's U. S. policy, Article (3) of Chapter II.

"TAKAYAMA: 'Does this mean that Japan will not try to reach any particular understanding with the United States after all? For example, if such an agreement as to guarantee the peace of the Pacific should be reached, and if the United States should, as a consequence, no longer sense menace in the Pacific, it may interfere with European affairs, which Germany will no doubt detest.'

"ANDO: 'No! Even if such an agreement should be reached, the agreement will be made in a manner that the United States will confine itself to the American continents and it will not interfere with the affairs of the South Seas and other parts of the world. Recently, Hitler propounded that the United States should mind its own business of the American continents and should not interfere with the affairs of other continents, and RIBBENTROP, in his conversation with our Ambassador SATO, did not seem to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation to restrain the United States. Apparently, Germany's wish is to maintain a peaceful relation with the United States at present and in the future, as long as the latter does not take an offensive attitude. Consequently, Germany is not likely to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Will not Germany demand us to take some measures in order to prevent the United States from participating in the war on Britain's side?'

"ANDO: 'Such anxiety was felt in the early stage of the present War, but we have practically no such uneasiness now, for Germany does not anticipate the United States' participation in the war any longer.'

"ISHIZAWA: 'There is one thing that we should keep in our mind in respect of our relation with the United States. After two to three years from now, the U. S. Navy will become a far greater power. Japan and Germany must necessarily check it together.'

"ANDO: 'Both Japan and Germany should not positively be antagonistic to the United States, but should restrain it peaceably.'

"ISHIZAWA: 'Judging from each assertion made by Japan and the United States, there is a considerable difference in opinions between the two, and it will require unusual efforts to adjust it. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the New Order in Europe, the United States will find it difficult to interfere in European affairs, and as a consequence, it will intervene in Far Eastern affairs, with the Philippines and Hawaii as its naval bases. Should a peaceful order be established between Japan and the United States, the latter may insist upon pretty severe conditions to be accepted by Japan. And if we try to make Germany restrain the United States, we may turn out to be a liability to Germany.'

"ANDO: 'However, should the United States put pressure upon Japan, Japan's power of restraining Soviet may be weakened, and Germany would not like it. So Japan's relations with the United States and Soviet and that of Germany will eventually become the same.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany has considerably advanced into South America since pre-war time, and won't it be as absolutely necessary for Germany to advance to South America after the war as well? If so, the United States would not approve of this movement and don't you think a conflict will arise between Germany and the United States?'

"Discussions followed.

"SHIBA: 'According to Helfrich who recently visited Japan, it was said that, contrary to Japan's erroneous assumption, Germany's industrial power which had expanded during and before the war would undertake great economic activities in order to extend the market for German industrial products in post-war time. It is certain that Germany will penetrate economically into China and the South Seas also.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning article (4) of Chapter II, as it was decided, we cannot accept a request to join the war, even if Germany should make such a request to us.

"ANDO: 'Concerning Chapter III, which is the coalition between Japan and Italy, Italy has hitherto reiterated that it would support Japan in her East Asiatic policy. It would be also important that we maintain a friendly relation with Italy to restrain Germany which would pride itself upon its victory. I think it will be an adequate measure to present our coalition proposal to Italy at the same time we do to Germany.'

"The Army and Navy approved his suggestion.

"Then someone asked, 'One of the most important matters for Japan in connection with Italy is Italy's relation with Soviet. But, is Italy willing to maintain peace with Soviet?'

"TAKAYAMA: 'As long as the present European War is in progress, Germany and Italy's policy toward Soviet will be more or less the same.'

"After there were some arguments about the formality of the agreement, it was decided that the agreement be written in the form of a diplomatic note, unless the other government is anxious to have it written in the form of a regular pact, as it would take a long time to enter into a formal pact, anyhow. (However, in a case as 'the recognition of Japan's position in French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies,' it was resolved that the formality of an agreement may be issued.) To sum up, they agreed to carry out the matter quickly. Furthermore, it was unanimously approved that the detail of concrete problems involved in each article be carefully studied."

Plan For Strengthening the Harmony
Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(Drafted July 12th 1940)

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in the face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition.

