

1031

Doc. No. 219P (94)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 129

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (CREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts.

No. 1653

TOKYO, October 11, 1940.

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By virtue of a widespread system of exchange and trade controls in North China which culminated on June 28, 1940, in the institution of a complete and discriminatory control of exchange, American trade with that area has come to a virtual halt.

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American enterprise having been practically eliminated from Manchuria, and American enterprise and trade in the North China area having been reduced to insignificant proportions, it now appears to be the intent of the military authorities of Japan to force American enterprise and trade out of Shanghai, the most important commercial center in China.

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Foreign Relations I, p. 883
at p. 884

1137

Doc. No. 219P (95)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 130

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts.

No. 1665

TOKYO, October 24, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has taken note that the Japanese military authorities in North China have since October 1 applied certain so-called "regulations governing the control of inspections and shipments of raw materials for light industries in North China." According to the press the regulations are applicable to cotton, hemp, jute, and other vegetable fibers, animal hair, leather, and furs.

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Failing an early modification of the attitude of the military authorities in China, American firms, both in the United States and in North China, are destined (1) to suffer large financial losses on account of stocks held for exportation under already existing contracts and on account of large additional unfilled contracts, and (2) to be eliminated from trade in which they have participated for a long period.

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Foreign Relations I, p. 889-890

1033

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (GREW)
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)¹⁴

I am informed by our Consul at Hanoi that certain merchandise owned by American interests is being refused re-export permits from Indo-China by the Indo-Chinese authorities chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon these authorities.

Detailed information regarding such merchandise is known to the Indo-China authorities, to our Consul, and presumably to the Japanese.

I have been instructed to request that appropriate steps be taken to put an end to this unwarranted interference with the shipments of goods and merchandise owned by Americans.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 298-299.

Footnote:

¹⁴ Notation: "Left with Mr. Terazaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, by the American First Secretary, Mr. Crocker, November 15, 1940, as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs".

1034

Doc. No. 219P (71)

Br. Ex. 103

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1700

TOKYO, November 26, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor formally to protest against the actions of the Japanese military at Hanoi who recently took into custody Mr. Robert W. Rinden, American Vice Consul, and the United Press correspondent, Mr. Melville Jacoby.

My Government considers that the employment of force and the threat of arms against an American official and the individual accompanying him were especially flagrant. I am constrained to recall that it has been necessary for my Government to point out to Your Excellency's Government, in connection with a deplorably large number of incidents involving American nationals and the Japanese military in China, that if the Japanese Government were to issue strict and effective instructions that American citizens should be treated with civility by the Japanese military, incidents of the character described above would not occur.

With reference to the incident which is the subject of the present note, I wish to invite the particular attention of Your Excellency to the fact that Mr. Rinden and his companion were threatened with rifles which were pointed at them, and were kept in custody by Japanese soldiers, and that the Japanese soldiers did not withdraw until the arrival of the French authorities, despite the fact that Mr. Rinden identified himself as an American Vice Consul to a Japanese officer who spoke and understood English.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 704-705

1035 2/14/41

No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND

TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 14 FEB. (SHOWA 16), 1941. "RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL."

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USE

Concerning your telegram No. 77, the present proposal by the British Foreign Minister which is based on the report from Ambassador Craigie seems to have been made under the presumption or fear that Japan would acquire military bases etc. in Thailand and French Indo-China by taking advantage of the arbitration conference between Thailand and French Indo-China, and then commence military action against England in the South Seas concurrently with Germany's landing strategy against England. It is difficult to understand on what grounds Ambassador Craigie based the above alarming report to his home government. When the Vice-Minister visited him on the 12th he said, in reply to the Vice-Minister's question that he knew well from past experiences that Japan's politics and diplomacy were controlled by the military, and that he had made the present report based on the speech and action of military men of responsibility. So, to make sure, I at once carefully privately investigated in various fields whether such facts existed, but I could find no such facts. On the other hand, in view of the fact that every influential newspaper in England is loudly reporting the crisis between Japan and England, the present proposition seems to be trying to check Japan's advance to the South, if only for the present besides containing the strategic motive of turning America's interest toward Thailand and French Indo-China and cementing the cooperation between England and America in this sphere. Although I think you have noticed this matter already, I am sending you our observation for you to bear in mind.

Wired to the Ambassador in America.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 1339A (1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 17 Feb., 1941, and described as follows:

No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND.

TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 17 FEB. (SHOWA 16), 1941.

"RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the Official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
 Signature of Official
 SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief. Archives Sect.
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Investigation Division

Witness: /s/T/4. T. Toguchi

Official Capacity I.P.S.

1036

Br. Ex. 140

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1714

TOKYO, December 17, 1940

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to invite the attention of Your Excellency to the fact that on November 15 an oral statement was left with Mr. Terazaki as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, "according to information from the American Consul at Hanoi, certain merchandise owned by American interests was being refused re-export permits from Indochina by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities.

On November 30, in a conversation with Your Excellency, I made further representations in this matter, repeating those made on November 15.

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1037

DOCUMENT NO. 220C (10)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 141

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (GREW)
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Referring to the American Ambassador's note to His Excellency the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, no. 1714 dated December 17, 1940, relating to the interference by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities, with the shipments of American owned goods and merchandise, the American Ambassador is now instructed to express to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion that it would not be consistent with humanitarian considerations to interfere with the movement of supplies of the Red Cross at present in Indochina, in addition to being unwarranted on other grounds. At least a part of the Red Cross supplies under reference, incidentally, was made possible by the contributions of American citizens.

Foreign Relations II, p. 300

DOCUMENT NO. 220C (10)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 141

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (GREW)
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Referring to the American Ambassador's note to His Excellency the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, no. 1714 dated December 17, 1940, relating to the interference by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities, with the shipments of American owned goods and merchandise, the American Ambassador is now instructed to express to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion that it would not be consistent with humanitarian considerations to interfere with the movement of supplies of the Red Cross at present in Indochina, in addition to being unwarranted on other grounds. At least a part of the Red Cross supplies under reference, incidentally, was made possible by the contributions of American citizens.

1038

EXTRACT FROM "THE TOKYO NICHI NICHI"

May 3, 1941

DEFENSE SECURITY LAW

MEASURE TO GO INTO EFFECT ON MAY 10.

The National Defense Security Law will be enforced on May 10, it was decided in the Cabinet Meeting on May 2.

Detailed regulations governing the enforcement of the law will be published on May 10.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 2531A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kazumi Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the records of the Cabinet Meeting and the decisions referred to in the attached newspaper article described as follows: Extract from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, May 3, 1941 entitled Defense Security Law

I further certify that the attached newspaper article correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet Meeting of the date referred to.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10 day of Oct, 1946

/s/ K. Ikawa
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Tomoo Satow

Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 16 day of Oct, 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt T. Toguchi

Investigator
Official Capacity

1039

PROPOSAL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN
TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU ON 7 FEBRUARY
SHOWA 16, 1941

2/7/41

1. At the first interview with the Foreign Minister after the formation of the KONOYE Cabinet, Ambassador CRAIGIE expressed the hope that the new Cabinet would collaborate and settle the relations between the two countries by friendly measures as did the preceding Cabinet. To this Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied that the Cabinet was considering carefully the general policy for the future, and added at the same time, as his unofficial idea, that a general improvement of the relation between Japan and England could not be hoped for, and a strained situation between Japan and England in the future was inevitable.

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Two days after the interview occurred the arrests of many Englishmen in Japan and Korea, on which a joint statement by the War Minister and Minister of Justice was issued, giving generally the impression of the existence of an English spy ring in Japan. But the result of the trial was that they were punished for trivial matters, and there was nothing about spies.

This was the general situation in July and August. In September Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact and formally joined on the side of Germany and Italy, enemies of Britain. The public speeches of statesmen and the tendency of the press were deepening more and more anxiety on the part of England.

2. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said in his official statement that the Tripartite Pact was a pact of peace, and you also stated that the main policy of Japan was to overcome the difficulties of the China affair and restore order in East Asia. But judging from facts which have happened since then, and considering all the indications that the sphere of influence of Japan is being enlarged to dominate East Asia, frankly the above explanation is hard to understand.

In this connection the British Government wishes to call your attention to the impropriety of the statement of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA concerning Japanese aspirations in Burma. As regards Indo-China and Thailand also, recent situations have not mitigated the strained relation in the

~~Secret~~

Secret

1940
1941

Far East at all. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said that only Japan had the right to mediate in the conflicts in the Far East, but the British Government can not approve of this claim.

If the purpose of the mediation were merely to bring about a settlement of conflicts, Britain would welcome it like all the other countries. But we have received the disquieting information that Japan had brought pressure to bear on Indo-China and Thailand, and we have come to entertain misgivings whether Japan were not using this mediation as a pretext to secure far-reaching political and military concessions from both these countries---e.g. newspaper information reports that Camran Bay and all the existing air-fields will be used by Japan.

3. The most important fact is the recent report of Ambassador Craigie, informing us that "In Japan the prevailing impression is that the crisis in the Far East will occur within these two or three weeks".

What do these facts mean? Who is challenging whom? Should we believe that a sort of advance planned by Japan will be carried out simultaneously with the German attack on England proper, and if so should Britain assume that her territories in the Far East are in danger of an attack by Japan? It is hard for me to understand the situation. Geographically Japan is in an advantageous position, so that she can remain entirely aloof from the calamity of war if she so desires, and moreover she is not being threatened by any one, certainly not by England.

If I may be allowed to speak frankly, it seems to me that Japan has many reasons for not intervening in another war after four years of the China Incident. In my opinion, Japan can not but recognize her reason for being on unfriendly terms with Britain and the United States, but as proved by history, it can not be denied that the prosperity of Japan was at its best when she was at friendly relations with Britain and the United States. So it is hard for me to understand the reason why Ambassador Craigie reported of the sphere of crisis increasing in Japan. It seems to me that the aim of the Japanese statesmen is to indicate the approach of a huge confusion.

2/7/41

USE

4. You will be able to understand that it is impossible to disregard the above signs and portents, and that it is necessary to tell you clearly our standpoint. England has territories in the Far East, but she has no aggressive intentions; however, she does not intend to sacrifice these territories by orders from any other country. And furthermore it is impossible to approve of the principle that Japan is the sole country having the right to administer and control the destiny of all the inhabitants (including the English) in the Far East. There is no doubt that Britain will protect her territories in the Far East with the utmost vigor, if they should be attacked, and defend the security and welfare of the inhabitants.

5. In addition, I wish to mention two points.

The first point is as follows: There is no objection to Japan deciding her own policy, but as an old friend and a former Allied Power, I do not think I will bring down the wrath of Japan upon myself for saying the following thing-- that I hope and pray that the policy about to be taken up by Japan will not lead to a terrible disaster. And moreover I can not but hope that, by cooperating with Germany and Italy, Japan will not depart from her wise caution and good sense with which she built up her great national power and prosperity in the past.

USE

The second point is as follows: It is rumored that concerning the war situation, news advantageous to Britain is being suppressed in Japan, and there is propagated an idea that Britain is a decadent country on the brink of ruin. But as you know, the real spirit of the English people of today is no such thing. Not only is there a strong determination of an absolute national unity throughout the whole of the British Empire, but also England possesses vast natural resources and has unlimited assistance from America. Whatever happens it is obvious that the British Empire will not fail in this conflict. Germany is exaggerating that she can conquer this Island Empire, but we are convinced of her failure. We averted the crisis in September last year, and at present England's power on land, on sea, and in the air has increased greatly from that time. The English nation is convinced that Germany will fail in her attempt to conquer England, and be defeated in this war.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1339 A (2)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify

that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of Six pages, dated 7 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: _____

PROPOSAL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU

on 7 FEBRUARY SHOWA 16, 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

SEAL
Chief, Archives Sect.
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official Capacity

1040

British-Japanese Diplomatic Relations
as Appeared in Eden-Shigemitsu Conversation, Feb. 1941

Secret Code Message to MATSUOKA (No. 77, London)

General
~~File~~ No. 3318 Telegram in Cipher London to Foreign
Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 77

I visited Foreign Secretary Eden on the 7th, at his request, and had with him a conversation on the basis of a written statement as per/No. 78. ^{telegram} Following this, I gave him my personal reply only, as per telegram No. 79. Please favor me with your instructions regarding the treatment of the Foreign Secretary's representation or reply to it. (End)

General
~~File~~ No. 3320 Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February, 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February, 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 78

1. In reply to the desire expressed by Ambassador Craigie on his first meeting with the Foreign Minister following the formation of the KONOYE Cabinet that the new Cabinet, too, would cope with the relations between the two countries in such a cooperative spirit and by such friendly means as were done by the previous cabinet, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied that the general policy for the future was now under careful consideration. On that occasion, he also stated as his unofficial intention that, between Japan and Britain, there was no hope of any general settlement in Anglo-Japanese relations, and that tension in Anglo-Japanese relations was unavoidable in the future.

Two days after this interview, there came the mass arrest

of Englishmen in Japan and Chosen, and a joint statement of the War Minister and the Justice Minister was issued, giving the impression that a general British espionage system existed in Japan. However, as the results of trials, they were convicted of only trifles and it was found that no actual espionage existed.

This is the outline of the situation in July and August, but in September Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance and openly sided with Britain's enemies, Germany and Italy. The public speeches of the statesmen and the tone of the press are more and more increasing Britain's anxiety.

2. In his public statement Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, stated that the Tripartite Treaty was a pact for the sake of peace. Your Excellency also said that the main object of Japan is to overcome the difficulties of the Chinese problem and restore order in East Asia, but judging from facts which have developed since then and from all indications of Japan's expanding her sphere of influence in order to "dominate," it is difficult to understand the foregoing explanation, to be frank about it. (to be continued)

General
File No. 3325

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon
Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

In this connection the British Government desires to call attention to the fact that it considers Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's reference to Japan's "aspirations" toward Burma to be an "improper reference."

Next in regard to the problem of French Indo-China and Thailand also, the recent situation has not alleviated the tension in the Far East. The British Government is unable to recognize the claim made by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that Japan alone possesses the right of mediating the disputes in the Far East.

If the object of mediation is simply to bring about the solution of disputes, Britain, like all other countries, welcomes such mediation. However, we have disquieting information that Japan has

exerted pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand, and we have come to harbour the suspicion that Japan is utilizing this mediation as an excuse for securing for herself far-reaching political and military concessions from these two countries. For instance, press dispatches have it that Camranh Bay and all of the existing airdromes will be offered for the use of the Japanese.

3. The most important point is the recent report of Ambassador Craigie, informing us that "there is a general feeling in Japan that a crisis in the Far East will develop within the next few weeks." What does this mean? Who is going to challenge and against whom? Is it some kind of a "forward moving" plotted by Japan? Are we to believe that it will be carried out simultaneously with the German offensive against the British homeland? And if this be true, should Britain deem her dominions in the Far East as being on the brink of danger from Japanese attack? I am at a loss to understand the situation. Since Japan possesses a geographically advantageous position, she can stand aloof, if she desires, from the ravages of war. Moreover, she is of all countries the least threatened by England. (to be continued)

General
File No. 3340

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

If I am permitted to speak my mind freely, there are many reasons why Japan, after four years of the China Affair would be better off if she did not enter into any further war with other countries. It is my opinion that, although we can understand Japan's reasons for holding an unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain and the United States of America, it is an indisputable fact that anti-British feeling in Japan was, as history shows, the strongest at the time when Anglo-Japanese relationship was the most intimate. I am quite at a loss to understand the reasons why Ambassador Craigie reported to us that the scope of a crisis is developing in Japan. "It seems that the purpose of Japanese statesmen is to show that some gigantic convulsion of upheaval is about to take place."

