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# I N D E X Of EXHIBITS

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Doc. No.	Pros. No.	Def. No.	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
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# I N D E X Of EXHIBITS (cont'd)

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Doc. No.	Pros. No.	Def. No.	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
220 C(31)	1080		Informal Oral Statement to NOMURA by Secretary of State dated 31 May 1941		9960
220 C(32)	1081		Excerpt from Memorandum of Secretary of State Hull dated 2 June 1941		9961
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16320(51)	1084		Entry in KIDO's Diary of 6 June 1941		9979
220 C(34)	1085		Informal Statement handed by Secretary of State Hull to NOMURA 6 June 1941		9982

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1	Thursday, 7 November, 1946
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4	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
T	FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal
6	War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan
y	
8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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1.B	
14	Appearances:
	For the Tribunal, same as before with the
15	exception of the HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from
16	India, not sitting.
17	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
18	For the Defense Section, same as before.
19	·
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23	(English to Japanese and Japanese
24	to English Interpretation was made by the
25	Language Section, IMTFE.)

· Inputer a received

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present except OKAWA, HIRANUMA, and MATSUI, who are represented by their respective counsel. We have certificates from the prison surgeon at Sugamo certifying that MATSUI and HIRANUMA are unable to attend the trial today on account of illness. The certificate will be recorded and filed.

Major Moore.

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LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore): If the Tribunal please, referring to document No. 1444, exhibit No. 919, page 1, the recprd page 9261, line 15, we recommend that the words, "Liaison Conference Decision Plan," be corrected to read, "Liaison Conference Decision, Draft."

> THE PRESIDENT: The correction will be made. Mr. Higgins.

MR. HIGGINS: If the Tribunal please, we offer in evidence I. P. S. document No. 1339A(3), which is a telegram dated February 18, 1941, from MATSUOKA to SHIGEMITSU.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1339A(3) will receive exhibit No. 1046. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1046 and received in evidence.)

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MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit No. 1046:

'CABLE #51 DESPATCHED 8:00 P.M. FEB. 18,
1941, BY FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA TO AMBASSADOR
'
SHIGEMITSU ON INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND
CRAIGIE REGARDING CABLE #47.

"Craigie, on the 15th, called upon me with 10 a note containing the purport of your cable No. 78 11 and a summary of the discussions between you and Eden. 12 I told Craigie on this occasion that I had already re-13 ceived from you a detailed report concerning this 14 question, and that in response thereto I had requested 15 you to lay my note before Foreign Secretary Eden and 16 handed him a copy of my cable #47. I then pointed 17 out to Craigie that there seemed to be an over-anxiety 18 on the part of Britain about the orientation of Japan's 19 policy, that various reports were reaching us that 20 Britain and the United States had taken up a combined 21 22 action against Japan, that this was inciting Japan's 23 public opinion, causing doubt and fear and giving rise to the arguments in some quarters that Japan 25 must take some counter-measures to meet this situa-

tion, and this would lead to misunderstanding on both sides. I further told Craigie that so long as they refrained from taking any such provocative attitude against us we would under no circumstances initiate action that would lead to anxiety on the part of Britain and the United States, that misunderstandings 6 by either party are the most dangerous factors, and that we wished to do everything possible to eliminate 8 them, and urged that England reconsider. I also explained to him that the major object of the Tripartite 10 Pact was the limitation of the warfare in Europe and encouragement of a peaceful settlement. Also under 12 strict secrecy I made it clear to him that, at the 13 moment of signing of the pact Germany had stressed 14 her desire to avoid provoking the United States and 15 especially to avert Japanese-American hostilities as 16 far as possible. Negotiations for the pact were car-17 ried out on the basis of the above. I told him that 18 I myself did not doubt Germany's real intention that 19 the above seemed to me to be consistent with her real 20 21 interest, but that Japan's policy also was based on this, and that she would continue to act along this 22 23 course.

