11 Sept

I N D E X
Of
WITNESSES

I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS

(none)

Wednesday, 11 September 1946

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930.

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Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before: HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from India, now sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.)

Morse & Abram

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA and MATSUI who are represented by their respective counsel.

In order to make it a matter of record, General Cramer, the Member from the United States of America, asks me to state that he has read the transcript of the proceedings of the Tribunal that took place prior to his taking his seat as a Member thereof, and, also, that he has examined the exhibits introduced during that period and has familiarized himself therewith.

Mr. Comyns Carr.

C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D, called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q May it please the Tribunal. When we adjourned last evening, Colonel Wild, I was asking you about an interview on the 22nd of February, 1942, between Brigadier Newbiggin and yourself, on the one side, and Lieutenant Colonel SUGITA on the other. Did Brigadier

Newbiggin say something through you, or through anybody else who was there interpreting, to Lieutenant Colonel SUGITA?

A Yes, he did.

Q Just tell us what it was.

A Brigadier Newbiggin made a very strong protest to Colonel SUGITA, stating that on the previous day over one hundred Chinese had been killed with machine guns on the beach just outside the wire of the Changi prisoner of war camp. Brigadier Newbiggin also complained that the prisoners of war, British prisoners of war, had been ordered to go out and bury the dead bodies, of which they counted over one hundred.

Q What did Colonel SUGITA say?

A Colonel SUGITA replied in English, "These Chinese were bad men; that is why we have shot them. Have you anything else to ask?"

Q What did Brigadier Newbiggin say to that?

A Brigadier Newbiggin said, "Yes, I have got something to ask. I ask that you should not shoot any more Chinese and that you should not ask our men to assist you by burying them." Colonel SUGITA was very angry and replied, "We shall shoot them whenever we want to if we find bad men."

Q Now, about their being bad men, had there been

any trial?

A From the one survivor of that shooting we understood that there had been no trial whatever.

Q During the week when you had been free to drive about the city, as you have told us, had you seen any signs of looting or disorder?

A There was absolutely no disorder in Singapore that I saw, and I didn't see any looting. Most of the peolpe were still staying in their houses.

Q Now, Colonel Wild, before we go any further I want you to tell us a little more about your source of information in these matters apart from what you saw yourself. During the captivity did the Japanese segregate the officers from the men, as required by the Convention, or were they all put into the same camp?

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we object to that question on the ground it assumes that there was a Convention.

MR. COMYNS CARR: The Convention, I understand, is already in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: We should have to take judicial notice of it if it were not. The objection is overruled.

Q Will you answer the question?

A In all the areas where I was, and as far as I know everywhere except in Borneo, the officers were left with the other ranks, in the same camps.

Q You mentioned another exception yesterday, I think, the Indian officers.

A Some of the Indian officers were separated from their men. Those were the most conspicuously loyal ones. The others were left with their men.

Q But British officers of Indian regiments you told us yesterday were separated.

A That is correct. No British officers were allowed by the Japanese to continue serving with Indian troops after the surrender.

Q Being kept in the same camps with the men, did you find any advantage in that from the point of view of discipline and morale?

A Yes. British and Australian and other allied officers were enabled to continue their duties as officers, that is to say, they were able to maintain discipline and keep up morale among the troops.

Q And what became your particular duty under those circumstances with regard to complaints of the manner in which the troops and others were treated?

A I was always a member of the small prisoner of war headquarters in every camp that I was in, under

the command of the senior prisoner of war officer, and, as I was one of the few officers in captivity who spoke the enemy's language, it was always my duty to liais between the prisoners of war and the Japanese. I had to convey all prisonser of war requests and complaints to the Japanese officer and I had to try to settle on the spot any instance of ill treatment which was brought to my attention by the prisoners of war.

Q And for that purpose was it the duty of those who had complaints to bring them to you?

A Yes, to me or to my commanding officer.

Q The complaints would come to you either direct or through your commanding officer, then?

A Yes.

Q Did that apply, also, to officers coming in from other camps?

A It did, particularly at Changi which was the largest camp inside East Asia and was a kind of staging camp for the Netherlands East Indies, Borneo, Siam, and so on.

Q Now, since your captivity came to an end and the Japanese surrendered, has it been part of your duty as a war crimes investigation officer to investigate these matters from that end?

A Yes, it has been since the first of September,

1945.

Q Now, since the surrender, have you and your colleagues made an investigation of this matter of the slaughter of Chinese in Singapore about which you have told us one part already -- one part about which you were present at the complaint?

A It is a case which I or officers under my command have been investigating the last year.

Q Can you say how many Chinese were slaughtered by the Japanese immediately after the surrender?

A Yes, I can. The number was definitely considerably in excess of 5,000 men.

Q Had there been any storming of the city or anything which could justify or excuse, make an excuse for it that it was done in the course of a storming of the city?

MR. LOGAN: I object to that, if the Tribunal please, on the ground it is leading, and, secondly, it calls for a conclusion and an opinion which is for this Tribunal to decide and not this witness.

Q Don't trouble about the second part of the question. I don't think the first part can be objected to. Had there been a storming of the city?

A There was no fighting in the streets of Singapore city. At the time that the surrender was

signed, the three Japanese divisions were on the outskirts of the city and about to assault it. None of those three divisions entered the city. General YAMASHITA kept all three of them outside the city and never allowed them inside. The only troops who entered Singapore city during the weeks immediately following surrender were the Kempeitai and the Keibaitai, the military police and the garrison troops. Order was maintained in the city under the terms of the surrender by five hundred armed British troops until the Japanese took the city over in the early morning, the night of the 16th of February, a peaceful take-over.

Whalen & Duda

Q Before the surrender, had General YAMASHITA issued an appeal in writing or otherwise to the British to surrender?

A Yes.

Q What were the terms, or what did he say?

A A letter was dropped into my Indian Corps area on the 10th of February from General YAMASHITA to General Percival which we passed to General Percival.

Q What was the ground mentioned? Did you see it afterwards?

A I read it myself. The grounds upon which General YAMASHITA asked for the surrender of Singapore were that the lives of the civil population should be spared the horrors of an assault on a city in which there were more than a quarter million inhabitants.

Q These 5,000 Chinese whom you have told us they massacred, were they civilian or military?

A The great majority of them were civilians, but among them there were some of the Strait Settlements volunteers who had been disbanded by us before the fall of the city.

Q I pass from that for the moment. Did you go to Changi Camp from Fort Canning about the 20th of February?

A I was going almost daily during that week

from Fort Canning to Changi.

Q About how many British and Australian prisoners of war were concentrated there?

A About 50,000.

Q Now, at that time what orders were issued by the Japanese about saluting?

A The orders were that all prisoners of war irrespective of rank were to salute all Japanese and Indian guards.

Q What happened if that order was not obeyed?

A If anyone failed to salute a Japanese sentry he automatically got beaten up.

Q And if you were not wearing a cap or hat what did you have to do then?

A The order was that prisoners not wearing caps, and therefore unable to salute, must make a profound bow to the Japanese or Indian.

Q Did that continue the whole period of your captivity?

A As regards saluting, everywhere that I was; with regard to the bowing, not in camps where I was.

Q Were British and Allied officers allowed to wear their rank badges?

A All British and Allied officers in Changi and other camps on Singapore Island were forbidden to

wear their badges of rank from February 1942 until we got permission to wear them again in April 1944.

Q Now, will you tell us about working camps and working parties at Singapore? Was the first one at River Valley Road?

A I think there was one before at Farrar Park, a temporary one; but River Valley Road was the first permanent working camp on Singapore Island.

Q And were you sent there on the 13th of March 1942 with a working party?

A Yes, I was.

Q About how many?

A About 1500.

Q Now, will you describe the accommodation at this place?

A The accommodation consisted of atap roof huts, double-decker huts, with wooden planking six feet wide running down two sides of an earthen gangway. The accommodation in these huts, the allowance per man, was from two and a quarter to two and a half feet by six feet of wooden planking. Upwards of 200 men were accommodated in each hut 120 feet long.

Q Was there any bedding or sleeping mats of any kind?

A No, none were provided.

Q What were the walls made of?

A The walls were made of some kind of palm leaf which got quickly eaten away by ants, and after a few weeks there were no walls.

Q Did the men sleep in these places or prefer not to?

A There was a great plague of bedbugs and in fine weather the men preferred to sleep outside as nothing was provided to deal with these pests.

Q Were there any cook houses?

A None when we arrived, only the huts.

Q How many men were confined in what space there, in all?

A By April 1942 our numbers had gone up to 4500, and we were confined in a space about 130 yards by 180 yards square.

Q Was there any sanitation whatever?

A There was no sanitation whatever when we arrived there, and no tools were provided for about a week to provide ourselves with any.

Q Did you complain to the Japanese in charge about that?

A I did complain very strongly, pointing out particularly that it was raining continuously most of the first week and the ground was water-logged, and

there was no place in the camp for the men to perform their normal functions.

Q What did the Japanese officer say to that?

A He said you were to scratch holes in the ground with your hands. At the end of each day when you filled up that hole you scratch another hole, and so on, for the first week. I pointed out that all the ground in the camp would be fouled by the end of a week, and he said at the end of the week you must dig up the first hole again with your hands and use it over again.

Q Finally did you manage to make direct contact with the municipal authorities and get some buckets?

A Yes, we contacted the municipality and got from them several hundred lidded buckets.

Q Did you have any outbreak of illness consequent upon this?

A There was an immediate outbreak of dysentery.

Q Did you have any other disease outbreak in that camp besides dysentery?

A There were a number of deficiency diseases which became very prevalent.

Q What was the highest number of men that were put into that River Valley Camp?

A Our peak number was 6000.

Q And was there another camp on Havelock Road?

A Yes, there was, with a peak number of 3500 men in it and under the control of our POW headquarters.

Q And how many were there in Havelock Road?

A The peak number in Havelock Road was 3500, and the peak number for the two camps combined under the POW headquarters to which I belonged was 9500.

Q Were conditions in Havelock Road better or worse than in River Valley?

A They were exactly the same.

Q Were the troops in the two camps commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Heath?

A Yes, they were.

Q Did you act as Brigade Major, interpreter and liaison officer?

A Yes, I did, for the two camps combined.

Q Now, up to December 1942 about how many prisoners of war passed through the two camps?

A Over 15,000.

Q How many of these had to be sent to hospital?

A Over 3000.

Q Where did the rest go?

A About 500 went overseas, I believe to Japan; several thousands went overland to the Burma-Siam Railway, and 5000 returned with me to Changi Camp in

December '43. I should say December 1942.

Q What was the food condition in those camps?

A As regards the bulk of the food issued it was quite good during those nine months. It was, however, deficient in vitamin content, with the result that many of these deficiencies occurred -- deficiency diseases occurred.

Q Did you make application for rice polishings as a remedy for that?

A Yes, many applications.

Q Was there a supply available to your knowledge?

A There was a very large supply available at the Johore Bahru rice mills. Some of the other camps were drawing regularly from the Johore Bahru rice mills including the Great World Camp which was only a quarter of a mile away.

Q Were you permitted to draw any for your camps?

A No, every application was refused.

Q Did the Japanese supply any clothing or boots at all?

A From the Japanese themselves, I do not recall that we received any clothing or boots during that period.

Q Did you get some from the International Red Cross?

A Yes, we did, in about June or July, 1942.

Q During the whole of your three and a half years of captivity, was there any other delivery of Red Cross parcels that came, to your knowledge?

A There were a very few extremely small deliveries made during the succeeding three years, but this was the only large delivery which ever reached us.

Q For instance, during the whole time, how much did you personally receive?

A I received, in three and a half years, the equivalent of one and a half weekly parcels -- food parcels -- of the type, I mean, which prisoners of war in Europe expected to receive weekly.

Q Now, do you remember an incident on the 29th of July, 1942 in these work camps?

A Yes, I do.

Q Just describe it, would you?

A The Japanese gave us orders to parade all the men who were inside Havelock Road Camp one afternoon. This included a considerable number of men whom the Japanese had agreed need not go out to work that day because they had no boots. It also included the cooks and other men who had duty in the camp, including medical orderlies and the chaplain. These men --

Q Did it also include any sick men?

A Yes, it did. It included those men who were excused duty on account of sickness.

Q What happened then?

A The whole party was marched over to a field just outside River Valley Road Camp, and Colonel Heath and I were summoned to come there, also. The Japanese Commandant of the two camps then addressed the troops through his own interpreter in my presence. He told them that they were lazy and showing ingratitude for all the kindness that they were receiving. He then ordered all these men to march to a car park which was being constructed next to the camp. It was soft ground which was being hardened up with broken brick. All these men were then made to double 'round

the car park in a large circle. Japanese guards stood in the middle of the circle and beat the men on their bottoms with their rifle butts to keep them going. As most of the men were bootless, they found the going very heavy on the broken brick, and there was a certain amount of broken glass about as well, and some of them got their feet cut.

