Show Oct 10.

# INDEX

Of

# WITNESSES

Prosecution's Witnesses	Page
KASAHARA, Yukio	7459
Direct by Colonel Ivanov	7459
Cross by Mr. HANAI " " Dr. KIYOSE " " Mr. Furness " " Mr. OKAMOTO	7464 7477 7495 7498

# INDEX

Of

# EXHIBITS

Pros.	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
692	Summary of Conversation Between HIROTA and HARADA		7447
693	Affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio		7447
694	Proposals made by Japanese General Staff dated 9 Feb 1931 Concerning the Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems		745 <b>7</b>
695	Affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio (in Japanese language)	7462	

# INDEX

Of

# EXHIBITS

# (cont'd)

Pros. No.	Def. No.	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
696		Summary of an Address made to his Excellency HARADA by Lt. Colonel KASAHARA	7462	7490
697		Affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio	7462	
698		Copy of the Anti-Soviet Strategy Plan of Major KANDA when he was serving in the Special Service Division, Japanese Army, in Harbin	7464	
699		Affidavit of MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, dated 22 Feb 1946 in Moscow		7501
700		A Cable from Consul-General OHASHI in Harbin to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA dated 7 Nov 1931 No. 516 (2)	7505	7505
701		Photocopy of Report dated 14 July 1932 of Lt. Colonel KAWARE, Torashiro, the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow		7508
702		"A Message of Lt. Colonel KANDA of 16 July"		7510
703		Affidavit of General USHIROKU, Jun, dated 21 March 1946	ý	7515

# INDEX

Of

# EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

Pros. Def. No. No.	Description For Ident.	In Evidence
704	Decision of the Conference of Four Japanese Ministers of 7 Aug 1936 under the title of: "Foreign Policy of the Empire 7523	
705	Affidavit of TOMINAGA, Keoji	7526
706	Table of the Increase of the Strength of the Kwantung Army and of the Japanese Army as a whole from 1932 to 1945	7531

Thursday, 10 October, 1946 1 2 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 4 Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930. 9 10 11 12 Appearances: 13 For the Tribunal, same as before. 14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before. 15 For the Defense Section, same as before, 16 with the addition of: MICHAEL LEVIN, who is now also 17 Associate Counsel for the Accused KAYA, Okinori. 18 19 20 21 (English to Japanese, Japanese to 22 English, Russian to English and Japanese to 23 Russian interpretation was made by the 24 Language Section, IMTFE.) 25

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, I desire to announce that Mr. Michael Levin, who is already well known to the Tribunal, has filed his appearance as additional associate American counsel for the Accused KAYA, Okinori.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Ivanov.

colonel Ivanov: We present to the Tribunal in evidence prosecution document No. 1990A, with the the affidavit of KASHARA, Yukio attached to it, prosecution document No. 2659. This secret document, a photostat copy of which is being presented, is dated 1931 and contains the summary of the talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 1990A will be given exhibit No. 692. Prosecution

document No. 2659 will be given exhibit No. 693. They

are bound together, the first three pages thereof being

document No. 1990 and the rest of it No. 2659.

(Whereupon, the documents above referred to were marked prosecution's exhibits No. 692 and No. 693, respectively, and received in evidence.)

THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney. 1 MR. BLAKENEY: May it please the Tribunal, 2 we wish to object to the acceptance of this affidavit 3 unless the witness is presented for cross-examination. He is, I understand, available. THE PRESIDENT: We made it a condition. 6 MR. GOLUNSKY: We did not intend to bring in 7 the witness because his affidavit is confined strictly to identification of the document, but if the Tribunal 9 thinks that the witness should be here we can easily do 10 it. The witness is available. 11 THE PRESIDENT: Other affidevits have been 12 admitted on the condition that the deponent, if avail-13 14 able, must be called if the Court so requires, or interrogated if the Court so requires. That condition 15 16 will obtain here. 17 MR. : LUNSKY: Does the Court require us to 18 bring him right now in? 19 THE PRESIDENT: Not until otherwise directed. 20 COLONEL IVANOV: There is an inscription on 21 the back of the photocopy of this document. 22 MR. HANAI: With respect to document 1990, 23 only a photostat has been tendered as evidence. The 24 original of this document is unknown, hasn't been

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cleared.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, we have not the original document at our disposal, only a photostatic copy, and that is why, before offering it to the Tribunal, we have shown it to the author, KASAHARA, and produced it in evidence before the Tribunal only when we had the affidavit of KASAHARA confirming the authenticity of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: You have the author's certificate that he wrote it. Admitted on the usual terms as already stated.

COLONEL IVANOV: There is an inscription on the back of the photocopy of this document. This inscription was made by KASAHARA, Yukio, former Japanese military attache in Moscow, in his own hand.

I quote the contents:

"The article written in Japanese on the other side of this photograph was recorded by me in my own handwriting, fifteen years ago, in 1931 (Showa 6), when Major General HARADA was in Moscow. It contains the gist of the conversations between Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA. I hereby certify the above with my own signature.

"September 3, 1946. KASAHARA, Yukio."

If the Tribunal please, I shall draw their special attention to the fact that the defendant HIROTA

was at that time the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow.

(Exhibit No. 108.) We present this document to prove first that the question of a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. has already been put on the agenda in 1931 and second that the same HIROTA, who was Prime Minister of Japan at the time of the confusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, pointed out in 1931 that the main purpose was rather the seizure of the Far East and Siberia than the defense against communism.

If the Tribunal please, I shall read the contents of the affidavit of KASAHARA, mentioned by me before. I quote exhibit No. 693:

"Affidavit.

"I, Lieutenant General Yukio KASAHARA of the Japanese Army, do hereby certify under oath as follows:

"That the photestatic copy of the document in Japanese under the title of Conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA is the photographic copy of the record of the outline of conversation of /mbassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA which took place while the latter was in Moscow in 1931, fifteen years ago.

"This record is in my handwriting, written at the request of Major General HARADA. The contents of the document are as follows:

"Concerning the Conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA."

3) THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH: If your Honor please, I understood the Russian prosecutor to say the witness was available. I am wondering why they don't put him in the box before they read this affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: This is a delayed application by you, Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH: I had been standing at the lectern here for nearly a minute and the Russian prosecutor wouldn't do me the favor of stopping his reading long enough for me to say anything.

THE PRESIDENT: You didn't come to the lectern until some &insiderable time after the document had been admitted and he had commenced to read.

MR. SMITH: Well, I understood your Honor has already ruled on this that he had to call the witness and he didn't do it.

THE PRESIDENT: I made it a condition that the deponent should be called as a witness if required by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has not yet required him to be called.

Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: The contents:

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"Concerning the conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA.

"In reference to the national policy of x x to be transmitted by Ambassador HIROTA to the Chief of General Staff.

"1. Desire the following matters be especially transmitted to the Chief of General Staff.

"Aside from whether Japan will wage a war against Soviet Russia, it is necessary for Japan to have strong policies against Soviet Russia being ready for war at any time. Its principal purpose is not defense against Communism but rather the conquest of Eastern Siberia,

"2. x x (words illegible) stated by Ambassador HIROTA on the disarmament problem. Generally: speaking, more than half of the diplomats of the world are in favor of military disarmament. However, since this refers to the general theory of disarmament, if it becomes clearly known that the military preparations of Japan is for use against Soviet Russia, it is only natural that she cannot reduce her armaments; and the world powers also (the remainder of the sentence was not submitted to me).

"In the above mentioned photostatic copy of the record, however, there are two letters each on lines 1 15 and 21 of the first page too indistinct to be read. Therefore, marks 'x x' were inserted.

"I have no recollection as to the recorded items in the remaining portion which was not presented to me.

"I hereby identify this affidavit in my own handwriting and that it is true."

Signed: "KASAHARA, Yukio."

End of quotation.

MR. FURNESS: May it please the Tribunal. THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: Defense now makes formal request that this witness be called to be cross-examined on the following grounds: It appears that the entire document was not submitted to him. Second, the source, according to the certificate, is the Red Prosecution Staff, not any department of the Japanese Government or any other department of the Russian. Third, the original exhibit which has been filed with the Court is almost wholely illegible. Fourth, the translation is apparently from Japanese into Russian and then the Russian translation is translated into English, according to the certificates filed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH: If the Court please, as counsel

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for Mr. HIROTA, we ask that the affiant be produced for cross-examination and, until such time that he is produced, that this affidavit stand struck out by order of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the prosecution desire to be heard on this? Minister Golunsky.

MR. GOLUNSKY: As I have already stated, we did not intend, we did not consider it necessary to put in the witness here because his affidavit was strictly confined to identification of the document. If we were to call him here we certainly would ask him only one question, if he confirms the contents of the document as stated in his affidavit. Under those conditions, according to the practice of this Tribunal, the cross-examination should be strictly limited to the question of identification only and it is thought that this would be a waste of time. If the defense want to question him as to the events about which the inscription just read stated, they can put him on the stand as their own witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal directs that the deponent be called.

