

## RADIO ADDRESS BY MR. YOSUKE MATSUOKA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

September 27, 1940, 10:00 p.m.

Today on the occasion of the conclusion of the Three Power Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial Rescript—I am profoundly moved to say—has been issued to the nation. What we, His Majesty's subjects, should do has been plainly indicated by the Prime Minister in his message. I sincerely believe that it is incumbent upon all of us to lay to heart the august will of our Sovereign and put forth our best efforts in order to surmount the current emergency.

Our country is now faced with a most difficult situation, unparalleled in its history. What step we should take at this moment is a grave problem upon which hangs the fate of our nation. The Government, keenly conscious of the gravity of its responsibilities, is seeing to it that nothing shall come amiss.

The objective of Japan's foreign policy is no other than to dispose of the China Affair, to construct a sphere of common prosperity in Greater East Asia and to contribute thereby to the establishment of true peace for the entire world. But when we look at the actual international situation, we find that this intention of Japan is not yet fully understood. There are countries which have the mistaken idea that peace means the mere maintenance of the old order, or those which, while realizing the inevitability of change, are reluctant to part with the old order. Moreover, there are countries which attempt to obstruct directly or indirectly, our construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, and even those who resort to all sorts of stratagem in order to block the path of Japan's advance toward the fulfillment of her great historic mission—that of establishing world peace. The Japanese Government has assiduously striven to remedy this regrettable state of affairs. Nevertheless, I regret to say that the situation has not only failed to improve, but it has even shown signs of aggravation in certain quarters.

Circumstances have now brought Japan to the point where she can no longer permit the international situation to drift as it will. At this juncture, there is only one course for Japan to take. That is to say, internally we should stand resolutely together—one hundred million people as one—by establishing speedily the new state structure for national defense; and externally, we should first unite with Germany and Italy which have the same aspirations and policy as ours and later with those Powers who can cooperate with us. We should thus go fearlessly forward to carry out our conviction, calling at the same time upon those Powers that obstruct us to reconsider their attitude. In such manner, the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yamato race—namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia.



Accordingly, we have conducted negotiation with the representatives of Germany and Italy, which have resulted in the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, made public just a short while ago.

The establishment of this historic relationship of alliance between the three countries, is, of course, due to the wisdom of our gracious Sovereign. At the same time it owes much to the judgment and decision of the eminent leaders of Germany and Italy--Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini. Again, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop, has earnestly made efforts for German-Japanese cooperation from the very day he assumed his present post, while the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, having been once stationed in East Asia, and understanding fully Japan's position in East Asia, has ceaselessly laboured for the promotion of Italo-Japanese friendship. Needless to say, these two foreign ministers have played important roles in the conclusion of the present pact.

The pact provides that Japan, Germany and Italy shall cooperate freely with one another toward the construction of a new order, respectively in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, in which these Powers are at present engaged. It also provides that if any one of the Contracting Parties should be attacked by an outside Power, at present not involved in the European War or in the China Affair, the three Contracting Powers shall render mutual assistance with all possible means, political, economic and military. Accordingly, it does not mean that because of this pact Japan is to enter the European War at present, nor that she intends to challenge any Power without provocation. It may be added also that the present treaty will not affect in any way the existing political status between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other.

The treaty also provides that Germany and Italy recognize Japan's position of leadership in regard to the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia. We in turn recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European regions where they are now engaged in the establishment of a new order, staking even their national existence in the undertaking. And thus the Three Powers are to join forces and help one another to the utmost.

With the conclusion of this treaty, Japan's responsibilities as leader of the new order in Greater East Asia becomes even greater than before. Although it is the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfill these responsibilities always by peaceful means, there is no telling whether there might not arise occasions and circumstances calling for a momentous decision on the part of our nation. Our future is beset with countless obstacles and difficulties, which, it must be fully realized, no ordinary effort will be sufficient to surmount. Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be prepared to endure all hardship and all sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as to conform to the august will of our Sovereign.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 823

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 298 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows: "Foreign Office Announcements". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office - - - - -

Signed at Tokyo on this  
13th day of September, 1946. /s/ R. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
13th day of Sep, 1946 /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt AUS  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity



Secret State MatterMemorandum of the Conference between the German Foreign Minister and Ambassador OSHIMA on 24 June 1942 in Berlin.

At the beginning Ambassador OSHIMA said it had been his desire to inform the German Foreign Minister before the beginning of the great German offensive something about the future military plans of Tokyo. However, to his great regret he had up to now received almost no concrete account from his Government about their military plans. There was, however, no doubt that the Japanese armed forces were making similar preparations for action of great scope in line with the German operations. Whether the direction of such action would be directed against Australia, India, or Russia was not clear; he guessed it would be directed to the South, against Australia.

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Ambassador OSHIMA then handed the German Foreign Minister a short note (as attached) according to which no war material had entered Russia via Vladivostok since Japan entered the war.

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During the further course of the conversation the German Foreign Minister in general stressed the importance of the year 1942 for our conduct of the war; he believes, as heretofore, that this year should be fully utilized by all means by adopting as daring a strategy as can be conceived.

The Japanese Navy probably still has such important tasks to solve as the strengthening of the Japanese position in Australia, the push to the Indian Ocean, securing the position facing, or in, Hawaii, as well as in the Aleutians. If new heavy blows could be administered to the Americans and English there, this would be of great importance to the joint prosecution of the war. It would be of especial importance if we could join hands somewhere in the Indian Ocean in the not too distant future. The German Foreign Minister was not aware of Japan's plans in this regard. At any rate, it is, however, important not to lose sight of the Russian question. If in view of the reorganization of shipping routes and of the consolidation of the positions thus far captured in the various seas, further maritime operations would perhaps be contemplated only at a later time. Then he was of the opinion that at any case



Russia should be tackled and the Russian enemy finally jointly disposed of in this year. It was the strength of the Tripartite powers that they had proceeded on the offensive from the outset, never waging a defensive war as England has done thus far.

Ambassador OSHIMA stated that he agreed to what the German Foreign Minister had said in every respect and asked him to be convinced that neither he nor his Government believed in conducting the war defensively but that victory could only be secured through further attacks. He had no doubt but that his Japanese armed forces were at this time preparing further operations according to a definite plan and would attack anew at an appropriate time.

The German Foreign Minister replied that the victories of Colonel General Rommel as well as the first attacks in the East and the raids of our submarines prove that this year Germany would go on attacking and he was convinced that Japan would do likewise. He added that also in future a daring strategy would be the shortest road to a victorious end of the war.

/s/ Gottfriedsen

(Handed to the German Foreign Minister by Ambassador OSHIMA during the conference of 24 June.)

1. Since Japan entered the war, 20 Russian merchantmen, totalling 102,000 tons, with a maximum loading capacity of 113,124 tons have entered the harbor of Vladivostok. During their voyage, these ships were searched by units of the Japanese Navy. The search revealed that the freight consisted mainly of foodstuffs, flour, sugar, vegetable oil, etc. and contained no armaments or munitions.

2. Apparently, the transport of these goods to Vladivostok was carried out in most cases after reloading in the harbor of Petropavlovsk. The occupation of the western Aleutian Islands by Japanese fighting forces will make this method very difficult in the future.

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 1372A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



The Inevitability of the Renovation by  
HASHIMOTO (p. 139, paragraph 4)

*Kinjuro*

### A Leap Towards Armament

There must be established an absolute armament to subjugate under any occasion, any nation with doctrines dis-similar to ours that may hinder the execution of the expansion of the Imperial undertaking. The main stress in the armament must be in the establishment of an air force, taking away from the people the idea that the aircraft belongs to the army and imbuing them with the idea that the aircraft belongs to the nation and the people, similar to the faith that our people had in the Japanese sword in olden times.

*Miyata*



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shibata, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Second Class Administrative Officer of Investigation Bureau of Home Ministry in charge of Home Ministry Library.

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: Book, entitled "The Inevitability of Renovation", by FASHIMOTO, Kingoro.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
7th day of August, 1946

/s/  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ H. C. Nortory

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edwar P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
7th day of August, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American Negotiations  
adopted through the conferences in the Imperial presence.

1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.
2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
3. Through the Imperial conference on November 5, 1941.

Proposition (A)  
Proposition (B)

4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941.

(Tavener's Excerpt)

1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on  
July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes  
in the situation.

I PRINCIPLE.

- a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace.
- b. Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defence. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations.
- c. Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

II SUMMARY.

- a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China.
- b. For the sake of her self-existence and self-defence Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion



of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will be ready for a war with Britain and the United States.



Wm  
c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

e We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

g As to the definite measures we shall decide separately.  
→ (End Tavenner's excerpt)

2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6, 1941.

Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.

In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows:

a In order to secure self-existence and self-defence, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October.

b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.



c If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands.)

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection.

Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain).

(1) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT.

The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident.

a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration.

b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARK -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.



(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defence.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defence.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

(3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials.

The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources.

a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South-Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China.

Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I:

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.



SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH BRITAIN CONCERNING THAILAND.  
(Memorandum)

Adopted in the Liaison Conference between the  
Imperial Headquarters and the Ministry, on August 16, 1941

Referring to the British Ambassador's private plans, chiefly on the problems of Thailand, at the conference with our Foreign Minister on August 11th, Japan's policy will be altered as follows:

(1) Japan's demands to Britain.

a Britain will respect the neutrality of Thailand and will not execute military measures there.

b Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with all resources necessary for her self-existence from Burma, Malay, British-Borneo, India, Australia, New Zealand, and other areas in the South-Western Pacific under British influence; and will devise the most favourable measures to normalize commercial tradings with those respective areas.

c From the Dutch East Indies and Thailand, Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with resources necessary for her self-existence; and in normalizing Japan's commercial trades with these nations, Britain will not take any obstructive measures and abandon her present actions that are proving a menace.

d Britain will bar her aid to Chiang Kai-shek (including the closure of the Burma Route).

(2) Matters that may be agreed upon according to the attitude of the British.

a We shall respect the neutrality of Thailand.

b We shall not make any military proposals to, nor military advances into Thailand.

c We shall not make any military advance not only in Thailand but also in all areas adjacent to French Indo-China (excluding China).

(3) Our principles in the negotiations.

a This negotiation will be the continuation of the daily contacts between our Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador; and each matter will be discussed in turn in the form of a reply to the Ambassador's private proposals. At the beginning, the problems of discussions will be localized to the utmost, and we shall strive to minimize the sphere of British proposals. We acknowledge it to be the best policy to start the discussions on the following matters:



- (a) Respect of Thailand's neutrality.
- (b) Military advance will not be made into Thailand.
- (c) Burma Route will be closed.
- (d) Resources will be supplied to Japan smoothly.

b Such problems as: Abandoning of Britain's aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Japan's not making military advances into Thailand and all other areas adjacent to French Indo-China, and problems of Dutch East-Indies, will be discussed after looking over the situation of the negotiations.

c In the course of this negotiation, attention must be paid lest we shall have nothing to profit, our future freedom of action will be restricted, and our present privileged standing will be obstructed.

(REMARK) The Imperial Government will promptly settle by mutual concessions the conference being held with Thailand in winding up the affairs of the frozen assets, and according to the situation, she will continue to negotiate on the general economic cooperation.

In this negotiation, special importance will be stressed on Japan's obtaining of her necessary resources.

3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

PROPOSITION (A)

- (1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problems of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time, we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States.

- (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops.

This problem will be eased as follows:

- a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China.

Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence



to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years.

(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States, (both understandings and other statements.)

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China.

(2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.

(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.



4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941. Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5, have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.



868  
TOP SECRET!

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 March 1939 19 o'clock

Arrival, 23 March 1939 18.10 "

No. 121 of March 23Secret!

For the State Secretary

I hear from well informed Japanese press source that the Japanese conference of the five ministers under the presidency of the Prime Minister had decided at two o'clock tonight after a discussion lasting several hours, to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers. The same was demanded by the Italian Government. The Navy had recommended limitation on Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed to have delivered the inquiry of the German Government, whether Japan would be willing to conclude the military treaty. Ostensibly, Germany is supposed to be content with merely anti-Russian pact and has requested an answer by April 3. The government here does not wish to break off the bridge to America and England despite the treaty and is for this purpose supposed to be considering concessions in China. The newspaper ASAHI also mentions in today's morning edition a secret minister's conference and announces that 'an important question of Japanese foreign policy would be decided upon in a few days.'

OTT

/135900/



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and OTHERS )

- AGAINST - )

ARAKI, SADA0 and OTHERS )

AFFIDAVIT

I, HORIBA, KAZUWO do swear on my conscience that the following is true:

1. I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as the Secretary of the First Demobilization Bureau.
2. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit A" which has been signed by me is a list of Members of the Institute for the research into total war. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit AA" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit A which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
3. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit B" which has been signed by me is a list of research student members of the Institute for the research into total war for the first, second and third periods from April 1, 1941 to March 1944. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit BB" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit B which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
4. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit C" which has been signed by me is a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit CC" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit C which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
5. THE said documents marked "Exhibit A", "Exhibit B" and "Exhibit C" have been compiled by me from memory and from enquiries made by me, the official records having been burnt or destroyed, and I cannot claim that they are complete.
6. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit D" which has been signed by me is a list of the subjects and practices of education and training for first term students of the Institute in 1941 showing the names of lecturers and the number of lectures on each subject and other particulars. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit DD" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit D which I have procured and handed to the International Prosecution Section.



7.\_\_\_\_IN my official capacity, I have examined the twentysix documents, particulars of which are contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked "Exhibit E", the said documents being now in the custody of the International Prosecution Section. The said documents have been compiled by the Total War Research Institute as material for research and training in the Institute, or are collections of the results of the work of the research students and were obtained by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from Japanese Government Offices.

8.\_\_\_\_IIMURA, Jo who formerly held the rank of Lieutenant -General in the Japanese Army held the post of Director of the Total War Research Institute from January 1941 to October 1941. Prior to his holding that post he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and on ceasing to hold that post he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria and subsequently he was appointed Director of the Military War College.

/s/ Horiba Kazuwo

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned Officer by the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO at War Ministry Bldg., Tokyo, Japan this 5th day of August 1946.

/s/ Roland Schwartz, Capt. TC  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E.

I. A. R. Joyce hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I did, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO in Japanese and in so doing did truly and correctly translate the contents thereof from English into Japanese. And I further certify that I did at the same time show to him the Japanese translation of the said affidavit which is annexed hereto and that he did read the same and thereafter did sign the said affidavit and the said translation in my presence, having previously duly sworn on oath that the contents of both the said documents were understood by him and were true. And I also certify that all proceedings incidental to the administration of the said oath and the signing of the said documents were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and from English into Japanese and were to the best of my knowledge and belief fully understood by him.