Principle -- To maintain an intimate connection with each other and to have a concrete political understanding as regards the mutual assistance in diplomatic and economic affairs.

Points

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

i) not to interfere with the autonomy or independence of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other races of the South Seas areas, to recognize that the above areas are within the sphere of Japan's influence, and to approve and support Japan's political leadership and cooperation in those areas;

(ii) to give proper support for the disposition of the China Incident;

(iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

i) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under the German leadership;

ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;

iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activity of Germany in China and in the South Seas.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in order that the United States shall not interfere with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall adopt such a policy as to check the U. S., never supporting her.

(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(5) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.

III. Japanese-Italian coalition.

In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany.

Plan for Strengthening the Harmony
Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition

Principle -- With the common aim of establishing a New World Order, Japan and Germany shall maintain close liaison with one another and shall in parallel engage in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas, and in Europe and Africa, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the above.

Points:

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

i) to recognize that French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Seas areas are politically and economically within the sphere of Japan's influence and that they shall be able of their own free will to enjoy autonomy or independence in the future, to recognize accordingly that Japan's approval must be necessary for the alteration of their political status quo, and to support the economic development of Japan in those areas, not preventing the implantation of her political power;

ii) to assure Japan of the indiscriminate treatment of her trade with Europe and Africa under the German influence, and to give favorable consideration to her other economic relations;

iii) to have harmony in economy and technique between Japan and Germany.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

i) to support the German policy in Europe and Africa, and to approve the German-directed New Order in Europe;

ii) to assure Germany the supply of essential materials in China and the South Seas;

iii) to recognize indiscriminate treatment of trade in China and the South Seas, and to give favorable consideration to German economic activities.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan must not adopt such a policy as would support the United States. Again, both Japan and Germany shall make common cause with each other against the U. S. in their Central and South American policy.

(4) To contrive the fall of British influence by the partition of her colonies.

In order to facilitate Britain's surrender Japan shall check her as far as possible in East Asia by such measures as the withdrawal of British forces, demand for the disarmament of Hongkong (Singapore), demand for the cession of British territories in the South Seas, independence of India, Burma and others, capture of British ships. For this end, Germany shall give adequate political support for disposition of the China Incident.

(5) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(6) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.

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II. Japanese-German coalition.

Principle -- With the common aim to establish the World New Order, Japan and Germany shall be engaged in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas and Europe and Africa, in parallel and keeping an intimate connection with each other, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the purpose.

Points:

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

1) to recognize that French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other South Seas areas are within the sphere

of Japan's influence and that Japan's approval is necessary for any alteration in their political reversion, and support the political guidance and economic aid of Japan toward those areas;

ii) to give adequate political support for the management of the China Incident;

iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

i) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under German leadership;

ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;

iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activities of Germany in China and the South Seas.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action is to be taken either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

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(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1308

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in
the following capacity: Chief of Archives
Section, Japanese Foreign Office
and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto
attached consisting of 24 pages, dated July 12, 1940,
and described as follows: Minutes of the joint conference of the
Army, Navy, and Foreign Office authorities for intensifying the
coalition between Japan, Germany and Italy. Dated July 12, 1940.
I further certify that the attached record and document is an
official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is
part of the official archives and files of the following named
ministry or department (specifying also the file number or
citation, if any, or any other official designation of the
regular location of the document in the archives or files):
Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
22nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I
am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described
document was obtained by me from the above signed official of
the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of Aug, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

"(Part II)

"MINUTES OF JOINT CONFERENCE OF ARMY, NAVY, AND
FOREIGN OFFICE AUTHORITIES OF INTENSIFICATION OF
COALITION AMONG JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY.

at the Foreign Office
on the 16th July 1940.

