

Document No. 0003

OSHIMA

The particulars with regard to Oshima, Hiroshi are to be found on page 335 of the Chronological Summary, and the additional exhibits which directly affect him are: Exhibit No. 2106 (Record page 15,186); Exhibit No. 2230 (Record Page 15,990); Exhibit No. 2232 (Record page 16,003).

From 1st August 1931-5 March 1934 he was a member of the Army and Navy General Staffs and was decorated for his services in the "incident".

The requirement that Japan secure the political strength and bargaining power which a military alliance with Germany would afford, and the reasons therefore, have been fully discussed. The first step in the accomplishment of this desired end was taken in the Spring of 1935 by the accused Oshima who was then Japanese military attache to Germany. The original negotiations were not initiated through diplomatic channels but were conducted by the Military Attache. It was not until the Spring of 1936 that the negotiations were conducted through regular diplomatic channels. The accused Oshima assisted in these negotiations. (Exhibit No. 477, Record page 5913) This resulted in the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 September 1936, the purpose and importance of which have been explained. He was again decorated for this.

Close collaboration was maintained between the Japanese and Germans under the provisions of the protocol of the Anti-Comintern which took the form of espionage and subversive activities against the Soviet Union. It was shown in a report of Reichsfuehrer, H. Himmler, on 31 January 1939, that the accused Oshima had succeeded in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Generalissimo Stalin, and that Oshima had purchased a tract of real estate in Falkensee in the name of a middle man, where Russians were employed in writing propaganda pamphlets which were conveyed from Poland into Russia by means of small balloons. (Exhibit No. 489, Record page 6026).



Germany at first opposed military aggression by Japan in China under the guise of fighting communism in third states, but upon Japan giving evidence in January 1938 of a determination to wage a major war against China, Germany re-oriented her policy and Japan thus gained the support of Germany in her plans against China as well as against Russia.

At this time, 4 February 1938, Chancellor Hitler assumed supreme command of the armed forces in Germany. In line with the expressed desire to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, Ribbentrop and Oshima, still Military Attache to Germany, discussed the advisability of closer collaboration between Germany and Japan which resulted in a proposal for a mutual aid treaty aimed at the entire world. (Exhibit No. 497, Record page 6051) Oshima, elevated to the rank of Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Germany on 8 October 1938, conducted the negotiations for a Japanese-German military alliance. Italy temporarily refused to unite in such an alliance. Oshima, after obtaining the approval of the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government, went to Italy in December 1938 for the purpose of inducing Mussolini to unite in such an alliance. (Exhibit No. 487, Record page 6061).

As a result of the division within the Japanese Cabinet as to the extent to which Japan should commit herself in the proposed alliance, Oshima was advised in December 1938 that the Ito Commission would be sent to Europe to make known the Government's exact position. (Exhibit No. 487, Record page 6062).

Oshima and Shiratori conferred on matters pertaining to the proposed alliance and contrary to the views of the Japanese Cabinet they advocated an all-cut military alliance aimed at the world. They endeavored to impose their convictions upon the Japanese Government and exercised the utmost pressure in their endeavor to influence and direct Japanese policy in this regard.

The Ito Commission on its arrival in Berlin instructed Oshima that he must work within the views of the Government (Exhibit No. 487, Record pages 6072-6079), but Oshima, desiring a military treaty without reservations on the part of Japan, refused to follow the advice of the Ito Commission and refused to communicate through official channels a



Japanese compromise proposal. Acting with Shiratori, then Ambassador to Rome, Oshima threatened to bring about a fall of the Japanese Cabinet by resigning from his post unless the Government reconsidered its stand. (Exhibit No. 499, Record page 6096).

In April 1939 the Japanese Government reconsidered its stand and presented a new draft of the proposed treaty in connection with which it requested an agreement that in the publication of the Pact an explanation be made which would tend to soften the attitude that would likely result on the part of England, France and America. The reason assigned by the Tokyo Cabinet for the necessity for such a limited interpretation of the Pact was that both for political and economic reasons Japan "was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposer of the three democracies."

Oshima, for the second time transcending the role of a ministerial officer, refused to officially communicate the Japanese Government's proposal to the nation to which he was accredited. (Exhibit No. 502, Record page 6100). By this action he endeavored to impress upon the Japanese nation the policy which he and the accused advocated and which was necessary to assure Japan the political and military support for their aggressive action in East Asia.

Ribbentrop informed Ambassador Oshima that a German-Italian pact would be signed during the month of May, and that it was desirable that the Japanese Government reach its final decision quickly, so that it would be possible to formulate secretly the Tri-Partite Pact simultaneously with the signing of the German-Italian Pact (Exhibit No. 486, Record page 6115). Such a pact was concluded on 22 May 1939 (Record page 6120). In the last days before its conclusion the Japanese Cabinet made strenuous efforts to come to a final decision. In a strictly confidential and unofficial conversation, Ambassador Oshima advised von Ribbentrop that he had received a telegram from Foreign Minister Arita, according to which the Japanese Government wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of a European conflict. For the third time, Oshima endeavored to influence the policy of his government in line with his view and that of his associates by refusing to pass this matter on to the German Government.



He advised Arita of this by telegraph, whereupon War Minister Itagaki intervened and requested Oshima to hold up further action with regard to Foreign Minister Arita in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factions in Tokyo, promising that the army was "firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at the risk of a Cabinet overthrow." (Exhibit No. 2230, Record page 15,990).