Dated this 5th day of August, 1946 at War Ministry, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ A. R. Joyce



## LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR

Official post	Name	Former post (Rank)	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
President	Jo Iimura	Lieut. General	Commander of 5th Army	From Jan.1941 to Oct.1941	Control
In charge of { President General Secretary	Shin Oka	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache in Shanghai	From Dec.1940 to Nov.1941	Assistant to President
President	Kiichi Endo	Major-Admiral	Commander in Chief of the 1st Despatched Fleet to China	From Nov.1941 to Mar.1943	Control
President	Keisaku Murakami	Lieut. General	Commander of Army	From Mar.1943 to Dec.1943	Control
President	Kanji Ogawa	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache to Japa- nese Embassy in China	From Dec.1942 to Jan.1945	Control
General Secretary	Kunio Kawamoto	Secretary of Great East Asia Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
In charge of President	Taro Wada	Secretary of Commerce and Industry Ministry	Ammunition official of the ammunition Ministry	From Mar.1944 to Apr.1945	Economy
General Secretary	Ryosuke Fujimuro	Major-General	die(Aug. 14th 1942)	From Oct.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Chiaki Matsuda	Captain	Front	From Oct.1940 to Sep.1941	Military affairs
Member	Wataru Watanabe	Colonel	Front	From Oct.1940 to Oct.1941	Military affairs
Member	Shoichi Terada	Secretary of Agricul- ture & Forestry Ministry	Chief of the Marine Production Bureau, Agriculture & Forestry Ministry	From Oct.1940 to Feb.1942	Economy
Member	Seitaro Okamatsu	Secretary of Commerce & Industry Ministry	Chief of Mining Supervision Bureau	From Oct.1940 to Mar.1943	Economy



Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Hiroo Oshima	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of the Business Bureau, Military Aid Board	From Oct.1940 to Jul.1943	Thought
Member	Katsumi Maeda	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Oct.1940 to Jun.1942	Economy
Member	Katsuzo Okumura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Second Rank Secretary of Embassy	From Oct.1940 to Nov.1940	Diplomacy
Member	Tooru Hagihara	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1940 to Feb.1942	Diplomacy
Member	Masaru Nishiuchi	Professor of Army	Professor of Army	From Mar.1941 to Jan.1944	Thought
Member	Kazuo Horiba	Colonel	Front	From Jul.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Tetsutoki Tsuda	Secretary of Communication Ministry	Secretary of Communication Ministry	From Jul.1941 to Dec.1941	Economy
Member	Hideo Hosoi	Secretary of Taiwan-government	Secretary of Taiwan-government	From Aug.1941 to Sep.1942	Thought
Member	Shigeo Honda	Senior staff of South M.R.Co.Ltd.	To South M.R.Co.Ltd.	From Oct.1941 to Mar.1943	Economy
Member	Kaoru Takeuchi	Captain	Ministry of Navy	From Nov.1941 to Jul.1942	Military affairs
Member	Totaro Sasaki	Member of Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	To Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	From Dec.1941 to Dec.1942	Economy
Member	Yuichi Hori	Secretary of Communication Control Office	Secretary of Communication Control Office	From Dec.1941 to Sep.1943	Economy
Member	Tsuru Kuwahara	Secretary of Legation	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Feb.1942 to Jan.1943	Diplomacy



Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Kikuro Higuchi	Railway Investigation Division	Secretary of Railway Ministry	From Feb.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	Tadao Annaka	Secretary of Insurance Board	Secretary of Ministry of Welfare	From Oct.1941 to Jul.1943	Economy
Member	Toshio Mano	Lieut. Colonel	Lieut. Colonel	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Military affairs
Member	Kumao Nishimura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Senior official of Embassy	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Diplomacy
Member	Risaku Yamazoe	Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry	Chief of the Forestry Administration Bureau	From Mar.1942 to Feb.1944	Economy
Member	Jiro Oba	Senior official of Monopoly Bureau, Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Jul.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	<u>Taro Iwase</u>	Member of Yokohama Specie Bank	Headquarters of Investigation and Research Mobilization	From Mar.1943 to Mar.1944	Economy
Member	Mikio Suzuki	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of Section Metropolitan Police Station	From Jul.1943 to Aug.1944	Thought
Member	Genpu Nakayama	Colonel	Front	From Aug.1942 to Aug.1944	Military affairs
Member	Den Harada	Secretary of Agriculture Forestry of Ministry	Secretary of Combined Board	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
Member	Seiichi Arafune	Secretary of Communication Control Bureau	Secretary of Communication Board	From Sep.1943 to Mar.1945	Economy
Member	Kenkichi Yoshida	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Diplomacy
Member	Minoru Machida	Secretary of Home Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Aug.1944 to Apr.1945	Thought



EXHIBIT "BB"*Students*  
LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE  
RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR(Note: Those whom no explanations are  
given returned to former posts.)

First period students (From April 1, 1941 to March 2, 1942)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Ministry of Railway		Osamu Akutagawa	
Domei-tsushin-sha		Takeo Akiba	
Ministry of Overseas Development		Takashi Ishii	
Ministry of Finance		Kenkan Imaizumi	
Intendance Bureau of War Ministry		Shun Okamura	
Secretariat of House of Representatives		Shiro Okabe	
Home Ministry		Shojiro Kawaguchi	
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Tadashi Kiyoi	
Member of central Bank of Industrial association		Kakuichi Kubota	
Tokyo girls' Higher Normal School		Go Kurazawa	
Ministry of Finance		Toshihiko Sakai	
Member of Nippon Bank		Tadashi Sasaki	
Ministry of Navy		Tadashi Shimura	
War Ministry		Masatoki Shirai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Keizo Tamagi	



Navy Ministry

Yoshio Takechi

Foreign Office

Hiroshi Chiba

Nippon Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd.

Recruited in course of study

Yukio Chiba

Ministry of Education

Takashi Choji

Tokyo Prefectural Office

Hisao Nakanishi

North China Area Army

Kanichi Narita

Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Tsutomu Nomiyama

Foreign Office

Intelligence Bureau of Cabinet

Kaoru Hayashi

Tokyo Higher School

Ministry of Education

Taneyuki Hara

Chosen Government

Hiroo Higasa

Home Ministry

Kiyoshi Fukuda

Mitsubishi Mining Co. Ltd.

Reiichi Hoshina

N.Y.K.

Katsuji Maeda

Judge

Judicial Research Institute

Kantaro Mibuchi

Ministry of Welfare

Katsumi Mibuchi

Daido-Gakuin

Jiro Miyazawa

Ministry of Communication

Yokohama Marine Affairs Bureau

Iwao Mori

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Gaisei Yano

Military Staff College

to proceed to front before graduation

Toshihisa Yamaguchi

Home Ministry

Keiichi Yoshioka



## Second period students (From 1st April 1942. to March 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Domei-tsushinsha		Nori Akutagawa	
Judge	Tokyo District Civil Court	Masanori Asano	( dead in June, 1944)
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Yoshihiko Ito	
Rural Rehabilitation Association		Katsuhide Inoue	
<u>Sumitomo chemical Industry Co. Ltd.</u>		Yasuhiko Ihochi	
<u>Yokohama Specie Bank</u>		Taro Iwase	
<u>Yamashita Shipping Co. Ltd.</u>		Juichi Urushino	
Home Ministry		Toshio Eguchi	
Ministry of Communication		Shigeru Otsuka	
North China Area Army		Teiken Oda	
Ministry of Railway		Gaku Kanematsu	
War Ministry		Kiyoyasu Kawakami	
Ministry of Education		Fujimaro Kubota	
Intendence Bureau of War Ministry		Takuji Kumagai	
Imperial agricultural Association		Kenichi Koike	
Tokyo Higher Normal School		Nobuaki Kobayashi	
Local Office	Ministry of welfare	Shinjiro Koyama	



War Ministry		Masatsugu Sakakibara
Ministry of Commerce & Industry		Kyo Sakuma (dead in June 1944)
Ministry of Over Seas Development	Ministry of Great East Asia	Hideo Sue
<u>Nippon Oil Co. Ltd.</u>		Eiji Suzuki
Foreign Office		Akira Sono
<u>M. H. I. Co. Ltd.</u>		Fumio Takaoka
Home Ministry		Katsuji Tamakoshi
Ministry of Navy	Front	Taizo Doi
Ministry of Finance		Yasuo Nakanishi
General Affairs Bureau. Manchukuo Government Chosen Government General		Tadao Natsume
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Masayuki Hashimoto
General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government		Yoshinori Fujimaki
Ministry of Welfare	Home Ministry	Yoshifumi Futagawa
<u>Nippon Steel Manufactur- ing Co. Ltd.</u>		Kishiro Hoshino
Taiwan Government		Isao Mizuno
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance	Seiji Minoyama (dead in March 1943)
The 4th Higher School		Hajime Murakami
Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Hiroshi Morikawa
Foreign Office		Hachiro Yamaji
Ministry of Navy		Zene Yamatsu
<u>Nippon Electric Distribution Co.</u>		Katsuro Yamamoto
		Ichiro Watanabe



## Third period Students (From April 1, 1943 to Dec. 15, 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Judge	Tokyo District Criminal Court	Gizin Aoki	
Home Ministry	Tokyo Prefecture Office	Masaaki Adachi	
Ministry of Navy		Teizaburo Ara	(dead)
<u>Nippon Manure Co.</u>		Yoshiro Arai	
Army Surgeon School		Katsuhiko Inagaki	
Ministry of Finance		Ryoichi Iida	
<u>Mainichi-Shinbun-sha</u>		Masahiro Imaizumi	
Government Deposit Bureau		Hiroshi Imai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministry of Ammunition	Akira Irie	
<u>Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co. Ltd.</u>		Tsugio Iwata	
Home Ministry		Toshio Ueda	
Chosen Government		Kiyokazu Okubo	
<u>Nippon Nitrogen Manure Co. Ltd.</u>		Tadashi Kakegawa	
<u>Nippon Coal Co. Ltd.</u>		Yoshiro Kanazaka	
<u>Dai Nippon Air Navigation Co.</u>		Tatsuhiko Kawabuchi	
Daido-Gakuin	General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government	Haruo Kitazawa	
<u>Z Mitsui Shipping Co.</u>		Shuichi Kumano	
Ministry of Railway	Ministry of Communication	Hirotsugu Kobun	
War Ministry		Yoshio Kouda	
Foreign Office		Tasaku Kojima	
Yokohama Higher Commercial School		Shinzaburo Koshimura	



Government Monopoly Bureau	Ministry of Finance	Masakatsu Mitsueda
Manchukuo Government		Asaumi Sato
Local Office	Ministry of Ammunition	Tadao Sato
North China Area Army		Seihei Sawabe
Ministry of Education		Sakuo Teranaka
Tokyo Prefecture	Tokyo Prefectural Office	Kosaku Nakamura
Army Ministry		Masaro Nalamura
Military Aid Board		Isao Nerio
Ministry of Great East Asia		Takehiko Hisatake
Foreign Office		Seizo Hiuga
Ministry of Navy		Ichiro Fujihara
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Mori Masuda
Kochi Higher School		Toshihiko Miyata
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Shigeru Murata
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Toyozo Murata
Mining Control Association		Saburo Morimoto
Taiwan Government		Asataro Yamamoto
Nippon Bank		Ko Yoshizawa
<u>Mainichi-Shinbunsha</u>		Nobu Yoshitake



EXHIBIT "CC"

LIST OF THE CONTENTS OF LECTURES AT THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
FOR TOTAL WARFARE

Name of lecturer	Social position of lecturer	Subject of lecture
Jyo Iimura	the Head of the Institute	Fundamental principles of National Total Warfare
Kiichi Endo	"	
Keisuke Murakami	"	
Kanji Ogawa	"	
Arata Oka	the Director of the Institute	Merits and demerits of Japanese On China Incident
Wataru Watanabe	Member of the Institute	General Principles of Total warfare
Kazuo Horiba	"	
Chiaki Matsuda	"	
Genpu Nakayama	"	
Seitaro Okamatsu	"	Concerning the material mobilization
Shuzo Yamada	the Planning Board	
Taro Oda	Director	
Yoji Minobe	the Planning Board	
Shoji Suganami	Chief of Steel Section in the Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Steel
Shoichi Terada	Member of the Institute	General conception of food question; food question; the condition of the marine products.
Einosuke Ishii	Chief of Agricultural Administ- ration Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products.
Risaku Yamazoe	Member of the Institute	
Den Harada	"	
Mototake Yugawa	Director of Provision Bureau	
Ko Kurakami	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	
Kanji Kato		
Tadaatsu Ishiguro		
Tetsutoki Tsuda	Member of the Institute	General conception of communication
Yuichi Hori	Member of the Institute	Marine transportation
Shizuō Yoneta	Director of Marine trans- portation Bureau	



Kikuo Higuchi	Member of the Institute	Land traffic
Sonosuke Nagasaki	Director of transportation Bureau in the Railway Bureau	Railroad transportation
Katsumi Maeda	Member of the Institute	General conception of finance
Uichi Noda	Secretary of Finance	Control of foreign exchange
Hisatsune Sakamizu	"	Finance control
Juichi Tsushima	Vice President of Bank of Japan	Theory on financial matter
Tsuneji Taniguchi	Director of Accountant's Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	Present state of Japanese Finance
Hideo Matsukuma	Director of Revenue Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	System of Japanese taxes
Tadao Annaka	Member of the Institute	General conception of service
Takeo Mori	Intendant Maj. Gen.	Economic history
Tooru Hagihara	Member of the Institute )	
Katsuzo Okumura	" )	
Tsuru Kuwatara	" )	State of things in foreign policy
Kumao Nishimura	" )	
Kenkichi Yoshida	" )	
Hikomatsu Kamikawa	Doctor of Law	History of diplomacy
Hidemi Ozaki	the Asahi (newspaper)	State of affairs in China
Kumataro Honda	Ambassador	State of affairs in China
Shigeharu Matsumoto	Domei News Agency	Gossip on China
Saburo Ota	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	State of affairs in the United States of America
Yoshio Nakano	Colonel	State of affairs in Great Britain
Buryo Isomura	Colonel	State of affairs in the Near East
Minister Sakamoto	Minister of Foreign Affairs	State of things in Europe
Ambassador Hongo	Ambassador	State of affairs in Soviet Russia
Hisao Tani	Lt. General	History of Russo-Japanese War
Koji Sakai	Lt. General )	History of World War I
Tsunamasa Shidei	Maj. General )	
Ryosuke Fujimuro	Maj. General	History of China Incident
Tetsuzo Nakajima	Lt. General	Change of Military Power Warfare
Takeji Teramoto	Rear Admiral	Essence of leadership
Masami Ishii	Colonel	Real condition of battle
Wataru Watanabe	Member of the Institute )	
Kazuo Horiba	" )	Outline of Military tactics
Genpu Nakayama	" )	



Chiaki Matsuda	Member of the Institute	)	Outline of Naval tactics
Kaoru Takeuchi	"		
Yozo Miyama	Colonel	)	Organization of the Army
Susumu Nishiura	"		
Kikusaburo Okada	Colonel		Military munition mobili- zation
Chiaki Matsuda	Member of the Institute		Organization of the Navy
Sumi Hiraizumi	Doctor of Literature		Japanese History
Takeo Yamada			"Kojiki" (ancient chronicle)
Masaru Nishiuchi	Member of the Institute		Original meaning of Japanese Nationality
Hiroo Oshima	"	)	trend of <u>thought</u> in the country
Hideo Hosoi	"		
Misao Suzuki	"		
Minoru Machida	"		
Goro Murata	Director of Peace Section in the Ministry of Home Affairs		Trend of the <u>thought</u> in the country
Sotaro Ishiwata	Secretary-General of the assi- stance of the Imperial Rule association		Regarding to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association
Seizo Kobayashi	Admiral		State of affairs in Formosa
Hideoto Mori	Secretary of the Planning Board		Poly-geography of the East Asia

Note: As above-mentioned has been made retracing my memory, it is not yet perfect.

/s/

The 22 May 1946.J. Iimura



EXHIBIT "DD"

Subjects and practices of educations and trainings for 1st term students in 1941.