"Attendances:

ANTO - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
ISHIZAWA - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office (withdrew
before adjournment)
TAJIRI - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
TOKUNAGA, Secretary, the Foreign Office
TAKAYAMA, Lt. Colonel, the War Ministry
TANEMURA, Major, the General Staff Office
SHIBA, Commander, the Naval Ministry

"ANTO (Foreign Office) utters: For today, I request Army and Navy to give us their opinions concerning the plan (proposal) relating to the intensification of coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy which I gave you on the occasion of the previous conference. Please start with Army.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I agree upon this plan as a whole and will give you our opinion in detail: as to the meaning of the word NANYO / T.N. South Seas/ contained in the phrase 'the construction of a new order in the Far East including the South Seas,' mentioned in clause 1, I would like to have it mean as Japan's intention to include the territory extending from Burma and the eastern part of India on the west to Australia and New Zealand on the east, but since there should be a South Seas of first sense and also of the second sense, the South Seas to be expressed as Japan's attitude for the present should be a narrower South Seas excluding Australia, New Zealand and Burma. Nevertheless, I think we should consider as Japan's attitude the NANYO of the wider sense.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As Japan's ideal, Australia, New Zealand and Burma, of course, should be included, but as a concrete question we should adopt the South Seas of the first sense for the time being. In regard to this point, I am wholly in agreement with Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): I agree to that.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, in regard to the outline of clause (2), I wonder if it isn't necessary to discuss the point that is to become the basis of the outline, that is the fundamental point, before the outline is decided with Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): Since the fundamental point is that since both countries are on a common footing -- that is, the establishment of a new order in Europe and Africa by Germany as her sphere of livelihood and the establishment of a new order in East Asia, including the South Seas, by Japan as her sphere of livelihood, does it mean that both countries should recognize and respect each other's sphere and assist and cooperate in the establishment of the new order within the respective sphere?

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Yes.

"ANTO (Foreign Ministry): I have no objection to the opinion of Lt. Colonel TAKAYAMA in regard to settling the fundamental point with Germany.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): That is, in regard to discussing this matter with Germany, the outline and details should be entered into only after the fundamental point has been discussed first.

"ANTO (Foreign Ministry): I agree with you.

"(Navy agrees)

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, let us go into the contents of the outline. In clause 1, there is a phrase 'not to interfere with the self-government and independence of the various races,' but I believe it is not necessary to make Germany express this.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): It is there for the purpose of showing that Germany has no intention of acquiring these territories.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I don't think it is necessary to make her say it distinctly. I wonder if it would not be sufficient if we make her recognize the fact that French Indo-China and Dutch Indies are within the sphere of livelihood of Japan and Japan's political leadership in these areas. After all, it will be 'recognize the fact that the South Seas area is within the sphere of livelihood of Japan.'

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Next, the question is about the meaning of political leadership. The strongest meaning of this is occupation, but we are not thinking of occupation at present. Anyway, it is necessary that the whole country conspire and unite on the point of political leadership and make Germany recognize as strong a political leadership as possible.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I think here lies one of the most difficult points in regard to the question of intensification of this problem. As seen hazily by the cable from Ambassador SATO, isn't it the intention of Germany to grasp the political leadership for herself and give Japan only the economic interest in regard to French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies. In other words, it appears as if Germany will not recognize Japan's right of political leadership.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I feel that way myself, and it is necessary to force Germany to recognize as strong a leadership as possible of French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies.

X "ANTO (Foreign Office): I think this point will be the first thing argued when the talk on the question of intensification of this matter is taken up, but according to the cable from Consul-General YAMAJI, the other day, Germany reportedly is willing to offer Japan the eastern part of the Dutch Indies. In another sense, it means that Germany is taking Java, Sumatra, etc.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to what attitude Germany will take towards Japan in future concerning the Dutch Indies and French Indo-China depends largely upon the attitude she will take towards Soviet Russia after the war. Since Germany has no intention to dispose of Russia immediately after the war, she might leave French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies to Japan easier than expected. But if she were to start with the construction of a new order in Europe, the question of French Indo-China and Dutch Indies will become considerably troublesome. And as for Japan, she should, for the time being, consider that Germany has the intention of politically taking over French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and should be prepared for it. For that, a considerably firm determination is necessary.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I agree with you. We should object strongly to Germany's intention to assume political leadership in Dutch Indies, etc.