Q What did you do?

A As soon as Colonel Heath and I saw what was happening, we went and had a very heated argument with the Japanese officer who was supervising this circus. Gradually, I got him to detach from the circus the cooks and the medical orderlies and some of the sick, while the others continued to run 'round. Finally, Colonel Heath and I managed to stop the performance altogether.

Q When it was stopped, what did the officer say?

A He called the prisoners together and said to them, through his interpreter, "I have taught you to dance in bare feet. Now you will work in bare feet."

Q Now, during the period you've been speaking of, March to December, 1942, where were these men working?

A Some of them were working on cleaning up

Singapore, but most of them were working at the docks.

Q What were they handling there?

A They were handling outgoing cargo, consisting of the loot of Malaya, and incoming cargo as well.

Q What did the incoming cargo consist of?

A It consisted of a great variety of material, including supplies for the Japanese forces and, sometimes, ammunition.

Q Did Colonel Heath make any complaint about that matter, that is, that his men were being compelled to unload ammunition?

A Yes, he did.

Q Did the Japanese pay any attention to it?

A They said, "It can't be helped. It is our orders, and you are our prisoners." That's the term of it. I can't remember exactly.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

BY COMYNS CARR (Continued):

Q Colonel Wild, just tell us about the conditions under which these men were working in the docks?

A They marched to and from their place of work. Owing to a shortage of clothing they always marched and worked stripped to the waist. Many of them had no hats.

Q What ultimately happened to the controversy as to whether they should work without boots?

A We won that daily battle and managed to keep bootless men in the camp.

Q During this period can you tell us anything of the treatment of the general officers -- British general officers?

A Yes. It was a matter of common talk among all the prisoners of war who were infuriated by the way in which general officers had been treated.

Q Did you manage to interview your own corps commander on this subject?

A Yes, I did.

Q What is his name?

A Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath.

Q When was that?

A On one of my frequent visits to Changi from the River Valley Road, probably in July 1942.

Q Still 1942, yes. What did he tell you?

A He told me that he had been interrogated by the Japanese at Changi Prison. He showed me a very dignified letter which he had written to the Japanese explaining that he was unable to answer certain questions regarding the defenses of India. He was then placed in a car and driven to Fort Canning where he was again interrogated by a Japanese Major. In the course of this interrogation when General Heath was not looking the Major came around the table and hit him a full-armed blow with his fist under the jaw. Under the orders of the Japanese Major he was then seized by four Japanese soldiers with rifles and bayonets who took him to an underground room in the precincts of Fort Canning. This was a small room which was normally air-conditioned, but as there was no air-conditioning at the time, there was no ventilation whatever. There was an inch or so of water on the floor and a lot of mosquitoes, and no furniture. There was a basin fixed in the wall, and the Japanese Major came in, tested the water and found it was running and then went outside the cell and turned

the water off outside. Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath was then left there in the dark for forty-eight hours without food or water. At the time he was fifty-six or fifty-seven and suffering from dysentery.

Q What was the method of the Japanese in dealing with sick prisoners of war?

A They were left to the care of our own medical officers and medical orderlies.

Q Did they make any attempt to hold medical inspections of their own?

A No regular inspections; only on special occasions when we drew to their attention some serious outbreak.

Q What hospital facilities were there?

A In the camp there were two of the standard huts which were set aside for the sick, but we did get permission from the Japanese to evacuate serious cases by lorry to Changi Hospital.

Q Now, after the surrender, were you required to supply complete nominal rolls of all the captured prisoners?

A Yes, we were.

Q And also those known to have been killed in action and died of wounds?

A Yes.

Q Did the Japanese inform you what these were wanted for?

A They told us that they were required by Tokyo for transmission to the British and Australian Governments.

Q Did you ever get any indication while you were in captivity as to whether they had been so transmitted?

A It seemed to us highly unlikely -- in fact, impossible -- that they had been for various reasons. From letters which we received in the camp it was clear that the first news which had reached home of many hundreds of men was that contained in the first post cards which we were allowed to write about six months after we were taken prisoner.

Q Now, throughout your captivity, both in Singapore and on the Burma-Siam Railway, were you required to supply particulars of such things as deaths of prisoners of war and other information about them?

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, many of these questions which the able prosecutor has been asking are rather leading, and I think we might have a direction from the Tribunal that he make his questions hereafter less leading than heretofore.

THE PRESIDENT: Those questions are not

prisoners of war to that office on the day on which they occurred. It was a matter of regular routine that those casualty lists were sent to Tokyo; and on certain occasions which I can remember, officers of the Malayan POW Administration went to Tokyo by air or ship to report to the headquarters of the POW Administration in Tokyo.

Q About how often were these lists of deaths sent to Tokyo?

A That I cannot say definitely but the office worked well. It was quite an efficient office and it worked to a regular routine. I have an idea that it was a question of monthly returns but I could not state that positively.

Q Now, you have spoken of the prisoner of war organization that was set up in September, 1942. Just tell us about that.

A Until September, 1942, we were under the control of the 25th Army headquarters and working camps were under the control of different Japanese units. In September, 1942, we were told that everything had been changed, that we had now become real prisoners of war, and that we had been taken over by an administration centered on Tokyo. We were removed from the control of the 25th Army and were put in

leading in the sense that they suggest the answer, certainly. It seems to me that each question is followed from an answer already given. I see no reason why I should intervene.

Q Then, Major Wild, will you just tell us about this question of supplying to the Japanese, I mean, on their demand, particulars of what happened to prisoners of war during their captivity. Just describe this system.

A I will illustrate it by describing the situation at Changi Camp, which was the largest and most important prisoner of war camp in Southeast Asia. At the Japanese headquarters of Changi Camp, there was a special office which dealt entirely with prisoner of war records. It was controlled by the Japanese and under them there were working there a British captain, sometimes as many as four or five British officers, and several British of other ranks. From September, 1942, when prisoners of war were taken over by the official Prisoners of War Administration Department, card index system was kept and we were informed that one card was to stay with the prisoner and the other one was sent to Tokyo. Complete casualty lists were kept in that office; deaths were reported with full details by the

charge of special body of officers -- Japanese officers -- and other ranks who belonged specifically and entirely to the POW Administration. Similar instructions were given at the same time -- about the same time -- to the prisoners of war in the Netherlands East Indies, and I heard them from officers who came from the Netherlands East Indies a month or so later. Malaya and Sumatra were grouped together into one POW area under the command of Major General FUKUYE and of the POW Administration.

Q Did he take his orders and make his report to anybody else in the area or direct to Tokyo?

A As regards the care and administration of prisoners of war, he took his orders from Tokyo. He had no duties whatever outside the administration of prisoners of war. He liaised with the commander on the spot regarding the provision of labor for various projects and was also under his instructions in matters of defended localities, and so on -- defense of the area.

Q With regard to labor, what were the relations between the Prisoners of War Department, which you have told us administered camps, and the people who wanted the labor and controlled or used the labor?

A I will illustrate that again by quoting a situation in Changi. For about three years a large number of prisoners of war were constructing a military aerodrome in Changi. The Japanese Army indented on General FUKUE's headquarters for how many laborers a day. The POW Headquarters at Changi then decided how many prisoners of war were to go out to work. While they were at work during the day, they worked under the directions of the aerodrome construction regiment engaged on the work. They were marched to and from work by guards of the POW Administration. Complaints of ill-treatment at work were made to the Japanese general in charge of prisoners of war or his headquarters, and if they saw fit, they complained to the Japanese Army Headquarters. The power of the POW Administration was such that I recall on one occasion Major General SAITO to have the POW Administration withhold all labor from the aerodrome one afternoon in view of our complaints of ill-treatment to which our men had been

subjected.

Q You told us that the Army indented for a certain number of laborers and the POW organization supplied them. Suppose there was a shortage, what happened, who decided on that?

A The POW Administration argued the thing out with us British officers, and it was the POW Administration who decided.

Q Supposing the required number could not be made up without sending sick men. Who decided that?

A Ultimately the POW Administration, but no one could be taken out of the camp without their permission.

Q Well, now, I would like to complete this subject. Tell us, on the Burma-Siam Railway, in your experience, as far as the basis of the Administration went, was it any different from what you have been describing, the system?

A No, the system was the same, the commanding officer being a Major General in charge of POW Administration in Siam. His position was exactly parallel to the GOC prisoners of war in Malaya and Sumatra.

Q And with regard to the making and

transmission to Tokyo of records of deaths of prisoners of war, was that carried on in the Burma-Siam Railway in the same way that you have described?

A Exactly the same way.

Q Now I should like to come to the question of the Red Cross. Was there an Australian Red Cross Commissioner, Mr. Guest, in Singapore?

A Yes, in Changi Camp.

Q Was he being treated by the Japanese as a prisoner or as a free man?

A He was treated as a prisoner of war, and I had many arguments trying to get him officer's status from the Japanese.

Q In January 1943, did you take him to the Japanese Commandant of the camp?

A Yes, I did.

Q Did you obtain permission for him to visit Mr. Schweitzer in Singapore?

A Yes, I did succeed in that.

Q Did you ask, make any request as to Mr. Schweitzer's coming to the camp?

A I did not. I don't recall doing so myself, but I recall Mr. Guest made an official report on his visit to Mr. Schweitzer on his return to tell me that

he had made such a request.

Q Was he, Mr. Schweitzer, permitted to visit the camp?

A Not until the war was over.

Q And in Mr. Guest's report did he mention whether Mr. Schweitzer had himself made request to visit it?

A Mr. Guest gave me a full account of his meeting with Mr. Schweitzer as soon as he returned to Changi Camp. He said Mr. Schweitzer had told him that he had been asking the Japanese again and again for the past year for permission to visit prisoner of war camps but that this had always been refused. Mr. Schweitzer was not interned because he was a Swiss; he was living in Singapore and was recognized by the Japanese as the Red Cross representative.

Q And were you there when he, for the first time, succeeded in making a visit after the war was over?

A Yes, about a week after the war ended, I would say about the 22nd or 25th of August last year, I saw Mr. Schweitzer being conducted aroung Changi Camp by the Japanese.

Q When Mr. Guest visited Mr. Schweitzer in January 1943, did Mr. Schweitzer give him anything

for the prisoners of war?

A He gave him fifty thousand dollars, that is Straits dollars, as a present from the Red Cross and said that he was willing to supply at least the same amount monthly thereafter.

Q Did he give him anything else, any medical supplies?

A He got him some spectacles.

Q Was the fact that he had made these gifts made known to the Japanese? Do you know?

A It was done quite openly, and at my interview with the Japanese, when I introduced Mr. Guest, I had given them a personal promise that everything would be done on high level Red Cross standards.

Q After this visit, was Mr. Guest ever allowed by the Japanese to see Mr. Schweitzer again?

A Once or twice within the next few weeks, but his visits to Mr. Schweitzer were stopped about March or April, 1943. He never saw him again until the end of the war. The Japanese also ordered us not to receive any more money from Mr. Schweitzer.

Q During the whole of your captivity either in Malaya or in the Burma-Siam Railway, did you ever see any representative, either of the Red Cross or of

the protecting power, who would also be a Swiss, or were you ever able to get in touch with one?

A The answer to your question is "never."

MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, I would like to explain that that is far from being a reflection upon the Swiss. At another part of the case we shall give evidence as to the efforts which they were making.

Q During the whole of that time, were you ever allowed to hold any communication with your own Government or any of the governments -- Allied governments who were represented -- who had nationals in the camp?

A Never.

Q Did you attempt to get in touch either with your own government or to obtain permission, I mean, from the Japanese to get in touch either with your own government or the protecting power?

A We made many such attempts, particularly asking the Japanese to let us apply for drugs, medicines, books and other necessities, and to report casualties. We offered, of course, to do it quite openly and under the control of a Japanese officer.

Q Even with regard to higher Japanese authority, were you ever permitted to bring your complaints to

anybody superior to the people whom you saw?

A It was always difficult to get past the barriers created by junior Japanese officers, but on rare occasions I, myself, did get access to the Major General of the POW Administration, and once to a full Colonel on the Burma-Siam Railway.

Q What correspondence were you allowed to send?

A I, myself, was allowed to send five post-cards of twenty-five words each to my family in three and one-half years.

Q Was there any warning or instruction given by the Japanese as to what might not be mentioned in them?

A There was a long list of regulations. We were not allowed to mention the country we were in or anything to do with the camp we were in or anything regarding our food, treatment, shortage of drugs, et cetera. We were told that if we said good things about the camps, postcards would be expedited; and if we infringed these regulations, our postcards would be torn up without explanation.

Q What happened to incoming mail?