Basic principle of National Constitution	22
NISHIUCHI, Staff Member.	18
YAMADA, President of Jingu Kogakukan College.	2
HIRAIZUMI, Professor.	2
Totalized War	412 (118)
Principle and rules of totalized war.	50
Director of Institute.	10
Superintendent of Institute.	15
TERADA, Staff Member.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	11
WATANABE, Staff Member.	6
HORIBA, Staff Member.	3
SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Section.	2
FUJIMURO, Staff Member with an additional post.	6
Leadership.	
Captain TERAMOTO.	6
State of things in foreign Countries.	34
1941	
Apr. 5. Extra lecture Latest international situations. HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 14. Germany and Italy. Major General OKAMOTO.	1
Apr. 28. Politics in China. OTA, Chief of 1st of Far East Bureau.	1
Apr. 30. Navy. MATSUDA, Staff Member.	1
May 2. Politics in Europe. SAKAMOTO, Chief of Europe and America Bureau.	1
May 15. Military affairs in Colonel ISOMURA. U.S.S.R.	1
May 20. Problems in the South Seas, Captain HORIUCHI.	2
June 5. Extra lecture. Ambassadors HONDA.	1



June 18.	Navies in Europe.	Captain KOJIMA	2
June 19.	Economics in China.	MORI, Secretary of Board of Planning.	1
June 30.	Powers politics toward China.	SAITO, Yoshie.	1
July 1.	1.) Policy in China.	OZAKI, Hidemi.	2
	2.		
July 2.	Economics in the South Seas.	YAMADA, Fumio	1
July 4.	Navy of U.S.A.	Captain OGAWA	2
July 4.	Europe and the South Seas	HAGIWARA, staff member	1
July 8.	Political policy of U.S.A.	UKI, Chief of 1st Section of American Bureau.	2
July 8.	Foreign Policy of U.S.A.	ONO, Chief of 2nd Section of American Bureau.	1
July 9.	Foreign Policies in the South Seas.	TOKO, Chief of 2nd Section of the South Seas Bureau.	1
July 14.	Natives in the South Seas.	ITAGAKI, Proffessor of College of Commerce.	1
July 25.	Foreign policy of Germany.	Secretary FURUUCHI.	1
Aug. 5.	Military affairs of China.	HORIBA, Staff member.	1
Sept. 10.	Extra lecture.	IMAI, 1st Secretary of Japanese Ambassadors in U.S.S.R.	1
Oct. 21.	23.) Affairs in U.S.S.R.	Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.	2
Oct. 28.	Problems in the South Regions.	HAGIWARA, Staff member.	1
Nov. 18.	British Colonial Policy.	OTA, Chief of 3rd Section of European Bureau.	
Nov. 29.	Economics in Germany.	TACHI, Investigation Official of Bank of Japan.	1
1942 Jan. 24.	Observation of the Great War from British point of view.	Lieutenant Colonel NAKANO.	2
	History of Totalized War.		28
	Lieutenant General TANI		13
	" SAKAI		5
	Vice-Admiral NAKAJIMA		10
	Practical exercises in room, investigations and trainings.		294



## Military Warfare.

Essence, strategy and tactics of Military Warfare. 40

WATANABE, Staff Member. 1  
 HORIBA, Staff Member. 7  
 Lieutenant General NAKAJIMA. 13  
 Major General SHITEI 4  
 ISHII, Staff Member with an additional post. 8  
 MATSUDA, Staff Member. 1  
 NAOI, Staff Member with an additional post. 6

Military Organization. 22

WATANABE, Staff Member. 3  
 Colonel NAKAYAMA. 2  
 " SANADA. 1  
 " OKADA. 2  
 Lieutenant Colonel OSAKA. 2  
 MATSUDA, Staff Member. 4  
 Captain TAKADA. 1  
 ISHIKAWA, Staff Member with an additional post. 1  
 Captain YANAGIMOTO. 3  
 " NAGATANI. 2  
 HASHIMOTO, Staff Member with an additional post. 2

Ships, arms and military materials. 20

WATANABE, Staff Member. 1  
 MATSUDA, Staff Member. 19

## Political Warfare.

(Diplomatic)

Essence, basic principle, rules and applications of political warfare. 10

HAGIWARA, Staff Member. 10

History of political warfare. 8

Professor KAMIKAWA. 8

## Economical Warfare.

Principle and rules of economical warfare. 9

TERADA, Staff Member. 4

OKAMATSU, Staff Member. 3

MAEDA, " 2

History of economical warfare. 6

Major General, Intendance MORI. 6



Economics in War times.  
Nil.

Important Materials.		16
1941	Apr. 22. Food situation. ISHII, Chief of Bureau.	2
	May. 1. General plan for material mobilization. SUZUKI, Staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 7. General plan for development of production. YAMADA, staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 10. Iron. SUGANAMI, Secretary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry.	1
	May 13. Coal. TSUDA, Chief of Coal Bureau.	1
	May 14. Fuel oil. AZUMA, President of Fuel Bureau.	1
	June 30. Fertilizer. SHIGEMASA, Chief of Bureau.	2
	July 24. Withdrawal of substitute materials. HIRAI, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 23. Non-iron Metals. WATANABE, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 28. Control of silk thread. YOSHIDA, Seiji.	1
	Oct. 31. Forestry products. IDEYAMA, Chief of Forestry Bureau.	1
	Nov. 7. On reorganization of economy. KANDA, Staff Member with an additional post.	1
	Dec. 2. Substitute fuel. BAN, Chief of Fuel Investigation Institute.	1
	Dec. 9. Agriculture in General. TERADA, Staff Member.	1
Money market and others.		
1941	Apr. 14. Finance. TANIGUCHI, Chief of Intendance Bureau.	1
	Apr. 21. Taxes. MATSUZUMI, Chief of Revenue Bureau.	1
	Apr. 22. Control of Money Market. SEKOMIZU, Chief of Planning Section.	1
	Apr. 24.) Inflation ARAI, Vice Governor of Kogyo Bank.	2
	30.)	
	Apr. 28. Affairs of Money Market. TSUSHIMA, Vice Governor of Bank of Japan.	1
	May 1.) Money order. NODA, Staff Member with an additional post.	2
	2.)	
	May 27. Railroad transportation. NAGASAKI, Chief of Transportation Bureau.	2
	June 12. Ships. YONEDA, Chief of Section.	2
	July 5. Electricity. TAGURA, Chief of 1st Bureau of Electricity Board.	2
	July 10. Services. Saiki, Chief of Section.	2



July 16.	Commerce.	MIZUNO, Chief of Bureau of Commercial Affairs.	2
July 21.	Latest state of affairs in China.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Sept. 11.	Aviation.	OKUBO, Chief of International Aviation Section.	1
Sept. 12.	Communication.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Oct. 31.	Prices.	HONGO, Chief of 2nd Bureau of Price Board.	1
Nov. 18.	Emigrants.	IMAYOSHI, Chief of Takuhoku Board.	1
Inspection.			
	Inspection of establishments in Tokyo Metropolis.		3
Thought Warfare.			19
	Principle and rules of thought warfare.		12
	OSHIMA, Staff Member.		8
	HOSOI, "		2
	OKA, Masao.		2
	History of thought warfare.		
	Nil.		
	Educational questions.		4
	Colonel NAKAGAWA.		2
	HORIIKE, Chief of Planning Bureau of Education Board.		2
	Domestic thought questions.		
	MURATA, Chief of Peace Section.		3
Lectures on Science and others.			10
Apr. 7.	On observation of secrecy.	OSHIMA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 24.		KOBAYASHI, ex-Governor General of Formosa.	1
May 12.		HOSHINO, ex-President of Planning Board.	1
May 19.		ISHIWATARI, President of General Affairs Bureau of Imperial Rule Assistance Association.	1
May 22.	Inspection of examination of conscription.	WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
June 17.		SORIMACHI, Eiichi.	1
Sept. 4.		SAKURAZAWA, Joichi.	1
Sept. 11.		MATSUMOTO, Chief of Editorial Office of Domei News Agency.	1



Nov. 17.	Inspection of the expeditionary session of the Diet.	1.
Inspection tour.		61 days
May 8-9.	Inspection of Military Cadets School.	2 "
May 30-June 3.	Inspection of the establishments in Niigata and Toyama Prefectures.	5 "
June 21-28.	Visit to the Great Shrine of Ise. Inspections of Naval Manoeuvre, and economical establishments of Kyushu and Chugoku, Districts.	8 "
July 19-20.	Visit to the Kashima Shrine.	2 "
Sept. 1-2.	Practice of purification ceremony.	2 "
Sept. 14-Oct. 19.	Foreign tour.	36 "
Nov. 12-14.	Inspection of Military Manoeuvre.	3 "
Nov. 20-22.	Inspection of Agricultural Communities in Ibaraki Prefecture.	3 "



EXHIBIT "E"SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

I.P.S. Doc. No.	TITLE.	Date of compilation by Total War Research Institute.
1543 (1)	"Special Plan of Export and Import under War Conditions." (Top Secret).  This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute in April 1938.	27 October 1941
1544 (2)	"Plan for Replenishing Technicians, Skilled Laborers and General Laborers for Expanding Productive Power". (Top Secret).  This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute on 17th June 1937.	18th October 1941
1548 (3)	"Data pertaining to natural Petroleum".	June 1943
1355 (4)	"Reports on 1942 Total Research". (Marked Secret).	30th March 1943
1367 (5)	"Daily Log of Training Affairs". (Marked Confidential).	July 1942
1368 (6)	"The Estimates of the Domestic and Foreign situation in the early part of 1941 from the Total War viewpoint". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1471 (7)	"Data in Estimating the Future of East Asia from an Economic Standpoint". (Marked Top Secret).  This publication was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute.	5th October 1941
1472 (8)	"Anticipation of Economic Warfare". (Marked Secret).	19th December 1941
1473 (9)	"Study on Total War pertaining to the National strength of Imperial Japan and Foreign Powers". (Top Secret).	March 1944



SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

I.P.S. Doc.No.	TITLE.	Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.
1507	(10) "Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance". (Marked Top Secret).	25th October 1941
	This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Institute in January 1939.	
1521	(11) "Table Discussion pertaining to completion Remaining Business". (Marked Secret).	1941
	"Suggestions for Implementing the Directions for the table discussion". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1524	(12) "Summary on Total War" - Volume I. (Marked Secret).	1 July 1941
1669	(13) "Documents pertaining to Second Stage Exercises table discussion in the Planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1594	(14) "Discussion from the Standpoint of Total War regarding present situation of Japan". (Marked Top Secret).	10th January 1943
1605	(15) "Documents pertaining to 1942 Exercises in the planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1621	(16) "Draft of Establishment of Greater East Asia-First Phase in the Total War Plan". (Marked Military Top Secret).	18th February 1942
1660	(17) "Opinions on Research Items". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1341	(18) "Asiatic Affairs".	14th December 1941
2228	(19) "Records of Progress of the First Stage Exercise in table discussion of Total War". (Marked Top Secret).	August 1941
1401	(20) "Report of Basic Research of War Time Industry".	March 1943



SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

<u>I.P.S. Doc. No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.</u>
1343	(21) Basic Research Materials for 1942.	1941-42
1342	(22) Table Top Manoeuvres for 1942. (Military "Top Secret")	1942
1331	(23) Anticipation of Diplomatic War in the Total War. ("Top Secret").	24 January 1942
1566	(24) "The Study of the System of National Organ- ization for the Total War of the Empire".	3rd February 1941
1549	(25) Revision of educational system of Total War Institute.	September 1943
1795	(26) Imperial Ordinance No.648 establishing "Control of Total War Research Institute".	30 September 1940.



COPY

Japanese Embassy  
Berlin

The Japanese Embassy has the honor to inform the Foreign Office, by order of the Japanese government, of the views of the latter in regard to the recently concluded pact of non-aggression and consultation between the German government and the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, as follows:

"The Japanese Government regards the pact of non-aggression and consultation recently concluded between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as running counter to the secret appended agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International."

Berlin, 26 August 1939

To the  
Foreign Office



Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4050B.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



EXCERPTS FROM IPS DOCUMENT NO. 1356 ENTITLED  
"FIRST TABLE TOP TOTAL WAR MANEUVERS - No. 1"

(Outside Cover)

Secret

Number 1

First Table Top Total War Maneuvers

Situation of the Maneuvers from the Third to the Ninth Terms.

The Problem and the Disposition of the Maneuvers

Superintendent's Department of the Table Top Maneuvers



IPS DOC. NO.  
1356-A

Page 1

SOKIEN NO. 7  
Part I

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State

Keeping secret

Secret to  
all except  
those par-  
ticipating  
in maneuvers.

Management

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Shall be re-  
turned after  
the end of  
maneuvers.

August 6, SPOWA 16  
(0830 delivered)

Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers - IIMURA, Jo.

Situation and Exercises of the Third Period  
Maneuvers of the First Total War Table Top Maneuvers.

(I) Situation at the beginning and middle of August, SPOWA 16.

1. International Situation.

(1) The DX War is gradually developing advantageously for X, and there are signs that X's offensive against B is becoming more and more positive.

(2) D is on a strict guard against N's attitude and is once more requesting the new cabinet of the Blue State to explain her attitude.

Pt. I, p. 1

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Situations of the Supreme Command and Army.

(1) The Supreme Command of the Blue State desires the repletion of armament and the preparation for war to meet a sudden change in the situation, and requests the acquisition (repletion) of strategic points in the district of T (F). It wishes, however, to avoid absolutely the occurrence of serious troubles with a third power, especially a two-sided operation against D and A (B).



(2) In order to prepare for war against D and A, (B, E) the Blue State is mobilizing calling up since the first decade of July, 300,000 new military personnel and 300,000 tons of new ships. (Quantity given orally).

### 3. Home Situation.

(1) The new mobilization and requisition of ships, carriages and cattle, have had some influence on all the fields of labor power, communication power, agriculture, mining, industry, etc. in the country. Decrease of production as well as considerable obstacles are expected as the situation grows more and more serious.

(2) As regards railroads and electrical communications, they are not smoothly functioning on account of the increase of military transport and communication, and decrease in the number of employees.

(3) The raising of funds for industry is not satisfactory especially the issue of debentures Pt I, p. 4 for the various enterprises for increase of production is becoming more and more difficult, with the result that 35 percent of raised debentures remain unsold and the situation cannot be neglected.

Short term funds are sufficient.

The stock market is not active.

(4) Owing to bad weather the rice crop all over the country will obviously be poor, and agricultural crops in general are also very poor. A shortage of fuel and the requisition of fishing boats have considerable influence on the haul of fish.

(5) As a result of leakage of a part of the negotiation between N and A, various rumors are arising among the people, but the situation is not yet noteworthy. As the situation grows more and more serious, the people in general are desiring the powerful leadership of the Government. Pt. I, p. 5

\* \* \* \* \*

### Questions II

1. Submit a report concerning the steps which the various organs of maneuvers of the Blue State will adopt by the 20th of August. (Deadline: 13.00 on 7th of August) and a report concerning the steps to be adopted by the end



of August. (Deadline: 0830 on 8th of August). However, the general policy to be taken by the Blue State Government must be shown privately to the Leading Section by 0900 on 7th of August.

2. The Blue State Government shall effect communications with the Supreme Command, and investigate concretely the competency of the Blue State in the execution of war on the occasion of entering war against A, B and E from the present situation, and submit the report at an appointed time which will be indicated afterwards.

Pt. I, p. 8

\* \* \* \* \*

SOKIEN Part II of No. 7

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Secret

Secret to all except  
to those who are con-  
cerned with the mane-  
uvers.

Management

Should be returned  
after the maneuvers  
are over.

August 7, SHOWA 16 (afternoon)

Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers - IIMURA, Jo

Supplementary Situation of the Third Period Maneuvers  
of the First Total War Table Top Maneuvers

1. On and after the 1st of August, meetings of the Liaison Conference between the Blue State Government and the Supreme Command were held several times, and the following items were decided on:

(1) The original plan of the private draft for the Total War policy.

(2) To submit to the Throne to open a meeting in the Emperor's presence concerning the Total War policy and the preparation for war which requires immediate attention.

(3) The draft provided for the above mentioned meeting in the Emperor's presence. (The draft should consist of the fundamental items of the Total War policy and the items concerning the action for the preparation for war which requires immediate attention, and shall be provided with explanatory items which include judgement on the Total War policy Pt II, p. 1 and the scale of the present war).



2. On 10th of August a meeting was held in the Emperor's presence and after questions on the fundamental problem by the Emperor, the prepared policy was concluded as the decision of the meeting in the Emperor's presence.

3. As regards the Government's plan for mobilizing resources and goods in the preparation for war against A, B and E, the Government and the Supreme Command negotiated with each other, with the result that they reached an agreement on the 20th of August after modifying a part of the final plan of the Government. During the proceedings of the meeting:

(1) Repeated negotiations between the authorities of administrative affairs resulted in no settlement while the situations didn't permit delay. So by the political settlement between the leaders of both parties, they compromised in that they should provide 100,000 tons of steel in addition to 1,900,000 tons for munitions reserve, and that they should perform supplementary operations for each of the other deficient materials.