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"Craigie then, in response, questioned whether I could check the so-called southward march

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of Japan, views on which were so active at the moment in Japan. Further, Craigie raised a query as to whether Japan did not expect exorbitant compensation for her role as a mediator of the Siam-French Indo-China conflict. I assured him as to Japan's southward advance that I would try to check it to the best of my ability, but as for the Siam-French Indo-China affairs I preferred to indicate Japan's real intentions by actual fact rather than by making excuses in words, and further, that as far as I myself was concerned, the greatest reward was the restoration of peace, with which I would be satisfied. I told him I believed that this was the first step toward realizing world peace which was Japan's ideal since the beginning of the nation; and I explained to him in detail Japan's policy. I added that since there exists a close intimacy between the Foreign Secretary and myself since our days in Geneva I had expressed my views outspokenly in my memorandum addressed to him, but in regard to that part which concerns arbitration for European peace, this had nothing to do with Germany and Italy, and that I had merely stated the belief which I've always held. The conversation between Craigie and myself lasted for about

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"Wired to U.S.A."

two hours, and he seemed quite relieved when he left.

We now offer in evidence I. P. S. document No. 1339A(8), which is a letter from Craigie to Foreign Minister dated February 21, 1941.

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THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 4 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, this 5 communication refers to an alleged misquotation in 6 the Japanese press. The document to which it refers 7 is a communique issued by the Thai Government on the 8 9 13th of February, 1941. This alleged mistake in the Japanese press certainly can have no probative value 10 11 with respect to the charges in the Indictment, and 12 no accusation that any of these accused were re-13 sponsible for the appearance in the Japanese press 14 of their interpretation of that document.

THE PRESIDENT: I notice it is regarded as
 a deliberate misquotation.

MR. HIGGINS: Yes.

18 THE PRESIDENT: It is not an ordinary mis19 apprehension or mistake.

Major Furness.

MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, referring
to exhibit 1046, there was a reference to the handing to Craigie of MATSUOKA's cable No. 47. This
same cable is referred to in exhibit 1041, a telegram
from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to Ambassador

SHIGEMITSU. I would like to ask whether that tele-1 gram No. 47 is in any of the papers which have been 2 introduced into evidence. 3 THE PRESIDENT: You should know. Mr. Furness. 4 MR. FURNESS: What is that? 5 6 THE PRESIDENT: You should know, and so should I. I do not recollect it. I think 49 is in. 8 MR. FURNESS: I know no particular paper which is referred to as telegram 47. I thought, though, that some of the other messages which haven't any telegram number, might be that particular document; 12 and if so, I would like to know which document, and I should think it would help the Tribunal since they 14 would know what the two men were talking about in 15 their conversation. 16 THE PRESIDENT: Well, now, you should not 17 interpose to ask whether a document is in. You 13 should know, and the Tribunal can be left to say 19 whether they want to see a document or not. Is the 20 document in, Mr. Higgins? I do not recollect it. I recollect 49.0

MR. HIGGINS: Mr. Hardin says he is not certain. It is his impression that 47 is in. He may have it confused with 49. That will be checked and reported.

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1	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2	No. 1339A(8) will receive exhibit No. 1047.
3	(Whereupon, the document above
4	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5	No. 1047 and received in evidence.)
6	MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit
7	No. 1047.
8	THE PRESIDENT: I should expressly state
9	that the objection to the last document tendered
10	on the ground that it has no probative value is over-
11	ruled for the reason I gave, that it imports some-
12	thing sinister.
18	MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit
14	No. 1047:
15	"BRITISH EMBASSY.
16	"TOKYO
17	"21st February, 1941
18	"My dear Minister,
19	"With reference to our conversation of yester-
20	day in regard to the presence of British troops near
21	the Malayan-Thai frontier, I send you the text of a
22	reassuring communique issued by the Thai Government
23	of the 13th instant. You will see from this that
24	that Government is not in any way apprehensive in
25	regard to the precautionary measures taken in Malay.
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1	"I am sorry to say that this communique was
2	distorted when published in the Japanese press. In-
3	stead of the words 'both countries still respect the
4	Treaty and pact on non-aggression concluded between
5	one another', the version given in the Japanese press
6	states 'Great Britain should respect the Non-Aggression
7	Treaty which she concluded with Thailand'. This can
8	only have been a deliberate misquotation, which I
9	am sure you will agree is very regrettable in present
10	circumstances.
11	"Believe me
12	"my dear Minister,
13	"Yours very sincerely,
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15	"(Sd) R. H. Craigie."
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1	We have a series of I. P. S. documents
2	numbered 1592A, B and C, taken from the Japanese
3	foreign office and separately authenticated.
4	We now wish to offer in evidence I. P. S.
5	document No. 1592A, which is a telegram No. 4808,
6	dated February 24, 1941, from SHIGEMITSU to MATSUOKA,
7	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
8	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9	No. 1592A will receive exhibit No. 1048.
10	(Whereupon, the document above
11	referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
12	hibit No. 1048 and received in evidence.)
13	MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit
14	No. 1048:
15	"Copy of telegram No. 4808.
16	"Nature of telegram: Code
17	"Date: Dispatched: 24 February, Showa,
18	16/1941/PM . Received: 25 February, Showa 16/1941/PM.
19	"TO: FOFEIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA.
20	"FROM: SHIGEMITSU, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN
21	LONDON.
22	"No. 135.
23	"At the request of Premier Churchill, I
24	had a talk with him for about an hour at noon on
25	the 24th. At that time the Premier spoke in

