

Mon 20 January 1917

minutes of the Court

Reuter

I N D E X

Of

WITNESSES

(none)

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
1908B	2177-A		Minutes of the Third Trial (OKAWA Testimony)		15556
1918	2178		Volume 64 of 65 "Proceedings, Tokyo Court of Appeals" re Trial of OKAWA, Shumei	15590	
1918A	2178-A		Excerpt therefrom		15590
1918B	2178-B		Excerpt from Trial of OKAWA Shumei re Propaganda Campaign conducted by OKAWA throughout Japan at the time of the Man- churian Incident		15591
684	2179		Book entitled "Asia, Europe, Japan" by OKAWA, Shumei, published 15 October 1925	15604	
684A	2179-A		Excerpts therefrom		15605
693	2180		Book entitled "The Way of Japan and the Japanese" by OKAWA Shumei published 20 March 1926	15609	
693A	2180-A		Excerpts therefrom		15609
692	2181		Book entitled "2600 Years of Japanese History" by OKAWA Shumei published 5 July 1929	15613	
692A	2181-A		Excerpt therefrom		15613

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
685	2182		Book entitled "The Establishment of Order in Greater East Asia" by OKAWA, Shumei, published 20 August 1943	15618	
685A	2182-A		Excerpts therefrom		15618
687	2183		Book entitled "SATO Shinen's Ideal State" by OKAWA, Shumei, published 20 February 1924	15633	
687A	2183-A		Excerpt therefrom		15633
2902	2184		Letter from OKAWA, Shumei to TOJO, Hideki, dated 20 July 1940		15644
13C	2185		Further extracts from exhibit No. 675		15648
828	2186		"10 Day Report from the Home Ministry of 11 January 1941"	15664	
828A	2186-A		Excerpt therefrom		15664
1598	2187		Book entitled "The Second Creation" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro (14th Edition) published 30 January 1941	15668	
1598A	2187-A		Excerpt therefrom		15668
1875	2188		Excerpts from Testimony of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, conducted from 17 January to 18 February 1946		15674
2955A	2189		Affidavit of Prof. Cheng Feng-Chu		15708
2773	2190		Extracts from Interrogation of DOHIHARA, Kanji	15713	
2773	2190-A		Excerpt therefrom		15713

1 Monday, 20 January 1947

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12
13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 - - -

18
19
20
21 (English to Japanese and Japanese
22 to English interpretation was made by the
23 Language Section, INTFE.)
24
25

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA and MATSUI who are represented by their
5 counsel. We have a certificate from the Surgeon
6 of Sugamo Prison that the accused MATSUI is ill and
7 unable to attend the trial today. The certificate
8 will be recorded and filed.

9 Mr. Levin.

10 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, on Friday when
11 Mr. Higgins presented Colonel L. M. Semenoff of
12 the Soviet Union, I did not realize that the pre-
13 sentation of Class B and C offenses by Mr. Justice
14 Mansfield had been concluded.

15 Mr. President, I gave to the interpreter
16 a copy of the statement that I want to make for the
17 purpose of saving time.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Levin, inasmuch as
19 it is not translated into Japanese, it cannot be
20 given simultaneously. It will have to be relayed.

21 MR. LEVIN: It will be recalled that when
22 the learned prosecutor from Australia made his opening
23 statement, which conformed strictly to the require-
24 ments of the Charter as to what the opening statement
25 should contain, I objected to that portion of the

1 statement which related to the accused SUZUKI on
2 the ground that same was a conclusion and argument-
3 ative, and that I asked that it be disregarded by
4 the Tribunal.

5 I desire to call the attention of the
6 Tribunal that throughout the presentation of this
7 phase of the case no evidence, either directly or
8 by affidavit, was tendered to implicate or which
9 implicated the accused SUZUKI with the Class B and
10 C offenses presented by Mr. Justice Mansfield. The
11 only evidence that might have the remotest connection
12 with the accused SUZUKI was exhibit 1971, which read
13 in part as follows:

14 "As a result, the Cabinet Planning Board
15 entrusted by the Army Administrative Department
16 for War Prisoners, held a conference on August 15
17 regarding the transfer of war prisoners to Japan
18 proper and their employment."

19 I desire to further call the Court's
20 attention that in Colonel Woolworth's opening statement
21 calling attention to the responsibility of indi-
22 viduals for Class B and C offenses the accused SUZUKI's
23 name was not mentioned.

24 In view of these facts, I now request that
25 that portion of Mr. Justice Mansfield's statement

1 which appears on page 12,875 of the record be dis-
2 regarded.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I understand you have a
4 motion to dismiss on behalf of the accused SUZUKI.

5 MR. LEVIN: That is correct, Mr. President;
6 and in view of the fact that a portion of that
7 motion refers to Class B and C offenses, I especially
8 make this application. Those are Counts 52, 53,
9 and 54 of the Indictment.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I see no reason why we
11 cannot and should not deal with that on your motion,
12 Mr. Levin. You have this morning made what is in
13 substance a motion to dismiss pro tanto. We should
14 deal with the matter as a whole.

15 MR. TAVENNER: If ~~it~~ please the Tribunal:

16 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

17 MR. TAVENNER: On Friday afternoon document
18 1908-B was introduced in evidence as exhibit 2177-A.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

20 MR. TAVENNER: In the course of his testimony,
21 Dr. OKAWA asserted Japan's need for acquiring Manchuria,
22 described his cooperation with the military in the
23 so-called solution of the Manchurian problem, defined
24 the March Incident and the October Incident and
25 their connection with the so-called Manchurian

1 Incident, and directly involved the accused, KOISO,
2 HASHIMOTO, ITAGAKI, and DOHIHARA in his planning.

3 I will now read from exhibit No. 2177-A
4 excerpts touching on these matters, beginning at
5 page 3.

6 (Reading) "Q. What is the purpose of
7 the East Asia Research Institute?

8 "A. Originally, this Research Institute was
9 founded by GOTO, Shimpei, the first President of
10 the South Manchuria Railway Company, with the idea of
11 making a Research Institute in Japan as an organ of
12 the South Manchuria Railway Company, after investi-
13 gating the various research organs in Europe. Mr.
14 GOTO's purpose at the time of foundation lay in
15 studying the economic situation of Manchuria from the
16 world's economic standpoint. When I became a member,
17 it was investigating the world's general economic
18 situation and the situations of Manchuria and China.
19 After it was turned into a foundation, the sphere of
20 investigation was limited in Manchuria and China,
21 and we began to study the economic value of Manchuria
22 and China not from the viewpoint of world economy, but
23 from the standpoint of Japan."

24 I will now omit reading down to the first
25 question appearing on page 7.

1 (Reading) "Q. It is understood that you
2 had published, 'The Gist of the National Reformation
3 Plan', by KITA, IKKI, and revealed the general outline
4 for how to reform Japan, is that right?

5 "A. Yes, it is right. However, I could not
6 entirely approve of the 'Gist of the National Re-
7 formation Plan' in general. There was no definite
8 plan for the practical reformation of the state at
9 that time, and it was necessary to have some opinion
10 worth discussing about. Consequently I published
11 that book so that our comrades could get together
12 and do some studying. It does not mean that I had
13 entirely approved of this book.

14 "Q. But I understand that you resigned from the
15 YUSONSHA because of difference of opinion with KITA
16 IKKI, and that the YUSONSHA had dissolved simul-
17 taneously with your resignation, is that right?

18 "A. Yes.

19 "Q. It is understood that you were very worried
20 about the Rice Riot of 1918, and the so-called The
21 Serious Incident in the Imperial Palace (KYUCHU,
22 JUDAI JIKEN), is that right?

23 "A. Yes. This is a matter which everybody
24 should worry about who looks clearly into the present
25 situation in Japan and has any interest in the future

of Japan.

1
2 "What I was most surprised about the rice
3 riot was that just when Japan had decided to begin
4 a war with a foreign country and the Commander in
5 Chief of the Siberian Expeditionary Forces was
6 bidding farewell to the Emperor MEIJI at the
7 MONOYAMA Mausoleum, some of the Japanese people
8 had to rise in request of rice because they were
9 hungry, and the military had to shoot at the hungry
10 people. I believe anybody would be surprised at
11 this.

12 "At that time I was very much shocked and I
13 thought that it was the first manifestation of the
14 defects of Japan which had hitherto been hidden."

15 I will omit reading down to the question
16 appearing in the middle of page 8.

17 "Q. However, in 1925, it seems that you
18 had organized the 'KOCHI SHA', is that right?

19 "A. Yes."

20 I will omit the next question and answer.

21 "Q. What were the principles of KOCHISA?

22 "A. I think there were seven principles.

23 (1) To establish a revolutionized Japan. (2) To
24 firmly establish a national ideal. (3) To realize
25 liberty in spiritual life. (4) To realize equality

1 in political life. (5) To realize fraternity in
2 economic life. (6) To liberate the colored races.
3 (7) Moral unification of the world."

4 I will omit reading down to the second
5 question appearing at the top of page 10.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "Q Was it because KITA-IKKI distributed
2 the so-called reprehensible literature in which he
3 accused the Minister of the Imperial Household
4 MAKINO and his ministry of corruption?

5 "A Yes.

6 "Q Since then, you and KITA drifted further
7 apart. Because the army was somewhat cautious of
8 KITA, they were cautious of you, too, but when they
9 found out that you had become estranged from KITA
10 by that incident, and relation between you and the
11 Army became more intimate than ever and you were
12 able to openly deliver lectures at the Army General
13 Staff, etc. weren't you?

14 "A Yes.

15 "Q Were these the men you became intimate-
16 ly acquainted with: Lt. Gen. KOISO, Maj. Gen.
17 OKAMURA, Maj. Gen. ITAGAKI, Maj. Gen. DOHIHARA,
18 Maj. Gen. TADA, Col. KAWAMOTO, Col. SASAKI and Col.
19 SHIGETO?

20 "A Yes.

21 "Q Now, what were your activities after
22 becoming an employee of the South Manchurian Rail-
23 way Company?

24 "A I was a very faithful employee. I
25

1 encouraged the staff of the Investigation Bureau
2 and also kept myself busy in the investigation of
3 world economy and the Manchurian situation. The
4 work assigned to me at that time was the investiga-
5 tion of licensed colonial corporations. This study
6 became the essay for my degree of Doctor of Law.

7 "Q Did you acquire the belief that the age
8 of Great Powers was gone and that the age of Super
9 Great Powers had come while you were doing such
10 research?

11 "A Yes, if you study world history, you
12 will reach such a conclusion. For a nation to keep
13 going as an independent country in this present age,
14 she should possess a territory that is at least
15 self-sufficient. The present state of world affairs
16 proves this clearly.

17 "Q In the case of Japan, what kind of
18 territory should she incorporate?

19 "A Korea and Manchuria are within the
20 scope of possibility, but I believe Manchuria alone
21 will not be sufficient.

22 "Q You seem to have made investigation
23 trips to Manchuria and China frequently, didn't you?

24 "A I went there two to three times a year
25 for two to six months ever since I became an employee

1 of the SMR Co. Hence, I have done considerable re-
2 search.

3 "Q Did you acutely sense the anti-Japanese
4 sentiment there?

5 "A It is not the anti-Japanese sentiment
6 which I acutely sensed, but what I regret very much
7 was the cause leading to the rise of the anti-
8 Japanese sentiment. To call it anti-Japanese
9 sounds narrow, but generally it means the diplo-
10 macy. Anti-Japanism is one of the manifestations
11 of diplomacy. Japan's diplomacy toward Manchuria
12 and China wasn't too active. Japan's influence in
13 Manchuria was at the highest peak when I joined the
14 S.M.R. And while I was in Manchuria, Japan's
15 influence began to wane yearly. It reached the
16 bottom following Chang Tsuo-Liu's death in an ex-
17 plosion and after Chang Hsuen-Lian assumed the
18 political power of Manchuria succeeding him.
19 Though there may be various arguments in regard to
20 this, in short, Japan's national opinion has never
21 united in its diplomacy toward foreign countries.
22 That is, the greatest cause was the fact that Japan
23 was divided in two in its diplomacy towards China
24 and Manchuria. It was in the spring of 1929 during
25 the later period when the TANAKA Cabinet assumed

1 positive policy and dealt with the Manchurian prob-
2 lem when, as a concrete manifestation of the TANAKA
3 Cabinet's positive policy, the S.M.R. desiring to
4 complete the construction of the Kirin-Huining
5 railway, exerted its whole effort trying to
6 secure the approval of Chang Hsueh-Liang. At that
7 time, I was in Mukden for several months starting
8 from January and was negotiating with Chang Hsueh-
9 Liang. One day, Chang Hsueh-Liang showed me a letter.
10 That letter was from his younger brother Chang
11 Hsueh-mei, who was in Tokyo at that time. It
12 stated as follows:

13 "Recently MINSEITO, member of the House
14 of Representatives, came to see me and stated that
15 the TANAKA cabinet will fall soon. In such an
16 event, the MINSEITO Cabinet will solve not only
17 the railway problem, but all Manchurian problems
18 to your advantage, so tell your brother to dilly-
19 dally and prolong the negotiations in regard to the
20 Kirin-Huining Railway until our Cabinet is formed.
21 Since another MINSEITO member of the House of
22 Representatives came to tell me that, I am relaying
23 this to you.'

24
25 "This, Chang Hsueh-Liang showed me with a
grin. With their being given a prospective of the

1 circumstances within, like this, it is inevitable
2 that they assume a more positive attitude and turn
3 anti-Japanese. I could not help feeling that the
4 development of Japan's power was absolutely hope-
5 less with Japan being divided into a MINSEITO state
6 and a SEIYUKAI state and half siding with the
7 enemy.

8 "Again in February of that year, Minister
9 YOSHIZAWA was negotiating with Chang Sing-tei, at
10 Shanghai in regard to the Nanking Incident. On
11 that occasion, I rushed from Manchuria to Shanghai.
12 Minister YOSHIZAWA had gone to Tokyo in the spring
13 of 1928 and had returned with a concrete plan for
14 the solution of the incident after having held repeat-
15 ed discussions with Prime Minister TANAKA and the
16 various cabinet members and having found something
17 that was satisfactory. Hence, he was negotiating
18 with the Nanking Government and I believe that they
19 had reached an agreement and probably had temporarily
20 signed it, but the text of the agreement was con-
21 sidered to be disgraceful on the part of the
22 TANAKA Cabinet's China diplomacy and almost
23 brought about a movement to overthrow the cabinet.
24 Hence, a telegram came from Tokyo suddenly instruct-
25 ing the cancellation of the arrangement made accord-

1 ing to the concrete plan which was decided the
2 previous spring when YOSHIZAWA had taken the trouble
3 to go to Tokyo. There is nothing so stupid as this.
4 This, in other words, is not a diplomacy towards
5 China, but toward the House of Peers of Japan.
6 If such a thing is continued, Japan's overseas
7 development can never be accomplished. At least,
8 not under the present circumstances wherein two
9 political parties are scrambling for political
10 power. It is therefore only natural for anti-Japan-
11 ism to exist. I thought this cannot be left alone.
12 This is what I meant when I stated I keenly felt
13 anti-Japanism.

14 "Q The newspaper, moreover, stated that
15 the MINSEITO members of the House of Representatives
16 clamored for the revelation of the real facts in
17 regard to the death by explosion of Chang Tsuo-ling
18 in The Diet. Is it true?

19 "A Yes, I believe Mr. Seigo NAKANO made
20 such interpolation before The Diet. This, too,
21 was most reprehensible.

22 "Q Was there any question raised as to
23 whether Japan should deal with Chang Hsueh-liang
24 or with Yong Yu-tin after Chang Tsuo-lin's death?
25

1 "A Yes. There was. The commander of the
2 Kwantung Army then was Lt. Gen. MURAOKA and the
3 Chief of the Special Service Agency was Shinji
4 HATA. Their opinion was that it would be better
5 naturally to deal with Chang Hsueh-liang and action,
6 in general, was taken according to this opinion.
7 However, since Yong Yu-tin had been handling their
8 business transaction, The OKURA-GUMI strongly ad-
9 vocated that, from a practical point of view, to
10 place the Manchurian political power in the hands
11 of Yong Yu-tin would be better because their commer-
12 cial advantages with Yong. And this opinion was
13 considerably strong within the army too. This was
14 the first time that I discovered that the capital-
15 ists of Japan had a great influence upon the politi-
16 cal and military diplomacy. For example, when Lt.
17 Gen. MURAOKA was in Mukden after the death by
18 explosion of Chang Tsuo-lin, he would meet with
19 Chang Hsueh-Liang, but not with Yong Yu-tin.
20 However, the OKURA-GUMI, wanting Lt. Gen. MURAOKA
21 to meet Yong Yu-tin and desiring at least to make
22 the relationship between Lt. Gen. MURAOKA and Yong
23 Yu-tin closer, actively campaigned to draw the
24 interest of the Army General Staff. As a result,
25

1 a telegram suggesting rather than ordering Lt. Gen.
2 MURAOKA to confer with Yong Yu-tin was sent from
3 the control headquarters. Lt. Gen. MURAOKA is a
4 very excellent army man who can be rated as being
5 No. 1 or 2 among the army personnel. And with him
6 in Mukden, how impudent it was for the person to
7 send a wire suggesting whom he should meet. I
8 thought it disgusting that OKURA-GUMI had begun to
9 have such a great influence upon them.

10 "Thus, there were two factions -- one center-
11 ing around Chang Hsueh-liang and the other around
12 Yong Yu-tin, existing in Manchuria and Japan. Such
13 being the state, the OKURA-GUMI secretly worked
14 behind the scenes. Thereafter, negotiations with
15 Manchuria were made with Yong Yu-tin.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "Q. And you reportedly started a people's move-
2 ment because you thought that the Manchurian and
3 Mongolian problems cannot be left in the hands of
4 the capitalists and politicians, but should be
5 solved by a people's movement, is that right?

6 "A. Yes.

7 "Q. Did you give lectures about this?

8 "A. Yes. On the opinion that a small country
9 cannot be independent, I reasoned that I should
10 let the people know that Japan, for the time being,
11 should attempt economic development in Manchuria;
12 that the nation cannot go on without having the
13 foundation of her national life built on a united
14 economic system of both Japan and Manchuria and that
15 if this is done, the Manchurian problems, too, can
16 be solved. There are fifty prefectures in Japan,
17 and I decided to make a hasty trip and explain the
18 Manchurian situation to the people by giving lectures
19 and showing motion pictures at three or four places
20 in a prefecture. I undertook this in the latter
21 days of April in May, 1929, immediately upon return-
22 ing from my Manchurian trip and continued it up to
23 the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident."
24
25

1 "Q Were there any repercussions?

2 "A There was a very unexpected reaction. At
3 first, I did not know how much the repercussion would
4 be, and when I consulted with the army authorities
5 about undertaking the project together, the army didn't
6 agree, stating that it would be criticized as mili-
7 tarism and imperialism and lose its effect if the army
8 would join. Hence, I undertook it alone and the
9 reaction was indeed surprising. Leaving aside rare
10 instances, it drew a full house everywhere.

11 "Q What do you mean by the construction of Hulutao
12 Harbor?

13 "A Hulutao Harbor is an ice-free port situated
14 to the west of Dairen at the tip of the Pohai Bay. As
15 it was planned to reconstruct the harbor, the harbor
16 reconstruction plan had already been made, and a Dutch
17 company had contracted and was undertaking the project.
18 Chang Hsueh-liang had thought of this and his proposal
19 was to usurp the prosperity of Dairen and at the same
20 time to construct a trunk line to Hulutao paralleling
21 that of S.M.R. and accumulate the products of Man-
22 churia at Hulutao, thus making S.M.R. virtually value-
23 less and killing the prosperity of Dairen.

24 "Q Was this the reason why the people gradually
25 began to consider the Manchurian problems seriously

1 and become disgusted with SHIDEHARA's diplomacy?

2 "A Yes, I believe so.

3 "Q It is claimed that as the voice of dissatis-
4 faction grew louder among the people, the army took
5 note of this trend and began to take positive action
6 gradually. Is that right?

7 "A Yes. The army, being alert on taking advan-
8 tage of opportunities, began taking positive actions as
9 soon as this trend became great. And finally, they
10 began to act together with us, and the Army General
11 Staff and other departments, even began sending lecturers
12 to us.

13 "Q It is said that the London Naval Disarmament
14 Conference has made the young naval officers indignant.
15 Is it so?