(2) The Supreme Command demanded in the meeting the following items:

(a) That they should accelerate, most urgently, the technical investigation for the increase of "octane" value of aircraft gasoline.

(b) That they should supplement as quickly as possible the deficient materials. Pt. II, p. 2

(Supplementary Order)

In the course of the maneuvers, try to make investigations on the minimum limit for securing civilian demand, especially the limit of ordinary gasoline, to such extent as is possible. Pt. II, p. 3

\* \* \* \* \*



SOKIEN Part III of No. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Management Papers of the 3rd Period Maneuvers - No. 1

Time to be presented: (Supposition) Middle of Aug. 1941  
(Real date) 7 Aug. 9:00 a.m.

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Head- quarters, the heads of the sections for: Military Force; Diplo- matic War; Ideological War; Economic War; Judgment.	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Prime Minister of the Blue State Government
-----------------------------------	--	--	---

General Policy of the Blue State Government concerning  
the Third Period Problems

(Project for Private Showing)

1. Against A

To the proposal of A, we shall neither give our word  
clearly concerning the position of the Blue State, nor expect  
an ultimate peaceful settlement with A, but adopt a delaying  
policy by diplomatic negotiations, repleting war preparations  
in the meantime.

2. Against D

We shall give to D the reply that the Blue State will  
not attack D positively, as long as D would faithfully observe  
the fulfilment of the Neutral Treaty between N and D.  
Pt. III, p. 2

3. Against X

We shall proceed along the policy of the maintenance of  
the status quo, and make them satisfied with the effect of  
the Tripartite Pact between N, X<sub>1</sub> and X<sub>2</sub>, restraining A's  
participation in war against X.



## 4. Against F and T

Against F, we shall proceed with the Total War policy previously decided upon. Against T, we shall endeavor to enforce the political and military coalition, and take positive steps in order to conclude a military alliance (Secret, if necessary).

## 5. Against E

We shall continue economic negotiations so that the relation between N and E will not grow worse than at present.  
Pt. III, p. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

The Management Papers of the Third Period  
Maneuvers No. 3

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Thoughts; War of Economy; Judgment Section	Time to be presented Supposition - Middle of August, 1941 Real Date 1 p.m. 7th of August
--------------------------------	--	--

Authorities to be reported to	State Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Prime Minister of the Blue State Government
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I intend to finish consultation at the Liaison Conference with the Supreme Command concerning the necessary matters in the draft of General Policy of the Blue State Government on the problem of the Third Period Maneuvers, decided in the cabinet meeting on the morning of the 7th of August, and then I will submit it to the Throne to obtain Imperial sanction.  
Pt. III, p. 4

\* \* \* \* \*

## SOKIEN Part IV

## Management Papers of the Third Period Maneuvers No. 2

To be presented  
Real date - 7th of August, a.m.

Authorities to be presented to	The Superintendent's Headquarters	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Foreign Minister, CHIBA, Hiroshi
Authorities to be reported to or informed	Government		



Measures of Foreign Minister to meet the situation at the beginning and middle of August. In conformity with the General Policy decided upon in the Five Minister's Meeting on of August, I aim, as an imminent question at preventing the relation between N, A and B from getting worse than they are at present and at the completion of the Blue State's intention of advancing southward into T and F, and I will adopt the following steps:

#### Against A

I will get the Ambassador in A to open negotiations with the A Government concerning the proposal of August 10 from A and get him to sound out A's real intention and possibilities of her granting concessions without speaking our mind concerning our situation and without expecting a final peaceful settlement. And I will prevent the relations between N and A from getting worse than they are. In the meantime, replete our war preparations and go on Pt. IV, p. 10

impressing A with our firm resolution to fulfill our duties of the N, X<sub>1</sub>, and X<sub>2</sub> Alliance, and to endeavor to restrain A's participation in war against X<sub>1</sub>. (Further details will be stated in the accompanying document in the telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador in A).

#### Against F

We shall superintend F's attitude so that she will not disturb our actions in the stationing of troops, establishment of military equipments, etc., in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement. When necessary, we shall adopt coercive measures against F.

#### Against T

Though aiming at the enforcement of an economic, military and political coalition with T, and ultimately the conclusion of a military alliance, we shall endeavor for the time being to obtain staple commodities, and to conclude an agreement needed for the financial and monetary coalition between N and T. Should this be difficult, we shall endeavor to push the negotiations concerning the agreement, by resorting to oppressive measures such as military pressure, repatriation of residents, etc. In case we cannot find any other measures except the use of armed force which will cause military conflict with A and B Pt. IV, p. 11  
we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary instigation.

Concerning the political and military coalition with T, we shall sound the intention of T's authorities, and endeavor to promote the coalition. But if we find it difficult to attain this object without resorting to pressure, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations.



## Against E

By continuing economic negotiations with E, authorities through the resident organs, we shall endeavor to prevent the relation between N and E from getting worse and to reduce the influence of the freezing of funds. If E's attitude is uncompromising and it becomes difficult to accomplish this, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary stimulation. Moreover, we will supplementarily propose to A and B the necessity of supplying N with E's goods and get them to advise E to mitigate her attitude.

## Against D

Concerning the rumor of the military alliance with A, B and C<sub>2</sub> against N, we shall request D to make her attitude clear and inform her that our country has grave concern Pt IV, p. 12 for the performance of the Neutrality Treaty, and indicate that we are prepared to take revenge for a violation of the Treaty. And at the same time, we shall inform D that though our policy is centered on the N, X<sub>1</sub> and X<sub>2</sub> Alliance as did that of the previous government, we have no intention of attacking as long as D maintains a friendly attitude towards us.

Running parallel with the said proceedings, we shall propose to D the conclusion of a new agreement concerning trade and fishery and the offer of the rights of the Karafuto petroleum. If D will not agree to our proposal, we shall threaten her with military demonstration, denouncement of the Neutrality Treaty, etc., but avoiding the conflict of arms. Concerning this economic request against D, we shall obtain beforehand the understanding of X<sub>1</sub>, and be prepared for D's alienating propaganda.

Against X<sub>1</sub>

We shall make X<sub>1</sub> be satisfied with the restraint of A and D and concerning their inquiry on negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention of securing the final victory of the Axis Powers by the above negotiations.

Pt IV, p. 13



## Against C

If there is fear of doubt arising about negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention, and ask for her understanding.

## Against B

Though we shall not positively request to negotiate with her; if we find an opportunity, we shall sound her intentions on the adjustment of diplomatic relations between N and B according to the same purport as in the negotiations with A.

Pt. IV, p. 14

\* \* \* \* \*

SOKIEN NO. 7  
Part 23

## Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 2

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters; War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Ideological; War of Economic; Judgment Section	Time to be presented	Supposition	First part of November, SHOWA 16
		Real date		August 14 5 p.m.

Authorities to be reported to or informed	Prime Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	SHIRAI, Masatatsu, War Minister
---	----------------	--	---------------------------------

Foreign Policy (to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting).

## I. Policy

1. Keeping its intention secret, the Blue State will carry out a surprise advance against E in the middle of November.

## II. Measures.

2. We will continue diplomatic negotiations with E as long as possible until the disembarkation is executed, without issuing an ultimatum.



3. We will first land our advance troops then the main forces by surprise on E on X day attempting, if possible on this occasion to conquer E at one stroke.

4. In case A and B take up the gauntlet after our military advance into E Pt. 23, p. 3

we will lose no time in advancing, overcoming these obstacles; but in case they open hostilities against us before the event takes place, we will begin an attack on P and Q first of all, and later seize the opportunity and advance against E.

5. We will take no measures against A and B for the time being, and with the landing on E, propose the following items:

(1) That N's advance into E is indispensable for the self-existence of the Blue State and peace in the Pacific.

(2) That we are prepared for a challenge from A and B at any time but we are ready to supply them with the necessary materials if they understand our real intention.

6. Against X we will request without delay that as we shall advance into E first of all to assist X against A and B; X shall not change her military operations against D into a defense attitude throughout and shall carry out positively her war of economy and thoughts against D Pt. 23 p. 4

and moreover shall wage war positively against A and B. Pt. 23, p. 5

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 8

Authorities	Superintendent's	Time to be presented
to be	Headquarters; War	Supposition - Latter part
presented to	of Arms; War of	of November
	Diplomacy; Judgment	SHOWA, 16
	Section	August 15,
		3 p.m.

Authorities	Prime	Presenter	SHIRAI,
to be reported	Minister	(Occupation and	Masatatsu,
to or informed		name of maneuver-	War Minister
		ing officer)	



Opinions to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting  
Foreign Policy Based on Supplementary Circumstances

I. Decision

1. The Blue State shall decide to initiate war against A and B and every possible measure should be taken to see that the internal and external situations at the time of the outbreak of war be extremely favorable.

2. The date of the opening of war shall probably be after the middle of December.

II. Measures

1. Against E

Besides waging a war of arms, we shall develop a strong war of thought Pt. 23, p. 10

and expect E's complete surrender in a short time. Further, we shall endeavor to send back ships and materials taking into consideration the temporary isolation of our troops which have advanced into E after the outbreak of the war against A and B, and to send beforehand the required munitions.

4. Against A and B

We shall endeavor to keep our intention of opening a war secret by means of a compromising and concessive diplomatic policy and endeavor to seize an advantageous situation at the outbreak of the war.

5. Against X

We will inform X that the time of our opening a war against A and B is at hand, and present our demand indicated in the items of SOKIEN, Total War Table Top Maneuvers No. 9, Part 4.

6. Against D

We will open negotiations on request. Though we will adopt a delaying policy, we shall maintain the premeditated plan of granting Items 1, 2 and 4. Pt. 23, p. 11



TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)

RECORD OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

A

Record of the Conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister (RAM) and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA in the presence of Ambassadors OTT and OSHIMA in Berlin on 27 March 1941.

The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed MATSUOKA with cordial words as a man who has shown by word and deed that he has the same attitude toward the problems of his country as the Fuehrer and his co-workers must have for Germany, and who made possible the conclusion of the pact with Japan as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country. The Tri-Partite Pact is a very important instrument for the future of the three countries, and represents the foundation on which the future of the three nations can be assured in a manner that has always been imagined by German and Japanese patriots.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the situation as it appears from Germany's view.

In reference to the military situation, he pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase of her fight against England. During the past winter, the Fuehrer prepared everything further so that Germany stands today completely ready for deployment in order to meet England everywhere she can be reached. The Fuehrer has at this moment at his disposal perhaps the strongest military might which has ever existed in the world. Germany has ready to strike 240 divisions, 186 of which are first-class attack divisions of young soldiers. Twenty-four (24) of them are armored divisions to which must be added more motorized brigades.

\* \* \* \* \*

If one calculates the sum total of the military situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion that the Axis is practically master of the situation in all of continental Europe in the military field. A gigantic army is at the disposal of Germany which is practically unemployed and can be committed at any time at any place where the Fuehrer deemed it necessary.

The political situation is characterized by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change of government arrived from Belgrade this morning, however all details are lacking so far. Also, the political situation in Europe and in the whole world has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-Partite powers. Germany continues to strive to win over this or that state which still stands outside of the pact, to the cause of the three powers. He (Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA ~~confidentially~~ that Spain at least in spirit is in the Tri-Partite Pact. Of the two or three remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interesting. He can tell MATSUOKA confidentially that here too, attempts would be made to win these countries for the Tri-partite Pact.

Certain feelers have already been aimed at Turkey. Even if this country formally has an alliance with England, it is at least not entirely impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact.



Germany has concluded her well known treaties with Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA knows how these treaties were made. Germany had at that time the desire to conclude a pact with Japan. Due to the situation in Japan it had not been possible to carry out this desire. On the other hand, the storm clouds of the war appeared more and more threatening in Europe and since the pact, Italy-Japan-Germany was unfortunately not possible at that time for the signing of which the Reich Foreign Minister had been, as Ambassador OSHIMA knows ready for six months on order of the Fuehrer, Germany had to decide upon the pact with Russia in view of the approaching war.

Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA that present relations toward Russia are correct but not very friendly.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German armies in the East are available at any time. Should Russia one day take up an attitude which could be interpreted as a threat against Germany, the Fuehrer would dash Russia to pieces. One is positive in Germany that such a campaign against Russia would end in a complete victory for German arms and the absolute destruction of the Russian Army and the Russian State. The Fuehrer is convinced that in case of an advance against the Soviet Union a few months later a power (gropmacht) Russia would no longer exist.

The Tri-Partite Pact has followed mainly the aim of frightening America from continuing on the course taken, and to keep her out of war. This goal is absolutely clear and appropriate. Furthermore, the Tri-partite Pact is to serve to secure the cooperation of the signatories in the new order, in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and in case of Japan in East Asia, for the future.

\* \* \* \* \*

Germany believes that for instance a rapid attack against Singapore would be a very decisive factor for a rapid overthrow of England.



EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

pp. 1076 to 1083

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.



At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937



Italy adhered. While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis".

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press in a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ... those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manouvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:



The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they roved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said: "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy..." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.



On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies". (Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances...

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Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

#### C. Divergence between Japanese and American Policies:

The President and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1935, and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933 the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international



treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

"I am ... wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.



In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues, in that situation, of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

pp. 1089.

On April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.



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During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind--and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact--that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects.

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The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small.

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On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region."



I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere".

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## II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941.

On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the



Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with these principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources--such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel--in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Konce and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible."



In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that those measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points--the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.



Entry Count CIANO DiarySeptember 19, 1940

Arrival of Ribbentrop. He is in a good humour and very pleased with the welcome given him by the "applause squad" which was well coached by the Questura. In the car he immediately speaks of the surprise he has in his portfolio; this is the Japanese military alliance which is to be signed in a few days in Berlin. The Russian dream vanished forever in the halls of the Belvedere at Vienna after the guarantees to Rumania were made. He believes that this stroke will have a double edge. Against Russia and against America. The threat of the Japanese fleet will keep the latter from making any move. I express a different opinion: The anti-Russian guarantees are all right; the anti-American note which will induce Washington to increase her commitments to Britain is not so good.

VB  
clouds { As far as Great Britain is concerned, Ribbentrop says that the weather has been extremely bad and that cloud formations, rather than the RAF, have prevented the final success of the air attacks. However, he says that the attack will be successful as soon as the weather clears for a few days. The landing preparations are complete and a landing is possible. British territorial defenses are nothing to worry about. It will only take one German division to break up the entire defense system.



Already Not yet		Approved by Parliamentary Councillor		Vice-Minister Sections: General, Military Service, Accountant, Connected: Transportation, Machinery, Materials		
Term to be kept: Perma- nently	Receipt No:	Received War Ministry	Army-China- Confidential- Receipt-No. 11512	Issued by: Munitions Section of Ordnance Bureau		
Decision directed by: Director of the Bureau	Concerning: Delivery of arms					
Action directed by: KAWAHARA	Minister: appointed by person in charge	Parliamentary Vice-Minister:	Parliamentary Councillor:	Secretary:	Copyist (of this note) FUKUDA	
		Vice-Minister: appointed by person in charge	Senior Adjutant: KAWAHARA	Adjutant in charge: KURATA Commissioner of Secretariate		
		Director of Bureau in charge: SUGA	Chief of Section in charge: ITO	Accountant: Section member in charge: SHOJI		
At Bureau in charge	No: China- Confid.- A-363	Connected: Director of Bureau: Chief of Section				
	Received on: Submitted on: Nov. 11, SHOWA 16/1941/					
At Minister's Secretariate	Received on: Nov. 11	Milit. Serv. KITAHARA Machinery OKONO Transport HIRONAKA				
	Finished on: Nov. 13					
		Circulation after execution (decision):		Director of Bureau:	Chief of Section:	

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Army - China - Confidential

Instruction from the adjutant to the Vice-Director of the Army Ordnance Headquarters.