4. I am sure that you will understand the impossibility of disregarding the above indications and warnings, and the necessity of clearly informing you of our standpoint. Great Britain possesses dominions in the Far East. Although we do not entertain any intention of aggressive acts, we also have no intention whatsoever of sacrificing these possessions under the orders of whatever country. Furthermore, it is impossible to acknowledge the principle that Japan alone possesses the right to "control the destiny of and dominate" all the people (including the Englishmen) of the Far East. It should not be doubted that in case the territories of Great Britain in the Far East are attacked and the safety and well-being of the inhabitants of such territories endangered, Britain will defend them "with the utmost vigour." (to be continued)

General
File No. 3345

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

5. I would like to state further two points. The first point is that we, of course, have no objection to Japan's "dictating" her own policies, but we do not think that we will incur Japan's wrath if we, as a former friend and an old ally of Japan, state the following matter. That is, I hope and pray that the policy which Japan is now about to carry out would not lead to a "terrible disaster," and I cannot but wish that Japan would not, by cooperating with Germany and Italy, lose the sagacious prudence and the sound judgment which had enabled her to establish a great national strength and prosperity.

The second point is that with reference to the war situation, reports favorable to Great Britain are being suppressed in Japan, and that the idea that Britain is now a "decadant" nation on the verge of ruin is being circulated. But as your Excellency know, the true spirit of the British people at present is not so. Not only do the whole people of the entire British Empire hold an absolutely strongly united determination, but Britain possesses bountiful resources and enjoys the unlimited aid of the United States of America, such that it is clear that Britain will never lose in this war. Although the Germans exaggeratedly claim that they will be able to conquer our Island Empire, we firmly believe in their failure. We succeeded in averting the crisis last September.

Today Britain's power on land, sea and in air greatly exceed that of that time. It is the firm belief of the British people that Germany will fail in the attempt to conquer Great Britain and will also be defeated in the war.

End

General
File No. 3341

In ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 79

Ambassador: Will this representation be made in Tokyo also?

Eden: No, I wish to state it as my unreserved opinion through you here.

Ambassador: I do not possess any data to prove that such a critical situation exists. Of course, under the present circumstances, I have no intention of criticizing the report of your Ambassador. However, I would like to be permitted to ask you a few questions from the impression I gained from your "expose," though I shall refrain from exchanging views regarding the detailed substance of it.

Eden: I shall hear them.

Ambassador: From what you have just said, I have received the impression that you have explained to me to make clear for the last time the standpoint of Great Britain under the premise that Anglo-Japanese relations are fast approaching the last stage. However, it is necessary for us to endeavour to the last, to avert the worst, even if no improvement can be made in the relations between the two countries. It is with this purpose in mind that I have done my best so far. In what you have told me just now, you have stated almost solely the unilateral view of Britain, but failed to show an ^{understanding} attitude of Japan's assertions, making only refutations and indicating the intention of disapproval. Moreover, I think that, in discussing this unfortunate aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, we should commence it from at least ten years ago, if not from 1904. You thoroughly know the history of the past ten years. To cite an instance, you have mentioned in your explanation Japan's cooperation

with Britain's enemy, but Britain has consistently held the policy of aiding Japan's enemies. The fact is that present aggravations of relations actually came mostly from this point.
(to be continued)

General
~~File~~ No. 3344

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 79 continued)

Furthermore, it is geographically quite natural that Japan should hold the leading position in East Asia, and this cannot be helped. It is no different from the special interests which Britain and the United States of America feel in the neighboring geographically related countries. You have mentioned French Indo-China, and seemed to view our movements there, etc., with suspicion, but we have not invaded any British territory. It is beyond my comprehension that you should say that you are unable to understand the important interests, both political and economic, which arise from geographical position. In stating the crisis in Anglo-American relations, you do not try to understand the other party's standpoint, but rather find fault with the Japan's policy and lay the blame on Japan. Do you think that such an explanation will serve to avert the impending crisis?

Eden: My principal aim is to avert the crisis for the sake of the two countries, and nothing more. Having received such a report, I cannot overlook it, but will do everything possible. To your Excellency I have unbosomed myself and frankly informed you of our feelings with the intention of successfully coping with this critical situation. I should be glad to hear further from the Japanese government as to its views on today's conversations.

Ambassador: Ito have spoken to you without reserve, but I have no intention to give my opinion in detail on the points mentioned by you today. Of course I shall transmit to my government what you have said. (End)

General
File No. 3338

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram No. 80

In the conference with Foreign Minister Eden, which I mentioned in telegram No. 78, he explained that the report from Craigie pointed out, besides those matters, that Japan's relations with Germany and Italy were becoming "progressively" intimate, and that the German "hold" on Japan was growing tighter.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1131

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 pages, dated Feb., 1941, and described as follows: HANDWRITTEN COPIES OF TELEGRAMS COVERING EDEN-HIGEMITSU CONVERSATIONS.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL.
Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME
Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T/h Toguchi

of Englishmen in Japan and Chosen, and a joint statement of the War Minister and the Justice Minister was issued, giving the impression that a general British espionage system existed in Japan. However, as the results of trials, they were convicted of only trifles and it was found that no actual espionage existed.

This is the outline of the situation in July and August, but in September Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance and openly sided with Britain's enemies, Germany and Italy. The public speeches of the statesmen and the tone of the press are more and more increasing Britain's anxiety.

2. In his public statement Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, stated that the Tripartite Treaty was a pact for the sake of peace. Your Excellency also said that the main object of Japan is to overcome the difficulties of the Chinese problem and restore order in East Asia, but judging from facts which have developed since then and from all indications of Japan's expanding her sphere of influence in order to "dominate," it is difficult to understand the foregoing explanation, to be frank about it. (to be continued)

General
File No. 3325

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

In this connection the British Government desires to call attention to the fact that it considers Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's reference to Japan's "aspirations" toward Burma to be an "improper reference."

Next in regard to the problem of French Indo-China and Thailand also, the recent situation has not alleviated the tension in the Far East. The British Government is unable to recognize the claim made by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that Japan alone possesses the right of mediating the disputes in the Far East.

If the object of mediation is simply to bring about the solution of disputes, Britain, like all other countries, welcomes such mediation. However, we have disquieting information that Japan has

exerted pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand, and we have come to harbour the suspicion that Japan is utilizing this mediation as an excuse for securing for herself far-reaching political and military concessions from these two countries. For instance, press dispatches have it that Camranh Bay and all of the existing airdromes will be offered for the use of the Japanese.

3. The most important point is the recent report of Ambassador Craigie, informing us that "there is a general feeling in Japan that a crisis in the Far East will develop within the next few weeks." What does this mean? Who is going to challenge and against whom? Is it some kind of a "forward moving" plotted by Japan? Are we to believe that it will be carried out simultaneously with the German offensive against the British homeland? And if this be true, should Britain deem her dominions in the Far East as being on the brink of danger from Japanese attack? I am at a loss to understand the situation. Since Japan possesses a geographically advantageous position, she can stand aloof, if she desires, from the ravages of war. Moreover, she is of all countries the least threatened by England. (to be continued)

General
File No. 3340

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon
Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

If I am permitted to speak my mind freely, there are many reasons why Japan, after four years of the China Affair would be better off if she did not enter into any further war with other countries. It is my opinion that, although we can understand Japan's reasons for holding an unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain and the United States of America, it is an indisputable fact that anti-British feeling in Japan was, as history shows, the strongest at the time when Anglo-Japanese relationship was the most intimate. I am quite at a loss to understand the reasons why Ambassador Craigie reported to us that the scope of a crisis is developing in Japan. "It seems that the purpose of Japanese statesmen is to show that some gigantic convulsion of upheaval is about to take place."

4. I am sure that you will understand the impossibility of disregarding the above indications and warnings, and the necessity of clearly informing you of our standpoint. Great Britain possesses dominions in the Far East. Although we do not entertain any intention of aggressive acts, we also have no intention whatsoever of sacrificing these possessions under the orders of whatever country. Furthermore, it is impossible to acknowledge the principle that Japan alone possesses the right to "control the destiny of and dominate" all the people (including the Englishmen) of the Far East. It should not be doubted that in case the territories of Great Britain in the Far East are attacked and the safety and well-being of the inhabitants of such territories endangered, Britain will defend them "with the utmost vigour." (to be continued)

General
File No. 3345

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section
(Telegram No. 78 continued)

5. I would like to state further two points. The first point is that we, of course, have no objection to Japan's "dictating" her own policies, but we do not think that we will incur Japan's wrath if we, as a former friend and an old ally of Japan, state the following matter. That is, I hope and pray that the policy which Japan is now about to carry out would not lead to a "terrible disaster," and I cannot but wish that Japan would not, by cooperating with Germany and Italy, lose the sagacious prudence and the sound judgment which had enabled her to establish a great national strength and prosperity.

The second point is that with reference to the war situation, reports favorable to Great Britain are being suppressed in Japan, and that the idea that Britain is now a "decadant" nation on the verge of ruin is being circulated. But as your Excellency know, the true spirit of the British people at present is not so. Not only do the whole people of the entire British Empire hold an absolutely strongly united determination, but Britain possesses bountiful resources and enjoys the unlimited aid of the United States of America, such that it is clear that Britain will never lose in this war. Although the Germans exaggeratedly claim that they will be able to conquer our Island Empire, we firmly believe in their failure. We succeeded in averting the crisis last September.

Today Britain's power on land, sea and in air greatly exceed that of that time. It is the firm belief of the British people that Germany will fail in the attempt to conquer Great Britain and will also be defeated in the war.

End

General

File No. 3341

In ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 79

Ambassador: Will this representation be made in Tokyo also?

Eden: No, I wish to state it as my unreserved opinion through you here.

Ambassador: I do not possess any data to prove that such a critical situation exists. Of course, under the present circumstances, I have no intention of criticizing the report of your Ambassador. However, I would like to be permitted to ask you a few questions from the impression I gained from your "expose," though I shall refrain from exchanging views regarding the detailed substance of it.

Eden: I shall hear them.

Ambassador: From what you have just said, I have received the impression that you have explained to me to make clear for the last time the standpoint of Great Britain under the premise that Anglo-Japanese relations are fast approaching the last stage. However, it is necessary for us to endeavour to the last, to avert the worst, even if no improvement can be made in the relations between the two countries. It is with this purpose in mind that I have done my best so far. In what you have told me just now, you have stated almost solely the unilateral view of Britain, but failed to show an ^{understanding} attitude of Japan's assertions, making only refutations and indicating the intention of disapproval. Moreover, I think that, in discussing this unfortunate aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, we should commence it from at least ten years ago, if not from 1904. You thoroughly know the history of the past ten years. To cite an instance, you have mentioned in your explanation Japan's cooperation

with Britain's enemy, but Britain has consistently held the policy of aiding Japan's enemies. The fact is that present aggravations of relations actually came mostly from this point.
(to be continued)

General
File No. 3344

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 79 continued)

Furthermore, it is geographically quite natural that Japan should hold the leading position in East Asia, and this cannot be helped. It is no different from the special interests which Britain and the United States of America feel in the neighboring geographically related countries. You have mentioned French Indo-China, and seemed to view our movements there, etc., with suspicion, but we have not invaded any British territory. It is beyond my comprehension that you should say that you are unable to understand the important interests, both political and economic, which arise from geographical position. In stating the crisis in Anglo-American relations, you do not try to understand the other party's standpoint, but rather find fault with the Japan's policy and lay the blame on Japan. Do you think that such an explanation will serve to avert the impending crisis?

Eden: My principal aim is to avert the crisis for the sake of the two countries, and nothing more. Having received such a report, I cannot overlook it, but will do everything possible. To your Excellency I have unbosomed myself and frankly informed you of our feelings with the intention of successfully coping with this critical situation. I should be glad to hear further from the Japanese government as to its views on today's conversations.

Ambassador: Ito have spoken to you without reserve, but I have no intention to give my opinion in detail on the points mentioned by you today. Of course I shall transmit to my government what you have said. (End)

General
File No. 3338

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram No. 80

In the conference with Foreign Minister Eden, which I mentioned in telegram No. 78, he explained that the report from Craigie pointed out, besides those matters, that Japan's relations with Germany and Italy were becoming "progressively" intimate, and that the German "hold" on Japan was growing tighter.

C E R T I F I C A T EI.P.S. No. 1131Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office -----
 and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 pages, dated Feb., 1941, and described as follows: -----
HANDWRITTEN COPIES OF TELEGRAMS COVERING EDEN-HIGEMITSU CONVERSATIONS. -----

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry -----

Signed at Tokyo on this
23rd day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
 Signature of Official
 SEAL.
Chief Archives Section
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME
Investigation Division I.P.S.
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T/h Tsuchi

~~Message from Matsuka to Eden, 13 Feb 1941.~~ 2/13/41

Copy of telegram. General No. 4399. Code Foreign Office.

Transmitted 8 p.m., 13th Feb 1941, Sec. 3. Europe Bureau.

Telegram to Ambassador SHIGELITSU, London, from LATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister.

No. 46 *Reuter*

Concerning your telegram No. 77.

Ambassador Craigie also wishes an interview with me which will be held within a few days. In the meantime, I want you to hand telegram No. 47 to Foreign Minister Eden, and at the same time explain to the minister the reason I express so unreserved an opinion is because I feel so close to him, as I was acquainted with Foreign Minister Eden ever since we were in Geneva. Also Ambassador Craigie's report of the approach of a critical point in Far East, etc. is really a ridiculous fantasy (The Vice Minister also called the Ambassador's attention on this point on the 12th.). Of course it is not only groundless but also there is no intention on our part to make trouble with Britain which I wish you would make a verbal representation to him.

USE Further some English newspapers, misunderstanding our real motives, are recently publishing stimulative news and editorials as if Japan would try to start military actions at any moment, which would only serve to make the relations of both countries worse and be harmful and there would be nothing to be gained by it. Will you kindly call his attention to this point to stop them?

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1132

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu _____ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION, _____ FOREIGN MINISTRY _____ and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 13 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: HANDWRITTEN TELEGRAM MATSUOKA TO SHIGEMITSU CONCERNING MESSAGE TO EDEN. _____ (TELEGRAM NO. 46) _____

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): FOREIGN MINISTRY _____

Signed at Tokyo on this

31st day of October, 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ M. Emura
SEAL

/s/ Ass't Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. CURTIS _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

31st day of October, 1946

/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.
NAME

Witness: /s/ Fred Kobayashi 2d Lt.

/s/ Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

1042

DOCUMENT NO. 220C (11)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 142

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1744

TOKYO, February 13, 1941.

.....

According to recent information received by my Government not only do Japanese officials in Indo-China continue to interfere with the granting of permits by appropriate authorities of Indo-China for the re-export of American-owned merchandise, but in one instance at least have caused these authorities to revoke a valid permit previously issued for the re-export of petroleum products owned by an American firm, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company.

.....

Foreign Relations II, p.308

1043

Br. Ex. 155

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts.

(WASHINGTON,) February 14, 1941

I accompanied the new Japanese Ambassador to the President's office and sat through the conference between the President and the Ambassador.....


The President then said that of course it is manifest that the present relations between the two countries are not good; that they are in fact getting worse, or to use a well-known expression, they are "deteriorating" . . . The President affirmed two or three times the view that the American people, while not bitter as yet, are thoroughly and seriously concerned and to a more or less increasing extent, at the course of Japan.

He then referred to the movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratly Islands and other localities in that area, as having given this country very serious concern. He said that the entry of Japan into the Tripartite agreement is likewise giving this country the same serious concern, especially from the viewpoint that Japan is supposed to have divested herself of her sovereign authority to deal with the question of peace and war and to leave it to the Tripartite signatories led by Germany. The President went over this the second time with increased emphasis as to the heavy signs of concern it had created among the American people.

.....

He then said that in view of all these serious conditions which are becoming increasingly worse and which seriously call for attention, it occurred to him that the Japanese Ambassador might find it advisable and agreeable as he, the President, does, to sit down with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials and review and reexamine the important phases of the relations between the two countries, at least during the past four or five years, and frankly discuss all of their phases and ascertain just when and how points of divergence developed and their effects, and bring the whole situation in these respects up to date in order to see if our relations could not be improved. The President said there is plenty of room in the Pacific area for everybody, and he repeated this statement with emphasis.