"ISHIZAWA (Foreign Ministry): I agree completely.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): I think the question of French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies depends entirely upon naval power and Germany, who has no naval power, will not be able to oppose Japan within the sphere of Japanese naval influence no matter how stoutly she may resist. Consequently, the question lies solely in Japan's determination.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I think you are right, but Germany, in such an event, might try to utilize Russia and check Japan from the north. This, too, is a point to be taken into consideration.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): I don't think that even Soviet Russia would be a tool of Germany and carelessly meddle into this with the hope of securing the northern section of Manchuria. Soviet Russia would probably seek for the Near East and India.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): How about setting aside (B) 'to assume a means of checking to expedite the surrender of England' as a separate clause, together with foregoing clause 'to give appropriate support for the disposition of the China incident'? This is because it is a current problem or a matter to be concluded in a short period rather than one that will regulate the future relation between Japan and Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As this was considered as a recompensation for Germany in return for recognition of the New Order in East Asia including the South Seas and for her support in the disposition of the Incident, there is no reason for any objection against making it a separate clause.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): It is stated that a restraining measure will be taken against England, but I wonder if there is any really effective restraining measure?

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): It's very difficult as a concrete plan.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Then, is it not necessary to change the working of this clause?

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): The newspapers can be utilized.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): The checking of England by Japan and Germany's support for the disposition of the incident can be regarded as balancing each other, and in regard to the recognition of the new regime to be considered in connection with the disposition of the incident, the balance can be obtained by the recognition of Poland and so forth, but in regard to obtaining her cooperation in the economic construction of China, I wonder if the check against England can't be regarded as its balance?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As compensation for her cooperation in the economic construction, the supplying of wolfram and other things, which Germany wants, and her participation in the enterprise to some extent can be considered.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I think we should refrain from allowing her to participate in the enterprises in China as much as possible.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): In case of the worst, we should show our generosity of allowing her to participate in as much as half of the enterprises.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): We do that, I want that to be restricted to the minimum.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): As for Germany's political support in connection with the disposition of the incident, it probably is her peace mediation for the time being. In regard to the economic problem, it is cooperation in economy and technique, and as compensation, we can give Germany's heavy industries markets in China and the South Seas.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): There is a necessity to consider Italy together with Germany.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Ministry): As compensation, Germany has been conducting coastal trade since the outbreak of the incident, and I believe it better to recognize such things as this coastal trade and industrial technical assistance. I wonder if it isn't necessary for Japan to learn economic technique from Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): It's necessary. America's heavy industry is rich in materials. In other words, it is a heavy industry of the rich - and Germany's is that of the poor. As for Japan, it is necessary for her to learn Germany's poor man's heavy industry.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): For Japan, it is extremely important for her to develop the heavy industry in Manchuria. Consequently, if we can't expect to take in anything from America, we must think of taking in these from Germany. If Germany's technique flows into Soviet Russia after the war, it will be a grave problem for Japan. We should consider introducing Germany's technique into Manchuria and China after the war.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): Returning our discussion to the beginning, does it mean, after all, that there is no concrete plan for checking England?

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): England can be checked to a certain extent by utilizing the newspapers.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): The instigation of an independent movement in India and Burma secretly according to the change of international situation can be regarded as an effective check against England.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): I think it would be an extremely effective check against England to take a strong attitude in regards to problems against England in connection with the China incident; for instance, taking a strong attitude in regard to problems pertaining to Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsen.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): Depending on the occasion, it may be a splendid idea to demand for the disarmament of Hongkong.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): After all, it means firstly to exclude the political rights and interest of England from China and secondly, to instigate the independence of Burma and India.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): These should be executed to the extent of not resorting to arms.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As for the Navy, couldn't she make use of vessels of unknown nationality?

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): That could be done.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): Is there no measures to take a step further and strike England rather than to check her?

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): That can be done when Chiang Kai-shek surrenders, but, for the time being, we had better not do it.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): Doesn't it mean that we had better participate in the war upon the disposition of the incident?

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): For the time being, it is best to proceed according to the present degree.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): If we discuss this question of checking England with Germany, Germany might start ask us to occupy Singapore.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): We can tell her that we will do that when the incident is settled.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): It would be all right if we claim that the attack on Singapore is to be carried out on our own accord.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): After all, it would be better to negotiate with Germany with the attitude that Japan will have no responsibility in regard to the question of taking part in the war, but may engage in a war with England independently.