By order I inform you that you are directed to have the prepared arms, stated in the "Army-China-Confid.-No. 3898, dated Nov.7," delivered to all troops at each place in accordance with the attached table.

P.S. Its expenditure is to be paid out of the extraordinary military budget account.

Army-China-Confid.-No.4004 Nov. 11, SHOWA 16.  
/1941/

Army - China - Confid.

Instructions from the Adjutant to the Chiefs of the Staffs of the 16th, 55th, and 56th Divisions.

By order I inform you that arms stated in the attached lists No. 1 and 2 are to be delivered as shown in the attached table.

Army-China-Confid.-No.4004 Nov. 11, SHOWA 16.  
/1941/  
(Sig.)

Army-China-Confid.-No. 10578 received by the War Ministry

Top Secret. Army Department in Imperial Headquarters.  
(Army)

No. 409. Part 3.

The notification to keep in secrecy the identification of the officers dispatched to French Indo-China.

15 October 1941.

The Chief Secretary of General Affairs of the Army Staff of Imperial Headquarters. Tadaichi Wakamatsu (Sig.)

To the Adjutant of the Army Ministry. Nawoichi Kawahara.

The notification.

To keep in secrecy the general plan for "Operation 'Ah'", I request your deep consideration to keep in secrecy at present, by wearing civilian clothes etc., the identification of the officers and the essential members of the staff of the Army Ministry who are to be dispatched to French Indo-China.

This notification to be sent to the following offices, i.e., Army Ministry; Aviation Section of Army Ministry; Sea transportation Headquarters of Army Ministry.



No. 1.

Dec. 627

Supplement sheets of the distribution of munitions kept by the Secretariate.

The 16th Division

The 55th Division

The 56th Division

Army Ordnance Headquarters

Classifications of the distribution of munitions		Date of the distribution	Name of troops to be distributed	Remarks
"Jin"		12th Nov.	The 55th Division	
"Bo"			The 56th Division	
"Hei"	"Ho"	13th Nov.	The 16th Division	
	"He"			
"Tei"		15th Nov.	The 55th Division	
"Hei"		15th Nov.	The 16th Division	



Secret. Separate Paper NO. 1

NO. 2

Kept by the Secretariate  
The 16th Division  
The 55th Division  
The 56th Division  
Doc. 627

The table of articles and quantities of  
munitions and ammunitions to be distributed  
in Japan proper.

Name of articles	Distribution of weapons before distribution									
	mark of flag									
	of the distribution									
	of the distribution									
	"Jin"	"Bo"	"Hei"			"Tei"				
	Red on white	Red on white	Red on white "ah"		Red on white	Red on white "ah - ah"				
	"ah Jin"	"ah"	"Ho"	"He"	"ah"	"Sh"	"Ro"	"Ho"	"Hi"	
	Hiroshima	Miji	Nagoya		Osaka	Hiroshima				
	10th Row									
94 style light trench motor										4
38 style light machine gun	180	180								
96 style machine gun	2	2								
89 style heavy grenade	2	2								
10 style grenade	2	2								
38 style rifle ball-cartridge with ammunition filler and paper case	1,400,000	720,000	482,000	216,000	1,402,000	5,760	23,040	23,040	30,240	
14 style revolver ball- cartridge	6,000	400	330	340	19,330	50	130	130	250	
97 style hand-grenade	24,000	17,200	11,400	5,800	22,800		40	40	80	
89 style shell of 89 style heavy grenade	22,000	13,200	8,500	4,700	26,200	30	150	150	330	



The table of articles and quantities of munitions and  
ammunitions to be distributed in Japan proper

Classification of ways of the distribution mark of tags places of distribution date of finishing the preparations for the distribution Name of articles		"Jin"		"Bo"		"Hei"		"Tei"			
		Red in white "ah-e"	Red in white "ah"	Red in white "ah"		Red in white "ah"	Red in white "ah-nh"				
				"to"	"he"		"Ih"	"Ro"	"Ha"	"ni"	
		Hiroshima moji		Nagoya		Osaka		Hiroshima			
10th Nov.											
92 style heavy machine gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case	55,400	370,000	200,000	108,000	772,000	2,400	12,000	12,000	15,000	
	92 style armour-piercing ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case	72,000	40,000	21,000	12,000	117,000	600	1,800	1,800	2,400	
97 style loading machine-gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		22,500			110,000					
	90 style armour-piercing ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		7,500			30,000					
92 style infantry gun	92 style shell cartridge	3,000	4,700	3,040	16,60	5,300		70	70	130	
94 style 37 millimetre gun	Armour-piercing ball-cartridge	840	840								
	shell-cartridge	3,000	200	1,500		4,500				200	
94 style 37 millimetre tank gun	Armour-piercing ball-cartridge		1,110			500					
	shell-cartridge		1,110			1,000					
41 style mountain gun	shell-cartridge	2,600	1,670	1,460	1,460	5,080				110	



82 style 37 millimetre anti-tank gun	Armor-piercing ball cartridge					3,820				
	Shell-cartridge					960				
94 style mountain gun	Shell-cartridge	16,000								200
	"Aka" cartridge	1,400								500
Reformed 38 style field gun	Shell-cartridge		18,000	7,400		15,000				
88 style 75mm anti- aircraft gun	90 style painted anti-aircraft cartridge	44,000	12,000			5,000				
91 style 10 shell	Pointed cartridge with case					15,000				
Anti-tank mine		50	50	30		1,000		20	20	20
Hand flame-bottle		90	90							
10 style grenade	Signal ball-cartridge	80	80							
4 Firing smoke-generator		400	330	200	100	400	100	100	100	300
Water smoke-generator		200	100	50	50	100	50	50	50	100
88 style middle class	"Aka" grenade	1,000	1,000	400	100	1,200	100	100	100	200
99 style destruction grenade		40	40	30	10	60	10	10	10	20
Hand gas-bottle		100	100	50	50	200	50	50	50	100



The table of articles and quantities of "Ah" machinery and utensils to be distributed in Japan proper.

Classification of ways of distribution mark of tags Place of the distribution Preparation for the distribution Name of articles	"Jin"	"Bo"	"Hui"			"Tsi"			
	Red on white	Red on white	Red on white "Ah"		Red on white	Red on white "Ah"			
	"Ah" in	"Ah"	"Ho"	"He"	"ah"	"Jh"	"Ro"	"Ni"	"Ni"
	Hiroshima	Kogi	Nagoya	Osaka	Hiroshima				
10th Nov.									
93 style small fine injector	6	2	2				1	1	2
Nitrogen bottle	12	4	4				2	2	4
95 style fire hose	40	40	24	16	100		24		16
96 style disinfectant package	500	500	300	200	1200		300		200
91 style middle class floating boat	20								
92 style telephone	15								
92 style fine covered wire	30 rolls								
93 style light telephone	5								
93 style light covered wire	10 rolls								
92 style portable beam-revolver	6								
94 style No. 3 "Ko" wireless telegraph	2								
94 style No. 5 wireless telegraph	3								
94 style No. 6 wireless telegraph	5								



Quartz for No. 5 wireless telegraph	"Ko" 4 sets "Oksa" 4 sets "Hei" 3 sets								
Dry-cell	Amount for 4 months			One-sixth of amount for 4 months	A half of amount for 4 months for 1 division		One-eighth of amount for 4 months for 3 inf. companies and 1 anti company	Same	
Vacuum-tube	for 36 inf. companies and 1 anti company	Same	Two-sixth of amount for 4 months for 1 division						
Cutting Hatchet	1,000	1,000	1,000	500	1,500	200	400	200	200
Long-handled trimmer	50	50	50	20	80	10	20	10	10
94 style No. 3 special receiver		2							



The table of articles and quantities of fuel oil and grease for motor-cars to be distributed in given proper.



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The table of articles and quantities of "Ah" munitions to be distributed in Japan proper.

(addition)

Classification of ways of distribution		"JIN"	"BO"	"HEI"	"TEI"	Remarks
Place of the distributions (or of shipping)	Mark of tag	Red on white	Red on white	Red on white	Red on white "ah"	
	Date of finishing the preparations of the distribution	"ah-JIN"	"ah"	"ah"	"hi"	
	Name of articles	Hiroshima	Moji	Osaka	Hiroshima	
as soon as possible						
38 style rifle ball-cartridge with ammunition feeder and paper case			990,000			
97 style hand grenade			23,000			
89 style shell-cartridge for 89 style heavy grenade			18,000			
92 style heavy machine gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		65,000			
	92 style armour-fiering ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		29,000			
92 style rifle	92 style shell cartridge		4,200			
94 style 37 millimetre gun	Armour-fiering ball cartridge		2,400			This is permitted to change for shell cartridge
	Shell cartridge		400			



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41 style mountain shell-cartridge gun		3.000			
Reformed 38 style field Shrapnel-cartridge gun			500		
88 style No. 7 90 style antiaircraft anti-aircraft pointed cartridge gun			2.000		
Ignition-tube of fire injector	1000				
97 style square yellow powder	500 Kg.				
Portable wooden tool	1 set.				
Portable tool for saddle	1 set.				
98 style electricity-proof instrument	5 set				
95 style collapsible boat				25	
Parts for repairing munitions	same quantity				Articles and quantity are shown in supplementary table.
Kerosene	30 drums				
Heavy oil	30 drums				for fire injector



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### Supplementary table

The table of articles and quantities of parts for repairing munitions.

-10-

Name of articles		quantity	Remarks
Sheath for 30 style bayonet		100	
38 style	Projectile	200	
	Spring of projectile	50	
	Cartridge	20	
	Follower board	20	
	Follower spring	30	
	Bearing	10	
89 style heavy grenade	Angle-regulator	5	
	Impact tip	50	
	Distance regulator	20	
	Spring of d. regulator	20	
	Small spring of d. regulator	10	
	Guard ring of projectile	50	
	Guard ring of a. regulator	50	
	Trigger bar	10	
	Guard ring of trigger bar	50	
	Spring of guard ring	10	







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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 627

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kameo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 15 pages, dated Oct, Nov, 1941, and described as follows: Memorandum pertaining to concealment of identity of military officers going to French Indo China and memo and charts pertaining to distributions of munitions, etc.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of October, 1946.

/s/ Kameo Ishibashi  
Signature of Official  
(SEAL)

Witness: /s/ Torakichi Nakamura

Corresponding Secretary  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of October, 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. -US  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
1st Lt., Inf.  
Chief, Inv. Div., IPS

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



823

Doc. No. 1298

Page 1

CODE TELEGRAM NO. 29430

Berlin September 26, 1940, A.M.

Received: Foreign Office September 26, 1940, P.M.

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

From: Ambassador KURUSU

No. 1251, (urgent), Ambassador's Special Code Book

Ambassador Schulenberg is on his way back to Germany to confer on German relations with Soviet Russia in the event of the Japan-Germany-Italy Treaty being concluded.

The German Government plans to guide the German press to lay particular emphasis on the fact that the treaty does not mean anticipation of war with Russia. But on the other hand, Germany is concentrating troops in the Eastern regions as a check on Russia.

2306  
Handwritten notes and signature



(cert)

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1298Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated Sept., 1940, and described as follows: Strictly confidential documents of the Foreign Office concerning the Tri-Partite Pact. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

\_\_\_\_\_.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of Aug., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2nd Lt., MI

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



Telegram SECRET

(Various seals,  
etc.)

Despatched from NANKING, 14th Nov. 1947.

Despatched at 1128

Received at 1330

14, Nov.

Addressed to the Vice-Minister of War

Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

Despatched by the Chief of the Third Air Group.

Telegram-- The Third Air Group Tel # 2704.

3. 1. The Chief of the Aerial Group will leave NANKING early tomorrow morning --the 15th-- with the staff officers required for the south part of Indo-China and will establish a command post in Saigon on and after the 16th.

2. The Chief of the Staff and the staff officers required shall remain in NANKING to carry out the concentration of aerial forces and measures with regard to shipping and transport.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
IPS No. 630-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary - 1st Demobilization and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages dated Nov. 14, 1941 and described as follows:

Telegram regarding troop movement

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry)

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946

s/ Kaneo Ishibashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ Shinaji, Kobayashi

SEAL  
Corresponding Secretary  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946

s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Name  
Investigator

Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis, 2d Lt. MI

Official Capacity



A G E N D A

1. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Hungary into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
2. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Romania into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
3. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Slovakia into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
4. Revision of the Ceremonial Law.
5. Special appointment of censors of the Home Ministry.



RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Meeting opens at 10:20 A.M., Wednesday, December 18, 1940

His Imperial Majesty Enters

Present:-

President HARA  
Vice-President SUZUKI

Ministers:

Prime Minister KONOYE	(No. 5)
Welfare Minister KANEMITSU	(No. 6)
Overseas Minister AKITA	(No. 7)
War Minister TOJO	(No. 8)
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA	(No. 9)
Education Minister HOSHIDA	(No. 10)
Commerce & Industry Minister KOBAYASHI	(No. 11)
Finance Minister KAWADA	(No. 12)
Home Minister YASUI	(No. 13)
Justice Minister KAJAMI	(No. 14)
Communications Minister MURATA	(No. 15)
Agriculture & Forestry Minister ISHIGURO	(No. 16)
Navy Minister OIKAWA	(No. 17)
Railways Minister OGAWA	(No. 18)

Councillors:-

Councillor KAWAI	(No. 21)
Councillor ISHII	(No. 22)
Councillor ARIMA	(No. 23)
Councillor KUBOTA	(No. 24)
Councillor ISHIZUKA	(No. 25)
Councillor SHIMIZU	(No. 26)
Councillor MINAMI	(No. 27)
Councillor NARA	(No. 28)
Councillor ARAKI	(No. 29)
Councillor MATSUI	(No. 30)
Councillor SUGAWARA	(No. 31)
Councillor MATSUURA	(No. 32)
Councillor USHIO	(No. 33)
Councillor HAGASHI	(No. 34)
Councillor FUKAI	(No. 35)
Councillor FUTAGAMI	(No. 36)
Councillor MANO	(No. 37)
Councillor OSHIMA	(No. 38)
Councillor OBATA	(No. 39)
Councillor TAKEKASHI	(No. 40)
Councillor MITSUCHI	(No. 41)



Absent:--

Imperial Princes:--	Prince YASUEITO	(No. 1)
	Prince NOBIHITO	(No. 2)
	Prince TAKAHITO	(No. 3)
	Prince KOTOHITO	(No. 4)

Councillors:--	Councillor KANEKO	(No. 20)
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Delegates (Government Delegates)

Director of the Legislation Bureau MURASE  
Councillor of the Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA  
(The above two concerning each item on the Agenda)

Director of the Europe & Asia Bureau (Foreign Ministry)  
SAHAMOTO  
Director of the Treaty Bureau (Foreign Ministry) MATSUMOTO  
The above two concerning Items 1, 2 and 3

President of the Board of Decorations SEKO  
Secretary of the Board of Decorations MURATA  
(The above two concerning Item 4)

Director of the Polia Bureau (Home Ministry) FUJIWARA  
(The above concerning Item 5)

Reporting member:--

Chief Secretary HORIE

Secretaries:--

Secretary MOROHASHI  
Secretary TAKATSUJI

President (HARA)

The meeting is called to order.

I submit the following three items together as the subject for discussion:--

1) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Hungary into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.

2) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Romania into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.



3) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Slovakia into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.

According to precedent, we shall dispense with the Readings, restrict ourselves to the main points of the bill, omit the reading and immediately call for the report of the investigation.

Reporting Member (HORIE)

Respectfully investigating these three items, I beg to state the following:-

Soon after the signing of the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, on September 27th of this year at Berlin, the German Government conveyed to the Imperial Japanese Government their desire that Hungary be allowed to enter the above-mentioned Three Power Pact, and asked for our opinion. Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Government replied that it had no objections. Following this, the German Government showed us the draft of the Protocol concerning Hungary's entrance into the above-mentioned treaty, and moreover told us on this occasion that it desired the early realization of this because of the European situation. Next the German Government told us it desired the entrance of Romania and Slovakia into the above-mentioned treaty, that it hoped for the realization of this as soon as possible, and as before asked for our consent. Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Government transmitted its consent to the draft of the Protocol, and at the same time, granted the desire of the German Government, and under the condition of receiving the recognition of the Government, caused our plenipotentiaries to sign the Protocol for Hungary on November 20th at Vienna, for Romania on November 23rd and for Slovakia on November 24th, both at Berlin.