A Incoming mail arrived in Changi Camp where it was sorted by prisoners of war under the supervision

of their officers. As a result of this sorting, mail for outlying camps or for Burma or Siam was despatched there in the original bags. The rest was kept for censoring by the Japanese.

Q Did that result in delays?

A Very long delays resulted ranging from weeks to months. I, myself, at the end of the war found four sacks of forgotten mail in a garage at the back of General SAITO's house at Changi.

Q In February, about the middle of February, 1942, did you receive a report or description from Major James Bull of the Royal Army Medical Corps?

A Yes, I did.

Q Just describe to us what it was about, and what he told you, would you?

THE PRESIDENT: It is almost twelve, Mr. Carr. We will recess now until one-thirty.

(Whereupon, at 1157, a recess was taken.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,

called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q Colonel Wild, when the Tribunal adjourned you were just beginning to tell us about a report made out from Major Bull. What was that about?

A It was about a massacre at the Alexandra Hospital on Singapore Island on the 12th and 13th of February, 1942.

Q Tell us what he said.

A He told me that on the 11th, or early in the morning of the 12th of February, 1942, the British line was withdrawn to a distance a long way in rear of Alexandra Hospital. I knew this was correct before, because I was present when the plans were made for that withdrawal. The high command rang

up the commandant of Alexandra Hospital, Colonel Craven, and told him that the withdrawal was about to take place and that his hospital would be left in an unprotected area. The hospital, which was the largest military hospital in Singapore or Malaya, was already well marked with Red Cross signs. In addition, in preparation for the unopposed arrival of the Japanese forces, a large number of extra Red Cross flags were displayed at every approach.

Q What did the Japanese do when they arrived there, according to Major Bull?

A According to a number of other officers to whom I spoke at that time, including Colonel Craven, the Japanese came into the hospital and went through the ground floors in it with a bayonet. The Japanese troops bayoneted or shot everyone whom they saw on the ground floor of the hospital.

Q Did they go into the operating room?

A They entered the operating theatre and bayoneted a wounded soldier who was under chloroform on the operating table. They bayoneted the surgeon who was doing the operation and killed them both. They bayoneted another medical officer, who was the anaesthetist. He survived and told me the story himself. He showed me the scars on his hands, where

he had caught hold of the bayonet, and the scars on his chest where it had penetrated. Major Bull was on the top veranda of the hospital. Realizing what was happening, he went onto the veranda and held out at the full stretch of his arms a Red Cross flag. His intention was to display the Red Cross flag to a Japanese officer whom he saw standing on the ground below. A bullet immediately passed through the Red Cross flag and struck the wall behind Major Bull. Major Bull lowered the flag, looked down and saw the Japanese officer directing the fire of a Japanese soldier who was standing beside him. The Japanese then entered the hospital wards. They made every wounded soldier who could stand on his feet get out of bed. If he was able to walk at all he was made to walk downstairs and out of the hospital. A friend of mine, a British officer, was lying in bed, his leg having been broken by a wound and his leg was in plaster of Paris. The Japanese soldier struck him on the leg with his rifle butt. In another ward a Japanese soldier took the pin out of a hand grenade and held it up for the patients to see. Altogether more than 200 men were taken out of the hospital by the Japanese. Among them was a medical officer from Kobe, called Captain Allardyce. He volunteered to

Colonel Craven, as he spoke some Japanese, to go find a senior Japanese officer and try to stop what was happening.

Q Where were these men taken to who had been brought out of the hospital?

A They were taken to some houses about half a mile away from the hospital, where they were shut up pretty tightly in some small rooms. Five of them died of suffocation during that night.

Q What happened the next morning?

A The next morning they were all taken out of these houses and bayoneted or machine gunned outside. Captain Allardyce was among those killed.

Q Did any escape?

A Five of them escaped. One of them, an officer, told me this story afterwards.

Q In addition to the 200 wounded whom you say were killed, what about the medical officers and orderlies?

A The total number killed were, medical officers, British medical officers, not less than 20; British medical orderlies, not less than 60; wounded, not less than 200. We collected and buried their bodies from River Valley Road Camp three months later.

Q Now, will you tell us something of what

happened at Parit Sulong in January of 1942?

A In January, 1942, a battle was going on in northwestern Johore in Malaya. I was at that time on the staff of the Third Indian Corps. I recall clearly that for some days we were very much worried at Third Indian Corps regarding the extrication of an ambulance convoy containing wounded.

Q Who were these wounded, what nationality?

A They were Australians and Indians. We were unable to extricate that ambulance convoy and my corps commander's hope was that it contained none except wounded and the Japanese would let it pass through.

Q Was there any survivor of it?

A There was one survivor of it.

Q Tell us his name, and any report you had from him.

A His name is Lieutenant Ben Hackney, of the 2/29 Battalion, Australian Imperial Forces. He told me the story. He made an official report to me in Changi on two separate occasions and has since made the same reports in affidavit form.

Q Tell us the contents.

A The wounded were two days and two nights in the convoy, moving from the direction of Maur

to Parit Sulong. They were finally captured by the Japanese at Parit Sulong Bridge. All of the wounded were taken out of the ambulances into the road. They were then driven along the road by stabbing with bayonets and beating with rifle butts. They were made to sit down together and strip themselves naked.

Q How many were there of each nationality?

A 110 Australians, was Hackney's figure, and 35 to 40 Indians. By this time some of them were dead. Their clothes were then thrown back at them in a heap and they were told to put them on. They were again driven along the road in the same manner and were forced into some small coolie quarters just off the road. Lieutenant Hackney said that the wounded were lying two or three deep on the floor and that he and six other officers were tied up on the veranda outside. They were given no water.

Q Did any senior Japanese officer arrive during these proceedings?

A Yes. After a large number of Japanese troops had been pouring down the road, there was a gap and then a special convoy arrived. It consisted of a number of staff cars, escorted in front and behind by tanks. A very senior officer got out of the convoy and was greeted with presented arms

and salute. He then came up to the building and looked inside at the wounded. He then turned away, appeared to give some orders to the Japanese on the spot, re-entered his car and disappeared.

Duda & Whalen

Q What happened after he had left?

A The Japanese took all the wounded out of this room and tied them together in bunches of five with signal wire.

Q What happened to Lieutenant Hackney?

A As there was not enough signal wire, some of the prisoners, including Hackney, merely had their hands tied behind their backs with rope. The Japanese then drove the whole party away from these buildings at the point of a bayonet. Hackney had a broken leg -- it was his original wound -- and he fell down on his face and pretended to be dead. He was hit on the head with rifle butts, and one Japanese picked up his broken leg and dropped it. He still pretended to be dead, and the whole party moved on beyond where he way lying. He then heard prolonged bursts of machine-gun and rifle fire from close at hand. The Japanese then went past him to the road and returned carrying cans of petrol. Shortly afterwards, there was a good deal of very loud screaming from close to where he was lying. He was joined that night by an Australian sergeant and an Australian private.

Q In what condition were they?

A The private was so badly wounded that he died almost immediately. The sergeant was not badly wounded.

But both were smelling strongly of petrol.

Q Did the sergeant explain what had happened and how he had got away?

A The sergeant told him that they had all been machine-gunned, but that this had not killed by any means all of them. They then had petrol thrown over them and had been set alight. The sergeant and this other man had rolled away from the heap of bodies into the bushes because they were among two of those who had only had their own hands tied.

Q Did Lieutenant Hackney show you the wounds made upon him by the rifle butts in the way you have described, and the bayonets?

A Yes. I saw a number of small scars in his hair, on his scalp, various wound scars on his body, and he also had a bent leg from the original wound which he received.

Q Since the Japanese surrender have the remains of these unfortunate men been found in the place described by Lieutenant Hackney?

A On the strength of what Lieutenant Hackney told me, I arranged for a search party to go out to the place which he had indicated. They found the remains of these men there. They had not been buried.

Q Now another subject: In May 1942, did

Colonel Heath, whom you have mentioned before, arrive at River Valley Camp from Changi?

A Yes, he did.

Q Did he inform you of the matter concerning three gunners of his regiment?

A Yes, he did.

Q Will you tell us about that?

A He told me, Lieutenant Colonel Heath told me, that in March 1942 he had been ordered by the Japanese to attend the execution of three men of his own regiment.

Q What did the Japanese say they were going to be executed for?

A The Japanese said that they had captured these three men in Johore while attempting to escape and had brought them back to Singapore. Lieutenant Colonel Heath told me that Lieutenant General Percival made a very strong protest to the Japanese, telling them that this proposed execution was illegal.

Q What had happened in the end?

A Colonel Heath, with some other officers, some other British officers, was taken to the beach outside Changi Camp. He was allowed to speak to these three gunners of his for a moment or two. His three men were then shot in front of Colonel Heath by the Japanese.

Q Did he give you the names of these three men?

A He did. I can remember one at the moment, McCann.

Q In September 1942, did the Japanese officer in command of Valley Road and Havelock Road camps -- River Valley Road and Havelock Road camps, give you some fresh orders?

A Yes. I was called to the office of the Japanese officer, who informed me that all prisoners of war must sign a certain form. He showed me the form, on which in English was printed a promise not in any circumstances to attempt to escape.

Q Did Colonel Heath, through you as interpreter, say anything about this?

A Yes. Colonel Heath said that if necessary he would show the form to the prisoners of war but he was quite certain that not one of them would be prepared to sign it.

Q Did he say anything about the international law on that point?

A The Japanese officer first replied that the prisoners of war must sign these forms whether they wished to or not. Colonel Heath then told him that there was no such thing as a compulsory parole and that to attempt to extract such a promise was illegal.

Colonel Heath said that it was not only illegal by international law, but also not permitted by British army law.

Q What was the Japanese reply to that?

A He said that any prisoner of war who did not sign the form would be confined in a narrow place and punished until he signed it. He said that this had already been done at Changi Camp and agreed -- and I think himself suggested or agreed to our suggestion that we should go out to Changi Camp that afternoon.

Q Did you go?

A Yes. We went that afternoon and had a conference with Colonel Holmes, who was the senior British and Allied officer in Changi Camp.

Q What did Colonel Holmes tell you?

A Colonel Holmes told us of the events of the past week at Changi. At that time there were about 17,000 prisoners of war there. They also had been told by the Japanese to sign non-escape forms.

Q And what had the Japanese done? First of all, had they agreed to do so? Had they signed?

A The prisoners all refused to do so, individually as well as collectively, and negotiations broke down after about two days.

Q What did the Japanese do?

A Lieutenant General Fukuye, G.O.C., prisoners of war, Malaya, then ordered all except about 1,000 of the sick prisoners to move to Selarang Square.

Q How many men were there moved, about?

A From fifteen to sixteen thousand.

Q And what accommodation was there on this square? How big was it?

A It normally accommodated one battalion in peace time.

Q About how many men would that be?

A Under 900.

Q How long were they kept in this place?

A Four days.

Q And was there any sanitary arrangements there?

A They had to dig their own latrines in the barracks square with picks through concrete and asphalt. There was practically no water, and they were forbidden to use a fire hydrant a few yards away from the square.

Q Did the Japanese threaten to take any further measures?

A Not only threatened but took extra measures.

Q What were they?

A As the prisoners still refused to sign the form, General FUKUYE announced that all the sick from the hospital, including the infectious cases, would be sent to Selarang Square as well. At this time there was a diphtheria epidemic as well as a ward full of dysentery patients.

Q While this was being discussed was Colonel

Holmes taken anywhere to see anything?

A Yes. Colonel Holmes was taken to see another execution during the negotiations.

Q What was the alleged reason for this execution?

A The alleged reason again was an attempt to escape. But the men concerned had been back in the camp living as ordinary prisoners of war for some weeks previously. These four men had not been tried. They were not under arrest. And it was believed by the prisoners that the charge had been reduced to a minor one of being found outside the wire.

Q How many of them were there?

A Two British and two Australian.

Q Can you remember the names of any of them?

A Corporal Breavington was one of the two Australians.

Q As a result of all this what did Colonel Holmes do about the signing of the forms?

A Colonel Holmes consulted with other senior officers in the camp, and on the advice of his own medical officers he himself ordered the prisoners of war to sign these forms under protest.

Q And what did Colonel Heath decide to do?

A Colonel Heath was advised by Colonel Holmes

not to subject the men in River Valley and Havelock Road to the same test in view of their very bad living conditions and reduced state of health.

Q Now, with regard to Lieutenant General FUKUYE, who you told us had ordered these things that you have been describing, what has happened to him?

A He was tried by minor war crimes court in Singapore some months ago and sentenced to death by shooting.

Q Did you give evidence at that trial?

A I did.

Q Now, you've spoken of Changi Base Camp, River Valley Road, Havelock Road where you personally were. Can you tell us whether the conditions in the other camps on Singapore Island were similar or different to those that you have described?

A Conditions were much the same in all the camps -- all working camps on Singapore Island.

Q Did you visit the others?