.....

10/34 

No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND

TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 14 FEB.
(SHOWA 16), 1941, "RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL."

Concerning your telegram No. 77, the present proposal by the British Foreign Minister which is based on the report from Ambassador Craigie seems to have been made under the presumption or fear that Japan would acquire military bases etc. in Thailand and French Indo-China by taking advantage of the arbitration conference between Thailand and French Indo-China, and then commence military action against England in the South Seas concurrently with Germany's landing strategy against England. It is difficult to understand on what grounds Ambassador Craigie based the above alarming report to his home government. When the Vice-Minister visited him on the 12th he said, in reply to the Vice-Minister's question that he knew well from past experiences that Japan's politics and diplomacy were controlled by the military, and that he had made the present report based on the speech and action of military men of responsibility. So, to make sure, I at once carefully privately investigated in various fields whether such facts existed, but I could find no such facts. On the other hand, in view of the fact that every influential newspaper in England is loudly reporting the crisis between Japan and England, the present proposition seems to be trying to check Japan's advance to the South, if only for the present besides containing the strategic motive of turning America's interest toward Thailand and French Indo-China and cementing the cooperation between England and America in this sphere. Although I think you have noticed this matter already, I am sending you our observation for you to bear in mind.

Wired to the Ambassador in America.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 1339A (1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kgoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 17 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: _____
 No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, _____
TO M. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND. _____
 TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 17 FEB. (SHOWA 16), 1941, _____
"RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL." _____

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Signed at Tokyo on this
21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
 Signature of Official
 SEAL
Chief. Archives Sect.
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME
Investigation Division
 Official Capacity I.P.S.

Witness: /s/T/4. T. Toguchi

1044 DUP

No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO M. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND

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Wired to the Ambassador in America.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1339A (1)

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TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 17 FEB. (SHOWA 16), 1941, "RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL." _____

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Signed at Tokyo on this
21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL
Chief. Archives Sect.
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME
Investigation Division
Official Capacity I.P.S.

Witness: /s/T/h. P. Toguchi

Cipher Telegram

Dated 7 p.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Foreign Office Cable #4490, 4492

Charge of U. S. Affairs Dept.

To Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

On Enlightening the Government and People of the United States

No. 68 Strictly Confidential.

During the recent interpellations in the Diet, the present Foreign Minister expressed our attitude and determination in a straightforward way to urge reconsideration on the part of the United States, and is making efforts to make it clear that our national resources have not been so much used up. On your arrival at your post please make continuous effort to make the President and the leading members in the Government and among the people know the Japan's real intention thoroughly, explaining to them fully, as you think fit, the following points.

1. It is the inherent mission of both Japan and the U.S.A. to rescue modern civilization from catastrophe and bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific, and it is our duty to cooperate with each other to accomplish this mission. On the basis of this faith, Japan wishes for the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. But unfortunately, the American Government and people do not try to understand Japan's real intention; instead, they misconstrue Japan's action as a threat towards the United States. This is a grave and very dangerous /p. 2/ illusion, indeed. Japan is strongly determined to execute the already-fixed policy at the risk of the nation's destiny. So if America should believe that, on the basis of information, that there are still some people among the Japanese who are secretly opposed to the Tripartite Pact (of course, there are, but there are such people in any country); or, overestimating the exhaustion of Japan's natural resources due to the prolongation of the China Incident, a strong attitude on the part of the United States would easily cause a split in the public opinion of Japan or make us give in, it would be a ridiculous misconception and we are afraid that such a belief would bring quite unfathomable results.

2. The consumption of our national resources is true to some extent, but not as bad as is propagated in America. It is our national character to repel strongly any pressure from foreign countries, so if the United States should purposely obstruct our way, the Japanese Government and people will unite more firmly and determine strongly to accomplish the national policy, regardless of sacrifice. Suppose the United States should be in the same situation as Japan, the Americans also would probably see the same result as the Japanese, /p. 3/ because in this point the American character is very similar to that of the Japanese. So the Americans should easily under-

stand such psychology and also the result caused by this psychology. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Japanese are very grateful to those who are quite sympathetic and have complete understanding towards them and at times will even make concessions or compromises under the circumstances, even if it is not logical. The intelligent public of America should take these characteristics into consideration.

3. There is not one person in Japan who wishes to fight against America. Should war arise between Japan and America, it would be America that started it. America has never yet gone into a war passively.

4. What does America expect to acquire by starting a war with Japan, anyhow? Does she wish to conquer Japan and wipe out the Japanese race? Surely there is no one in America who has such an idea. Even if they should have such a dream, it is absolutely impossible to actualize it. Supposing that America could subjugate Japan and enforce a treaty as relentless as the Versailles Treaty, Japan will break from the fetters of restraint within thirty years. An example / p.4/ is not far to seek. See it in the restoration of Germany. Japan has a unique national structure unparalleled in the world. She has tided over many difficult situations in the past under the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor. It is certain that the restoration of Japan would be accomplished far more rapidly and more wonderfully than in Germany. The Imperial Household is an everlasting source of our national power. Without understanding this unique national structure, it is impossible to understand the Japanese people. After all, a clash between Japan and America will not only lead to the destruction of the two countries where friendly relations should exist by nature, but also lead to the destruction of world civilization. America has nothing to acquire from it, and, when considered coolly, a war between America and Japan is most foolish.

5. If Japan and America should come to war, the Soviet Union will certainly make some move. And if Japan should be defeated as America anticipates, the Soviet Union will overwhelm the whole of China, communize it, and, gaining ground, communize the greater part of Asia. Would America welcome such an eventuality? If, by any chance, Japan should be defeated, the situation in East Asia would be alarming.

6. The Japanese foreign policy is based on the great idea of Eight Corners Under One Roof. Japan devotes herself to insure the peace and prosperity of the world. /p.5/ of course, Japan has not the least intention of attacking America, so we find it difficult to understand why America is engrossed in making military preparation against Japan. Japan and America should not be pitted against each other, but should cooperate with each other. However, not only are the American statesmen very inciting in their speech and action against Japan recently, but also their aim seems to be to build up a great army, big enough to make America the police of the whole world. This is not only a sad thing for the peace of the Pacific, but also of no advantage to America. America ought not to interfere in the spheres of other strong nations at random, but awaken to her own responsibility towards world

peace, and with the spirit of mutual aid and mutual concession, devote herself in tiding over the present difficulties and promoting the welfare of mankind.

Please send this telegram to Great Britain.

/1.7/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 12, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

London to Foreign Office cable, '3639

Charge of European, Asiatic and Southern Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister Matsuka from Ambassador Shigenitsu

No. 9 Urgent

1. Anxiety on the part of Great Britain is largely due to fear caused by lively discussion in Japan of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the southward advance and because she thinks that Japan intervention in the disputes between French Indo-China and Thailand is to acquire navy and air bases in these districts for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, and that this is concerted operation over both Europe and Asia after consultation with Germany.

2. There are some people who advocate that if Japan should acquire military bases in Thailand, Britain should regard it as a violation of the Non-aggression Pact with Thailand and to take military action against Thailand at once. Many reports are sent in saying that for this purpose Britain is concentrating troops on the Malay-Thailand frontier and sending in air-units. This is stimulating the United States, Australia and also Holland and other countries very much, but England, under CHURCHILL, is quite militant, and the situation cannot be easily predicted, connected with the war situation in Europe and/p.8/ Africa. This has been made much clearer by EDEN's proposal on the 7th and the tone of the press of these days.

3. Japan should dispose of the China Incident at any cost. Especially if Japan could succeed in building up a foundation in French Indo-China, it is quite clear that Japanese power over Britain and the South will become more oppressive gradually. Therefore I would suggest that from the point of tact Japan should regard action without words as the first principle; declare clearly to Britain that Japan has no intention of encroaching upon British territory and also express her strong determination not to allow any country to interfere in Japan's negotiations with other countries. (Moreover, lay stress on the fact that what Japan wants to acquire is economical demands and that between nations it is impossible to close the door economically.) Also I consider that Japan should modify the public cry of advancing to the South, and first of all build up her foundation. Also I feel that it is very necessary that the Tokyo Arbitration Conference be concluded as soon as possible.

/P.9/ Cipher Telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 13, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Batavia to Foreign Office Cable #3655
Charge of Southern Affairs and Trade Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUKA from Envoy YOSHEZAWA

Negotiation No. 65 (Strictly Confidential)

Cooperative relation between Dutch East Indies and the United States and Great Britain has become much closer recently as America's aid to Britain has become active, and the attitude of the Dutch East Indies towards Japan is nothing but the reflection of the attitude of the United States. It is difficult to notice such a distinction between them as is generally supposed in Japan. America's attitude towards Japan is growing worse even without Secretary of State HULL's speech at Congress. There is no room for doubt that the problem of the South Seas, especially of the Dutch East Indies, is an important cause for America's plan of a huge expansion of naval ships. It should be said that the real problem lying between Japan and America is not China but the Dutch East Indies. Regardless of the result of the Anglo-German war, the United States will persistently regard with hostility Japan who has ambitions towards the South Sea Islands. On the other hand the authorities of Dutch East Indies, consulting their own interests, desire to be in the hands of the United States rather than Japan. And besides, not only are they in such a condition that they can expect positive aid from both the United States and Britain, but also think that not even Germany will agree to the Dutch Indies coming under Japanese authority as a dependency so easily. /p. 10/ On the other hand, in the speech of the Japanese government against the United States and Dutch East Indies there is no consistent underlying strength, and finally it has given one the impression that barking dogs seldom bite; and the Dutch have begun to underestimate Japan's real power. Therefore it is natural for the Dutch East Indies to follow the attitude of the United States. At this time, then, when the United States is about to push on with her oppression against Japan, it is difficult to expect even unsatisfactory success from the Dutch-Japanese negotiations. Its breaking up is only a question of time. The acquiring of those thirteen items of necessary commodities will meet with difficulties. That is, the only means for Japan to settle the problem of the Dutch East Indies is by exercising her real power. Without this determination it will be quite fruitless for Japan to strive to achieve success by peaceful negotiations, shouting loudly for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

p. 11 Ordinary telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 18, Showa 16 /1941/

Received night, Feb. 19, Showa 16/1941/

From Ottawa to Foreign Office Cable #4130
Charge of U. S. Affairs and Investigation Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Ambassador YOSHIKAWA

No. 24

On the 17th at the reopening of Parliament, the Prime Minister made a speech on the international situation and also on diplomatic relations. The following is the main point of his speech on the relation between Japan and Canada.

There are some among the authorities on diplomatic and military affairs who believe in the possibility of a world-wide dissension occurring from Japan's attack on Singapore and Germany's capture of Suez and Gibraltar along with Germany's invasion of England. Recent statements of Japanese statesmen have given us an impression that the situation has come to a crisis, and some of those statements seem to confirm the possibility of Japan's southward advance. But the Canadian Government still hopes that the opinion of the moderate element in Japan will be adopted, but, in view of the speeches and action of the Japanese statesmen and the concentration of Japanese troops, it must not be overlooked that there are signs that Japan will be compelled to take an aggressive action at such a time as is most advantageous for /P. 12/ an aggressive nation.

Influenced by the urgent condition in the Orient, the anti-Japanese atmosphere in British Columbia has increased. Unfounded and irresponsible blame was put on the Japanese-Canadian, so that the government appointed a special committee to investigate the real facts of the situation on the Pacific Coast. A report and advice has been sent in, and the Government has acknowledged the report, etc. Details will be sent by official communication. Telegraphed to England and America and mailed to Vancouver.

/P. 13/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 17, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 18, Showa 16 /1941/

From Santiago to Foreign Office Cable #4048
Charge of Investigation and U. S. Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Charge d'Affaires KAWASAKI

No. 33 (Confidential)

Concerning your telegram No. 311 (on the collection of information concerning the appeasement policy of the U.S.A. toward Japan), in a meeting with Secretary Lyon, son-in-law of Ambassador Grew, on other business, he mentioned that he had tried as had been indicated to him but that the Tripartite Pact was a death-blow to Japanese-American relations and that so long as this existed the United States could not change her policy suddenly and that his father-in-law was worried.

Doc. No. 1150

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1150

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated 13-18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Series of handwritten Telegrams dated 13-18 Feb. 1941 between Foreign Minister and various envoys in London, Washington, and Batavia. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this
30th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Assistant, Chief Archives Sect.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
1st day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Cipher Telegram

Dated 7 p.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Foreign Office Cable #4490, 4492

Charge of U. S. Affairs Dept.

To Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

On Enlightening the Government and People of the United States

No. 68 Strictly Confidential.

During the recent interpellations in the Diet, the present Foreign Minister expressed our attitude and determination in a straightforward way to urge reconsideration on the part of the United States, and is making efforts to make it clear that our national resources have not been so much used up. On your arrival at your post please make continuous effort to make the President and the leading members in the Government and among the people know the Japan's real intention thoroughly, explaining to them fully, as you think fit, the following points.

1. It is the inherent mission of both Japan and the U.S.A. to rescue modern civilization from catastrophe and bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific, and it is our duty to cooperate with each other to accomplish this mission. On the basis of this faith, Japan wishes for the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. But unfortunately, the American Government and people do not try to understand Japan's real intention; instead, they misconstrue Japan's action as a threat towards the United States. This is a grave and very dangerous /p. 2/ illusion, indeed. Japan is strongly determined to execute the already-fixed policy at the risk of the nation's destiny. So if America should believe that, on the basis of information, that there are still some people among the Japanese who are secretly opposed to the Tripartite Pact (of course, there are, but there are such people in any country); or, overestimating the exhaustion of Japan's natural resources due to the prolongation of the China Incident, a strong attitude on the part of the United States would easily cause a split in the public opinion of Japan or make us give in, it would be a ridiculous misconception and we are afraid that such a belief would bring quite unfathomable results.

2. The consumption of our national resources is true to some extent, but not as bad as is propagated in America. It is our national character to repel strongly any pressure from foreign countries, so if the United States should purposely obstruct our way, the Japanese Government and people will unite more firmly and determine strongly to accomplish the national policy, regardless of sacrifice. Suppose the United States should be in the same situation as Japan, the Americans also would probably see the same result as the Japanese, /p. 3/ because in this point the American character is very similar to that of the Japanese. So the Americans should easily under-

stand such psychology and also the result caused by this psychology. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Japanese are very grateful to those who are quite sympathetic and have complete understanding towards them and at times will even make concessions or compromises under the circumstances, even if it is not logical. The intelligent public of America should take these characteristics into consideration.

3. There is not one person in Japan who wishes to fight against America. Should war arise between Japan and America, it would be America that started it. America has never yet gone into a war passively.

4. What does America expect to acquire by starting a war with Japan, anyhow? Does she wish to conquer Japan and wipe out the Japanese race? Surely there is no one in America who has such an idea. Even if they should have such a dream, it is absolutely impossible to actualize it. Supposing that America could subjugate Japan and enforce a treaty as relentless as the Versailles Treaty, Japan will break from the fetters of restraint within thirty years. An example / p.4/ is not far to seek. See it in the restoration of Germany. Japan has a unique national structure unparalleled in the world. She has tided over many difficult situations in the past under the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor. It is certain that the restoration of Japan would be accomplished far more rapidly and more wonderfully than in Germany. The Imperial Household is an everlasting source of our national power. Without understanding this unique national structure, it is impossible to understand the Japanese people. After all, a clash between Japan and America will not only lead to the destruction of the two countries where friendly relations should exist by nature, but also lead to the destruction of world civilization. America has nothing to acquire from it, and, when considered coolly, a war between America and Japan is most foolish.

5. If Japan and America should come to war, the Soviet Union will certainly make some move. And if Japan should be defeated as America anticipates, the Soviet Union will overwhelm the whole of China, communize it, and, gaining ground, communize the greater part of Asia. Would America welcome such an eventuality? If, by any chance, Japan should be defeated, the situation in East Asia would be alarming.