16 "A It is obvious, I believe, as to how indignant
17 the young naval officers were by the mere fact that
18 Lt. Cmdr. KUSAKARI committed suicide.

19 "Q June 30, 1930, Gen. YASHIRO died. Did he tell
20 you anything in regard to the country at that time?

21 "A He didn't say anything definitely, but he
22 repeatedly stated that everything should be done for
23 Japan.

24 "Q In that year, Premier HAMAGUCHI was shot with
25 a pistol at Tokyo Station and the following year 1931,

1 the Diet was convened under Acting Premier SHIDEHARA,
2 and it was put in disorder as though a bees' nest had
3 been disturbed because of a slip of the tongue by the
4 acting premier. Was it so?

5 "A Yes.

6 "Q Did you found the Jimmukai?

7 "A Yes, I did, on the anniversary of the accession
8 of the Emperor JIMMU on February 11, 1932.

9 "Q What are the principles of the Jimmukai?

10 "A The general principles of the Jimmukai were
11 to realize a family system conforming to the national
12 spirit, to eliminate the evils of party politics, which
13 considers party's interest and policy as primary and
14 national welfare as secondary, and to reform the capi-
15 talistic economic system, which considers self-interest
16 as primary and national welfare as secondary. What we
17 planned to do was to bring about the opportunity for a
18 national reformation through a national movement.

19 "Q Was this movement effective?

20 "A It was in February, 1932, that the movement
21 was started, and I was arrested in June of that year.
22 If I had not been arrested, I believe it would have
23 become a considerably powerful movement.

24 "Q Did you have supporters or sponsorers?

25 "A I don't know.

1 "Q Do you know a person named Koichiro ISHIHARA?

2 "A Yes, I do. He was a supporter of the Jimmukai
3 and he supplied us with most of the funds needed for the
4 movement of the Jimmukai.

5 "Q You were connected with the so-called March
6 Revolution or the Imperial Flag Revolution, weren't you?

7 "A There wasn't any incident called the March
8 Revolution. Since it is not proper to use the word
9 'revolution' for the March Incident, I would like to
10 make this clear beforehand.

11 "(The Chief Justice, after a conference,
12 ordered the spectators to leave the court after having
13 announced that the resolution and the reason for the
14 suspension of open court thereafter was because of the
15 fear of impending the public peace and order, but special
16 permission was given to Seisaku HASEGAWA, Munezo MURAI
17 and A. KATA KURA to attend court.

18 "The Chief Justice, then, questioned Shumei
19 OKAWA as follows:)

20 "Q Did you, in about 1931, know that there existed
21 a strong antagonism against the political parties among
22 the important personnel of the Army?

23 "A Yes, when Acting Premier SHIDEHARA made a slip
24 of the tongue before the Diet. The slip of the tongue
25 was made in regard to the London Conference. A statement

1 to the effect that it was disloyal for anyone to criti-
2 cize it. Using this as their ground, the Seiyukai Party
3 started a great commotion and prevented the progress
4 of the session for three days. This made the army per-
5 sonnel, who had been indignant at the attitude of the
6 Diet before this, all the more indignant.

7 "Q The military group reportedly believe that Japan
8 can never be saved if parliamentary politics in which
9 two powerful parties confronting each other, is sloppily
10 continued. That enmity of America toward Japan, in the
11 long run, may bring about a Japanese-American war and that
12 if a Japanese-American war is unavoidable, it should be
13 held now. Is it so?

14 "A Yes. If a Japanese-American war is unavoidable,
15 this war probably will be a protracted one. Since Japan
16 will be confronted with food and other economic diffi-
17 culties, the Manchurian problem should be settled
18 before this. Therefore, the national life, we thought,
19 should be reconstructed on an economic foundation made
20 up of Japan and Manchuria as a unit to enable Japan to
21 withstand a protracted war.

22 "This Manchurian problem was the important
23 motive for the March Incident. SHIDEHARA's diplomacy
24 was very soft and he did not try to take any positive
25 action against Manchuria. Since it had been firmly

1 proven by the China policy of the TANAKA Cabinet that
2 even if the Seiyukai Party should form a cabinet and
3 advocate a positive policy, it would only be words, we
4 thought that this would not do.

5 "Q Then, the Capt. NAKAMURA Incident occurred and
6 it was decided, by the high officers at the Chiefs-of-
7 Staff conference held in May of that year, that an
8 aggressive policy should be taken without any hesitation,
9 wasn't it?

10 "A It wasn't by high officers. Even in the
11 Japanese army, high-ranking officers do not readily
12 express such opinion. It was decided by the young
13 Chiefs-of-Staff conference that since one can never tell
14 what they'll do next upon judging from the attitude of
15 Chang Hsueh-liang, they should be smashed firmly and
16 without any hesitation in the event the Manchurian
17 regime should insult Japan beyond the limit.

18 "Q Were you present when such discussions were
19 held?

20 "A Yes, I was.

21 "Q Then, on September 18, the destruction of the
22 Manchurian railway line at Lukow-chiao occurred and
23 with this as the beginning, the Manchurian Incident
24 began, didn't it?

25 "A Yes. We were able to take such prompt action

1 because, as I have stated previously, our mind was made
2 up.

3 "Q Next, what is the March Incident?

4 "A In short, it ended merely as a plan. The plan
5 was for the masses to express their disapproval of the
6 Diet then in session by means of a mass demonstration.
7 To do this, as many people as possible would be mobilized.
8 Since a clash with the police must naturally be
9 expected on this occasion, those who start this
10 demonstration should bear this in mind. And if during
11 the clash with the people the citizens or people taking
12 part should increase more and more, aggravating the
13 commotion and throwing the metropolis into a turmoil,
14 the army would step in and declare martial law, thus
15 taking its first step toward national reformation.

16 "Q With whom did you make the plan?

17 "A The movement for it grew up as it was being
18 discussed here and there.

19 "Q Then, was there a rumor at that time that
20 Gen. UGAKI will succeed Gen. TANAKA as president of the
21 Seiyukai Party?

22 "A Yes, there was.

23 "Q So did you see Gen. UGAKI to ascertain the fact
24 upon being told by the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau
25 KOISO?

1 "A Yes, I did. These circumstances lead to the
2 March Incident. At that time, my intimate friends,
3 Col. SHIGETO, head of the Second Chinese Affairs Section
4 and Lt. Col. Kingoro HASHIMOTO of the Russian Affairs
5 Section of the General Staff, told me that the upper
6 class of the army was burning with indignation at the
7 Diet and that such a Diet should be crushed. And they
8 asked me to see Gen. UGAKI to find out what his opinion
9 was. Then, I met Gen. UGAKI for the first time. In a
10 similar vein as that expressed by me previously, Gen.
11 UGAKI stated that Japan can never develop her fate and
12 overseas development with such a Diet and expressed in
13 very strong words his indignation at party politics.
14 Then, when I returned and told Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO and
15 others the gist of what I had heard from Gen. UGAKI,
16 they decided to get the opinion of others. HASHIMOTO
17 and SHIGETO, then went to see Lt. Gen. NINOMIYA, who
18 was then Deputy Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA,
19 who was then Chief of the Second Department, and asked
20 their opinion. They, too, were very indignant and
21 inquired if there wasn't any means to bring about an
22 opening for a reformation at this time.

23 "Q Didn't Chief of Military Affairs Bureau KOISO
24 have any connection with this?

25 "A As it was being discussed more and more by

1 everyone, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau KOISO
2 gradually came to be involved, and others also joined
3 later.

4 "Q Was it the discussion to start a mass demonstra-
5 tion on March 20 and was this called the March Incident?

6 "A Yes.

7 "Q But it was cancelled because of the fear of
8 being discovered, wasn't it?

9 "A It wasn't because of the fear of being dis-
10 covered. It was because of Gen. UGAKI's opinion that
11 we shouldn't do such a thing.

12 "It was planned to agitate a mass demonstration
13 at first and to have the army take positive actions
14 when martial law is declared. Gen. UGAKI's intention
15 appeared to be that, too. When I met Gen. UGAKI, that
16 was what I ascertained first, and I reported this to
17 Col. SHIGETO and others.

18 "That evening, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau
19 KOISO, Deputy Chief of Staff NINOMIYA and Vice-Minister
20 of War SUGIYAMA went to see Gen. UGAKI. Gen. UGAKI
21 told them exactly what he had told me and these three
22 had the idea the Gen. UGAKI possessed such a positive
23 intention.

24 "Then, Lt. Gen. KOISO, taking charge of every-
25 thing, told me that since there would be the danger of

1 being discovered if too many fussed about it, we should
2 pretend to have suspended it on the surface and that I
3 should represent the civilians and he will represent
4 the army. However, although he went ahead with the plan,
5 Lt. Gen. KOISO decided to suspend it later. Hence, it
6 was decided to suspend it and that was the end of the
7 March Incident.

8 "I decided to carry on after that by myself,
9 but since Marquis Yoshichika TOKUGAWA dissuaded me from
10 doing so, I abandoned the plan.

11 "Q Did you intend to dissolve the Diet or merely
12 bring the members of the Diet to their senses by mass
13 demonstration?

14 "A We didn't intend to destroy the Diet completely.
15 Gen. UGAKI stated that he had an intention to dissolve
16 the Diet and held as many elections as necessary. We
17 had no intention to disapprove parliamentarism itself.

18 "Q What do you mean by taking positive action of
19 martial law is declared?

20 "A Our idea was to set up a new political power
21 and form a Cabinet centering around the army.

22 "Q You mean to leave the Cabinet system as it is,
23 but have an influential army man as the leader of the
24 Cabinet and actually adopt a bold policy. But not in
25 the form of a dictatorship, is that right?

1 "A Yes, my idea is so. At any rate, we didn't
2 care what they did if it was a Diet that would obey.

3 "Q Now, what is the October Incident?

4 "A At the last trial, the Chief Justice told
5 Mr. HOMMA that OKAWA claims that he is the only civilian
6 that knows about it; but what I meant was the March
7 Incident. The public appears to be making various
8 remarks in regard to the March Incident and as if
9 UGAKI is an ambitious person. What I mean was that
10 I was the only civilian who knew the actual facts.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "The cause of the October Incident is re-
2 lated to the Manchurian Incident and was started by
3 the destruction of the SMR line at Lukow-chiao on
4 September 18, 1931. The Cabinet at that time, as you
5 know, was the SHIDEHARA Interim Cabinet and it had
6 no definite policy. Not only was the policy of the
7 Cabinet so, but the military leaders, too, had no
8 definite ideas.

9 "At that time, as a result of having
10 taken two days and two nights to decide whether the
11 action of Commander HONJO should be approved or
12 not, it was found that if his action were to be
13 disapproved, Commander HONJO would have to be court
14 martialed. Therefore, they finally approved it,
15 but they did not know their own mind in everything.
16 Even in an urgent instance when speedy measures and
17 methods should have been taken, the attitude of the
18 government was very disgusting. If they should
19 dilly-dally as they were doing, all would end in
20 vain, although the lid for the solution of the
21 Manchurian Incident had been thrown open. Even
22 the purpose would not be achieved. Hence, the aim
23 of the October Incident was, generally speaking, to
24 crush them and set up a new powerful political
25 power capable of undertaking the solution of

1 important problems because it was obvious that
2 they, possessing such a weak stomach as to be
3 unable to digest even the domestic problems, could
4 do nothing if they were fed with such a big and raw
5 thing as Manchuria. Also, according to Mr. HOMMA,
6 he had heard of it in about September, so I can't
7 help wondering how it had leaked out. At any rate,
8 it was like that and was planned by the young army
9 officers. Many others joined them, and the general
10 set up was that a couple of army men would draw up
11 the entire plan and that these who endorsed this
12 aim were not to consider the plan of others, but to
13 carry out only the role assigned to them exactly as
14 determined by the planners of the whole undertaking.
15 This was necessary to prevent the secret from
16 leaking out and was also most reasonable. In this
17 type of thing, many should not be called in on the
18 discussion, for the most logical thing is to do it
19 with a consistent idea. Hence, I know the assign-
20 ment given to me, and about how many had been
21 gathered to do approximately this much, but not the
22 details.
23

24 "The set up, generally speaking, was to
25 have military men primarily and not to include
civilians.

1 "Q Who drafted the ultimate plan?

2 "A I don't know exactly, but the person who
3 gave me orders was Kingoro HASHIMOTO.

4 "Q Then you don't know who was at the top
5 drafting the plan?

6 "A I have an idea.

7 "Q Are SHIGETO, HASHIMOTO, ITAGAKI and
8 DOIHARA involved?

9 "A Yes.

10 "Q Are you the only civilian?

11 "A Yes.

12 "Q After all, they are satisfied with how
13 things are now, so what do they want to do?

14 "A Their plan, I suppose, is to set up a
15 Cabinet centering around the army and with an army
16 man at the head and establish a one-party political
17 system.

18 "Q Are they going to leave the Diet as it is
19 now?

20 "A I think they planned to leave it so.

21 "Q What was your assignment?

22 "A My assignment was to lead a squad of
23 eighty soldiers and visit the various influential
24 newspapers in Tokyo and to order them to write items
25 desired by us and to see that they do it. Another

1 was to make a flag with the inscription 'The Imperial
2 Flag Renovation Headquarters' (Kinki Ishin Hombu)
3 and float it from the roof at the Land Survey
4 Department of the General Staff Headquarters.

5 That is, the headquarters was to be set up in the
6 Land Survey Department. But we weren't able to
7 carry this out because the soldiers who had planned
8 this secretly had been arrested.

9 "Q Were General MASAKI and General ARAKI
10 involved in the March Incident or the October
11 Incident?

12 "A No.

13 "Q Were you involved in the Blood Brotherhood
14 Incident?

15 "A Absolutely not.

16 "(At this juncture, the Chief Justice,
17 after a conference, announced his decision to
18 suspend the closed court order and ordered the court
19 to be opened.)

20 "The Chief Justice, then questioned
21 Shumei OKAWA as follows:"

22 I will omit reading down to the middle
23 of page 27.

24 "Q When KOGA visited you on April 3, 1932, at
25 your home in Tokyo, Shinagawa-ku, Kami-Osaki,

1 4-chome, #231, formerly Tokyo-Fu, Ebara Grun,
2 Osaki Cho, Kami Osaki, #231, you gave him five
3 pistols, about 125 rounds of bullets and 1500 yen
4 at the above mentioned home of yours, didn't you?

5 "A Yes."

6 I will omit reading down to a question
7 near the bottom of page 32.

8 "Q Do you think that the action taken by KOGA
9 and others in the February 15 Incident to be right?

10 "A I think it was inevitable.

11 "Q What do you think of your action of having
12 furnished funds and pistols?

13 "A Generally speaking, the motive and the
14 result should be considered in determining this.
15 Since my motive was very good, I have no regrets.
16 Considering it from its result, I don't think that
17 it caused any bad effect although in the argument
18 of Prosecutor KIUCHI it is claimed that it caused
19 a bad effect, I believe it to be good for, after
20 all, it will contribute to the progress of our
21 country."

22
23 I present for identification only prosecu-
24 tion document No. 1918, which is volume 64 of 65,
25 Proceedings, Tokyo Court of Appeals, relating to the
said trial of OKAWA, Shumei.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
2 ment No. 1918 will receive exhibit No. 2178 for
3 identification only.

4 (Whereupon, the document above
5 referred to was marked prosecution's
6 exhibit No. 2178 for identification.)

7 MR. TAVENNER: The first excerpt from this
8 document is the record of additional questioning
9 of OKAWA by the Court, and I desire to offer it in
10 evidence as prosecution document No. 1918-A.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
12 terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
14 ment No. 1918-A will receive exhibit No. 2178-A.

15 (Whereupon, the document above
16 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
17 hibit No. 2178-A and received in evidence.)

18 MR. TAVENNER: This document is presented
19 only for the purpose of complying with the Tribunal's
20 order that the entire testimony of OKAWA be presented.
21 I do not desire to read it.

22 The second excerpt from this document is
23 a statement presented to the Court in behalf of
24 OKAWA, which describes in some detail the propa-
25 ganda campaign conducted by him throughout Japan at

1 the time of the so-called Manchurian Incident and
2 other matters. I desire to introduce it in evidence
3 as prosecution document No. 1918-B.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
5 terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
7 ment No. 1918-B will receive exhibit No. 2178-B.

8 (Whereupon, the document above
9 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
10 hibit No. 2178-B and received in evidence.)

11 MR. TAVENNER: I will read exhibit No. .
12 2178-B.

13 "The Investigation of the Special
14 Contribution of Dr. Shumei, OKAWA,
15 the Former Chief Director of the East
16 Asia Economic Research Institute to
17 the Manchurian Incident.

18 "The contribution that he separated the East
19 Asia Economic Research Institute from the South
20 Manchurian Railway Company.

21 "The efforts that he exerted for the reform
22 of the Institute after the separation.

23 "The works of investigation.

24 "The establishment of the policy towards
25 Manchuria and the awakenings of the national opinions,

1 and the control of guidance.

2 "Activities after the settlement of the
3 Manchurian Incident.

4 "Contribution to the establishment of
5 Manchukuo.

6 "With his pure and simple nature, Shumei
7 OKAWA, the former chief director, took the lead of
8 the great number of his staff, and also he had a
9 power to make his staff attend to their duties with
10 diligence and enthusiasm.

11 "The works of the Research Institute were
12 nothing but the works of Mr. OKAWA both nominally
13 and virtually. I believe that it is hardly imagined
14 that but for Mr. OKAWA the following things would
15 not have been done, that is, the reform of the
16 various systems after the separation and independence
17 of the Research Institute, the works of the investi-
18 gation, the establishment of the Japanese policy
19 towards Manchuria and the awakenings of the national
20 opinions, the contribution to the leadership and
21 the Manchurian Incident which had followed, and the
22 activities before and after the establishment of
23 Manchukuo.

24 "The contribution to the separation of the
25 East Asia Economic Research Institute.

1 "Hitherto, the Research Institute showed
2 a change on its course of the investigation when-
3 ever the authorities of the South Manchuria Rail-
4 way Company were changed, and worse than all it
5 was not only twice or thrice that even its
6 abolition was brought up in the discussion as an
7 object. But Mr. OKAWA made the relation between
8 Japan and Manchuria and Mongolia closer and tighter,
9 and at the same time, reading that in order to plan
10 how to expand the Japanese economical activities,
11 we had to rely upon the activities of such an organi-
12 zation as this Research Institute, Mr. OKAWA per-
13 suaded Jotaro YAMAMOTO, who was at that time the
14 president of the South Manchuria Railway Company,
15 to separate this Research Institute from the South
16 Manchuria Railway Company and also to make it an inde-
17 pendent foundation in July of the fourth year of
18 Showa (1929).

19 "Then he made it possible for the institute
20 to demonstrate its activities, making the funds rich
21 and enlarging its substance."

22 I omit reading to the last paragraph on
23 page 2.

24 "After the separation of the institute,
25 Dr. OKAWA placed the purpose of investigation on

1 the relation between Japan and China, especially
2 the relation towards Manchuria and Mongolia. He
3 planned to contribute to the Japanese development
4 to Manchuria by investigating the economy and also
5 the political condition of each part of the East
6 Asia and also of the world, making this a keynote,
7 and from the view point of the above-mentioned, he
8 made various kinds of investigations, and even those
9 which were distributed among various parts of both
10 the government and the people in the form of pub-
11 lished books counts over fifty kinds.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

W
O
L
F

x

Y
E
L
D
E
N

1 "The Establishment of the Policy towards
2 Manchuria and the Awakening the National Opinions
3 and the Control of Leadership.

4 "In May in the fourth year of Showa (1929),
5 as soon as the separation of the Research Institute
6 was decided first of all in order to establish the
7 foundation of the Japanese policy towards Manchuria,
8 the chief director OKAWA began to make the investiga-
9 tion researches in detail in cooperation with the
10 general staff headquarters, ordering all the person-
11 nel. While as to the nations, in order to prepare
12 them for the occasions by making them recognize the
13 Manchurian problems well, Dr. OKAWA gave the lectures
14 in various parts in the whole Japan on 'the situations
15 of Manchuria, Mongolia and China, and he gathered the
16 authorities versed in this problem, and he sent them
17 to various parts to propagandize to people to deepen
18 their recognition on the problems regarding Manchuria.'