MR. GOLUNSKY: The witness will be here in several minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: In the meantime we can be

proceeding with other matters.

for identification prosecution document No. 1753, the proposals made by the Japanese General Staff dated February 9, 1931, concerning Russo-Japanese fishing problems. This document proves that the attitude of the Japanese General Staff was that any pretext should be used for an attack against the U.S.S.R. In 1931, particularly, the General Staff was ready to use the tension in the negotiations of fishing between Japan and the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of intervening by armed forces and starting a war.

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard enough for the time being. You are reading the document, aren't you? We have enough for the time being.

Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: Defense objects to the admission of this document in evidence on the ground that the certificate of source shows only that it comes from the files of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will look at it first. It is very hard to decide on objection without seeing the document.

MR. FURNESS: In that case, no certificate

would be necessary since all the prosecution would have to do would be to produce it. If they produce it, it proves it comes from them.

THE PRESIDENT: A similar objection has already been made against a document tendered by the American Section of the prosecution. We held that the certificate of Mr. Danly, I think, was not sufficient. This objection is sustained.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, there is a difference between the case the President has mentioned just now and this one. In the American case the certificate came from a department of this prosecution; in this case the certificate comes from the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Soviet Union, an organization entirely independent from this prosecution, and in my opinion it comes complete under the conditions provided for by Article 13 of the Charter.

THE PRESIDENT: It is still the Russian prosecution, whether it be in Moscow or in Tokyo.

I will consult my colleagues. They may take a different view.

(Whereupon, the Members of the Tribunal conferred upon the bench).

THE PRESIDENT: We think the Russian prosecution should tell us where this document was obtained

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by the Russian Government, and should give us a certifi-cate to that effect. MR. GOLUNSKY: I will undertake to supply the certificate as soon as we can have it. THE PRESIDENT: For the time being the document is rejucted as evidence. We will admit it con-ditionally as we did in the case of the French documents CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1753 will receive exhibit No. 694. 

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 694 and received in evidence.)

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

extracts from Chapter 6, entitled, "Counter-Measures which the Empire should Adopt." I quote page 9 of the English translation, paragraphs 5 and 6:

"Japan must be convinced of the urgent necessity of considering the reason by which her interests in Russia is authorized, and with the determination to make the unlicensed fishing absolutely safe in the future, firmly and boldly push through her insistence during the negotiations.

"Judging from the internal and external state of Soviet Russia, if we showed our determination to

obtain unlicensed fishing, they will have no courage
to maintain their insistence. However, if we carried
out our insistence in spite of Russian resoluteness,
by force of circumstances, the result be the severance
of diplomatic relationship with Russia, and it will
give us the opportunity to promote our sincere desire
of executing our basic national policy against Russia."

THE PRESIDENT: It appears on page 9.

MR. GOLUNSKY: The witness KASAHARA is in the
room, if the Tribunal please. We will call him right
now.

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#### DIRECT EXAMINATION

### BY COLONEL IVANOV:

- Q Mr. Witness, tell the Court your full name.
- A I am KASAHARA, Yukio.
- Q How old are you?
- A Fifty-eight.
- Q What post did you hold in 1931, fifteen years ago?
- A Military attache, Japanese Embassy, in Soviet Russia.
- Q I present to you prosecution document 2659, affidavit written by you in your own hand in the Japanese language. I ask you to consider this document. Mr. Witness, please tell the Court, did you write and sign this document?
  - A Yes, this was written by me.
- Q Mr. Witness, please tell the Court, is everything stated in your affidavit true?
  - A It is the truth.
- Q I presented to you a photostat copy of the document 1990-A. Please consider it, Mr. Witness.

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Mr. Witness, tell to this Court, what is this document?

When Major General HARADA was on a tour of inspection in Europe and visited Moscow, I brought him to the then Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. HIROTA, for a courtesy call; and this is an outline of what Ambassador HIROTA told Major General HARADA at that time, which I wrote and gave to General HARADA.

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please, I shall present to the witness several documents for identification, which he testified by his own signature previously.

I present to you prosecution document 2657, affidavit written in the Japanese language. I ask you, Mr. Witness, to consider this document.

Did you sign this document, Mr. Witness, and is everything stated in it true and correct?

THE PRESIDENT: These documents should be tendered for identification, with a short explanation of what they are.

I wrote it, and everything in it are true.

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please, I ask them to accept in evidence this document, and I shall read from it certain excerpts. I present

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prosecution document 2657, affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio. I shall read certain excerpts later on.

MR. GOLUNSKY: There was an inexactness in the English. translation. The Colonel said he was offering at this time the document for identification.

MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, none of the defense can find the document referred to.

THE PRESIDENT: This is for identification only. It cannot be tendered except in accordance with the rules. If there is any attempt to tender a document as an exhibit, the defense will have the right to cross-examine first.

Q Mr. Witness, I present to you a photostat copy of prosecution document 1990-B. Please look at this document and tell the Court what it is.

A This is a copy of some of the things I told Major General HARADA with respect to conditions in Russia at the time I met him when he was passing through Moscow.

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Court please, I present document 1990-B for identification.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
No. 1990-B will receive exhibit No. 696. The previous
prosecution document, 2657, which was received for
identification only, was given exhibit No. 695.

(Whereupon, document No. 2657 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 695 for identification; and document No. 1990-B was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 696 for identification.)

Q Mr. Witness, I present to you prosecution document 2652 -- correction: 2658. This document is an affidavit written by you. I ask you to consider this document and tell the Court whether you signed it.

A Yes, this was written by me.

Q Is everything written in this affidavit by you correct and true?

A It is the truth.

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please, I present prosecution document 2658, affidavit of KASA-HARA, Yukio, for identification.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
No. 2658 will receive exhibit No. 697 for identification.

(Whereupon, document No. 2658 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 697 for identification.)

THE PRESIDENT: Captain Brooks.

MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I wanted to call the attention that the defense do not

have the other affidavits of this witness, 2657 and 2658, that are being offered for identification, and we would like to protect ourselves on that and have at least twenty-four hours to study it before we have to cross-examine the man on it. The prosecution will keep that in mind.

THE PRESIDENT: They cannot be tendered as exhibits until the rules as to service have been complied with. That is all I can say.

The tendering of cocuments for identification is a matter of precaution, and the precautions are not barred by our rules. It has been applied to all sections of the prosecution.

BY COLONEL IVANOV (Continuing):

Q Mr. Witness, I present to you a photostatic copy of the prosecution document 2460. Tell me, what is this document?

A This is a copy of the Anti-Soviet Strategy
Plan which Major KANDA showed me in his private capacity and which was prepared in his private capacity when he was serving in the Special Service Division,
Japanese Army, in Harbin.

shall present for identification prosecution document 2460, which is a report made by KANDA, Masatane,

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military measures against the U.S.S.R. THE PRESIDENT: It will be marked for identi-2 fication. 3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 4 No. 2460 will receive exhibit No. 698 for identifica-5 tion. (Whereupon, document No. 2460 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 698 for 8 identification.) 9 COLONEL IVANOV: If the defense has any 10 questions concerning the identification of this docu-11 12 ment, they may ask these questions now. 13 THE PRESIDENT: The defense may cross-examine 14 in the usual way. 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. HANAI: 17 What was the mission on which Major HARADA 18 went, I ask the witness? 19 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, the 20 prosecution objects to this question as being outside the scope of the direct examination.

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Major General HARADA's principal mission to Europe was to make a study of military education in

out of the affidavit. It may be asked.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it arises

that part of the world. He was dispatched to Europe on this mission by the General Education Bureau of the Army. His visit in Moscow had nothing to do with his mission; he merely passed through, and on that 4 occasion visited me, at which time we had private, informal conversations. JAPANESE MONITOR: Office of the Inspector 7 General of Military Training, is the regular term. 8 (Continuing) Major General HARADA was never 9 attached with either the General Staff or the War 10 Office. He has been wholly connected with military education. Then, in other words, in passing through Moscow he just dropped in on you? A Yes. And on that occasion you just incidentally took Major General HARADA there on a courtesy visit to Ambassador HIROTA, is that not so? Ordinarily, the military attache does not present to the ambassador any lower military officers. But in the case of general officers, it was general practice and custom for the military attache to take

Was there any particular purpose in interviewing

the general officer to the ambassador to make a call

of courtesy; and I followed that custom.

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1	the ambassador?
2	A There was no particular purpose outside of
3	making a call of courtesy.
4	Q Then, how long were the conversations which
5	took place?
6	THE PRESIDENT: That is unnecessary.
7	A I do not remember the length of the conversation
8	but I do not think it was long.
9	Q Were the contents of the conversation exactly
10	as reproduced in the photostatic copy of the document?
11	A No, this is only an outline of the conversation
12	and not a verbatim transcript of the conversation. I
13	cannot say with confidence that it is an exact repro-
14	duction of the conversation.
15	THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen
16	minutes.
17	(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
18	taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
19	were resumed as follows:)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

BY MR. HANAI (Continued):

I should think Major General HARADA presented many questions with regard to the situation in Russia during his visit in Moscow at this conversation; how about it?

THE PRESIDENT: That is too general.