connection with the matter of Anglo-Japanese relations with which he had been personally concerned. He went into detail in speaking of the situations from the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance through the Russo-Japanese War and up to the World War and he expressed how much he desired to keep a friendly relationship with Japan."

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THE PRESIDENT: "He went into detail."

MR. HIGGINS (Reading continued): "Then, 10 as the second point, he expressed deep regret re-11 garding the present Anglo-Japanese relation which 12 is gradually getting worse; if a clash should occur 13 between the two nations it would indeed be a tragedy. 14 He emphasized that the defense works undertaken in 15 the area with Singapore as its center were merely 16 for the protection and control of the area and that 17 Britain had never taken any policy such as to resort 18 to an offensive against Japan. As the third point, 19 he emphasized that the British had a firm resolu-20 tion for the prosecution of the war. He went so far 21 as to say that if what Britain believes to be 22 justice should fail to gain the victory, Britain 23 24 had better go to ruin. He said he had been thinking 25 that this was not at all an easy war as people in general thought and that it would by no means come

1	to an end this year. He; however, believes that the
2	war will certainly be brought to an end with victory
3	on the part of Britain. Therefore, he said that the
4	question of mediation which Mr. MATSUOKA mentioned
5	would not arise. In connection with the cordial
6	message which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA sent to
7	British Foreign Minister Eden, Premier Churchill
8	has given me the note of another telegram No. 136,
9	asking; me to tell you that since Eden is away he
10	himself has written you the outline of the talk we
11	had today. The questions and answers in the talk
12	will be sent afterwards by cable.
13	"THIS TELEGRAM ALONE HAS BEEN SENT TO THE
14	UNITED STATES."
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1	MR. HIGGINS: We offer in evidence I. P. S.
2	document No. 702A, a document taken from the
3	Japanese Foreign Office duly authenticated. It
4	is an interchange of communications between the
5	Japanese Foreign Office and the British on mutual
6	relations and it is dated February 24, 1941.
7	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
8	terms
9	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
10	No. 702A will receive exhibit No. 1049.
11	(Whereupon, the document above
12	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
13	No. 1049 and received in evidence.)
14	MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit
15	No. 1049:
16	"INTERCHANGE BETWEEN JAPANESE FOREIGN
17	OFFICE AND BRITISH ON MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS.
18	"Note from Japanese Minister for Foreign
19	Affairs containing message to his Britannic Majesty's
20 21	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been
21	laid before Prime Minister.
23	"Prime Minister is gratified to observe
24	that Monsieur MATSUOKA sees no reason to apprehend
25	any untoward developments in East Asia, and notes
	with satisfaction his assurance about peaceful

intentions of Japanese Government.

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"Since Monsieur MATSUOKA, for his part, makes reference to 'movements of British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations', Prime Minister would allow himself to offer certain observations which he hopes may remove any misunderstanding of position of H. M.'s Government.

"There is no question of H. M. 's Government making any attack upon or committing any act of aggression against Japan; and Prime Minister is sure that this also represents intentions of United States, though of course he cannot claim to speak for them. All preparations which are being made in Oriental Regions by Great Britain and United States are of a purely defensive character. Incidentally, Prime Minister would wish to assure Monsieur MATSUOKA that concern which Mr. Eden expressed to Japanese Ambassador was not based exclusively on reports from H. M. 's Ambassador in Tokyo, but on the course of events in Far East and on a study of the speeches of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs himself.