A I visited several others on short liaison visits, and I was in frequent contact with the senior officers in charge of them and with many of the men working there.

Q Were you on Singapore Island the whole time of the captivity?

A I was, except for eight months in 1943 which I spent in Siam.

Q Did the rations improve or otherwise?

A They got steadily worse.

Q What was the effect upon the health and condition of the prisoners, yourself included?

A Well, universal loss of weight, weakness, and a variety of deficiency diseases, apart from the fact that sick men had the greatest difficulty in recovering from their illnesses.

Q Now, from August, 1942 onwards, were men being despatched from Singapore to the Burma-Siam Railway?

A Yes, they were.

Q About how many in all went there from Singapore?

A There were forty thousand.

Q Did they include any who had come from elsewhere?

A Yes, a large number who had come from the Netherlands East Indies to Changi Camp and who had then been transferred.

Q Had any prisoners of war been sent from Singapore to other places than the Burma-Siam Railway?

A Yes. Some had gone by sea to Formosa in Japan, and others by sea to Burma.

Q What effect did this have upon the overcrowding which you've described?

A It eased it to some extent, although camp areas were reduced by the Japanese as prisoners left.

Q Now, in April, 1944, was something fresh done about the 3,500 civilians who had been in Changi Jail?

A Yes, they were moved from Changi Jail to Sime Road Camp.

Q Who were put to take their place in Changi Jail?

A Five thousand prisoners of war.

Q I think you told us that seven hundred was the normal complement for which it was built.

A That is correct.

Q How were they accommodated?

A Four men were accommodated in each cell designed for a single convict. One slept on the sleeping place, two on the floor, and the fourth across the open Asiatic latrine. Also, hundreds of men slept on the inside ventilators through which the ventilation of the building was supposed to take place.

Q Did you, yourself, endure those conditions for some weeks?

A Yes, for some weeks.

Q Was there any explanation for that overcrowding at that date, having regard to the fact that, as you told us, so many prisoners of war had gone away?

A There was ample accommodation in Changi Camp from which we had come, but we were forced to vacate that entirely in August, '44.

Q Now, I want you to tell us about the work on which prisoners of war in Singapore were employed after the first year. You have told us about the first year, now later.

THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q Colonel Wild, would you tell us about the work on which prisoners of war were employed in Singapore from the end of 1942 onwards?

A From the end of 1942 onwards, practically all the prisoners of war on Singapore Island were engaged in constructing the military airdrome at Changi.

Q At the beginning of 1945, were there some new working camps formed?

A Yes. New camps were formed at Johore Bahru on the mainland, at Kranji in the north of the Island, and at other places; and a part of Changi Camp was set aside for men engaged on similar work.

Q On what work were the men in these camps employed at that time?

A They were employed until August, 1945, on constructing defense works. These consisted of tunnels for storing ammunition, gun emplacements, and entrenchments.

Q Were any employed in connection with guns?

A Yes. A detachment at the Japanese Alexandra Ordnance Depot was employed on repairing guns and making parachutes and wicker baskets by which ammunition could be dropped to Japanese troops.

Q Is there an island in Singapore harbor called Blakang Mati Island?

A Yes, there is.

Q Were prisoners of war employed there and in what connection?

A Prisoners of war were kept there for the whole three and a half years of captivity and for the last two to three years they were employed in handling bombs. They unloaded bombs from ships and stored them in a big bomb store on Blakang Mati Island close to their camp.

Q Now, in the latter part of the war was Singapore and particularly military installations in Singapore being bombed by the Allies?

A The first raid was on the 5th of November, 1944, and from then until the end of the war the Island was being bombed frequently by B-29's from India.

Q Was any choice given to the prisoners of war as to whether they would work on these war works for the Japanese or not?

A No choice whatever. They were ordered to do it and disobedience meant severe punishment.

Q Was any attempt made to remove them from the danger of Allied bombing?

A None that I ever heard of.

Q Now, with regard to medical stores, was any sufficient supply of medical stores ever given to the prisoners of war by the Japanese?

A Never.

Q Clothing and boots, what do you say about them?

A Clothing was issued either not at all or in completely inadequate quantities; boots, very small quantities; and during the latter part of the war most of us were going about barefoot or in wooden clogs.

Q During the last six months of the war, what was the ration allowance to prisoners of war?

A At Changi Camp, about six ounces of rice and two ounces of maize per man per day with a very small allotment of vegetables and occasionally a spoonful of dried fish.

Q Was there any meat?

A None.

Q Had there ever been any meat?

A Yes, during the first year.

Q Now, what resulted in the way of disease -- for instance, beri-beri?

A Beri-beri was practically universal. Other deficiency diseases were a form of blindness; a few men went completely blind, and other skin diseases such as scrotal dermatitis and pellagra.

Q What was done with regard to letting sick men off work?

A It was always a struggle for the British officers to prevent sick men from being sent out to work as working figures were so high.

Q How far were you able to prevent it?

A At Changi Camp, always fairly successful, but I am speaking of ordinary standards and the state of health of all men in that camp was then so low that, in fact, practically none would have been taken out to work if they had not been prisoners of war.

Q Did you make special arrangements for men whose weight had fallen below one hundred pounds?

A Yes, we kept over one hundred of them together in a ward -- in a hut which was called "X" Ward.

Q What did you do for them?

A We kept them alive by making contributions

from our own food in order to increase their diet.

Q Now, I want you to tell us about an incident known as the "Double Tenth?"

A The "Double Tenth Incident" is so-called because it was on 10 October 1943 that it started.

Q At that time were you on the Siam Railway?

A I was.

Q But have you investigated the matter, both after your return to Singapore in captivity and since the Japanese surrender?

A Yes, I have in very close detail.

Q And tell us the result of the investigation.

A On 10 October 1943 the Kempeitai raided Changi jail where the civilian internees were confined. They took away about forty-five of the civilian internees to Singapore, including some of the most distinguished of the civilian internees. They took them to the Kempeitai headquarters in Singapore where they kept them for some months in bamboo cages.

Q Did they give any reason for this? Were they accused of anything?

A They were accused of nothing at the time of their arrest. They were accused of various things while they were being interrogated.

Q Describe what happened.

A These bamboo cages were like rooms made of bamboo inside the main structure of the building. They were crowded together, about ten or twelve to each cage. The only sanitation was a latrine in the middle of the cage without any means of privacy.

Q Were they all men?

A Two of them were women, one of them being a lady doctor from Singapore. Many of them suffered from dysentery in this confinement, and for long periods the only drinking water which they got was that which they drank out of the latrine. At intervals the men were taken out daily -- the men were taken out and subjected to torture over a period of many hours by the Kempei. This torture consisted of being made to kneel for long periods on a sharp-edged piece of wood, being beaten all over with heavy clubs or split bamboos, the famous water treatment which consisted of pouring very large quantities of water down the victim's mouth while he was held down on the floor. The alternative was to place the victim under the legs of a chair in which the Kempei sat, place a linen cloth over his face and pour water on that. Either of these treatments, I have been informed by those who suffered them, produced all the sensations of drowning. The electric treatment was also used; and

the electric terminals were applied to the more tender portions of the victim's body and the Kempei turned the handle of the machine.

Q As the result of this, was there any suicide attempt?

A A British doctor jumped out of the window of the torture room and broke his pelvis in the fall.

Q What did the Kempei do about that when they discovered it?

A The Kempei concerned and his Japanese interpreter carried him back to the bamboo cage in a chair from which they threw him into the cage. Some of the people in the cage pointed out to the Japanese that the doctor had a broken pelvis. The Japanese interpreter then kicked him in the groin.

Q Did any of them die under torture?

A Fifteen of them died under torture or as a result of it.

Q Tell us some of those included in the fifteen.

A Among those who died were Mr. Hugh Frazier, the Colonial Secretary of the British Government in Malaya.

Q Can you name any others who suffered the torture and survived?

THE MONITOR: We have not finished the interpretation yet, sir.

A Another who died is Mr. Adrian Clark, the Chief Legal Adviser to the Government. Another was Dr. Stanley.

Q And amongst those who survived?

A Among those who survived this torture was the Right Reverend, the Bishop of Singapore. He was given three hundred strokes tied face-down to a table.

Q Now since the Japanese surrender, have you interrogated a number of Japanese about this matter?

A I have.

Q Did they admit or deny it?

A In general they admitted it, and one of them

cared to take pleasure in demonstrating to me how the water treatment was administered.

Q What has happened to them?

A They have all been tried in minor war crimes courts in Singapore.

Q Now will you tell us about Outram Road Gaol in Singapore?

A Outram Road Gaol was the military prison of the Japanese forces in and around Singapore.

Q Will you tell us about Major O'Neill and Captain Marriott, their experiences there, please?

A Major O'Neill of the Indian Medical Service and Captain Marriott of the British Army were both cut off in the jungle after the battle of Slim. They were wandering in the jungle with another small party of British troops for some weeks. They were trying to rejoin the British forces, as they had not heard of the fall of Singapore. They were captured by the Japanese early in April. At this time Major Marriott -- Captain Marriott was very sick with dysentery, and Major O'Neill was doing his duty as a medical officer in staying behind to look after him. They were captured by the Japanese forces in Johore and were very well treated in the officers' mess of the battalion which captured them. The officers of

this battalion told them that they were now going to be sent to the big prisoner of war camp at Changi on Singapore Island. They were sent to Changi Camp under the escort of a Japanese soldier. On arrival in Simgapore the Japanese soldier asked the Japanese military police the way to Changi prisoner of war camp.

Q Shorten this a little bit, please, Colonel Wild -- not so much detail.

A Yes. The military police put them into Outram Road Prison. There they were brought before a military court about three weeks later--and there they were brought before a military court in Singapore about three weeks later, and were sentenced to five and four years penal servitude. The remainder of that party was captured a few days later and went through exactly the same experience except that it ended with their becoming ordinary prisoners of war in Shangi Camp.

Q Now did you get all these facts from various sources, and in February, 1943, did you put them before the then G. O. C. of the prisoners of war in Malaya, General ARIMURA?

A I got the facts from Captain Marriott himself in Changi in January, 1943, when he was temporarily released from Outram Road Prison. I explained

them personally to Major General ARIMURA first in a written report and then in a personal interview which went on for over an hour.

Q Did he promise to do anything about it?

A He said that it was an obvious miscarriage of justice and that I need not bother any more because he would see that both officers came back to Changi Camp.

Q Did they come back to Changi Camp?

THE MONITOR: Just a moment, please.

A Then Captain Marriott was taken back to Outram Road Prison shortly afterwards and Major O'Neill never got out of it until the end of the war.

Q What were you able to find out as to the conditions in Outram Road Prison?

A The British and Allied prisoners in Outram Road Prison were made to sit at attention in their cells for about fourteen hours a day and at night they had to lie down under a naked electric bulb. The food which they received was grossly inadequate and far less than that given to the Japanese prisoners. Japanese convicts were employed as warders over the prisoners of war. They were frequently beaten up.

Q With regard to medical attention, what happened?

A They got no medical attention whatever unless they were practically in a dying condition.

Q Were any of them ever released owing to sickness?

A When they were desperately ill, they were sent out to Changi Camp to be put into the prisoner of war Hospital there. Altogether about a hundred came out during the three and one-half years.

Q Did the Japanese medical officers visit those men while they were there frequently?

A Every two months or so they would be visited in the special ward where they were kept.

Q For what purpose?

A To see if they had recovered sufficiently to go back to Outram Road Gaol.

Q Were there a large number of deaths in the jail?

A On the civilian side of the jail, very many. In the military side, not so many in the jail, but a number of them died after they came out to Changi.

Q Since the Japanese surrender, have considerable number of those who were employed in Outram Road Gaol and Commandant and medical officers and so on been brought to trial?

A About forty-four of them are now on trial,

I understand.

Q Now did you personally in about June, 1944 see some of these men brought to Changi from Outram Road Gaol?

A Yes, I did.

Q Describe it.

A Four men arrived in a bus from Outram Road Gaol under a Japanese escort. I was called by the Japanese to receive them. I lifted all four out of the bus myself.

Q What was their condition?

A They were so thin that it was difficult to believe that they could still be alive. They seemed to weigh only a few stone when I picked them up.

Q Could they speak?

THE MONITOR: Just a minute, please.

Q Could they speak?

A Only in a feeble whisper.

Q What nationalities were these four men?

A Two were Dutch and two were British.

Q What became of them?

A Two of them died within the next two or three days.

Q Was there a post-mortem report by an Australian medical officer?

A Yes, he showed it to me. He mentioned in it that their bowels were as thin as tissue paper from starvation.

Q When you lifted the four men out of the bus, did you notice anything else there?

A Yes, a rough wooden box.

Q What was in the box?

A I lifted the lid and there was an elderly European, the dead body of an elderly European in it.

Q What did you notice about the condition of that?