The form and contents of the three Protocols are completely identical. They are composed of three articles. Japan, Germany and Italy are the contracting powers on one side while on the other side the contracting powers are Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia as the case may be. Between these two contracting powers, the following points are agreed upon:

1) Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are to join the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy signed at Berlin on September 27, 1940.

Hungary, Romania and Slovakia may cause their representatives to participate in the mixed commissions provided for in Article 4 of the above-mentioned treaty whenever problems concerning the interests of these three countries are discussed by the Commissions.

The main body of the above-mentioned treaty is to be appended to the Protocol as a Supplement. The Protocol will be drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian and Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian as the case may be. Each of these texts will be considered official.



By the conclusion of this treaty Hungary, Romania and Slovakia recognize the leading position of Germany and Italy in Europe and the leading position of Japan in Greater East Asia, and will also cooperate with Japan, Germany and Italy in making efforts for the construction of a new world order. The six countries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia have pledged each other that if any one of them is attacked by a country not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese hostilities, the six countries will aid each other with all possible means, and that these points will have no influence on the existing political situation between each of these countries and the Soviet Union.

We believe that the three items under consideration are in accordance with principles of the preamble of the Three Power Treaty previously concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy, that in order that Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia might join the treaty the interested countries have decided to conclude an agreement in the form of a protocol, and that this will be of service in strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis and in realizing the final purpose of the Three Power Treaty. For these reasons the conclusion of this agreement may be called an opportune step, and its articles may also be recognized as presenting no difficulties. Thus we consider that each of these three items should be passed as they stand.

The above is a respectful report on the results of the investigation.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

The protocols under consideration will expand the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, and are a very serious matter because circumstances may arise in which our country will bear the duty of giving military aid to Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia and of going to war for them. Therefore, I wish to ask two or three questions. First, in what position are these three countries to enter the Three Power Treaty? That is, what is the meaning of the word entrance in these protocols? As there are no special stipulations concerning the Three Power Treaty other than the article regarding the Mixed Technical Commission in the protocols, we may consider the above-mentioned three countries have the same rights and duties as Japan, Germany and Italy as far as the other articles of the treaty are concerned. In that case, regarding the second article of the treaty, Germany, Italy, Hungary and the other two countries in Europe? Since the chief object of the Three Power Treaty is to establish the two great co-prosperity spheres of Europe and Greater East Asia, is it not right to understand it in the above-mentioned manner?

Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

The Honorable Councillor's theory concerning Article 2 of the Three Power Treaty is correct, but as to Article 1, our country does not recognize the position of Germany, Italy, Hungary and the other two countries in Europe; our country and Hungary and the other two countries recognize the



the leading position of Germany and Italy in Europe. In other words, we understand that Hungary and the other two countries recognize the leading position of Germany and Italy, and of Japan, in Europe and Greater East Asia, respectively.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

Such an explanation would be convenient for Germany and Italy, but would not be convenient for Hungary and the other two countries. To cause a country to join a treaty in order to recognize the leading position of another country, and not to have one's own country's position recognized - that is a very awkward explanation. If the meaning (of the protocols) is indeed as the honorable delegate has answered, it would have been sufficient simply to have said that (Hungary and the other two countries) recognize the stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty. Next, regarding the explanation concerning mutual aid among the six countries, there is no doubt that Japan, Germany and Italy, and the three countries who are parties to each of the protocols under consideration bear the obligation of mutual military assistance. What are not clear are the obligations the three countries of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia will bear between each other. From the form of these protocols it does not appear there is any provision for mutual assistance between these three countries. I ask for a reply.

Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

The honorable Councillor's theory is correct and there is some doubt about the wording of the protocols. But in actual practice, since three new countries have joined the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy and since these six countries have entered into a relationship of alliance my interpretation is that when the situation stipulated in Article 3 arises, these three newly-joined countries also bear the obligation of assisting one another.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

If there were an article providing for admissions in the Three Power Treaty, there would be no question, but since there is none, Hungary and the other two countries became one of the contracting parties in the respective protocols, but there is no reason for the arising of any relationship between these three countries. I believe that there is no reason for those who are not parties to a treaty assuming obligations. What is the Government's opinion?

No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

As to the first point of the honorable Councillor's question, it goes without saying that the three countries newly joining the treaty recognized the position of Japan, Germany and Italy when signing the protocol. Regarding this point, I believe that aside from the theory of treaties, as a political theory, there is no room for doubt, and as for the second point, there can also be no doubt. Since the fundamental spirit of the subject under consideration is that the countries party to this treaty act as one in



assisting each other, although there may be doubts on this point as a legal theory, no doubt can arise on it as an actual political problem.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

Since the honorable minister declares himself of the same opinion as far as the interpretation of the treaty goes I hope he will satisfactorily deal with the matter politically. In conclusion I have a question to ask regarding the form of concluding international treaties. Recently, when the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy was submitted to this Council for deliberation only the Japanese text was placed before this Council as the official text of the treaty, and the German and Italian texts were not submitted. Today for the first time I have become aware of its contents when these protocols were placed before us for deliberation. Since I am fully aware of the circumstances of the times I have no intention of disputing about this, but in future I desire that all official texts be submitted to this Council for consideration before asking for the Imperial approval. Among the official texts of the protocols submitted to this Council for consideration are Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian. These languages, unlike German and Italian, are comprehended by few persons in this country. What methods have the authorities employed to see that these texts agree with the official Japanese text? To give an example, a few years ago there was a plan to conclude a treaty between our country and Ethiopia. When the Imperial approval was almost about to be asked for, it was found on engaging a scholar of the Imperial University to interpret the official text in Ethiopian that there were two or three points on which it differed from the official text in our language. Finally, the draft was discarded and a new treaty drawn up in which French was the official language. While I believe that in all probability much care was taken in comparing the official texts of these protocols, I would like to know how this was done.

Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

As regards the matter pointed out by the honorable Councillor, in view of the precedent concerning the Ethiopian language we have taken due care. There are competent specialists in our country regarding Hungarian and Romanian while Slovakian is a dialect of Russian and there were specialists in the Russian language who comprehended that language. Therefore, we have carefully scrutinized the text, and have also inquired of the German and Italian Embassies concerning this. Thus we have taken every care so that there might be no discrepancy between these texts and the official Japanese text.

No. 26 (SHIMIZU)

When will Germany and Italy recognize the Nanking Government as the Government representing the Republic of China? Also, what attitude will the three countries newly adhering to the Three Power Treaty take regarding the recognition of this Government.



## No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

The Imperial Japanese Government had already discussed the recognition of the Nanking Government with Germany and Italy before our recognition of this Government. Italy is prepared to recognize this Government immediately and I expect that following this, Germany and the other three countries concerned in the protocols under consideration will extend recognition also. However, in regard to the Italian Government, as it is desirable that the Imperial Japanese Ambassador be the doyer of the diplomatic corps accredited to the new Government, we asked the Italian Government to extend recognition after our ambassador had presented his credentials, and obtained their understanding regarding this. Also, as for the time the German Government will extend recognition, there is a delicate problem. That is to say, the Imperial Japanese Government has not yet given up its hope of realizing an all-out peace in China. For this, it is all the more necessary to ask for German assistance on the side lines. But if the German Government should recognize the new Government it will naturally mean the severance of ties with the Chungking Government and will only bring about inconveniences. However, I am confident that the German Government will recognize the New Government any time our Government requires.

## No. 35 (FUKAI)

Recently a war has broken out between Italy and Greece. Concerning this have there been any negotiations between our Government and the Italian Government regarding the application of the Three Power Treaty?

## No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

To date there have been no negotiations between Japan and Italy regarding the application of Article 3 of the Three Power Treaty. I consider that even in future neither Germany nor Italy will demand action by Japan under the interpretation that they have been attacked by Greece.

## No. 22 (ISHII)

*note again* According to the explanation of the Foreign Office authorities, Hungary commenced negotiations with Germany herself because she desired to join the Japan-Germany-Italy Three Power Treaty, and our country agreed to this through the good offices of Germany. But as regards Romania and Slovakia, Germany urged their adherence and opened negotiations with the Imperial Japanese Government. Moreover, the German Government desired a speedy realization of this, so that the Imperial Japanese Government was unable to take the proper steps and finally concluded the protocols now under discussion by an ad referendum. To begin with, the Three Power Treaty was concluded by the three Great Powers of the world, as far as the Imperial Japanese Government is concerned, there should be no reason for such undue haste in causing these second rate powers to join the Treaty. Furthermore, each of the treaties now under consideration are treaties whose conclusion contains the danger of staking our national fate. Therefore, I consider that



these treaties are not such as should be welcomed by our government. As for Romania, she has a dispute of many years standing with Russia over Bessarabia. Should incidents arise from this, there is fear that, depending on developments, our country may bear the obligation of going to war for that country. Moreover our country has no hope of receiving any assistance from Romania. Germany also, because of her relationship to the Soviet Union will be in the position of looking on with folded arms. In regard to this, there is something I would like to know. Why did Germany drag along these small weak countries and what is the reason for having been in such haste that the Imperial Japanese Government was even unable to take the proper steps in signing the protocols with these countries? Also, what led the Government to agree to the treaties under consideration, in which an occasion will arise wherein Germany will not bear any obligations but our country will.

#### No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

me  
No diplomatic relations in Europe at the present moment are so complicated and so delicate as those between several powers such as Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, Great Britain and others in the Balkan Peninsula. GERMANY and ITALY are endeavoring to strengthen their position in the said peninsula to the greatest possible extent for convenience of carrying out their war with GREAT BRITAIN and from the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with, and at the same time, rendering a menace to SOVIET RUSSIA. In taking necessary steps for the purpose the German authorities concerned are most fearful of the divulgence of the secret. If these protocols should leak out before sealing, the object in view could never be attained, which circumstances explain their haste in concluding the agreements. Now in view of the circumstances that have led to the conclusion of the Three Power Alliance, and of the existing international situation, this Empire ought to agree to the enhancement to any extent of GERMANY's position in the Balkan Peninsula, for one of the objectives of the 3-Power Alliance lies in taking advantage of the alliance in order to adjust Russo-Japanese relations. While it is necessary to intensify the close relations between GERMANY and SOVIET RUSSIA based on the interests of the two powers. I deem it a good policy to aggrandize the German menace to SOVIET RUSSIA availing ourselves of the situation to regulate our relations with SOVIET RUSSIA, seeing that SOVIET RUSSIA does not find any menace in JAPAN and is inclined to reject the adjustment of Russo-Japanese relations. From this point of view the Government has agreed to the proposal in question from a conviction that it will be favorable to our diplomacy. It seems that GERMANY intends to include ITALY as well as the BALKAN states within her sphere of influence, and to besiege TURKEY diplomatically in order to take ultimate control of her, thereby obviating the danger of her entry into the war. It is not without reason that GERMANY should request JAPAN <sup>to be</sup> quick in taking action in connection with the matter. Considering it necessary for the improvement of our international position, especially in Russo-Japanese relations, we have taken the said exceptional action. I hope you will understand these circumstances.



President (HARA)

As there are no other opinions expressed, we shall immediately vote on the matter. All those in favor of the items under consideration, please rise.

(All arise)

President (HARA)

The items have been passed by a unanimous vote.

(Nine pages omitted)

(Translator's Note: The discussion of Items 4 & 5, Revision of the Ceremonial Law and Special Appointment of Censors of the Home Ministry, are omitted as they are purely a matter of form and have no bearing on the present case.)

President (HARA)

The meeting stands adjourned.

His Imperial Majesty Leaves.

Meeting Closed at 11:50 A.M.

President:	Yoshinichi HARA	(Signature)
Chief of Secretary:	Sueo MATSUI	"
Secretaries:	Yuzuru NOROHASHI	"
	Masami TAKATSUGI	"



Doc. No. 1285

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 1285

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated 18 Dec. 1940, and described as follows: Privy Council Proceedings "Recognition of Protocol in Entrance of Hungary Roumania, and Slavokia in Tri-Partite Pact". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
4th day of September, 1946

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo  
Signature of Official

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
4th day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. M. I.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



Top Military Secret

Proj. No. 105  
S. A. No. 15072  
Sack No.  
Item No. 372

Title: Monthly Wartime Report (KO) No. 4 of the HA CorpsDate: Nov. 1941Headquarters of the HA Corps

Content:

- SNS
- (4)
- I. General Condition of the Corps.
  - II. Preparation for the Attack on Hongkong.
  - III. Operations and Garrison Duty.
  - IV. The State of Public Peace.
  - V. The Investigation of Topographical Data.
  - VI. The State of Traffic and Communications.
  - VII. Outline of the Rear Conditions.
  - VIII. The Condition of the Army of the New Regime.

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- I. General Condition of the Corps.
  1. The Corps is preparing whole heartedly for military operations against Hongkong, and also intensifying the blockade against the enemy.
  1. Preparations to attack Hongkong are progressing smoothly, and are expected to be completed early in December.
  2. Fortifications under construction for the defense of CANTON and its surrounding strategic points were completed during the latter part of November.
  3. The 18th Division, the 21st Heavy Field Artillery Battalion, the 4th and 15th Independent Engineer Regiments, the 8th and 11th Epidemic Prevention and Water-Supplying Sections, and the 10th River Crossing Materials Company left the command of the Corps at their respective positions at 00.00, 15th inst.
  4. The 45th Air Regiment, the main force of the 10th Independent Air Unit, a part of the 18th Independent Squadron, and the direct co-operation unit of the 44th Air Regiment were assigned to the corps at end of this month.



5. As the IIAI Branch Unit in HAINAN had returned to their original units the MATSUO Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 1 Infantry Battalion) was organized and despatched to above place from Shantou.
6. The units of the SANO Corps in CHUNGMEN districts were relieved of guard duty in the middle of this month by the newly organized BANJOE Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 2 Infantry Battalions)

## II. Preparation for the attack on Hongkong.

Upon receiving unofficial instructions to attack Hongkong, the corps wholeheartedly prepared and began concentrated movements of the units to attack at the end of this month.

### 1. Gathering of Information

Gathering of information was started from the middle of Showa 15 /1940/. In August of this year, the focus of the gathering of information was directed toward Hongkong and endeavored to grasp all aspects of Hongkong by air reconnaissance, reading air photographs, carrying out investigations in actual places, and utilizing all types of intelligence, moreover, the units to execute the attack were ordered to gather the information.

### 2. Training

The SANO Corps, as well as being appointed to guard /duty/ since the end of Showa 15 /1940/ commenced training for the attack /on Hongkong/, and especially executed training of the staff in attacks, building of fortifications, attacking fortifications of a special type, and the usage of materials in August of this year, and field training to about a 1000 officers and men who are to be the main body of units attacking five positions. Furthermore, in the beginning of October, when the KOKUDA Corps were relieved of guarding the guard area excluding the intermediate district, units were concentrated and executed regular training.

Since the KITAJIMA branch unit was stationed near the British-Chinese frontier, the branch unit devoted themselves to training for the attack on Hongkong.



3. The Repair of the Transportation Road in the Rear  
Since the end of September repairs of the motor-road between HULEN and PAOAN, which is the main transportation road in the rear, were commenced and completed on the 8th Oct. as prearranged.
4. Commencement of /Troop/ Movements.  
In the last part of this month SANO Corps units stationed in CHUNGHLEN were concentrated in HULEN. The main force of the SANO Corps concentrated in FUSHAN and units under direct army command in the CANTON area have commenced movements gradually to the HULEN, TUNGKUN, and SHEKLUNG areas, secretly by the CANTON-SAMSHUI and CANTON KOWLOON lines.
5. Thus, the Corps has ordered, on the 30th inst., preparations for the attack on Hongkong and endeavoring to keep the plan secret are awaiting the opportunity to open hostilities.