19 "Its plans and the outline of the progress
20 were as the following:

21 "The purpose of this propaganda, was to
22 divide people into three parts into the armed forces
23 in various parts, the local leading class, and the
24 general populace, and to lead the forces, mainly the
25 group of the officers, and the local leading class or

1 the intellectual class of the citizens and the
2 educated with the lectures and pamphlets and also
3 to lead the general populaces with the lectures and
4 movies about the situations of Manchuria, while
5 using the pamphlets which were explained plainly,
6 and he tried his best to carry out this purpose. Thus
7 by August of the sixth year of Showa from the fourth
8 year of Showa, they made their rounds of the whole
9 land. To explain this in detail, in the fourth year
10 of Showa, they went their rounds the nine provinces
11 in the North East District, and the places where
12 they held the lectures counted forty. In the fifth
13 year, they made their rounds of one district and ten
14 provinces or twenty-seven places, by August of the
15 sixth year of Showa, they went rounds of twelve
16 provinces and the places where they held the meetings
17 were eighteen. After the incident happened, in the
18 cooperation with the general staff headquarters, and
19 the South Manchurian Railway Company, again they had
20 the lectures at fifty places in the whole nation for
21 two months. During this period, the chief director
22 Dr. OKAWA made lectures fifty-two times voluntarily
23 and if we added the times of his lectures made, being
24 asked by others, they count even one hundred and twenty.
25

"Thus he held lecture meetings in one hundred

1 and thirty-five different places, and the number of
2 audiences were over a hundred thousand. Once Chief
3 Director OKAWA mounted the lecture platform, the
4 whole audience would always show their enthusiasm to
5 brave fire and water for their motherland aroused by
6 the fulmination of OKAWA. Thus, once the beacon was
7 burned in Mukden, the people united, and dared the
8 government and its hesitation, and finally accomplished
9 the great task of the establishing Manchukuo. Especial-
10 ly, for the union of the national opinion, he estab-
11 lished 'Toa-Kai' (East Asia Ass'n) besides this
12 lecture meeting, and formed a united body of the
13 national leaders which held one thousand members
14 throughout the nation and reported or translated
15 the publications of the Research Institute and
16 European, American, Russian or Chinese criticism on
17 Japan, thereby working for arousing the spirit of
18 cooperation and the public opinion. We must, at
19 the same time, especially write about the establish-
20 ment of the union of the Economic Research Organs
21 throughout the nation. This union united more than
22 one hundred and twenty Research organs in offices,
23 companies and schools throughout Japan, and as a
24 facility of the Chief Director of the Research Insti-
25 tute, it has been guiding the unification of public

1 opinions on foreign policy, and it must be said that
2 its contribution was extremely great.

3 "The Outline of Doctor OKAWA's Lecture.

4 "The Outline of Manchurian Problems.

5 "The Present Conditions in China and Chang
6 Hsuch-liang.

7 "The America's Policy towards Manchukuo and
8 Mongolia.

9 "What is so-called Manchurian Problems?

10 "Japan's position in East Asia.

11 "China's International Relations.

12 "Japan's Attitude in East Asia.

13 "The Activities before and after the Incident.

14 "In this way, Chief Director OKAWA has been
15 concentrating all his energies directly and indirectly
16 on the ground that the solution of the Manchurian prob-
17 lems is an absolute condition to the very existence
18 of Japan, but knowing that a trouble could not be
19 avoided in the solution of this problem, he has been
20 taking the above-mentioned measures and has been
21 leading the nation in order to prepare the people for
22 such a case. In foreign relations, he has been pre-
23 paring for the worst by propagandizing the particular
24 position of Japan in Manchuria by various methods, and
25 by cooperating with the chiefs of the Kwantung Army,

1 did his utmost to further various background opera-
2 tions.

3 "Although these are confidential matters
4 and cannot be minutely described, there were times
5 when he risked the lives of his best followers, and
6 on other occasions he himself went to the actual field
7 and planned matters, and his efforts were such as
8 cannot be conjectured by ordinary persons. Possibly
9 the situation during this period is well known at
10 the army headquarters. When the incident broke out,
11 and the situation became disadvantageous, he requested
12 his foreigner friends, regardless of whether they
13 were residing in Japan or not. to visit the place of
14 the present post or Manchuria themselves, and had
15 them propagandize to their own countries the in-
16 evitableness of the Manchurian Incident and the just
17 position of Japan. Citing an example, Doctor Klaus
18 went to Manchuria himself, and sent to his country,
19 Germany, an extremely effective and adequate report
20 as well as sending a long report which continued for
21 a month and was very kindly disposed towards Japan to
22 his immediate superiors and to the Pope. However, as
23 these happenings took place during the confusions of
24 the Incident, not even the men of intelligence, let
25 alone the general public, knew of them.

1 "His Contribution towards the Establishment
2 of Manchukuo.

3 "From the viewpoint that the establishment of
4 Manchukuo is absolutely necessary for the existence
5 of Japan, as well as that the spirit should always
6 be founded on the morality of Japanese chivalry, he
7 has been of the opinion that the Japanese officials
8 who are to assist Manchukuo should be the most superior
9 among the Japanese nationals, and he conferred with
10 the Kwantung Army, and cooperating with the army,
11 he selected the officials for Manchukuo and sent
12 them to that country. However, there was a time
13 when he was looked upon with suspicion as the
14 thoughtless higher class were moved by the slanders
15 of narrow-minded persons, but his clear, transparent,
16 cloudless soul was explicitly revealed by the actual
17 facts. For instance, the most superior young officials
18 who are working on the front line as the first year
19 graduates of Daido Gakuin Institute without the
20 least self-interest and are now exerting themselves
21 to the utmost are all chosen by Doctor OKAWA himself."
22
23
24
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: That document comes from
2 a Tokyo Court of Appeals. Will you tell the Tribunal
3 or remind me who is the individual or who are the
4 individuals responsible for that pronouncement on
5 OKAWA's activities?

6 MR. TAVENNER: It is a paper filed in his
7 defense in the proceedings.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We expect you to prove that,
9 Mr. Tavenner.

10 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

12 MR. BROOKS: I would like to ask if the
13 prosecution -- if the Court would approve, would call
14 for cross-examination, the maker of the certificate
15 and the party that has made this report for cross-
16 examination on this matter.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Why, in our own countries
18 these court records could be produced by a person not
19 taking an oath. Why call this man? Why call some
20 clerk for cross-examination, Captain Brooks?

21 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, I just consulted
22 with the prosecutor and asked if he would stipulate
23 and agree that OKAWA, Shumei was sentenced by this court
24 to 5 years' imprisonment and served his sentence, and he
25 said he would.

1 MR. TAVENNER: The paper referred to is shown
2 by the certificate to be a part of the official record
3 of the trial. A further explanation in regard to it
4 will be obtained if it is in the record.

5 THE PRESIDENT: The parent document is not in
6 evidence. It is merely tendered for identification.
7 That is why we must have proof of the nature of this
8 document you have just read.

9 MR. TAVENNER: I offer in evidence prosecution
10 document No. 684, which consists of three excerpts
11 from the book entitled, "Asia, Europe, Japan" by OKAWA,
12 Shumei, published 15 October 1925. It is an attack
13 upon the principle of maintaining the status quo among
14 nations, advocates world supremacy by Japan and urges
15 Japan to prepare for war with the United States.
16

17 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

18 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, this
19 excerpt does not show and I think it would be quite
20 proper to show the date of publication of this book and
21 have it before the Court, because I think that would be
22 relevant to its value.

23 THE PRESIDENT: A Colleague assures me that
24 the date appears in the certificate.

25 MR. BROOKS: I don't have the certificate,
your Honor.

1 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
2 minutes.

3 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess
4 was taken until 1100, after which the
5 proceedings were resumed as follows:)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A
b
r
a
m
&
S
p
r
a
t
t

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal,
4 the OKAWA book to which I referred, I desire to be
5 tendered for identification only, and the excerpts,
6 consisting of document 684, to be introduced in
7 evidence.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

9 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I want
10 to enter an objection to the introduction of the
11 excerpts from this publication in 1925 for lack of
12 probative value due to the date and the writer's
13 position at that time; anything that was said in
14 there would be immaterial and irrelevant at this date.

15 THE PRESIDENT: It is already admitted for
16 whatever probative value it has. Lord Patrick pointed
17 out that it had a date, 1925. It is admitted for
18 whatever probative value it has.

19 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
20 No. 684 will receive exhibit No. 2179 for identifica-
21 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom bearing the same
22 document number will receive exhibit No. 2179A.

23
24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 2179 for identification, and the excerpts

1 therefrom were marked prosecution's ex-
2 hibit No. 2179A and received in evidence.)

3 MR. TAVENNER: I will read exhibit No. 2179A.

4 "'Asia, Europe, Japan' by OKAWA, Shumei.

5 "Excerpt 1.

6 "We must admit that it is very clear that
7 as long as one sticks to the present status quo and
8 the other strives to destroy it, this effort to re-
9 construct Asia will be contradictory to the aim of
10 the League of Nations -- also a product of the World
11 War. Regardless of how the platform of the League
12 of Nations may be decorated with rhetorical flourishes
13 it is after all an organization which is meant to
14 eternally maintain the international status quo and
15 is by no means based upon the new internationalism.
16 Moreover, does not the status quo of the world actually
17 imply the domination of the world by the Anglo-Saxons?
18 Therefore, the League of Nations exists in order to
19 enable the Anglo-Saxons to be the permanent dominators
20 of the world."

21 MR. BROOKS: I can't follow that, your Honor.
22 684 -- it doesn't appear on our excerpt in that order.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Page 70.

24 MR. TAVENNER: (Reading continued) "One of
25 the reasons why Japan is called the only black spot

1 in dawning Asia is also because Japan joined the
2 League of Nations. (p. 70)

3 "Excerpt 2.

4 "In Chapter 9, Revival of Asia:

5 "However, we must not be so rash as to
6 conclude that the coming war between the East and West
7 will be fought between allied Asia and allied Europe.
8 Such a thing cannot possibly happen in the near future.
9 The war between Asia and Europe will be fought by
10 the respective powers representing Asia and Europe,
11 which will be the dawn of the new day in the world
12 history, when all mankind will become awakened from
13 their slumber. It will be fought also in the future
14 by the respective powers of Asia and Europe as it
15 has been the case in ancient times. The strong Power
16 representing Asia and the other strong Power repre-
17 senting Europe will be chosen out by Heaven as champions
18 of the East and the West. Although there might, of
19 course, be some other countries siding with either
20 one of these two, the actual fighting must be done by
21 the decisive war of the said two Powers. In short,
22 the coming war between the East and West will be a
23 clash and strife of the strongest countries in the
24 East and the West. Asia! You must not confuse con-
25 ceptions with facts, and imagine that the war between

1 the East and the West will take place only when the
2 alliance of all the eastern countries and the alliance
3 of all the western countries is realized. Regardless
4 of the other powers' attitude, one of you must be
5 chosen as the champion of Asia -- the champion for
6 the New World to come. (p. 75)

7 "Excerpt 3.

8 "Chapter 10. Europe, Asia, Japan.

9 "The history of the world indicates that
10 the West and the East must be linked together. How-
11 ever, this union will not probably be completed in
12 peace. "Heaven is always seen through brandished
13 swords." For the sake of the advent of a New World,
14 it is the unavoidable fate, as has probably been the
15 case in the past, to have a deadly fight between the
16 powers of the West and of the East. This theory is
17 sure enough realized in the American challenge to
18 Japan. The strongest country in Asia is Japan and
19 the strongest country that represents Europe is
20 America. We can't tell whether it was by coincidence
21 or God's will, but as these two countries are symbolized
22 by the sun and the stars respectively, the opposition
23 of the two countries appears as if to signify the
24 opposition between broad daylight and a dark night.
25 These two countries are destined to fight against each

1 other as Greece and Persia, or Rome and Carthage had
2 to do. O Japan! Will it be a year, ten years, or
3 thirty years hence? Only God knows when it will be.
4 At any time, you /T. N. Japan/ may be summoned/ to
5 fight. Let us not lose even a moment in preparing
6 ourselves!/
7

8 "During the three thousand years since
9 the foundation of the country, this superior race has
10 only taken the whole of her culture and civilization
11 from foreign countries. Japan has never yet made
12 any positive contribution to the history of the world.
13 Was this long period of preparation actually not for
14 the sake of today? Through the victory of Japan in
15 the coming war between Japan and America, the dark
16 world will disappear and a world radiant with the
17 rays of the sun must begin." (pp. 82, 83)"

18 I present for identification only prosecu-
19 tion document 693. It is a book entitled, "The Way
20 of Japan and the Japanese," by OKAWA, Shumei, published 20
21 ~~March~~ 1926; and from this book I desire to introduce
22 in evidence document No. 693A, which consists of two
23 excerpts from this book.

24 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I would
25 like for the same objection to be noted for each one
of these excerpts from this book.

1 THE PRESIDENT: The objection has been and
2 will be overruled in each case, Captain.

3 Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
5 No. 693 will receive exhibit No. 2180 for identifica-
6 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom, bearing the
7 document No. 693A, will receive exhibit No. 2180A.

8 (Whereupon, document No. 693 was
9 marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2180 for
10 identification, and document No. 693A was
11 marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2180A and
12 received in evidence.)

13 THE PRESIDENT: We take it it is admitted
14 by the defense that the date is 1926. There is no
15 proof otherwise.

16 MR. TAVENNER: I don't know, your Honor.
17 I am not familiar enough with this book to know the
18 publication date. I thought the certificate showed
19 the fact that it was --

20 THE PRESIDENT: We have no certificate with
21 this.

22 MR. TAVENNER: I believe the certificate
23 was circulated separately from the document.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Is it in some of these
25 comprehensive certificates?

1 MR. TAVENNER: I will have the certificate
2 produced and attach it to the document. I know there
3 was one.

4 In this book the accused OKAWA reiterates
5 the principle of Japanese world supremacy, for the
6 accomplishment of which war between the great powers
7 of the East and West must be fought at the risk of
8 their whole existence.

9 I will read exhibit No. 2180:

10 "'The Way of Japan and the Japanese' by
11 OKAWA, Shumei.

12 "Pages 125-126) Asia and Europe in the
13 History of the World.

14 "The fact that Japan has hitherto had
15 practically no connection with world history means, in
16 my opinion, that Japan has to render her services
17 towards a mission which is greater than anything other
18 countries have ever achieved. What, then is this
19 mission which has no parallel ever since the commence-
20 ment of world history? As is being suggested by many
21 people, I believe that our mission lies in realizing
22 the unification of the civilization of Europe and that
23 of Asia and to thereby open a new page in the history
24 of the world.

25 "(Pages 142-143) I am afraid that a war

1 between the great powers of the East and West which
2 must be fought at the risk of their whole existence
3 is, as was the case in the past, again a fate now
4 inevitable for the advent of a new world. This does
5 not by any means imply, however, that all Asia as
6 a body will wage war against the whole of Europe. In
7 the actual circumstances, one country representing
8 Europe and one representing Asia will be chosen as
9 the champions of the West and the East respectively,
10 and they will have to fight for the realization of a
11 new world. In very truth it seems to me that
12 Providence is trying to elect Japan as the said
13 champion of the East.

14 "It seems to me that all the preparations
15 we have made in the long period of past three thou-
16 sand years have been meant for this purpose. This
17 is truly a sublime and grand mission, we must say. In
18 order to fulfill this sublime mission, Japan and the
19 Japanese must endeavor to develop a strong moralistic
20 spirit and to materialize that spirit in the life of
21 the individual and that of the nation. With this, I
22 close my lecture."

23 MR. BROOKS: I would like to have the record
24 show that this first excerpt read started at pages
25 125 to 126, and that the second excerpt was from

1 pages 142 to 143, starting, "I am afraid that a war
2 between the great powers," et cetera.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks appears to
4 repeat something already in the exhibit.

5 MR. TAVENNER: I omitted to read the page
6 numbers while reading the text. It appeared plainly
7 in the document itself.

8 THE PRESIDENT: This transcript will show
9 the whole exhibit, as it always does.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 MR. TAVENNER: I offer for identification
2 only prosecution document 692, which is a book en-
3 titled "2600 Years of Japanese History," by OKAWA,
4 Shumei, published 5 July 1929, and I desire to in-
5 troduce in evidence from this book certain excerpts --
6 a certain excerpt set out in prosecution document
7 692-A.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
10 No. 692 will receive exhibit No. 2181 for identifica-
11 tion only, and the excerpt therefrom, bearing the
12 same document number, will receive exhibit No. 2181-A.

13 (Whereupon, the document above re-
14 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
15 2181 for identification, the excerpt therefrom
16 being marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2181-A
17 and received in evidence.)

18 MR. TAVENNER: In this book Dr. OKAWA told
19 the Japanese people that Japan had the divine mission
20 of restoration of the world, the first step of which
21 is the establishment of the new order in East Asia
22 which Japan started to establish in collaboration with
23 Manchukuo.

24 I will read exhibit 2181-A, pages 441 to
25 444 inclusive:

1 "2600 Years of Japanese History. By OKAWA,
2 Shumei.

3 "Page 441-444 inc.

4 "The Chang Hsueh-lian regime was swept completely
5 away from Manchuria in one swoop through the quick
6 and daring actions of the Japanese troops. The Man-
7 churian people, who had long been suffering under the
8 oppression and exaction of the Chang regime, took
9 advantage of this occasion and started the independence
10 movement, finally succeeding in declaring independence
11 in February of the following year, 1932. Then, on
12 the 15th of September 1932, our country recognized
13 this newly established Manchukuo, concluded the
14 Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, and thus laying the legal
15 foundation for the co-existence and co-prosperity of
16 both countries, started to establish the New Order in
17 East Asia in close collaboration with Manchukuo. When
18 Japan faced this sublime task, the spirit of patriotism
19 which had been slumbering in her people's hearts was
20 suddenly awakened. Democracy and Communism which had
21 overwhelming influence on the minds of the people not
22 long ago were finally swept away, and the national-
23 istic tendency reached an unprecedented climax.
24 Moreover, when Japan daringly rebuffed the coercion of
25

1 other Powers at the time of the Manchurian Incident,
2 by boldly withdrawing from the League of Nations and
3 by abrogating the London Treaty, the self-realization
4 of the people was much intensified, the excessive es-
5 teem for the West as in the past was overcome, and a
6 vivid spirit of independence was reborn.

7 "However, the establishment of Manchukuo ex-
8 ceedingly incited China. China, who had already
9 been carrying on antagonistic movements against Japan
10 for a long period of time through her misunderstanding
11 of Japan's true intentions, took the establishment
12 of Manchukuo as an outcome of Japan's imperialistic
13 ambition, and incited the hostilities of her people
14 against Japan by advocating recovery of the lost ter-
15 ritory. Due to this attitude of China, many un-
16 fortunate incidents took place between Japan and
17 China, and this situation reached its explosive point
18 on 7 July 1937 when a unit of the Japanese Army that
19 was engaged in night manoeuvres at Marco Polo Bridge
20 near Peking was suddenly fired at by a group of
21 Chinese soldiers. In spite of Japan's patient exer-
22 tions to settle the affair peacefully on the spot,
23 China persistently maintained a challenging attitude,
24 placing too much confidence in her national power
25 and underestimating our national strength. Therefore,

1 Japan was impelled to resort to arms in order to
2 urge China to thoroughly re-examine her attitude;
3 this finally resulted in the utilizing on the Con-
4 tinent of the greatest number of troops ever known
5 since the founding of the Empire (T.N.Japan). Since
6 the outbreak of the Incident, already two years are
7 about to elapse. During those years, the Japanese
8 forces have, under the August virtue of His Majesty,
9 scattered the Chinese troops away like leaves blown
10 away by a hurricane. We have first of all succeeded
11 in hoisting the flag of the rising sun over the whole
12 of North China; then we have captured Shanghai which
13 the enemy counted upon as being impregnable; taken
14 Nanking, the capital, then Canton like a whirlwind,
15 going farther up along the Yangtze River to realize
16 the fall of the three cities of Wu-Han and Nanchang.