6. The Japanese foreign policy is based on the great idea of Eight Corners Under One Roof. Japan devotes herself to insure the peace and prosperity of the world. /p.5/ of course, Japan has not the least intention of attacking America, so we find it difficult to understand why America is engrossed in making military preparation against Japan. Japan and America should not be pitted against each other, but should cooperate with each other. However, not only are the American statesmen very inciting in their speech and action against Japan recently, but also their aim seems to be to build up a great army, big enough to make America the police of the whole world. This is not only a sad thing for the peace of the Pacific, but also of no advantage to America. America ought not to interfere in the spheres of other strong nations at random, but awaken to her own responsibility towards world

peace, and with the spirit of mutual aid and mutual concession, devote herself in tiding over the present difficulties and promoting the welfare of mankind.

Please send this telegram to Great Britain.

/1.7/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 12, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

London to Foreign Office cable, 43639

Charge of European, Asiatic and Southern Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister Matsuo from Ambassador Shigenitsu

No. 94 Urgent

1. Anxiety on the part of Great Britain is largely due to fear caused by lively discussion in Japan of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the southward advance and because she thinks that Japan intervention in the disputes between French Indo-China and Thailand is to acquire navy and air bases in these districts for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, and that this is concerted operation over both Europe and Asia after consultation with Germany.

2. There are some people who advocate that if Japan should acquire military bases in Thailand, Britain should regard it as a violation of the Non-aggression Pact with Thailand and to take military action against Thailand at once. Many reports are sent in saying that for this purpose Britain is concentrating troops on the Malay-Thailand frontier and sending in air-units. This is stimulating the United States, Australia and also Iceland and other countries very much, but England, under CHURCHILL, is quite militant, and the situation cannot be easily predicted, connected with the war situation in Europe and/p.8/ Africa. This has been made much clearer by EDEN's proposal on the 7th and the tone of the press of these days.

3. Japan should dispose of the China incident at any cost. Especially if Japan could succeed in building up a foundation in French Indo-China, it is quite clear that Japanese power over Britain and the South will become more oppressive gradually. Therefore I would suggest that from the point of tact Japan should regard action without words as the first principle; declare clearly to Britain that Japan has no intention of encroaching upon British territory and also express her strong determination not to allow any country to interfere in Japan's negotiations with other countries. (Moreover, lay stress on the fact that what Japan wants to acquire is economical demands and that between nations it is impossible to close the door economically.) Also I consider that Japan should modify the public cry of advancing to the South, and first of all build up her foundation. Also I feel that it is very necessary that the Tokyo Arbitration Conference be concluded as soon as possible.

/P.9/ Cipher Telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 13, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Batavia to Foreign office cable #3655
Charge of Southern Affairs and Trade Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUKA from Envoy YOSHIKAWA

Negotiation No. 65 (Strictly Confidential)

Cooperative relation between Dutch East Indies and the United States and Great Britain has become much closer recently as America's aid to Britain has become active, and the attitude of the Dutch East Indies towards Japan is nothing but the reflection of the attitude of the United States. It is difficult to notice such a distinction between them as is generally supposed in Japan. America's attitude towards Japan is growing worse even without Secretary of State HULL's speech at Congress. There is no room for doubt that the problem of the South Seas, especially of the Dutch East Indies, is an important cause for America's plan of a huge expansion of naval ships. It should be said that the real problem lying between Japan and America is not China but the Dutch East Indies. Regardless of the result of the Anglo-German war, the United States will persistently regard with hostility Japan who has ambitions towards the South Sea Islands. On the other hand the authorities of Dutch East Indies, consulting their own interests, desire to be in the hands of the United States rather than Japan. And besides, not only are they in such a condition that they can expect positive aid from both the United States and Britain, but also think that not even Germany will agree to the Dutch Indies coming under Japanese authority as a dependency so easily. /P. 10/ On the other hand, in the speech of the Japanese government against the United States and Dutch East Indies there is no consistent underlying strength, and finally it has given one the impression that barking dogs seldom bite; and the Dutch have begun to underrate Japan's real power. Therefore it is natural for the Dutch East Indies to follow the attitude of the United States. At this time, then, when the United States is about to push on with her oppression against Japan, it is difficult to expect even unsatisfactory success from the Dutch-Japanese negotiations. Its breaking up is only a question of time. The acquiring of those thirteen items of necessary commodities will meet with difficulties. That is, the only means for Japan to settle the problem of the Dutch East Indies is by exercising her real power. Without this determination it will be quite fruitless for Japan to strive to achieve success by peaceful negotiations, shouting loudly for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

p. 11 Ordinary telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 18, Showa 16 /1941/

Received night, Feb. 19, Showa 16/1941/

2 / 13 / 41
Take Indonesia

From Ottawa to Foreign Office Cable #4130
Charge of U. S. Affairs and Investigation Depts.

Canada

To Foreign Minister MITSUOKA from Ambassador YOSHIZAWA

No. 24

On the 17th at the reopening of Parliament, the Prime Minister made a speech on the international situation and also on diplomatic relations. The following is the main point of his speech on the relation between Japan and Canada.

There are some among the authorities on diplomatic and military affairs who believe in the possibility of a world-wide dissension occurring from Japan's attack on Singapore and Germany's capture of Suez and Gibraltar along with Germany's invasion of England. Recent statements of Japanese statesmen have given us an impression that the situation has come to a crisis, and some of those statements seem to confirm the possibility of Japan's southward advance. But the Canadian Government still hopes that the opinion of the moderate element in Japan will be adopted, but, in view of the speeches and action of the Japanese statesmen and the concentration of Japanese troops, it must not be overlooked that there are signs that Japan will be compelled to take an aggressive action at such a time as is most advantageous for /P. 12/ an aggressive nation.

Influenced by the urgent condition in the Orient, the anti-Japanese atmosphere in British Columbia has increased. Unfounded and irresponsible blame was put on the Japanese-Canadian, so that the government appointed a special committee to investigate the real facts of the situation on the Pacific Coast. A report and advice has been sent in, and the Government has acknowledged the report, etc. Details will be sent by official communication. Telegraphed to England and America and mailed to Vancouver.

/P. 13/ Cipher telegram
Dated p.m. Feb. 17, Showa 16 /1941/
Received a.m. Feb. 18, Showa 16 /1941/

2/17/41

From Santiago to Foreign Office Cable #4048
Charge of Investigation and U. S. Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Charge d'Affaires KARASIKI

No. 33 (Confidential)

Concerning your telegram No. 311 (on the collection of information concerning the appeasement policy of the U.S.A. toward Japan), in a meeting with Secretary Lyon, son-in-law of Ambassador Crew, on other business, he mentioned that he had tried as had been indicated to him but that the Tripartite Pact was a death-blow to Japanese-American relations and that so long as this existed the United States could not change her policy suddenly and that his father-in-law was worried.

Doc. No. 1150

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1150

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated 13-18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Series of handwritten Telegrams dated 13-18 Feb. 1941 between Foreign Minister and various envoys in London, Washington, and Batavia. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this
30th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Assistant, Chief Archives Sect.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
1st day of Oct, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

CABLE #51 DESPATCHED 8:00 P.M. FEB. 18, 1941, BY FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU ON INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND CRAIGIE REGARDING CABLE #47.

Craigie, on the 15th, called upon me with a note containing the purport of your cable No. 78 and summary of the discussions between you and Eden. I told Craigie on this occasion that I had already received from you a detailed report concerning this question, and that in response thereto I had requested you to lay my note before Foreign Secretary Eden and handed him a copy of my cable #47. I then pointed out to Craigie that there seemed to be an over-anxiety on the part of Britain about the orientation of Japan's policy, that various reports were reaching us that Britain and the United States had taken up a combined action against Japan, that this was inciting Japan's public opinion, causing doubt and fear and giving rise to the arguments in some quarters that Japan must take some counter-measures to meet this situation, and this would lead to misunderstanding on both sides. I further told Craigie that so long as they refrained from taking any such provocative attitude against us we would under no circumstances initiate action that would lead to anxiety on the part of Britain and the United States, that misunderstandings by either party are the most dangerous factors, and that we wished to do everything possible to eliminate them, and urged that England reconsider. I also explained to him that the major object of the Tripartite Pact was the limitation of the warfare in Europe and encouragement of a peaceful settlement. Also under strict secrecy I made it clear to him that, at the moment of signing of the pact Germany had stressed her desire to avoid provoking the United States and especially to avert Japanese-American hostilities as far as possible. Negotiations for the pact were carried out on the basis of the above. I told him that I myself did not doubt Germany's real intention, that the above seemed to me to be consistent with her real interest, but that Japan's policy also was based on this, and that she would continue to act along this course.

Craigie then, in response, questioned whether I could check the so-called southward march of Japan, views on which were so active at the moment in Japan. Further, Craigie raised a query as to whether Japan did not expect exorbitant compensation for her role as a mediator of the Siam-French Indo-China conflict. I assured him as to Japan's southward advance that I would try to check it to the best of my ability,

but as for the Siam-French Indo-China affairs I preferred to indicate Japan's real intentions by actual fact rather than by making excuses in words, and further, that as far as I myself was concerned, the greatest reward was the restoration of peace, with which I would be satisfied. I told him I believed that this was the first step toward realizing world peace which was Japan's ideal since the beginning of the nation; and I explained to him in detail Japan's policy. I added that since there exists a close intimacy between the Foreign Secretary and myself since our days in Geneva I had expressed my views outspokenly in my memorandum addressed to him, but in regard to that part which concerns arbitration for European peace, this had nothing to do with Germany and Italy, and that I had merely stated the belief which I've always held. The conversation between Craigie and myself lasted for about two hours, and he seemed quite relieved when he left.

Wired to U.S.A.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 1339A (3)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 18 pages, dated 18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: CABLE #51 DESPATCHED 8:00 P.M. FEB. 18, 1941, BY FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA TO ALBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU ON INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND CRAIGIE REGARDING CABLE #47. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
 21st day of Sept, 1946

's/ K. Hayashi
 Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: 's/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 25 day of September, 1946

's/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Witness: 's/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigation Division
 Official Capacity

I.P.S.

We can't let the press know go undisturbed.
We

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TOKYO.

21st February, 1941

Logan (not bound by the terms when they of Jap origin)
It has already been my understanding that after a conference
is off by 1942 - he would be for his credit

My dear Minister,

With reference to our conversation of yesterday in regard to the presence of British troops near the Malayan-Thai frontier, I send you the text of a reassuring communique issued by the Thai Government on the 13th instant. You will see from this that that Government is not in any way apprehensive in regard to the precautionary measures taken in Malay.

I am sorry to say that this communique was distorted when published in the Japanese press. Instead of the words "both countries still respect the Treaty and pact of non-aggression concluded between one another", the version given in the Japanese press states "Great Britain should respect the Non-Agression Treaty which she concluded with Thailand". This can only have been/

His Excellency

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

have not
at do not appear to be bound when offering
documents or intrusions
It is to be understood by one of
Jap origin

been a deliberate misquotation, which I am sure you will agree is very regrettable in present circumstances.

Believe me

my dear Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd) R. H. Craigie

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1339A (8)Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kgoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 21 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Letter dated 21 Feb. 1941, from Ambassador Craigie to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA regarding presence of British troops near the Malayan-Thai Frontier.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. HayashiSignature of Official
SEALWitness: /s/ Nagaharu OdoChief, Archives Sect
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official CapacityWitness: /s/ T/h T. Toguchi

Copy of telegram No. 1592A

Nature of telegram: Code

Date: Dispatched: 24 February, Showa 16/1941/PM

Received : 25 February, Showa 16/1941/PM

TO : FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA

FROM: SHIGEMITSU, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN LONDON

No. 135

At the request of Premier Churchill, I had a talk with him for about an hour at noon on the 24th. At that time the Premier spoke in connection with the matter of Anglo-Japanese relations with which he had been personally concerned. He went into detail in speaking of the situations from the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through the Russo-Japanese War and up to the World War and he expressed how much he desired to keep a friendly relationship with Japan. Then, as the second point, he expressed deep regret regarding the present Anglo-Japanese relation which is gradually getting worse; if a clash should occur between the two nations it would indeed be a tragedy. He emphasized that the defense works undertaken in the area with Singapore as its center were merely for the protection and control of the area and that Britain had never taken any policy such as to resort to an offensive against Japan. As the third point, he emphasized that the British had a firm resolution for the prosecution of the war. He went so far as to say that if what Britain believes to be justice should fail to gain the victory, Britain had better go to ruin. He said he had been thinking that this was not at all an easy war as people in general thought and that it would by no means come to an end this year. He, however, believes that the war will certainly be brought to an end with victory on the part of Britain. Therefore, he said that the question of mediation which Mr. MATSUOKA mentioned would not arise. In connection with the cordial message which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA sent to British Foreign Minister Eden, Premier Churchill has given me the note of another telegram No. 136, asking me to tell you that since Eden is away he himself has written you the outline of the talk we had today. The questions and answers in the talk will be sent afterwards by cable.

THIS TELEGRAM ALONE HAS BEEN SENT TO THE UNITED STATES

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1592-A

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 24 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 4808 from SHIGEMITSU in London to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

19th day of Sep, 1946

/s/ K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. SATO

(SEAL)

Official Capacity

STATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCUREMENT

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

20th day of Sept, 1946

/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.
NAME

Witness: T/4 P. TOGUCHI

Investigator
Official Capacity

"INTERCHANGE BETWEEN JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE
AND BRITISH ON MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS."

Note from Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs containing message to his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been laid before Prime Minister.

Prime Minister is gratified to observe that Monsieur Matsuoka sees no reason to apprehend any untoward developments in East Asia, and notes with satisfaction his assurance about peaceful intentions of Japanese Government.

Since Monsieur Matsuoka, for his part, makes reference to "movements of British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations", Prime Minister would allow himself to offer certain observations which he hopes may remove any misunderstanding of position of H. M. 's Government.

There is no question of H. M. 's Government making any attack upon or committing any act of aggression against Japan; and Prime Minister is sure that this also represents intentions of United States, though of course he cannot claim to speak for them. All preparations which are being made in Oriental Regions by Great Britain and United States are of a purely defensive character. Incidentally, Prime Minister would wish to assure Monsieur Matsuoka that concern which Mr. Eden expressed to Japanese Ambassador was not based exclusively on reports from H. M. 's Ambassador in Tokyo, but on the course of events in Far East and on a study of the speeches of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs himself.

Turning now to the war in progress in Europe between Great Britain and Germany it will be within Monsieur Matsuoka's recollection that, before outbreak of war, H.M. 's Government made every offer, by concession and reasonable dealing, to avert hostilities. That is recognised throughout the world, and indeed the Government of the day in this country were severely criticised for having travelled too far along this road. Their efforts were unavailing, and German Government, by attacking Poland after so many breaches of faith and of treaties, chose arbitrament of war. H.M.'s Government, having thus been forced to enter upon this grievous quarrel, have no thought but to carry it to a victorious conclusion. Naturally it takes some time for the peaceful communities which compose British Empire to overtake military preparations of countries which have long been exulting in their martial might, and adapting their industries to war production. But even now H.M.'s Government feel well assured of their ability to maintain themselves against all comers, and they have every reason to hope that within a few months they will, with rapidly increasing supply of materials which is coming from United States, be overwhelmingly strong.

Monsieur Matsuoka makes allusion to help which this country receiving from United States of America. Prime Minister would observe that that help is being given for very reason that battle which this country is waging is for overthrow of system of lawlessness and violence abroad and cold, cruel tyranny at home which constitutes German Naziism regime.

It is this system that people of British Empire, with sympathy and support of whole English-speaking world, are resolved to extirpate from continent of Europe. H.M.'s Government have no designs upon integrity of independence of any other country, and they seek no advantage for themselves except satisfaction of having rid the earth of a hateful terror and of restoring freedom to the many insulted and enslaved nations of European continent. This they would regard as greatest honour that could reward them, and the crowning episode in what, for western world, is a long continuity of history.