I understand the IBM is not working.

THE MONITOR: The IBM is not working; just a minute, please.

A Before Major General HARADA was taken by me on this courtesy call to the Ambassador, I spoke to him generally on the situation in Russia and it was on the basis of the information that I had imparted to him that he asked questions of the Ambassador and the Ambassador made remarks to him.

O Then, is it not so that you made this document after making your own selections and analysis of the questions and replies which took place during the conversation?

A Will counsel please repeat the question? I was unable to hear all of it.

O Is it not so that you yourself, Mr. Witness, on the basis of the questions and replies which took

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. BY MR. HANAI (Continued):

C I should think Major General HARADA presented many questions with regard to the situation in Russia during his visit in Moscow at this conversation; how about it?

THE PRESIDENT: That is too general.

I understand the IBM is not working.

THE MONITOR: The IBM is not working; just a minute, please.

A Before Major General HARADA was taken by me on this courtesy call to the Ambassador, I spoke to him generally on the situation in Russia and it was on the basis of the information that I had imparted to him that he asked questions of the Ambassador and the Ambassador made remarks to him.

Then, is it not so that you made this document after making your own selections and analysis of the questions and replies which took place during the conversation?

A Will counsel please repeat the question? I was unable to hear all of it.

O Is it not so that you yourself, Mr. Witness, on the basis of the questions and replies which took

	place during the conversation, boiled the whole thing
1	down and prepared the document?
2	A Yes, I myself summarized and wrote down the
3	gist of the conversation. It was not submitted to
4	Ambassador HIROTA for inspection.
5	Q Did you write this document during the course
6	of the conversation or at a later date?
7	A Not during the conversation but after I
8	had returned to my own office by request of Major
9	
10	General HARADA, who asked me to note some of the
11	points in the conversation at the time of his departure-
12	just before his departure.
13	Q You just said, Mr. Witness, that you did not
14	present this document to Ambassador HIROTA for inspec-
15	tion, but did you ask the Ambassador for his approval
16	with respect to the contents or for his views thereto?
17	A With respect to this document, I did not
18	show it to the Ambassador nor talk about it to him.
19	However, with respect to Russian questions in general,
20	I have had occasion to exchange views with him.
21	
22	Q On the basis of the conversation, as well as
23	the fact that you wrote notes thereof later on, can
24	you positively say that your own personal views did
25	not enter into this particular document?

As you say, I should think that some of my

private views also entered into this document at the 1 time of its writing inasmuch as I did not present this document for inspection to the Ambassador. I cannot say positively whether I had expressed the Ambassador's 4 thoughts truthfully and fully. Also, it might have been the case where I might have put a personal twist 6 or interpretation to what Mr. HIROTA said. Because of the fact that there were many pending questions 8 between Russia and Japan at the time and Japanese 9 opinion at home was not very enthusiastic about some of these questions and Japanese opinion happened to 11 be in favor of the disarmament question, it might be that Ambassador HIROTA wanted to draw the General's attention to some of these questions -- wanted to draw public attention to some of these questions.

THE MONITOR: And he might have used certain words purposely to accomplish this.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I object to this question because it does not fit to ask the witness what HIROTA might have thought.

THE PRESIDENT: He cannot depose as to HIROTA's mere thoughts; that is, thoughts unrevealed to the witness.

0 What was HIROTA's diplomatic policy, especially his policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in its practical

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and realistic aspects. 1 MR. GOLUNSKY: If your Honor please, I 2 object to this question as being too broad and outside the scope of direct examination. 4 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld. 5 MR. HANAI: May I state to you, Mr. President, 6 that this has a direct connection with the document in question. 8 THE PRESIDENT: You may endeavor to do so. 9 I cannot see any connection. 10 MR. HANAI: I find relevancy on this ground: . 11 that Ambassador HIROTA was a strong advocate of 12 13 a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviet 14 Union, a strong advocate of a policy of diplomatic 15 cooperation between the two countries, and actually 16 himself endeavored to carry this policy out. The 17 document in question gives the impression that 18 HIROTA's policy was exactly the opposite and I am 19 trying to disprove this fact. 20

THE PRESIDENT: You may ask questions on all matters dealt with in the memorandum made by the witness. So far we have not had the advantage of hearing what is in that memorandum.

Q Was not the main question discussed during the conversation between Ambassador HIROTA and Major

General HARADA with regard to the disarmament question? 1 I cannot recall exactly but inasmuch as dis-2 armament was the foremost question, one of the foremost questions, at that time, I should think from my 4 own imagination that that was the topic of conversation. that was the main topic of conversation. 6 THE PRESIDENT: Before we can effectively 7 deal with any objections that may be raised, we should know what is in the memorandum. 9 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, this 10 11 document which is alluded to as a memorandum here 12 has been read by Colonel Ivanov as exhibit 692. 13 THE PRESIDENT: There is a Japanese document 14 in the exhibit, in the affidavit, or annexed to it. I 15 was not sure whether that was read or not and according 16 to the witness that is only a part of the memorandum. 17 We should know what was in the other part, if that is 18 available. The witness may be able to recall what 19 was omitted. 20 THE WITNESS: I don't think that memorandum 21 was in its entirety but I do not know what was omitted --I cannot recall what has been omitted. 23 Have you any recollection, Mr. Witness, 24 whether there was any talk about the fact that Soviet 25

armaments were being strengthened at the time?

	Yes, I spoke of it and so did Ambassador
1	HIROTA.
2	THE PRESIDENT: Is the document shown to
3	the witness a fair representation of all that was
4	said at the interview of which he made a record?
5	THE WITNESS: As I have stated in the
6	affidavit, this was merely an outline of the main
7 8	points of the conversation. It is not a verbatim
9	transcript of the entire conversation.
10	Q When this photostat was shown to you, Mr.
11	Witness, were you able to read it?
12	A Yes, I was able to read it.
13	Q We ourselves cannot read it.
14	THE PRESIDENT: You must take his answer.
15	A Yes, I was able to read it because it was
16	in my own handwriting and there are certain habits
17	which are clear to me.
18	Q Mr. Witness, will you be good enough to
19	read it.
20	(Thereupon, a document was handed
21	to the witness.)
23	Q (Continuing) Mr. Witness, will you be good
24	enough to read that aloud?
25	MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I
	should like that the witness should be handed the same

	document he has been reading while he gave his affi-
1	davit and not one of the copies which were distributed
2	to the defense because I do not know how clear this
3	
4	particular copy is.
5	THE PRESIDENT: I understand he is now
6	looking at the copy that was shown to him before he
7	made his affidavit.
8	A (Reading in Japanese.)
9	THE PRESIDENT: That should be put into
10	English.
11	A "Re the conversation between Ambassador
12	HIROTA and Major General HARADA." Then there are some
13	sections blurred, unreadable, illegible. "And with
14	respect to Japanese policy"
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16	THE PRESIDENT: We want the words the witness
17	used.
18	A (Continuing) "Regarding the conversation
19	between Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA
20	with respect to points to be communicated from Ambas-
21	sador HIROTA to the Chief of the General Staff." Then
22	after that the words are illegible.
23	THE PRESIDENT: Did the witness say the
24	words were illegible?
25	THE MONITOR: Yes, Mr. President, he did.

THE WITNESS: I was unable to read it because

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1 2 the words were not legible and even at that time I struggled very much in order to understand or to find out what those blurred passages meant.

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0 Reading by imagination --

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used the word. "that I deciphered or I tried to surmise

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THE WITNESS: The document, not being clear --

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legible -- there are some places where my imagination

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has entered in.

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THE MONITOR: Just a minute. The witness what it was that I had written," and the defense attorney in this asked him, "By deciphering or by guessing what you wrote, or what you mean -- 'imagine'?"

THE MONITOR: And I imagine that this sentence must be this way, or it must be so.

- There seems to be some difference, Mr. Witness, between the passage you just read and the same passage -supposedly the same passage -- in your affidavit.
- I should think there would be the possibility of such differences arising from the fact that my imagination has entered into figuring out the blurred passages.
- In the document you just read you said, "from Ambassador HIROTA"; in the affidavit, the word, "from," is missing. In the passage you just read the words, "request for communication," has been mentioned. In your affidavit, "request" is missing.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, that is counsel's statement. Does the witness admit that? It may be supported by the record when we make comparisons. THE WITNESS: I confirm that.

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	23	in the va	u
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Q Where did you put the original of this document?

A What do you mean by "original"?

Q The document you wrote in your own handwriting.

A The document was written with a carbon copy.

One copy was given to Major General HARADA and the other copy was placed in the vault of the military attache's office in Moscow.

Q Is this document still in the deposit since then?

A I do not know whether or not this document is still in the vault -- in the deposit. I left

Moscow in the Spring of 1932, and I do not know whether this document has remained there since then.

THE MONITOR: I know that it was there until then.

Q Do you know how the photostat of this copy was made -- photostat of this document was made?

THE PRESIDENT: That is immaterial.

A I do not know how it was made. Either it was made from the copy in the hands of Major General HARADA or the copy which I left in the strong box or in the vault of the military attache's office in Moscow, a photostat of which was taken by the Soviets without our knowledge.