A He had a white beard. He was very thin, and his knees were drawn up and his hands were clasped across his stomach.

Q Now, Colonel Wild, I want you to tell us about the Burma-Siam Railway.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Mr. Comyns Carr, that is a rather big subject, is it not?

MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: There is one thing I would like to mention. Objection was taken this morning to your leading. I could not find that you were leading because your questions did not suggest the answer. But this afternoon your questions may have had the

effect of refreshing the memory of the witness thus rendering nugatory the rule that a witness' memory can be refreshed only from notes made at the time. However, this witness' familiarity with war crimes and his position makes it obvious that, even if you examine him in the strictest form, you would still get the same results. I have no doubt that you were influenced by that consideration, and for that reason I have not referred to the matter before. The method you have pursued, while not being prejudicial to the defense, has enabled the evidence to be taken speedily.

We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, 12 September 1946, at 0930.)

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12 Sept.

I N D E X

Of

WITNESSES

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

Pros. No.	Def. No.	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
472		Map of Burma-Siam Railway and various Camps along it.		5452
473		Letter or telegram from Mr. Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee to the Foreign Minister dated 23 June 1944		5492

Thursday, 12 September, 1946

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930.

- - -

Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.)

DEPUTY MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

THE PRESIDENT: Until I announce otherwise, it should be taken that all the accused are present except OKAWA and MATSUI, and that they are represented by counsel.

Counsel will be at liberty to mention any matter at this stage of the proceedings each morning.

Mr. Comyns Carr.

C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,

called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q Colonel Wild, would you now come to tell us about the building of the Burma-Siam Railway? What purpose did that railway serve?

A It was built as a means of supplying the Japanese forces in Burma, particularly as a preparation for the invasion of India.

Q When did prisoners of war begin to leave Singapore to work on that railway?

A About August 1942.

Q At that time did you or they know where they

were going, or what for?

A No information whatever was given.

Q When and how did you first learn about the building of the railway?

A After my return to Changi in December 1942, from some men who had been working on the Burma-Siam Railway and had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment in Outram Road Prison. They had been sentenced for offences in Siam and had been transferred to Changi from the prison owing to illness.

Q Who were the first prisoners of war to go there, and from what country did they come?

A The first to go to Burma were a party of Australians under Brigadier Varley called A Force.

Q Now, I think at this point it would be convenient, in order to follow the remainder of your evidence, if we hand to the Members of the Tribunal a plan which you have had prepared of the railway and the various camps along it.

Were you subsequently sent to the railway yourself so that you are familiar with most of the ground shown on this plan?

A Yes.

Q Let us just get the main features of it clear before I take your evidence in detail.

On the right hand of the plan it shows Bangkok, is that right? Bangkok on the extreme right?

A Yes.

Q And proceeding to the left, do you get just beyond the first straight line to Banpong? Was that the point at which contact was made by rail from Singapore?

A That was normally the detraining point. From there the old railway went up as far as Kanchanburi, five points to the north of Banpong.

Q Yes. Now, rather more than half way across the plan towards the left, do you come to the boundary between Burma and Siam?

A Yes, marked by dashes and dots.

Q Is that point known as the Three Pagodas Pass?

A Yes, it is.

Q And then on the Burma side, do you finally get down to the junction with the pre-existing railway at Thanbuyzayat?

A That is correct.

Q Are there any other general matters about this plan which you think it necessary to explain before you come to the detailed story ?

A Only I think that from Kanchanburi at the 50 kilo mark up to about the 364 kilo mark at Anaquin

it was previously virgin, mountainous jungle.

Q Was it built from one end to the other, or from both ends simultaneously?

A From both ends simultaneously.

Q When was the work begun?

A In about August 1942.

Q And when and where were the two ends joined?

A The two ends were joined at the end of October 1943, at about the 257 kilo mark, Konquita.

Q The A Force whom you have mentioned, which end did they go to?

A They worked from Thanbuyzayat at the Moulmein end.

Q Did you personally have any contact with them after they left?

A Yes. They passed through my camp at Songkrai, 287 kilo, laying the railway lines in late September 1943.

Q Did you receive a report at that time from any of their officers?

A Yes. I spoke both to Brigadier Varley, the commander, and I had a long conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, V.C., and his interpreter, Captain Drower.

Q You are going to give us shortly your own

account of what happened to your own force. Did their account of what happened to their force differ materially from that?

A Their experience had been very similar to that of my party, except that their food had been better and that they had not had to do a long march. As regards living and working conditions and treatment, I should say identical.

Q Did they report specially on the question of prisoners of war attempting to escape?

A Yes, they did. They told me that over twenty of their men had been shot without trial for alleged attempts to escape.

Q Did they mention any other work that the prisoners of war had been engaged on for the Japanese besides the railway?

A Yes. Their first work on leaving Singapore had been to build a military aerodrome for the Japanese at Victoria Point, in Burma.

Q When the railway was finished, what became of the surviving prisoners of war?

A Six thousand survivors of F and H Forces were sent back to Singapore. The remaining prisoners were concentrated in the plains of Siam, in the vicinity of Kanchanburi, the 50 kilo mark, and certain numbers

were retained along the line for maintenance work.

Q As you have told us, you accompanied F Force. When did that start?

A The latter part of April 1943.

Q How many did it consist of at the start?

A Seven thousand, of whom about 3600 were Australian and 3400 British.

Q Were they there just about a year? I think you told us the survivors got back to Singapore in April 1944.

A They were in the jungle for just seven months, and the last of the survivors came back in April 1944, exactly a year after leaving.

Q During that period, how many of them died?

A Thirty-one hundred out of the seven thousand.

Q Who were the people who were guarding them? How many, and of what nationality?

A About 250 Koreans and about 30 or 40 Japanese.

Q Did any of them die?

A Yes, one Korean.

Q Is that all, either Koreans or Japanese?

A That is all that I ever heard of.

Q Do you know what the casualties were in A force?

A During the same period, by Japanese accounts, nine hundred.

Q Is that A force or H force you are speaking of?

A It was A force.

Q And in the same period, what was the position with regard to casualties amongst the guards?

A Four of them died, of whom one was killed by bombing and another committed suicide.

Q Out of how many in all?

A I cannot recall the figure now.

Q Now, did H force come up about the same time as your own?

A Yes, a month later, in May, 1943.

Q What were their casualties?

A About nine hundred out of three thousand in seven months.

Q Taking the prisoners of war as a whole, from what you knew at the time and have discovered

since, what would you say were the total casualties during the construction of the railway?

A Sixteen thousand.

Q Out of about how many in all?

A Out of over forty thousand; I believe as many as forty-six thousand.

Q Now, were the whole of those deaths duly recorded, in the same way as you described yesterday, with the Japanese authorities?

A Yes. The Japanese made a great point of it, and we were not allowed to bury a dead body until all the facts had been officially given to them in accordance with their pro forma.

Q And did the officers to whom you had to report it tell you what was going to be done with the information?

A Yes. In my force, which remained under Malayan POW administration, the figures were always sent to the headquarters of the Japanese at Changi Camp for onward transmission to Tokyo as previously. As regards the other parties in Siam, which were under the Siam POW administration, their figures were similarly reported, as they occurred, to the Major General's headquarters at Tarso, Siam. One copy was forwarded by Major General SASSA to the headquarters

of the POW administration in Tokyo.

Q Were the particulars as finally sent forward correct in all respects?

A No. In the many hundreds of cases where we reported the cause of death as dysentery, the lists were returned to us, and we were compelled by the Japanese to alter the cause of death to diarrhea. I remember protesting over that point myself, and the answer from the Japanese officer was that, unless such alteration was made, the lists would not be forwarded.

Q Did they explain why they wanted that particular alteration?

A Yes. The Japanese medical officer of F force -- I am quoting it wrongly. The Japanese interpreter of F force, when asked about this by me, said it was the orders of the Japanese medical officer of F force. He said that in the Japanese Army it was regarded as a disgrace to the administration and to the medical services if men in their charge died of infectious diseases.

Q Now, in addition to the prisoners of war, were there large numbers of laborers of various Asiatic races employed on the railway?

A Very large numbers; at least twice and

probably three times as many as there were prisoners of war.

Q Did you, yourself, while you were there, have frequent contact with them?

A Frequent contact. Our camps were side by side, and our men were working with them.

Q What races did they chiefly belong to?

A The majority were Southern Indians, mainly Tamils. There were also a large number of Burmese, some Malays, and a few Chinese.

Q Any Siamese?

A I never met any in my area, but I understand there were some on the extreme sides.

Q Did you receive reports from those whom you met about the conditions under which they had come there, the conditions under which they were working?

A Frequent reports, and in F force there were many Englishmen who spoke Malay and Tamil.

Q What was the effect of their reports?

A The picture we got was that tens of thousands of them had been recruited in Singapore and Malaya. Two ways were normally employed for recruiting them: One was to promise the city dwellers, particularly, good food and good treatment, and allow-

ances for their families if they, themselves, went to work in other towns, on anti-malaria work, and so on. The second method, particularly in the country districts of Malaya, was simply conscription. They were rounded up from rural states and tin mines and placed on the trains, often without opportunity of saying goodbye to their families. In all cases, they had been taken by train to Banpong and thence had walked into the jungle.

Q From what they told you and from what you saw yourself, would you say that their conditions were better or worse than those of the prisoners of war?

A They were worse.

Q Since the end of the war, has the war crimes organization in Southeast Asia been investigating, trying to ascertain the full numbers of casualties amongst these Asiatic laborers?

A Yes, in Burma, Siam, and Malaya for the last year.

Q W hat is the best estimate you can give us?

A The usually accepted estimate is one hundred fifty thousand Asiatic laborers of whom one hundred thousand died. I think you can take sixty thousand deaths as proved and certain. The exact figures are

most difficult to obtain because the Japanese appear to have kept no records whatever.

Q Now, will you describe to us your personal experiences with F force. Begin at the beginning. How did the orders come for F force to start?

A The orders were first received in April, 1943 by Colonel Holmes in Changi Camp from the headquarters of Major General ARIMURA at Changi.

Q How many were required for the party?

A Seven thousand.

Q Did you personally interview anybody -- any Japanese officer about the arrangements?

A Yes. I paid two official visits to General ARIMURA's headquarters, once by myself and once with Colonel Harris, the commander of F force.

Q Tell us -- describe the interview.

A I was told by Colonel Holmes to explain that there were not seven thousand fit men in Changi; the most we could raise would be five thousand men; and, of these, all had been weakened by malnutrition during the past year, and some were convalescent.

Major General ARIMURA's headquarters were most reassuring about it all. We were officially told that we must take two thousand unfit men whom the Japanese agreed to classify as non-walking sick. I

was told that the sole reason for the move was that the food situation was getting difficult on Singapore Island; we were not going to working camps but to health camps; it was a nice place in the mountains, and none of the men would be required to leave their health camps to work; the most that we should be required to do would be to look after ourselves and do necessary work inside the camp; it would be in the best interests of the sick men to take them because they would have a better chance of recovering in these health camps than if they remained in Changi, as the food was short.

I stressed again and again the physical condition of these men and supported my statement with written documents from the medical officers -- our own medical officers. I was promised that there would be no marching whatever. After the first train parties had left, I was called again by the Japanese and told that there might be a short march of fifteen miles. Colonel Harris and I protested at this breach of their previous promises, and we were told that any really sick men would be taken in lorries and everyone's baggage would be carried, and the whole day would be allowed for covering the distance. I said, "Many of these men cannot walk fifteen yards, let

alone fifteen miles"; and General ARIMURA's headquarters said, "In that case, you have our promise that they will be carried by truck."

Q What were you told by them about the conditions inside the camp when you got there?

A I was only told there were big, large comfortable huts there.

Wolf & Yelden

Q You have spoken of Lieutenant Colonel Harris who was commanding one part of the proposed force. Was that the British or the Australian party?

A Both the British and the Australian. It was a small force headquarters recognized by the Japanese consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Harris, three other Lieutenant Colonels and myself.

Q Was there an Australian officer amongst the Lieutenant Colonels that you have spoken of? I want to get the names to link up with other evidence.

A Not in the little force headquarters itself, but with the Australians was their own senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kappe.

Q Have you told us all about the promises that were made to you by General ARIMURA's staff about this expedition?

A All that I have in my mind at the moment.

Q Yes. Did you start--Did the force start by train?

A Yes. We left in thirteen successive train parties, on thirteen successive nights, about five hundred strong each.

Q What were the conditions in the train ride?

A We traveled in roofed steel box cars,

normally used for carrying rice, twenty-seven men to a car sitting cross-legged on the floor. The journey took four days and four nights from Singapore to Banpong.

Q What were the food and water supplies like on the journey?

A The food consisted of rice and thin vegetable stew in somewhat inadequate quantities. In my own train we had no food or water for the last twenty-four hours, but I persuaded the engine driver to give me a few buckets of water out of his engine.