Peace

Monsieur Matsuoka, with loftiest motives, has hinted at his readiness to act as the mediator between the belligerents. Prime Minister is sure that, in light of what he has said and upon for the reflection, Monsieur Matsuoka will understand that in a cause of this kind, not in any way concerned with territory, trade or material gains, but affecting whole future of humanity, there can be no question of compromise or parley. It would be a matter of profoundest regret to H.M.'s Government if by any circumstance Japan and this country were to become embroiled, and this not only because of their recollection of the years during which two countries were happily united in alliance, but also because such a melancholy event would both spread and prolong the war without however in opinion of H.M.'s Government altering its conclusion.

Foreign Office, W. 1.

24th February. 1941

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 702

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 24 Feb, 1941, and described as follows: Conversation between Prime Minister Mr. Churchill and Ambassador Mr. Shigemitsu, on Feb. 24, 1941 (in English)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
 1st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo

Signature of Official
 SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Yamamoto

Assistant Chief Archives Section
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 1st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Investigator, I.P.S.
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takio Tozuchi

1050

Suspicious!

Copy of Telegram No. 4840

Nature of Telegram: Code

Date: Dispatched 25 February Showa 16/1941/ A.M.
Received: 25 February Showa 16/1941/ P.M.

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

From: Ambassador OSHIMA, Berlin

No. 160 (Urgent)

At the interview with Ribbentrop reported to you in Telegram No. 157, I stressed that there have been various conjectures concerning Japanese-German relations, especially concerning the Tri-Partite Pact, that there has also been slanderous propaganda by England and the United States; but that although there may be some degree of misunderstanding on the part of Germany, the fact that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact will be clearer when the Imperial Rescript is issued; and that both government officials and people are moving forward with united and steadfast resolve toward the realization of the national policy, with the aforementioned treaty as the keynote of our foreign relations. Ribbentrop agreed, saying that Germany too has a comradely feeling of being in the same boat as Japan, and that Chancellor Hitler has the strongest faith on this point. He said that he hoped that there was no misunderstanding about Germany's real intention by Japan.

For your reference.

Relayed to Germany, Soviet Russia, Turkey, and to the U.S.A.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____

I. P. S. No. 1592-BStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 page, dated 25 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 4840 from Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this19th day of Sept., 1946/s/ K. HAYASHI
Signature of OfficialWitness: /s/ T. SATO

SEAL

Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this20 day of Sept., 1946/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.
NAMEWitness: /s/ T/4 P. TOGUCHIInvestigator
Official Capacity

106-2

TELEGRAM

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TOKYO, February 27, 1941--2 a.m.
(Received 4:55 p.m.)

Excerpt.

Australian troops

317. In the course of my conversation today with the Foreign Minister he went out of his way to accuse the British Government of taking measures in the Far East which were a direct incitement to Japan and which rendered very difficult an improvement in the situation. He referred in this connection to the reported mining of Singapore and the sending of Australian troops to the Malaya-Thailand border.

I said that it seemed to me extraordinary that the Japanese should interpret and characterize obviously defensive measures as measures of offense. As I had said to the Minister at the American-Japan Society luncheon, we must inevitably be guided by "facts and actions" and that certainly the facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance were concrete causes for serious anxiety not only on the part of Great Britain but of ourselves. Having occupied in succession Waichow, Hainan, the Spratly Islands, and other areas, the Japanese military were now pouring troops into Indo-China and, according to our informer, had occupied the airport in Saigon, quite apart from naval activities in those regions, and that these steps, taken in conjunction with the public utterances of many Japanese statesmen, generals and admirals concerning Japanese intentions to the southward, had created a situation which could hardly be regarded with equanimity either by the United States or Great Britain since they threatened not only our interests but our possessions.

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Foreign Relations II, pp. 308-309

1053

Japan's Second Offer (Handed by Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to CHURCHILL)

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledges the receipt of the Note of His Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister, dated February 24, 1941, and takes pleasure in apprising the latter that the statement and remarks contained therein have been duly noted.

The Foreign Minister trusts that Mr. Churchill is not necessarily expecting observations to be made upon them. He wishes, however, to take advantage of the opportunity to state that no hint whatever of his readiness to act as a mediator between the actual belligerents was intended to be conveyed in his Memorandum addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, nor did he imagine for a moment any possibility of such a hint being read in any part of the text. The Foreign Minister took occasion in his Memorandum to refer to the mediation now taking place in Tokyo as Mr. Eden had made allusions to it and incidentally took the liberty of stating in a general and abstract manner the views he has always cherished, in order to make clear the aspiration and attitude of his country concerning the problem of peace or the recovery of normal conditions throughout the world.

The Foreign Minister believes that it will not be entirely out of place to reiterate what he has said on more than one occasion in reference to the Tripartite Pact, inasmuch as this matter was touched upon by Mr. Eden in his conversation with Ambassador Shigemitsu. The Tripartite Pact was concluded as, and remains, a peace pact in the sense that it was entered into largely with a view to preventing a third Power from participating in the European war or Sino-japanese conflict, thus limiting the participants and dimensions of the war and also to bringing about peace at the earliest possible date. Japan's ideals were epitomized in the preamble of the Pact, and it is needless to say that Japan, remaining absolutely loyal to the aims and ideals enunciated, will always find herself standing by her allies in carrying out her duty under the Tripartite Pact.

The Foreign Minister would equally deplore and regret, if by any untoward circumstances, Great Britain and this country were to become embroiled, not only because of the recollection of the years during which the two countries were united in alliance, but also because such a tragic eventuality would be fraught with the danger of destroying modern civilization to the undoing of the best part of Humanity.

February 27, 1941.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1339A (7)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 27 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: JAPAN'S SECOND OFFER (HANDED BY AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU TO CHURCHILL).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
23rd day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25 day of September 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official Capacity

1094

Doc. No. 1593-A

Page 1

No. 6915 (Total number)

Date; 7.00 P.M. March 4, 1941

Sender; Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Addressee; NOGIURA, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.A.

Subject: Ambassador NOGIURA's denial of the war with
America

No. 107

Concerning No. 123 of your telegram. I fully appreciate the circumstances under which you had to make your answer in a cautious way. However, as I have already made an affirmative reply to the question as to whether Japan will participate in a warfare in case the United States should attack Germany, at the general meeting of Budget Committee in the House of Representatives and on other occasions, I hope that hereafter you will act in concert with me when you answer questions of like nature.

Doc. No. 1593-A

Page 2

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1593-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one pages, dated 4 March, 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 6915, MATSUOKA to NOMURA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry - - - - -

Signed at Tokyo on this
20th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: J.A. Curtis 2d Lt.

/s/ Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts.

(WASHINGTON,) March 8, 1941.

* * * * *

The Ambassador then said that it would be well-nigh unthinkable for our two countries to fight each other on account of the destructive effects that would inevitably result in any event. I here spoke and said that my country entertained the same idea about the destructive effects of a military clash between our two countries. I then inquired of the Ambassador whether the military groups in control of his Government could possibly expect important nations like the United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or three nations before our very eyes organized naval and military forces and went out and conquered the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. Could they expect countries like mine to continue to remain complacent as that movement is going on? I inquired further what countries like mine would have to gain by remaining complacent in the face of a movement to substitute force and conquest for law and justice and order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he then said that embargoes by this country were, of course, of increasing concern, and that he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country should force his Government, in the minds of those in control, to take further military steps. To this I replied that this is a matter entirely in the hands of his Government for the reason that his Government took the initiative in military expansion and seizures of territory of other countries, thereby creating an increasingly deep concern on the part of my own and other countries as to the full extent of Japanese conquest by force which was contemplated; that my country has not been at fault and none of the nations engaged in conquest have pretended seriously to charge it with any action of omission or commission in relation to the present movement of world conquest by force on the part of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified military conquest. I then repeated the terms of the Tripartite Agreement and the public declaration of Hitler and Matsuoka and other high authorities in Japan to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite arrangement were out by military force to establish a new order not for Asia alone

not for Europe alone, but for the world, and a new order under their control. I said that whatever interpretation the Ambassador might give these utterances and military activities in harmony with them thus far, the American people who were long complacent with respect to dangerous international developments have of late become very thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as a matter of most serious concern in relation to movements by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge of the seas and the other continents for their own personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions and this tremendous concern will remain and continue so long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, with no apparent occasion to do so other than that of capture and exclusive use of the territory and other interests of other countries. The Ambassador again sought to allay the idea of military conquest on the part of his country, and I again replied with emphasis that so long as Japanese forces were all over China and Japanese troops and airplanes and naval vessels were as far south as Thailand and Indochina and Saigon, accompanied by such threatening declarations as Japanese statesmen are making week after week, there can only be increasing concern by nations who are vitally interested in international affairs both on land and sea as they are also vitally interested in the halt of world conquest by force and barbaric methods of government.

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I proceeded to comment on Japan's line of activities and utterances by saying that this country and most other countries only proclaim and practice policies of peaceful international relationships, political, economic, social and cultural. Sometimes the policy to promote these mutually beneficial relationships is proclaimed, such as our good neighbor policy with special reference to Pan America. And yet all of our acts and programs and policies adopted by the twenty-one American nations in their conferences from time to time are made universal in their application, so that Japan and all other nations receive the same equal opportunities for trade and commerce generally throughout the Americas that each of the American nations receives itself. In striking contrast the new order in greater Eastern Asia is unequivocally believed to be purely a program of military aggression and conquest with entirely arbitrary policies of political, economic and military domination.

P. 1

1057

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) March 14, 1941

Excerpts.

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The President again returned to the Tripartite Agreement and said that it had upset the American people because they think that a concerted effort is being made by Germany and Italy to reach the Suez Canal and by Japan on the other hand to approach Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Ambassador spoke more strongly than he had in his earlier talk with me, expressing his belief that his country would not go South.

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The President finally remarked that, as the Ambassador indicated, matters between our two countries could undoubtedly be worked out without a military clash, emphasizing that the first step in this direction would be the removal of suspicion and fear regarding Japan's intentions. I here remarked that, of course, with Matsuoka astride the Axis on his way to Berlin and talking loudly as he goes, and Japanese naval and air forces in the vicinity of Indochina, Thailand and Saigon, with no explanation but with serious inferences, the Ambassador must realize how acute feeling and opinion in this country have become.

ADK

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P.1
1057

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) March 14, 1941

Excerpts.

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Foreign Relations II, p. 396
at pp.397-398

1059.

Peace via
Am. + Jap. "Individuals".

OG WHO?

Doc. No. 2200 (23)

Page 1

4-9-41

PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF PRIVATE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDIVIDUALS ON APRIL 9, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our people should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just Peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligations, desires to declare that its military obligation under the Axis Alliance comes into force only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. China affairs.

The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

- a. Independence of China
- b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China ?
- c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
- d. No imposition of indemnities
- e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan.
- f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek and of Wang-Ching-Wei
- g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
- h. Recognition of Manchukuo.

With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.

Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese.

IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.

a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the proposed joint Conferences.

b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might despatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.

2 | c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of Chinese affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are respectively available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.

b. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.

d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration---on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Conference.

a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.

b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.

c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.

Addendum. *Secret*

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

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Peace

P/1
1060

Doc - Peace
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

(WASHINGTON,) April 14, 1941

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador's compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

who?

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

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JP -

Peace

1061
P. 1

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

(WASHINGTON,) April 16, 1941

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With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

"I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later.

.....

Churchill (R)

1062

Message from the Right Honourable Winston Churchill, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy was handed unofficially to Mr. Matsuoka by His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow on April 12th, 1941.

(Note. - It had originally been intended that this letter should be delivered to Mr. Matsuoka by Mr. Shigemitsu who had expected to meet the Japanese Foreign Minister during his stay in Europe).

Your Excellency,

I take advantage of the facilities with which we have provided your Ambassador to send you a friendly message of sincerity and goodwill. I venture to suggest a few questions which, it seems to me, deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and people:

(1) Will the Germans, without command of the sea or command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer or autumn of 1941? Will the Germans try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?

(2) Will the German attack on British shipping be strong

enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores with Great Britain and the United States of America transforming their whole industry to war purposes?

(3) Did Japan's accession to the triple pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war?

(4) If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to deal with Japan while disposing of the Axis Powers in Europe?

(5) Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?

(6) Will the British Air Force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941 and far stronger before the end of 1942?

(7) Will the many countries which are being held down by the German army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years pass by?

(8) Is it true that the production of steel in the United States of America during 1941 will be 75 million tons and in Great Britain about 12-1/2 million tons, making a total of nearly 90 million tons? If Germany should happen to be defeated as she was last time would not the 7 million tons of steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed war?

From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and Great Britain, the great sea Power of the West.

I remain, with great truth and respect,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Sd) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1339A (9)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Keoru, hereby certify

that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 12 April, 1941, and described as follows: _____

Letter from Churchill to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA handed to MATSUOKA at Moscow on 12 April 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo /s/

SEAL
Chief, Archives Sect
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh , hereby certify that I
am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was
obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese
Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of September, 1946

Richard H. Larsh /s/
NAME

Witness: T/4 T. Toguchi /s/

Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official Capacity

R
Sup

1063

April 22, 1941

Your Excellency,

I have just come back from my trip and hasten to acknowledge the receipt of paper, handed to me at Moscow on the evening of the 12th instant by Sir Stafford Cripps with remark that it was a copy in substance of a letter addressed to me dated London, April 2nd 1941, and forwarded to Tokyo.

I wish to express my appreciation for the facilities with which your Government made efforts to provide our Ambassador when he wanted to meet me on the continent. I was keenly disappointed when I learned that he could not come.

Your Excellency may rest assured that the foreign policy of Japan is determined upon and after an unbiased examination of all the facts and a very careful weighing of all the elements of the situation she confronts, always holding steadfastly in view the great racial aim and ambition of finally bringing about on the earth the conditions envisaged in what she calls Hakkoichiu, the Japanese conception of a universal peace under which there would be no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation of any and all peoples. And, once determined, I need hardly tell Your Excellency, it will be carried out with resolution but with

utmost circumspection, taking in every detail of changing
circumstances.

I am, believe me,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

Yosuke Matsuoka.

His Excellency

The Right Honorable Winstor Churchill

Prime Minister of Great Britain.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1339A(10)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru _____ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 12 April, 1941, and described as follows: Telegram from MATSUOKA to CHURCHILL dated 12 April 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry _____

Signed at Tokyo on this 21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigation Division IPS
Official Capacity

7064

Br. Ex. 105

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(PRINCE KONOYE)

Excerpt.

No. 1779

TOKYO, April 14, 1941

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 173^o of February 4, 1941, with reference to the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, by Japanese aircraft on January 2^o, 1941, at which time the American Consulate at that place was seriously endangered, and to inform Your Excellency that American lives and property were again endangered at Kunming on April 8 by a wanton and indiscriminate bombing attack by Japanese airplanes.

On this occasion, according to the American Consul at Kunming, the China Inland Mission, where seven American citizens including three children were residing, was badly damaged by explosions and barely escaped destruction by fire. At the same time, the house occupied by the American-citizen clerk of the Consulate, adjacent to the Mission, suffered concussion and damage in the form of broken glass, fallen plaster and tiles, and demolished electric light fixtures.

.....

(G) 1068

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1941
Arrival 7 May 1941
No. 685 of 6 May

5/6/41

1110 S.
100 Hours
Most urgent !

Re: Telegram No. 676 of 5 May for the German Foreign Minister
For the German Foreign Minister.

Today I had a rather long conversation with MATSUOKA whom I told the points of view contained in the foregoing telegram. MATSUOKA entirely agreed with my trend of thought, asking me to explain his conception of the present situation to the German Foreign Minister as follows.