As early as April 1939 Ribbentrop advised Ambassador Oshima that if negotiations for the Tri-Partite Alliance were delayed too long it might become necessary for Germany to consider a non-aggression pact with Russia. (Exhibit No. 487, Record page 6080). Such a pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939 (Record page 6122). Ambassador Oshima was directed to file a protest to Germany's action in concluding the pact, but in order to preserve his own policy and that of most of the accused with regard to Japanese-German relations and collaboration for which he had so energetically worked, he disobeyed his government's instructions for the fourth time by postponing delivery of the Japanese memorandum of protest until 18 September 1939, when the matter was handled in a surreptitious and unofficial manner. (Exhibit No. 506, Record page 6124).

The expediency of quickly concluding a German-Russian non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939 became apparent upon the dramatic German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Notwithstanding the temporary set-back to the conclusion of a Japanese-German-Italian Alliance, Oshima continued in his efforts to develop closer German-Japanese relations. In September 1939, he agreed with Ribbentrop that Japan's fate was linked with Germany's fate and that if Germany could succeed to mediate for a settlement between Japan and Russia, the result would be that Japan would be free to extend her power in East Asia toward the South in which direction her vital interests lie. Ribbentrop considered it would be of great importance for the policy of collaboration that General Oshima remain as Ambassador to Germany, in which capacity he had enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler and the German Army. (Exhibit No. 507, Record page 6127).

When General Oshima resigned as Ambassador, Ribbentrop advised the German Ambassador to Japan that General Oshima on his return would



work further for German-Japanese friendship and requested that Oshima be allowed to transmit in code telegrams to the Reich Foreign Minister personally and to forward letters addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister unopened. (Exhibit No. 508, Record page 6131).

Oshima, timing his action with the initiation of war by Hitler against Poland, advised the Japanese Government to proceed with military aggression in the Southern areas of Greater East Asia and against Hongkong, for which the Japanese Navy, in his opinion, was prepared. (Exhibit No. 509, Record page 6136).

After Oshima's return to Japan, the German Ambassador reported on 23 February 1940 that Oshima and others remained "in an unchanged friendly attitude and ready for every support." (Exhibit No. 511, Record page 6141).

The downfall of the Yonai Cabinet and its replacement by a stronger pro-alliance and pro-German Cabinet has been discussed elsewhere. The new Cabinet concluded the Tri-Partite Pact of 27 September 1940, the final milestone in the carrying out of that part of the conspiracy directed toward German and Italian assistance in the accomplishment of Japan's so-called divine mission. Upon the conclusion of the Pact, Foreign Minister Matsuoka offered Oshima the appointment of Ambassador to Germany. General Oshima at first declined reappointment to this position on the ground that it would interfere with the continuance of his politically active work in Japan for the Tri-Partite Pact. However, upon the exertion of pressure by the Foreign Minister and upon insistence by the Army, supported also by important Navy circles, General Oshima accepted reappointment. (Exhibit No. 560, Record page 6422).

Foreign Minister Matsuoka, at a farewell party for Oshima on 15 January 1941, stated that "the efforts exerted by our country for establishing the New Order in East Asia which began with the Manchurian Incident, and the efforts exerted by Germany and Italy to break down the Versailles system both have a fundamental common cause which, in turn, will contribute to the establishment of the New Order of the World." With German-Japanese relations destined to become closer, he said that Oshima's ability would be relied upon in an extensive way. (Exhibit No. 473-C, Record page 6423).



Oshima, in a conference with the State Secretary of German Foreign Ministry on 22 February 1941, stated with regard to British possessions in East Asia that Singapore must be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land, although he considered it necessary to take Hongkong first. (Exhibit No. 570, Record page 6457). On the following day, in a conference with Ribbentrop, Oshima asserted that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May; that prudence required preparations for war against both England and America; that the moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe and that the occupation of Hongkong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need. (Exhibit No. 571, Record page 6459). Oshima promised Ribbentrop that he would procure maps of Singapore in order that Hitler, considered as the greatest expert on military questions at that time, could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. (Exhibit No. 580, Record page 6529).

Oshima was a member of the General Commission established under the provisions of the Tri-Partite Pact. (Exhibit No. 121, Record page 768).

On 22 June 1941 Germany invaded Russia. Hitler had informed Oshima of his intention as early as 6 June (Exhibit No. 1084). Shortly thereafter, Oshima agreed with Ribbentrop that he would influence the Japanese Government in the direction of speedy military action against the Soviet Union. (Exhibit No. 587, Record page 6562).

Between the first and third of December, 1941, Ambassador Oshima began the definite negotiations for a "no separate peace pact" between Japan, Germany and Italy, which was concluded on 11 December 1941. The question had been raised by the General Staff as early as 18 November, and an assurance given by Ribbentrop on 21 November (Exhibit No. 601).

On 14 December 1941, Chancellor Hitler gave a reception in honor of Ambassador Oshima at which Oshima was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in Gold. At this reception Hitler acknowledged Oshima's services in the achievement of German-



Japanese cooperation which had culminated in a close brotherhood in arms. In the discussion that followed, Ambassador Oshima explained the progress of the war in the Pacific and stated that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India and that it was important for Germany to synchronize its attack against India from the west as Japan attacked from the East. (Exhibit No. 609, Record page 6670).

In March 1943, Oshima attended a conference with Ribbentrop in which Ribbentrop suggested that Japan institute similar warfare as Germany had been doing and in which Ribbentrop discussed with Oshima the German U-Boat Order of September 1942 in regard to failing to rescue survivors of torpedoed merchant vessels. Oshima conveyed to the Japanese submarine authorities information regarding the German operating policy, namely, complete destruction of personnel as well as the ship. (Exhibit No. 2106, Record pages 15,187-15,189). While Oshima is particularly concerned with the conspiracy alleged in Count 5 of the Indictment, we submit that the evidence shows that he was linked with the more general conspiracy from the beginning, or at least from an early date, and responsibility for all the acts alleged in the Counts in which he is charged.