Q Were there any sanitary accommodations at all?

A Absolutely none. We used the tracks at halts, which had already been very badly fouled by previous train rides. As we had to eat at these halts, the flies were rather a serious menace.

Q When your train arrived in Banpong, tell me what happened then?

A We were marched from the train for a distance of about two miles to a so-called staging camp. We had been ordered by the Japanese to take fifty-seven lorry loads of baggage with our force, including all our heavy cooking gear and equipment for a four hundred bed hospital.

Q What became of the heavy baggage?

A All this heavy equipment was stacked by order of the Japanese in an unguarded dump on a piece of wasteland near the railway station. We had two boxcars full on my train, including two pianos which the Japanese had told us to take, also two heavy electric lighting sets and a good many miles of electric wire. All this was stacked on the dump by orders of the Japanese and I saw a number of Japanese and Siamese looting the dump as fast as we put our stuff onto it.

Q What became of that material in the end?

A Except for small quantities of drugs which we got permission to take from that dump and carry with us into the jungle by hand, the whole of our heavy supplies remained at Banpong for the next eight months. When we came back from the jungle in November, we got permission to go to Banpong and recover as much of it as we could. Most of the valuables had disappeared.

Q Was this material which had been supplied by the Japanese, or was it your own -- this heavy baggage?

A At least ninety-nine percent of it was our own.

Q Well now, where did you and your men spend

the night or what happened when you got off the train?

A We went into a so-called staging camp at the entrance of which was a notice in English, "Instructions to Coolies and Prisoners of War."

Q How far was it -- How far did you have to march to it?

A About two miles.

Q And what was its condition when you got there?

THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break, Mr. Carr. We will adjourn now for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows):

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Before I proceed further, I should formally tender the map, prosecution's document No. 6525, in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 6525 will receive exhibit No. 472.

(Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No. 472 was received in evidence.)

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q I was asking you about the state of the camp to which you were marched.

A It was in a very dirty state, having previously been used, as you are informed, by many thousands of Asiatic laborers who had previously passed through it. The accommodations consisted of very large palm leaf roofs resting on the ground. There was room for the men on the bare ground under the roofs.

Q Then did you learn how you would have to make the next part of the journey?

A Yes, I learned from the Australians in

Train Party No. 6, who were about to leave the camp on foot, that every man had to cover an unspecified distance on foot. The previous five train parties of about 2,500 Australians had already left on the five previous days by road for an unknown destination.

Q What did you do?

A I went with Lietenant Colonel Harris to the office of a Japanese officer of the Malayan POW Administration. We made a very strong protest to him, reminding of the promises which had been made before we started by Major General ARIMURA. He said the march could not be helped, as there was no transport, but he would not tell us how far the men had got to go.

Q Actually, how far did you have to march with your force?

A Two hundred miles in two and one-half weeks.

Q Where to?

A From Banpong to Niki Niki, 276 kilomarks, and a large part of the men had to march to Songkrai, 287 miles, or to an unmarked camp right on the Three Pagodas Pass, just to the north.

Q Were the men in a fit condition to do this march?

A Speaking of an infantry soldier, it would have been an arduous march for fit troops, the conditions being that from Kanchanburi, the 50-kilo mark, up to the Three Pagodas Pass, we were marching by rough jungle tracks over mountainous country; and the marching was in fifteen night stages -- no day marching. Combat as we were, with not only with all the baggage we could carry, but with 2,000 non-walking sick, it was a very severe ordeal. All the fitter men had to help the sick along with arms around their shoulders; and in the worser cases we had to carry the sickest men for 200 miles on improvised stretchers. The monsoon rains broke in the middle of the march, and the last six stages were done in pitch darkness in torrential rain and through knee-deep mud.

Q Were you, yourself, sent on by the Japanese officer with Lieutenant Colonel Harris and others to prospect this march -- to go on ahead?

A Yes, by orders of the Japanese officer, we were sent to Tasoa by truck at the 124 mark on the left of the river, with orders to establish the POW Headquarters there.

Q Then did you find the headquarters of a Japanese prisoner of war organization?

A Yes, it was the headquarters of the

Japanese Major General who was G. O. C., Prisoners of War, Siam. I went there with Colonel Harris as soon as we arrived, and we tried to see the Japanese General. We were not allowed to get past the Japanese civilian interpreter, who said that F Force, our party, was under the control of the G. O. C., Prisoners of War, Malaya.

Q Generally speaking, was this division of responsibility a thing which resulted in conditions being better or worse?

A Well, I consider that this division of responsibility, which amounted to an evasion of responsibility by both of the Japanese Generals, aggravated our conditions during the succeeding months.

Q Did you then go to the Staging Camp at Tarsoe?

A Yes, it was the only one of the fifteen staging camps that I saw where any head cover was provided for any of the men during the daytime, about four small tents between five hundred men.

Q Whom did you find there, and in what state?

A I found there the first Australian marching party about to leave that night, having arrived the same morning. Most of them were drawn up on the far

side of the road, ready to march. About twenty of them who were obviously quite incapable of marching were sitting on the grass -- on the camp side of the road. The Japanese corporal in charge of the staging camp was pulling these men to their feet and hitting them with a bamboo stick. If the men could limp or stagger a pace or two, they were struck on the back with a stick and sent across the road to join the marching party. I saw a man showing a large ulcer on his leg to the Japanese corporal. The Japanese corporal kicked it.

Q Did you succeed in preventing that behavior of the Japanese corporal?

A I told him what I thought of him, and the rest of the sick men were sent back to the camp.

Q When the next party arrived, did you have a discussion with Major Bruce Hunt, Australian medical officer?

A The next party of Australians arrived the following morning. I at once saw Major Bruce Hunt, of the Australian Army Medical Service -- Medical Corps, and I made a plan with him. In accordance with this I took fifty of these sick Australians two miles away to the headquarters of the Japanese General. I told the Japanese corporal to come too,

and he did. I paraded these fifty men in front of a Japanese medical officer. He gave them some medical treatment, particularly the blisters and the sore feet, and agreed that thirty-six of them should not march that night. At my suggestion he gave this as an order to the Japanese corporal. I particularly pointed out to him an Australian chaplain who had a weak heart, and he was included in the thirty-six. I then took the fifty men back to the camp and found on arrival that the Japanese corporal was giving instructions that only fourteen should stay behind that night instead of thirty-six.

Q I think we can shorten this part of the matter, Colonel Wild, a bit. Will you summarize the remainder of what happened about this?

A After reporting this again to the Japanese medical officer, he issued an order in writing to his own sergeant major that the thirty-six men should stay. This was given to the corporal. At the parade that night the corporal sent back fourteen of the men into the camp and ordered the other twenty-two to march. I objected to this, and I was beaten up with bamboos by the corporal and five of his men. Major Bruce Hunt got in front of me and held up his Red Cross arm band. He was -- he

diverted the fire, and had a broken finger on his hand as a result. By this time the twenty-two men were calling out, "We are not going to see our officers treated like this," and voluntarily crossed the road to the marching party. Three of them were carried back a few minutes after they had left, having collapsed, and the Australian chaplain died at the next camp.

Morse & Abram

Q Did you go on about the 4th of May to Konquita Staging Camp?

A Yes, I did, and found a party of Australians there.

Q Which distance is that, which kilometer stage?

A 257.

Q What did you find the conditions there?

A I found that the Australian marching party was accomodated within a few yards of huts in which a large number of Asiatic laborers were dying from cholera. The ground of the staging camp was badly fouled with feces from these unfortunate people and the air was full of flies. I was told by an Australian officer there that he had asked the Japanese engineers for tools to clean up the camp, He was contemptuously told to use his hands.

Q The same evening did you arrive at Lower Niki Camp?

A Niki Niki, 276.

Q Did you go with Colonel Harris to see anybody there?

A Yes, I went with Colonel Harris and saw Lieutenant Colonel BANNO, the Japanese commander of F Force. Colonel Harris described the situation at the staging camp at Konquita and said, "You must either

stop the march or by pass Konquita. If you don't, we will have a violent outbreak of cholera in all our camps within a week." This was not done and every one of the fifteen marching parties had at least twelve or twenty-four hours in Konquita.

Q Did this Colonel BANNO that you have spoken of represent the prisoner of war administration or the army side?

A He was an officer of the POW Administration of Malaya and Sumatra.

Q Did you receive a report from an Australian medical officer shortly afterwards?

A A few evenings later the Australian medical officer in Lower Niki, or Niki Niki Camp, told me that he had diagnosed the first case of cholera. Within a fortnight cholera had broken out practically simultaneously in the six working camps and we had 1500 cases of it.

Q Did the Japanese provide any medical supplies for dealing with it either for you in your camps or for the Asiatic laborers?

A We were given cholera injections and Colonel BANNO supplied one Flit spray and a sack of chloride of lime. We, ourselves, had one cholera box which we had brought by road for the six camps but we were not

allowed to go much from one camp to another.

Q What did you do?

A We made hollow needles from splinters of bamboo and we joined them by the rubber from doctors steth-escopes to a bamboo container. We then made a mixture of stream water and common table salt. We warmed it to blood heat, and with this apparatus we used to go up and down the line of cholera patients putting the mixture into the vein in the bend of their arm. We segregated everyone if he went down with cholera and fit men took turns in looking after them.

Q How many cholera cases did you have all together during that outbreak?

A About 1500.

Q And about how many did you manage to save by these methods?

A About 700.

Q Now, you have described to me at Singapore how the working parties were demanded by the army and made up by the Prisoner of War Administration. Was it the same way on the railway?

A Exactly the same.

Q Who were the people who were making the demands?

A The regiment of railway engineers who were responsible for the construction of the line, Fifth

and Ninth.

Q And describe generally the results with regard to the type of men who were made to work and the hours they were made to work.

A Sick men were invariably made to work owing to the exorbitant demands that were made for labor. Malaria was not accepted as an excuse for not working unless the patient actually was in a rigor.

Q And with regard to the hours of work?

A The hours of work were from before first light until after dark, and in my camps there were a large number of men who had literally not seen their camps in daylight for many weeks. I remember one occasion when the men came back from work at 2:30 in the morning and were paraded for work again at 6 o'clock the same morning. At that time the work consisted of pile driving in a swollen stream.

Q In which camps did you personally see this state of affairs?

A In Niki Niki Camp, in Niki itself, in the three Sonkurai camps which are not clearly marked here.

MR. LOGAN: We notice, if your Honor please, that the witness is recently referring to some document. We would like to know the document to which he is referring.

Q Have you been referring to any document, Colonel?

A Not that I recall. I am referring to my own memory.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is that paper on the edge of the witness box?

THE WITNESS: This is the map of the railway, sir, with which I was supplied with a copy just before recess.

THE PRESIDENT: I have been watching him closely and that is the only document I have seen him handle.

Q What occurred with regard to the monsoon rains at this time?

A The monsoon rains broke about the 7th of May and it rained almost without cessation until the beginning of October.

Q Was that before you had completed the march, or after?

A The first six train parties, the Australians, had fortunately completed the march before the rains broke, but the British troops, who followed them, had to do from three to ten night marches through the tropical rains.

Q What was the result?

A The result was that even men who had started reasonable fit were broken in health before they reached their camps, largely because the best of them killed themselves looking after their friends.

Q What were the conditions at the staging camps where they had to stop, under this rain?

A They made themselves little shelters of leaves or ground sheets, if they had them, and sometimes they were taken out for working parties by the Japanese during the day.

Q Was any cover provided by the Japanese in any building with cover or any sort?

A At Tasoa Camp there were a few small tents, but otherwise I do not remember any cover at any of the staging camps except, of course, for the Japanese guards.

Q What were the food and drinking conditions at these camps?

THE PRESIDENT: We are about to break new ground now, Mr. Carr. We will adjourn until half past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

DEPUTY MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

C Y R I L H E W D A L R Y M P L E W I L D,

called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

Q Colonel Wild, did you personally spend various periods of time in the camps, in each of the camps that you have mentioned?

A I was stationed for periods of time in Lower Niki Niki, and Songkrei camps, and I liaised from Songkrei to Lower Songkrei and Upper Songkrei camps.

Q In your capacity as Lieutenant Colonel Harris' staff officer, did you also have communications, written and oral, with the senior Allied officers in those various camps?

A Yes, I saw those officers or read their reports always.

Q What opportunities of contact did you have with

the Japanese during the time you were on the railway?

A I was in frequent contact with Lieutenant Colonel BANNO, the commander of F Force, and had daily contact with the Japanese commanders of the camps where I happened to be stationed. I was also in continual contact with the guards.

Q And what about the Japanese railway engineers who were in charge of the work?

A I saw them less often; but I had to liaise with engineer officers and also stop trouble caused by the engineers themselves.