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not t	the o	origi	nal?											

A I judged that this was my own by two points: one, my own calligraphic habits, and the other, by the contents of the document itself; although I do not remember exactly, at least my recollection is of the general subject matter.

O Did you, Mr. Witness, remember that such a conversation had taken place even before you were shown this photostatic copy?

A I did not know -- I did not recall this conversation, not even until I was called here as a witness. I recalled it only when I was shown this document.

MR. HANAI: That is all, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY DR. KIYOSE:

Q There are four more lines, Mr. Witness. I should like to have you read the balance.

A The witness says "I don't have the document with me. "

THE PRESIDENT: Hand it to him.

(Whereupon, a document was handed to the

witness.)

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A (Continuing): "With respect to the dis-
armament question, HIROTA stated", and then the
passage is blurred, "with respect to the disarmament
question over half of the general public and
diplomats seem to be in favor of the reduction of
armaments. But, this being a general argument in favor
of disarmament but, if this is clarified as being
mainly that Japanese armoments are mainly directed
towards the Soviet Union, it would be natural that
reduction could not be possible in Japan, and the
powers also" and that is all.

It seems to be a little different, Mr. Witness. Wasn't there one more line between what you previously read and what you just read now?

I do not think there was another line.

Is there not a passage written in very small characters?

The passage written in small characters between the lines is: "With respect to the disarmament question HIROTA", and that is all it is possible to read. "What HIROTA stated", and that is all I could read. There are a few characters after that which are blurred.

THE PRESIDENT: He read from the photostatic copy shown to him before he made the affidavit. That

1	has already, as I understand, been tendered for identi+
2	fication. It should now be tendered finally by the
3	defense, I take it, if they rely on their cross-examin-
4	ation in that respect.
5	DR. KIYOSE: Then prosecution document 1990-A
6	is tendered in evidence.
7	THE PRESIDENT: It is tendered for identifica-
8	tion.
9	MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, it has
10	been tendered in evidence.
11	THE PRESIDENT: It is already in evidence.
12	DR. KIYOSE: One more question.
13	Q In the latter part, after the passage you have
14	just read, there is a part missing entirely. Now, are
15	there more passages to follow?
16	THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "The passage
17	that you read the last passage that you read, is
18	that complete? Are there more to follow?"
19	A Yes, there are more passages to follow, but
20	this is all that was shown to me.
21	Q How many pages were there in the document
22	which you wrote yourself?
23	A I do not recall how many pages; but I am
24	positive in saying that there is more to follow.
25	Q Did the document you wrote have a meaning as

a whole, or does each of its parts have a separate 1 meaning? 2 I do not know just how much would follow, but I am quite positive in saying that it was not 4 just two or three characters. THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness. 6 MR. FURNESS: The defense requests the pros-7 ecution to produce the other pages of the original 8 document of which the photostat of the first page has already been taken; and which is part of exhibit 10 692, I understand. We believe that if they have the 11 12 first page of which they could take a photograph, they 13 also probably have the other pages. If not, we would 14 like to know what happened to them. 15 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov. 16 MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, this 17 page, this photostat which has been presented to the 18 Tribunal was assured by the Intelligence Service at 19 the time, and that is the only page of which you have 20 the photostat. 21 THE PRESIDENT: Read out what Minister Golunsky 22 said, please. 23 (Whereupon, Mr. Golunsky's last statement

was read by the official court reporter.)

MR. FURNESS: We would like to get the original,

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particularly the other pages,

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THE PRESIDENT: Are they available?

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MR. GOLUNSKY: We don't have them at our

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disposal, and we tried to find the original here in

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Tokyo and failed.

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THE PRESIDENT: Did you try in Russia, Minister

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Golunsky? Did you try in Moscow or elsewhere in Russia?

MR. GOLUNSKY: Certainly. In Moscow we tried

first. That is the only part of the document which

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we could have in Moscow. We tried to find in Tokyo

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the original which General HARADA should have brought

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here with him and didn't find it.

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MR. FURNESS: May we ask when the photostat

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24 25 was taken?

THE PRESIDENT: No. that is immaterial. We want to know whether the whole original is available or a copy of the whole. That is the point. The time when the photostat was taken does not help us.

MR. FURNESS: I thought it would be material, sir, if the photostat was taken recently.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we are not cross-examining the prosecution at this stage. We want to know the facts first.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, I draw the attention of the Tribunal that there are two numbered

1 3 4 tant to us. 5 6 that he imagined it. 8 9 clear to me. 10 11 witness. 12 13 14 know where the original is. 15 16 document if it is available. 17 18 19 20 to him. 21 THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of the whole 22 23 24

paragraphs in the part of the document which we have submitted to the Tribunal. The first numbered paragraph is complete, and that is the one which is impor-

MR. FURNESS: I thought the witness stated that the first paragraph was not in the document,

THE WITNESS: What has just been said is not

THE INTERPRETER: This is statement of the

4 / MR. FURNESS: I would also like to know whether General HARADA is available because he might

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wants the whole

MR. GOLUNSKY: We tried to find HARADA, but we failed to find him. After the recess I can give the Tribunal definite information as to what happened

document the Tribunal may find some difficulty in acting on what has been produced. I do not speak for them all now, but that is a possibility, of course. In the absence of the production of the whole document,

we may have to consider also whether HARADA should be called, if he is available. But so far we have not undertaken to call witnesses. I doubt whether the Charter contemplates that course in any circumstances.

MR. FURNESS: It is our understanding, it is the understanding of the defense that the only documents to which this witness has testified are exhibits 692 and 693. It is our further understanding that when the others which have been identified are introduced, we will have further right to cross-examine. On that understanding the defense has no further questions to ask this witness at this time.

THE PRESIDENT: A colleague raises the following question: whether the witness has read -rather, he says he has the impression that the witness has read parts of the document which are not translated yet. He refers to the passage beginning with "aside" and ending with "Eastern Siberia."

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, the prosecution would like to have the possibility to compare the record of what the witness read here in Court with the text he gives in his affidavit. We have not been able to do it yet.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-past one.

1	(Whereupon, at 1156, a recess was taken.)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, just before the noon recess you said that a Member of the Bench called to your attention the fact that the entire passage quoted by the witness from the document had not been translated into English. Shall we make that translation now on the basis of the Japanese stenograph transcript? What is the Court's pleasure?

THE PRESIDENT: We want to know what the witness read out as he looked at that document. Can you recall what the witness said as he read it out?

THE INTERPRETER: The translation is to be made on the basis of the shorthand transcript taken in Japanese.

THE PRESIDENT: That is sufficient.

THE INTERPRETER: Then we shall proceed?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

THE INTERPRETER: "Regarding the conversation between Ambassador HIROTA and HARADA, request by Ambassador HIROTA for transmission to the Chief of the General Staff." Ifter this the passage is blurred and I cannot read. "With regard to national policy: 1. Especially desirous that this be transmitted to

the Chief of the General Staff. Putting aside the

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Is that sufficient, sir?

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question of whether or not Japan should make war against the Soviet Union, there is the need to take a strong policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with the resolve to fight the U.S.S.R. at any time when necessary. The objective, however, should not be defense against Communism but, rather, the occupation of Far Eastern Siberia.

"To Ambassador HIROTA regarding the disarmament question." At this point the President acknowledgedcounsel KIYOSE who appeared at the lectern.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is sufficient.

MR. GOLUNSKY: There will be no redirect examination.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released on the usual terms. Is there anybody in charge of the witness? Where is Captain Van Meter? Take him from the box.

Mr. Smith. Do you want the witness?

MR. SMITH: Yes, I would like him for a

If the Tribunal please, there must be an error somewhere. We listened to the English translation as this witness was reading from the document and we didn't hear anything that even resembles what was just

read back from Japanese notes.

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THE PRESIDENT: I understand that what he said was taken in Japanese and we got the translation of that Japanese. That is all we ever get.

MR. SMITH: Well, your Honor, in the interest of fairness, could we have the English read back as to what this witness said was in this document, that is, what part of it he could make out?

THE PRESIDENT: He read that document in Japanese. He read the Japanese in the document and what he said in Japanese was translated into English.

MR. SMITH: Then, your Honor, the English translation must be incorrect and the transcript of the record would be incorrect. That is what is copied into this record. Well, I am really confused, your Honor. Notwithstanding what my associates say, that evidently something was left out of the English translation. If it was I would like to have it gone back over and make sure of this because it is highly important to my client.