"Turning now to the war in progress in Europe between Great Britain and Germany it will be within Monsieur MATSUOKA's recollection that, before

outbreak of war, H. M. 's Government made every offer, 1 by concession and reasonable dealing, to avert 2 hostilities. That is recognized throughout the 3 world, and indeed the Government of the day in this 4 country were severely criticised for having travelled 5 too far along this road. Their efforts were un-6 availing, and German Government, by attacking 7 Poland after so many breaches of faith and of 8 treaties, chose arbitrament of war. H. M. 's 9 10 Government, having thus been forced to enter upon 11 this grievous quarrel, have no thought but to carry 12 it to a victorious conclusion. Naturally it takes 13 some time for the peaceful communities which compose 14 British Empire to overtake military preparations of . 15 countries which have long been exulting in their 16 martial might, and adapting their industries to war production. But even now H. M. 's Government feel well assured of their ability to maintain themselves against all comers, and they have every reason to hope that within a few months they will, with rapidly increasing supply of materials which is coming from United States, be overwhelmingly strong.

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"Monsieur MATSUOKA makes allusions to help which this country receiving from United States of America. Prime Minister would observe that that

help is being given for very reason that battle which this country is waging is for overthrow of system of lawlessness and violence abroad and cold, cruel tyranny at home which constitutes German Naziism regime.

"It is this system that people of British Empire, with sympathy and support of whole Englishspeaking world, are resolved to extirpate from continent of Europe. H. M. 's Government have no designs upon integrity of independence--"

THE PRESIDENT: "Or."

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MR. HIGGINS: "Integrity or" it should be.

(Reading continued): "--integrity or 13 independence of any other country, and they seek no. 14 advantage for themselves except satisfaction of 15 having rid the earth of a hateful terror and of 16 17 restoring freedom to the many insulted and enslaved 18 nations of European continent. This they would 19 regard as greatest honour that could reward them, 20 and the crowning episode in what, for western world, 21 is a long continuity of history.

"Monsieur MATSUOKA, with loftiest motives, has hinted at his readiness to act as the mediator between the belligerents. Prime Minister is sure that, in light of what he has said and upon for the

reflection, Monsieur MATSUOKA will understand that 1 in a cause of this kind, not in any way concerned 2 with territory, trade or material gains, but affecting 3 whole future of humanity, there can be no question 4 of compromise or parley. It would be a matter of 5 profoundest regret to H. M. 's Government if by 6 any circumstance Japan and this country were to y become embroiled, and this not only because of their 8 recollection of the years during which two countries, 9 were happily united in alliance, but also because 10 such a melancholy event would both spread and pro-11 long the war without however in opinion of H. M. 's 12 Sovernment altering its conclusion. 13 "Foreign Office, W. 1. 14 "24th February, 1941." 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

We now offer in evidence IPS document No. 1 G r 2 1592-B which is a telegram No. 4840, dated February e e 3 25, 1941, from OSHIMA to MATSUOKA. n Ъ 4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. e r 5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document g 6 No. 1592-B will receive exhibit No. 1050. 8 7 (Whereupon, the document above R 3 8 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit r t 9 No. 1050 and received in evidence.) 0 n 10 MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit 11 No. 1050: 12 "Copy of Telegram No. 4840 13 "Nature of Telegram: Code 14 Dispatched 25 February Showa 16/1941/A.M. "Date: Received, 25 February Shows 16/1941/P.M. 15 "To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA 16 Ambassador OSHIMA, Berlin "From: 17 "No. 160 (Urgent) 18 19 "At the interview with Ribbentrop reported to 20 you in Telegram No. 157, I stressed that there have been various conjectures concerning Japanese-Cerman re-21 lations, especially concerning the Tri-Partite Pact, 22 that there has also been slanderous propaganda by Eng-23 land and the United States; but that although there 24 25 may be some degree of misunderstanding on the part of

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We now offer in evidence IPS document No. 1 G r 2 1592-B which is a telegram No. 4840, dated February e e 3 25, 1941, from OSHIMA to MATSUOKA. n Ъ 4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. e r CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document g 6 No. 1592-B will receive exhibit No. 1050. 8 7 (Whereupon, the document above B 3 S referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit r t 9 No. 1050 and received in evidence.) 0 n 10 MR. HIGGINS: I read prosecution's exhibit 11 No. 1050: 12 "Copy of Telegram No. 4840 13 "Nature of Telegram: Code 14 "Date: Dispatched 25 February Showa 16/1941/A.M. Received, 25 February Showa 16/1941/P.M. 15 "To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA 16 Ambassador OSHIMA, Berlin 17 "From: "No. 160 (Urgent) 13 19 "At the interview with Ribbentrop reported to 20 you in Telegram No. 157, I stressed that there have been various conjectures concerning Japanese-Cerman re-21 lations, especially concerning the Tri-Partite Pact, 22 that there has also been slanderous propaganda by Eng-25 land and the United States; but that although there 24 25 may be some degree of misunderstanding on the part of