- all agreed -
"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to the relations with Soviet Russia mentioned in clause 2, it is to keep peace for the time being and eventually to guide Soviet Russia in such a way as to conform to the common standpoint of Japan and Germany. Depending on the occasion, the turning of Soviet Russia's spearhead toward Burma and India can be considered.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Regarding our relations with America, it is possible as a future problem that Japan and Germany may take a joint action in South America against America and that whether Japan should sustain Germany in her economical policy toward South America may become a problem. Hence, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for Japan to consider now the possibility of taking joint action with Germany against America after the establishment of the new order in East Asia a few years hence?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): In regard to the question of America, there is a necessity of giving it greater consideration. Germany, at present, is quite optimistic about America and concerning the post-war administration, 'Schaht' is thinking of getting American loan, while other Nazis are thinking of depending on the 'barter' system. After all, as to what attitude Germany will take against America, we cannot tell until after Germany has defeated England. At present, Germany's attitude is 'America should not interfere in European problems.' From the Japanese-German discussions, we can't tell anything more than what has been indicated in the plan at present.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): That's right, but as for Japan's mental attitude, it is necessary that she take into consideration those matters heretofore discussed. In this respect, it is proper to have in mind Japanese-German cooperation in the economic expansion into South America.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): I think Germany is looking down upon American economy as a money economy in considering her future economic debouchment into South America. At any rate, it is necessary at least to sound out what Germany is thinking of in regard to America and Soviet Russia for the future. For Germany, America's support of Soviet Russia is a great threat.

"TANEIURA (General Staff Office): From my opinion, a dispute between Germany and America may materialize before long. There is the possibility of a dispute being caused by America's defense against Germany's debouchment into South America. As South America is a very good market for Japan also, I think we should plan to undertake debouchment into South America in cooperation with Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): After all, these matters are contained in the policy restricting America to only within the American continent. Although it is necessary to hold, as our mental attitude, the points stated by Lt. Colonel TAKAYAMA, won't the original draft be about enough for the time being as points to be written on paper?

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to the question of our obligation to participate in the war stated in clause 4, Japan as already discussed shall not be bound, but we should keep in mind that we might have to wage war against England independently.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): In conclusion, I agree to the original draft in regard to cooperation with Italy.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Ministry): What about drawing up a simpler plan separately with Italy?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): We had better to treat Italy in the same way as and at the same time with Germany.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): As to Germany and Italy, we must recognize that there is a difference between them of economic and political power heretofore possessed in China.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Regarding the question of Soviet Russia, won't it be necessary to change our proposal to Italy?"

"ANTO (Foreign Office): From the latest report of Mr. Chuichi Ohashi, Italy is considering the use of Mohammedans to advance into the Iran and Indian area. Should Soviet Russia advance into Iran, Italy herself would have a considerable interest in regard to the question of Soviet Russia. At any rate, Germany and Italy, though different in degrees, are in a common position in regard to the question of Soviet Russia. Therefore we could make a similar proposal to both Germany and Italy.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): Nextly, I like to hear the opinion of Navy side.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): We agree to what Lt. Colonel TAKAYAMA has already stated. In strengthening the cooperation between Japan and Germany, we should make the recognition of the respective spheres of new order and the cooperation between Japan and Germany the framework of the plan and never to show that Japan wants things. Besides, in strengthening our coalition, I wonder if it isn't necessary to push the discussion further in regard to the American and Soviet Russian problems. There is no real difference between Japan and America. Present oppositions between Japan and America are most economical and for the most part emotional. Besides, in regard to the Soviet relationship, it is necessary that Japan and Germany guide it profitably. Only it is a question as to whether these points should be exposed in the text of the treaty.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): The problem of America and Soviet Russia should not be exposed, but should be dealt with in a secret clause.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): What kind of steps are you going to take to realize this original draft (plan)?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): Perhaps this will be discussed between Japan and Germany and the main points exchanged through official documents.

"ANTO (Foreign Ministry): Now the opinion among us officials concerned has been unified. It is essential that no time be lost in its execution.

"(All agreed.)"