THE PRESIDENT: If anything has been left out it should be put in. But I understand that every word the witness used as he read that Japanese document and he spoke in Japanese has now been translated into English. If that is not the case, I would like

the Language Section to say so. 1 THE INTERPRETER: As far as the Language 3 Section is concerned, Mr. President, the passage which 4 was just read was taken from the Japanese stenographic 5 transcript, a portion of which was not translated into 6 English this morning. THE PRESIDENT: Was that the only portion not 8 translated into English this morning? THE INTERPRETER: That was the passage es-9 pecially referred to by the Honorable President this 10 11 morning. 12 THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me whether any 13 other passage remains untranslated? 14 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. With respect to a 15 portion which has not been given a complete transla-16 tion into English; only a partial translation was 17 given this morning. 18 THE PRESIDENT: We require now a complete 19 translation of that portion. 20 THE INTERPRETER: May we proceed, sir? 21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. 22 THE INTERPRETER: The Witness: "No. 2. 23 What Ambassador HIROTA said with respect to the dis-24 armament question and a few words following are

illegible and I cannot read them. Continuing quoting:

'Regarding this disarmament question, it seems that more than half of the general public and diplomats are in favor of disarmament but, this being with regard to the disarmament question in general, if it is clarified that Japan's armaments are directed toward the Soviet Union, naturally that armament could not be reduced. The world powers also — The remainder is blurred and the witness said, 'That is all.'"

THE PRESIDENT: Have you now translated all the witness said as he read from that document?

THE INTERPRETER: To my knowledge, yes, sir, in so far as the document is concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, we are now going to introduce other documents identified by the same witness. Therefore, perhaps we had better keep the witness on the stand while we are introducing them.

to the Tribunal for identification prosecution document No. 1990B, exhibit No. 696, summary of an address made to His Excellency HARADA by Lieutenent Colonel KASAWARA. This document is also dated 1931. On the back of the last page of the photo copy, which is also dated 1931, there is an inscription made by

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KASAHARA which reads as follows: "The record of this document was taken by me in my own hand September 3, 1946. KASAHARA, Yukio."

If the Tribunal please, I shall quote in evidence excerpts from "Summary of an Address made to his Excellency HARADA by Lieutenent Colonel KASAHARA."

I quote this document to show aggressive designs against the U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document

No. 1990B was given for identification exhibit No. 696

and is now admitted according to the order of the Court.

(Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit

No. 696 was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: I quote this document to show aggressive designs against the U.S.S.R.

"Summary of an Address made to His Excellency
HARADA by Lieutenent Colonel KASAHARA." The following
is from the second chapter of the summary of an address
under the title of "National Defense of Soviet Russia."
I quote page 2 of the English translation:

"Soviet Russia at present is not offensive but defensive and is particularly afraid of foreign invasion."

In the third chapter under the title of

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"Conclusion" the following is said concerning the Soviet Union. I quote page 3 of the English text, paragraphs 2 and 3:

"At present, however, in view of her national powers in general, it is judged that she has not enough strength to execute a war.

"There is never a better time than now for Japan to solve her Far East problems. The western neighboring countries (Poland, Rumania) are able to rise now in unison with Japan but as the years pass it will get more and more difficult. If we are determined to solve the Far East problem now even at the risk of waging war, it may be solved without a war, although there is no objection even if by chance a war should be waged."

I ask the Tribunal to accept in evidence prosecution document No. 2657, exhibit No. 695. This is the affidavit of KASAHARA, Yukio.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, we didn't get this document until this noon. I has not been served on us within -- beyond the twenty-four hour limit.

THE PRESIDENT: You may see fit not to rest on your rights in view of the short nature of the

document. I take it you are not pressing your objec-tion. MR. FURNESS: A good many of us, sir, haven't got the document at all. Personally, I don't insist on it. THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are the only counsel to take it so far, Major Furness. Proceed. Proceed to describe it. COLONEL IVANOV: (Reading) 

## "AFFI DAVIT

"I, Lieutenant-General Yukio KASAHARA, state under oath as follows:

"During my service as a military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Soviet Russian from 1930 to 1932, I came to know the following matters through my duties.

"1. In 1931, when Major-General HARADA of the Japanese Army passed through MOSCOW on his return trip to Japan from Europe, he had a talk regarding the situation in the Soviet Union and Japan's policy toward Soviet Union with me and Japanese Ambassador HIROTA.

"At the time of the conversation between Major-General HARADA and me, my Assistant, Major YAMAOKA was present and at the time of the conversation between Major-General HARADA and Ambassador HIROTA, I was present.

"2. The photostatic copy of the document in Japanese entitled 'Outline of the Talk to his Excellency, General HARADA' which is now presented to me, is the one in which the matters that I told Major-General HARADA during his stay in MOSCOW in 1931 was correctly recorded, as far as its contents are concerned. I think the matters in pages 1 to 9 of the document are in Assistant Officer Michitake YAMAOKA's own handwriting.

In order to affirm the said facts, this day I subscribed 1 my signature on the back of the said photographic document and the date on which the document was presented 3 to me. 4 "3. The photostatic copy of the document in 5 6 Japanese entitled 'Matters concerning the talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA is the one 7 in which the outline of the talk between Major-General 9 HARADA and Ambassador HIROTA was recorded, during the 10 former's stay in Moscow fifteen years ago, in other 11 words, 1931. 12 . "This record was made by me at Major-General 13 HARADA's request. 14 "I certified the above fact in my own hand-15 writing on the back of the said document." 16 17 /s/ "KASAHARA, Yukio" 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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The defense may question the witness in connection with the affidavit I have read and the document I have read before. THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR, FURNESS: I call your attention to prosecution docu-7 ment No. 1990-B which is exhibit No. 696. I call your 3 attention to paragraph three which is headed "Conclusion." I ask you to read the first sentence of that 10 paragraph. 11 (Whereupon, a document was handed 12 to the witness.) 13 14 (Continuing) I request you to read aloud. 15 THE PRESIDENT: You had better get some 16 Japanese counsel to point it out to him. 17 Do you want me to read all of it? 18 I want you to read the first sentence of 19 that paragraph. 20 Do you want me to read the conclusion in its 21 entirely or with respect to Soviet defense -- nation-22 al defense, or what passage do you mean? 23 THE PRESIDENT: The first sentence only.

(Continuing) "In short, it should be selfevident that Soviet Russia will change her policy

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from that of passive defense to aggression in the future parallel with the completion of her economic power and defense."

Q I now refer you to section 2, sub-section (f) and ask you to read the first sentence of that sub-section.

THE INTERPRETER: Major Furness, the document which the witness has and the document which we have is different, sir. I wish you would instruct him to that effect. The witness has only a photostat.

MR. FURNESS: Well, it is the document which is before the Court, and it is supposed to be a copy of the exhibit; the paragraph which is headed "Militarization of the people."

(Whereupon, an off the record discussion was had between the witness and the monitor.)

A "The militarization of the people. All possible efforts are being bent on the militarization of the public. In Japan the year before last, three million; in Japan last year, five million; and" -- I cannot read the month, but it must be at the end of the year or thereabouts -- "this year, nine million."

Q Will you read the last sentence.

A "The effect has infiltrated even the rank of

kindergarten age."

And then referring to the "nublic" there, you were referring to the Russian public, were you not?

THE PRESIDENT: Why are you asking him to read those passages, Major Furness? Are you testing his ability to read the photostat, or are you trying to get in matters favorable to you? I don't question your right to do either.

MR. FURNESS: I am trying to bring out matters favorable to the defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is going to be very expensive of time.

Q General, at the time that you made this report, you were military attache in the Japanese Embassy at Moscow, were you not?

A Yes. This is not a report. This is a sort of an informal lecture that I gave to his Excellency, General HARADA. I am under no obligation to make reports to General HARADA.

As military attache, you were under the general staff, were you not?

A Yes.

Q And you were making this informal report to a major general who was traveling through Europe and was attached to the military training section

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- A Yes.
- ? And can you give us the approximate date?
- A No. I cannot recall the date.
- Q Can you give us the year?
- A I think it was in the sixth year of Showa.
  1931.
- Q And this informal report expresses your personal views, does it not?

A Yes.

MR. T. OKAMOTO: Mr. President, there is one more point on which I should like to get confirmation from the witness on this document.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

## BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

Q With respect to the passage which counsel
Furness requested the witness to read, the passage
marked "3. Conclusion," it seems that in the Japanese
original there is the phrase "... economic strength
vis-a-vis the United States." I think that this
passage was not read when the witness read the document.

Now, I should like to ask the witness if the phrase ". . . economic strength vis-a-vis the United States" is included in this passage. The entire meaning of the conclusion changes, and, therefore, I

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should like to have this confirmed by the witness.

A Yes, the word "vis-a-vis the United States" was written in such small characters on the side that I could not read it and, therefore, omitted it. But now that it has been pointed out to me by counsel, I can confirm that the words are "vis-a-vis the United States," if read carefully.

Q Then if I should include this particular passage in the English text, it would read somewhat as follows: "It is self-evident that Soviet Russia will change her policy toward the United States from passive defense. ." et cetera. And I should like to have the witness confirm if that is the real meaning of the conclusion. Is that the purport of your conclusion, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, exactly.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all the cross-examination? Any re-examination?

MR. GOLUNSKY: There will be no redirect. I suppose the witness might be now released, because the next document which has been identified by him we intend to produce tomorrow. He will be available then.

THE PRESIDENT: He is at liberty until tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: As it has already been shown here by my colleague, Mr. Darsey, the instigators of aggression in the Far East started on September 18, 1931, the realization of the plans of occupying Manchuria, which had been prepared beforehand. See pages 2847 and further of the record.