17 "The object of the Japanese military expedition
18 to China was, as expressed in the Imperial Edict of
19 4th September 1937, simply 'to urge grave self-
20 reflection upon China and to establish peace in East
21 Asia without delay.' The Chinese Government, however,
22 taking the last hold on Chungking in a corner of
23 Ssuchuan Province, in spite of the fatal blow she
24 had received, is still calling for a protracted war
25 of resistance. This obstinate opposition to Japan is

1 due to their expectation of assistance from England,
2 France and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and on
3 the other to their hope that Japan will utterly
4 exhaust her strength. The respective interests and
5 objects of these pro-Chiang Kai Shek Powers vary,
6 but they all agree in not welcoming the revival of
7 Asia under Japan's leadership. Accordingly they have
8 restrained Japan by their foreign policy, and are
9 trying to place her in a disadvantageous situation
10 either by helping China financially or by supplying
11 her with munitions of war. In these circumstances,
12 Japan must, observing the Imperial wishes to cut down
13 the root of the evils of long standing, make up her
14 mind to continue to exert her utmost efforts with
15 irresistible force over a long period in order to
16 realize the establishment of the New Order in East
17 Asia. The establishment of the New Order in East
18 Asia is the first step towards the eventual recovery
19 of all Asia, and this in effect will mean the res-
20 toration of the World. Since her national foundation
21 2600 years ago, Japan has never before assumed such a
22 truly grand and sublime role. We must accordingly
23 overcome all trials and difficulties both internal and
24 external in order to fulfill this divine mission."

25 THE PRESIDENT: That book appears to be

written in 1939. Is that so?

1
2 MR. TAVENNER: 5 July 1939 is date of pub-
3 lication.

4 I now offer for identification only document
5 685. It is a book entitled, "The Establishment of
6 Order in Greater East Asia," by OKAWA, Shumei, pub-
7 lished 20 August 1943, and from it I desire to in-
8 troduce in evidence excerpts appearing in prosecution
9 document 685-A.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
12 No. 685 will receive exhibit No. 2182 for identifica-
13 tion only, and the excerpt therefrom, prosecution's
14 document 685-A, will receive exhibit No. 2182-A.

15 (Whereupon, the document above re-
16 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
17 2182 for identification, the excerpts therefrom
18 being marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2182-A
19 and received in evidence.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

M
o
r
s
e
&
W
h
a
l
e
n

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. TAVENNER: (Reading):

"Extracts from Shumei OKAWA's 'The Establishment of Order in Greater East Asia.'

"If I were to write a modern history of Japan, I should begin it with a description of Shin-en SATO's ideas. This is because in the soul of this great scholar had already been conceived a new Japan in the most concrete form. (From page 9)

"Shin-en SATO, first of all, thought Japan 'the foundation of the world' and believed that Japan would be able to make all the rest of the world her countries or prefectures if she succeeded in 'ruling over the foundation of the world'. With a view to carrying out this 'great work of renovating the world', he advocted a drastic political renovation of the interior Japan and the order of unifying all nations. 'In order to develop other countries, it is best for the Empire /i.e. Japan/ to make a start by absorbing China into her first of all,' he advocted '.....Even the powerful China is no match for the Empire, not to speak of other barbarous countries.If China becomes our possession, is it possible for the other countries in the West, Siam and India not to come gradually under the sway of the Empire yearning for her power of commanding love and respect, being

1 overawed and falling prostrate before her?' Besides,
2 it was his opinion that in order to control China,
3 'no other place is easier to occupy than Manchuria.'
4 And at the same time he thought it necessary to obtain
5 the whole 'area in the South Sea covering thousands of
6 ri starting with the Philippines so as to prepare
7 for the northward aggression of the European Powers,
8 especially of Great Britain and then obtain gradual
9 control of India and its neighbors and various islands
10 in the Indian Ocean, following the occupation of
11 China, Annam, Shan-Cheng and Cambodia.' (From pages
12 10-11).

13 "This explains why the loyalists of the
14 Meiji Restoration period made it their goal of ambition
15 to renovate Japan and at the same time unify Asia,
16 under the slogan of 'reverence for the Emperor and
17 expulsion of foreigners'. Shoin YOSHIDA says in his
18 letter to Genzui KUZAKA, 'We should show our pushing
19 spirits by cultivating the Isle of Yezo /i.e. Hokkaido/,
20 ruling over the Loochoos, obtaining Korea, occupying
21 Manchuria by force, controlling China, and reigning
22 over India.' Izumi MAKI states in his suggestions
23 which he advanced to Sammi OHARA and also in his letter
24 to Nanshu SAIGO that Japan should set herself against
25 the invasion of /the countries in/ Europe and America

1 by obtaining Korea and the Loochoos, and making
2 Manchuria and Chingkuo her outside clans."

3 I will omit reading down to the last para-
4 graph on page 3:

5 "The Japanese victory over the Russians gave
6 the first and severe shock to the European countries
7 that had been bracing the high way of aggression for
8 four hundred years and had never been put to shame
9 of defeat by any alien race. For the first time,
10 their time-honored victory met with a setback at that
11 time. This caused to arouse hope and courage among
12 the nations that had been under the pressure of the
13 white men, and inspired the various races that had been
14 suffering under the tyranny of the Powers with ideal and
15 vitality.

16 "It is the victory of one world over another.

17 "So-called 'Versailles system' was meant to
18 build a palace of European peace on the basis of Germany
19 which was weak and incompetent. And at the same time
20 the League of Nations made it its second important
21 object to put pressure upon Japan that was considered
22 to have lost the least and have gained the most in the
23 World War.

24 "Then, what did Britain and America do toward
25 Japan? First of all, they succeeded in reducing Japan's

1 status in East Asia as they had been wishing to, at
2 the Versailles conference.

3 "Britain and America, not being satisfied
4 even with this, gave heavier blow to Japan at the London
5 Conference. It might be that Britain and America
6 chuckled to themselves over the thought that they had
7 succeeded in strengthening the Versailles system by
8 this. Nevertheless, this system soon met with a
9 severe repulsion, namely, the Manchurian Incident and
10 thus the old order of the world began to go through
11 the stage of collapse.

12 "As I stated before, the Russo-Japanese War
13 gave the first blow to the European ambition to assume
14 hegemony of the world and it was going to prove a pre-
15 lude to the coming restoration of the world by urging
16 Asia to wake up to the situation; nevertheless, Japan,
17 to our great regret, failed to realize this meaning
18 which would be epoch-making in the world history/ but
19 rather she made for the direction which was quite con-
20 trary to the fundamental trends of the world history/:
21 instead of being kind to the nations in Asia, who were
22 deeply impressed with Japan's victory over Russia and
23 were beginning to direct their attention, and instead
24 of leading and encouraging them, Japan, on the con-
25 trary, devoted herself solely to keep pace with Europe

and America in her international policies.

1 "The movement which aims at the expulsion of
2 Japanese rights and interests has been emphasized
3 acceleratively. And this trend much aggravated with
4 Chiang Hsui-Liang's becoming a new master of Manchuria
5 after the death of Chiang Tso-Lin through the explosion
6 in the summer of Showa 3 (1928).

7 "Besides, Chiang Hsui-Liang judged that the
8 fierce strife for political power between the Seyu-Kai
9 and the Minsei parties would make it impossible for
10 Japan to unify her public opinion, and on the other
11 hand, lacking in his proper knowledge of essential
12 qualities of the Imperial army he had become so self-
13 conceited that he believed that the Japanese army which
14 lacked experiences of actual warfare would be no match
15 for the Chinese army which had been trained through a
16 series of battles. And in the end, this ultimately led
17 some of the Chinese soldiers to explode the railroad
18 of the South Manchurian Railway Co. at Liuchiaokon.

19 "On the midnight of September 18, 1931, some
20 Japanese soldiers of the Third Company, Mukden
21 Independent Defense Unit, hearing an unusual noise of
22 explosion during their patrol along the railroad not
23 far off Liuchiaokon, immediately rushed to the scene
24 and found the rails blasted, when they were fired at
25

1 by Manchurian soldiers. They, therefore, returned
2 the fire, while they sent an emergency call for the
3 main body; and, at one coup, they started to attack
4 Peitaying. On the morning of the following day, the
5 19th, they succeeded in their swift driving away of
6 the Manchurian army from Peitaying and then occupied
7 the Castle of Mukden. On the afternoon of the same day,
8 Commander of the Kwantung Army HONJO, who left Port
9 Arthur at dawn alarmed at the news, arrived at Mukden
10 accompanied by his staff officers, took command and
11 superintendence of the shold army moving the Head-
12 quarters to Mukden, and clarified his firm resolution
13 by absolutely denying Chiang Hsui-Liang's Regime in
14 Manchuria and clearly declaring his intention of waging
15 a thoroughly punitive war against it at home and
16 abroad. Thus did the so-called Manchurian Incident
17 break out.

18 "The Japanese government will surely put
19 restraint upon military operations in Manchuria.
20 This was just what Britain and America believed.
21 Mr. Stimson, the then Secretary of State (of the United
22 States of America), writes down in his diary as
23 follows: 'The Japanese Foreign Minister will put out
24 the flames of nationalism and lead Japan to be a faith-
25 ful observer of the Nine Power Pact and of the Kellogg

1 Pact.' When China brought an action for the Manchurian
2 Incident before the League of Nations then in session
3 and Mr. Drumond, Chief Secretary of the League of
4 Nations, tried to sound him regarding the American
5 attitude for applying the Kellogg Pact to the Manchurian
6 Incident, Mr. Stimson, firmly believing the above-
7 mentioned Japanese Foreign Minister's intention, gave
8 the following answer: 'It is wise for us to refrain
9 from any action that may inflame Japanese feeling
10 cause the Japanese to support their army authorities
11 and thus put Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA in a very
12 difficult position.'

13 "Now, when Japan came to fact the great task
14 of founding of Manchoukuo after the Manchurian Incident,
15 ardent patriotic spirit which had lain dormant in the
16 soul of the nation woke up all of a sudden. Democracy
17 which had been taking the world by storm up to that
18 time and communism which had become so uppish follow-
19 ing it hid themselves from among the people and a
20 nationalistic trend became unprecedentedly flourishing
21 instead. In the process of her realization of this
22 great work, Japan was obliged to fight against the
23 heavy pressure of Britain and America and this had
24 gradually caused Japan to clearly realize that Britain
25 and America on whose good offices had depended Japan

1 for her security were throughly incompatible enemies
2 of East Asia. Under these circumstances, Japan
3 decisively disconnected herself from the League of
4 Nations, an organ for the Anglo-Saxons to assume the
5 hegemony of the world, in other words, their headquarters
6 for maintaining the old order of the world and con-
7 sequently Japan, overcoming her dependency on Britain
8 and America at a stroke, succeeded in exhibiting her
9 independent spirit in hier diplomacy.

10 "In September, Showa 17 (1936), the Commander
11 of the Kwantung Army issued a very important proclama-
12 tion regarding the mission of the Hseih-ho-hui /i.e.
13 the Concordia Association/ in the process of the found-
14 ing of Manchoukuo and at the same time the Chief of
15 the Staff of the Kwantung Army officially gave the
16 following explanation about this proclamation: 'What
17 the Concordia Association prays for is, in the first
18 stage, to bring Manchoukuo to perfection and then to
19 establish gradually paradise with righteous govern-
20 ment by emancipating the oppressed and conquered
21 nations in every part of East Asia.

22 "Nobody, I suppose, expected at the beginning
23 that the regretable skirmish between Japan and China
24 which had been occasioned by the report of a rifle
25

1 heard at the approach to the Marco Polo Bridge on
2 July 6, Showa 12 (1937), should extend over such a
3 long period of time. The Japanese government, for
4 instance, called it the North China Incident and faced
5 it with the so-called non-expansion policy, under the
6 very simple slogan of 'chastising outrageous China.'
7 But unexpected development of affairs forced the govern-
8 ment to overthrow its non-exansion policy by the actual
9 situation and the name of the Incident was also changed
10 to the China Affair, the line of battle being extended
11 over the whole China as was named and the situation
12 having continued up to the present. The China Affair
13 has been included in the Greater East Asia War since
14 December 8, Showa 16 (1941) when the Imperial Rescript
15 declaring war upon America and Britain was promulgated
16 and its name was disused, but still Japan and China
17 are fighting fiercely.

18 "Since the outbreak of the China Affair, both
19 America and Britain have manifested an apparent
20 hostile feeling against Japan, And changes had taken
21 place in their attitude toward Japan three times --
22 two years from the beginning of the Affair to the out-
23 break of the European War, the period from the outbreak
24 of the European War to the conclusion of the Triple
25 Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, and from

1 that time onward. During the first period, they
2 supported /the/ Chungking /government/ openly to fight
3 against Japan so as to protect their rights and
4 interests in China thoroughly. Nevertheless, during
5 the second period which followed the outbreak of the
6 European War, they seemed as if they had been endeavor-
7 ing to curry favor with Japan in order to win her to
8 their side if possible, at the cost of part of their
9 rights and interests if it could not be helped, or
10 at least to prevent her from taking part with Germany
11 and Italy. The very interception of the Burma Route
12 by Britain is enough to give us a general tendency of
13 their policy. As there were still many people at that
14 time in Japan who advocated the reliance on Britain
15 and America, such activities of Britain and America
16 were a very mischievous temptation. Japan, however,
17 did not fall into the trap and the Triple Alliance
18 came into being.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "Should the two countries, Japan and China,
2 unite through the great duty of revived Asia and rise
3 hand in hand for its materialization India would never
4 fail to act in unison with them, and then the establish-
5 ment of the Greater East Asia Sphere would proceed
6 under easy sail.

7 "So long as the China Affair is not managed,
8 we shall not be able to expect a successful conclusion
9 of the Greater East Asia War, to what extent the fight-
10 ing power of Britain and America may fall off.

11 "History shows us most clearly that the inter-
12 posal of a third state between Japan and China has al-
13 ways caused the gulf between them to be deepened.

14 "And, as mentioned before, Japan tried to make
15 China change her false course by this /Manchurian/ In-
16 cident and on the other hand, being resolved to be pre-
17 pared to become a champion for the emancipation of
18 Asia returning to the spirit of restoration, she en-
19 deavored to re-establish a closer union of blood rela-
20 tionship than before with China. In spite of the fact
21 that such Japanese spirit and ideal have become as
22 clear as day by our declaration of war upon America
23 and Britain, the Chiang Regime is still overriding
24 the great duty of reviving Asia allying with the com-
25 mon enemies of Asia -- this should be said to be a

1 matter for great regret, indeed.

2 "The first of these geographical divisions
3 is the damp zone which is under the influence of the
4 monsoon. This includes those areas that face the
5 Pacific and Indian Oceans and extend, beginning with
6 the north, from the Japanese Islands, the Korean Penin-
7 sula, South Manchuria, China, and then, through South-
8 East Asia, to the south which includes India and Cey-
9 lon.

10 "Now, geographically the damp zone of Asia
11 includes those three great parts and it is Japan, China,
12 and India that represent those three parts. Before we
13 came in touch with Europe and America, what was called
14 'world' by us were Kara /i.e. China/ and Tenjiku /i.e.
15 India/, in other words, the eastern half of Asia in
16 which China and India formed its center; adding Japan
17 to these two countries, we have called them 'Three
18 Countries.' Now we call these 'Three Countries' the
19 Greater East Asia Sphere and we are fighting in order
20 to realize a new order here.

21 "It was indeed Japan's victory in the Russo-
22 Japanese War that roused Asia from her long lethargy.
23 A dark night had covered Asia but, from that time on,
24 the day began to dawn gradually and a flash of hope
25 appeared from the east.

1 "The fact is too well known to be repeated
2 here, but Japan has learnt many things from China and
3 India for a long time. Our modern spirit has been
4 formed by thoroughly assimilating and fostering up
5 the thought and culture of China and India-----there-
6 fore, the Japanese spirit can be understood correctly
7 only when it is considered to be orientalism.

8 "Besides, Japan, as stated before, has called
9 the whole Orient 'Three Countries' and has been can-
10 vassing with that consciousness at all times-----that
11 Japan had a clear consciousness of 'Three Countries'
12 when China left Japan out of consideration and perhaps
13 India was not aware of the very existence of Japan,
14 suggests that the time will soon come when she will
15 assume a great mission and responsibility toward China.
16 And the day has come! What makes the basis of the
17 spirit of the new order of the Greater East Asia is the
18 Three Country Spirit which has been hardened through
19 her vital experiences of one thousand years. The
20 objectification or materialization of the Three Country
21 Spirit is neither more nor less than the Great East
22 Asia Sphere."

23 "Finally, according to his belief, Japan, being
24 the first country in the world to be created--" That
25 is another document. I beg your pardon, sir.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

2 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, on page
3 4 of exhibit 1282-A there is a mistranslation; it says
4 the Versailles Conference, it should be the Washington
5 Conference. It is down in the third full paragraph.
6 I think it is pages 40 and 41. It appears on the
7 original. It has been checked.

8 I would like to call to the Court's attention
9 that the first full paragraph on page 2 read by the
10 prosecutor refers to Shinen SATO who, I have confirmed,
11 lived over two hundred years ago.

12 THE PRESIDENT: The translation question will
13 be referred to the board in the usual way.

14 MR. TAVENNER: I offer for identification
15 only prosecution document 687. It is a book entitled
16 "SATO Shinen's Ideal State," by OKAWA, Shumei, published
17 20 February 1924, and I desire to introduce two ex-
18 cerpts from this book as prosecution document No. 687-A.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 687 will receive exhibit No. 2183 for identifica-
22 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom, document No.
23 687-A, will receive exhibit No. 2183-A.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 2183 for identification; the excerpts
2 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
3 No. 2183-A and received in evidence.)

4 MR. TAVENNER: I will read exhibit No. 2183-A.

5 "Excerpts from 'SATO Shinen's Ideal State' by
6 IKAWA, Shumei.

7 "Finally, according to his belief, Japan,
8 being the first country in the world to be created,
9 is the foundation of all nations and ever since the
10 beginning, it has been the primary mission of Japan
11 to protect all nations of the world to live in peace
12 and safety.

13 "He therefore established a most concrete
14 policy as regards the way in which Japan should ac-
15 complish her Divine Mission to give orders to all the
16 nations. (Page 47)

17 "His brilliant brain, taking into consideration
18 the international position of Japan, perceived the
19 danger rather than the crisis and fate of our country.
20 Hence, he warned that if the maritime provinces of
21 Siberia are not occupied to prevent the southward ad-
22 vance of Russia on one hand, the South Sea Islands not
23 taken to prevent the northward advance of England on
24 the other hand, Japan will not be able to solidify the
25 foundation of her national strength. (Page 50)"

1 MR. BROOKS: I would also like to call to the
2 Court's attention that this is the same excerpt from
3 the history of SATO Shinen of two hundred years ago.

4 THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing to prevent
5 the modern Japanese from adopting his attitude.

6 MR. TAVENNER: Document No. 2902 is a copy of
7 a letter from OKAWA to TOJO. The original of this
8 letter cannot be found, so there is attached to the
9 document an affidavit by HAYASHI, the interpreter who
10 translated the original document and who states that
11 the copy is a true and accurate translation of the
12 original which he had in his possession in October 1945
13 when he made the translation, and also there is attached
14 the affidavit of Captain H. E. Thompson, Chief of
15 Civil Intelligence Section, stating that the original
16 cannot be located. There is also attached to this
17 document an interrogation of the accused OKAWA which
18 is intended as a further authentication of the copy
19 and for the purpose of establishing the year 1940 as
20 the year in which the letter was written. I offer in
21 evidence prosecution document No. 2902 with the affi-
22 davits and interrogation mentioned.

23 MR. BROOKS: If the Court please, I object to
24 its introduction. The defense has not been served with
25 a copy; none of the defense counsel have a copy of 2902.

1 THE PRESIDENT: The rules will be observed,
2 Mr. Tavenner.

3 MR. TAVENNER: My information was that the
4 rules were complied with several days ago with regard
5 to this document. There may be some mistake.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You may look into the matter
7 during the luncheon adjournment. We will adjourn until
8 half past one.

9 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess
10 was taken.)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

AFTERNOON SESSION

1
2
3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,
4 at 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Warren.

8 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, during
9 the noon recess defense counsel held a meeting and
10 discussed a matter of grave importance to us, I
11 think to the entire conduct of the trial. The matter
12 of particularly pressing moment at this time is in
13 reference to our motions to dismiss.