### III. Operations and Garrison Duty

1. KI Corps  
A part of the forces were stationed at HSIKAN as public peace and order on the right bank of CHUKIANG had become worse, the remainder being engaged in guarding in their previous disposition.
2. KOLCDA Corps  
As a result of the enlargement of the guard area, importance was attached to the FATSHIN district, and cleared the district of the enemy.  
Furthermore, in the middle of November, the Northern SAMSHUI and Southern TSUNCEA districts were cleared.
3. KITAJIMA Branch Unit  
Other than preparing for the campaign against Hongkong, a part of the unit annihilated the communist bandits in HANGSHUPAI, KUANGTOU AND TZUPATIEN districts in the beginning of November.
4. ARAKI Branch Unit  
The disposition of a part of the force was changed, and together with enforcing guarding more rigidly endeavored to reconnoiter the offensive plan of the enemy.



## 5. MATSUI Corps

In the latter part of October a punitive expedition was conducted in the northern part of CHAOYANG, the enemy bases being annihilated.

## 6. BANJONE, and MATSUO Branch Units

No change.

## 7. HANYU Unit

As well as executing air-defenses in the vicinity of CANTON, secretly reconnoitered the HONGKONG district.

The summary table of main battles in November and the summary maps are shown in the attached chart No. 1 and inserted maps No. 2 respectively.

Total war results are as per attached chart No. 2.

## IV. Peace Conditions

The enemy disturbed our rear somewhat actively in attacking the ferry-steamers in the south of CANTON in the middle of November, and frequently, buses in the latter part of October. However, as a result of the activity of the Military Police (KEIPEI) these mixed units (partisans) were captured, and peace conditions in general are satisfactory.

The chart of the conditions of peace are as per attached sheet of inserted maps No. 3.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 628Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Okikatsu, Arao \_\_\_\_\_ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of \_\_\_\_\_ General Affairs Divisions and that as such official I have custody of the \_\_\_\_\_ document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated November, 1941, and described as follows: "HA" Corps Monthly Report. \_\_\_\_\_ I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Bureau \_\_\_\_\_

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5 day of July, 1946

/s/ Okikatsu, Arao  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kaneo Ishibashi

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout \_\_\_\_\_, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of July, 1946

/s/ William C. Prout  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monohan

Investigator  
Official Capacity

I.P.S.



Top secret telegram from O. TSUKADA, Chief  
of Staff of Southern Army to KIMURA, H.,  
Assistant Minister of War.

Nov. 22, 1941

Top Secret

"Forward movement of Southern Army"

Addressed to Assist. Minister of War /H. Kimura/

From General Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada.

"The HQ of the Southern Army will advance as follows. Special  
secrecy is requested.

(2) Nov. 25 to leave Tokyo  
Nov. 26 embark from Ujina by Suwa Maru  
Nov. 29 landing at Keelung.

After that the HQ will be located at Taihoku<sup>K</sup> until about  
Dec. 5. The staff officers will be about 5 and others will be  
stationed at Saigon.



# C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

IPS No. 654-A

## Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ISHII, Masayoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: In charge of military History and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 22 Nov, 1941, and described as follows:

Top Secret Telegram O, Tsukada, Chief of Staff to Vice Minister of War.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files:

Military Affairs Section - War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
27th day of June, 1946

s/ M. Ishii

Signature of Official

Witness: \_\_\_\_\_

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

## Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
27th day of June, 1946

s/ William C. Prout

Name

Witness: s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

IPS



TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file. MOST URGENT

Tokyo, 4 October 1941 2,578

Arrival: 4 October 1941 1325 hours.

No. 1974, of 4 October.

For the German Foreign Minister.

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with Pol. VIII

NOTE: Sent on to Special Train under No. 3351. Tel. Ktr.  
4 October 1941.

VB  
As I have stated in my last report, the Japanese-American negotiations seem to be without result, unless the United States fundamentally changes her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do. However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, there remains in JAPAN, a certain sense of uncertainty as to what policy should be adopted in JAPAN. For the first time in her history JAPAN feels herself physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her forces on militarily inferior CHINA; now she is under the impression, despite brilliant individual successes, that she cannot successfully terminate this conflict by military means. Even more than this feeling prevailing within the country, the long drawn out service behind the front /Etapendienst/ has probably impaired the Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help feeling that the mobilization, begun in July, has enhanced the sense of weakness by bringing to light the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and see, the goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army leaders (Minister for War, Chief of General Staff, Head of the Political Section and of the Section for Foreign Armies) the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at.

VSE  
(The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to bring about a new distribution of power in EUROPE and the Far East by overpowering the British Empire. Keeping



AMERICA at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could only be mere means to this end.)

*Point  
Wintky  
moscow*

Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and has carried it through militarily successful to a great extent the important thing is to reestablish the connection of the powers of the Tripartite Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, and to concentrate the entire energy on fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far East as well as on the British Isles. Operations in European RUSSIA had demonstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION have suffered defeat but that the political collapse of the regime does not automatically follow. (Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring, unless a moral collapse of the regime comes about. The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after the occupation of MOSCOW, to induce the remainder of RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this, JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and east during next spring for which JAPAN would then be in a position to do this/ despite having the CHINA conflict on her hands. In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time.

*USE*

Military actions by JAPAN against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South are independent of the time of year. It is to be endeavored to link /them/ up with a German drive against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Middle East, although there is no absolute necessity to wait /for it/. However, victory over the British Empire would be complete only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Indian position.

*use*

With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly show the attitude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not



too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military Attaches in the impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, the calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does not guarantee the success of a southward push beyond initial conquests. In French...one group garbled)...only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic leadership deprives the Japanese fighting forces of the assurance which is essential to success. It is therefore to be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive.

The activation of JAPAN in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be brought about by demonstrating to her technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common goal (passage through SIBERIA or a combined attack in the Middle East or the Far East). A long-distance flight from the Russian front to MANCHULI as soon as this is technically possible, would probably make a deep impression here. Considering the formalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are otherwise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem.

In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no mention was made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find out that in military considerations they were almost completely setting aside or ignoring the possible intervention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy. Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting entangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen. The Japanese Government /Staats-fvevng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the character of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Article Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through



common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAHMER as negotiations chairman and myself.

The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged.

I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regulation /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. However, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders.

I shall next report on the attitude of the political circles.

OTT

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



876

"MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN  
THE EVENT OF JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN WAR" --12 Nov. 1941

SECRET

In dealing with this copy, especial care must be taken in regards to outsiders.

12 November 1941

Concerning measures to be taken in the event of Japan's participation in war. (Supplement No. 1)

(Precedents of military administration in occupied areas.)

The Second Department of the Treaty Bureau.

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# C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

IPS. NO. 1412-A

## Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 60 pages, dated Nov. 12, 1941 and described as follows:

Military Administration Measures to be taken in the Event of Japan's Participation in War

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Japanese Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22nd day of August, 1946

s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: s/ Nagaharu, Odo

SEAL

Archives Chief

Official Capacity

## Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946.

s/ Richard H. Larsh

Name

Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis, 2nd Lt, MI

Investigator

Official Capacity



*W. H. H.*  
"We are not a jury, you are addressing the public."  
It is a question of whether we should permit these interruptions  
but they are made before I know they are interruptions."

876

Doc. No. 527

Page 1

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE  
REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM)  
AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA  
IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

\* \* \* \* \*

He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

The RAM declared that it was quite possible that the above-mentioned circumstances should very soon lead to a conflict between Germany and Russia. If Germany felt herself in danger, she would immediately strike and finish off bolshevism.

\* \* \* \* \*

Japan had, however, to bear in mind that, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay on the European side. These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

Matsuoka finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

(Berlin. 31 March 1941.)



OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL  
APO 124A U.S. ARMY  
28 March 1946

This is to certify that the photostatic copies listed below are true copies of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and are now in the custody of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality:

- 1877-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, at Berlin on 29 March 1941.
- 2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at Fuschl.
- 1834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56/R. Extract of a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941.
- 2954-PS Memorandum about the conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.
- 2897-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 14 July 1941. #1217
- 2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097
- 1881-PS Memorandum about a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Reich and Minister Meissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
- 2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941.
- C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan. Fuehrer Headquarters. Dated 5 March 1941.

GERARD SCHAEFER  
1st Lt. Inf.  
Chief, Documentation Division

Bepno:



DETAILS OF THE EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATION  
IN THE SOUTHERN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

No. 38 of forty volumes

National Top Secret

Decisions by the liaison conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government of Japan on November 20. - P

1. General Policy.

For occupied areas a military administration is to be temporarily enforced for the purpose of restoring public peace and order, for the immediate acquisition of resources vital for our national defense, and for maintaining the self-sufficiency of our operational forces.

The final reversion of the territories we have occupied and their future disposal are to be decided later.

5 2. Details

1. In the execution of military administration, such administrative organs as still exist will be made as much use of as possible and all obtaining social and racial customs will be respected.

2. As far as operations allow, our Occupation Forces will take measures to obtain all resources vital for our national defense and to expedite their development.

Resources vital for our national defense which are developed or obtained in the occupied areas will form an integral part of the Materials-Mobilization Plan of the Central Executive and everything needed by our operational forces for local self-sufficiency will, as a rule, be assigned to them locally in accordance with the Executive's distribution plans.

3. The transportation of resources to Japan will be assisted in every way possible by the Navy and Army alike, who will do their best to make full use of the ships they have requisitioned.

4. The Occupation Forces will keep control of railways, shipping, harbours, aviation, communications and the post.



5. The Occupation Forces will control trade and exchange and in particular will prevent any leakage to the enemy of resources of special importance, such as petroleum oil, rubber, tin, tungsten, quinine, etc.

6. Existing local currencies will, as a rule, be utilized and circulated as far as possible, but in unavoidable cases military notes of foreign denomination will be used.

PLUNDER  
↑  
7. Natives will have to reconcile themselves to such pressure as is unavoidably involved for them in our acquisition of resources vital for our national defense and the local self-sufficiency of our Occupation Forces. Demands for their pacification will not be tolerated if they militate against these objectives.

VC  
8. American, British and Dutch nationals will be directed to cooperate with our military administration. For the recalcitrant, deportation or other appropriate measures will be devised. The existing rights and interests of the Axis Powers will be respected but any future extension of them will be restricted as far as possible.

Chinese emigrants will be made to renounce allegiance to the Chiang Government and to sympathize and cooperate with our measures.

Native inhabitants will be directed so as to promote their feelings of dependence on the Imperial Army. We must avoid giving rise to any premature independence movement.

9. Japanese will be strictly examined as to their fitness before they can make their first trip into enemy land after the start of operations; preferential consideration will be given to the return journeys of those who were once resident in these areas, but who have returned to Japan. *the occupied territory*

10. The following measures are to be taken in connection with the execution of military administration:

- (a) All important matters concerning our local military administration shall be decided by means of liaison conferences between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government. Local troops will be notified of decisions of the Central Executive by the Navy and Army respectively.



- (b) Schemes and regulations for the acquisition and development of resources will for the present be made by the Central Executive organization, under the leadership of the Planning Board. The latter's decisions shall be carried out in accordance with (a).
- (c) In the case of F.I.C. and <sup>Thailand</sup>~~Siam~~, our pre-arranged policies will be adhered to and no military administration will be enforced. Measures will be decided later in the event of any sudden change in their status.

Notes:--

1. The military administration machinery will be gradually amalgamated, readjusted or taken over by the new organization which the Government will set up, depending on the progress of the Imperial policies toward the Occupied Territories.

(The End)



TRANSLATION OF NUREMBERG DOCUMENT  
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL(Page 1  
of Orig.)

Record

Fue/No. 13/14

of the conference between the "Fuehrer" and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the German Foreign Minister as well as Ambassadors OTT and OSHIMA on 27 March 1941.

After a few words of welcome the Fuehrer inquired first how MATSUOKA had stood the long and tiring trip from Japan to Germany. MATSUOKA replied that the trip agreed with him very well especially since on his trip through Siberia he was entirely cut-off from the outside world and only from time to time got to see a small Siberian country paper in which practically no actual news was recorded. He therefore had felt as if on a vacation trip.

Page 2

(Page 2 of Orig.) After that the Fuehrer gave a survey of the general situation. (He said) The war was forced upon Germany. However, she had not been surprised by the war; because she had had the opportunity to follow up the campaign of incitement of certain British, French and American circles for years and therefore prepared herself for everything. In spite of these thorough preparations the outbreak of the war was however not a political aim. Germany had political demands, but hoped to be able to satisfy same by reason. In 1939 the procedure of a peaceful revision of impossible situations which had worked until then with success was interrupted through Poland's pushing forward and the resultant consequences.

Page 3

(Page 3 of Orig.) Considering the present situation soberly and without imagination one would have to state that at the outbreak of the war in 1939 there were on the opposite side 60 Polish, 6 Norwegian, 18 Dutch, 22 Belgian and 138 French divisions. In addition there were 12-13 British divisions on the continent. Now it was possible, in barely 1½ years, to eliminate 60 Polish divisions with the occupation of Poland, 6 Norwegian divisions with the occupation of Norway, 18 Dutch divisions with the occupation of Holland, and 22 Belgian divisions with the occupation of Belgium, and out of 138 French divisions only 8 weak brigades are still in existence. All British troops were dispersed and chased away. These are losses which cannot be replaced, and Britain's position cannot be saved any more. By this the war was decided, the Axis powers have become the controlling combination. Resistance to their will is impossible.



Page 4

f Orig.) As MATSUOKA knows, at the beginning of the war Germany was just on the point of building a navy. In spite of this fact any military operations in the course of which seaways had to be used, especially in Norway, were completed, and the British were not in a position to prevent these operations. The German submarines as well as the surface vessels (auxiliary cruisers and battle ships) together with the Luftwaffe caused the British tonnage losses amounting to almost 3/4 of British and Allied losses of World War I. For, at first, very few submarines were put into active service by Germany. By far the greatest number had been used to train new crews for the numerous units manufactured by mass production. The real submarine warfare would only begin in the present and next month. Britain would be weakened to a considerably greater extent than her present losses and would not be in a position to threaten German shores and means of communications anymore. Besides, Germany is tying up an increasing percentage of the British fleet in the North Sea and the Atlantic. The same is being done by the Italian fleet and the German Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean.

Page 5

f Orig.) Germany has absolute control of the air in spite of all British explanations about alleged successes. MATSUOKA would be able to check this statement while looking around in Berlin and comparing present Berlin with present London. Blows of the Luftwaffe would still be increased considerably in the next few months. Britain would suffer from increasingly heavy losses of ship space, and the effectiveness of the German blockade is being shown by the fact that rationing in Britain has to be much stricter than in Germany. The war, meanwhile, would be continued as preparation for the final blow against Britain.

The "Fuehrer" then discussed the situation in the Mediterranean and explained the Italy had been unfortunate in North Africa because she lacked the necessary antitank defense against the British Tank army. Now, however, the danger has been eliminated with the arrival of the first armored division in Tripolitania which will soon be followed by a second division. A further British advance is now out of question, to the contrary, the Axis will in a short time begin a counter-attack.

Page 6

f Orig.) The Italian undertaking in the Balkans was hindered by severe weather conditions. However, in the next few days all difficulties in this theater will be eliminated by a combined advance of Germany and Italy. There is no military problem because Germany has 240 divisions "unemployed" at her disposal out of which 186 divisions are first class assault troops. The losses in personnel and material were very slight in the years of 1939 and 1940 so that in spite of the previous campaigns Germany is stronger in every respect than she was in 1939.



The Fuehrer than expressed his conviction that Britain already has lost the war. It is only a matter of insight whether she wants to admit this. Consequently this will then result in the collapse of the people and of the regime which is responsible for the insane policy of Britain.

Page 7  
of Orig.)