Germany, the fact that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact will be clearer when the Imperial Rescript is issued; and that both government officials and the people are moving forward with united and stead-fact resolve toward the realization of the national policy, with the aforementioned treaty as the keynote of our foreign relations. Ribbentrop agreed, saying that Germany too has a comradely feeling of being in the same boat as Japan, and that Chancellor Hitler has the strongest faith on this point. He said that he hoped that there was no misunderstanding about Germany's real intention by Japan. "For your reference. "Relayed to Germany, Soviet Russia, Turkey, and to the U.S.A." 

1	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hardin.
2	MR. HARDIN: I offer in evidence IPS docu-
3	ment 1592-C which is telegram No. 5956 dated Febru-
4	ary 25, 1941 from SHIGEMITSU in London to MATSUOKA.
5	THF PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7	No. 1592-C will receive exhibit No. 1051.
8	(Whereupon, the document above
9	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
10	No. 1051 and received in evidence.)
11	MR. HARDIN: (Reading)
12	"COPY OF TELEGRAM NO. 4956.
13	NATURE OF TELEGRAM: Code
14	DATE DESPATCHED: 25 Feb. Showa 16, 1941, P.M.
15	RECEIVED: 26 Feb. Showa 16, 1941, P.M.
16	TO: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
17	FROM: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU in London
18	"No. 137-1
19	"1. At the interview with Premier Churchill
20	
21	on the 24th he first spoke to me consecutively for
22	about 20 minutes as summarized in my previous tele-
23	gram No. 136.
24	"2. I answered that I understood what he said.
25	However, with regard to the third point, I told him
	that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA did not offer to med-

iate, but that he simply emphasized Japan's spirit toward peace and that he especially expressed his concern over the peace in East Asia. Availing myself of this opportunity I told him that I wanted to express my unreserved opinion to the effect that while the relations between Great Britain and Japan had become very clear, to our satisfaction, by Japan's avowal of having no intention to aggress upon Great Britain and by Britain's declaration that she would not take any offensive policy against Japan, it was very regrettable that Britain, who was well aware that the aggravation of the relations between the two countries arose from the problems in China, has been, together with other countries, giving concrete assistance to the Chungking government, our enemy, thus maintaining a policy enabling the Chungking Government to carry on resistance against Japan. Such a policy is recognized as a challange to the peace of East Asia for which Japan has deep concern. I continued that Japan bas no idea of conquering China and that her amprejudiced stand was clearly pointed out in MATSUOKA's message. and that we are carrying out our policies in that line under the treaties with the Nanking Government. In view of the present world conditions, it is im-

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possible for Japan to go on existing, abandoning 1 the continent of China to a chaotic condition. and, 2 therefore, that it is only justifiable for her to 3 counter-attack against hostile activities made upon 4 order and peace. Uneasiness could not be eliminated 5 unless this point should be amended. I said that I 6 was convinced that in the Pacific the time has come 7 to require more positive and constructive policies. 8 not just the preventing of general destruction. This 9 would be significent for preventing conditions from 10 becoming aggravated again. If all of the nations 11 12 concerned had enough self-control to be able to 13 construct peace in this area, too, through their 14 goodwill and mutual understanding, I went on, it 15 might prove the first step in gradually saving the 16 world from catastrophe. This was why I had been 17 making efforts and exchanging opinions with Lord 18 Lloyd (the Colonial Secretary, a leader of the Upper 19 House and an intimate friend of Churchill. Died 20 lately). Lord Lankey and others, as I said in con-21 clusion, he (Churchill) might have been aware. 22

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"3. The Premier answered that he was aware of it; then he said that as he had declared previously (his speech in Parliament at the time of the conclusion of the negotiations over the Burma

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Road) to the contrary, he considered it desirable that Japan be active in China, and that peace be brought about between them; so Great Britain had no intention of interfering. He said that rather than giving assistance. Britain's position is indeed tantamount to strict neutrality. Great Britain, he continued. has no objection now or later to the uninterrupted development of Japan as one of the great countries of the world. He said that, at any rate, he is at present doing his utmost to reestablish a righteous peace in Europe. The British Empire alone has a White population of sixty-five millions as against a population of seventy-five millions in Germany, and he was sure that the war should be brought to a final victory for his country by utilizing far bigger resources and with the assistance of the U.S.A.