14 In accordance with the Tribunal's permission
15 given to us in the past, there will be an overall
16 general motion to dismiss, and, in addition, there
17 is being prepared and processed motions for all of
18 the accused. From the number of documents and other
19 matters called to our attention, we had anticipated
20 that the prosecution would continue in their present-
21 ation of their phases of the case for a longer period
22 of time than apparently they contemplate at the
23 present time. Due to the very nature of the motions,
24 which, of course, are directed to the evidence, it
25 has been necessary that defense counsel, in order to

K
a
p
l
e
a
u
&
G
o
l
d
b
e
r
g

1 make at least a presentable appearance -- or at least
2 a semblance of a decent argument -- to the Tribunal,
3 that we delay the commencement of the preparation of
4 our motions as long as possible.

5 As matters now stand, it, of course, goes
6 without saying that our motions to some extent must
7 be anticipatory of the evidence which will be
8 introduced and which has been introduced from the
9 time we started processing.

10 Now, we have stated in the past, and the
11 situation still remains static, that is, we do not
12 have and have never had sufficient help to carry
13 out the mechanics of the tasks assigned to us.
14 Setting aside every other thing that we have, there
15 are enough motions and arguments in process now to
16 where I have been informed that it would be impos-
17 sible to complete merely the mechanics of running
18 them off on the Mimeograph machine today or tomorrow.
19 We, of course, had expected some assistance from the
20 prosecution's translation section and from some of
21 their clerical help which they have promised, but
22 so far they have been unable to give us any assis-
23 tance. The defense counsel consequently have requested
24 that I request the Tribunal to give us a recess until
25 next Monday, rather an adjournment until next Monday,

1 regardless of what time this week the prosecution
2 may finish their case in order that we can complete
3 the mechanics of the preparation of our motions.

4 They have also asked me to express our
5 apprehension for the future events to come that we
6 will not have sufficient help -- mechanical help
7 and things to get our case out in time as we should.
8 We, therefore, request the Tribunal to give us such
9 assistance as they can in that matter.

10 Thank you, sir.

11 THE PRESIDENT: You and Mr. Logan and
12 other defense counsel spoke to me during the lun-
13 cheon adjournment about these matters, Colonel Warren,
14 and I did suggest that you bring them up here this
15 afternoon. I understood your difficulty was due to
16 the shortage of staff and not to a desire to hear
17 the last word of the prosecution's evidence before
18 you prepared your motions. It may be that prose-
19 cution cannot assist you fully until they have pre-
20 pared to meet those motions.

21 I have mentioned this matter to two or
22 three of my colleagues. I have not had an opportunity
23 to speak to all of them, but I feel, though, that we
24 are prepared to give you whatever extra time is
25 required. But, I am sure that we would all expect

1 you to be ready not later than Monday next.

2 MR. WARREN: Apparently, your Honor, I
3 did not make myself clear on one point. In stating
4 that this was a motion that went to the evidence
5 and we had not heard all of the evidence, I did
6 explain that our motions must of necessity become
7 anticipatory with reference to some phases. We are
8 working now, but the reason I explained that was
9 to show to the Tribunal the reason we had delayed
10 as long as we thought we could and get in under the
11 wire. As a matter of fact, most of our motions and
12 the arguments have already been completed. It is
13 a mechanical difficulty, and your Honor was correct
14 in your interpretation of our committee's intentions
15 at noon.

16 Thank you, sir.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Do you suggest you will be
18 ready to move your motions on Monday, or merely that
19 your papers will be in order then?

20 MR. WARREN: We anticipate, your Honor,
21 that we will be ready to start presenting our
22 motions on Monday.

23 THE PRESIDENT: That means the prosecution
24 will be served before Monday. They must get some
25 notice, however short. We will have to hear them on

1 that, of course.

2 MR. WARREN: Yes, we had taken that into
3 consideration.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Higgins.

5 MR. HIGGINS: Mr. President, we would
6 like to have the benefit of an examination of those
7 motions -- arguments that they have already prepared
8 because our replies will be a matter of some time
9 to us and the sooner we get them, the sooner we will
10 be in a position to accommodate the defense by the
11 lending of some of our personnel -- the use of some
12 of our personnel.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: The two motions already
2 filed are very short and we would expect the others
3 to be short.

4 MR. WARREN: Your Honor, we will be prepared
5 to present to the prosecution immediately upon the
6 close of their case everything that we have processed
7 and in the mimeograph form. After that we shall be
8 prepared as soon as the document is completed and
9 in final form draft to give them a typewritten copy.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I think I can say in behalf
11 of the Tribunal that if you undertake to be ready
12 on Monday we will give you until then.

13 MR. WARREN: Thank you very much, your Honor.

14 THE PRESIDENT: There is another matter,
15 Colonel Warren. Colonel Hanley said that the
16 defense desired the accused to be brought into the
17 War Ministry every day during the recess in order
18 to facilitate the preparation of the defense case.
19 I think I can say in behalf of the Tribunal that
20 if the persons responsible for security are satis-
21 fied, the Bench will raise no objection. It may be
22 that proper facilities are not available at Sugamo
23 for so many, but we do not readily interfere with
24 security measures.
25

1 MR. WARREN: Yes, your Honor, I appreciate
2 that. Not only is it a question of all that; it is
3 a question of transportation. It will save us
4 literally hours of time which we can apply to the
5 preparation of this case, which it is our earnest
6 desire to do, and if it can be worked out we cer-
7 tainly will appreciate it.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

9 MR. TAVENNER: If the Tribunal please, the
10 question was raised as to whether or not prosecu-
11 tion document No. 2902 had been served on defense
12 counsel. I was advised during the noon recess that
13 we have a receipt showing that it was served on the
14 administrative office of the defense on the 16th of
15 January, four days ago. I therefore desire to offer
16 in evidence prosecution document No. 2902, together
17 with the two affidavits and the interrogation of
18 OSHIMA attached thereto -- OKAWA I meant to say.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

20 MR. BROOKS: Mr. President and members of
21 the Tribunal, I want to object to the introduction
22 of this document, first on the ground that there is
23 not a certificate of origin and authenticity as to
24 the copy of said letter, as to its origin.
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: OKAWA admits it, doesn't he?

2 MR. BROOKS: I will get to that, your Honor.

3 Second, it is not the best evidence and the
4 original letter should be produced so that the trans-
5 lations can be thoroughly checked and the date can
6 be authenticated.

7 As to the exhibit No. 4186, the interroga-
8 tion of OKAWA of the 11th of March, 1946, this is
9 being offered as a part of this exhibit, and due
10 to the mental condition of OKAWA, I haven't ques-
11 tioned thereon, and I do not believe that any ques-
12 tioning would achieve any results. However, I
13 asked associate counsel in the case, Mr. Blewett,
14 to question Mr. TOJO as to this letter, and he
15 denies any letter whatsoever. I asked the prosecu-
16 tion if in their examination of TOJO they have any-
17 thing on this it should be brought to light in
18 connection with this matter, because we do not have
19 that mental condition in his case.

20
21 I should also like to further object to the
22 last question on prosecution document No. 4186 in
23 that it is a double question, and I ask that the
24 answer be stricken, as it could not be responsive
25 to such a question; and the Japanese translation

1 is not a simple yes.

2 I call that to the attention of the trans-
3 lators.

4 THE PRESIDENT: The objection made by
5 Captain Brooks is met by the admission in OKAWA'S
6 interrogation, if the interrogation is proved.
7 The last question is not objectionable, in view of
8 the admission immediately preceding it. It merely
9 follows up what is already admitted. These inter-
10 rogations, like police interrogations in ordinary
11 criminal cases, are always put in the form of lead-
12 ing questions. That is the only way to effective-
13 ly interrogate in such circumstances. Suspects who
14 are interrogated are not regarded as police wit-
15 nesses -- prosecution's witnesses being examined
16 by judicial process.

17
18 The objection is overruled and the document
19 is admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
21 No. 2902 will receive exhibit No. 2184.

22 (Whereupon, the document referred to
23 above was marked prosecution's exhibit 2184 and
24 received in evidence.)

25

W
h
a
l
e
n
&
M
o
r
s
e

1 MR. TAVENNER: I will read exhibit 2184:

2 "To: Hideki TOJO, #25 - 2 chome KITAZAWA,
3 Setagaya-ku.

4 From: Shumei OKAWA, #231 - 4 chome Kami-
5 Osaki, Shinagawa-ku. 21 July 19__

6 "Your Excellency:

7 "During these turbulent times your duties must
8 keep you very busy; but because you are the one hope
9 of Japan, I pray that your most important mission with
10 regard for the welfare of the people is thoroughly
11 accomplished.

12 "But for the insincerity of the Minister of
13 Finance the United States Loan Agreement question is
14 almost settled as you know. Will you please exert
15 your wholehearted efforts in alleviating this condition.

16 "General Chiang Kai Shek's only salvation is
17 to obtain aid from the United States; therefore if the
18 above-mentioned agreement is completed it will be a
19 lightning stroke obliterating China's only hope,
20 bringing about an immediate termination of the China
21 Incident and making it possible for Japan to proceed
22 in its southward advancement plan. This I believe is
23 the only solution to the present critical situation.

24 "It was my wish to confer personally with
25 you on this matter but because I am leaving for Manchuria

1 tonight, please accept this epistle instead."

2 I will read from the accompanying interroga-
3 tion of OKAWA the last two questions and answers.
4 After setting forth the letter in question, this ques-
5 tion is asked:

6 "Did you write that letter?"

7 "A Yes, I think so.

8 "Q You remember this letter very well now that
9 I read it to you? You wrote it on July 12, 1940?"

10 "A Yes."

11 Colonel Woolworth will now address the Court.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Woolworth.

13 COLONEL WOOLWORTH: May it please the Tribunal,
14 It has been agreed by defense to waive the provisions
15 of Rule 6b(1) of Rules of this Tribunal as to the
16 introduction of excerpts from documents as follows:

17 Against HASHIMOTO: documents No. 13-c, 828,
18 1598, and 1875;

19 Against MINAMI: documents No. 1903, 827, 1426,
20 831, 1483, 1869;

21 Against UMEZU: documents No. 1483, 1144-A,
22 1144-B, 1144-C, 1144-D, 1144-E.

23 Prosecution has agreed to have processed for
24 defense such further excerpts from said documents as
25 reasonably may be required.

1 HASHIMOTO conspired, led and instigated
2 aggressive warfare on the part of Japan, with announced
3 purpose of having Japan control all East Asia, China,
4 Burma, Siam, Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands
5 East Indies.

6 He was the author of many books, pamphlets
7 and articles advocating such action.

8 He was one of those responsible for the March
9 and October, 1931, incidents.

10 He conspired with Major CHO and Dr. OKAWA
11 and others to bring about the Manchurian incident.

12 He was founder of the Sakura Kai, Dai Nippon
13 Seinento (Greater Japan Youth Party), and its
14 successor Dai Nippon Sekisei-Kai; Permanent Director
15 of IRAA, Director of IRAPS, Vice President and Chief
16 of Staff of GHQ of IRAA Youth Corps, permanent director
17 of Greater East Asia League -- all of which organiza-
18 tions fostered plans for wars of aggression in viola-
19 tion of treaties and international law.

20 I will now offer documents to prove the
21 above facts.

22 Prosecution document No. 13-C was introduced
23 for identification only as exhibit 675, record page
24 7348. I now desire to offer in evidence additional
25 excerpts from this document which have not as yet been

1 read.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
4 No. 13-C, further extracts therefrom, will be given
5 exhibit No. 2185.

6 (Whereupon, the document above referred
7 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 2185 and
8 received in evidence.)

9 COLONEL WOOLWORTH: I will now read the marked
10 portions of this document, exhibit 2185:

11 "Excerpts from the article entitled 'A
12 Message to Young Men' ('Seinen Shoshi Ni Tsugu') by
13 Kingoro HASHIMOTO, published in the 'Taiyo Dai Nippon'
14 17 December 1936.

15 "This August I retired from active military
16 service and entered with high spirit the front line of
17 the renovation movement. When one is in the military
18 profession, the prosecution of his own aspirations is
19 restricted in no small degree, but when one retires
20 from public life, he finds himself in the happy situ-
21 ation of being able, if he would only try, to work
22 fully from a broadminded, high viewpoint. I decided
23 at once to begin a new action for the next generation
24 and organized the Greater Japan Young Men's Party
25 (Dai Nippon Seinento).

1 "Our aim is renovation. In order to effect
2 renovation, blood and enthusiasm are absolutely
3 essential. The blood and enthusiasm thus required
4 are the possessions of young men.

5 "From the physical point of view, old people
6 never can accomplish such a great work as the second
7 creation of the world. For the sake of the renovation
8 I hope that pure, sincere and ardent young people will
9 surely succeed in it. To make young men become the
10 framework of New Japan and to unite the whole strength,
11 both tangible and intangible, of the Japanese race in
12 our Emperor, is the way to be loyal to our country,
13 and that is also the spirit of the Dai Nippon Seinento."

14 "Excerpts from the Article entitled: 'The
15 Reform of Parliamentary System' appearing in the Taiyo
16 Dai Nippon January 17, 1932, Page 1:

17 "Responsible government - Party Cabinet System -
18 runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is
19 the democratic government which ignores the 'Tenno'
20 government.

21 "Then what is the nature of state ministries?
22 The above mentioned 'Exposition of the Imperial Consti-
23 tution' says: 'The way for state ministries to serve
24 the Throne is to strive to encourage good and correct
25 wrongs, and if they commit any mistakes, they shall not

1 evade responsibility under the pretence of having made
2 them under Imperial command.' It further says:

3 'According to the Constitution, state ministers have
4 the heavy responsibility of assisting the Throne and
5 possess great administrative powers. They not only
6 occupy posts of making decisions on their own responsi-
7 bility, but also have the duties of correcting wrongs.
8 Hence, they should themselves bear responsibility for
9 them!'

10 "No matter how much the existing political
11 parties, imitating the constitutional system of Europe
12 and America, might try to make it the basis of party
13 government under the pretence of responsible govern-
14 ment, it is very clear that it runs counter to the
15 'Tenno' government, which has been established firmly
16 since the founding of our Empire, and which remains
17 solemnly unshaken in the constitution granted by the
18 Emperor.

19 "Dissolve the Political Parties at Once.

20 "They who destroyed the national structure,
21 desecrated the Constitution and corrupted the govern-
22 ment, not realizing their faults, are now bewildered
23 by the demand for the rejection of party government
24 and the reformation of the parliamentary system and are
25 trying their best to glorify their own rule by deceiving

1 the people in the name of 'Movement for the defense
2 of the Constitution.' When we consider their dangerous
3 anti-national structure, political ideology and their
4 aggressive evils, we believe it most urgently necessary
5 first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing
6 political parties and destroy them for the sake of the
7 construction of a cheerful new Japan."

8 At the bottom of page 2:

9 "Excerpts from the article entitled, 'Powers
10 are Desperately Building Up Air Forces - Build Up an
11 Invincible Air Force,' appearing in Taiyo Dai Nippon
12 July 1, 1937, Page 1:

13 "In comparison with such desperate efforts
14 of the powers to enlarge and reinforce their air
15 forces, Japan is in a pitifully poor condition at present.
16 If we allow things to remain in their present state,
17 it is certain that there will be an irretrievable handi-
18 cap between Japan and the other powers in the future.
19 Especially how shall we be able to battle against the
20 Soviet Union which is not making irresistable progress?

21 "The declaration by Kingoro HASHIMOTO says:
22 'Make an invincible air force the mainstay of armaments,
23 get rid of the concept that the air force belongs to
24 the army and foster instead the concept that it is the
25 air force of the State, the same as our ancient concept

1 of the sword.' In other words, the strongest and most
2 promising air force should constitute the mainstay of
3 armaments, with which we intend to complete an invincible
4 structure."

5 "Excerpts from the Article entitled, 'The
6 Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence
7 (Dai Toa Koka Ken)' by Kingoro HASHIMOTO, President
8 of Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai, appearing in Taiyo Dai
9 Nippon, January 5, 1942, page 1:

10 "The war to bring an end to the Euro-American
11 culture which has dominated for several centuries the
12 peoples of the whole world, has been started. The
13 blow struck in the Pacific on the 8th of December, 1941,
14 is a blow of initiation of the movement for the turn-
15 ing of world history. The world culture based on the
16 old principle of domination will probably meet doom
17 with a violent crash.

18 "The utmost efforts of the leaders of the
19 world to avert such a situation were all in vain.
20 History, like the universe, revolves in a stately form.
21 It is beyond the power of man to control it. Why does
22 history revolve so? People may say: 'from liberalism
23 to totalitarianism; from national economy to regional
24 economy; from the old order to the new order.' But
25 there are merely superficial views of the matter. The

1 world is striding forward as if it were the divine
2 will, toward a greater higher and truer principle of
3 governing mankind.

4 "The present great world upheaval is a
5 scene of strife where we are groping for a high
6 philosophy and principle of governing mankind. Seeing
7 this scene of strife, 'Amano Minakanushi No Kami' (the
8 creator of the universe) must be very anxious to make
9 us grasp the highest principle of guiding mankind.
10 Well, then, what is the highest principle of man-
11 kind? That is our national structure. It is the great
12 ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu' (universal concordia).

13 "Such capitalism and communism have no
14 significant philosophy nor any humanitarianism, and
15 yet Britain, America and U.S.S.R. have theologized
16 these shallow principles, and have tried to exploit
17 the people of the world. But they have now reached
18 their last days in the present great world war.
19 Hitler said that the present great world war was a
20 war of the outlook of the world. I would like to say
21 that it is a war for the establishment of a guiding
22 principle. It should be called a war for the establish-
23 ment of the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.' Whether
24 we like it or not, the world is progressing steadily
25 toward the above-described guiding principle.

1 "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
2 and the European Co-Prosperity Sphere of Germany and
3 Italy are the manifestations of this progress. The
4 North and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere is, in
5 its pattern, a similar manifestation, although it is
6 still bearing the name of old capitalistic guiding
7 principle for co-prosperity, it is certain that it will
8 have to rely on our guiding principle some day in the
9 future. Among those three regional blocs, the Greater
10 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere possesses the highest
11 and most philosophical guiding principle. By guiding
12 principle, I mean the principle of 'Hakko Ichiu', a
13 principle similar to that of the human body. And that
14 is why I call this sphere 'Dai Toa Koka Ken' (The
15 Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence).
16 That is, in the 'Koka Ken', the constituent countries
17 form an organic whole, with Japan as the brain, grow-
18 ing and developing as one living substance under the
19 august virtues of His Majesty the Emperor. If it is
20 only a horizontal federation of the countries of
21 Greater East Asia, it not only lacks life, but is
22 also very far from the ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.'

23 "It follows that, as the first cardinal point
24 of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under
25 Imperial Influence, the races of Greater East Asia

1 must religiously grasp the above described principle.
2 Otherwise, it would be meaningless. In order to
3 achieve this, first of all the Yamoto race must be
4 fully imbued with this principle and disseminate and
5 inculcate it into other races. The Yamoto race must
6 be fully imbued with and practice this principle. This
7 is Showa Renovation. Without this it is not possible
8 to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial
9 Influence.

10 "In fixing the limits of the Greater East
11 Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, we must turn
12 our attention first of all to national defense, because
13 however abundant our resources may be, and however
14 solid the political combination of the various races
15 may be, we shall be very easily destroyed by outsiders
16 if our national defense is deficient. From the
17 national defense point of view in the light of the
18 present world situation, it is absolutely necessary to
19 include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in our
20 national defense sphere. This is because we shall
21 automatically be able to control the countries of the
22 Sphere if we gain control of the seas. Little consider-
23 ation needs to be given to the armaments with reference
24 to countries within the Sphere, but armaments against
25 those outside the Sphere are necessary. The mainstay

1 of our national defense is our invincible air force.
2 From this standpoint the minimum requirement is the
3 inclusion of islands within the line extending in the
4 east from Hawaii and New Zealand, and in the West
5 from the Persian Gulf eastward. In the north it is
6 necessary to take possession of the Aleutian Islands.
7 I refrain from saying here about the U.S.S.R. sector,
8 but you can imagine what I want to say. Besides these,
9 Japan, Manchuria, China and other countries on the
10 continent should be added of course, and further, great
11 naval ports are necessary in the northern part of Japan,
12 Singapore, the southern point of India, Sidney, and
13 Davao. With these places as operational bases, it is
14 necessary to establish many air bases and bases for
15 minor war vessels in the neighboring islands. By means
16 of a series of operational spheres of our air forces,
17 we should ensure the safety of the Greater East Asia
18 Sphere under Imperial Influence, and at the same time
19 post a considerable army on the continent and other
20 countries of the Sphere under Imperial Influence.