7/2/41
W

He read the speech of the Fuehrer yesterday and is extremely impressed by the sureness and wisdom of the arguments. On the other hand, ROOSEVELT seems to him to have completely lost his head, judging from his hysterical invectives. Impressed by the Fuehrer's speech, he has sent to the German Foreign Minister through the Japanese Embassy in Berlin a telegram, of which he handed me a copy.

Moscow
amb.
only
top.

Turning to a discussion of the overall situation MATSUOKA stated that he intended to acquaint me with the American proposal as soon as he had achieved acceptance of his viewpoint by the authoritative quarters within the country. The American proposal probably originates in a report to WASHINGTON by the American ambassador in MOSCOW; he has known him for a long time and had a frank discussion with him at MOSCOW while on his trip back. The American ambassador, who did not conceal his critical attitude towards ROOSEVELT, asked him what JAPAN would do in case the United States should join the war. He replied that then Japan likewise would in any case immediately join the war on the side of the Axis powers. The Ambassador tried to soften this view point in that he tried to represent Japanese interference as possible in his report to WASHINGTON. He (MATSUOKA), however, emphasized most clearly that Japan would then strike.

Z

Even on his way back to TOKYO he expected the American Counter move. When he arrived he found the American proposal of which I had been informed, and which skillfully caters to the needs of certain domestic political groups. At first, not only industry but likewise high Navy leaders had favored a serious discussion of the American proposal. Meanwhile he has used the interim to influence the Admiral, especially pointing

to the activistic groups of young officers in the Army and Navy who would determinedly resist such a policy. On Saturday a solemn group consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior HIRANUMA and the Chief of the Army gave their consent to the interim reply which was communicated in the foregoing report; and gave a vote of confidence. At any rate, dealing with the American proposal will lead to strained relations with economic circles. He will try to manoeuver tactically in such a way that AMERICA will be pledged to non-participation in the European war, the more so since from the Fuehrer's speech he has gained the impression that German policy is pursuing this aim. However, he cherishes only meagre hopes as far as this is concerned since he personally presumes that the American developments in the direction of a participation in the war will continue at a quick pace. Just now he is having investigated the question whether a Japanese protest is not called for even against patrolling activity on the part of American armed forces amounting to the arbitrary creation of an American safety zone.

He would be grateful for the earliest possible information on the views of the German Foreign Minister concerning the American proposal /T.N. to be used/ for the unavoidable domestic political discussion.

As to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, MATSUOKA reported that right after his departure from BERLIN, he did not envision the possibility of the settlement. During the conversation with the German Foreign Minister he also voiced this saying he would accept only in case RUSSIA showed readiness. In his opinion the neutrality pact was the off-shoot of Russian fear of Germany. He found STALIN absolutely willing to keep the peace. STALIN assured him that there could be no question of RUSSIA's concluding a pact with the Anglosaxon powers. One of his (MATSUOKA's) motives for concluding the neutrality pact had been to provide another hinderance to this pact. According to STALIN, the SOVIET Union did not join the Tripartite pact because the allied powers were not in need of Russian assistance. However, in case this was necessary, RUSSIA is prepared to co-operate extensively with the Tripartite powers. When I remarked that the SOVIET Union wanted to protect its rear and asked what attitude Japan would adopt regarding American shipments of armaments via VLADIVOSTOK in case of a German-Russian conflict, MATSUOKA answered as follows:

No Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity to attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact could change this. Finally MATSUOKA voiced his opinion that American participation in the war could induce the Fuehrer to resolve upon a solution of the Russian question by violent means in order firmly to secure areas of supply, because the war would then probably drag on for a longer term. He is personally convinced of a speedy victory of the German forces in this case

I thanked MATSUOKA for his frank utterances, promising him to ask the German Foreign Minister for an opinion as soon as possible.

During my conversation today I have, of course, continued in my endeavors to direct Japanese policy toward SINGAPORE, in opposition to American interference manoeuvres and against the existing Japanese tendency to pay attention primarily to RUSSIA.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4059-A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. B. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

1869

Doc. No. 219P (74)

Br. Ex. 106

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HATSUOKA)

Excerpt

No. 1793

TOKYO, May 6, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note No. 1779 of April 14, 1941, addressed to Prince Konoye during Your Excellency's absence from Japan, concerning the repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the danger to American lives and damage to American property caused thereby, and to inform Your Excellency that according to information received from the American Consul at that city, the Consulate was again seriously damaged during an air raid on April 29, 1941. Window glass and screens were blown out; plaster, a large memorial tablet, and part of a wall were knocked down; and dirt and debris were blown into the Compound. Fortunately, there appear to have been no casualties.

.....

Foreign Relations I, p. 711

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA)
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON MAY 12, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale (amicable understanding), arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:-

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another.

The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Kono Statement and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Government of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.

B. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nations and freedom from discrimination.

Addendum.

The present Understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

(ANNEX)

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT

II. Par. 2.

Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War.

Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged but we desire to make it clearer by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation as is mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.

If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.

III.

China Affair.

The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as the "principles of Konoe." Practically, the one can be used to explain the other.

We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document, that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chaing Kai-shek regime if Chaing Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.

7AR. | If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.

The three principles of Price Konoe as referred to in this paragraph are:

1. Neighborly friendship;
2. Joint defense against communism;
3. Economic cooperation--by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace;
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
4. No annexation, no indemnities;
5. Independence of Manchoukuo.

III.

Immigration to China.

The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past immigration legislation of the United States, that America is now taking a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in China.

Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.

IV.

Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations.

(a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of disagreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after an understanding has been reached and relations between our two countries improved; and after our present China commitments are eliminated. Then we will know the actual situation and can act accordingly.

Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.

This proposal, (b) of IV. might better be made a subject of a separate memorandum. Particular care must be taken as to the timing, manner and scope of carrying out such a gesture.

V.

Gold Credit.

The proposal in the second paragraph of V. has been omitted for the same reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (a) and (c).

VI.

Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.

The words, in the first paragraph, "without resorting to arms" have been deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear on many occasions in various statements made both by the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

VIII. (VII.)

Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area.

As the paragraph (a) implying military and treaty obligation would require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this in the present Understanding.

Paragraph (b) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has been altered for the same reason.

In paragraph (c) ((d)) the words "and to the Southwestern Pacific Area" have been omitted because such questions should be settled, as necessity arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities in the Southwestern areas by the Governments of the United States and of Japan respectively.

Conference.

The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We consider that it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a conference between the President and the Premier or between suitable representatives of theirs will be considered when both the United States and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference after taking into due consideration the effect resulting from the present Understanding.

Announcement

In regard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion of the present Understanding a draft will be prepared in Tokyo and cabled to Washington for the consideration of the United States Government.

1071
(Annex 2)

DRAFT SUGGESTION A HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

II THE ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF JAPAN
TOWARD THE EUROPEAN WAR

US Peace Draft

The Government of Japan declares that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was and is defensive and is designed to prevent the nations which are not at present engaged in the European war from participating therein, and declares that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy come into force only if and when one of the parties of the pact is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European hostilities.

The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defence thereof.

The Government of Japan further declares that it is under no commitment under its Axis Alliance or otherwise which is inconsistent with the terms of the present declaration of policy and intention agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

(Annex 3)

DRAFT SUGGESTION B HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

III CHINA AFFAIRS

When this declaration of policy and intention, including the provisions of this section, is agreed upon and both Governments have given it their approval and commitment, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of China that those Governments enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations on a basis as follows:

- a. Neighborly friendship.
 - b. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
 - c. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon.
 - d. No annexation.
 - e. No indemnities.
 - f. Equality of commercial opportunity in terms of and with conditions of fair treatment for all concerned.
 - g. Parallel measures of defense against subversive activities from external sources.
- 11

Br. Ex. 172
p. 2

h. The question of the future of Manchuria to be dealt with by friendly negotiations.

(Annex 4)

DRAFT SUGGESTION C HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

V. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF BOTH NATIONS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN
PACIFIC AREA

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activity and American activity in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward ensuring on the basis of equality of opportunity equal access by Japan and by the United States to supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 432-434

1072

Doc. No. 219P (75)

Br. Ex. 107

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1802

TOKYO, May 17, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note No. 1793 of May 6, 1941, concerning repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the consequent danger to American lives and damage to American property, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the American Consul at Kunming has reported that the Consulate was again damaged during a Japanese air raid on May 12, 1941. Fragments of bombs were scattered in the Consulate compound and one piece broke through a window into a residence bedroom.

Moreover, during this same raid, the larger part of the compound occupied by Mr. Stanley McGearry, an American clerk of the Consulate, was destroyed and his residence so damaged as to render it barely habitable, and for the third time recently the China Inland Mission, where a number of Americans live, was damaged and the residence there of Mr. E. L. Crapuchettes, an American citizen, was partly demolished.

.....

Foreign Relations I, p. 713

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

5/18/46

Tokyo, 18 May 1941
Arrival 18 May 1941
No. 759 of 17 May

1.40 M
1.00 hours
Most urgent !
To be kept in a locked file

Marginal

Note:

Sent on to
FUSCHL
under
No. 1573
18 May
3.25
hours
Tel.
Ktr.

For the German Foreign Minister

Re: Telegram of 15th, No. 622.

Today I have carried out the instructions of the above mentioned telegram during a long conversation with Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I stressed the especially immense regret of the German Government that the German views of 11 May were not awaited before the reply to WASHINGTON was sent off. Making use of the arguments of telegram No. 592 of 11 May and No. 622 of 15 May, I have pointed to the necessity of making America give the most clear and precise assurance not to participate in the European conflict; I also pointed out that the formulation employed in the Japanese reply re Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, constitutes the absolute minimum of what must be demanded in view of the Tripartite Pact. The German Government must insist on being immediately informed on the American reply, as well as to be admitted to further negotiations between JAPAN and the USA.

Matsuoka pointed to his oral communication to HULL, reported in telegram No. 733 of (groups garbled), as well as to his conversations with the British and American ambassadors, reported in telegram 750 of 15 May, which showed that he would not jolt the Tripartite Pact. During a secret Cabinet Session he had called upon all members of the Government clearly to acknowledge Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact on their part too, in all of their conversations. All members of the Cabinet had agreed unanimously. Besides he views the chances of the Japanese-American Negotiations most skeptically, and as heretofore he counts on America's entry into the War in the near future. His sole motive in the negotiations with USA is, if possible, to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States into

5/18/41

Matsuoka say "Stalling out War"

the war and furthermore to eliminate the increase of the present American assistance to England.

HULL has not yet taken a stand regarding the Japanese proposal, merely promising a study which would take a certain amount of time. He will immediately inform us of the American reply, also keeping abreast, and as far as possible consulting with the allied governments of Germany and Italy on the further course of the negotiations. When I demanded to be admitted to the coming phase, he replied that he would meet our desire to a great extent; he could however not promise always to await the views of the axis powers, especially when a quick utterance was absolutely essential. I cogently requested MATSUOKA to do nothing without Japan's allies in these negotiations, which concerned the Tripartite Pact in its entirety.

ANTI-WAR FORCES Domestic political influences, to whose pressure MATSUOKA has yielded in the face of the allegedly imminent American entry into the War, can be found among certain anglophiles of the Court, such as Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, exponent of industry and big money, such as Minister Without Portfolio OGURA, and some influential Navy officers with whom Ambassador Admiral OPTURA /TN: NOMURA/ has apparently worked together in WASHINGTON. This group was joined by elements of the army who want to gain time in order to retain freedom of action in view of the uncertainty of RUSSIA's future attitude. Minister of the Interior, HIRANUMA, has probably acted in the same way; he had to resign when the German-Russian non-aggression pact was concluded, being a champion of a German-Japanese alliance against RUSSIA. Finally, the activist group which is closely working together with the Embassy, is at present weakened by the serious illness of SHIRATORI who has left the political struggle on account of a serious and apparently incurable illness.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 406CA.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

1074

Br. Ex. 153

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS
MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) MAY 19, 1942.

ACCOUNT OF INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1941.

Excerpts.

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1921-2

1931

" The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921-1922 became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of 'Manchukuo'. This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.

1934

1922

"During the years that followed, Japan went steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by force of arms. In December 1934, she gave notice of her intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922. She then proceeded with intensified construction of military and naval armaments, at the same time undertaking, from time to time, limited actions directed toward an extension of her domination over China and involving disregard and destruction of the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.

7/37

"In July 1937, the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Invading forces of more than a million men occupied large areas along the seaboard and in the central provinces. In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

"Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed 'new order' in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the / interests

interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors.

"It should be manifest to every person that such a program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of nearly one-half of the population of the world is a matter of immense significance, importance and concern to every other nation wherever located.

"Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats."

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Foreign Relations II, p. 525 at
pp. 329-330

Copy of the Telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dispatched on 20 May (T.N. Year is missing) (1941?)
No. 567.

5/20/1941

Betrayed
Terno 1075

P4 Terno
P5

In connection with the rumor that you are going to America, I heard various rumors here concerning the problems of the negotiation between Japan and America. Although from the interview with HIBBENTROP on 5th May, I learned that it was not a mere rumor. Although I intended to go on without touching this matter, in view of the tendency of this matter, and considering the future of Japan and of the influence of the Tripartite Pact, I can not remain without some deep thoughts. As I believe that it is my duty to inform you of the opinion of the German staff and also of my frank opinion, I send the separate telegrams no. 568 and no. 569.

What I want to mention to you now is as follows:

oshima

You showed me the reason why you did not inform this matter to the Italian Ambassador in Germany two times recently. However, presently I have no intentions of sounding out the problem of the confidence in me or of my position towards the people during the present critical period when the whole of our nation should act upon the "Way of the Imperial Subjects" as its primary principle. Much less do I try to sound your opinion, for the practice and technique of diplomacy belong to your department.

But what I cannot understand is that you think it is unnecessary to have me report the opinions of the Staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-American Agreement which has a very delicate relation with the Tripartite Pact, is about to be concluded. Therefore, from the standpoint of my duty as an Ambassador to Germany, I could not keep silent, and I expressed my opinion frankly in the separate telegrams, although it might be unnecessary. I beg you to take these circumstances into consideration. (End)

V.B. Germany betrayed.

Copy of the Telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA to
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.
No. 568

VB
1. On 3rd May Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him. When I called on him I was informed about the telegram regarding the Japanese-American negotiation. He said that although the telegram was to be kept a secret from me and the Italian Ambassador, as a friend to me, he revealed it to me for my personal understanding, since the matter is extremely serious. He then showed me the draft regarding the agreement proposed by America on 16 April. The draft consisted of four articles. He (RIBBENTROP) confessed that he was quite at a loss to understand the real intention of the Japanese government, so I answered him that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, as you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) had clearly stated on your previous visit to Germany. I further told him that, accordingly, there was no reason to conclude such a treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Thus, I avoided being concerned in this matter.

VB
2. But on 9th of May RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him again, and he showed me OTT's telegram of the draft of the intermediary answer of Japan to America and also the telegraphic record of the conference between you and OTT which was held on 6th of May. RIBBENTROP seemed to have understood the affair clearly from the frequent telegrams sent by OTT, and according to the said intermediate reply, it is supposed that Japan has consulted regarding the understanding with America to a considerable extent, and to tell you frankly, according to the informations that Germany has gathered, from various sources, there is a report that the proposal was made by Japan. Gathering from the conversation of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and OTT, it seems to me that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was compelled by a certain group to consent to it. Moreover, it is reported that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA during the course of that conference stated that Japan will participate in a Russo-German war, if it should breakout. When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently, he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going to attack SINGAPORE, but it seems that you have changed your opinion.

I have some doubts as to the true intention of ROOSEVELT.

FDR

If you should become obliged to conclude this agreement in order to avoid the participation in a remotely possible war, the Tripartite Pact would in reality become meaningless even if it may be possible to hit upon some legal pretext. Moreover, I believe that in Japan's progress, she will lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After lengthy thoughts concerning this problem, I thought of the following two plans from the German viewpoint.

- (a) Plan to refuse the proposal of America.
- (b) Plan to conclude the Japanese-American agreement under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending 'convoy' patrol lines.