We shall present evidence which will show that Manchuria was necessary to the Japanese military for further aggression against the U.S.S.R. and China.

We tender in evidence prosecution document
No. 1950, the affidavit of MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, a
lieutenant general of the Japanese Army, who was Chief
of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from July 1928 to
May 1932. This affidavit was drawn up on February 22,
1946, in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

MR. BLAKENEY: We object to the reception of this affidavit, also, unless the witness be produced for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: It will be admitted on the condition, among others, that the witness is to be produced for cross-examination if the Court directs. At present we have not heard enough to warrant such

a direction.

Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
No. 1950 will receive exhibit No. 699.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 699, and was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: The most important part of this affidavit is Lieutenant General MIYAKE's testimony that the plan of occupation of Manchuria was the most important part of the general plan of a war against U.S.S.R. drawn up by the Japanese General Staff.

I quote the following extract from this affidavit, page 3 of the English translation:

MIYAKE in answer to the questions put by the interrogator stated the following:

"That plan of operation was signed in Manchuria by Lieutenant General HONJO, the Commander of Kwantung Army, by me, and my assistants, Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA. Then that plan, as I have mentioned, was submitted to the Army General Staff of the Japanese Army in July of 1931. Chief of General Staff KANAYA Hanzo gave his approval in the same month. As far as I know, that plan for the occupation of Manchuria was an important part of

the general plan of the operations of Japanese forces against the Soviet Union and was drafted by the General Staff of Japanese Army. It was then, when I started out for my new post as Chief of Kwantung Army Staff, in July 1928, that I found out the existence of a plan to attack the U.S.S.R. Our functions to participate in that plan were known by the Staff of the Kwantung Army. Some parts of that plan were modified in later years."

I stop quoting this affidavit now, but I shall return to it later on concerning other questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: On the basis of what has been read from this affidavit, we request that the witness be produced for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Whereabouts is this deponent?
The affidavit is signed in Moscow.

MR. GOLUNSKY: I cannot tell exactly where he is at the present moment. He was in Moscow when he was examined in February of this year.

THE PRESIDENT: For the time being, I think the majority of the Tribunal think that interrogatories should be sufficient if he is not in Japan.

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, in view of the prosecutor's statement to the effect that he

intends to read more of this affidavit later on, which is marked on the copies we have, it affects some of the other accused in this case, and I think steps should be taken at this time to have him here later.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I would like to point out the practical futility of substituting interrogatories for the right of cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: It was done extensively at Nuernberg.

MR. SMITH: In the first place, we have no funds to take any depositions. We have no stenographers available to send to Moscow or any other place to take any depositions.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a consideration.

MR. SMITH: I would also like to point out to your Honor that unless counsel are present and are able to see the witness and size him up, we would not have the remotest idea what kind of questions to put to him or how to go about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we should hear all he has to say first.

MR. LOGAN: May I say a further word, if your Honor please?

In examination of the last answer given by

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this affiant in his affidavit, it may very well be that he is on trial in Russia. I do not know. Perhaps the prosecutor could advise us.

MR. GOLUNSKY: Shall I answer this question? THE PRESIDENT: If you are in position to do

MR. GOLUNSKY: Well, to the best of my knowledge, he is not on trial. But I know an investigation is being carried on in the Soviet Union about the activities of the Kwantung Army, and I do not know of course, to what result this investigation might lead in the future.

THE PRESIDENT: We have open minds on the need for calling him. But I think we would prefer to hear all he has to say in that affidavit before we come to a decision. He is a very important witness.

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COLONEL IVANOV: We present to the Tribunal 1 for identification prosecution document No. 1513, a 2 cable from Consul General in Harbin OHASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA of November 7, 1931, No. 516 (2). 4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document 5 No. 1513 will receive exhibit No. 700 for identifica-6 tion only. 7 (Whereupon, document No. 1513 was 9 marked prosecution's exhibit No. 700 for identification). 10 11 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote in evidence an ex-12 tract from this telegram to show that not only Japanese 13 military but Japanese foreign ministry officials as 14 well took active part in spreading Japanese aggression 15 in Manchuria. 16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document 18 No. 1513, exhibit No. 700, is now admitted by order 19 of the Court. 20 (Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit 21 No. 700 was received in evidence). 22 COLONEL IVANOV: I quote the cable: 23 "It is hard for me to approve of the plan 24 for the independence of Manchuria which the government

tacitly seems to permit. I think it would be fairer,

more correct and complete for us to adopt the policy of carrying out the guarantee occupation of all Manchuria and administer it ourselves for the time until all pending problems with China are solved. If we do not do this, everything will be at best incomplete, and the policy for the control of North Manchuria will become useless.

"Although it would have been better to have left Manchuria alone from the beginning, it would be much more damaging to all policies to leave things half way, since we already have meddled with Manchuria."

I tender in evidence Prosecution document
No. 1991, the photocopy of the report dated July 14,
1932, of Lieutenant Colonel KAWABE, Torashiro, the
Japanese military attache in Moscow, who was later on
prometed to the rank of Lieutenant General of the
Japanese Army. This document proves the military
preparations of Japan for an attack against the U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, we make the same objection as to the source of this document which, from the certificate, appears to be the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow.

We also call attention to the fact that the document was apparently translated from Japanese into Russian, and then that Russian translation into English, there being no direct translation from Japanese into English.

We understand further that Colonel KAWABE is presently available, since he is in Sugamo Prison.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, the question of the certificate I think does not arise in this instance, because on the back of the document we have the inscription by KAWABE himself that this was the document written by him under the circumstances mentioned by Colonel Ivanov.

According to the information received by us from the Investigation Section of the International Prosecution Section, KAWABE is not in Sugamo Prison, but is in the Nagoya Prefecture. We have requested that KAWABE should be found and brought to Tokyo, and they have promised that he would be here either this evening or tomorrow. Therefore, in order not to break

the logical sequence of the case, I respectfully request that the Tribunal allow us to read this document now, and the defense will have the opportunity to cross-examine KAWABE as soon as he is brought to Tokyo.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on those terms, and otherwise on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
No. 1991 will receive exhibit No. 701.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 701, and was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: KAWABE, Torashiro, made the following inscription on the back of each page of this document:

"I hereby certify that this photocopy is a copy of the document written in my own hand. KAWABE, Torashiro, September 3, 1946."

The English translation of the note is given in the record of presentation of this document to KAWABE, Torashiro, attached to this document.

In this report KAWABE sees the most urgent task of Japan in exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia and says the following. I quote page 1 of the English translation, paragraph 3.

"As to the obstacles such as Chinese maneuvers, restraints by the League of Nations, acts of America and Russia, etc., against the accomplishment of the great task, we should employ proper diplomacy and endeavor to exclude the obstacles as well as avoiding making matters worse, but it is necessary for us to be ready to appeal to arms against Russia, China and under certain circumstances against America if it is inevitable. Therefore, the emphasis must be laid on the repletion of military armaments against Russia."

In a special chapter of the report KAWABE expresses the views concerning the "Attitude Towards the Soviet Union" and writes the following. I quote only the first statement which serves for KAWABE as a starting point, page 1 of the English translation, paragraph 5:

"A Russo-Japanese War in the future is unavoidable."

KAWABE in his report recommends the following. I quote page 2 of the English translation, paragraph 3:

"As to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact proposed by the U.S.S.R., we must be non-committal and reserve our freedom of action.

"Regarding the construction of transportation networks in Northern Manchuria, we must take into

consideration the drain of the East China Railway and strategy towards the U.S.S.R."

We shall introduce evidence which proves that it was not only KAWABE's own opinion, and that both of his conclusions which I have just quoted were carried into effect.

My colleague, Major General TADEVOSYAN, will present to the Tribunal evidence proving that the Japanese Government as regards the conclusion of the non-aggression pact actually took "such a stand which would provide a free hand for the Empire," and that was what KAWABE had advised to do. We shall present to the Tribunal a series of evidence concerning the fact that the communication net in Manchuria was built only with the view of "strategic considerations against the U.S.S.R."

Now I tender in evidence the photocopy of prosecution document No. 1654, "A Message of Lieutenant Colonel KANDA of July 16."

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 1654 will receive exhibit No. 702.

referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 702, and was received in evidence.)

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: The document which I have tendered is a message of Lieutenant Colonel KANDA, dated July 15, 1932. KANDA at that time was Military Attache in Turkey. He was on his way from Tokyo to Istanbul via Moscow. He gave this message to Lieutenant Colonel KAWABE, Torashiro, the Japanese Military Attache to U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: We wonder where any of that evidence as to where this Colonel KANDA was going and what he was is in the document. It does not appear to be. We also see various dots indicating things have been left out; possibly that is due to illegibility but we have no information.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Golunsky.

MR. COLUNSKY: If the Tribunal please, this decument has been identified by the witness KASAHARA, who explained to the Tribunal what this document was.

THE PRESIDENT: Did he say anything about KANDA's movements?

MR. GOLUNSKY: I apologize; I made a mistake.