21

22

23

24

25

1 I turn next to page 8. "Excerpts from
2 Article entitled 'Clear the Clouds from the East
3 Asia Sky' by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared
4 in the 1 May 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

5 "On coming back to the homeland from the
6 battlefield, the first pledge I made is to 'pay
7 homage to the soldiers.' We can pay no higher
8 homage to them in leading the China Incident to its
9 solution, and the cardinal point of the solution
10 lies in solving the problems in connection with
11 England and the Soviet Union who assist Chiang Kai-
12 Shek. Without solving these problems, all our ef-
13 forts in destroying Chiang Kai-Shek would be fruitless.
14 The longer we fight, the firmer the Chinese people will
15 unite, adoring Chiang as their hero. Chiang Kai-Shek
16 is a puppet fed and manipulated by England and the
17 Soviet Union. Therefore, the key of solving the Chi-
18 nese problem lies in the destruction of those supporters
19 of Chiang.

20 "The chief supporter is England rather than
21 the Soviet. She has great interests in China, and as
22 her retreat from China leads necessarily to her re-
23 treat in India and in her other territories in Asia,
24 it is perfectly natural that she is making desperate
25 efforts to stick to China.

1 "When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union
2 will be left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural
3 and impossible for the Soviet Union to make an alliance
4 with England. Communism, which is the fundamental
5 principle of the Soviet Union, advocates a challenge
6 to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy
7 to have made Russia intent on the oriental affairs.
8 If we show our decision to attack England, the Soviet
9 Union will immediately turn the point of her spear to-
10 ward India, the treasure house of capitalism. We must
11 defend on the north and advance toward the south. Our
12 destiny will be decided in the south.

13 "I have heard recently of the need of strength-
14 ening Axis collaboration. From the viewpoint that the
15 success in solving the China Incident depends entirely
16 upon the expulsion of England, the policy of Germany
17 and Italy to destroy England and France are on the same
18 foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must
19 instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial
20 Tri-Partite Pact, including democracy as well as com-
21 munist as the object of attack. If we strengthen our
22 collaboration, it is easy to put an end to England and
23 France. In Europe, Germany and Italy will eliminate
24 communism and democracy, the two enemies of human
25

1 civilization, and in Asia, in the area east to India
2 at least, Japan will expel those countries which are
3 founded upon communism and democracy."

4 "Excerpt from Article entitled, 'Expel the
5 British Influence from the Far East' by HASHIMOTO,
6 Kingoro, which appeared in the 15 May 1939 issue of
7 Taiyo Dai Nippon:

8 "Under the present condition, it is very
9 easy to beat England. We have only to say decisively
10 that we will occupy Hong Kong and her concession in
11 Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far
12 East? The British fleet will not be able to enter
13 Singapore. For we have our peerless aviators in addi-
14 tion to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she
15 will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100,000,000
16 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if
17 we need 100 airplanes to sink a warship, the account
18 is entirely on our side."

19 "Short Cutting Remarks on the Present Situa-
20 tion by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro which appeared in the 1 June
21 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

22 "It is a humiliation to have a talk with
23 England."

24 "Define England as the enemy!"

25 "Our way is one: Expulsion of England."

1 "Arm the Axis!"

2 "The enemy that blocks our way to the South
3 is England."

4 "Excerpts from the article entitled 'The
5 Solution of the Incident Depends upon the expulsion
6 of England' by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in
7 the 20 June 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

8 "If it had not been for the support of Eng-
9 land, the Chiang Government would have been already
10 destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England,
11 the Incident will be brought to an end immediately.

12 "The Premier and the Foreign Minister have
13 told us that it is necessary to strengthen the Axis
14 collaboration, but they have been hesitating to con-
15 clude the Military Alliance. It is because they are
16 afraid of England. If the Tri-Partite Military Alliance
17 is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must
18 instantly proceed toward it.

19 "The foreign concessions in Tientsin are
20 blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the
21 attack. Because the whole nation has recognized its
22 necessity, the Government should avail itself of this
23 opportunity and attack instantly. The attack should not
24 be stopped at Tientsin, but extended to Shanghai and
25 to Hong Kong. This is the only possible solution of the

1 China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England!"

2 "Excerpt from an article entitled, 'Organize
3 a Class A Wartime Cabinet that has no Fear of England
4 and the Soviet Union' by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro appearing
5 in the 10 July 1939 issue of the Taiyo Dai Nippon:

6 "Now our real opponents are England and the
7 Soviet Union. When there is only one way ahead of us,
8 why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic
9 blockade? Even if it should be enforced, it is only
10 a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole
11 can make her way through with a complete wartime system
12 in which every subject returns his property to the
13 Emperor.

14 "A Government without policy and decision is
15 a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion,
16 power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear.
17 What we need now is a wartime cabinet with the highest
18 authority."

19 "Excerpt from an article entitled 'Build a
20 State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its
21 Leader' by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the
22 20 July 1939 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

23 "The public opinion of the whole people has
24 taken an anti-British turn. This is natural and satis-
25 factory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do

1 not know what to do with China. My opinion is as fol-
2 lows:

3 "1. The thorough destruction of the old order
4 is necessary. We must destroy the Kuomintang Govern-
5 ment, and the economic, political and ideological in-
6 fluences of England and Russia.

7 "2. China and Manchukuo should organize a
8 state union with Japan as its leader. We must organ-
9 ize a self-supplying bloc within the Far East, and that
10 economical, defensive bloc must be led by Japan, the
11 savior of East Asia. We should then have friendly
12 terms with those countries that recognize our union
13 state, and allow no commercial relations with other
14 countries."

15 "Excerpt from an article entitled, 'No More
16 Compromise!' by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in
17 the 25 September 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

18 "I have often pointed out that England and
19 America have been hostile to us throughout the China
20 Incident. The Government authorities also have re-
21 cently warned the nation of this fact. Moreover,
22 have they not been taking such challenging attitudes
23 as to give birth to the term 'ABCD bloc?' The abol-
24 ishment of the commercial treaty by England, America's
25

1 freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic
2 embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is
3 no hope of readjusting the friendly relations between
4 Japan and the two countries. Germany and Italy have
5 already gone into a state of war with America. What
6 Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-
7 Partite Pact.

8 "The Incident will come to an end when the
9 leaders of China become aware of the true facts and
10 become oriental again. If we should put an end to
11 the Incident now, by compromising with England and
12 America, China will be left as she has been - dependent
13 on England and America. If this should happen, how
14 could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed
15 themselves for the cause?

16 "The Government seems to be taking the atti-
17 tude of an opportunist. It is not a good attitude.
18 We Japanese must decide by ourselves. It is up to us
19 to create our own victorious history."

20 I offer for identification only prosecution
21 document No. 828, which is the "10 Day Report from the
22 Home Ministry of 11 January 1941," and from this docu-
23 ment I desire to introduce in evidence Section 2.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1 No. 828 will receive exhibit No. 2186 for identifica-
2 tion only, and the excerpt therefrom, bearing the same
3 document number, will receive exhibit No. 2186-A.

4 (Whereupon, the document above re-
5 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
6 No. 2186 for identification, the excerpt
7 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 2186-A and received in evidence.)

9 MR. WOOLWORTH: I will read exhibit 2186-A.

10 "II. The conditions of Sekiseikai meetings
11 in the Central and Western Districts. Sekiseikai
12 has been preparing for opening of meetings in Western
13 and Central Districts, and as per schedule the Cen-
14 tral Area meeting was opened in Kyoto on the second
15 of this month, and the Western Area meeting was opened
16 at Kokura on the ninth of this month."

17 THE PRESIDENT: You are reading another docu-
18 ment. It may be another translation of the same docu-
19 ment. The document we have opens this way: "The
20 conditions of the Ultra Nationalist meetings--"

21 MR. WOOLWORTH: If the Tribunal please, there
22 was a correction published on this document. There was
23 an error in translation, and the words "Ultra National-
24 ist meetings" and the words "Ultra Nationalist Society"
25 were stricken, and in their place was substituted

"Sekiseikai" meetings.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Our copies have not been
2 corrected yet.

3 MR. WOOLWORTH: There is a further correc-
4 tion in paragraph 3, the words "Ultra Nationalist
5 Society" are stricken - in the second line of paragraph
6 3.

7 THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear in our
8 copies in paragraph 3. Right at the end the words
9 appear, at the end of page 1.

10 MR. WOOLWORTH: It is the numbered paragraph
11 3, sir, toward the bottom of the first page, the sec-
12 ond line.

13 May I proceed?

14 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

15 MR. WOOLWORTH: ". . . . and as per sched-
16 ule the Central Area meeting was opened in Kyoto on the
17 second of this month, and the Western Area meeting was
18 opened at Kokura on the ninth of this month.

19 "(1) Conditions of the Central Area meeting.
20 On the day in question they gathered at Kangyo Hall
21 in Okazaki Park, 5800 members attended and there were
22 two speeches by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, President of the
23 society, and ADACHI, chief clerk. After the lecture,
24 inspection of members was held in the public square in
25

1 front of the meeting place and afterwards with all
2 members in formation, circled the park and went to
3 pay homage at Heian Shrine and from there to Kisaka
4 Shrine in twos and threes, and were dismissed.

5 "At this meeting, the President of the socie-
6 ty, HASHIMOTO, advocated overthrow of England and
7 America just as he has always done in his customary
8 lecture, entitled 'Praying to Soldiers.' And regard-
9 ing the TOJO Cabinet he commented: (Since the out-
10 break of China Affair, succeeding Cabinet has been
11 regarded with contempt by England and America but
12 now, for the first time, a cabinet has appeared which
13 has some power.) He also advocated southward advance,
14 and as epilogue he strongly emphasized: (Greater
15 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is not suitable. We
16 should construct Greater East Asia under the Imperial
17 Influence Sphere as soon as possible. That time is
18 not to be counted by month but by days. In short it
19 is necessary for us to act at once.)
20
21
22
23
24
25

W
o
i
f
&
y
e
l
d
e
n

1 "(2) Conditions of the Western District
2 meeting. Members meeting was held that day at Kokura
3 City Public Hall at 10.30 in the morning and there
4 were 15000 members including 50 women assembled.
5 After a resolution had been made and passed and the
6 address of instructions by the President advocating
7 strongly, the passing of the resolution of the society,
8 had been given movements of every local branch offices
9 and central office were reported, the meeting finished
10 at 12.20 then in a body, went to the military cemetery
11 to pray. On the way, HASHIMOTO, President, ADACHI,
12 the chief clerk, and NISHIBE, head of the Western
13 District office, riding their horse reviewed the
14 members. At three o'clock in the afternoon the
15 lecture meeting was held at the meeting place. How-
16 ever, there was no enthusiasm among the members and
17 there were only about 1800 people present and amongst
18 them there were extremely few members. HASHIMOTO, the
19 President, and ADACHI, the chief clerk, gave lectures
20 almost identical with one given at the Central District
21 meeting, but a feeling of unenthusiasm was felt.

22 "(3) Command for boosting of moral support
23 of southward advance. President of SEKISEIKAI (Ultra
24 Nationalist Society) HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, now on a
25 lecture tour in Kwansai District, on the seventh of

1 November directed members of head office to transmit
2 the following command throughout the whole country.

3 "Rise up resolutely, time approaches. Insti-
4 gate at once a powerful national movement, using
5 every kind of method (speeches, discussion, meetings,
6 posters, etc.) and begin a sweeping campaign against
7 sympathizers of England and America and at the same
8 time start a movement to inspire moral support of
9 'Advance Southward' program throughout the country."

10 I offer for identification document No. 1598
11 which is a book entitled "The Second Creation" by
12 HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, the 14th Edition, published 30
13 January 1941. I offer in evidence excerpts from this
14 document.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
17 No. 1598 will receive exhibit No. 2187 for identifica-
18 tion only and the excerpt therefrom bearing the same
19 document number will receive exhibit No. 2187-A.

20 (Whereupon, the document above
21 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 2187 for identification only; the excerpt
23 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
24 No. 2187-A and received in evidence.)

25 MR. WOOLWORTH: I will now read exhibit 2187-A.

1 "Excerpts from 'The Second Creation' by
HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, 30 January 1941 (14th Edition)

2 "DECLARATION

3 "The world at present is facing an historic
4 turning point requiring great fundamental change
5 because the social system of materialistic liberalism
6 has come to a deadlock. (p. 1)

7 * * *

8
9 "At this juncture, any country that succeeds
10 in establishing a superior national structure, will
11 be able to lead the whole world. I think our country
12 whose national policy is 'eight corners under one
13 roof' (Hakko Ichin) should, with a bold leap, estab-
14 lish the national structure combining mental and
15 material culture, and become a glorious moral leader
16 of the world, by immediately displaying her original
17 character depending solely upon His Majesty with all
18 the capacity of the nation. In this sense, I propose
19 the following new national structure. (p. 1)

20 * * *

21 "III. Diplomatic Strides.

22 "Within our territory we should let different
23 races have limited self-government under a closely
24 connected organic system that would allow each race
25 to give full play to its strong points, so that the

1 racial cultures may be elevated as a whole and the
2 influence of the Imperial benevolence may be realized.
3 This policy should be extended to the rest of the
4 world. (p. 2)

5 "IV. Strides in Military Preparations.

6 "Absolute war preparations should be completed,
7 enabling us to crush, at any time, countries which,
8 under different ideologies, may interfere with us
9 when we carry this national structure into operations.

10 "The principal part of our armaments should
11 be an invincible air force. We should lead the
12 nation to have the idea that airplanes belong to
13 the nation and the country, giving up the idea that
14 they belong to the Army, so that they may come to
15 bear the same confidence in aircraft that the Japanese
16 nation is known to have had toward the Japanese sword
17 from of old. (p.3) * * *

18 "If our overseas emigration and also the
19 export of our commercial commodities to foreign markets
20 should prove to be impossible, there is only one thing
21 left: The national policy to develop the Asiatic
22 Continent and to advance to the south, which Japan has
23 been carrying out in spite of the difficulties since
24 the Manchurian Incident. (p. 216) * * *

25 "Regarded from the Japanese standpoint, the

1 China Incident is undoubtedly an expansion and develop-
2 ment of the Manchurian Incident. Being afraid of
3 Japan's expansion on the Continent after the Manchurian
4 Incident, European and American powers have tried
5 every means to prevent it. For example, they blocked
6 the markets of our commercial commodities; Great
7 Britain influenced the United States to threaten
8 Japan in economic as well as military affairs.

9 Great Britain also instigated Soviet Russia to make
10 such unreasonably heavy war preparations in the Far
11 East, and tried to fish in troubled waters by causing
12 war between Japan and Russia. It is Great Britain's
13 plainest anti-Japanese policy to help the Chiang
14 Kai-shek Government and turn it against Japan. One
15 of her methods is seen in the fact that Great
16 Britain has interfered with the accomplishment of
17 our national policy toward the Continent by buying
18 out the pro-British elements in Japan. The China
19 Incident is really the outcropping of the conflict
20 between Japan and England on the stage of China.

21 (pp. 218, 219) * * *

22 "Japan and England are doomed to fight with
23 force of arms also in the near future, but as it is
24 the diplomatic policy to break down Great Britain
25 without using force, we consider it the most appropriate

1 policy to expel all British influence from China
2 first, and gradually to exclude British influence
3 from the East Asiatic united zone, by means of anti-
4 British pressure from the masses. (p. 236) * * *

5 "At present as the second World War is
6 raging, Great Britain is trying her utmost not to
7 offend Japan's feelings, but she will surely renew
8 her effort and strengthen her anti-Japanese policy
9 as soon as the European affair is settled. As far as
10 our country is concerned, now is the best opportunity
11 to overthrow Great Britain. (p. 237) * * *

12 "In diplomacy, too, it is best to concentrate
13 strength on the principal points and to smash them
14 one by one. At present, our diplomatic opponent is
15 England, so we must concentrate all our efforts upon
16 control over England. Our diplomatic policy toward
17 Soviet Russia must be decided from this standpoint.
18 Soviet Russia is a bogey-like country, and the extent
19 to which she can be trusted is very hard to understand,
20 but it is not wise to turn her into our enemy reck-
21 lessly. And all the more so since the conflicting
22 interests possessed by Soviet Russia and Japan in East
23 Asia are not so grave or significant as those existing
24 between Great Britain and Japan. (pp. 238, 239) * * *

25 "It is reasonable for us to be prepared

1 against Soviet Russia, which is an incomprehensible
2 country, solidify ideological and warlike preparations
3 to resolutely defy Soviet ideological or military
4 challenges, and be ready in power to overthrow her
5 on the spot, should she come and invade us. (p. 239)

6 "However, if a political pact were to be
7 reached from a broader point of view between Japan
8 and the Soviet Union to the effect that Russia will
9 adjust diplomatic relations with Japan and take the
10 offensive against Britain, all these pending procedural
11 problems will be solved of themselves. (p. 241) * * *

12 "The principle of our foreign policy is to
13 push activities viz a viz the powers on the one hand,
14 while on the other exerting its full strength toward
15 the re-establishment of China and the formation of a
16 united body of countries in East Asia. When this
17 united body has been formed, the actual power of our
18 country will be absolutely incomparable. Great Britain
19 and Soviet Russia will count for nothing. And if we
20 thus embrace the Continent of Asia and seize control
21 of the Pacific Ocean, then great forward striding
22 Japan will be recognized by the world as a leading
23 nation of the earth. (pp. 242, 243)."

24
25

1 I offer in evidence prosecution document
2 No. 1875, consisting of excerpts from the interrogation
3 of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, conducted from 17 January to
4 18 February 1946.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document No.
7 1875 will receive exhibit No. 2188.

8 (Whereupon, the document above
9 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
10 hibit No. 2188 and received in evidence.)

11 MR. WOOLWORTH: I will read exhibit No. 2188:

12 "Excerpts from Testimony of HASHIMOTO, Kingoro,
13 conducted from 17 January, 1946 to 18 February, 1946.

14 "Q And in your examination of February 12
15 you denied having made the following statement which
16 was included in the publication entitled 'Sekai Saiken
17 No Michi' (How to Rebuild the World), which was published
18 30 January 1941: 'I would not say that is the only
19 reason, but anyway thereafter the Manchurian Incident,
20 withdrawal from the League of Nations, denunciation of
21 the Disarmament Agreement, the May 15 Incident, Shimpei
22 Tai, and the February 26 Incident took place in succession.'
23 When you denied making that statement in your examination
24 of February 12 you were mistaken on that point, were you
25 not?

1 "A It is in that book. I was mistaken the
2 other day." (Case 343-10, Page 8-15 Feb. 46)

3 * * * * *

4 "Q Colonel, you said at the last hearing that
5 you were one of the founders of the Sakura Kai. Is
6 that true?

7 "A Yes.

8 "Q Who were some of the other members of
9 that society when it was formed?

10 "A The founder of this SakuraKai is myself,
11 but there are a few others that were with me at the time
12 The sole founder of this society is myself,
13 and the others were more or less in the capacity of
14 assistants as secretaries, etc." (Case 343-6, Page 31-
15 22 January 1946)

16 * * * * *

17 "Q Do you know anything about the Greater
18 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?

19 "A Yes.

20 "Q Describe to what geographical regions
21 this Sphere extended.

22 "A The approximate geographical sphere would
23 include India, the Philippines, China.

24 "Q Was Burma included?

25 "A Yes.

1 "Q You wanted to get the British out of this
2 sphere?

3 "A Yes."

4 * * * * *

5 "Q You belong to the Dai Nippon Seki Sei
6 Kai?

7 "A I formulated that. (Case 343-6, Page 41-
8 22 January 1946)

9 "Q But sooner or later you did get around
10 to planning a coup de etat, didn't you?

11 "A This was not something that the Cherry
12 Blossom Society alone planned, but in October, 1931
13 there was the attempted 'October Incident' in which it
14 was planned to do away with the high government officials
15 in office and put in a new group.

16 "Q And prior to this October incident there
17 had been the 'March Incident' which had failed,
18 hadn't there?

19 "A Yes."

20 * * * * *

21 "Q Colonel, suppose you just tell us now the
22 names of those that planned the March Incident and the
23 names of those that planned the October incident.

24 "A I will start with the March incident. I
25 shall have to think a bit to bring to mind the names.