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I think I could settle with Army along the line discussed heretofore.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): It's same with Navy.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): If the discussion is to be held in Germany, it may be necessary /for someone/ to go and explain our intention, as it is impossible to express it thoroughly by telegram.

"(All agreed.)"

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1392

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 15 pages, dated July 16, 1940, and described as follows: (Part II) Minutes of joint conference of Army, Navy, and Foreign Office authorities of intensification of coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy. Dated July 16, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
22nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
24 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

597

"The International Situation and Japan's Position.

"(Address of Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro ARITA,
delivered over the air on June 29, 1940)

Japan's ideal since the foundation of the Empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in the world. Our foreign policy has also been based upon this ideal, for which we have not hesitated at times even to fight by staking our national existence.

What the entire mankind longs for is the firm establishment of world peace. But it goes without saying that peace can never endure unless it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. Unfortunately, however, the establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realization at the present stage of human progress. In order to realize such a great ideal, therefore, it seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally and economically should first form a sphere of their own for co-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres. The cause of strifes mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity of some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrationalities and injustices of old. The war in Europe brings home the truth of this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international peace on a permanent foundation every effort must be exerted for the rectification of the blunders that have been committed in this regard.

It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettable, therefore, that there should be those who not only fail to understand Japan's great undertaking based upon this fundamental principle, but on the contrary, obstruct the establishment of peace in East Asia by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek.

Sometimes there are those who would disapprove a change of the status quo by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has drawn is nothing other than a 'life-giving sword' that destroys evil and makes justice manifest.

The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially and economically very closely related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and the insuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion.

The idea to establish first a righteous peace in each of the various regions and then establish collectively a just peace for the whole world has long existed also in Europe and America. This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a center the peoples within that region are to secure their co-existence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere. It also presupposes that these groups will respect one another's individual characteristics, political, cultural and economic, and they will cooperate and fulfill one another's needs for their common good.

When the present European war broke out, the Japanese Government at once declared their policy of non-involvement and made it clear that this country did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the same time did not want to see the war spread into East Asia. Quite naturally Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia.

Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a new order in East Asia, is paying a serious attention to developments in the European war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions--any development therein, and any disposal thereof--is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1008

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages in Japanese, 5 pages in English, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: Address of Foreign Minister ARITA, delivered over the air on June 29, 1940. The International Situation and Japan's Position.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

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22nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

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24 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

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Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

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Signed at Tokyo on this

24 day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Telegram (Secret Cypher Process)

Tokyo, 1 July 1940 1.30

Arrived: 1 July 1940 10.20 hours

No. 642 of 1.7

Ref. D.N.B. Tokyo 482 ff re: Foreign Minister ARITA's radio speech on Japan's attitude in the international situation.

The originally intended attempt of the Foreign Minister to gain contact with internal political development by announcing a more active foreign political fixing of aims /Zielsetzungen/ and thereby, to strengthen the cabinet's position; this is being wrecked by protests from the opposition led by the army, which forced the original text to be substantially mutilated. This explains the lack of concrete ideas, a fact which a section of the press too, has pointed out.

The growing influence of the army also results from the stronger military attitude toward Hong Kong and Indo-China. Internal political developments show characteristic signs of initial oppression /Bedrueckung/ and indicate an early change of cabinet.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 4028B

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo - 3 July 1940 1310 hours
Arrived " " " 2305 hours

No. 648 of 3 July

In answer to telegram of 2-7-40 (No. 542), according to a leading article in the 'ASAHI' clearly inspired by the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Minister intended to stress in his radio speech that the present government has never deviated from the Axis policy, and has always had full sympathy for the German demand for a New Order in Europe, so much the more since Japan herself is striving for a New Order in Asia. The government is determined to consolidate Axis friendship. The army protested against this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above policy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and because the army wanted to avoid the YONAI-ARITA cabinet using a sudden stress on friendship with the Axis as a chess move to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, which is close to us and to save its own existence.

The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, who disclosed the original text of ARITA's speech to 'ASAHI' and announced the army's protest publicly in a press conference, caused great indignation in army circles.

As I have learned confidentially, the Press Chief was arrested and grilled by the military police on account of this indiscretion.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

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G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)