I referred to another document by KANDA. This document

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was addressed to KAWABE and received by him and identified by him. That is why I requested the Tribunal before the recess that we be allowed to read this document today and that the defense will have their opportunity to cross-examine KAWABE on this matter as soon as he will be in Tokyo. That will be perhaps tomorrow.

MR. FURNESS: I assume it will also appear who Colonel KANDA was, where he was going and in what capacity.

MR. GOLUNSKY: He was at the time a Military
Attache of Japan in Turkey and was on his way from
Tokyo to Istanbul and stopped in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: The defense is objecting to your saying that because it does not appear in the document. It is only a trifle.

MR. GOLUNSKY: I am anticipating now the evidence of KAWABE, who will be here tomorrow. Of course, I do not insist that anything I say has any probative value.

THE PRESIDENT: On page 2 of the interrogation there are two certificates there by KAWABE which ought to be sufficient evidence of origin or of authenticity, whatever you might call it.

COLONEL IVANOV: KAWABE, Torashiro,

following on the back of the page one of the photo-1 copy of the document: "I hereby certify that this 2 photocopy is a copy of the document written by me 3 in my own hand. September 3, 1946, KAWABE, Tora-4 shiro." And on the back of the page 2 of the photo-5 copy of the document KAWABE made the following in-6 scription: "I hereby certify that this is a photo-7 copy of the record of the message which was forwarded to me by Lieutenant Colonel KANDA, in Moscow, on 9 July 16, 1932, on behalf of Liertenant Colonel 10 11 KASAHARA, of the General Staff. KAWABE, Torashiro." 12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1970 will receive exhibit No. 703. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mantz. (Handing document 16 to Clerk of the Court.) 17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Correction, please: 18 Prosecution's document No. 1654 will receive exhibit 19 No. 702. 20 (Whereupon, the document above 21 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 22 No. 702 and was received in evidence.) 23 THE PRESIDENT: Proceed to read it. 24 COLONEL IVANOV: As it appears in the record, the Chief of the Russian Section of the 2d Department

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of the Japanese General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel KASAHARA, Yukio, gave the following information. I quote page 1, paragraph 1:

"It was decided that the (army and navy's)
preparations for waging war against Russia should
be completed before the middle of 1934. However,
it does not mean that hostilities will be opened
immediately after the preparations have been completed.
In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war against
Russia is necessary for Japan. This is, however,
not the intention of the entire (army)."

What were the plans of a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. drawn up by the Japanese General Staff in 1934-1935? We can find the answer to this question in the testimony given by General USHIROKU, Jun, who was at that time Chief of the 3d Department of the Japanese General Staff.

We introduce in evidence prosecution document No. 1970, the affidavit of General USHIROKU, Jun, of March 21, 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 1970 will receive exhibit No. 703.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

No. 703 and was received in evidence.)

COLONEL IVANOV: If the Tribunal please, I shall read the following extracts from the document. I quote page 3 of the English translation, beginning from paragraph 2:

"Q. Do you know anything about the operation codes KOO, OTSU and HEI in the General Staff Head-quarters?

"A. I know them: KOO means the War against the U.S.A. OTSU against the U.S.S.R. and HEI against China.

"Q. Describe the outlines of the OTSU plan at the time when you were The Chief of the 3d Department in the General Staff Headquarters during 1934 to 1935.

"A. Concerning the Plan of 1935, I know the following facts. The gist of it is: in connection with the affairs of the 3d Department in the General Staff Headquarters, to carry on mass transportation of troops from Japan proper to Northern Manchuria and the \*ransferring of main forces in Manchuria from central areas to Northern Manchuria. The main portion of troops was concentrated to the east, i.e., the Matchiang area and the other portions were respectively concentrated to the north, i.e., South of Heiho and to

the vicinity of Hailar. The above-mentioned is all that I know of the Otsu plan of that time."

I omit one question and answer and quote page 3 of the English translation.

"Q. How many divisions intended to be transported from Japan proper according to the above plan of the General Staff Headquarters?

"A. Twenty Division."

I shall read one more excerpt from this document, page 4 of the English translation:

"Q. Who drew up and who approved" -THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

MR. LOGAN: In respect to this excerpt, your Honor, the last question asked contains conclusions and it is immaterial as to whether or not the plan was submitted to and sanctioned by the Emperor as he is not one of the defendants in this case, and on that ground I object to that question being asked and the answer given.

THE PRESIDENT: Yesterday Dr. KIYOSE pointed out that a plan was only a draft. This evidence tends to show this was a perfected plan and not a draft for what it is worth. It is difficult to say that it is irrelevant and/or immaterial.

DR. KIYOSE: This is quite different from

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the plan to which I called the attention of the Court yesterday. The year is different -- the date is different.

MR. LOGAN: I understand, your Honor, that this is a different plan being spoken about in this document but in any event the question as asked here assumes that it had been submitted and sanctioned by the Emperor and therefore it is objectionable in addition because of the form of the question. It puts the answer in the witness' mouth.

THE PRESIDENT: All these questions and written interrogatories, affidavits, are leading as a rule. That is one of the main objections to this form of evidence. I think we will have to admit it for whatever probative value it has, Mr. Logan. I did not suggest that this plan was the same as the one Dr. KIYOSE referred to yesterday but the distinction between draft plans and perfected plans is always material.

MR. LOGAN: As far as the purpose of this trial is concerned, your Honor, I think the previous question and answer definitely establishes all that the prosecution would wish to establish insofar as this trial is concerned in that apparently it was approved by someone of the General Staff. I fail to

see how any further sanctioning or submission of the 1 document to the Emperor would be of any probative 2 value insofar as the prosecution's case is concerned 3 because certainly he is not one of the accused here. 4 THE PRESIDENT: It also fixes a date, as I 5 am reminded by one of my colleagues. 6 MR. LOGAN: It may very well be that the 7 prosecution has other evidence or can prove the 8 date it was approved, as claimed here, by the General 9 Staff in other portions of this document, I don't 10 know, or they may have other evidence on it. 11 12 THE PRESIDENT: I think we must admit it. 13 Mr. Logan. I must overrule your objection. 14 COLONEL IVANOV: (Reading) 15 "Q. Who drew up and who approved the Otsu 16 plan of 1935? 17 This plan was drawn up by Lieutenant 18 General KIYOSHI, Imai, Chief of the 1st Department in 19 the General Staff Headquarters, and approved by Field-20 Marshal Prince KAN-in, Chief of the General Staff. "Q. When was this plan submitted to and 22 sanctioned by the Emperor? 23 "A. In March, 1935." 24 Now we shall introduce in evidence evidence 25 showing that the large-scale military preparations

of Japan against the U.S.S.R. were determined in full accordance with the aims and wishes of the Japanese Government. 

THE PRESIDENT: Major Blakeney.

MR. BLAKENEY: Inasmuch as I understand that these are all the excerpts from this interrogation which will be read, I should like to request the Tribunal to order the production of this witness; and, this connection, I should like to point out to the Tribunal that apparently this is all of this affidavit which will be heard, although the entire document is in evidence against the several defendants.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean heard during the prosecution's case, Major. Of course, you may read so much of the balance as you think fit when you are giving evidence.

MR. BLAKENEY: I don't wish to read the remainder, sir; I wish to be able to cross-examine on that remainder which is already in evidence although not read.

THE PRESIDENT: If we direct that the witness bascalled for cross-examination, and we will consider that, of course, seeing you have made an application, than we will decide how much of the balance you can put to21him having regard to our rules.

22 Colonel Ivanov.

colonel IVANOV: I present to the Tribunal for identification prosecution document No. 1857 -- the

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top secret decision of the conference of the four ministers: the Prime-Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, and Navy Minister of August 7, 1936 under the title of: "Foreign Policy of the Empire".

Allow me to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the defendants HIROTA and NAGANO were among the participants of that conference.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: We make the same objection, that there is no indication of where the Russian prosecution found this document.

THE PRESIDENT: A certificate of origin must be attached or they must undertake to procure it.

MR. FURNESS: Then we need not make the objection to each document of that type.

MR. GOLUNSKY: If the President please, this is the second time we discussed this question. I think in order to save time we could agree that the prosecution will undertake to furnish to the Tribunal a certificate showing in which way those documents came into possession of the Soviet Government.

All those documents, by whoever got them, were handed over to the officers of the Military Procurator of the Soviet Union and that is where we got them from; but, since the Tribunal has directed us to furnish

certificates of the origin of those documents, we will gladly do so as soon as it is practically possible. 2 THE PRESIDENT: We understand the defense to 3 object to every document that has not a certificate of origin. There will be no need to repeat the objection. MR. FURNESS: The ruling of the Court is 7 that it is accepted only conditionally? 8 THE PRESIDENT: That applies in every case 9 where there is no certificate of origin. TO CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 11 No. 1857 will receive exhibit No. 704 for identification. 12 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document 13 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 704 for 14 identification.) 15 COLONEL IVANOV: I shall quote in evidence an extract from the second chapter of this decision, 17 under the title of "The Most Important Trends of the 18 Policy." 19 THE PRESIDENT: Better call out the number 20 again. 21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document 22 23 No. 1857 will receive exhibit No. 704. COLONEL IVANOV: I quote page 4 of the English 24 25 translation, second half of paragraph three:

"But at present taking into consideration today's state of the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, it is rendered the important point in the practical scheme for China, first to make the North China immediately a special district of pro-Japan-and-Manchukuo and anti-Communism, to obtain resources for national defense and to extend traffic establishments as well as to make whole China anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese. (Measures which should be carried out practically for the present shall be made up separately.)"