1 NINOMIYA, who is now dead. SUGIYAMA, who is also dead.
2 KOISO, he is alive. TATEKAWA, deceased, OKAWA, alive.
3 I think Major General NAGATA was involved, but am not
4 sure. Major IKEDA was somewhat involved
5 SHIGETO, yes. That is about all

6 "Q How about Major CHO?

7 "A Yes."

8 * * * * *

9 "Q The way it stands you admit plotting with
10 General TATEKAWA, General KOISO, General NINOMIYA,
11 General SUGIYAMA, and Dr. OKAWA to bring about the
12 March Incident and to bring about the October Incident;
13 but you deny any knowledge or complicity in the 2/26
14 Affair?

15 "A Yes, that is correct.

16 "Q You admit to active participation then
17 in two revolutions, but not three.

18 "A Yes."

19 * * * * *

20 "Q Did you have any part in the formation
21 of the Dai Nippon Seinen To?

22 "A After being retired in October 1936,
23 I organized this society.

24 "Q And you were president of the society,
25 were you not?

1 "A I was head of the society."

2 * * * * *

3 "Q Where was your regiment stationed at the
4 time of the Panay Incident?

5 "A At a place called Wuhu, on the Yangtze
6 River above Nanking.

7 "Q Who was the General in command over you
8 at that time?

9 "A Lieutenant General YANAGAWA.

10 "Q How did the attack on the Panay happen?
11 What caused it?

12 "A I had no knowledge of the Panay Incident
13 until the British gunboat Ladybird passed by Wuhu; I
14 shelled the Ladybird and took it into custody and at
15 that time the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird told
16 me he was going to the assistance of the Panay because
17 he had gotten word that the Panay was in trouble. This
18 was my first knowledge of the Incident. I simply knew
19 the Panay was downstream and did not know anything further
20 than that."

21 * * * * *

22 "Q Under whose orders did you act when you
23 shelled the Ladybird?

24 "This was under orders from Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA.
25 These orders read as follows: 'Nanking being in a state

1 of seige, and it appearing that enemy troops will attempt
2 to flee upstream, Colonel HASHIMOTO is to sink all
3 vessels proceeding toward Nanking without regard to
4 nationality.'"

5 That should appear as an answer.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
7 minutes.

8 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess
9 was taken until 1500, after which the
10 proceedings were resumed as follows:)
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A
b
r
a
m
&
4
S
p
r
a
c
t

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Woolworth.

4 MR. WOOLWORTH: May it please the Tribunal,
5 in the second line on page 3 should appear the letter,
6 in capital, "A." It was omitted.

7 (Reading):

8 "Q Colonel, when you came back from the battle-
9 field in China 25 March 1939, weren't you tendered a
10 great reception described as 'an unprecedented demon-
11 stration for the national restoration'?

12 "A The assembly was a good deal after my return.
13 As for the rest of your question, that is essentially
14 correct.

15 "Q You state there in your book that you dis-
16 solved the Dai Nippon Seinento and instantly estab-
17 lished the Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai and the following
18 policies were approved at the Third General Assembly
19 of the Association in 19 November 1939:

20 "1. Restroation of the nation.

21 "2. Stronger armament for the defense and
22 liberation of the Asiatic races.

23 "3. Asiatic autarchy.

24 "4. Attack Britain and her dominions.

25 "5. Imperialization of east Asia.

1 "6. Establishment of state union in Asia.

2 "A Point one, that is correct. Point two I
3 advocated a peerless air force. Point three is cor-
4 rect. Point four, whether I said it then or not I do
5 not know, but I hold those feelings.

6 "Q Aren't they set out in your book there?

7 "A This book has only through the Second General
8 Assembly. No, it is here! Point four is correct. I
9 say that to attack England is to bring to a conclusion
10 the China Incident. Point five -- I do not know what
11 you mean exactly -- I advocated independence of all
12 Asiatic nations. Six is correct.

13 "Q Colonel, when you published this book in 1941
14 including these attached outlines and histories of
15 your societies, you were a leader and an official and
16 a permanent director of the Imperial Rule Assistance
17 Association, weren't you?

18 "A That is correct.

19 "Q And the Premier KONOYE was the President of
20 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, wasn't he?

21 "A Yes.

22 "Q Colonel, you stated in answer to some ques-
23 tions of mine on the 12th of February that in Taiyo Dai
24 Nippon you did not say in an article entitled 'Expel
25 the British Influence from the Far East,' that 'under

1 the present condition it is very easy to beat England.'

2 (Copy of the Taiyo Dai Nippon is shown to HASHIMOTO.)

3 "A Is that so?

4 "Q Was your answer true that you did not say any --

5 "A There is no mistake. I must have said it.

6 "Q And did you not say on the same day to me that
7 you did not say in an article in this paper under date
8 of May 11, 1939, 'We have only to say decisively that
9 we will occupy Hongkong and her concession in Shanghai.
10 How can the British troops come to the Far East?'

11 (Copy of the article is shown to HASHIMOTO.)

12 "A Yes, I made such a statement. It is something
13 I said a long time ago and therefore I did not remember
14 it very well. But if you look at it here (pointing to
15 the newspaper) you should find the correct statements.

16 "Q Then you want to correct the answer you made
17 on the 12th of February in which you said that you did
18 not make such a statement?

19 "A It is as written here.

20 "Q And it does say there in that article written
21 by you, in substance, 'that we have only to say de-
22 cisively that we will occupy Hongkong and her concession
23 in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the
24 Far East?'

25 "A That is correct.

1 "Q And you did say in that same article that
2 the 'British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore
3 for we have our peerless aviators in addition to the
4 fleet?'

5 "A Yes, in substance -- but what is actually
6 stated here is that if we have these aforementioned
7 things the British Fleet will receive a crushing blow
8 before being able to enter Singapore.

9 "Q This quotation which you just read is from
10 the publication Taiyo Dai Nippon dated May 11, 1939,
11 which is part of document No. 13, is it not? (Indicating
12 copy of publication).

13 "A Naturally.

14 "Q And you were responsible for the publication
15 of that newspaper?

16 "A Yes.

17 "Q And that was published bimonthly, the 5th
18 and 20th?

19 "A Three times a month. It is not circulated
20 outside of the Sekisei Kai.

21 "Q How many members did that society have?

22 "A I do not believe there were over 20,000.

23 "Q And in this same article you said in sub-
24 stance: 'Even though England is wealthy, she will
25 suffer greatly if her warship which costs one hundred

1 million yen will be sunk by our three hundred thou-
2 sand yen airplane.'?

3 "A That is correct.

4 "Q Then you were mistaken when you stated on
5 the 12th of February that you had made no such state-
6 ment?

7 "A That is so. I did not remember.

8 "Q And in the issue of this same paper of June 1,
9 1939, did you say 'Define England as the enemy?'

10 "A Yes.

11 "Q Then you were mistaken when you stated in
12 the examination of 12 February that you did not make
13 such a statement?

14 "A Yes.

15 "Q And did you state in the issue of June 1 of
16 this paper, document No. 13, 'Our way is one -- expul-
17 sion of England?'

18 "A Yes.

19 "Q Then your denial of that statement was untrue.

20 "A I had no remembrance. Your interpretation
21 was not incorrect. My memory was in error.

22 "Q What is the title of that article there?
23 (Indicating article in paper)

24 "A It means on topics of the time, upon
25 matters of the moment, or something like that.

1 "Q It doesn't say 'Solution of incident depends
2 upon expulsion of England?'

3 "A Yes. (Comment by Interpreter: He admitted
4 that.)

5 "Q Does it appear there that you said, 'if it
6 hadn't been for support of England, the Chiang Govern-
7 ment would have been already destroyed?'

8 "A Those are essentially my ideas, but whether
9 it is here or not I do not know. (Looking at article
10 to see.) I do not see it here, but those were my
11 ideas in any case.

12 "Q Turning to the June 20, 1939 article, title,
13 'Expulsion of England in the Solution to the China
14 Incident,' did you state in that article substantially
15 as follows: 'The foreign concessions in Tientsin are
16 blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the
17 attack, because the whole nation has recognized it is
18 necessary the Government should avail itself of this
19 opportunity and attack instantly. The attack should
20 not be stopped at Tientsin but extended to Shanghai and
21 to Hongkong. This is the only possible solution of the
22 China incident. We have no choice -- fight England.'

23 "A In substance that is correct.

24 "Q Then you were mistaken when you made a
25 statement on the 12th of February that you did not say

1 that in this paper?

2 "A That is so. My memory was bad.

3 "Q When you denied that you published the state-
4 ment 'Don't hesitate to establish the Asiatic Bloc, this
5 is not an infringement of the Nine Power Treaty; if
6 others think it constitutes such an infringement, re-
7 nounce the treaty,' you were mistaken, were you not?

8 "A There is nothing about the Nine Power Pact in
9 this article. I made that statement in an article in
10 the issue of this same paper dated December 5, 1939.

11 "Q Then you were mistaken when you denied making
12 that statement in your examination of February 12?

13 "A Yes, I was mistaken. (Case No. 343-10, pages
14 4 to 7, inc. -- 15 Feb. 1946).

15 "Q You were in favor, however, of the expedition
16 into Manchuria, were you not?

17 "A Yes.....

18 "Q Did you make a statement advocating the
19 unification of the world under the Emperor, in which
20 you said 'The territories will include Japan, the
21 leader, Manchukuo, China, the far eastern part of
22 Soviet Russia, French Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Dutch
23 East Indies, British East India, Afganistan, Australia,
24 New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and islands on the
25 Pacific and Indian Oceans?

1 "A That I did say. I do not recall including
2 Russia or Hawaii. However, I did make such a statement.

3 "Q In fact, that plan has been in your mind and
4 been advocated by you for many years, has it not?

5 "A I have had such an idea for a long time.
6 (Case No. 343-7, page 5-6-- 12 February 1946.)

7 "Q You published a book, did you not, or were
8 author of it, entitled 'Inevitability of the Renova-
9 tion?'

10 "A Yes.

11 "Q I show you a document which is marked
12 'Document No. 488,' and ask you if you were the author
13 of that book?

14 "A Yes, I wrote it.

15 "Q Did you state in this book 'But what prevents
16 most seriously the progress of the world and the pros-
17 perity of the races is the assistance of England. Japan
18 has only to show her decisive attitude. We have only
19 to say that we will occupy Hongkong and Shanghai. Eng-
20 land knows that if she loses in China she must withdraw
21 also from India.'? This is the book published 25 Dec.
22 1940, called the 'Inevitabilit of the Renovation.'

23 "A Yes.

24 "Q Colonel, directing your attention to page 35
25 of this same publication that you admitted authorship of --

1 Did you not advocate the unification of the world
2 under the Emperor as expressed in the Imperial Edict
3 promulgated by Emperor JIMMU?
4

5 "A Yes, that is correct.

6 "Q Directing your attention to page 52. Did you
7 not say, 'This newly organized measure is the only way
8 for the complete promotion of the unification of the
9 world under the Emperor. And consequently our nation
10 has the right to establish a new order and a problem
11 like the China Incident can be considered as the be-
12 ginning of the establishment of this New World Order.'?

13 "A Yes, it is written there.

14 "Q Directing your attention back to page 36, did
15 you not say in substance that the world to come will be
16 divided into three blocks -- the American block with the
17 Monroe Doctrine, the Oriental block of the Oriental
18 Races, and the European block in Europe.

19 "A Yes, I did.

20 "Q And these three blocks will have to strive
21 for mastery?

22 "A Yes.

23 "Q And in promoting Japan to international
24 position, the most important point is the establish-
25 ment of the Japan-Manchukuo-China block?

"A That is so. In other words, the world will

1 be divided into three blocks, and we must make a block
2 also.

3 "Q Then you talk about how strong the Oriental
4 block must be made following the KONOYE declaration,
5 and then you make this statement: 'This new order
6 means a thorough destruction of the old world order
7 sustained by England, America, France, and the Soviet
8 Union.' That is still on page 36.

9 "A Essentially those were my words.

10 "Q Now you further urged on the people through
11 this publication the 'expulsion of the Anglo-American
12 organization to exploit East Asia.'?

13 "A Yes, I made such a statement.

14 "Q Directing your attention to page 58, you are
15 urging a powerful Cabinet to accomplish these aims, and
16 you say 'It is beyond doubt that those nations like
17 Britain, America, and the Soviet are scheming to op-
18 press Japan by having close touch with one another.'?

19 "A Yes, I made that statement.

20 "Q Now directing your attention to page 62 of
21 this same document No. 488, did you not say that -- the
22 nation which stands as the leader of the anti-Japanese
23 enveloping attack is Britain. Therefore the infliction
24 of the decisive blow on Britain, the leader, prior to
25 their thorough amalgamation is one of the first for

1 dispelling the others. Once Britain is defeated,
2 America will not act haughty, but if in spite of that
3 America shows signs of challenging us, she can easily
4 be knocked off by means of an individual attack; and
5 this is the only strategy through which Japan can win
6 her victory?

7 "A Yes, I made that statement.

8 "Q Then you went on to say on page 64, 'Fortu-
9 nately the cream of Europe, two mighty nations, are
10 extending their hands for an alliance with Japan.
11 Now is the critical moment for deciding the question
12 of creating the expanded greater Japan! The time has
13 come! If we do it now it can be done!'

14 "A Yes.

15 "Q Now, Colonel, we direct your attention to
16 page 71 of this same document and do we not find you
17 urging 'Germany and Italy are fighting against England
18 and France in order to overthrow the status quo and
19 to establish a new order. And it is needless to say
20 that the China Incident in Asia also is the Japanese-
21 Chinese united front against the Anglo-American
22 domination. When we take a strict view of the histori-
23 cal facts. Japan, Germany, and Italy have already gone
24 into an inevitable war against England, France and
25 America.'? Then you say 'Those who purposely refuse to

1 admit this fact are dependent upon England and America.
2 Now I will ask you -- at this time that you published
3 this query to the Premier YONAI, wasn't he trying to
4 put an end to the China Incident and effect a friendly
5 settlement with England and America?

6 "A I do not believe they were."
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "Q What was the purpose of this exhortation?

2 "A I believe it was aimed at telling YONAI to
3 carry on and to bring about an end to the China
4 Incident.

5 "Q Then, Colonel, why did you say this -- 'If
6 you try to put an end to the China Incident in colla-
7 boration with England and America, you will never
8 be able to solve the problem. The instant you make
9 up your mind to expel England and America from China,
10 China will start moving toward a new order?' That is
11 on page 73.

12 "A It was not a fact that YONAI was trying to
13 bring to a close the China Incident. However, at
14 the time there was talk about working in conjunction
15 with the United States and England, and this was
16 written as a warning not to do so.

17 "Q Directing your attention to this same remarka-
18 ble document, page 115, do you not find yourself urging
19 on the people of Japan that 'Now is the time for
20 totalitarianism to rule the world?'

21 "A Yes, that is correct.

22 "Q And on page 122, you say 'The world is ad-
23 vancing from individualism to totalitarianism, and
24 in the future the nations in the world will be
25 united into one?'

1 "A Yes.

2 "Q And on page 131 you are writing about
3 ringing the loud alarm bell at the year end, and did
4 you not say under the date of 20 December 1940, 'The
5 world is now divided into two camps, the one camp is
6 for the status quo, and the other is for the new order.
7 Japan is not neutral. Our enemies of course....are
8 England and America who want to maintain the status
9 quo...Why should we hesitate to take a decisive
10 attitude toward America? ...Whatever form it may take,
11 the collision between Japan and America is inevitable.
12 We had best rise when it is not too late and estab-
13 lish a Co-Prosperity Sphere in the south. Nothing
14 ventured, nothing gained?'

15 "A That is correct.

16 "Q And then don't you refer a little later, on
17 page 135, to the war with China, which has been
18 curiously labeled 'an incident' as a 'holy war?'

19 "A Yes, that is correct.

20 "Q Now I believe, Colonel, that back in 1936
21 you published your rather famous 'Declaration of
22 HASHIMOTO Kingoro?'

23 "A Yes, that was the declaration of the society.

24 "Q But it is known and was labeled in your pub-
25 lication of it as the 'Declaration of HASHIMOTO

1 Kingoro?'

2 "A Yes.

3 "Q And you wrote it?

4 "A Yes.

5 "Q Directing your attention to it, did you say
6 'Methinks that our nation, which has the realization
7 of the unification of the world under the Emperor as
8 her national policy, should instantly manifest her
9 inherent nature in uniting all her people directly
10 under the Emperor?'

11 "A I do not know how the translation reads, but
12 essentially I said something of the sort -- that the
13 world would have to be united under the principle of
14 the Eight Corners Under the One Roof.

15 "Q I will direct your attention to your section
16 dealing with the advancement of our policy abroad. You
17 say in that section 'Within our dominion let each race
18 give a full play to their own characteristics by
19 giving them restricted local government under a close
20 organic system. Try to enhance their racial culture
21 as a whole and to materialize concretely the way of
22 the Empire. With this formula we must later work
23 upon the other parts of the world?'

24 "A That is essentially correct.

25 "Q In this same declaration of yours, Colonel,

1 made away back in 1936, you have got a section on
2 'Advancement of Armaments,' in which you said 'In-
3 crease our armaments to the amount absolutely nec-
4 essary for conquering other countries of different
5 principles that try to hinder us on our way toward
6 the realization of the Imperial Way. The essence of
7 the armaments should be the invincible air force
8 whose airplanes should be considered airplanes of the
9 nation, not only of the Army. Make the people trust
10 the airplane as they trusted the sword in the old
11 times?'

12 "A Yes, I did make such a statement.

13 "Q Now at the time this book was published, were
14 you an official in the IRAA?

15 "A I believe so.

16 "Q Now will you state just what position you
17 held in the IRAA at this time?

18 "A Somu. (Interpreter's Note: Which I believe
19 translates General Affairs Secretary.)

20 "Q You were also a permanent director, were
21 you not?

22 "A Yes.

23 "Q Quoting from the Japan Year Book for 1941-42,
24 in the article on page 175, entitled 'National Move-
25 ment for Assisting the Throne,' the following appears:

1 'The move is highly political in nature.' Isn't that
2 so?

3 "A Prince KONOYE originally thought of it as
4 being a political movement, but because of the clamor
5 in the Diet, all political action was stripped from it.

6 "Q The party aimed at 'superseding the old party
7 politics characterized by sectional interests and
8 predicated upon liberalism?'

9 "A That is substantially so.

10 "Q And it aimed at 'the concentration and
11 unification of all the forces and resources of the
12 nation?' Its activity extended to the whole life of
13 the nation, did it not?

14 "A Yes.

15 "Q Now quoting further from the Year Book, 'the
16 President controls the Association and directs the
17 movement; the Prime Minister is President ex officio.'
18 Is that true?

19 "A That is a question of terminology as the Prime
20 Minister is actually the President and under him the
21 man who controls the Association and directs the
22 movement thereof is known as the Vice President.

23 "Q Now, Colonel, if a new man became Prime Min-
24 ister he also became President of this Association,
25 didn't he?

1 "A That is correct.

2 "Q Colonel, as to the membership of the Associa-
3 tion, the Japan Year Book 1941-1942 states 'The Asso-
4 ciation for Assisting the Throne being a movement that
5 concerns the entire nation, every individual of the
6 Japanese Race is by birthright qualified for membership
7 in it in the widest sense of the term.' Is that a
8 true statement?

9 "A Yes.

10 "Q As a matter of fact, the effect of this
11 Association was to create a single party in the Diet
12 replacing all the other political parties, was it not?

13 "A That was the aim; but the result was that
14 the Diet members fought the scheme and ultimately
15 succeeded in keeping the IRAA out of politics.

16 "Q Did nearly everybody in Japan belong to
17 this society?

18 "A One hundred million.

19 "Q Would you say that this Association largely
20 resembled a Fascist Party) (Comment by Interrogator
21 to Interpreter: Explain to him that we understand
22 that under the Japanese constitution there couldn't
23 be a one-party system, but ask him if actually this
24 was not the beginning of the institution of somewhat
25 of a Fascist Party in Japan.)

1 "A Outside the realm of politics it worked to
2 unite the people as one and to follow the road behind
3 the Emperor.

4 "Q Colonel, wouldn't you say that this associa-
5 tion had accomplished the same thing in Japan in the
6 way of a national mobilization of efforts and re-
7 sources that the Nazi party did in Germany, or the
8 Fascist party did in Italy?

9 "A The only difference is that we had nothing
10 to do with politics.