In her present critical situation Britain is clinging to any blade of straw. She especially relies on two hopes:

First, for American help. Germany has figured on this help from the beginning. It will, however, assume more palpable proportion only in the year of 1942, but even then the extent of this help would be in no proportion to Germany's increased productivity:

Britain's second hope is Russia. The British Empire as well as the United States of America hoped that they would succeed, in spite of everything, in getting Russia on Britain's side. They expected to reach this goal if not this year then perhaps next year in order to bring about a new balance of power in Europe.

Page 8  
of Orig.)

On this it should be noted that Germany has made the known treaties with Russia, but still more important than this is the fact that Germany has 160 to 180 divisions at her disposal in case of emergency, for her protection against Russia. In case of this eventuality she (Germany) has therefore not the slightest fear and would not hesitate for a second to draw the consequences at once in case of danger. He (the Fuehrer) however does not think that this danger will occur.

About the objectives of the German warfare in Europe the Fuehrer said that the British hegemony, under all circumstances, would be broken, the British influence in Europe eliminated and every attempt at American interference in Europe would be excluded. Furthermore, the new order of the European continent would as the most essential element, establish the limitation of the rights and duties of those who lived on the continent, and would exclude all the countries which only wanted to interfere from the outside, that is especially Britain and America.

Page 9  
of Orig.)

In the present struggle the Axis powers were spiritually, morally and partially materially, supported by Japan. The Tripartite Pact, for instance, through the cooperation with Japan made it possible to supply German auxiliary cruisers in East Asia. Above all it caused America to hesitate to enter the war officially. On the other hand it has contributed to the Japanese partner a great deal towards her own future by means of the work and battles of Germany.



There are few situations which offer greater facilitation and a greater probability of success in the realization of the Japanese aim than the present one. Britain is completely checked, on the sea, in the air and on land. In the Mediterranean ever stronger British power is being tied up. Likewise she has to use increasingly stronger units for convoys. Often, cruisers and destroyers are not longer sufficient since these convoys would be attacked on Germany's part by battleships. For in contrast to World War I, Germany owns today on the long front from Narvik to the Spanish-French border numerous bases from which she could advance with her naval forces against Britain and her supply lines. Britain, therefore, is nailed down in Europe, the aim is the destruction of the British Empire.

(Page 10

of Orig.) America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war some place else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone opposed to the powers of the Tripartite Pact. But in no case could America wage a war some place else.

(Page 11  
of Orig.)

Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint action of the Tripartite power than the one established today will in all human possibility never again arise. On the other hand it is clear to him that with every historical act a risk has to be taken into consideration. Rarely in history, however, has the risk been less than at present while war is being waged in Europe, Britain is tied up there, America is still at the beginning of her armament, Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Western border. Such a moment will never occur again, it is unique in history. No (the Fuehrer) admits that there is a certain risk involved, but it is an exceptionally small one at a time when Russia and Britain are eliminated and America is not yet prepared. If this favourable moment would pass by and the European conflict would possibly end in a compromise, France and Britain would recover in a few years. America would join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner or later be faced with the task after all of defending the security of her living space (Lebensraum) in a battle against these three nations.

(Page 12

of Orig.) Militarily, too, there has not been since the memory of man a situation relatively as favourable as now, although the military difficulties resulting from action should not be underestimated.

Especially favorable is the fact that there exist no conflicts of interests between Japan and her Allies. Germany, which would satisfy her colonial demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe.



On the other hand the cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons never meant a real coalition but always only a playing off of one against the other. Just as much as Britain does not put up with the hegemony of one nation in Europe, she would in East Asia play off Japan, China and Russia against each other to promote the interests of her own empire. The United States would act just like Britain, she would inherit the empire and replace British imperialism with American imperialism.

A better situation for joint action would hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He (The Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, the German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody also in her previous history. He has the necessary power of resolution in critical situations and, finally, Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of successes which is also unique in the world but need not be repeated.

In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the year 1941. He has always been for cooperation with this country. Ambassador OSHIMA knows that he (the Fuehrer) has worked firmly toward this goal for many years. He is determined in the future never again to deviate from this line. As already mentioned, especially favorable for cooperation is the fact that there are no conflicts in interest between Japan and Germany. For interests in the long run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will of a Fuehrer; therefore they always endanger anew the cooperation between nations if they are turned in opposite directions. In the case of Japan and Germany, therefore, one can plan for the longest time on account of the non-existence of such conflicts. This has been his firm conviction since earliest youth. The Japanese, German, and Italian nations would be highly successful if they would draw the consequences from this present unique situation.

MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank statements which made the whole situation very clear to him. Although he already has occupied himself thoroughly with the arguments advanced by HITLER, he would once again consider most thoroughly the arguments mentioned.

On the whole he agrees with the views mentioned by the Fuehrer. Especially he is also of the opinion that any resolute action involves a certain risk. MATSUOKA declared with reference to the report of Ambassador OTT and the German Foreign Minister through which the Fuehrer will probably be accurately informed about the present situation in Japan, that he wants to present the situation personally and very frankly. There are in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which can be kept in check only by a strong man. This is the type which although he would like to have the cubs of the tigress, is, however, not prepared to go into the cave to snatch them away from their mother. These trends of thought, were presented by him using



(Page 16 of Orig.) the same picture at a conference at headquarters in the presence of two princes of royal blood. It is regrettable that Japan has not yet rid herself of these circles, indeed that some of these people are even in influential positions. Confidentially, however, he can say that, after a violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at the conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that decisively, when she has the feeling that she would otherwise lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless of the condition of her preparations, because there would always be some people who would consider the preparation insufficient. This point he, MATSUOKA, carried successfully also against both the princes. The timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate and would act partly because of a sympathetic pro-British or pro-American attitude.

MATSUOKA then pointed out that he had advocated the alliance already long before the outbreak of the European war. He greatly exerted himself at that time on behalf of its conclusion, but regrettably had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he personally held the view that Japan first should attack Singapore and put an end to British influence in this district, and only then should conclude the Tripartite Pact, because the thought of Japan joining the alliance without simultaneously making a contribution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to him. Because, while Germany has already waged a gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at the time of the conclusion of the pact, had not yet contributed anything. Therefore, he had very strongly insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not push it through and then, by force of circumstances reversed his program and put joining of the pact in first place.

(Page 18 of Orig.) He did not have the least doubt that the South Sea problem could not be solved without the capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only to intrude into the cave of the tigress and take out the cubs by force.

It is only a matter of time until Japan will attack. According to his opinion the attack should ensue as soon as possible. Unfortunately he does not govern Japan but has to convert the rulers to his opinion. He will surely also succeed in this some day. But at the present moment he cannot, under these circumstances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese nation.

Upon his return, he would give these matters his most serious attention after his conference with the Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having personally examined the situation in Europe. He could not promise anything definite but promises that he will personally advocate to the utmost the goals indicated.

(Page 19 of Orig.) MATSUOKA then also urgently requested the statements just presented by him to be held strictly confidential because upon their becoming known in Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion would probably turn pale and try to get him out of his office.



While endeavoring to bring about the pact, he had also kept strictest silence until the very last moment and frequently and purposely created the impression of a pro-American or a pro-British attitude for the deception of his adversaries.

Shortly before conclusion of the pact it was reported to him that the British Ambassador made strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite pact. The American Ambassador also expressed himself similarly. A few days after conclusion of the pact he asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador Page 20 admitted everything and, moreover, stated that every Japanese he had met f Orig.) since publication of the conclusion of the pact, had expressed the opinion that Germany would win the war. This, according to the opinion of the American Ambassador, is untrue, Germany has no chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact perhaps with the assumption of a German victory.

MATSUOKA declared further that he had thereupon replied to the American Ambassador that only God knows who would win the war in the long run. But he (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the basis of the victory of this or that power, but based on his vision of the new order. He had listened with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer about the Page 21 new order and was fully and entirely convinced by them. If he would f Orig.) for once, assume purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would turn at a given moment against Germany, he must state to the American Ambassador that Japan would then immediately come to the assistance of her ally.

His visions of the new order were laid down by him in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact. That is an ideal which has been transmitted from one generation to another since time immemorial. For him, personally, the realization of this ideal is his life objective to which he has devoted all his labor up to now, in order to make a small contribution on his part toward its realization. This Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Rom-Tokyo, is also a contribution toward this realization. The execution of these trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further, stands moreover with the motto: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." This was not yet understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan Page 22 should ever deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA) would be the first to f Orig.) fight against it.

In this connection MATSUOKA also reminded of the other principle of the preamble to the Tripartite Pact according to which every nation was to take the place due it. Although Japan, too, will proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the new order, and although she sometimes would have to lead with a strong hand the nations affected by this new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously quoted motto constantly before her eyes: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation."



During the further course of the conversation MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an explanation about it to the German Foreign Minister and would have given it at the morning conference if the German Foreign Minister had not been called away prematurely. Now he intends to give this information to the leader.

Page 23 First of all he intended to pay a complimentary visit to Molotov on  
f Orig.) his trip through Moscow. After some reflection however, he decided to ask the Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild way from the Soviet government whether there exists any interest in a conference between Stalin and him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could follow his instructions with the Soviet government, the proposal was made by the Russian government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsueka. He spoke with Molotov for about 30 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that due to the necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes with Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin.

He had explained to Stalin that the Japanese are morally communists. This ideal had been passed on from the fathers to the sons since time immemorial. But at the same time he stated that he does not  
Page 24 believe in political and economic communism and rather assumed that  
of Orig.) his Japanese ancestors had already early given up every attempt in this direction and had devoted themselves to moral communism.

For that which he called moral communism, MATSUOKA then quoted some examples from his own family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism and egoism introduced from the West. At present the situation in Japan in this respect is extremely confused. However, there is a minority which is strong enough to fight successfully for the resurrection of the "old ego" of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan is extremely bitter. But those who fight for the restoration of the old ideal are convinced of their final victory.

Page 25 The Anglo-Saxons are basically responsible for the penetration of  
f Orig.) the above-mentioned prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the old traditional Japanese ideal Japan is compelled, therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just as well as in China she is fighting not against the Chinese but only against Great-Britain in China and capitalism in China.

MATSUOKA stated further that he had explained to Stalin his ideas about the new Order and thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this order and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight against them. He explained to Stalin that the Soviets also on their part are advocating something new and that he believes to be able to settle the difficulties between Japan and Russia after the collapse of the British empire. He pictured the Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviet Russia's common enemy.



Page 26 Stalin held out the prospect of an answer when he would travel through Moscow on his return to Japan, but immediately added after some deliberation that Soviet Russia never was friendly with Britain, nor ever will be.

MATSUOKA, in the further course of the conversation, made some remarks about the nature of the TENNO. The TENNO is the state, and the life as well as property of each Japanese belongs to the TENNO, that is the state. This is so to speak the Japanese version of a totalitarian state structure.

In conclusion MATSUOKA spoke admiringly about the way in which the Fuehrer is leading the German nation, which stands behind him in complete unity, with determination and power through this great time of revolution unequalled in history. Each nation has such a leader but once in a thousand years. The Japanese nation has not yet found its Fuehrer. But he would surely appear in the hour of need and take over the leadership of the nation with determination.

Berlin, 1 April 1941

signed: SCHMIDT  
Ambassador

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3 May 1946

I, WANDA S. TIESZEN, Civ., X 046265, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1878-PS.

WANDA S. TIESZEN  
Civ., X 046265



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Measures to be taken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for the execution of National Policies, which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor held on November 5.

11/13/41

Liaison Conference Decision  
November 13th, 1941.

#### Policy Towards Germany and Italy.

When the present negotiations with the United States of America break down and a war with her becomes unavoidable (presumed to be after November 25th), the Japanese Government shall notify Germany (and Italy), without delay, of our intention to start war against the United States of America and Britain as soon as our war preparations are ready, and shall open necessary negotiations with them in connection with the following matters, telling them that these are a part of our war preparations:

1. Participation of Germany (and Italy) in the war against the United States of America.
2. No separate peace.

#### Remarks:

If we are requested by Germany to join in the war against the Soviet Union, we shall reply that we will not enter it for the time being. It cannot be helped if, as a result of it, Germany's participation in the war against the United States of America is delayed thereby.

#### Policy towards Britain.

Prompt measures shall be taken directly or through the medium of the United States of America to make Britain accept, and positively cooperate with us in, the matters included in the understandings reached in the negotiations between Japan and the United States of America.

In order to conceal our intentions, no other special diplomatic measures shall be taken.



### Policy towards the Dutch East Indies

In order to help conceal and disguise our intentions, we shall open as soon as possible a series of diplomatic negotiations /with the Dutch East Indies/, in the form of continuation of previous negotiations, with the chief object of obtaining commodities needed by our country.

### Policy towards the Soviet Union

Diplomatic negotiations /with the Soviet Union/ shall be continued in conformity with Item I of the Outline of Diplomatic Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which was decided at the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and the Government held on August 4th, 1941.

### Policy towards Thailand.

1. Just before commencing the advance into /Thailand/, the following demands shall be made and their immediate compliance obtained:

Our troops shall advance /into Thailand/, as prearranged, even if our demands are rejected by Thailand. However, efforts shall be made to localize as much as possible military collision between Japan and Thailand.

(a) Right of passage of Japanese troops through her territory and the grant of various facilities incidental thereto.

(b) Immediate enforcement of measures to avoid possible collisions between the troops of Japan and Thailand, owing to the passage of Japanese troops.

(c) Conclusion of a joint defence agreement, if Thailand desires it.

Note: No special change in our attitude towards Thailand shall be made before the commencement of the negotiations. In particular, great care shall be taken to conceal our plan of opening war.

2. After the penetration of our troops, we shall immediately open negotiations with the Government of Thailand for concrete arrangements on the following matters:



(a) Matters concerning the passage and stationing of Japanese troops.

(b) Provision, construction and enlargement of military establishments.

(c) Provision of necessary traffic and communication facilities as well as factory facilities.

(d) Matters concerning billeting and sustenance for the Japanese troops passing through or stationed in Thailand.

(e) Loans to defray necessary military expenditure.

Remarks: In the negotiations on Items 1 and 2, we shall definitely promise to respect her sovereignty and territorial integrity in conformity with the Outline of Policies towards French Indo-China and Thailand, which was decided at the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and the Government held on February 1st, 1941.

Moreover, depending on the attitude of Thailand, we shall try to turn the negotiations to our advantage by suggesting that we will in future consider the cession of a part of Burma or Malay to Thailand.

#### Policy towards China.

The following measures shall be taken, bearing in mind the necessity of preserving our all-round fighting power to cope with a protracted world war by avoiding military attrition in China as far as possible, and also bearing in mind the probable decrease of our military strength in the future:

1. To drive out the military forces of the United States of America and Britain in China.

2. To place under our actual control enemy concessions in China (including the Legation Quarter in Peking) and important enemy interests (such as the maritime customs and mines), but care shall be taken to lighten as far as possible our burden in respect to manpower and materials.



Note: Though the International Settlements and the Legation Quarter in Peking shall be brought under our actual control after driving out the enemy's military forces, these areas shall not be completely taken over since they also include interests of countries friendly to us.

3. The abovementioned plans shall be carried out only after the declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain, lest our intentions be revealed.

4. Our right of belligerency against the Chungking Regime shall not be obtained by a declaration or other formalities, but the actual effect of belligerency will be obtained by a declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain.

5. Among the enemy interests in China, even those interests connected with the National Government shall, if necessary, be brought under our control for the time being, and adjustment made separately.

6. The activities of influential Chinese in the occupied area shall be encouraged and fostered as far as possible, so as to win the people's mind to Sino-Japanese cooperation and thereby gradually establish localized peace in the areas where this is possible.

7. In our economic relations with China, we shall lay special stress upon the acquisition of goods. For this purpose reasonable adjustments shall be made in the various existing restrictions.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1441Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 13 Nov., 1941, and described as follows: Fundamental Foreign Tenets Concerning the Execution of the National Policies Decided by the Imperial Conference of November 5. Dated 13 November 1941. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17 day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Sept. 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 P. Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity