

16 Sept

✓

I N D E X

Of

WITNESSES

<u>Prosecution's Witnesses</u>	<u>Page</u>
Wild, Cyril Hew Dalrymple (resumed)	5599
Direct by Mr. Comyns Carr (cont'd)	5599
Cross by Mr. Blewett	5686

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
476		Extracts from the Diary of the Major General KAWAMURA, the 9th Infantry Brigade Com- mander		5624

1 Monday, 16 September, 1946

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12
13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17
18 - - -

19
20 (English to Japanese and Japanese
21 to English interpretation was made by the
22 Language Section, IMTFE.)
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

W
o
l
f
&
Y
e
l
d
e
n

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session
3 and ready to hear any matter brought before it.

4 THE PRESIDENT: All accused are present
5 except OKAWA who is represented by counsel.

6 Mr. Comyns Carr.

7
8 C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,

9 called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
10 resumed the stand and testified as follows:

11 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: Colonel Wild, when the
13 Tribunal adjourned on Friday I was reading at page
14 40 of exhibit No. 475. I had concluded paragraph "c"
15 on that page and I had asked you some questions about
16 it. I will now proceed with paragraph "d". (Reading):

17 "d. The equipments for transportation of
18 personnel are as follows:

19 "1. Setting aside indispensable vessels, all were
20 two storied. Still further in every spare room on
21 the decks, two or three storied berths were equipped
22 as it was called the 'Decisive battle transportation'.
23 Thus the capacity was increased.

24 "2. The space between the upper and the lower
25 stories was regulated not to touch the head in sitting

WILD

DIRECT

1 attitude (about 0.75 metre in minimum).

2 "3. As the capacity was increased as far as
3 possible, with an equipment of such berths as said in
4 1 and 2, each person lost the freedom of his action
5 in a ship when the ship was damaged by a torpedo and
6 many persons and munitions were sunk to the bottoms
7 of the sea.

8 "This caused the greatest difficulty in the
9 operation of the Japanese army and its fighting power
10 of long duration. About this matter, it is supposed
11 that your navy knows well.

12 "The bad ventilation and the bad and in-
13 constant supply and the loss of sleep (it was impossible
14 to lie down) due to the closest packing caused the
15 conspicuous increase of patients during the trans-
16 portation.

17 "Even those who did not fall ill during the
18 transportations, must be at rest for a time after
19 landing, or else, they sometimes became unable to
20 fight a severe battle.

21 "For that reason, the shipping space was
22 calculated to economize as far as possible, the water-
23 closet being put outside gunnel."

24 Then omitting paragraph "C", "a" and "b",
25 come to small "c" in the middle of page 41. (Reading):

WILD

DIRECT

1 "c. Instances of counter-measures for trans-
2 portation and its actual conditions accompanying the
3 want of vessels were as above mentioned. It is de-
4 sired that you acknowledge the war prisoners were
5 not closely packed up only because they were war
6 prisoners.

7 "That they were kept from coming out on the
8 decks may be from the viewpoint of guarding and pre-
9 venting of espionage of the voyage of ship groups.

10 "It may be supposed that the war prisoners
11 transported to the Thailand-Burma Railway area were
12 treated better than in any other areas."

13 Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, do you see any
14 reason for that supposition, as far as your information
15 goes?

16 A I should just like to explain that the system
17 whereby prisoners were carried to Siam was the same as
18 in other voyages. The system, in fact, was that
19 wooden stages were built up in empty coal bunkers
20 and in holds with three-foot clearance between one
21 stage and the next one. Where it says that twenty-
22 nine men were carried in the space of one cubic
23 "tsubo" that means that fourteen to fifteen men sat
24 cross-legged on these planks in an area six feet by
25 six feet; and three feet above their heads another

WILD

DIRECT

1 fourteen or fifteen men were sitting in the same
2 space and so on to the top of the hold or the bunkers.
3 Where this was harder on the prisoners than on Japan-
4 ese was because their average height was greater and
5 they were not accustomed to sitting cross-legged.
6 Also, they were usually suffering from dysentery--
7 had some cases of dysentery among them when they em-
8 barked -- and they were not allowed on deck during
9 the voyage. This applied to the voyages to Siam or
10 Burma as well as to other voyages, and I know that one
11 Dutch ship going from N.E.I. to that destination had
12 extremely heavy casualties during the voyage.

13 Q About the suggestion that not allowing them
14 on deck was a precaution against espionage, what do
15 you say?

16 A That is a good instance of the age-old
17 Japanese preoccupation with espionage and it is dif-
18 ficult to see what possible use the prisoners could
19 have made of the information if they had gotten it.

20 Q If they were unable to transport the prisoners
21 under proper conditions, was there any necessity for
22 transporting them at all?

23 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please--

24 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

25 MR. LOGAN: We object to that question.

WILD

DIRECT

1 We think it is purely argumentative and not to be
2 decided by this witness.

3 THE PRESIDENT: It is a question an expert
4 might answer, and he is an expert.

5 A No doubt the Japanese considered it necessary
6 but what, as prisoners, we were stressing to them
7 again and again was that they had not the right to
8 move prisoners unless they had proper means to do so
9 nor the right to detain them in places like the Siam
10 jungle where they were unable to feed and supply them.

11 C I need not read the rest of page 41; and
12 page 42, Colonel Wild, does that deal with the two
13 forces, F and H Forces, on which you have been giving
14 us your personal experiences?

15 A It does.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)

17 "4. How two branches of the Malay camp
18 were removed on foot within the construction area
19 to the spot.

20 "A. Outline.

21 "In May, 1943, to promote the work, two
22 branches of the Malay camp were newly attached to the
23 railway regiment. One of them was moved to Niike and
24 the other to Kinsaiyork, being transported by railway
25 from Shingapore to Panpon, from where they went on

WILD

DIRECT

1 foot.

2 "According to the circumstances at that
3 time, it was the want of the transportation means
4 that forced them to march on foot.

5 "B. Then was just the time the deploy the
6 forces and labor to the remote places accompanying
7 the progress of the work. At the same time the only
8 means of transportation, that is lorries, were scarce
9 enough to be used for the supply, and rather they
10 were sometimes in want. Therefore, they could not
11 be used for the transportation of persons. Also the
12 water-routes did not swell yet, so that the use of
13 ships were restrained.

14 "C. For that reason, the following action
15 was taken to remove them on foot.

16 "a. At the end of April the commissary
17 facilities were established along the line of con-
18 struction and they were used to give the aid in the
19 accommodations and supplies.

20 "At every 20 or 25 kilometres along the
21 march line, a pavilion (camping by means of tent) was
22 set up, with a tea-supplying place in the interval.

23 "b. The march was as a rule 20 or 25 kilo-
24 metres a day and made by night to avoid the heat.

25 "c. A great effort was made to check the

WILD

DIRECT

1 epidemics on the marching road and stragglers were
2 taken in to the nearest sanitary institution. For
3 this means, motor cars were driven along in order to
4 make liaison and to take stragglers in.

5 "d. In consideration of the supply, an
6 echelon was made up of 200 or 300 persons. It was
7 made a rule that they should rest one day, when they
8 marched two or three days.

9 "D. And at that time, the 31st Division
10 ('Retsu' Division) which were marching to Burma were
11 all walking on foot from the middle of April in the
12 same way as above.

13 "E. In short, the marching on foot was not
14 avoidable, if the circumstances were considered.
15 Even a squadron on an urgent operation was, as it
16 really was compelled to march more than 400 kilometres,
17 and we assure that it was decidedly not only on the
18 war-prisoners that this was compelled."

19 Q Now, Colonel Wild, you have told us, given
20 us your account of this matter; is there any particular
21 additional comment you want to make on this account
22 of it?

23 A The so-called pavilion which was set up at
24 every twenty or twenty-five kilometers meant, in effect,
25 the accommodation which was provided for the Japanese.

WILD

DIRECT

1 After the beating which Major Hunt and I had sustained
2 at Tarsoe, we did in a sense win our battle to the
3 extent of being allowed to put, say, thirty sick in
4 the prisoner of war hospital at Tarsoe. We did see
5 Japanese infantry marching up the road and they were
6 not having an easy time. I said myself earlier
7 that as an infantry soldier I consider it would have
8 been an arduous march for fit troops. The Japanese
9 were fit and well feed. We were half-starved and had
10 two thousand non-walking sick to push along. As
11 regards the rest days, the last march of the British
12 troops who went to Songkrai Camp were five successive
13 night stages in the worst of the monsoon rains, and
14 they were taken out to work the next day.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: Now, passing over to page
16 44, I read the conclusion to which this committee came:

17 "CONCLUSION

18 "1. The foregoing is an explanation of the
19 circumstances which compelled a heavy toll of life
20 during the progress of the construction work. In the
21 final analysis, causes of the tragedy may be traced
22 principally to the placement of a time limit on the
23 construction, the immense difficulty in making thorough
24 preparation and to the precipitancy with which the
25 Japanese soldiers, despite their lack of experience

WILD

DIRECT

1 in such large-scale construction work and meagre
2 scientific equipment, dared to carry on their work
3 in strict obedience to orders which they character-
4 istically regarded as imperative. Thus the occurrence
5 of the casualties, it must be declared, was by no
6 means due to any deliberate intention on the part of
7 the Army authorities.

8 "As regards the employment of prisoners of
9 war in the above construction work, it may be stated
10 that at the time the Japanese Army as a whole enter-
11 tained the ideas that the employment of prisoners of
12 war in any work other than military operations was not
13 a breach of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it
14 is to be insisted that the incident was of a radically
15 different character from the so-called maltreatment
16 of prisoners of war.

17 "2. The incident, already stated was an
18 inevitable outcome of the situation then prevailing,
19 and, if anyone is to be called to account for the
20 dreadful death rate, the responsibility ought to be
21 placed on the then Chief of the General Staff (General
22 Sugiyama) who ordered the construction, the War
23 Minister (General Tojo) who sanctioned the employment
24 of prisoners, and the Commander-in-Chief of the South
25 Area Corps (General Terauchi) who was entrusted with

WILD

DIRECT

1 the construction on the spot.

2 "3. As regards individual cases of mal-
3 treatment of prisoners of war, it is desired that
4 investigation be started upon the further receipt
5 from the Allied Powers of a report of the details,
6 particularly the ranks, and names of the suspected
7 offenders, and if as a result, they should be found
8 guilty severe measures should be meted out to them."

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

WILD

DIRECT

G
o
l
d
b
e
r
g
&
S
p
r
a
t
t

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

2 Q Now, Colonel Wild, will you just look at
3 the tables of statistics which are attached to this
4 document? No. 1 has the headings for the month, the
5 total number of prisoners, and then in the "Operation
6 on Construction of Railway", "Number of Prisoners
7 Worked", and "Rate to Total Number of Prisoners".
8 Then a similar division under the head of "Works
9 in Branches"; and a similar division under the head
10 of "Number of Accidents".

11 I want you to explain to us what is meant
12 by "Works in Branches", and how the figures under
13 that head came to be so high.

14 A The "Works in Branches" covers men who were
15 engaged on camp duties such as doctors, medical order-
16 lies, cooks, and so on. It was always a matter of
17 the utmost difficulty to get sufficient men kept off
18 work to keep a camp going. The reason, therefore,
19 that those figures are so high must, in my opinion,
20 be that they include a large number of the light duty
21 men whom I mentioned earlier; that is to say, men who,
22 in effect, were starved out of hospital to work for
23 a few hours so they could get a little more to eat.

24 Q With regard to tables No. 4 and 8, are those
25 simply copies of the ones we have seen already in

WILD

DIRECT

1 exhibit No. 473; that is our document 1810, Colonel
2 Wild?

3 A They appear to be so.

4 Q No attempt has been made to bring them up to
5 date?

6 A Evidently not.

7 Q Or to correct the errors which you pointed
8 out before?

9 A I find no corrections.

10 Q Now Colonel Wild, while you have been in
11 Tokyo have you made some further investigations?

12 A Yes, I have, particularly in Sugamo Prison.

13 Q And has it come to light that there is in
14 existence a complete series of reports by this War
15 Ministry Committee dealing with prisoners of war over
16 all the Pacific area?

17 A Yes, as a result of my interrogations twenty-
18 six more documents have come to light similar to the
19 one which you have been reading.

20 Q And have you obtained possession of one which
21 deals with the Chinese massacre in Singapore, about
22 which you gave us evidence before, earlier?

23 A It came into my hands for the first time
24 last Thursday.

25 MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal,

WILD

DIRECT

1 we have had that document translated and processed,
2 and we have attempted to serve it, but a difficulty
3 has arisen which I understand has arisen not for
4 the first time in the matter of service of documents
5 where for any reason there is short notice.

6 Rule 6 b provides "As far as practicable, a copy
7 of every document intended to be adduced in evidence
8 by the prosecution or the defense will be delivered..."
9 and so on, "....not less than twenty-four hours
10 before such document is to be tendered in evidence."
11 In fact, they were ready for delivery at six -- at
12 or any time after six o'clock on Friday, but the lady
13 who presides over the defense office, being informed
14 before she closed her office at five o'clock that that
15 was the position, declined to receive them at any
16 time after five o'clock on Friday until this morning.
17 I am not aware of anything in the rule, or of anything
18 that has been said by the Tribunal, limiting the
19 nature of the twenty-four hours for service; and I
20 ask the Tribunal to allow me to introduce this document
21 now in order that I may have the advantage of asking
22 the witness some questions about it.

23 THE PRESIDENT: You have been reading from
24 the rule as originally enacted, Mr. Comyns Carr. There
25 has been an amendment --

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Oh, I am sorry.

2 THE PRESIDENT: --which places the matter
3 entirely in the hands of the Court.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: Ah, yes.

5 THE PRESIDENT: The words, "as far as prac-
6 ticable", were deleted, and the words "except as
7 otherwise provided by the Tribunal" were inserted.
8 It means that we -- it means this: that we can decide
9 the matter here and now.

10 Dr. KIYOSE.

11 DR. KIYOSE: I am going to ask a question
12 concerning the question of massacre of the Chinese
13 officer generals. This was found in the Legal Affairs
14 Section of the Demobilization Bureau, but it was not
15 submitted by this section. I do not know whether it
16 was this witness or some other American officer, but
17 someone came the other day to the Legal Section of the
18 said bureau and brought back this document.

19 THE MONITOR: After searching for some docu-
20 ment, took this particular document out with him.

21 DR. KIYOSE (Continuing): This document is
22 yet incomplete and neither the Legal Affairs Section
23 nor the Committee -- the Section for Investigation
24 of Affairs Concerning Prisoners of War has decided
25 this -- to make this a final version. That is why

WILD

DIRECT

1 this document is devoid of signature nor seal which
2 is customary in preparing an official document in
3 Japan; and it is neither dated; and also the author
4 of the document is also unknown; and this is merely
5 a reference in order to prepare for -- to be used in
6 the future conferences. Therefore, I object to this
7 document being introduced as evidence.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

9 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, the
10 casual examination of this document the prosecution
11 is talking about shows that it has forty pages in
12 length and we have just received it as Court opened
13 this morning. We have had no opportunity to examine
14 it. With respect to the attempted service on Friday
15 night, I know nothing about it; but, apparently, if
16 that rule were relaxed permitting the prosecution to
17 serve a document on us at six o'clock on Friday night,
18 I suppose that would extend to any time that they
19 wished to serve it and not comply with that twenty-
20 four hour rule. The question of serving documents
21 over the weekend has come up at least twice, I believe,
22 in Chambers before; and I do not recall any definite
23 ruling being made by your Honor with respect to it,
24 but I believe when it did come up, it was frowned upon
25 and it was suggested to the prosecution that they comply

WILD

DIRECT

1 with the twenty-four hour rule before the weekend.

2 That is my recollection of what happened.

3 I am quite sure that if the prosecution had
4 attempted to serve this, or see that some of the copies
5 got into the hands of some of the defense attorneys
6 before Saturday, that we would have had an opportunity
7 to read it over the weekend because there is always
8 some of us in town available.

9 In addition to that, your Honor, there is
10 no certificate attached to this document, the copy
11 that I have received, and we are unable to tell from
12 where it came; and, more fundamental than the
13 objection with respect to the service of this document
14 in time is the same objection that I made the other
15 day with respect to document 1509-A. If it is the
16 purpose of the prosecution in offering this document
17 at this time to question this witness about it for
18 the purpose of tearing down a document, we seriously
19 object to it and think it is fundamentally wrong. The
20 prosecution has not stated whether or not the defend-
21 ants intend to rely on this document.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Well, they could not state
23 whether the defendants were going to rely on it,
24 but apparently they are going to rely on it.

25 MR. LOGAN: If your Honor please, I said

WILD

DIRECT

1 "defendants" because what I am trying to explain is
2 that if the defendants intended to rely on a document
3 and the prosecution will make that claim, then perhaps
4 there might be some basis for this preliminary exam-
5 ination of a document in anticipation of what our
6 defense might be; and in addition to that, the pros-
7 ecution has not stated whether or not it intends to
8 rely on it; and with respect to document 1509-A,
9 we assumed that when they introduced it in evidence
10 that they intended to rely on that and vouch for
11 its credibility. But, they did just the opposite.
12 But, particularly with respect to the time of the
13 service of this document, we believe that it should
14 not be permitted to be used in examination of this
15 witness.

16 MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal,
17 first of all, with regard to the service, I
18 tried to make it clear that the document has -- a
19 sufficient number of copies of it have been
20 available in this building all through the weekend
21 at a place which was notified to the representative
22 of the defense at the time before five o'clock on
23 Friday. If she did not pass on the information to
24 my learned friends, or if they did not choose to send
25 for the documents, that is not a matter for which the

WILD

DIRECT

1 prosecution is responsible.

2 Secondly, with regard to Dr. KIYOSE's
3 objection, that depends upon some assertions of
4 fact by him, and I shall be in a position both through
5 this witness and from internal evidence in the docu-
6 ment itself to show exactly how and under what circum-
7 stances it did come into existence. In my submission,
8 it is a report of a department of the Japanese
9 Government, namely, the War Ministry, of an investi-
10 gation ordered and held by them. Dr. KIYOSE is wrong
11 in saying that it is not signed. The witness will
12 be able to identify the signatures on it and to tell
13 us who the individuals are. Therefore, in my sub-
14 mission, it is a document which, under Article 13c
15 of the Charter, does not require a certificate. And
16 lastly, with regard to the objection as to the manner
17 in which we are seeking to use this document, and the
18 last one, we use it, as I explained before, for the
19 truth of certain parts of it although we criticize
20 other parts of it through this witness.
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DORECT

M
o
r
s
e
&
A
b
r
a
m

1 THE PRESIDENT: By criticize you mean attack,
2 Mr. Comyns Carr. You will have to face up to that.

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: Oh, yes. In my submission,
4 there is no objection to that in any case, and particu-
5 larly in the case here where, although I cannot show
6 at present at least that the document actually emanates
7 from any of the accused in this dock, it does emanate
8 from the Japanese Army and does **purport** to represent
9 the defense of the Japanese Army to these allegations.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. KIYOSE.

11 DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, I don't want to
12 argue about this matter. However, as Mr. Comyns Carr,
13 pointed out that the first half of this document
14 certainly bears a signature --

15 THE MONITOR: Just a moment. Mr. Comyns Carr
16 said this document bears signatures but I submit that
17 the original copy has a signature, original copy alone
18 has a signature.

19 THE INTERPRETER: The original of this docu-
20 ment has no signature and I would like to show this
21 to the Language Arbiters.

22 DR. KIYOSE: There are so many corrections
23 on this original copy -- on this copy with pencil and
24 pen and it is not customary to see those corrections
25 on a Japanese official document.

WILD

DIRECT

1 THE MONITOR: Correction on the first statement
2 by Dr. KIYOSE: I don't desire to argue about this
3 but --

4 THE INTERPRETER: The first half of this docu-
5 ment has no signature.

6 THE MONITOR: The first half of this document
7 does not bear any signature. One more addition: If
8 you see the entire document it would be clear.

9 DR. KIYOSE: In our country it is customary
10 to affix seals at the particular places where the
11 corrections have been made on the official copy so that
12 the original draft can be distinguished -- the original
13 can be distinguished from the draft copy.

14 THE MONITOR: Original can be distinguished
15 from the corrected copy.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE:

17 DR. KIYOSE: On page 12 of the English copy
18 reference is made to Fourth Unit, No. 4 Unit. There
19 is no such unit as Fourth Unit. This is a unit of one
20 of the subdivisions of the investigators when the in-
21 vestigation was being made, and that is not the identity
22 of the person responsible for drafting this document.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE, I won't hear you
24 further at the time being. You are referring to matters
25 which, as Mr. Comyns Carr has pointed out, are matters

WILD

DIRECT

1 for evidence later by the defense. We must take this
2 document, which is about to be tendered in evidence,
3 according to its face value. It may or may not be
4 signed; it may or may not have a number of unsealed
5 or unmarked corrections. Those are matters of fact
6 to be determined later. Whether this document is to
7 be admitted or not has to be determined by the terms
8 of the Charter and, as it is a document coming, we are
9 told, from enemy sources and relates to matters in
10 issue, it is our duty to admit it for whatever it is
11 worth, for whatever probative value it has.

12 Then dealing with the question of whether
13 the document was served in due time to be admitted
14 today, it appears to me that having been served at
15 the place named by the defense, during office hours,
16 necessary notice was given. Mr. Logan said it was
17 served on a lady, I think, who represented the defense.
18 I may have misapprehended him. If it can be said that
19 after all there was no actual service, well, there is
20 evidence, and it is not contradicted, that service was
21 refused in effect. In any event, on the facts as ad-
22 mitted there is a strong case for an exemption or an
23 exception by this Court in terms of introduction to
24 the rule. That position is strengthened, as two of my
25 colleagues pointedly indicate to me in a joint note,

WILD

DIRECT

1 by the fact that Mr. KIYOSE, has disclosed a full know-
2 lege of the document in question. He, at all events,
3 will not be taken by surprise if the document is ad-
4 mitted this morning, and he represents all the defendants.

5 This rule, unlike our national rules, does not
6 exclude holidays in calculating the period of notice.
7 It is possible that I said in Chambers that the prose-
8 cution should treat the holiday period as excluded
9 from the period of notice. I don't recollect. It is
10 a thing that I would be likely to say.

11 Now, as for the other point, the use to be
12 made of the document and the use made of the earlier
13 document, that matter has already been argued twice
14 and we are not going to argue it a third time.

15 The document may be used this morning. It
16 comes within the exception, if compliance has not been
17 made with the rule. That is the opinion of the Tribunal.

18 We will recess now for fifteen minutes.

19 (Whereupon, at 1050, a recess was taken
20 until 1105, at which time the proceedings were
21 resumed as follows:)

22

23

24

25

WILD

DIRECT

W
h
a
l
e
n
&
D
u
d
a

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 DR. KIYOSE: In the remark I made before the
4 recess, Mr. President, I have discovered that there
5 was some mistake in interpretation and I should like
6 to have that correction made.

7 I heard that whereas I said "original," the
8 term "original" in Japanese was interpreted "the
9 first half." Since there has been a shift in the inter-
10 preters I will make the explanation myself.

11 In the document which was about to be sub-
12 mitted by Mr. Comyns Carr, in respect to that document
13 I said "original" and that the original had no signa-
14 ture. And on that basis I contended, that is, my mean-
15 ing, the meaning of my contention was that this docu-
16 ment, being incomplete and being a preliminary document,
17 could not be submitted as evidence either as a docu-
18 ment representing the government or the individual.
19 Feeling rather unfortunate that there has been this
20 misunderstanding, I have made this explanation.

21 I should also like to point out that I saw
22 the document here just a while ago for the first time,
23 that is, the original document, and I have only
24 informed the Tribunal of what I have learned here with
25 respect to the incident which took place in the

WILD

DIRECT

1 Mobilization Ministry, Mobilization Bureau.

2 THE MONITOR: Correction: About the details
3 of how this was taken out by the Allied personnel from
4 the Mobilization Bureau, I only heard about that part.
5 But I had not seen the original before I came here.

6 DR. KIYOSE: I do not believe that the fact
7 that this document was taken out of the Mobilization
8 Ministry by the American or Allied officers has any-
9 thing to do with the length of time required by the
10 prosecution to serve this paper to the defense.

11 I would just like to point out those two
12 points.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Nothing Dr. KIYOSE says has
14 any bearing on the decision, as appears from the
15 reasons given for the decision. The document comes
16 from the Japanese Government and it appears to relate
17 to matters in issue, and it is admissible under the
18 Charter.

19 Dr. UZAWA.

20 DR. UZAWA: I should like to have the Court
21 understand, Mr. President, that this document was
22 placed on my desk this morning and from that point was
23 delivered. As to the general delivery of this docu-
24 ment, in some cases documents are placed in the box
25 of every defense counsel; but it happened that these

WILD

DIRECT

1 documents were brought in one lump and were delivered
2 in this room.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that, Dr. UZAWA, is a
4 matter between you and the person who represents the
5 defense for these purposes.

6 Major Furness.

7 MR. FURNESS: So that the record may be
8 straight, sir, we would like to explain the service
9 of this document. We understand that at about 3:30
10 our Document Division--

11 THE PRESIDENT: Now, we cannot have this
12 matter re-argued. There is no need for you to put the
13 record straight. American counsel and Japanese coun-
14 sel addressed us on the matter. Mr. Comyns Carr had
15 the last word. We gave our decision and this is an
16 attempt to reopen the decision. You may put on the
17 record something inconsistent with the matters placed
18 before us by other American counsel and on which our
19 decision was given, and I do not think you should be
20 allowed to do so.

21 When you say you want to put the record
22 straight it is very obvious you want to contradict
23 or supplement something that other American defense
24 counsel have said. We refuse to hear you, Major
25 Furness, you are coming too late.

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. FURNESS: It was something that we could
2 only learn over the recess, sir.

3 THE PRESIDENT: It is too late now. We are
4 not going to reopen the matter.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Then I formally tender the
6 document, which is prosecution's document No. 2647.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 2647 will receive exhibit No. 476.

10 (Whereupon, the document above re-
11 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 476, and was received in evidence.)

13 MR. COMYNS CARR: May the witness have the
14 original to look at for a short time?

15 (Whereupon, a document was handed to
16 the witness.)

17 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

18 Q Colonel Wild, have you as a result of your
19 inquiries ascertained how the committee which has been
20 referred to in the course of this discussion came into
21 being, and how this report came into being?

22 A Yes, I have.

23 Q First of all, who appointed the committee?

24 A The main committee was convened on the orders
25 of Lieutenant General WAKAMATSU, Vice-Minister of War.

WILD

DIRECT

1 It was called the Prisoners of War Investigation Com-
2 mittee.

3 Q At about what date did it first come into
4 existence according to the information given to you
5 by the members?

6 A In September or early October 1945.

7 Q When the Vice-Minister of War took this
8 action, where was the Minister of War?

9 A The Minister of War, Lieutenant General
10 SHIMOMURA, was detained in Shanghai, being unable to
11 return to Japan owing to the close of hostilities.

12 Q Was the Vice-Minister, therefore, acting as
13 Minister?

14 A He was ~~in effect~~ doing so.

15 Q Now, then, with regard to this particular docu-
16 ment, who prepared this one and how were they appointed?

17 A This sub-committee was detailed by Lieutenant
18 General WAKAMATSU to study the question of what the
19 Japanese themselves called the Chinese Massacre Affair.
20 The chairman was Colonel SUGITA, who got his orders
21 direct from General WAKAMATSU, and there were four
22 committee members of the sub-committee.

23 Q Are their signatures, or any of them, to be
24 found on the original document?

25 A It is in my recollection that I saw Colonel

WILD

DIRECT

1 SUGITA's signature on this original, but I cannot say
2 whether the others have also signed it or not.

3 Q When you say it is within your recollection
4 that you saw it, how did you come to see it?

5 A When the document first came into my hands
6 on Thursday.

7 Q Do you mean you went through it and found it,
8 you went through the document and found the signature?

9 A It was screened rapidly for me, and that sig-
10 nature was pointed out to me at that time. I should
11 need some similar assistance if I could find it now.

G
r
e
e
n
b
e
r
g
&
B
a
r
t
o
n

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: May I ask your Honor if
13 during the recess he may be allowed to examine the
14 document with such assistance in order to point
15 out after the recess where the signature is?

16 THE PRESIDENT: I see no objection to that,
17 Mr. Carr.

18 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

19 Q Now, the members of the committee, are
20 they all persons whose names are known to you?

21 A Colonel SUGITA gave me four names: Lieuten-
22 ant-Colonel OISHI, Lieutenant-Colonel HASHIZUME,
23 Lieutenant-Colonel KINOTAKE, and he said, I think,
24 Lieutenant-Colonel FUJIWARA.

25 Q Were any of those persons, to your knowledge,

WILD

DIRECT

1 in Singapore at the time this happened?

2 A Lieutenant-Colonel OISHI, and Lieutenant-
3 Colonel FUJIWARA, Lieutenant-Colonel HASHIZUME, and,
4 I think, Lieutenant-Colonel KINOTAKE were all in
5 Singapore on the staff of YAMASHITA at the time.

6 Q And Colonel SUGITA himself?

7 A Colonel SUGITA himself is the same man to
8 whom I referred at some length in my earlier evi-
9 dence. He was senior Intelligence Staff Officer of
10 General YAMASHITA. Lieutenant-Colonel OISHI was
11 particularly notable during these massacres as the
12 Chief of the Kempeitai in Singapore.

13 MR. COMYNS CARR: I now propose to begin
14 reading the document, or extracts from it, begin-
15 ning, which I think is the logical order, at page
16 12: (Reading)

17 "SECRET

18 "A proces-verbal concerning the punishment
19 of Chinese residents in Singapore

20 "By the 4th unit

21 "23 Oct., 1945

22 "1. Circumstances of manoeuvres by
23 Chinese residents in the Malay Campaign:

24 "During the MALAY campaign, Chinese res-
25 dents were very active in their manoeuvres from

WILD

DIRECT

1 the beginning to the end around the battle-fields
2 and especially in the rear, obstructing our cam-
3 paign and causing us much difficulty. That is to
4 say, near the battle-fields they chiefly communi-
5 cated with the enemy, consequently our plan of
6 operations was perceived by the enemy, placing us in
7 a very disadvantageous position; or areas where our
8 troops were concentrated were bombarded, thus it
9 was not only once that our troops had to suffer
10 meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our com-
11 missary lines were attacked, lines of communication,
12 military communication lines were destroyed, and our
13 military materials damaged, delaying the arrival of
14 those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-
15 fields, consequently often the MALAY campaign, which
16 necessitated speed, was obstructed and made difficult."
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, were you, as
3 you told us, a staff officer engaged throughout that
4 campaign?

5 A From the first attack in the north of
6 Malaya down to the fall of Singapore.

7 Q Have you read the 11 paragraphs of examples
8 which followed that passage which I have just read?

9 A Yes, I have.

10 Q Do they relate to incidents in the cam-
11 paign with most of which you are familiar?

12 A They relate to places in Malaya with which
13 I am fully familiar and connect in my mind with the
14 actions that took place there during that campaign.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: I do not propose to take
16 up time by reading those incidents, unless the de-
17 fense wish me to, but just to ask this witness some
18 questions about them.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

20 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, if the
21 prosecution is going to question this witness about
22 specific instances, I think that it should be read
23 to him and asked if he was actually there at the time
24 they occurred.

25 THE PRESIDENT: There is no need to read

WILD

DIRECT

1 them. The substance could be put shortly.

2 Q First of all, were there any organized
3 Chinese military units acting as part of the British
4 forces?

5 A Yes, there were two formations known as the
6 Federated Malay States Volunteer Force, and there is
7 the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force. These
8 comprised a number of battalions which correspond
9 almost exactly to Territorial battalions in England.
10 Also, like Territorial battalions, they consequently
11 carried the name of the State from which they came,
12 such as the Kedah Volunteer Force, Penang Volunteer
13 Force, and so on. The only difference was that the
14 nationalities -- different nationalities ordinarily
15 took a pride in forming their own individual compan-
16 ies within those battalions. Thus, you have a Brit-
17 ish company, Malay company and a Chinese company in
18 the same battalion. The Chinese volunteers were in-
19 variably British subjects and men of good character
20 and standing. It was considered a great honor to be
21 a member of the volunteer force. And I notice, look-
22 ing at these incidents in this document, the reference
23 "Chinese" is used again and again; and in the majority
24 of cases where the word "Chinese" is used, it may be
25 safely assumed that the individual was a British

WILD

DIRECT

1 subject.

2 Q In addition to the forces you've mentioned,
3 was there another special force raised amongst the
4 people of Chinese race during the campaign?

5 A There was another battalion raised by my
6 own corps headquarters, recruited entirely from the
7 Chinese and officered by British officers. This
8 battalion was particularly used for outposts and
9 scouting duties and for harassing the enemy's
10 communications.

11 Q Now, looking through these 11 paragraphs of
12 examples, and as far as you can identify the inci-
13 dents at all, what do you say as to what Chinese
14 were the persons taking part in them?

15 A I know of no Chinese who took part in the
16 fighting against the Japanese during the invasion of
17 Malaya apart from those who were in our regular armed
18 forces. On the other hand, it is only reasonable,
19 I think, to suppose that the Japanese forces were
20 not exactly accepted with open arms by the local
21 population, particularly in view of the appalling
22 manner in which their troops behaved as they came
23 down the peninsula.

24 Q As far as giving information is concerned,
25 is it a fact that information was from time to time

WILD

DIRECT

1 conveyed to the British forces by local residents?

2 A Naturally, because the sympathy of the local
3 population was, with few exceptions, on the side of
4 the defending troops and not of the invaders.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Now, I will read from
6 page 14, paragraph 2:

7 "2. The state of public peace in and
8 around Singapore after the surrender of the British
9 forces.

10 "The British forces in Singapore surrend-
11 ered on the 15th of February and the island im-
12 mediately after the fighting actions was covered
13 with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to
14 be noted is the fact that there was a two-three
15 day gap between the day of the British surrender
16 and the day of the Japanese entry into that city.
17 Thus, during this interval, implements of war such
18 as rifles, ammunitions, machine guns, revolvers,
19 wireless equipment, light automobiles, etc. were
20 moved away and concealed in the houses of Chinese
21 and natives. Such state became clear gradually,
22 and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic
23 wires running between the headquarters of all the
24 army corps in the suburbs and the city were cut
25 off intentionally, rendering it impossible to

WILD

DIRECT

1 maintain the communication between them. And it
2 became clear that the Chinese in the suburbs or
3 in the urban districts of the city plundered pro-
4 visions, clothes and fuel, etc. and concealed those
5 things in their store-houses or above the ceiling
6 or under the floor of individual houses, etc."

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Pausing there, what do you say about this
3 two or three day gap?

4 A It is quite untrue. There was no such
5 gap. As I mentioned before, we got permission to
6 retain five hundred British troops under arms until
7 the Japanese took over control of Singapore. That
8 was arranged on the evening of the 15th of February
9 and our surrender. I left Fort Canning about eight
10 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of February to go
11 to Bukit Timah for another conference with the Japan-
12 ese, and Japanese soldiers were already on duty in
13 Singapore.

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continuing:)

15 "In the meanwhile, what constituted our
16 primary consideration was that it was impending
17 to draft a major proportion from our forces to
18 prepare for the approaching operation, and that
19 we were to maintain the public peace in the oc-
20 cupied area with a minor force. The advance
21 towards the south of our army was very speedy.
22 On the other hand, there were still a number of
23 bases in the west coast of Malay peninsula left
24 for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on top
25 of this, the hostile Chinese dispersed in the Rhio

WILD

DIRECT

1 islands, south of Singapore, Lingu island and the
2 Anambu islands after the fall of Singapore seemed
3 to be preparing for their future action in coopera-
4 tion with their comrades in Singapore and Malay
5 peninsula and the rumors about the British rein-
6 forcements to arrive were circulated. So we feel
7 keenly the necessity to secure public peace with
8 some drastic measure and control to check the false
9 rumors in Singapore island. (Reference)."
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Now, during all the time that you had been
3 in Malaya before the Japanese invasion, had there
4 been disturbances? Was the population given to
5 distrubance?

6 A Certainly not. Malaya was a very happy
7 place in my observation, and the happiest thing about
8 it was the way in which Indians, Malays and Chinese,
9 many races, lived in peace with one another.

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

11 "The status of the activities of DeGaulle's
12 group was likely to have been made clear gradually by
13 the 28th of February; Klay /phonetic/, a jei Lumor
14 /phonetic/, a spy of the military commission of the
15 DeGaulle's party, and Coceil /phonetic/, the manager
16 of the French Indian China Bank, were then arrested
17 and detained.

18 "3. Regarding investigation and execution
19 of Chinese residents in 'Singapore'.

20 "Under the consideration that simultaneous
21 advance of the various corps of the expeditionary
22 forces into the city of Singapore should rather cause
23 a difficulty in keeping peace and order of the city,
24 the military order was given, on Feb. 17, to detail
25 a force in a size of nearly three infantry battalions

WILD

DIRECT

1 plus the 2nd detachment of Field Military Police
2 /KEMPEITAI/ under the command of Major-General
3 KAWAMURA, commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade;
4 while the major part of the military operation forces
5 was placed back to station at the northern suburb of
6 'S' city, thus to have only small number of the unit
7 put on duty for the guard of the city. The said
8 guard commander, on the following day, visited the
9 General Headquarters and did the required liaison.

10 "(1) Posting

11 "The posting at the beginning was as shown
12 on the attached map showing the status of disposition,
13 but afterward the guard was extended all over the is-
14 land on March 2nd with a movement of military
15 strengths occurring since then.

16 "(a) Search for hostile Chinese. The in-
17 vestigation was executed during the 4 days period
18 from Feb. 17 to 20 mainly on the basis of 'a list of
19 the anti-Japanese Chinese' which had been secured at
20 'IPOH' and with reference to search materials of the
21 roster of the detective bureau criminal lists of the
22 Police Office and the statement made by rescued
23 Japanese. The police officials of the Malay detective
24 bureau were caused to attend to this occasion!"
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Contunod)

2 Q Pausing there, what can you tell us about
3 that paragraph and about what was done with the
4 Malay police?

5 A According to my information, one of the
6 members of that committee -- sub-committee, obtained
7 from the police station in Singapore a list of the
8 Chinese detectives of the Singapore police force.
9 He handed the list to the chairman of the sub-
10 committee, and the twenty Chinese detectives were
11 shot that night. I am informed by the present head
12 of the Malayan's Currency Service that all twenty
13 were outstandingly good members of the detective
14 force in Singapore.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

16 "(b) The number of persons searched during
17 the first series lasting for 3 days, Feb. 21-23, about
18 5,000 persons; the second series, Feb. 18-March 3,
19 about 1,500 persons; the third series at the end of
20 March, about 300 persons. Among them, about 2,000
21 persons were released after the investigation.

22 "(c) Reason for the search and the execu-
23 tion. There exists no written order given to the
24 Guard Commander; it is, however, almost clear that
25 the Guard Commander had issued orders to cope with

WILD

DIRECT

1 the idea of the Army, and in the light of the situ-
2 ation of the mopping up operation throughout the
3 MALAY peninsula, it is clear that the Guard Commander
4 did not issue orders based on his own personal view.
5 It is, however, very doubtful whether the mass exe-
6 cution of Chinese was due to the order of the
7 commander-in-chief or not.

8 "As Lieutenant-Colonel HAYASHI who was Chief
9 of Staff in charge at that time died on the field, it
10 is impossible to find the fact.

11 "(d) Execution of the punishment. The ob-
12 jectives of the punishment constitute mainly those
13 who communicated secretly with the enemy; those who
14 led the hostile bombing of our airfields; those who
15 did marking of targets of artillery gun fire; those
16 who disturbed rear transport lines; those who did not
17 change the attitude of opposition to Japan and self
18 confessed the continuance of the act to oppose Japan
19 at our investigation. These were the leaders of the
20 Federated Association of Chinese Volunteer to oppose
21 Japan, and member of Communists party in Malay; those
22 who were punished strictly total about 5,000 up to
23 the end of March."

24
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continuing)

2 Q Pausing there, in your opinion, was it pos-
3 sible to examine even on these bases, the cases of
4 five thousand people in three days?

5 A Most certainly not. The Japanese themselves
6 said, and I saw for myself, that they kept the small-
7 est possible number of troops in the city to do this
8 job.

9 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
10 half-past one.

11 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
12 taken.)
13 - - -
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

N
o
l
f
&
Y
e
l
d
e
n

1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2
3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
4 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

8 - - -

9 C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,

10 called as a witness on behalf of the prosecu-
11 tion, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

12 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

13 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

14 Q Colonel Wild, I noticed the expression
15 "punished strictly" in the last line that I read
16 before the adjournment. Is that one with which you
17 became familiar in captivity?

18 A Yes, we learned in captivity that that
19 was the accepted Japanese euphemism for execution.

20 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read; para-
21 graph 4 on page 16:

22 "4. The Present Situation of Regulating
23 Operation in MALAYA Peninsula.

24 "(1) The Present Situation of the Public
25 Peace in MALAYA Peninsula.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "We have already mentioned the conditions
2 of the Chinese manoeuvring during our MALAYA
3 operation. Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE
4 many anti-Japan Chinese have entered secretly into
5 cities and jungles and declaring communism and commun-
6 icating with each other, some of them have continued
7 to be active in order to develop the systematic
8 anti-Japan movement under the strict and strong system
9 and try hard to obtain weapons, ammunition, provisions,
10 money and members, while looting our stock of weapons
11 obtained in the battle field, killing secretly our
12 soldiers and officers, and were acting independently
13 in destroying the networks of communications and
14 traffic and killing, threatening, looting good
15 citizens. Though the battle was over there was great
16 anxiety about the public peace in MALAYA.

17 "(2) The Present Situation of Regulating
18 Operation.

19 "Our Army has recognized the importance and
20 necessity of subjugation operations after the surrender
21 of SINGAPORE and till nearly the end of February
22 despatched the 18th Division to 'JOHORE' Province,
23 the 5th Division to other provinces in MALAYA outside
24 of 'JOHORE' Province from SINGAPORE Island and made
25 each of them stand guard over the public peace in the

WILD

DIRECT

1 district in charge also carrying out the subjugation
2 operation against the anti-Japan Chinese.

3 "The 5th Division divided the districts
4 in its charge into several parts and made detach-
5 ments take charge of portion.

6 'MALACCA' Province

7 'NEGRISEMBILAN' Province 11th Infantry Regiment

8 'SELANGOR' Province 41st Inf. Reg.,

9 5th Artillery Regiment

10 5th Transport Regiment

11 'PERAH' Province 42nd Inf. Reg.

12 'PAHANG' Province 5th Cavalry Regiment

13 'KEDAH' Province

14 'TRENGGANU' Province

15 'KELANTAN' Province 21st Inf. Reg.

16 "The 5th and 18th Division commenced the
17 subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of
18 March. Carrying out the research and subjugation
19 of anti-Japan Chinese in cities and jungles we
20 caught wicked Chinese till the end of April; about
21 1,000 in 'JOHORE' Province, about 1,500 in 'SEREMBAN',
22 'MALACCA', about 300 in 'SELANGOR', about 100 in
23 'PERAH', about 50 in 'PAHANG', and about 200 in
24 'KEDAH' and 'PENANG', and confiscated many weapons,
25 but after investigation released most of them the

WILD

DIRECT

1 same way everywhere. There were, however, many cases
2 in which at the arrest the Chinese resisted by firing
3 guns, which induced us to return fire and persons
4 on both sides were injured and killed. Many people
5 (leaders) were there who committed suicide, recognizing
6 their unfavourable circumstances."

7 BY MR. COMYNS CARR(Continued):

8 Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, what can you tell
9 us about those numbers of persons mentioned in those
10 provinces?

11 A Among other things, I have been in charge
12 of war crimes investigation in Malaya and Singapore
13 since February, this year. I have some thirty files
14 of evidence on the way in which this so-called
15 subjugation was carried out. It can safely be stated
16 that many thousands of Asiatic citizens of Malaya
17 were killed by the Japanese shortly after the occupa-
18 tion. I should say that these figures are not un-
19 reasonable for the first round-up. As regards Johore,
20 they include, no doubt, the whole of a peaceful
21 Eurasian settlement near Johore Bahru city. All the
22 Eurasians -- men, women, and children -- were murdered.
23 On the evidence of witnesses we exhumed their bodies
24 shortly before I came up to Tokyo.

25 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing at page 18:

WILD

DIRECT

1 "Since the beginning of May also, the anti-
2 Japan Chinese still continued anti-Japan activities,
3 hiding themselves from the eyes of the Japanese, and
4 the public peace was often jeopardized. Our Army
5 carried on subjugations and tried to keep the public
6 peace, often traversing jungles and meeting with
7 great difficulties and suffering considerable damages,
8 but never succeeded in entirely sweeping away the
9 anti-Japan Chinese.

10 "The subjugation which is noted among those
11 since May is that in the forest to the north of
12 KWALA LOMPUR. Finding out a report that about 300
13 anti-Japan Chinese were planning the assassination
14 of Japanese soldiers and the burning of Japanese
15 barracks, we sent a punitive force to subjugate
16 them, taking the initiative against them. After a
17 battle the defeated Chinese fled away deep into the
18 forests. In this battle, the bodies left dead in the
19 field numbered 200."

20 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)

21 Q Can you tell us anything about the position
22 at Kwala Lompur?

23 A I never heard any such battle in the
24 neighborhood of Kwala Lompur, but it is true that a
25 number of villages in that area were completely

WILD

DIRECT

1 wiped out by the Japanese on the ground that they
2 harbored communists.

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)

4 "(3) Conclusion.

5 "In short, the regulating operation in the
6 Malay Peninsula was not only for the Japanese Army
7 itself, but was an action for the purpose of guarding
8 the public peace which was carried on for the protection
9 of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens
10 (including the ordinary Chinese, Malaysians, Indians,
11 etc.) and though it is to be regretted that the
12 circumstances in details, are not clear on account
13 of lack of material it is plain enough that all those
14 dead Chinese died by the bullets during the battles
15 of subjugations. During these difficult subjugations
16 a considerable number of victims appeared on our part
17 also."

18 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

19 Q Have you anything to say about that para-
20 graph then?

21 A Only that it is, to say the least, a bit
22 curious that during the hundred years or so of
23 British rule in Malaya we had not found it necessary
24 to slaughter thousands of citizens in order to
25 protect the remainder.

WILD

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

2 MR. FURNESS: We object to the speeches
3 which are being made by the witness regarding past
4 history. We also object to testimony by a prosecutor
5 on the case which he has investigated as a prosecutor.

6 THE PRESIDENT: The last part of the objection
7 is not clear to me.

8 Major Furness.

9 MR. FURNESS: He has testified that he is
10 the head of the Investigation Section of the war
11 crimes in Singapore and Malaya. I take that to be
12 the equivalent to the prosecution of war crimes there
13 and it does not seem to me that he should be allowed
14 to make these broad statements when regarding the
15 things which he investigated. They are statements
16 of conclusions and it seems to me that in his position
17 he should not be allowed to make them.

18 THE PRESIDENT: He simply stated that the
19 British found no need to massacre Chinese to preserve
20 the peace in Malaya. That is obvious enough, but it
21 would be desirable for him to avoid such statements.
22 They do not help us; we know that without being told.

23

24

25

WILD

DIRECT

MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continuing to read)

"V. About the handling of this investigation of punishment of the Singapore Chinese.

"I. The enemy's protest has not yet come, but the reports concerning this problem is as follows:

"(1) The story by Major Moris Deeton /phonetic/ and Captain Thomas Ellis /phonetic/

"We were pushed into freight-cars and brought to Siam, after the fall of Singapore and were used in the construction of the railroad between Bangkok and Mouimein. Many died on account of hunger and the tropic diseases, the medicines for which were very scanty. According to the talk of a member of the Australian advance-party, all of 1840 in number except 34 members died before they reached the spot 130 miles off to the west.

"(2) The report sent from London on Sept. 5. The announcement of the terrible cruel actions of the Japanese toward the prisoners of the allied powers and those detained people have caused the anxiety of thousands of families in the world. Every evening papers in London has reported, 'the Singapore radio has said that when a complete document is made public, the civilized world will

WILD

DIRECT

1 be against the cruel deeds of the Japanese. A
2 Chinese was forced to drink petroleum and a Jap-
3 anese threw a kindled match into the mouth of the
4 Chinese.'

5 "A great massacre of the Chinese troops
6 and civilians by machine-guns took place in Singa-
7 pore, and Dr. Bedler /phonetic/ the former physician
8 of the Sultan of Johore believes that more than
9 150,000 Asiatics (not including military men) were
10 punished or tortured to death by the Japanese secret
11 police. The largest majority of them are Chinese
12 and the doctor said that, in the small area of
13 Dabon /phonetic/ alone, some 30 thousand were killed
14 by the Japanese secret police, and that it was a
15 matter of course that the Chinese hated the Japanese
16 so much.

17 "Telling the story of the ill treatment,
18 the PWs released in Hongkong said that they received
19 only a small portion of the packages sent by the
20 Red Cross. (San Francisco Sept. 5)

21 "A correspondent on board of an American
22 hospital ship reported the barbarism of the Japanese
23 toward the Australian, British and Dutch prisoners
24 who worked in oil-refineries and machine-factories.

25 "Atrocities committed while the road

WILD

DIRECT

1 was under way in Burma and Siam were also reported
2 to the effect that 'Even invalids were forced to
3 walk to the place of constructional work and break
4 stones. ' (Sept. 5 Australia.)

5 "According to the report reached the Army
6 Headquarters in South-Eastern Asia, allied power
7 prisoners were greatly suffering from malaria, beri-
8 beri, consumption and dysentery. (Sept. 5. San
9 Francisco.)

10 "3. Singapore internment camp.

11 "A London broadcast reported on Sept. 6,
12 about the Japanese atrocities at the Singapore in-
13 ternment camps as follows:-

14 "(1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all
15 nationalities including men, women, and children
16 were interned, but Red Cross has never been per-
17 mitted to visit there. All males above 10 years
18 old were compelled to undergo heavy labor and were
19 supplied with rations even less than half of that
20 issued by the 'Malay' Prison Bureau as punishment
21 before the war. When the rescue arrived at, all
22 persons have just begun to roast snails.

23 "(2) During the period of more than 3
24 years, there was only a single period when a logi-
25 cal control was prevailed; this occurred in the

WILD

DIRECT

1 period when the commandant was a Japanese civilian.

2 "3. There existed always the terrors of
3 many atrocities and everybody was beaten day and
4 night for not saluting properly.

5 "4. Spy suspects were especially ill-
6 treated. On October 2nd, 1943, the police started
7 a barbarous search to find evidences of spy suspects
8 in the camp. 57 men and women were confined in a
9 small guard-room, and for many hours they were made
10 to sit with their legs bent in Japanese style and
11 without being given even a minimum of decency they
12 were forced to stay there for many months. One
13 European was tortured for 55 hours and the other
14 was struck 144 times. There was a record with the
15 full particulars of the devilsh torture, which
16 Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and re-
17 corded in which a Japanese poured water into the
18 mouth and nostrils of one of the suspects and then
19 pressed the swollen stomach of the latter with his
20 foot or jumped on the upper part of the stomach.
21 Some of the prisoners of war will bear the scars
22 of the Japanese torture forever.

23 "5. The captives released at Singapore
24 talked of the ill-treatment: forced labor, worst
25 food ration and beating.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "(2) Judging from the attitudes adopted
2 by the United States and British especially the
3 public opinion prevailing in those countries, the
4 British protest against Japan is not so bitter as
5 the United States at present, but Britain will
6 file a protest on completion of further close in-
7 vestigation after the recovery of the ex-occupation
8 area. It is, therefore, necessary for us to take a
9 measure to cope with the situation.
10

11 "1. Though it is not necessary to pro-
12 duce these investigation materials at present as
13 long as Britain or the United States does not make
14 any request and yet preparation should be made so as
15 to meet the changing situation.

16 "2. The execution of Chinese residents at
17 Singapore to some extent was unavoidable considering
18 the circumstances which arose at that time, but
19 since the execution had reached a considerable num-
20 ber, Britain, (the United States) and China will
21 announce it as a big massacre and will lodge a pro-
22 test with us. So that it will also be necessary
23 to make a preparation for the punishment of those
24 responsible."
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 The next part of the document is headed:
2 "Outline of the Investigation Concerning Inhumane
3 Acts (Principally against the Chinese Problem) during
4 the Malaya (Singapore) Operations, 22 November 1945,
5 Group No. 4; addressed to: POW Affairs Investigative
6 Department, POW Affairs Central Investigative Committee.

7 "I.

8 "The Outline of the Protest and Reports by Great
9 Britain on Inhumane Acts in Malaya (Singapore) Area.

10 "Although there were almost no protests from
11 Great Britain, there were some highly exaggerated and
12 superficial reports made in England after the conclu-
13 sion of the war.

14 "1. On 10 March 1942, British Foreign Minister
15 Eden gave a formal explanation in the House of Com-
16 mons on the outrageous acts of the Japanese following
17 the surrender of Hongkong, of which the gist is as
18 follows:

19 "GIST: According to the reports of those who
20 escaped from Hongkong, prisoners of war and citizens
21 in Hongkong were treated inhumanly regardless of race.
22 Fifty British soldiers were bound hand and foot and
23 were then bayoneted to death.

24 "Even after ten days from the surrender of
25 Hongkong, the wounded were left on the battlefields,
and the dead were not buried. Europeans and Asiatics
alike were abused and killed without discrimination.

"The Chinese quarters of the city became a

WILD

DIRECT

1 nest of prostitutes. These outrageous acts can be
2 compared to that of the great Rape of Nanking in
3 1937.

4 "There were no windows, doors or lights in
5 the prisoners' camps which were mere huts without
6 sanitary facilities. Food was very poor, mortal
7 diseases broke out, and deaths continuously occurred.
8 Furthermore, the Japanese Government would not allow
9 the representatives of the Protecting Powers and the
10 International Red Cross to visit the district.

11 "We do not possess any information concerning
12 the prisoners in Malaya. We only know that 75,000
13 Chinese had been captured in that area.

14 "It is not true that the Japanese army act
15 on the spirit of chivalry.

16 "2. We have been notifying and protesting that
17 we have deliberately studied the great quantity of
18 evidence concerning the treatment of detained British
19 nationals in East Asia which were obtained by the
20 British Government on 2 September 1942 and which hold
21 no ground for refutation, but there is nothing con-
22 cerning Malaya."

23 Then I am omitting several pages because
24 they are the same in substance as in the former
25 document which I have already read.

WILD

DIRECT

Continuing on the middle of page 24:

"In short, this has caused no great problem until today, but considering the tendencies of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, especially the public opinion of both countries, England will thoroughly investigate this matter as soon as she regains her former territories and there is strong possibility of her launching protests against Japan. So we must also investigate and announce the true facts concerning these matters.'

"II.

"General Situation in Malaya (Singapore) and the Management of the Natives by the Military before War.

"Before the Greater East Asia War broke out, Malaya, Singapore, in particular, was the center of policy and strategy in the south and was the nucleus of pressure against Japan. The activities of the natives in general, especially the Chinese, were very vigorous and the pressure was carried out in every sort of form, such as demonstrations, boycott and threats, so that there were soon more and more Japanese returning to Japan. Thus Singapore naturally began to draw the attention of all the Japanese.

"The military were keenly aware of the necessity

WILD

DIRECT

1 of a speedy occupation of Malaya, especially
2 Singapore, and as the operations in Malaya were the
3 first to be started in the Southern operations and
4 in view of the aim of the Greater East Asia War,
5 it was necessary to assume an attitude of endearment
6 towards the natives so as to exalt the justice of the
7 Imperial Army throughout the world, and a determined
8 attitude was taken towards those who interfered with
9 the activities of the army. The military adopted
10 the policy of strictly observing merits."

11 And again omitting several pages for the
12 same reason, I come to page 29:

13 (Reading):

14 "CHAPTER 4
15

16 "Clearing of battle-fields and mopping up
17 operations after the capitulation of the enemy.

18 "Believing that it would not only answer
19 the purposes of our 'Sacred War' but also bring
20 about good results in further operations in the
21 southern areas especially in the Sumatra and Anda-
22 mans operations, which were our army's next tasks
23 at that time--to set up a firm military administration
24 in Malaya and especially in Singapore, as soon as
25 possible after the capitulation of the British Army,

G
o
l
d
b
e
r
g
&
S
p
r
a
t
t

WILD

DIRECT

1 our army at first stationed only Kempei in Singapore
2 itself and avoided sending big units into the city.
3 Major-General KAWAMURA Saburo was given command of
4 No. 2 Kempeitai (with about 2 companies of auxiliary
5 Kempei and armoured car and tank company from No. 5
6 and No. 18 Imperial Guards Divisions attached to them,
7 and the necessary troops, and put in command of
8 Singapore city, while the main force of the Imperial
9 Guards Divisions were put in Charge of Singapore
10 island (excluding the greater part of the city) and
11 continued their work of clearing the battle fields
12 rapidly and their mopping-up operations. By these
13 means, our army tried to establish public order and
14 at the same time prepared for the next round of
15 operations.

16 "Considering the importance of Singapore
17 to the forces and the fact that it was infested with
18 plain clothes bandits who had obstructed our mili-
19 tary operations for the whole period of our oper-
20 ations in Malaya, our army decided on a strict
21 attitude in dealing with the Chinese emigrants. On
22 Feb. 17th, our army issued an Army Order and dis-
23 patched Major HAYASHI Tadao, a staff officer to
24 Singapore garrison headquarters, mainly for the
25 purpose of dealing with this matter.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "In the latter part of February the main
2 strength of the 5th and the 18th Divisions success-
3 ively moved to Northern Malaya and Johore State and
4 assumed the same duties as those mentioned above.

5 "The clearing of the battlefields and the
6 mopping-up operations on Singapore Island.

7 "Major-General KAWAMURA, Commander of the
8 9th Infantry Brigade, who had been newly appointed
9 as the commander of the Singapore Garrison Forces,
10 appeared at the army headquarters on the 18th. Be-
11 sides making the necessary contacts, he issued, in
12 view of the above-mentioned situation, an order to
13 the 2nd Field Gendarme Unit, it mainly to clear the
14 battlefields and mop up the enemies within the city.
15 Moreover, the main strength of the Imperial Guards
16 Division was transferred from its operational area
17 to the key points on the island where it continued
18 the clearing up of the battlefields and mopping-up
19 operations.

20 "Outline of command system and detailing/
21 of troops/"
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): There follows
2 a chart, which shows that there was a direct chain of
3 command from the Army Commander to the Second Field
4 Gendarme Unit and another to the Commander of Singa-
5 pore Garrison Forces, and that at some unknown date
6 it seems that this Unit took direct supervision of
7 the Auxiliary Gendarmes.

8 Resuming in the middle of page 31:

9 (Reading):

10 "The search for and the disposition of
11 anti-Japanese Chinese merchants.

12 "1. The army's policy toward the Chinese.

13 "In view of the great obstructions to our
14 operations put up by the anti-Japanese activities
15 of Chinese subsequent to the operations in central
16 Malay, we were obliged to change the original
17 attitude toward the Chinese which we had held
18 at the time of the outbreak of war. We were obliged
19 to deal with the disobedient Chinese in a stern
20 manner.
21

22 "2. The collection of data concerning
23 anti-Japanese suspects among the Chinese.

24 "On the basis of mainly the register of
25 anti-Japanese Chinese as well such other data as
the register of the Detective Bureau, police

WILD

DIRECT

1 office register of criminals, advice by rescued
2 Japanese residents, and the information supplied
3 by some of the anti-Japanese Chinese merchants who
4 were arrested, a register of disobedient Chinese
5 suspects was drawn up during the four days from
6 February 17 to 20 and the suspects were detained
7 at several places and detected beginning from the
8 21st. In making the detections we made sure of
9 obtaining accuracy by using the above-mentioned
10 registers as our basis and also obtaining the
11 presence of the police from the Detective Bureau
12 of Police Office.

13 "The number of persons examined as sus-
14 pects during the course of detections was roughly
15 as follows:

16	"First time	Feb 21 to 23 (3 days)	about 5,000
17	"Second "	Feb 28 to March 3	about 1,500
18	"Third "	End of March	about 300

19 "After the examination for the detection
20 of suspects about 1,000 to 1,500 persons were re-
21 leased and about 5,000 persons were apparently
22 punished as anti-Japanese spies (those who guided
23 the enemy in bombing airfields, gave indications
24 of the direction of artillery shelling, attacked
25 or disturbed the rear commissary lines, or guided

WILD

DIRECT

1 such activities, the leaders of anti-Japanese
2 organizations, members of the anti-Japanese Volun-
3 teer Army, and members of the Malay Communist
4 Party)."

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): Then passing
2 over several pages, I will begin on the second para-
3 graph, page 38:

4 (Reading): "The collection of the contri-
5 butions from the Chinese, which was carried out with-
6 out reference to the arrests of Chinese in Singapore,
7 seemed to be mainly a counter measure adopted to cope
8 with inflation following the occupation of Malay.

9 "Since the currency in circulation reached St.
10 \$260,000,000 -- "

11 What does "S-t" stand for?

12 THE MONITOR: Straits dollars.

13 MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading continued): "-- follow-
14 ing the surrender of the British troops as compared with
15 St. \$210,000,000 in pre-war days, it was decided to
16 have the difference, St. \$50,000,000, donated. The
17 donations were collected about the time of the trans-
18 fer of General YAMASHITA to another post."

19 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

20 Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, we are going
21 to read some more about that in a diary shortly, but
22 what can you tell us about that now?

23 A In the last two days or so before Singapore
24 fell, very large sums in Straits dollars, paper cur-
25 rency, were collected and burned by order of the

WILD

DIRECT

1 G. O. C. Malaya and the Governor General, particularly
2 all bank notes held in the Bank of Singapore.

3 THE MONITOR: Was that "old" or "all"?

4 THE WITNESS: "All."

5 MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading continued):

6 "5. Judgements.

7 "In short, it can be understood from the
8 guiding policy of the Army Commander at the beginning
9 of the war that utmost efforts were made to prevent
10 and check the inhumane acts committed during the course
11 of the Malay (Singapore) campaign.

12 "(1) With regard to the question of the
13 disposition of the Chinese in Singapore, it is clear
14 that Commander YAMASHITA, following the surrender of
15 the British Army, issued to the various commanders of
16 the corps and of the Garrison Forces an order concerning
17 the clearing up of battle-fields and purging operations
18 (mopping-up operations) with the determination to
19 eradicate spies and disturbers of peace and order,
20 in view of the intensive obstructive measures and
21 anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese during the
22 campaign. However, no written order for the punish-
23 ment of the Chinese alone exists. The Commander of
24 the Garrison Forces at Singapore, on the basis of the
25 above-mentioned order and the Army's intention, carried

WILD

DIRECT

1 it out as a part of the operations for clearing
2 up the battle-fields and of the purging operations.
3 Judging also from the objective situation at that
4 time and the state of mopping-up operations through-
5 out the entire Malay Peninsula, it is clear that it
6 was not based on the personal view of the Commander
7 of the Garrison Forces. I should judge that, in
8 punishing the Chinese, preparations were made before-
9 hand and various measures adopted after entry into
10 Singapore in order to ensure propriety."

11 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

12 Q Colonel Wild, can you say -- help us as to
13 who "I" is in the singular at that point in the
14 document?

15 A From internal evidence it would appear to
16 be the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, Colonel SUGITA.

17 MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading continued):

18 "2. Since the arrests and punishments
19 of the Chinese were conducted during the course
20 of clearing up the battle-fields and mopping-up
21 operations following intensive fighting, it is
22 needless to say that it is difficult to judge
23 such acts on the basis of the standard for normal
24 times, even though efforts were made to ensure
25 their propriety. It appears that the reports by enemy

WILD

DIRECT

1 newspapers include those who died from war sickness
2 during operations and even citizens at large who
3 were victims of bombing. They also exaggerate
4 things. Accordingly, it seems proper to estimate
5 the number of spies and anti-Japanese undesirable
6 elements who were punished at about 5,000.

7 "In Hu HSING's 'Notes on the New Life
8 of the Chinese' it is written that there was a
9 fairly large number of undesirable Chinese who
10 obstructed operations and instigated and looted
11 law abiding citizens. This gives an idea of the
12 situation.

13 "3. Although it is not possible to
14 guarantee that, in making the arrests and punish-
15 ments, the staff officers concerned did not 'overdo'
16 themselves, and although it is difficult to get a
17 clear idea of the situation then because Lt. Col.
18 HAYASHI, who was the staff officer in charge of it
19 (staff officer attached to the headquarters of the
20 Shonan Garrison Forces) and Chief of Staff Lt.
21 General SUZUKI have died in action, it may become
22 further clear if Major General IKETANI, who was
23 the chief of the operations section, and Colonel
24 TSUJI, who was the staff officer in charge of
25 operations, are interrogated."

WILD

DIRECT

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

2 Q Colonel Wild, have you been able to find
3 either of those gentlemen?

4 A I know where they are.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

6 DR. KIYOSE: Prosecutor Carr asked a while
7 ago, asked to the witness a while ago who was the
8 man mentioned by "I" in singular in the statement.
9 However, in the Japanese text of it, which is the
10 original text of it, I do not see any mention of
11 the word "I".

12 THE MONITOR: First person singular.

13 THE PRESIDENT: The Language Section will
14 have to clear that up for us. We direct them to do so.

15 Q Now, Colonel Wild, before the adjournment
16 you were not able to tell us about the signatures
17 on this document. Are you now in a position to deal
18 with that?

19 A Yes, I am.

20 Q On what part of the document, as we have
21 it translated here, are the signatures to be found?

22 A They are on the cover of the Japanese document
23 which at the time I looked at it had been displaced
24 and put inside and the cover does not appear to have
25 been translated. When I originally received this

WILD

DIRECT

1 document, the cover was on top as it is now.

2 Q And what is said on the cover, and what are
3 the signatures to be found there?

4 A It is marked "Original" and "Secret." It
5 then says in Japanese: "Furyo kankei chosa chuo
6 iinkai" meaning "The Central Committee of Investi-
7 gation Relating to Prisoners of War." The next column
8 is: "Furyo kankei chosabu," which is the Investi-
9 gation Section dealing with Prisoners of War.
10 There is then a typed heading which may be translated
11 "Investigation of the Cruel Acts Committed During
12 the Malayan (Singapore) Campaign". The next column
13 or heading refers to the investigation of the Chinese
14 Affair. Then there is marked "Dichi han", the No. 4
15 Section, followed by the names of three of the officers
16 in that No. 4 Section. They are written in the same
17 hand in ink in Japanese, SUGITA, Taisa, Colonel SUGITA;
18 OISHI, Taisa, Colonel OISHI; third one, HASHIZUME, Chusa,
19 Lieutenant Colonel HASHIZUME. Below those three names
20 are the personal seals of the three officers concerned,
21 a valid signature in Japanese. The date given is
22 November 22 , 1945, followed again by No. 4 Section.

23 Q Is that the whole of it?

24 (No answer.)

25

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

WILD

DIRECT

1 DR. KIYOSE: Those seals are the signs --

2 DR. KIYOSE (in English): Not "signs".

3 DR. KIYOSE (Interpretation continued): --that
4 this document had been circulated among the officers
5 concerned and had been read by them and not that this
6 document was written by those officers themselves.

7 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "These three
8 names with their personal seal imprinted on this does
9 not mean that these men wrote the document. This
10 seal just indicates that they have read this document.
11 In Japanese documents signatures are not written in
12 a way to --" I mean "signatures are always written
13 with first and last name both on the paper. This
14 document does not have that."

15 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have enough to show
16 that for the time being it is properly part of the
17 prosecution's case. The defense can attack it when
18 they give evidence later. We do not want to hear
19 any more about it.

20 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing):

21 Q Attached to the document and within the cover
22 are the three extracts from diaries.

23 A There is no all-embracing cover, but those
24 extracts were attached to the original when we received
25 it.

WILD

DIRECT

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: That brings me to page 1
2 of the document as we have it here, your Honor:"The
3 Excerpts from the **Diary**, February 18th."

4 It is there, read Page 1.

5 DR. KIYOSE: I would like to know the name
6 of the author of this diary. Whose diary is it?

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: We shall soon find out
8 when I have read it.

9 Q Perhaps I might ask you now, Colonel Wild,
10 did the author of the diary accept its authenticity
11 when you questioned him?

12 A I showed the photostatic copy of it to him
13 and he recognized it as his own immediately.

14 Q Who was that?

15 A Major General KAWAMURA, Saburo, Lieutenant
16 General, late Lieutenant General.

17 THE MONITOR: "Late"?

18 THE WITNESS: Retired.

19 MR. COMYNS CARR: The Tribunal will notice
20 that the second extract also purports to be from a
21 diary by the same individual.

22 Q Have you yet been able to clear up, Colonel
23 Wild, why it is that two extracts from the diary in
24 slightly different phrases appear attached to this
25 document?

WILD

DIRECT

1 A I have not had any opportunity of doing so.

2 Q Which one was it that you showed to Lieutenant
3 General KAWAMURA?

4 A I gave him the first nine photostatic pages
5 which cover both diaries, and he used them for his
6 own purposes during the next hour.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: I will read the first one.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean the first nine
9 pages of this or in Japanese? This has eleven pages.

10 THE WITNESS: The first nine pages of the
11 Japanese version. I think I am right in saying nine.
12 It was the pages of the photostatic Japanese version
13 equivalent to the first seven pages of the English.

14 MR. COMYNS CARR: Page 8 is quite a different
15 diary, your Honor. We will see when we get to it.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

A
b
r
a
m
&
M
o
r
s
e

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: I will read the first
2 document. (Reading) "February 18th.

3 "I was appointed the commander of the guards
4 in Singapore and was ordered to command the 3rd Bat-
5 talion, 11th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion,
6 41st Infantry, and military police including assistant
7 gendarmes, and to take charge of the defense of
8 Singapore.

9 "At 10 a.m. I reported at the army head-
10 quarters and received orders and instructions on
11 defense and also received news of the attachment of
12 the extra staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.

13 "I have issued orders concerning the general
14 guarding.

15 "February 19th. I heard reports from the
16 OHASHI unit, military police, which was in charge of
17 guarding and inspection of the city.

18 "The pillaging by citizens is still going on.

19 "Towards evening, the defense headquarters
20 were removed to Fort Canning in the city, the former
21 general headquarters of the British forces.

22 "The same evening, according to instructions,
23 I issued orders requiring the wholesale rounding up
24 of undesirable Chinese residents, which is to be en-
25 forced from the 21st.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "Especially I urged the gathering of Chinese
2 malcontents into a certain restricted area to be
3 separated from the rest of the citizens.

4 "February 21st and 22nd. The wholesale
5 round up was enforced.

6 "February 23rd. At 11 a.m. the meeting of
7 commanders was held and we heard the various reports
8 from each party, on the conditions of arrest and
9 later reported the information to the army commander.

10 "February 24th. From today, extending over
11 three days, the meeting of the branch directors of
12 the military administrations is to be held. I have
13 today attended the meeting.

14 "February 25th. The commander of the
15 forces made a round of inspections, and examined the
16 defense situations in the city.

17 "March 1st. I have received orders to take
18 charge of the guard of Changi district from today.
19 The 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment was as-
20 signed for this purpose.

21 "March 4th. I have received an order to
22 take charge of the defense of the entire island of
23 Singapore. In accordance with the instructions of
24 the army, I have issued orders for the refugees in
25 Singapore to go back from where they came from." "To"

WILD

DIRECT

1 it should be.

2 The rest of that is immaterial for our
3 purposes. Page 4. (Reading)

4 "Extracts from the diary of Major General
5 KAWAMURA, the 9th Infantry Brigade Commander.

6 "February 16. Despatched Major KOBAYASHI
7 and approximately 100 officers and men under his com-
8 mand as an Emergency MP unit to the Raffles college
9 by 10 a.m.

10 "Got all units to clean the battlefield.
11 This day, despatched the unit under Major MISHIBA's
12 command to handle the Prisoners of War matters.

13 "February 17. Our headquarters were removed
14 to the Clubhouse for the reason of inconvenience in
15 command.

16 "Late at night I was ordered to take command
17 of both battalions of the 11th and 41st Infantry
18 Regiments and the Emergency MP unit as the newly-
19 appointed commander of the Singapore Guard Force, and
20 to take charge of the guarding of the city.

21 "February 18. Presented myself to Army
22 headquarters at 10 a.m. to receive the order ap-
23 pointing me to be Guard Force Commander.

24 "At 12 a.m. I went to Raffles College and
25 issued the necessary orders. Staff Officer HAYASHI

WILD

DIRECT

1 was assigned to me.

2 "February 19. Inspected the general situations
3 within the city from 10 a.m. Listened to the report
4 concerning the situations from MP Unit Commander
5 OISHI and his men. (Was impressed with the imperfec-
6 tion of the military discipline of our officers and
7 men.)

8 "In the evening, our headquarters were re-
9 moved to Fort Canning.

10 "Issued an order to make wholesale arrests
11 of delinquent Chinese from the 21st and thereby ad-
12 vocated their assembly in a certain area.

13 "February 20. Held a memorial service for
14 those who laid down their lives and a ceremony of
15 awarding certificates of merit.

16 "February 21. Started the wholesale arrests
17 today. Held a memorial service in the Division.
18 Later, inspected the situations of searching by the
19 Central Area Unit.

20 "February 22. In the morning, inspected
21 the situations of the East Area Unit, the camp for
22 British non-combatants and the North Area.

23 In the afternoon, attended the memorial
24 service of the OKABE Unit and later inspected the
25 situations of the Central Area Unit.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "February 23. Held a Unit Commander meeting
2 from 11 a.m. and listened to the reports concerning
3 the situations of searching to the effect that those
4 who had been punished numbered approximately 5,000, of
5 which important persons are continuing to be detained
6 and are under investigation.

7 "In the evening, was invited to the dinner
8 in the Division. Heard that the Division will
9 shortly be dispersed to various areas. It was a
10 farewell party for me.

11 "Memory: It is in my memory that on the
12 23rd I went to the Army headquarters to report
13 after the Unit Commander Meeting had adjourned.

14 "February 24, 25, 26. Held a meeting of
15 chiefs of the Military Administration Department on
16 the 25th, the Army Commander called on us during his
17 inspection tour.

18 "On 26th, the Army Commander gave a speech
19 to the effect that we should take up a far more
20 positive attitude, instead of the heretofore internal
21 guidance.

22 "March 1. From this day, the guarding of
23 Changi was taken over by the 3rd Division, 11th In-
24 fantry Regiment.

25 "March 2. Inspected the prisoners of war

WILD

DIRECT

1 in Changi. Today, concerning the security precau-
2 tions throughout the Shonan Island, I gave necessary
3 orders.

4 "March 4. The guarding units throughout
5 Shonan Island were changed, at 12 p.m. today. From
6 this day, ordered the refugees to leave the place."

7 And again, the rest of it is immaterial.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

1 Now, page 8. (Reading)

2 "Abstracts of the Subjects Concerned from the
3 Greater East Asiatic Top Secret Operation Diary of the
4 Imperial Headquarters.

5 "The following descriptions are what were
6 reported to the Imperial Headquarters by the 25th
7 Army, excepting the 2nd clause of March 13th, which is
8 the report from the Southern General Army.

9 "February 7. The army enters at once into
10 the next operation without the ceremony of triumphal
11 entry.

12 "February 18. 1. The army made about three
13 battalions of infantry and the second field ~~gendarmarie~~
14 under the command of Brigadier KAWAMURA mount guard
15 over the city of Singapore, and the main force located
16 in its vicinity are engaging in cleaning the battle-
17 field and preparing for the coming operation.

18 "2. Each one company of 5 D successfully
19 landed on the islands 'Bukum' and 'Sambo.'

20 "February 20. SASAKI Battalion of 5 D landed
21 on Bintang Island without bleeding.

22 "February 21. There are fairly many volunteers
23 and Malaysians who joined the enemy's force as a volunteer
24 army and the fifth column. The army is now in search
25 of them.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "Those who were taken in soon after the fall
2 of Singapore: 16 Chinese volunteers, 360 Malayan
3 volunteers.

4 "February 24, 25, 26. On this occasion when
5 the main operation of Malay has come to an end, a
6 meeting of the head officials of the branches of the
7 military administrative department was held.

8 "February 27. With captives and captured
9 arms was organized the Singapore Island Defense Corps.
10 All of the seventy thousand of captives cannot be
11 consumed by this army. The army wishes to use them
12 dispersed in each necessary field, and immediate in-
13 struction is desired.

14 "February 28. The state of activities of
15 'de Gaulle' faction here is now being clarified by and
16 by. 'Glaire,' /phonetic/ a Jew, 'Remanl,' /phonetic/
17 a spy of the military committee of the 'de Gaulle'
18 faction and 'Causelle,' /phonetic/ the Manager of the
19 French Indo-Chinese Bank have been subjected to intern-
20 ment and inquiry.

21 "March 1. As it has serious influence on the
22 future action of the army, we wish to know if you have
23 any intention to move the present captives here to any
24 other places than Malay Peninsula. At present,
25 85,000 captives.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "March 3. The occupation of Singapore is going
2 smoothly and the occupation business by committee mem-
3 bers was completed at the end of February. State of
4 affairs in the city of Singapore: Soon after the
5 occupation, we arrested and executed about 5,000
6 delinquent persons as the first clearing and, further,
7 we are preparing for the next clearing. The appeas-
8 ing campaign to the citizens is as follows (the
9 following: concerning the currency). The movement
10 of the military administrative organs has been taking
11 its regular course."

12 March 13 is immaterial.

13 "March 17. Since the commencement of Malay
14 operation, we have been watching strictly the movement
15 of the Chinese residents. After the capitulation of
16 Singapore Island, their interest in Japan has been
17 intensified. At the same time, rigorous measures were
18 adopted to such anti-Japanese Chinese as the volunteers.
19 Thus, their movement has taken decisive direction.
20 That is, they take an attitude to submit their lives,
21 properties and all the rights and interests to the
22 Japanese army and to wait penitentially for any orders,
23 keeping these things for themselves. They propose that
24 if the commander of the Japanese Army would exempt them
25 from death and would give them a favor to carry on

WILD

DIRECT

1 their occupations at ease, they would swear their
2 future faithfulness and economical contribution and
3 would contribute one half of their properties to the
4 Japanese army. As to the offering of one half of their
5 properties, we accept only their spirit and instead of
6 one half we receive cash of fifty million yen. With
7 the foregoings, the first step of the measures toward
8 the Chinese residents in Malay is completed. Next,
9 the second means shall be taken.

10 "March 18. From Colonel Tsuji:

11 "I intend to take my post there after the
12 inspection of battle condition of Burma and Philippine
13 theatre about the latter part of March.

14 "April 10. Though the public peace of Malay
15 Peninsula is going to recover by the activities of
16 respective guarding units, still, secret movements
17 of Chinese residents here have not entirely ceased yet.

18 "March 27. Approximately 1500 persons in
19 Celenban and Malacca were captured at once and a lot
20 of arms were confiscated, and the majority who were
21 captured were released after investigation.

22 "March 29. (At the distance of 16 kilometers
23 to the north of Kwantan) The den of communists was
24 crippled entirely and 15 of its members were captured
25 (the leader committed suicide) at the end of March.

WILD

DIRECT

1 "At the location of 15 kilometers to the
2 south-east of Kagayan approximately 500 hiding com-
3 munists are being searched with the attempt of ousting.

4 "April 5. Fifty-three anti-Japanese radicals
5 were captured at Taipin. At Penan, we are to make a
6 round up before long.

7 "April 16. As the result of the search by
8 our Gendarmerie, we have disclosed the plot movement
9 of British battle beaten remaining soldiers and a
10 certain party of Chinese communists (it seems to be
11 under the leadership of CHENG-CHIEH-MIN). Accordingly,
12 after the further searching out of the location of
13 the wireless apparatus, we expect to capture this
14 group."

15 That is the whole of that document.

16 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continuing)

17 Q Now, there are just two short matters I want to
18 ask you about further, Colonel Wild. One is this:
19 Did you, while in captivity, get to know of any
20 protests that were being made by the British Govern-
21 ment about your treatment?

22 A Yes, we did.

23 Q When for the first time?

24 A In so far as they were broadcast, from soon
25 after we were taken prisoner of war.

WILD

DIRECT

1 Q In particular, do you remember the speech by
2 Mr. Eden coming through?

3 A I read the full text of Mr. Eden's protest
4 regarding the Burma-Siam Railway in Changhi Camp the
5 day after it had been delivered.

6 Q Do you remember the date, approximately?

7 A I would say January, 1944. It made a great
8 impression on us at the time as we had left Siam only
9 a few weeks before, and it read like the statement of
10 an eye witness.

11 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
12 fifteen minutes.

13 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken
14 until 1500, at which time the proceedings were
15 resumed as follows:)

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WILD

DIRECT

D
u
d
a
&
W
h
a
l
e
n

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Major Moore.

4 MAJOR MOORE: Mr. President, if the Tribunal
5 please, I refer to the pronoun "I" in prosecution's
6 document No. 2647, page 38, third line from the bottom.

7 The clause should read, "It should be judged
8 that . . ." or, "It is our judgment that . . ." The
9 reference is to the final judgment of those who were
10 preparing the investigation.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

12 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

13 Q How did you get the information through in
14 the prison camps that you have been telling us about?

15 A In every camp I was in we always had our
16 secret wireless receivers with which we used to listen
17 in to the B.B.C., New Delhi, Australia, Chungking,
18 and San Francisco.

19 Q Did the Japanese ever discover them?

20 A I remember their discovery of one at Kan-
21 buri within a day or so of my arrival there from the
22 jungle.

23 Q What did they do to the people concerned?

24 A They were six British officers; three of
25 them had been concerned in it and three had not been

WILD

DIRECT

1 concerned in it, although they lived in the same hut.
2 Under the directions of the Japanese camp commandant,
3 these six British officers were flogged with heavy
4 sticks for four hours, between about one o'clock in
5 the morning and about five o'clock in the morning.
6 Two of them died after about two and a half hours'
7 flogging.

8 The case was one of the first to be tried
9 in Singapore, and the Japanese officer and his chief
10 assistants were hanged and the remainder were sen-
11 tenced to long terms of imprisonment.

12 Q Since you have been engaged in war crimes
13 investigation in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia
14 Command, approximately how many cases have been brought
15 to trial there?

16 A Over three hundred by now; including those
17 undergoing trial, nearly four hundred.

18 Q And with what results, again broadly stated?

19 A Well **over** a hundred death sentences and about
20 a hundred and fifty terms of imprisonment.

21 Q Have some been acquitted?

22 A About fifty.

23 Q Now, is that exclusive of those brought to
24 trial by Australian courts, Dutch courts and American
25 courts?

WILD

DIRECT

1 A Exclusive, except that some of the Dutch,
2 American, and so on, cases have been tried in Singa-
3 pore; but excluding a large number tried in areas
4 outside Singapore.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is all I have to ask
6 the witness.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

8 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honors please, this
9 witness has travelled a long and circuitous road
10 covering a vast territory--

11 THE PRESIDENT: Now, you must examine him
12 and not give us a sermon on his evidence.

13 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, I am--

14 THE PRESIDENT: No preliminary statements,
15 Mr. Blewett. Proceed with your cross-examination.

16 MR. BLEWETT: That statement, your Honor,
17 was preliminary to a motion that the testimony of
18 this witness not supported by his own personal know-
19 ledge of the facts be stricken from the record.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We have announced from time
21 to time during the trial that hearsay is admissible
22 under the Charter.. Its probative value will depend
23 on all the circumstances..

24 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, this
25 defense panel is entirely satisfied that the Members

WILD

CROSS

1 of this Court will distinguish between hearsay and
2 factual evidence. But for those who may read this
3 record from various parts of the world, including,
4 perhaps, future law students, the defense feels that
5 it is customary that such motions should be of record.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming that
7 all the Members of this Tribunal will reject hearsay.
8 Some may, and some may not. We do not admit it for
9 the mere purpose of rejecting it.

10 MR. BLEWETT: I shall proceed with the wit-
11 ness, your Honor.

12 CROSS-EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. BLEWETT:

14 Q Did you meet and speak with Colonel SUGITA?

15 A Was the name SUGITA?

16 Q Yes, SUGITA.

17 A I did.

18 Q Where was the Colonel confined? Where was he
19 located?

20 A At the time I spoke to him he was in Sugamo
21 Prison.

22 Q What was the date?

23 A I spoke to him on three successive days, I
24 should think about a fortnight ago. I can't quote the
25 dates from memory exactly.

WILD

CROSS

1 Q Where is Colonel SUGITA at the present time?

2 A I have at last succeeded in getting him
3 transferred to Singapore, having originally asked for
4 his arrest on the 18th of September, last year. He
5 was No. 2 on my original list of "Wanted" forwarded
6 on the 18th of September last year to Supreme Allied
7 Command, Southeast Asia.

8 Q Do you know where Colonel SUGITA is at the
9 present time?

10 A I hope he is in Singapore by now. If not, he
11 is on his way there. Arrangements for his transfer
12 had already been made before I saw him; and I considered
13 myself lucky to catch him before he left.

14 Q Upon what date did he leave Tokyo?

15 A Not less than ten days ago; I should think
16 probably two weeks ago. I can't recall exactly, off-
17 hand.

18 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, I have been
19 asked by the majority of defense counsel that your
20 Honor issue a bench warrant for Colonel SUGITA.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I know of no such procedure
22 except in the case of a witness who has been subpoenaed
23 and has failed to attend. As far as I am aware, there
24 has been no subpoena for SUGITA.

25 The defense will be at liberty to ask the

WILD

CROSS

1 Court to issue a subpoena for his attendance, and if
2 he fails to attend the Bench may take steps to enforce
3 his attendance. That is all I can say.

4 MR. BLEWETT: If your Honor please, defense
5 respectfully points out that this witness is the only
6 person that can testify to these facts. The prosecution
7 no doubt knows of his whereabouts, of what station he
8 has reached on his way to Singapore.

9 THE PRESIDENT: I will be prepared to deal
10 with any application made by the defense for the issue
11 of subpoena for his attendance. But it must be made
12 in chambers as other applications of the kind have been
13 made, and must be supported by particulars, the nature
14 of which we have indicated frequently enough.

15 MR. BLEWETT: We shall so follow the rule,
16 your Honor.

17 Q With whom did you communicate at Singapore
18 headquarters on December 8, 1941?

19 A If I remember rightly, what I said was that
20 we were in immediate communication with Singapore. At
21 that time I was a G.3, a captain; and the senior
22 officer in operations room at the time of that incident
23 was a G.S.O.2, a Major Anderson. We took calls as they
24 came in, but I can't say at this distance of time who
25 exactly was at the other end of the wire, except that

WILD

CROSS

1 he was the appropriate officer on duty in the operations
2 room of the Malaya Command at that time.

3 Q What transpired as to headquarters having any
4 information regarding declaration of war?

5 A There was some indignation at the fact that
6 the attack had been made without declaration of war,
7 which was something known within an hour or so, I sup-
8 pose, to every staff officer in Malaya.

9 Q Who actually gave you the information, Colonel?

10 A I recall that that was one of the questions
11 put to Malaya Command as soon as the announcement of
12 the attack had come in, and the conversation occurred
13 immediately afterwards between Major Anderson and my-
14 self, commenting on the fact, and with other officers
15 who came in, including the Brigadier and the corps
16 commander; added to which, had such a declaration been
17 received by Malaya Command it would have been in corps
18 headquarters within two minutes and it would have been
19 the immediate duty of Major Anderson and myself to dis-
20 tribute it to the two divisions and thence to brigades,
21 and so on, throughout the whole army corps.

22
23
24
25

WILD

CROSS

G
r
e
e
n
b
e
r
g
&
B
a
r
t
o
n

1 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Wild, would you
2 kindly speak in shorter sentences and pause for
3 translation if you can manage to do so?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I will, your Honor.

5 Q From whom did you learn of the landings at
6 Singora and Patani?

7 A By telephone message from probably the
8 Brigade Major or Staff Captain of 8th Indian Brigade
9 with headquarters at Kota Bahru. Within a short
10 time of that I was relieved and went off duty, and
11 I heard about the Singora and Patani landings on my
12 return to the Operations room where my co-commander
13 was holding a conference.

14 Q From where did the signal come?

15 A From Kota Bahru.

16 Q What is the distance from that Kula Lampar --

17 A Kuala Lumpur.

18 Q (Continuing) Kuala Lumpur to the Siamese
19 border?

20 A Between 300 by road -- between 300; no, I'm
21 wrong. About 300 miles.

22 Q At exactly what point did the Japanese and
23 British first clash after the landings at Singora and
24 Patani?

25 A There were two points. I'm not sure which

WILD

CROSS

1 came first. Both were just over the border into
2 Siam, we in Corps headquarters having authorized
3 our troops to cross the border after we heard the
4 Japanese had attacked. The two points were just
5 north of Kroh: K-r-o-h, just north of Padang Besar.

6 Q Would one of these places be Ban Sadao:
7 B-a-n S-a-d-a-o?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Could the other place have been L-e-d-d-e?

10 A I don't remember that name. It is an un-
11 usual spelling for a name in that part of the world.

12 Q But they did clash at two locations.

13 A They did.

14 Q And where are these two locations with re-
15 spect to the borderline of Siam and Malaya?

16 A They are **north** of the border inside Siam.

17 Q How far?

18 A I speak entirely from recollection of some
19 years ago on this point, and I have no map. I think
20 the Kroh column advanced about thirty miles in an
21 attempt to hold a defensive position called the
22 Ledge, it being impossible to defend the position
23 just south of the border on that road.

24 Q And did these operations occur on the morn-
25 ing of December the 8th, 1941?

WILD

CROSS

1 A I should say that the one on the west coast
2 occurred pretty late on the 8th, if not in the early
3 hours of the 9th. The first clash on the Kroh Road
4 took place as soon as the border was crossed. It
5 was, I think, some time after daylight, perhaps in
6 the middle of the morning, of the 8th.

7 Q Was there any agreement at that time be-
8 tween the Siamese Government and the Japanese as to
9 the movement of troops?

10 A None that we knew.

11 Q Was a treaty of alliance concluded between
12 the two nations later?

13 A Some time during the Japanese occupation,
14 if one calls it that, in Siam, I believe it was con-
15 cluded.

16 Q Would you agree that it was the 21st of
17 December, 1941?

18 A That I don't remember.

19 Q How many troops did the British have in
20 Malaya at that time?

21 A I can tell you in formations but not in
22 numbers. One Indian division of the northwest; one
23 weak Indian division, that is, less a brigade, on the
24 east coast; in Johore, two brigades of Australians;
25 on the island of Singapore, two brigades plus one

WILD

CROSS

1 reserve brigade: about half what was considered the
2 minimum necessary before the operation started.

3 Q What does a brigade consist of in your army
4 as to officers and men?

5 A It consists of three battalions of about
6 800 men and 30 officers. I am afraid I should have
7 to work the thing out a little to give you that
8 answer exactly.

9 Q Just tell me approximately the number of
10 men on Singapore island at that time.

11 A At what time?

12 Q December, 1941, just prior to December 8.

13 A I should think five British battalions --
14 I quote again from memory because I had nothing to
15 do with the island then -- and a brigade of Indians --
16 three battalions of Indians. I am afraid, without
17 reference to a contemporary order of battle, it is
18 quite impossible for me to answer questions on numer-
19 ical strength of units with authority. I can do it
20 for my own corps area, but that stopped not far south
21 of Kuala Lumpur.

22 Q I shall leave that question, Colonel, al-
23 though you told us the number of prisoners of war in
24 each locality very precisely.

25 A That was because of my duty there --

WILD

CROSS

1 Q I understand that you were not on Singapore
2 island at that time, and I shall not press that ques-
3 tion. When did your 3rd Indian Corps come to Kuala
4 Lumpur?

5 A The 3rd Indian Corps Headquarters came to
6 Kuala Lumpur in June, '41, and I joined them there
7 two months later.

8 Q What did you do in Japan from 1931 to 1940?

9 A I was on the staff of the Rising Sun Petrol-
10 eum Company, a company belonging to the Shell organ-
11 ization.

12 Q Where were you located?

13 A Nagoya, Sendai, Yokohama, Tokyo, Kyoto,
14 Hakata or Fukuoka.

15 Q And you are a student of the Japanese lang-
16 uage and history, are you not?

17 A During my last three and a half years in
18 the country, yes.

19 Q Are you author of any books or pamphlets?

20 A I am the author of a work on the first
21 century of foreign intercourse with Japan, sixteenth
22 and seventeenth century. It is called "Purcha's
23 His Pilgrimes in Japan."

24 Q Have you written anything other than that
25 regarding Japan?

WILD

CROSS

1 A Nothing.

2 Q How did you obtain the information that the
3 Japanese had ships in Singora and Patani?

4 A From aerial reconnaissance photographs, and
5 particularly from the intelligence reports. I was
6 in Operations myself.

7 Q What is the basis for your statement that
8 there were 3500 European nationals in Singapore at
9 the time of the surrender?

10 A Actually, the number was larger, but that
11 was the number that was interned. They were interned
12 in the camp immediately next door to ours.

13 Q What nations were in the majority?

14 A Presumably British, but I never read the
15 split by nations.

16 Q What is the source of your information that
17 these 3500 men, women and children were placed in
18 Changi Prison?

19 A Because Changi Prison was within two miles
20 of Changi Camp where I was confined for the early
21 part of my captivity, and there was contact between
22 the prisoners of war and the civilian internees. On
23 two occasions I went into Changi Prison myself and
24 talked to a lady internee there.

25 Q Was it from her you learned there were 3500?

WILD

CROSS

1 A I didn't discuss the question with her.

2 Q Exactly where did you get that figure of
3 3500?

4 A It was the -- I was going to say accepted
5 figure, the figure that I heard, in Changi POW Camp.

6 Q Well, then, you did not have that information
7 from your own personal knowledge, Colonel?

8 A No, from what I was told by other prisoners
9 of war. But there was contact, as I told you, be-
10 tween Changi Camp and Changi Prison.

11 Q I mean, how did that contact have to do
12 with you personally?

13 A There was something which the prisoners of
14 war were extremely irritated about, that their wives
15 and children -- many of them were married to the
16 people who were in the jail -- were being confined
17 within those walls of their prison. I was also con-
18 cerned in arranging with the Japanese for a visit of
19 such husbands to their wives, and it was, in fact,
20 arranged; not only husbands and wives, but also more
21 distant relatives. I gave the lists to the Japanese,
22 got their approval with certain erasures, and the
23 meeting, in fact, took place. I naturally talked to
24 a great number of those men when they came back. I
25 mention that as one source of information only.

WILD

CROSS

1 Finally, I was in the jail in April, 1944, at the
2 time when I was officially assisting a senior
3 officer to take over the jail. At that time, the
4 prisoners of war advance guard, to which I belonged,
5 overlapped for a short period with the civilian
6 internees' rear guard. Also, as interpreter, it was
7 my duty to argue with the Japanese over the over-
8 crowding of five thousand in the jail. And I re-
9 member that three thousand five hundred, the number
10 of the civilian internees, was one of the arguments
11 we used. It was not queried by the Japanese, although
12 their POW office also controlled the civilian intern-
13 ees.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
15 half-past nine tomorrow morning.

16 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-
17 ment was taken until Tuesday, 17 September
18 1946 at 0930.)
19
20 - - -
21
22
23
24
25