Q Substantially, was there any difference between the living conditions and treatment of prisoners of war in these various camps?

A None.

Q Will you describe one of them as an example?

A When I entered Songkrei camp on the third of August 1943, I went first to a very large hut accommodating about 700 men. The hut was of the usual pattern. On each side of an earthen gangway there was a 12-foot wide sleeping platform made of split bamboo. The roof was inadequately made with an insufficient quantity of palm leaves which let the rain through almost everywhere. There were no walls, and a stream of water was running down the earthen gangway. The

framework of the hut was bamboo tied with creeper.

In this hut there were 700 sick men. They were lying two deep along each side of the hut on the split bamboo platform. Their bodies were touching one another down the whole length of the hut. They were all very thin and practically naked. In the middle of the hut were about 150 men suffering from tropical ulcers. These commonly stripped the whole of the flesh from a man's leg from the knee to the ankle. There was an almost overwhelming smell of putrefaction. The only dressings available were banana leaves tied around with puttees, and the only medicine was hot water. There was another hut further up the hill of similar design in which so-called fit men were kept, and one well-roofed and better constructed hut occupied by the Japanese guards.

Q Was any bedding supplied?

A None whatever.

Q What did they have to cover them from the rain?

A When we first entered these working camps none of them were roofed at all for the first few weeks. The monsoon had already broken, and during those weeks the men had nothing whatever to cover themselves from the rain except banana leaves. If they were strong enough each man cut a couple of banana leaves and put

them over his own body.

Q Was any roofing material ever received?

A In my own camp of which I was in command, Lower Niki, we got a lorry load of atap palm, which was enough to roof half the hut in which the worst of the sick were lying. In Niki Camp no atap palm was ever received, but we got some rotten, leaking canvas. In the other four camps after a few weeks about enough atap palm was supplied to roof all the huts with about half the amount that was necessary. Again, this does not apply to the Japanese and Korean guards, who always had a proper roof over them.

Q By the middle of July 1943, that is, ten weeks after you had left Singapore, what was the state of F Force as a whole?

A We had 1700 deaths by that time, and 700 men out of the 7000 were going out to work. Of these 700, we British officers considered that 350 should have been lying down sick.

Q Did you make any report on that matter to the Japanese?

A I reported those figures at that time to Lieutenant Colonel BANNO. I also reminded him of the farewell address given to us by the Japanese officer at Singapore, which was that if we trusted to the

Imperial Japanese Army no harm would come to us.

Q How soon had you discovered that the promises you told us were made to you in Singapore were not going to be fulfilled?

A There was not a suggestion of it until we reached Banpong.

Q By November 1943, seven months after you had left Singapore, what was the state of the force?

A Three thousand men had died.

Q Going forward a little, when you got back to Changi in January 1944, was there a medical inspection of the survivors conducted by the Japanese?

A Yes. Three thousand men who had been given six weeks' rest after returning to Singapore were examined, with me as interpreter, by two Japanese medical officers. They passed 125 men out of the whole lot as fit for light duty.

Q You have accounted for 6000 out of the 7000. What had happened to the other 1000?

A Rather over 900 we had had to leave in improvised hospitals at Banpong either as being too sick to survive four days' journey in the train, or as medical and administrative personnel to look after them.

Q And the other 100?

A Well, 86 more died during that period.

Q Now, did you make any inspection or did you move on the third of August, 1943 to Songkrai Camp?

A Yes, I did.

Q You needn't give us the general description of it because you have already told us it was the same as the others. What had happened about deaths in that camp, or what did happen while you were there?

A In that hut of 700 men, which I described, 270 died during August. 16,000 men--- 1,600 men had marched into Songkrai Camp at the beginning of May, 1943, and 1,200 of them were dead by November. I, myself, stayed there until November.

Q In September of that year, did you receive an order from a Japanese officer about that camp?

A I was told that as we were preventing more than 200 men from going out to work each day, we had got to evacuate the whole of that long hut within four days.

Q What was to happen to the sick who were still there?

A 700 men were to be put out into the jungle.

Q Did he tell you why?

A Because the hut was going to be filled up

with Asiatic coolies, because they could do the work.

Q Was that, in fact, done, or did you succeed in preventing it?

A The Asiatic coolies did, in fact, arrive at the time stated, but I succeeded in preventing it.

Q What was the work which was supposed to be done at this camp?

A It consisted chiefly of building a high level, heavy timber bridge across a river gorge. Also, building the embankments and digging the cuttings and approaches to it. The timber we felled and moved ourselves.

Q How many prisoners of war died over that job?

A I should say that that bridge cost a thousand British lives.

Q Did you see the working parties lined up to go out?

A I did.

Q Describe their condition.

A Well, every morning the same scene was repeated. In the half light, about 200 men would be paraded in the mud. None of them had more than a pair of shorts to wear, and some had kilts made of sacking. Practically none of them had boots. Most of

those who had not were suffering from swollen-red trench feet.

Q Were there also men working in a quarry?

A Some of them worked regularly in a quarry, and cut feet were a common source of trouble.

Q What was the result of the cut feet?

A Unfortunately, they often developed into these shocking tropical ulcers.

Q Were the Japanese engineers content with the number of men who turned out to work?

A They were never content, and they generally insisted on about thirty men from the hospital being paraded at the same time for their inspection.

Q Did you make any protest about that?

A Always, daily, most strongly.

Q On your own account or on behalf of the medical officers?

A Both.

Q How did the sick men, who were forced to go to work, get there?

A They were carried there with their arms 'round two of their friends.

Q Was there another method besides that?

A Many of them used to pole themselves along with a long bamboo held in two hands at the side.

They used to call themselves "the Gondoliers."

Q Was any clothing received from the Japanese during this period?

A We got a thousand pieces of sacking and a new suit of cotton drawers.

Q How were the working parties treated by the Japanese engineers?

A They were driven from morning 'til night without pity.

Q In what way?

A With a stick, sometimes with lashes of wire.

Q What happened to the prisoner of war officers?

A They always accompanied even the smallest party of their men to work, and it was their duty to try and stand between their men and the engineers.

Q What happened to them when they did so?

A They generally got beaten themselves, but sometimes they were able to do some good.

Q Do you remember making any protests yourself about this?

A I made many; but I remember once, in particular, I complained to Colonel BANNO that a British Major had been beaten five times in that day, for

that reason.

Q Did you get any satsifaction from that complaint?

A Colonel BANNO did instruct the junior officer not to allow it any more, but I am afraid the beatings continued.

Q Throughout your experience there, were you -- were there many occasions when you made protests?

A Very many; because, as the headquarters group, we used to pass to the Japanese all the complaints which we got from the other camps as well.

Q Do you remember an occasion in October, 1943 when A force, or some men from A force, arrived to do some work in the neighborhood of Songkrai camp?

A Yes, they were laying the railway lines through the camp along the cutting which we had made.

Q Do you remember any special incident which happened then?

A A Japanese engineer was standing on the truck containing the sleepers. As each pair of Australians came up to the truck to collect his sleeper -- collect their sleeper -- each pair of Australians used to come up to the truck to collect

a sleeper. As each pair arrived at the truck, the Japanese systematically hit them on the head with a stick. It looked more like a matter of habit than a question of punishment.

Q Do you remember an incident about a cook?

A Yes, I was called out of my hut and saw one of our British cooks sitting on the ground with his head laid open. He had been struck on the head with an axe by a Japanese guard.

Q Did you make a complaint about that?

A I went and fetched a Japanese officer and showed him both the wounded man, the axe and the Japanese who had done it.

Q What happened?

A The Japanese officer said, very mildly to the Japanese, "That does not do." The guard was not punished.

Q With regard to officers, you have told us that the officers accompanied their men to the working parties. Did the officers have to work themselves?

A Not as laborers in my force, but they did to the south of us. All together, about 800 British officers were employed as laborers in coolie gangs for between two and three years. I saw them myself

in Siam and talked to many of them.

Q Was there any particular reason why that happened in some places and not in others?

A It was a deliberate plan and order of the Japanese Army that these two big working parties of officers should be formed. They were sent from Singapore for this purpose in two formed parties of about four hundred each.

Q Were they chiefly drawn from any particular part of the Allied Army?

A They were chiefly British officers of the Indian Army.

Q Now, do you remember a matter in October, 1943 with regard to Upper Songkrai Camp and a quarry there?

A Yes. I went to Upper Songkrai Camp on receipt of a report from the senior British medical officer of F force. What I saw there exactly confirmed his report. There was a hut full of sick men, like the one I had described at Songkrai, with about five hundred men lying crammed tightly together under a light atap palm roof. The Japanese, for the whole week, had been carrying out blasting in a quarry close by in such a way that at every blast the shower of broken rock fell into the camp. This rock rained

through the atap roof and fell onto the bodies of these sick men. The sick were in a very nervous state, never knowing when the next blast would come. Many of them sat up for hours together holding sleeping mats over their heads. I saw the ground of the camp around this hut covered thickly with broken rock.

Q Had anybody been injured in consequence?

A One sick man, I know of, had an arm broken and died two hours later.

Q Had the officer-in-charge made any protests?

A He had made several to the Japanese officer without effect.

Q Were you able to get anything done about it?

A I saw the Japanese officer, and I heard afterwards that, although the blasting continued, it was done in such a way that no more rock fell into the camp.

Q Do you remember anything about the lifting of tree trunks?

A The usual practice of the Japanese engineers was to use half as many prisoners of war to lift a tree trunk as Asiatics; and, when the tree trunk was up on the men's shoulders, they used to take half the men away leaving the rest to carry it.

Q Have you seen that yourself?

A I have. I have seen men carrying such a tree trunk along the bed of a stream.

Q Did you make protests about that?

A I did, particularly on one occasion when a young Australian, who at the time was aged eighteen, slipped in the mud in his bare feet and his comrades were unable to hold up the tree trunk. It fell on his head and killed him.

Q Now, will you tell us about the facilities for treating the sick? Were there any infirmaries or hospitals?

A There were no infirmaries or hospitals in any of these six working camps except in one or two small isolation huts which we built for cholera cases.

Q How did the doctors manage?

A They collected the sick together in one of the ordinary camp huts and at night they used to look after them by the light of bamboo flares. In spite of these difficulties, if it had not been for the British and Australian and Indian doctors -- Anglo-Indian doctors with us -- I doubt if any men would have come out of there alive.

Q How were operations carried out?

A Generally in the open air under mosquito net

to keep the flies off. In my force the doctors did over seventy amputations of legs on account of tropical ulcers.

Q Did you ever get any help from Japanese doctors or supplies of Japanese medical stores?

A As regards the urgently needed dressings, I got permission from Lieutenant Colonel BANNO to buy on our own money a considerable quantity of cotton cloth.

Q From whom did you buy it?

A From a Siamese merchant in a neighboring village. We divided this up between the six camps. We got quinine in special quantities to deal with those with active malaria but not for prophylactic purposes. Ninety-five percent of these survivors had malaria when they got back to Singapore.

Q Did Japanese doctors ever come at all?

A A Japanese doctor for F Force arrived in July, 1943.

Q What did he do?

A I believe he made one tour of the working camps just to look at them, but not more. He stayed at Niki at Colonel BANNO's headquarters and did the office work over the sick reports. I believe he did indent on the Japanese Army for drugs because I know

on one occasion he received a hamper of them. This was opened in front of the British medical officer and all the valuable drugs had been removed.

Q Did you make any request to the Japanese with regard to the evacuation of your sick?

A We asked them again and again to evacuate our sick to the Siam plains by river from Niki.

Q Is that the river which is shown on the plan?

A Yes, it is. It is the main water route.

Q For what purpose did the Japanese use it?

A They used it for bringing up rice and the barges went down empty.

Q To your knowledge were any of the other prisoner of war camps allowed to evacuate some of their sick by those means?

A It was the usual way of evacuating the sick from the camps by the river south of us.

Q Was your request ever granted?

A No, it was refused.

Q Was anything ever done by the Japanese to provide an infirmary for the sick of F Force?

A Yes, at the end of August they established a so-called hospital camp in Burma about sixty miles to the north of Songkrai.

Q Were any sent?

A We sent about two thousand from the various camps in open steel trucks.

Q You mean railway trucks or motor trucks?

A Motor trucks.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr, we will recess now for fifteen minutes.

(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken until 1500, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

Q Colonel Wild, you were telling us about the so-called "hospital" to which you were ordered to send two thousand men in August, 1943, and that they were sent in open box -- motor box cars. Now what were the circumstances of the journey and what happened to them?

A They were carried in these open steel trucks over a corduroy road, tree trunks laid on the earth. There were long delays. They had no shorter at night. Eighty of them died during the sixty mile journey.

Q When they got there, was the so-called "hospital" any better than the huts they had left?

A The huts were the same design but a little better. They were new.

Q Was there any hospital equipment?