Now we shall show how the Japanese General Staff fulfilled the tasks set by the leaders of the militarist clique, which ruled in Japan, by preparing the invasion of the Japanese Army onto the territory of the Soviet Union.

The evidence concerning the plans of a war against the U. S. S. R. from 1939 and 1941 will be presented later by my colleague Colonel Rosenblit.

We shall establish the contents of the plan of a war against the U. S. S. R. in 1940 through the testimony of TOMINAGA, Keoji, Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army, whose affidavit of February 21, 1946 I present to the Tribunal in evidence under No. 1984 and ask to admit it on the usual terms.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

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COLONEL TVANOV: We wished to bring witness TOMINAGA to be examined before the Tribunal in Tokyo because his testimony is very important. But due to the illness of the witness we are bereft of this opportunity. I present to the Tribunal the certificate of his illness.

MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, I didn't hear that. I was under the impression that the affidavit was going to be introduced in evidence; but I understand that it is just the affidavit, or just that portion of it that -- well, as a matter of fact I didn't hear it at all through this earphone.

THE PRESIDENT: His affidavit is tendered, but with a certificate of illness which is the excuse for not calling him personally. Neither document has been admitted yet. What is your objection? How can we talk to you if you don't wear your earphones?

MR. BLEWETT: My objection, sir, is: If this affidavit is offered in evidence, I am going to ask the Tribunal to exercise its discretion and give the defense the opportunity of cross-examining the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Unless we indicate the contrary, we will make it a condition of the acceptance of any affidavit that the proponent will be called, if directed by the Tribunal, or will be subjected to interrogation

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if directed by the Tribunal. But, in most cases, we would want to read what is in the affidavit before we would give such a direction.

MR. BLEWETT: Your honor, if the Tribunal please, the defense has examined this affidavit, and it is quite clear that to do justice to these accused we should be permitted and granted the right of cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Let us read it first to see whether we agree with you or not. For the time being, I do not know a single word it contains, nor does any other Member.

MR. BLEWETT: We shall renew our request, sir, at the proper time.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1984 will receive exhibit No. 705.

(Whereupon, the above-mentioned document was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 705 and received in evidence.)

colonel IVANOV: TOMINAGA in 1940 was Chief of the 1st, i.e. operation, department of the General Staff and thus directed the drawing up of operation plans. I quote the following extracts from his affidavit concerning the plan of 1940, pages 4 to 5 of the

English translation:

"A. I, as the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, drew an agression plan against U. S. S. R. in 1940. According to this plan, the main attack should be operated from Lake Hanka area in the direction of Khabarovsk to separate the Maritime Province from U. S. S. R. For this purpose 12 infantry divisions, as main forces, and 2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments, 2 cavalry brigades and 5 bombardment groups, as auxiliary forces, were to be applied. After attacking Khabarovsk and occupying Vladivostok plain, the Northern Front Forces, formed from 7 divisions; an artillery brigade and other units were to begin to attack. In case of success, the Western Front Forces were also to open their attack, having a main attack in direction of Chita, with the intention to occupy Soviet territory extending to Lake Baikal.

"Q To whom did you report this plan?

"A I reported it to Prince KANIN, Chief of General Staff Headquarters.

\*Q Was there anybody else to whom you reported this plan?

"A I, myself, reported this plan to His Majesty the Emperor in company with Prince KANIN.

"Q Did the Emperor sanction the plan?

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"A. After a few days the sanction to this plan was given by the Emperor. "

I omit several questions and quote one more excernt on page 5 of the English translation, last paragraph.

"O In what month was the plan sanctioned?

"A It was in March of 1940."

Such were the plans of the Japanese General Staff against the U.S.S.R. prior to the attack of Germany on the Soviet Union. As I have said before, my colleague, Colonel Rosenblit, will present evidence to the Tribunal concerning more recent plans of a war against the U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

MR. BLEVETT: It seems to me that that has been sufficient to indicate that this witness should be called. The affidavit is along the same tenor, and names specifically several of these accused, and certainly, if there is any of these affidavits where the witness should be produced, this is an example.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand the prosecution to agree with you, but they say he is sick.

We think he should be called.

MR. BLEWETT: We understand the witness is in Tokyo, your Honor.

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MR. GOLUNSKY: No, the witness is in Moscow. It was also our desire to bring him here personally. We sent a request to Moscow to send him, and in answer we got the certificate which I right now handed to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: A majority of the Tribunal require his attendance.

MR. GOLUNSKY: As soon as I will take measures, that is as soon as his health will permit, he will be brought to Tokyo.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brooks.

MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, I would like to call the attention of the Language Section for correction, if it is proper, on page 4 of exhibit 705 in the second line, the word "aggression plan" appears. I understand that in the original it should read "attack plan" as distinguished from a defense plan; and these words have certain meaning to military personnel, and such plans are customary in all armies of various nations.

THE PRESIDENT: The point is referred to the Language Section.

Colonel Ivanov.

COLONEL IVANOV: Now I shall introduce evidence proving that the plans of a war of aggression against

the U. S. S. R., which during all those years were being drawn up by the Japanese General Staff and on which I have spoken before the Tribunal, were not theoretical plans drawn up at random, but led to actual preparation for a war against the U. S. S. R.

We shall present to the Tribunal evidence that the Japanese Government headed by the defendants spent hundreds millions yen, many rare materials and manpower for the purpose of building barracks, military dumps, strategic roads, fortified districts and other military constructions in Manchuria and Korea on the U. S. S. R. frontiers.

I shall present to the Tribunal a number of documents from the Red Army General Staff which contain data characterizing the increase of the Japanese armed forces in Manchuria in the period after 1931 and of turning Manchuria into a military base.

I tender in evidence prosecution document
No. 2237, "Table of the Increase of the strength of
the Kwantung Army and of the Japanese Army as a
whole from 1932 to 1945."

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 2237 will receive exhibit No. 706.

("hereupon, the above-mentioned document was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 706 and received in evidence.)

colonel IVANOV: To make the understanding of the data given in the table easier, we have drawn up diagrams containing this data.

I beg Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal to consider the chart on page 1 of the appendix to the table and to follow the changes which took place during the above-mentioned years in the strength of the Japanese army as a whole and of the Kwantung army which was its part.

In this chart the first small columns on the left side show that by Janaury 1, 1932 the Kwantung Army was 50,000 men strong, and the Japanese Army as a whole was by that time 256,000 men strong. The Kwantung Army at that time comprised about twenty percent of the Japanese Army.

By January 1, 1937 the strength of the Kwantung Army was increased more than five times as much and amounted already to 271,000 men. And the Japanese Army as a whole was by that time 872,000 men strong. The

Kwantung Army already comprised more than thirty percent of the Japanese Army.

By January 1, 1942 the strength of the Kwantung Army was at its highest -- 1,100,000 men and was twenty-two times higher than the strength of the Kwantung Army in 1932 and four times higher than the strength of the Kwantung Army in 1937. In 1942 the Japanese Army as a whole was 3,200,000 men strong. And the Kwantung Army comprised at that time about thirty-five percent of the whole Japanese Army.

This diagram expressly shows the extremely rapid increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army during all these years up to 1942 inclusive.

After the occupation of Manchuria the strength of the armament of the Kwantung Army also was rapidly increased.

I ask you, Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal, to consider the chart on page 2 of the appendix, the table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army tank park and of the Japanese Army as a whole from 1932 to 1945. I quote only the data concerning the Kwantung Army.

The Kwantung Army had by January 1, 1932 -- 40 tanks, by January 1, 1937 -- 439 tanks, by January 1, 1942 -- 1000 tanks.

Now I ask you to consider the table which shows the increase of the artillery park, page 4 of the appendix. The Kwantung Army had by January 1, 1932 -- 300 pieces of ordnance; by January 1, 1937 -- 1193 pieces of ordnance; by January 1, 1942 -- 5000 pieces of ordnance.

I also ask you to consider table of the increase of the fighting planes, page 5 of the appendix. The Kwantung Army had in 1932 -- 180 planes; in 1937 -- 500 planes; in 1942 -- 1500 planes

I ask you now to consider table on the increase of the number of the Kwantung Army infantry divisions, page 3 of the appendix. The Kwantung Army by January 1, 1932 had 2 division; by January 1, 1937 -- 6 divisions; by January 1, 1942 -- 7 divisions.

I do not bring the attention of the Court to the corresponding indices of the number of divisions in the whole composition of the Japanese Army, although this information is given for comparison in the diagram and in the table, and I present to the Tribunal --

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half-past nine tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Friday, 11 October, 1946, at 0930.)