RIBBENTROP asked my (Ambassador OSHIMA) opinion, saying that he wished to report plan (a) to the Fuhrer as he believed it to be a good one. Therefore, although I did not receive any instruction, I conjectured the intention of the Japanese government from common sense, and as my personal opinion, insisted upon plan (b) explaining that (b) would be much more advantageous to Germany. The reasons that I explained to RIBBENTROP were as follows:

708
If plan (b) are adopted, Germany will be able to fight a single combat against Britain and terminate the war in a short time. Again, although it might be wishful thinking, perhaps the "ROOSEVELT faction" may recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless, and would make it a reason to alleviate America's assistance to Britain.

Even in case of its failure, it is useful at least for ascertaining ROOSEVELT's actual intentions concerning the assistance to Britain. Thirdly, it will enable those Japanese who want the cooperation with America to realize its impossibility. However, RIBBENTROP said that America would utilize this negotiation to estrange Japan from Germany, as long as this negotiation continued, and he repeated the same thing in telegram no. 545 (dispatched to TURKEY, no. 11). He further stated that it is possible for America to utilize it as propaganda material to convince the anti-war faction in America that America could now advance to the Atlantic Ocean because of the elimination of apprehension in Pacific area, and consequently the situation would become very dangerous to Germany. Therefore, he did not agree with my opinion, and said that at any rate this

to send a telegram on the evening of the same day to the Fuhrer, who was out of BERLIN, for a decision. At the same time, he wished to report my opinion to the Fuhrer. Then I asked him whether or not he had consulted with Italy already. To my question, he answered that Italy has already received all the reports from Ambassador INDERLI, but he had not yet consulted directly with the Italian government, but that as soon as he received the decision of the Fuhrer, he wished to send the telegram to OTT so that he might consult Italy.

MUSSO

2. As I made a promise to Prime Minister MUSSOLINI to visit him at the beginning of this month, I started for ROME on the night of the 10th. On the morning of the 12th, Minister BISMARCK visited me, and by orders of RIBBENTROP, he showed me the telegraphic instructions to OTT and added that the Italian government had the same opinion as Germany. After I read that instruction, I recognized that the Fuhrer had made a different decision from that of RIBBENTROP. In the afternoon of 13th, RIBBENTROP flew unexpectedly to ROME and met MUSSOLINI and CIANO on the same day, and asked me to visit him on the morning of the 14th. When I went to see him, he showed me the telegram from OTT concerning the interview on the 12th, between you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) and the two Ambassadors of Germany and Italy in Tokyo. He expressed deep discontentment at your statement that you had been in a position where you were compelled to commence with the negotiation with America and that because of internal reasons, you were unable to await the arrival of opinions from Germany and Italy. He asked reproachfully why couldn't you await the telegraphic instructions when they were sure to arrive in several days. I told him that although I was not aware of the circumstances, I guessed that Japan was compelled to take such a measure because of the following reasons: It was necessary for Japan to conclude the agreement as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in Japan such important negotiations as this must be privately reported to the Emperor. I added that I believed that the agreement was not made out of inconsideration to Germany and Italy. RIBBENTROP, however, would not readily accept my words. He said that when you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) visited Germany, he met you (MATSUOKA) many times but he did not hear anything substantial concerning the Japanese-American agreement which is closely related to the Tripartite Pact. He said that it came as a great surprise to him when he received such a report soon after you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) returned to Japan. He continued that frankly he was much afraid that the agreement might make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. He also said that as he

THRONT

(RIBBENTROP) had remarked the other day, he did not believe ROOSEVELT from the very beginning, and that although his opinion was to advise Japan to refuse the American proposal he had to send a telegraphic instruction contrary to his own opinion. Hearing that I told him that it was a great pity to have a misunderstanding between Japan and Germany concerning this matter, so I gave advice to him that it was very necessary to inform OTT of his opinion, to make the facts clear and certain. When I visited Foreign Minister CIANO on the evening of the same day, it seemed that an interview had already taken place between RIBBENTROP, MUSSOLINI and CIANO, since CIANO expressed the same opinion as RIBBENTROP.

3. No sooner did I return to BERLIN on May 17th, than I was asked by Vice Minister WEISEGGER to visit him. When I called on him, he, by the telegraphic order of RIBBENTROP at FUSSELL, showed me a draft of Japan's answer to America which was telegraphed by OTT on the 14th, and the draft of the instruction of the German government to OTT concerning Japan's answer to America. He (WEISEGGER) said that as he received the order only to show me (Ambassador OSHIMA) the telegram, he will not express any opinion, but that in view of the present political situation, the German government had a deep concern about the result of this problem. He added that the German government attached great importance to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement to OTT to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war. He (WEISEGGER) then asked me whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned from his stay in Germany. I told him that I did not know what the Foreign Minister had revealed concerning Japan's attitude toward a Russo-German war, but that in Japan, such an important matter as this should be decided by the Emperor, and that probably Foreign Minister MATSUOKA must have expressed his personal opinion. I further added that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany I had no doubt that you (MATSUOKA) were aware of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia.

(End)

Telegram No. 569 sent by Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

1. As I reported in the separate telegram, the German government has a deep dissatisfaction concerning the problem of the Japanese-American agreement, and has much apprehension about the future of the Tripartite Pact. Since America is actually participating in the war, if Japan, ignoring the present circumstances, should conclude an agreement with America, it would be very natural for Germany to suspect that Japan is trying to check America's participation in the war, and at the same time trying to avoid her own obligation of participating in the war. When you came to Germany, all the people in Germany heartily welcomed you, and delighted in the strengthening of the 'Axis'. Since this is directly after that occasion, the feeling that Germany was betrayed is very strong.

2. I am well aware of Japan's desire to solve the China Incident as soon as possible in order to have time to spare for politics, economy and other fields. However, the European war is developing very favourably for Germany and Italy. In a few months, very important developments are expected, and if at this time Japan should lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy who will become the leaders in Europe, simply for an immediate profit, it is very unfavourable. Needless to say, America seems to have proposed the agreement as a temporary measure for estranging Japan from the Tripartite Alliance. I am afraid that such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war.

3. Aside from the point that if Japan solves the China Incident with the support of America, she will leave an uneradicated root of future calamity, I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking SINGAPORE at random, she will invite the contempt of not only America and Britain, but also those of Germany and Italy. And, should America, taking advantage of the elimination of fear in the Pacific area, reinforce her assistance to Britain, the development of the European War would greatly be affected although America may avoid nominal participation in the war. Subsequently, Japan may suffer from some unexpected calamity. Moreover, should Japan abandon her right to leadership in the Southern regions for the sake of America, it is clear that Japan cannot stress the leadership to Germany and Italy.

This will mean that Japan abandoned her great mission to establish a new order in the Greater East Asia.

4. Last autumn, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, and the road our people should follow was made clear. But, if Japan should conclude the Japanese-American Agreement now, our people in Japan would be bewildered as to which path they should follow. Moreover, our friendly countries will despise Japan and will not trust Japan any longer. Subsequently, Japan will fall into international isolation, and will gain nothing. Therefore, I hope earnestly that the Japanese Government will embody the following two points, if the conclusion of the agreement is unavoidable:

- (a) As conditions to the conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement, it is absolutely necessary for Japan that she should make use of her situation over America, and establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact, by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain. Again, Japan should demand America's neutrality in the European war, and at the same time, make clear that Japan has an obligation to participate in the war, based upon the Tripartite Pact. If America does not accept our proposal, Japan must not conclude the agreement.
- (b) It is most unfavourable for Japan to give the impression to Germany and Italy that the Japanese government is compelled to conclude the agreement on account of the increasing influence of a party in Japan that wants status quo. The conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement will only make Germany and Italy increasingly suspect that Japan took this action in order to avoid the obligation to participate in the war. Therefore, concerning the Japanese-American negotiation, Japan has to exchange frank opinions with Germany and Italy, and must thoroughly convince Germany and Italy about the purport of article (a).

Chief of AMERICA Bureau	} submitted separately)) (T.N. these notations were marked in the margin)
Chief of EUROPE-ASIA Bureau		

(50 13743)

SECRET -- Embassy CHO Code

(T.N. In the copy, there are 2 stamps indicating TOP SECRET.)

Dispatched A.M. May 21, 1941
from BERLIN.
Arrived P.M. May 21, 1941
this office.

To the Foreign Minister

from Ambassador OSHIMA

No. 575

The JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement now under negotiation, is thought to be important change in the national policy, and it concerns greatly with the plans of the JAPANESE military and naval attaches in Germany. Therefore, recognizing the fact that it is necessary to transmit this agreement to them beforehand, telegrams No. 567, No. 568, and No. 569 were sent exclusively to both attaches today, the 20th. As regards this matter, I wish you will inform the War Minister, the Naval Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the Chief of the Navy General Staff.

1077

Br. Ex. 173

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) May 28, 1941

.....

The Ambassador commented that under the Japanese constitutional system other ministers in addition to the Foreign Minister are consulted in matters relating to foreign policy.

The Secretary said that in his consideration of the matters we have been exploring a difficulty has been presented by questions involving the relations of our respective countries toward the European war. Mr. Matsuoka since his return from Europe, according to reports widely published in the press, has been making declarations on every occasion in regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting Germany in the event of American entry into the war. He said that, if we went into an agreement with Japan, critics would assert, unless the Japanese Government could clarify its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the event that the United States should be drawn into the European war through action in the line of self-defense, that there was no assurance as to Japan's position. The Secretary referred to the President's speech of the previous evening and reviewed what the Secretary had previously said publicly and also to the Ambassador in regard to the attitude of this country toward maintaining the freedom of the seas against Hitler as an essential measure of self-defense.

.....

The Secretary then brought up the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and asked the Ambassador to indicate what the Japanese Government had in mind.

.....

The Ambassador indicated, in reply to specific questions, that such evacuation would not include troops retained in China under the provision of cooperative defense against communistic activities. He contemplated an arrangement being negotiated with China similar to the Boxer Protocol under which Japanese troops would be stationed for an indefinite period in North China and Inner Mongolia. The Ambassador said he could not indicate approximately how many troops it was proposed to station in China under such an arrangement or define precisely the areas in which the arrangement would be operative.

Br. Ex. 173

The Secretary commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship, as the presence of these troops tended to produce incidents and friction;

1078

5/31/46

Br. Ex. 174

AMERICAN DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
(NOFURA) ON MAY 31, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and without Commitment

(WASHINGTON) May 31, 1941.

The governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the necessary concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting into national relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Br. Ex. 174

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The Concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it. Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government

Br. Ex. 174

of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

NOTE: (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Br. Ex. 174

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Annex 1)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)
Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation--by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchukuo.

Br. Ex. 174

(Annex 2)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The position of the Government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

" . . . As waged by them (the aggressor powers) this is not an ordinary war. It is a war of assault by these would-be conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and which are resisting in self-defense. . . Such is the movement which is extending rapidly throughout the world.

"If experience shows anything, it shows that no nation anywhere has the slightest reason to feel that it will be exempted from attack by the invader, any more than, in a town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citizen might expect to be free from attack.

" . . . Every thinking man can answer the question for himself by simply calling the roll of the wretched victims of world aggression who are now in a condition of semi-slavery, and whose every hope of again enjoying the blessings of civilization depends only on the defeat or failure of the movement of conquest. So it is in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania, Luxemburg, France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia.

" . . . The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations have lost everything that makes life worth living, it is high time that the remaining free countries should arm to the fullest extent and in the briefest time humanly possible and set for their self-preservation.

" . . . Events have shown beyond possible question that the safety of this hemisphere and of this country calls for resistance wherever resistance will be most effective. . . This policy means, in practical application, that . . . aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity. So--ways must be found to do this.

Br. Ex. 174

" . . . Those nations that are making resistance are primarily seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties. Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own safety. The United States both in its direct defense effort and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for the nations that are offering resistance means security for us, aid to them is an essential part of our own defense. Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater resources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that every free nation anywhere is a bastion of strength to all the remaining free peoples everywhere.

" . . . Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time. It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas.

" . . . Some among us, doubtless with the best of intentions, still contend that our country need not resist until armed forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United States, until the invading countries had acquired complete control of the other four continents and of the high seas, and thus had obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicapped defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely dangerous view."

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration--that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The only other attitude this Government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being

Br. Ex. 174

aggressors and with having assumed the offensive. A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precautions for its safety.

In the light of the existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereas for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins--the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth--or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."

Foreign Relations II, pp. 446-451

1079

5731

AMERICAN STATEMENT HANDED TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
(NOHURA.) ON MAY 31, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

(WASHINGTON) May 31, 1941.

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT

Introductory statement.

A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.

In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of section III has been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter, the word "southwestern" has been omitted from point numbered five and, in view of the new subject matter under point six (for explanation see infra), part of the subject matter under point six in the Japanese draft has been incorporated in an additional section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section VI of the Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see infra).

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The first paragraph has been omitted in as much as the statement of fact is a self-evident one.

In the third paragraph of the Japanese draft there has been substituted for the word "backward" the word "other" in order to maintain consistency with principles relating to equality of races and peoples.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implication of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is not an opportune time for the American Government to endeavor to bring about peace in Europe.

To the second paragraph of the Japanese draft a new sentence has been added to emphasize the aspect of self-defense.

Br. Ex. 175

The third paragraph has been omitted in as much as the text of the Tripartite Pact has been published and no purpose would appear to be served by express reference to any of its provisions.

The fourth paragraph of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protective and self-defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.

A statement in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States contains an elaboration of this Government's viewpoint toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Chancellor Hitler.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.

The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the same time to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

The statement in the Japanese Annex and Supplement in regard to this section has also been revised in a few particulars in conformity with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic relations the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, a principle to which it is understood the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.

As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

Br. Ex. 175

IV. Commerce between both nations.

A statement is included in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-cut statement of the fundamental purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document may speak for itself on this all-important subject.

The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order that it may gain added emphasis.

The statement in the Japanese draft in regard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in a new section bearing number VII.

The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the agreement.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The phraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the language of the Tydings-McJuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934.

Br. Ex. 175

Addendum

In view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the Government of the United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its annexes. This Government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two Governments should work out procedures covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding and of at least the definitive substance thereof.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 451 - 454

1080

Document No. 220 C (31)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 176

AMERICAN INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL ORAL STATEMENT HANDED
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON MAY 31, 1941

The Government of the United States will at some appropriate stage prior to any definitive discussion talk over in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the discussions, especially as it relates to China.

Foreign Relations, II, p. 454

1081

Br. Ex. 177

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) June 2, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan came to my hotel apartment at his request.
....

I then very slowly and deliberately asked the Ambassador whether it was his considered judgment that his Government seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement, for peace and non-discriminatory commercial relations and friendship generally in the Pacific area. He promptly replied that that was his judgment. I remarked that, in the light of the loud statements which Matsuoka and others were daily making, the question which I propounded was sharply raised, and that one was forced back to the inquiry of whether Japan really is seeking this sort of settlement, or whether she is only seeking a way to get out of China, and otherwise to go forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie a settlement establishing peace, non-discriminatory commerce and fair friendly relations in the Pacific area. The Ambassador reiterated his view that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.

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Foreign Relations II, pp. 454-455

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1082

Doc. No. 219P (76)

Br. Ex. 108

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt

No. 1817

TOKYO, June 4, 1941

EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note to Your Excellency No. 1803 of May 22, 1941, concerning damage inflicted on properties of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking by Japanese aircraft on May 9 and May 10, 1941, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that properties of the same Mission at Chungking were again seriously damaged by Japanese aerial bombardment on June 1, 1941.

According to information received from the American Embassy at Chungking, a section of the hospital of the Mission at Tai Chishang, in the center of the city, was badly damaged by a direct hit. A second bomb damaged the compound wall, and the home of an American missionary received damage from stones through the roof. This property has been damaged on at least four previous occasions.