A Only what they took with them.

Q How many of thetwo thousand died before the railway was completed four months later?

A Eight hundred.

Q When the railway was completed, what was done

about removing the prisoners?

A They were sent on the newly completed line to Kanchanburi. All of them, including the sick, traveled in open trucks or roofed box cars.

Q Were you in charge of the party from Songkrai Camp?

A Yes, in charge of the last party of two or three hundred.

Q What happened?

A I got four hours to move -- four hours notice to move at night. I paraded the men, most of whom were sick, in the cutting through the camp in groups according to the number of trucks I was told were coming. It took me the full four hours to move the men a hundred yards as many of them had to be carried. I got the Japanese corporal to promise to leave the loading entirely in my hands.

Q Will you condense this a little bit? We don't want too much detail at this point.

A The train stopped too far down the line and was five trucks short. The Japanese and Koreans got very excited and forced the men down the track and into the trucks. I ended up with fifty-seven men in my box car. We were all standing packed together except two who were on the floor. One I remember had

his leg off the day before. We traveled like that to Niki, when I reduced the numbers in the train to about twenty-seven per box car. There the Japanese medical officer gave me an order that I was not to bury any man who died. I told him that if we were likely to be in the train three or four days, that a number of men were certain to die. He gave the order to the Japanese guards, the Korean guards, that I was not to bury anyone.

Q What did you say to him?

A I told him he was a disgrace to the Japanese Army. Altogether seven of my men died between Niki and Kanchanburi. I disposed of six of the bodies to other prisoner of war camps along the line. There was no prisoner of war camp when the seventh man died. So I took him out of the train and buried him myself.

Q When the train got to Kanchanburi, what was done with the sick men?

A The men were taken out of the train about ten o'clock at night and left lying on the ground in the station yard for twelve hours.

Q What sort of a night was it?

A It was a very cold night in December and a lot of them -- several of them were dying the next morning. Quite a number died within the next few days.

Q How long did you remain there?

A About three weeks.

Q And what happened then?

A I went back to Singapore with the last party, leaving only the sick behind in hospital.

Q Before you left, did you receive a visit from the Kempeitai?

A Yes. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon and I were visited by a civilian member of the Kempeitai in Kanchanburi. He said that Kempeitai had just received orders from the Japanese Government in Tokyo to inquire into the condition of prisoners of war in Siam. We decided -- he then asked us to write a true account of what had happened to F Force during the last few months. I decided it was genuine and we wrote a full account that night and particularly listed all the breaches of the convention.

Q Tell me, with regard to this request from the Kempeitai, did it surprise you that they should ask for this information?

A Yes, it did, partly because Kempeitai had been in the area where we were, and partly because it didn't seem in accordance with their ordinary behavior.

Q Had those Kempeitai who had been there been able to see the facts for themselves?

A Yes, certainly.

Q When you had completed the report, to whom did you give it?

A We gave it to this member of the Kempeitai.

Q What did he say he was going to do with it?

A He came back to see us, and said that the Chief of Kempeitai in Kanchanburi had been very much pleased with it and had said that it was being sent to the Chief of Kempeitai in Bangkok for immediate transmission to Tokyo.

Q Did you ever hear anything more about it?

A No more than that.

Q Now there are a few matters still -- general matters about the railway I want to ask. You have mentioned some of the diseases which prevailed there. Just give us a list of them, will you?

A Cholera, malaria, typhus, wet and dry beriberi, tropical ulcers, small pox, diptheria.

Q I think you told us before something about dysentery, but you didn't mention that in your list.

A Dysentery was almost universal, both anemic and bacillary dysentery.

Q Did you get cases of men suffering from more than one of those diseases?

A Frequently, more often than not, the men who

died had two or more diseases. I, myself, have signed death certificates for as many as four diseases listed.

Q Now about food, will you tell us the relative food supplies given to the prisoners and to the Japanese themselves?

A The Japanese always had as much rice as they could eat, I should say six hundred grams a day or more certainly. They threw a lot away. In addition, the Japanese had considerable quantities of tinned food. The prisoners' ration varied from four hundred grams of rice per working man on a good day to two hundred grams or less which was the allotment for the sick.

Q Did they ever supply any of their tinned foods to the prisoners?

A No.

Q Was there ever any meat?

A A certain number of cattle were driven into the camps from Burma.

Q How were they divided?

A Usually, I should say half a bullock for fifty Japanese and the other half for every thousand prisoners.

Q What about the quality of the food?

A The quality of the food was poor, and besides rice it consisted mainly of beans which were particularly bad for people suffering from dysentery.

Q Now you have mentioned just now that a man at work got four hundred grams and a sick man two hundred to two hundred and fifty. Was there any system about that, just explain to us?

A The system was explained to us again and again by the Japanese. It was simply that if a man did not work, he could not expect to eat. The Japanese -- we could not disabuse the Japanese of the idea that if they cut down the rations of sick men in the hospital, they would make them go out to work to get more food. Unfortunately there was no pretension about our men's sickness and the consequence -- as a consequence of this, there was a great many more deaths.

Q Was there any intermediate scale between the four hundred and the two hundred?

A There was a light duty scale in some camps whereby if men would get out of the so-called hospital hut and work around the camp they got a little more food.

Q Did you and other officers make protests about this?

A Yes, we did. I remember particularly one made by Major Bruce Hunt.

Q What reply did he get from the Japanese officer?

A He said, "In the past you have spoken somewhat boastfully about humanity and the Geneva Convention. You must realize that you are our prisoners and you are in our power and in these circumstances these things do not apply."

Q Do you remember any other conversation of a similar type?

A Yes. On this occasion we asked the Japanese officer how he thought Japan would be able to explain her treatment of prisoners after the war. His reply was, "A victorious Japan will not have to explain."

Q Were any Red Cross parcels or mail received while you were on the railway?

A We received some mail when we got back to Kanchanburi, but no parcels while we were in Siam.

Q When you left Kanchanburi did you return to Singapore by train again?

A Yes, in the same way which we had come up, twenty-seven to a box car; four days. The conditions were exactly the same but it was harder on the man as they were all so broken in health.

Q Do you remember the circumstances of an escape from Sonkurai Camp and what happened about it afterwards?

A Eight British officers escaped from Sonkurai Camp in June, 1943. They had agreed to risk their lives in order to tell the outside world of the treatment we were getting. They were captured after fifty-two days in the jungle during which four of them died. They were brought back to Sonkurai Camp and I was told to see them, to go to see them shot. I protested about that and they were sent to Singapore where they were sentenced to ten and nine years penal servitude.

Q Was that after you, yourself, had returned to Singapore?

A Yes, that trial took place after I had returned.

Q At the end of the war were those men released

with others from Outram Road Gaol?

A One was released from Outram Gaol. The others had all been brought back to Changi Camp as seriously ill.

Q Was there any difference in their treatment in Outram Road Gaol from what you have described already with regard to other prisoners?

A Their treatment was exactly the same except that one who had dozens of ulcers on his legs and could only walk with crutches at the time I saw him. He told me that the bandages were removed as soon as he was put in his cell and that he got no medical treatment during his imprisonment.

Q Amongst those ultimately released were there any Americans?

A Among those released was the complete crew of an American B29. They had been shot down over Singapore in April, 1945.

Q Was there any difference in their treatment from that of the others?

A Yes. They were imprisoned under ground and given half the ration which was normally given even to Allied prisoners of war in the jail. In four months they had got into a very weak physical condition.

Q In September, 1945, did you have the

satisfaction of attending the surrender of the Japanese to Admiral Lord Mountbatten?

A Yes. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten gave me a special seat to see General ITAGAKI surrender.

Q What was the 7th area or military district of the Japanese system in 1944 and 1945?

A I understand that the 7th Army took over from the Southern Army at Singapore in about March or April, 1944.

MR. COMYNS CARR: The Tribunal will find, by looking at exhibit 110, that the accused ITAGAKI was appointed commander of the 7th Military District Army on the 7th of April, 1945 -- the last item in that biography or personnel record of him. And from exhibit 104, that the accused DOHIHARA had held the same position from March 22, 1944, down to that date.

I now propose to tender in evidence prosecution document 1810 and, having read it, to ask this witness some questions about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1810A will receive exhibit No. 473.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 473 and was received in evidence.)

MR. COMYNS CARR: It is really seven separate documents, found upon a file of the Japanese War Ministry, relating to the matter about which the witness has been speaking.

In order of date, the first one is page 2 of the document as it has been bound up. It is a letter, or telegram from Mr. Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee to the Foreign Minister, dated 23 June 1944. At that date the accused SHIGEMITSU was Foreign Minister. It reads:

"Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

"The International Red Cross Committee has the honor to inform the Japanese Government that it requests Japan to give every possible assistance for the well-being of the prisoners who are interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam for the purpose of preparing for the traditional service which is offered voluntarily to all belligerent nations to guarantee more welfare of the prisoners of war and non-combatant civilian internees. They are suffering from illness due to medical and other causes, especially made morbid by the climatic conditions of the place of internment.

"Regarding this matter, the International

Red Cross Committee has the honor to propose to the Japanese Government that she give consideration for entering into a reciprocal agreement with the governments of the belligerent nations in reference to the transfer of those coming under Articles 69 and 72 of the Geneva Convention concluded in 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

"The International Red Cross Committee requests the Japanese Government to consent to the transfer of said prisoners of war to an area with better climatic conditions, and to guarantee better conditions for prisoners of war as a first step until the settlement of such an arrangement. To achieve this objective, the International Red Cross Committee is prepared to collect necessary medical supplies if the Japanese Government will give consideration for their transportion and distribution. The International Red Cross Committee will greatly appreciate any intimation from your Government on this matter."

And then on page 1 of the document dated the eleventh of July, 1944, is a memorandum from Minister SUZUKI, who would be a subordinate of the accused SHIGEMITSU in the Foreign Office, to the Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Subject "Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

"Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam, Mr. Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, sent us a telegram, as annexed in this report. Its translation is attached herewith.

"Concerning the return of seriously wounded and ill prisoners of war proposed by the International Red Cross Committee, there will be much difficulty in its execution and therefore an answer will be made that it would be difficult to make such arrangements at present. The problems of the transfer of prisoners and transportation and distribution of medical supplies requested should be included, together with the solution and execution of the transportation of relief supplies which is now being negotiated between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States.

"I would like to send the above reply, and would appreciate your suggestion."

And that is sent to the War Minister, The Prisoner of War Information Bureau, The Navy Ministry.

Then on page 3 there is a memorandum from the Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau, to

the Chief of General Staff of the "I" Unit, Chiefs of Staff: OKA, MORI and TOMI Units, Commander of the Field Railway Unit of the Southern Army, Chiefs of Prisoner of War Camps in Burma and Siam. Subject: Concerning the treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma.

"Regarding the above subject, the Foreign Ministry has applied to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as per enclosed. Please inform me immediately whether such conditions existed or not, and to submit confutation data."

That document bears no date and unfortunately at present we have not succeeded in finding the enclosed.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: I am informed that the Japanese translation in the hands of Japanese counsel show that it is dated the 29th of July.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Which year?

MR. FURNESS: 1944.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Much obliged. I am obliged, but I think that must be a mistake, because it is the next document, which in the English copy bears that date, but it must have been around that date. The next document on page 4 does bear that

date, and it is from the Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau to Minister SUZUKI, again at the time when the accused SHIGEMITSU was Foreign Minister. (Reading) "Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma.

"In reply to your telegram No. 599 regarding the abovr subject, I beg to reply as follows:

"(1) The prisoners of war in question interned in Burma belong to the prisoner of war camps in Siam or Malaya. The names of prisoners of war in Siam and Malaya camps have already been reported, which amounted to 10,000. The names of prisoners of war who died in that area are being reported successively."

MR. FURNESS: My Japanese counsel still states that document that was read just before this, page 3, was dated the 29th of July. I would like to call attention to the fact that this one which Mr. Comyns Carr has just read is Prisoner Supply No. 35 and the one that he read before was Prisoner Supply No. 36.

MR. COMYNS CARR: That may be quite right.

MR. FURNESS: It therefore seems rather uncertain that either one is a reply to the other. I don't know.

MR. COMYNS CARR: I think my friend is

quite right. Those two probably are not.

BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

Q Colonel Wild in the last one which I read it is stated that the names of prisoners in Siam and Malays have already been reported, which amounted to 10,000. What have you got to say about that?

A The number of prisoners of war in Burma and Siam at the time my party got up there in April, 1943, was over 30,000, and we in "H" Force swelled the number by 10,000.

MR. COMYNS CARR: At the present time I need not read pages 5 and 6 and the next one in order of date is the last one, which begins on page 10. It is from the Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in Siam to Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Subject: Information re: British Prisoners of War in Burma.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1600 an adjournment was taken until Friday, 13 September 1946, at 0930.)