11 "Q However, I will direct your attention back
12 to one of your first answers this morning, in which
13 you verified the statement in the Japan Year Book
14 that the 'movement was highly political in nature.'

15 "A It was originally political, but was even-
16 tually prohibited from having any part in political
17 action.

18 "Q Didn't you say the main purpose was to unify
19 the nation back to the military for defense of the
20 nation and its principles?

21 "A No, KONOYE was not thinking along these lines.
22 The political parties had disbanded and therefore
23 KONOYE thought, I believe, that this movement would
24 make it possible to have a new and strong single party.
25

"A And you agreed with him?

1 "A Yes, I agreed with him and worked towards
2 it. That was the reason I became a member of the
3 Preparatory Committee.

4 "Q Now I hand you a document marked 'Evidentiary
5 Document 490', and ask you to look at it. I show you
6 your picture in the front of the book. The name of
7 this book is 'How to Rebuild the World.' and I ask
8 you, did you write this book?

9 "A Yes.

10 "Q When?

11 "A Around 1941 I believe.

12 "Q Were you dissatisfied with the way the
13 IRAA was being run at this time?

14 "A No.

15 "Q Why did you get out?

16 "A There was actually no particular reason.

17 "Q How long before you joined the IRAPS?

18 "A I believe I resigned from the IRAA in
19 February of 1941 and the IRAPS was not set up until
20 April of 1942.

21 "Q I will ask you, Colonel, if your book 'How
22 to Rebuild the World' was not published 30 January
23 1941?

24 "A Yes.

25 "Q Then your other answer was a mistake, was it

1 not?

2 "A I believe I said I was still a member.

3 "Q To clear it up anyway, Colonel, you were
4 still officially connected with the IRAA when this
5 book was given to the nation?

6 "A Yes.

7 "Q Directing your attention to page 83 of this
8 same book, do you not urge a 'reformation of Japan
9 is an urgent necessity. Liberalism should be taken
10 away from every sphere?'

11 "A Yes, more or less. Liberalism must be done
12 away with because this is a form under which different
13 individuals strive to make money for themselves or
14 gain power for themselves, and do not heed the overall
15 wishes of the nation.

16 "Q You were the leader of a Young Men Organiza-
17 tion at this time?

18 "A Yes.

19 "Q What was your position in this organization -
20 President?

21 "A I was the President.

22 "Q I hand you a book marked for identification
23 'Evidentiary Document 487,' and ask you to look at
24 this book.

25 "A This is my book.

1 "Q Is not the title of this book 'Speeches to
2 Young Men'?"

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, I think you are
4 speaking rather fast.

5 MR. WOOLWORTH: (Continuing to read):

6 "Q Is not the title of this book 'Speeches to
7 Young Men?'

8 "A Yes.

9 "Q I point to your picture in the front of the
10 book, that is the Japanese front, and ask -- did you
11 write this book?

12 "A Yes. If you go into detail on this book,
13 some of the academic subjects in it are things that I
14 heard from others so that it might be a little dif-
15 ficult for me to explain fully. However, I wrote it.

16 "Q That's all right, Colonel. Directing your
17 attention to page 12, is Chapter II not headed 'Des-
18 truction of World Liberalism?'

19 "A That is correct.

20 "Q In this chapter, do you not attack liberalism,
21 majority rule, imperialism, and white rule? And in
22 this chapter you advocate substituting a controlled
23 economy and free economy, do you not?
24

25 "A Yes.

"Q And on page 23, don't you say 'The existing

1 world order has come to such a pass that it must
2 either settle accounts or undergo a second world war?'

3 "A Yes.

4 "Q Still, from your book, 'Speeches to Young
5 Men,' on page 24, Chapter III, headed 'Material
6 Civilization and Spiritual Culture,' don't you say
7 that 'The white man has conquered four-fifths of the
8 globe and Japan alone is standing against him. Un-
9 less strengthened by Japanese influences, Asiatic
10 peoples fall prey to the white man.' You then pre-
11 sent historical arguments to the effect that Asiatic
12 arms were often and Asiatic culture was always superior
13 to European. You then view history as a struggle
14 between the Europeans and Asiatics and say 'for three
15 thousand years the Asiatics were superior, but in the
16 past three hundred years the white man turned the tables
17 because of his material progress.' Then you further
18 say 'Does this mean that Asiatic spiritualism will
19 always bow to materialism? No.' Not the true Asiatic
20 Spirit, but a degenerated form of it was defeated.
21 Japan will lead a revival of the old Asiatic culture.'
22 Are these not accurate quotations and statements from
23 this chapter?

24 "A Yes, in substance those are my remarks.

25 What I have said in essence is that European material

1 civilization has defeated our Asiatic spiritual
2 civilization, but that this state of affairs does not
3 necessarily have to continue, and that we must rise.

4 "Q I will direct your attention to Chapter 7 of
5 this same book published in 1937, headed 'Japan of
6 the World, the World of Japan,' and will ask if you
7 don't say there -- 'Japan for Japan's sake; Japan for
8 the world's sake; the world for Japan's sake. Build-
9 ing a better Japan was our chief aim. At the time of
10 the Meiji restoration Japan was on the first stage.
11 A better Japan thus built, however, must be a power
12 of the world since after the Sino-Japanese war, which
13 was quite an epoch making war for Japan, Japan's
14 power has been recognized and become one of the three
15 most powerful nations in the world. But this is never
16 the end of all. We must build the world for Japan's
17 sake. Heaven ordered Japan to achieve its great
18 mission. The Manchurian Incident has thus occurred.'
19 Is that not a correct quotation?

20 "A This is substantially a correct translation.

21 "Q Do you not argue in this same chapter that
22 Japan is literally forced to expand by the white man,
23 that because of emigration and national industrialism
24 being blocked and boycotted by the whites, the only
25 course left is for Japan to enlarge her territory.

"A That is correct.

1
2 "Q Then don't you say in that chapter that 'there
3 are four countries we must watch today -- China,
4 Soviet Russia, America, and the English Empire.

5 "A Yes.

6 "Q In Chapter VIII of this same book entitled
7 'Speeches to Young Men,' don't you say on page 201,
8 'Our Army and Navy are personally controlled by the
9 Emperor and are the means to show the dignity of this
10 country of the Gods.'

11 "A Yes, that is correct."
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

D
u
d
a
&
E
d
e
r

1 MR. WOOLWORTH: Judge Hsiang will address
2 the Court.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

4 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, in
5 reference to the statement on page 2 of exhibit
6 2188 in regard to KOISO, I want to submit for
7 reference the June 26 court record, page 1404, line
8 8 to 14; page 1410, line 12 to 19; page 1411, line
9 4 to 7; page 148, line 12 to 25; and finally, page
10 1419, line 1 to 16.

11 THE PRESIDENT: You said page 148. Do
12 you mean that?

13 MR. BROOKS: Will the reporter repeat the
14 President's statement? I didn't get it.

15 (Thereupon, the official court
16 reporter read as follows: "You said page
17 148. Do you mean that?")

18 MR. BROOKS: 1418, line 12 to 25. Cor-
19 rection.

20
21 These statements were by the prosecution's
22 witness on cross-examination, covering this
23 matter, and I would like to request the right to
24 cross-examine HASHIMOTO on page 2 in reference to
25 his statements in regard to KOISO.

THE PRESIDENT: We can't call him, and I am

1 sure the prosecution won't. Did you say you wanted
2 to cross-examine the interpreter, or the interro-
3 gator, or HASHIMOTO?

4 MR. BROOKS: I requested the right to
5 cross-examine HASHIMOTO on the interrogation.

6 THE PRESIDENT: That is HASHIMOTO, the
7 accused. I shouldn't be called upon for any further
8 explanation.

9 MR. BROOKS: If the prosecution is putting
10 this testimony in evidence I would like to have the
11 right to cross-examine on it.

12 THE PRESIDENT: He is not a prosecution's
13 witness. No accused who is interrogated before the
14 trial ever is.

15 MR. BROOKS: May I inquire if the Court
16 is taking the reference to other accused in con-
17 sideration in accepting this if the evidence
18 accepted -- if the evidence as presented is being
19 accepted also against KOISO, as well as the accused
20 HASHIMOTO?

21 THE PRESIDENT: That applies to all co-
22 defendants. If it is desired that the Tribunal
23 should hear argument on it, well, they will hear it,
24 but my mind is made up about it.
25

You see what the position is, you would

1 have the prosecution calling the accused and sub-
2 jecting him to all the risks that followed. You
3 see, he has not made any statement here on oath.
4 There is no such thing as calling him for cross-
5 examination. You are asking in effect that the
6 prosecution call one of the accused as a witness.
7 We have no power to direct that, in my opinion.
8 This, however, is an international court and I am
9 only an Australian Judge, who doesn't bind this
10 Court.

11 MR. BROOKS: May I reserve my point for
12 later argument if we see fit, and for the right to
13 call this HASHIMOTO as a hostile witness in the
14 defense case?

15 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Hsiang.

16 JUDGE HSIANG: Mr. President and Members
17 of the Tribunal: In compliance with the Court's
18 direction regarding IPS document No. 2955, which
19 received, last Friday, court exhibit No. 2176, the
20 prosecution introduces in evidence IPS document
21 No. 2955-A, being an affidavit by Professor Chang
22 Feng-Chu, handwriting expert, setting forth, among
23 other things, his qualifications and experience
24 as such.
25

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
2 ment No. 2955-A will receive exhibit No. 2189.

3 (Whereupon, the document above
4 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
5 hibit No. 2189 and received in evidence.)

6 JUDGE HSIANG: I will read exhibit 2189.

7 "International Military Tribunal for the Far East

8 "No. 1

9 "The United States of America, et al

10 versus

11 "ARAKI, Sadao, et al

12 "AFFIDAVIT

13 "1, CHANG Feng-Chu, of Nanching, Province
14 of Kiangsi, China, do swear on my conscience that
15 the following facts are true:

16 "1. I was born in Nanchang, China, on
17 3 December 1895. I am now Member of the Committee
18 of Educational Research, Ministry of Education,
19 Nanking, China, and concurrently, Cultural Expert
20 of the Chinese Mission in Japan, Tokyo, Japan.

21 "2. During my boyhood and early youth I
22 studied uninterruptedly Chinese literature and
23 philology under many masters. Following several
24 years of study in Japan, I graduated and received the
25 degree of 'Bungakushi' from the Kyoto Imperial

1 University in 1922. Since then, while engaged in
2 other activities, I have constantly kept up my
3 study of Chinese literature and philology.

4 "3. I have held the following positions:

5 "Professor of Chinese and Japanese Litera-
6 ture, National Peking University.

7 (1922-1929)

8 "Professor of Chinese and Japanese
9 Literature, Teachers' College,
10 Peking. (1923-1927)

11 "Lecturer on Chinese Literature, Institut
12 des Hautes Etudes Chinoises,
13 Universite de Paris. (1930-1933)

14 "Engaged in Cultural Research Work under
15 Ministry of Education, Nanking and
16 Chungking. (1934-1945)

17 "Member of Committee on Educational Re-
18 habilitation, Ministry of Education,
19 Nanking, China. (1945-1946)

20 "Member of Committee on Educational
21 Research. (February 1946 to date)

22 "Cultural Expert of the Chinese Mission
23 in Japan. (April 1946 to date)

24 "4. I commenced to learn Chinese handwriting
25 in early boyhood and have never ceased to study and

1 practice it. For a period of over thirty years
2 my interest in Chinese calligraphy as an art has
3 continued and grown. I have closely studied the
4 writings of famous Chinese men of letters, start-
5 ing with WANG Hsi-Chih in TSIN Dynasty (4th Century
6 A.D.) and continuing down to modern writers. I
7 frequently had access to both private and public
8 art collections and was thus enabled to make a
9 comparative study of penmanship of a large
10 number of past literary masters. As a student
11 of art, I had opportunity not only to see but also
12 to scrutinize closely various types of handwriting
13 shown in manuscripts left by famous authors of the
14 past as well as of the present. As a teacher,
15 I had opportunity to and did observe and analyse
16 different types of handwritings of hundreds of
17 students. As penmanship in Chinese is an art in
18 itself and constitutes a part of attainment of
19 an intellectual, my profession constantly presents
20 me occasions calling for the observation and
21 examination of handwritings of my fellow
22 countrymen.

24 "While I was Lecturer on Chinese Litera-
25 ture, Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises,
Universite de Paris, I was three times invited as

1 an expert on Chinese handwriting by the Tribunal
2 de la Seine a Paris, to examine Chinese handwriting
3 and did so qualify and testify before the said
4 Tribunal.

5 "6. Following the written request of the
6 Chief Prosecutor of the International Prosecu-
7 tion Section for the recommendation and designation
8 of a Chinese handwriting expert to examine Pu-Yi's
9 handwriting, Lt. General CHU Shih-Ming, Chief of
10 the Chinese Mission in Japan, recommended and
11 designated me for that purpose. I was consequently
12 invited by the Prosecution to serve in that
13 capacity.

14 "7. I.P.S. document No. 2955 entitled
15 'A Report on the Study of Pu-Yi's Handwriting'
16 bearing court exhibit No. 2176, annexed hereto, is
17 a statement drawn up by me after consideration
18 of matters set out therein and in so far as it
19 describes facts is true and in so far as it
20 expresses my opinions is correct to the best of
21 my knowledge, information and belief."

22
23 In the Mimeographed copies distributed
24 of this affidavit there are typographical errors, in
25 putting two lines in the wrong place. I will read
the remainder of the document as it is found

1 in the original copy filed with the Tribunal. I
2 continue to read the affidavit as follows:

3 "I certify upon my conscience that the
4 above facts are true and correct. CHANG Feng-Chu,
5 Signed, 18 January 1947, Tokyo. Witness: Yorkson,
6 C.T. SHEN, Signed, Minister Plenipotentiary Chief
7 Adviser, Chinese Mission in Japan, 18 January 1947,
8 Tokyo."

9 Colonel Mornane will present documents
10 for the prosecution.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Mornane.

2 LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: I propose to tender
3 to the Tribunal one document as part of the case against
4 the accused LOHIHARA. It is prosecution document
5 No. 2773, and constitutes a record of the interrogation
6 of that accused on the 11th of January, 5th of
7 February, and 12th of February, 1946.

8 I tender the original document for identifica-
9 tion and the marked excerpts in evidence.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 2773 will receive exhibit No. 2190 for identification
13 only; and the excerpt therefrom, bearing the same
14 document number, will receive exhibit No. 2190-A.

15 (Whereupon, the document above
16 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 2190 for identification, and the excerpt
18 therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 2190-A and received in evidence.)

20 LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: (Reading)

21 "11 January 1946, Pages 1, 2, 3.

22 "Q What year was it when you first went to
23 Manchuria for the first time?

24 "A August 15, 1931. I entered Manchuria with
25 Japanese forces as a Colonel and as Commander or Head

of the Japanese Special Service Department.

1 "Q What were your duties in that capacity,
2 briefly?

3 "A First of all, to gain intelligence of the
4 Chinese and as a liaison between the Chinese forces
5 and the Japanese forces -- but this was before the war.
6

7 "Q What was the date when the Manchurian Inci-
8 dent began?

9 "A September 18. The war or state of hostilities
10 began September 18, 1931. At that time, there was
11 a Captain who was killed. I had to investigate the
12 killing and negotiate with the Chinese forces. That
13 was the particular job I was there for.

14 "Q How long did you continue on that assignment?

15 "A I was recalled to Tokyo about the 8th of
16 September. I was recalled to Tokyo regarding the
17 killing of this Captain.

18 "Q How long after the Manchurian Incident were
19 you assigned as head of the Japanese Special Service
20 Department there?

21 "A When I went back, I was relieved of the
22 Special Service Command and was sent over there as one
23 of the staff section of the Kwantung Army.

24 "Q Is that the Supreme Command of the Kwantung
25 Army?

1 "A I was a member of the staff of the Kwantung
2 Army headquarters. On the 23rd, I became head of the
3 City of Mukden.

4 "Q What I want is a brief statement or table of
5 your assignments there.

6 "A At the end of November, I was sent to Harbin
7 as head of the Special Service Organization.

8 "Q How long did you stay on that?

9 "A Until the last of March 1932. I went as a
10 Brigadier General. On the first of April 1932, I took
11 command of the 9th Brigade with the grade of Major
12 General at Hiroshima. I stayed at Hiroshima from
13 April 1932 to July 1934 and then went to Mukden with
14 the Japanese Special Service Organization.

15 "Q How long did you stay at Mukden?

16 "A Until the end of February 1936. Then, I
17 became a Lt. General and Commander of the 1st Depot
18 Division in Tokyo until March 1937. I then became
19 Commander of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya until
20 August 25, 1937. After that, I went to North China
21 (Peiping to Hankow drive) and the 14th Division
22 became part of the First Army until the first of
23 June 1938 when I was recalled to Tokyo to serve on
24 the staff attached to the Chief of Staff. From
25 August 1938 to June 1939, I was sent to China by the

1 Government to see what I could do about settling the
2 war. I carried on negotiations with Tang Shao-I and
3 Ou Phi Fu, who was the original founder of the
4 Kuomintang Party. These people acted as intermediaries
5 between Chiang Kai-Shek. Tang Shao-I was killed so
6 that the negotiations fell through.

7 "Q Were you Chief of the Mission?

8 "A Yes, I was Chief of the Mission.

9 "Q What was your next assignment?

10 "A On June, 1939, I became Commander-in-Chief
11 of the 5th Army in Taonan, Manchuria, until the fol-
12 lowing June 1940, when I became Supreme War Councillor.
13 About April 1941, I was made Inspector General of
14 Aviation.

15 "Q Did you continue as Supreme War Councillor
16 at the same time?

17 "A Yes.

18 "Q That went to when?

19 "A The first part of May 1943.

20 "Q After that?

21 "A I became Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern
22 Army. At the end of March 1944, I became Commander of
23 the 7th Area Army at Singapore and remained there until
24 the first part of April 1945. I then became Inspector
25 General of Military Training. I arrived in Tokyo

on May 10, 1945.

1 "5 February 1946, Pages 2 and 3.

2 "Q In August 1931, who was the Chief of the first
3 section?

4 "A The Chief of the first section was ISHIHARA,
5 Kanji.

6 "Q What was his grade, Lieutenant General?

7 "A I am not quite sure if his rank was Lt.
8 Colonel or full Colonel.

9 "Q And who was Chief of the second section in
10 August 1931?

11 "A The Chief of No. 2 section was ITAGAKI,
12 Seishiro, rank of Colonel. I am not sure about the
13 other sections, but there was one man named KATAKURA,
14 Chu, who might have been one of the section chiefs.
15 I am not quite sure if he was chief of a section or
16 not. My memory is not very clear on that. I cannot
17 think of the other section chiefs.

18 "Q Now, did your Special Service Organization
19 operate under the control or under the direction of the
20 second section, the Intelligence Section?

21 "A Yes, Special Service Organization was part
22 of No. 2 section.

23 "Q And you reported to Colonel ITAGAKI?

24 "A Yes, I did work for Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro.
25

1 "Q And that was true in August 1931, while you
2 were Resident Official of Mukden?

3 "A Yes, that is true.

4 "Q And during that time the second section gave
5 you your order as to what your organization was to do?

6 "A Yes, that is true. I received my orders
7 from No. 2 section but they were given by the Commanding
8 General of the Kwantung Army.

9 "Q As Resident Official of Mukden -- you had
10 that title while being the head of the Special
11 Service Organization there, is that correct?

12 "A When I was Mayor of Mukden I was not the head
13 of the Special Service Organization.

14 "Q When was that, General?

15 "A I am not quite sure, but I think it was
16 September 21, 1931.

17 "5 February 1946, Pages 10 and 11."

18 THE PRESIDENT: This is a very lengthy one
19 you are about to read and you would not finish it
20 tonight.

21 When do you hope to finish the prosecution's
22 case, Colonel?

23 LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: I beg your pardon?

24 THE PRESIDENT: When do you hope to close
25 the prosecution's case?

1 LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: With regard to
2 the accused LOHIHARA?

3 THE PRESIDENT: The lot.

4 LIEUT. COLONEL MORNANE: I should think
5 about Thursday, sir.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we will adjourn
7 now until half-past nine tomorrow morning.

8 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment
9 was taken until Tuesday, 21 January 1947,
10 at 0930.)

11 - - - - -
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