In addition, the newly built Lewis Memorial Institutional Church of the same Mission, located at a distance of about seven hundred yards from the hospital mentioned above, was completely wrecked by a direct hit. This property has likewise been damaged on at least four previous occasions.

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Br. Ex. 178

6-4-41

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) June 4, 1941

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATESII. The Attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of the United States declares that, so far as its attitude toward the European war is concerned, it does not and will not resort to any aggression aimed to assist any one nation against another.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese would be quite prepared to drop the foregoing suggestion if we on our part would be prepared to drop our proposed sentence in the first paragraph reading, "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to have inserted at the beginning of Section II a new paragraph reading as follows:

"It being the common aim of both Governments of Japan and the United States to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace."

Mr Hamilton raised for consideration the question of whether the idea underlying the proposed paragraph could not be incorporated in the first section. He pointed out that an express reference of this kind under Section II, which deals with the attitude of the two countries to the European war, might be regarded as inconsistent with the President's declared attitude in regard to the question of a present American effort to bring about peace in Europe. He suggested also for consideration whether it might not serve the purpose desired to change the word "our" to "all" in the first paragraph of Section I, which in our draft reads as follows:

"Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed to (toward) the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they would leave this point for further consideration and that we might also consider whether the words could not be incorporated in some other section or in a section by itself.

With reference to Section III, Mr. Wakasugi proposed an entirely different formula. The formula in our draft and the formula he proposed are shown in parallel columns as follows:

Br. Ex. 178

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF
MAY 31

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe Principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

The reason adduced by Mr. Wakasugi for this change was that it was desired to avoid giving any impression to the Japanese people that there was involved any question of an American mediation between China and Japan.

The Japanese then offered an alternative formula, concerning which they wished to make reservations on minor points, reading as follows:

"The Government of Japan having announced the general terms within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China conflict, which terms are declared by the Government of Japan to be in harmony with the Konoe principles and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Chinese Government at Chungking that that Government and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations."

Mr. Hamilton then asked Colonel Iwakuro whether it was his conception that upon the conclusion of this agreement it would be the Wang Ching-wei regime or the Government at Chungking which would con-

FORMULA PROPOSED BY
JAPANESE

The President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek that it will enter as soon as possible into a negotiation with Japan on the basis of the Konoe three principles and the practical application of these principles for a termination of hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations.

Br. Ex. 178

stitute the Government of China.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese now recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime as the Government of China and regarded the Government at Chungking as a local regime. The proposed understanding contemplated negotiations by the Japanese Government with Chungking. As regards the outcome of the negotiations, there were three possibilities, which he charted on a piece of paper, attached: (a) that the Chungking Government might become absorbed into the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei, (b) that the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei might become absorbed into the Chungking Government, and (c) that both the Nanking Government and the Chungking Government might be coalesced into a new government. The Japanese Government proposed to leave this matter to be decided by the Chinese themselves.

Mr. Wakasugi then offered an amended annex on the part of the Japanese Government in connection with Section III. The formulae in the draft of May 31 and in the Japanese redraft are shown in parallel columns:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF
MAY 31

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation--by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.

FORMULA PROPOSED BY
JAPANESE

The basic terms as implied in the Kono three principles and the practical application of those principles are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Cooperative defense against communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in the Inner Mongolia and certain areas of the North China.
3. Economic cooperation.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus contributing to world peace.

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Br. Ex. 178

6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Amicable negotiation in regard to "Manchoukuo."

6. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with agreement between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.

8. No indemnities.

9. Recognition of "Manchoukuo."

Mr. Wakasugi explained that, with reference to caption three of the foregoing annex, the Japanese did not wish to expand the wording in the caption beyond the mere statement "economic cooperation", as they wished to leave the matter to be dealt with by negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Hamilton observed that in the Japanese Oral Explanation of May 12 this point had been expanded by the statement "by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third powers and that we had substituted the phraseology "by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations" in the interest of clarity. Mr. Hamilton here emphasized the importance which this Government attached to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

Mr. Hamilton noted that in caption six where we had suggested the wording "military and naval forces" the Japanese in their new draft had restored the term "troops". He asked whether it was not intended by Japan to withdraw their naval forces. Colonel Iwakuro said that in normal international intercourse war vessels visited ports of other countries, and, moreover, at Shanghai foreign powers, including the United States, normally maintained marines or corresponding naval units. They had used the English word "troops" as translation of the Japanese term "guntai" which was not restricted to army forces. He said that it was Japan's clear intention to withdraw all armed forces whether of the army or the navy engaged in the present hostilities, and he had no objection to the use of the term "armed forces" if that would cover better what was meant. He added that it was his understanding that "Chinese Territory" included Chinese territorial waters.

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of all the points made in connection with Section III and the annex pertaining thereto.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese had no changes to offer with respect to the text of Section IV, but that they desired the

Br. Ex. 178

withdrawal of our annex relating to restrictions upon trade during the present international emergency. He stated that such an annex would weaken the force of the stipulation in Section IV. He said that they thought that the word "available" in Section IV would cover what we had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the point.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they wished to offer an alternative wording for Section V. The formula of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31	FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area	V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel,) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

Asked what were the reasons for the proposed changes. Colonel Iwakuro explained that Japan had no suspicion that the United States would engage in activities other than peaceful in the Southwest Pacific area, and he felt that the United States should accept Japanese declarations in regard to the peaceful character of their aims. The reason for restricting the application of this section to the Southwestern Pacific area, which we had broadened to include the whole Pacific area, was that it was the Japanese desire to devote this section specifically to the Southwestern Pacific area on account of the special interest which the Japanese people had developed therein.

Br. Ex. 178

He pointed out that Section VI covered the whole Pacific area. Mr. Hamilton raised the question whether the pledge in regard to peace might be incorporated in Section VI, retaining, however, in Section V a statement pledging both countries to the application of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He emphasized the importance which this Government attached to such statements. He pointed out in reference to commercial relations that in an earlier draft we had proposed the wording "on the basis of equality of opportunity"; that the Japanese had objected to that phraseology on the ground that Japanese had no clear concept of the implications of the term; and that, as we had been given to understand that the Japanese would not object if we used phraseology contained in a recent speech by the Secretary, we had in our draft of May 31 substituted such phraseology. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the question of a possible change in the draft.

With reference to Section VI, Mr. Wakasugi offered an alternate draft, which includes an additional paragraph. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT
OF MAY 31

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

FORMULA PROPOSED
BY JAPANESE

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

The Government of Japan declares that it has no intention to establish military bases within the area of the Western Hemisphere nor to entertain any political designs therein. Similarly, the Government of the United States declares that it has no intention to establish military bases in East Asia or in the Southwestern Pacific area; nor to entertain any political designs therein. The Government of Japan and the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the Western Hemisphere.

Their objections to the wording of our draft were that they thought the phraseology somewhat redundant and that they did not understand what we meant by the word "controlling". They indicated a willingness to accept the word "basic" for "controlling" after Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to explain. There was no discussion of the second paragraph other than a statement by the Japanese that they would be willing to have the contents embodied in an annex. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the proposal.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to offer no changes with respect to Section VII, but they desired the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of Japan reading as follows:

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

VII. Neutralization of the Phillipine Islands.

The Government of the United States will accord in the Phillipine Islands to the Japanese subjects a non-discriminatory treatment.

Mr. Matsudaira said that what they had in mind in this point was to provide for non-discrimination in matters both of Japanese immigration and establishment. Mr. Hamilton observed that the quota system in the Phillipine Immigration Law was on a non-discriminatory basis. Mr. Matsudaira admitted this, but indicated a desire for a larger quota.

There was no further discussion. Mr. Hamilton said that we would report to the Secretary and it was agreed that Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Ballantine would keep in touch as to the next step.

1086

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 11 June 1941 1140 S hours

Arrival 12 June 1941 130 hours

No. 927 of 11 June.

Prince URACH has informed us of a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the KWANTUNG army, General UMEZU, in HSINKING: "Commander-in-Chief of the KWANTUNG army, General UMEZU, stressed that he welcomed the Neutrality pact JAPAN-RUSSIA for the moment. Since, however, the Tripartite pact is the unchangeable basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan's attitude towards the Neutrality pact must undergo a change just as soon as the hitherto existing German-Russian relations undergo an alteration.

OTT

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4061B.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

Br. Ex. 180

DRAFT DOCUMENT RECEIVED INFORMALLY FROM ASSOCIATES OF THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 15, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments, in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a Conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting the international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other people.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

The Government of Japan having declared that the general terms, within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China Affair, are implied in the Konoe principles and in the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of the Government of Japan to establish a relation of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Government

Br. Ex. 180

at Chungking that it enter with the Government of Japan into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Enclosure)

Br. Ex. 180

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, that both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 473-476.

Doc. No. 219P (77)

Br. Ex. 109

TELEGRAM
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY
OF STATE

TOKYO, June 16, 1941--9 p.m.
(Received June 16--10:35 a.m.)

Excerpts

830. Chungking's 240, June 15, 3 p.m. Without delay I immediately sought an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and delivered to him in person a signed note quoted below. I made the most emphatic representations and pointed out the grave danger to American-Japanese relations involved in recent bombing attacks on Chungking which have now resulted in heavy damage to our Embassy property, including the residence of the Ambassador, and seriously jeopardizing both the lives of the Ambassador and other American nationals and the U. S. S. Tutuila.

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"Excellency: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that according to information just received from the American Ambassador at Chungking, during an air raid early on the afternoon of June 15, 1941, twenty-seven Japanese airplanes flying high bombed Chungking and also dropped several, about five, bombs within areas of one to three hundred yards of the Embassy Chancery and the United States ship Tutuila. A bomb which dropped within fifty yards of the entrance to the Embassy dugout hit alongside of and heavily damaged the offices of the assistant military attache, about half way between the Chancery and the United States ship Tutuila. The concussion and flying debris damaged the Chancery, including the windows, transoms, tile roof, screens and shutters. Some damage was also caused at the Ambassador's residence a half mile away and at the Standard Oil offices near the Chancery.

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Foreign Relations I, pp. 715-716

1091

Br. Ex. 181

ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 21, 1941

Excerpt.

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The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self-defense. The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesmen of the Japanese Government emphasizing Japan's commitments and intentions under the Tripartite alliance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?

U.S. Pol.
re AXIS -
ANTI-COMMINTERN-

Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Government to include in its terms for a peaceful settlement to be offered to the Chinese Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in resisting communistic activities. While this Government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted the Japanese Government to make such a proposal, and while this Government does not desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, would not permit this Government to associate itself with any course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. - Furthermore, although in matters affecting only this country there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this Government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.

Br. Ex. 181

The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this Government must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. This Government sincerely hopes that the Japanese Government will manifest such an attitude.

NOTE: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment" which was handed the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 485-486.

Br. Ex. 182

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 21, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory
and Without Commitment

(Washington,) June 21, 1941.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

NOTE (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, vide the Oral statement handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.)

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

NOTE (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestions that the language of Section III be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Br. Ex. 182

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Annex 1)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace. !
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.

(Annex 2)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

(Annex 3)

SUGGESTED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:

EXCELLENCY: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth fully the position of this Government upon this subject.

I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude toward the European war but in order that there may be no misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement, to establish and to preserve peace in the Pacific areas.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State.

EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter of June--.

I wish to state that my government is fully aware of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my Government the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

(Annex 4)

SUGGESTED LETTER TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION

EXCELLENCY: In the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and frankly views on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to applying to Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. It is believed that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to confirm the statements already expressed orally in the form of replies on the following points:

1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations for a

peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be effected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out?

It would be appreciated if as specific replies as possible could be made to the questions above listed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Item 8)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

Special Train 28 June 1941, 2010 hours
Arrival: 28 June 1941, 2030 hours

No. 267/R German Foreign Office, 28 June
No. 560 of 28 June 1) German Embassy Tokyo
2) Cipher-Bureau, Secret remark for
officials in charge (M.B.D. 3611)

(Marginal note: Sent on to Tokyo under No. 916 Telko, (d)
28 June 1941 2130 hours)

~ Will

I have agreed with Ambassador OSHIMA that he should influence his government to the effect of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia. I also request you now to utilize all available possibilities to influence to the same effect the government there, and other influential circles. Please make use of the following arguments:

- 1) The war between Germany and Soviet Russia will not merely lead to the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but will result in a final solution through a fight to the finish /Endkampf-loesung/ of the Russian question.
- 2) The annihilation of Russian power by our military action, to be expected in relatively short time, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany gets hold of the Russian oilfields and wheat fields, sufficient provisions for the whole of Europe is thereby guaranteed, so that the British blockade becomes entirely senseless. Direct land communication to East Asia will likewise be established at this occasion.
- 3) In this way all requirements then exist for making possible the New Order of the European Sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.
- 4) The present situation provides Japan, too, with a unique opportunity just as Germany in Europe. Japan can now create the basis for the New Order

see (5)

VG

planned by it in East Asia by a military action against Soviet Russia. After the elimination of Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the Chinese problem as desired by Japan, will meet with no further difficulties.

- 5) From the point of view of Japan's interests, the idea of a move to the South in the direction of Singapore is and will be of great importance. Since, at present, Japan is not ready for this, and in addition such move is not yet possible in the present phase of the war, it is in the utmost Japanese interest not to leave unused the at present available opportunity to solve the Russian problem in the Far East as well. She would thereby protect her rear for the move to the South.
- 6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan should, without delay, decide upon a military attack against Soviet Russia. A Japanese move against an already beaten Soviet Russia would considerably injure Japan's moral and political position.
- 7) It may be counted upon that the speedy conquest of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan takes part in it from the East, will probably be the best way to convince the United States of the absolute futility of entering into the war on the side of England, then completely isolated and facing the most powerful alliance of the earth.

See (2) →

←

RIBBENTROP

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that: I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4081C.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a true, photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a true photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

/s/ G. H. Garde

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

OFFICE OF MILITARY

GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

1097

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

6/28/46

Tokyo 28 June 41 1145 hours
Arrival 28 June 41 2210 hours

To be kept in
locked file

No. 1009⁶ of 28 June Secret!

Re Telegram No. 1034 with Pol VIII, of 25 June

WAR

Indo-China

Within the last days the leadership committee of the Cabinet has repeatedly met in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire Cabinet and deliberating committees without reaching a clear-cut decision as to Japan's future attitude to the German-Russian war. As far as could be found out, only preparatory measures for the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered thus far. As Army memorandum confirms, preparatory measures have indeed begun with zest. Under the circumstances the preparations for attack against Russia will take at least six weeks, unless a decisive material and moral weakening of Russia in the Far East takes place beforehand. According to reliable, confidential information, Premier Konoye and the majority of Cabinet Ministers, to be sure, seem to maintain the view that nothing must be undertaken that would injure Japan's military position in China. Hence, the Cabinet seems thus far merely to have resolved on tightening their grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions are allegedly being prepared.

Caution
v12-v12-

In public and behind the scenes discussions concerning the attitude to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, who always closely work together with the Embassy, have held various confidential conversations -- cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June -- in which caution towards the Soviet Union and determined action in the South was advocated.

The danger exists that the Southern expansion desired by this group will at first be limited to French Indo-China, while their efforts* could hinder Japan's activity in the North. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the general directions, given to me at Berlin, to work, in the first place, for Japan's activity

*) Clear text
evidently
missing

in the South while ignoring the Soviet Union, are still valid if a successful move to the South beyond Indo-China cannot be counted on at present. According to confidential reports coming to me from the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador OSHIMA is said to have urgently advised the Japanese government to attack Russia soon.

I request telegraphic instructions.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4081D.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant Genera.

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

1099

Doc. No. 219P (78)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 110

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1845

TOKYO, July 8, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that during a severe Japanese air raid on Chungking on June 29, 1941, at which time the British Embassy was badly damaged, the concussion from bombs dropped on the south bank of the river caused some damage to the staff residence of the American Embassy.

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Foreign Relations I, p. 718