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"4. The premier said further that after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact the intentions of Japan had been so vague as to cause suspicion on the part of Britain and the U. S. A., but instead that conditions have now become good is clear both at home and abroad by the press accounts. To the above I answered that it would be a gross mistake to consider that the latest press campaign by Britain gives favorable effect to Japan. In a word, a campaign of such nature would be only harnful and unprofitable. Then the Premier justified himself, saying that there was no special campaign. "5. At the interview today Permier Churchill tried to emphasize the determination of Great Britain to carry through the war, calling the German actions inhuman aggressive acts, but he did not criticize the past Japanese policies toward China. Instead he

appeared to show an attitude of indifference toward it.

"Dispatch relayed to United States."

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	We tender in evidence IPS document 220C (12)
1	from exhibit 58 for identification, Volume II. This
2	is an excerpt from a telegram from Mr. Grew to Secre-
3	tary of State, dated February 27, 1941.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
5	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7	No. 220C (12) will receive exhibit No. 1052.
8	(Whereupon, the document above
9	referred to was marked prosecution's exhib-
10	it No. 1052 and received in evidence.)
10	MR. HARDIN: (Reading)
12	"TELEGRAM
13	"THE, AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
14	SFCRETARY OF STATE
15	"TOKYO, February 27, 19412 a.m. (Received
16	4:55 p.m.)
17	"Excerpt.
18	"317. In the course of my conversation today
19	with the Foreign Minister he went out of his way to
20	accuse the British Government of taking measures in
21	the Far East which were a direct incitement to Japan
22	and which rendered very difficult an improvement in
23	the situation. He referred in this connection to the
24	reported mining of Singapore and the sending of Aus-
25	tralian troops to the Malaya-Thailand border."
	a day of the startege flattand border.

" I said that it seemed to me extraordinary that the Japanese should interpret and characterize obviously defensive measures as measures of offense. As I had said to the Minister at the American-Japan Society luncheon, we must inevitably be guided by "facts and actions! and that certainly the facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance were concrete causes for serious anxiety not only on the part of Great Britain but of ourselves. Having occupied in succession Waichow, Hainan, the Spratly Islands, and other areas, the Japanese military were now pouring troops into Indo-China and, according to our informer, had occupied the airport in Saigon, quite apart from naval activities in those regions, and that these steps, taken in conjunction with the public utterances of many Japanese statesmen, generals and admirals concerning Japanese intentions to the southward, had created a situation which could hardly be regarded with equanimity either by the United States or Great Britain since they threatened not only our interests but our possessions."

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1	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.
2	MR. KEENAN: We offer in evidence IPS
	document No. 1339A (7) which is Japan's proposal by
3	SHIGEMITSU to Churchill, dated February 27, 1941.
4	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
5	CLERK OF I.IL COURT: Prosecution's document
6	No. 1339A (7) will receive exhibit No. 1053.
7	(Whereupon, the document above
8	referred to was marked prosecution's exhib-
9	i . 1053 and received in evidence.)
10	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
11	"Japan's Second Offer (Handed by Ambassador SHICEMITSU
12	to CHURCHILL)
13	
14	"His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister
15	for Foreign Affeirs acknowledges the receipt of the
16	note of His Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister, dated
17	February 24, 1941, and takes pleasure in apprising
18	the letter that the statement and remarks contained
19	therein have been duly noted.
20	"The Foreign Minister trusts that Mr. Church-
21	ill is not necessarily expecting observations to made
22	upon them. He wishes, however, to take advantage of
23	the opportunity to state that no hint whatever of his
24	readiness to act as a mediator between the actual be-
25	lligerents was intended to be conveyed in his Memoran-
	Trager on or a realized to be ochoeyed in mit headen of en-

dum addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Principal 1 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, nor did he 2 imagine for a moment any possibility of such a hint 3 being read in any part of the text. The Foreign 4 Minister took occasion in his Memorandum to refer 5 to the mediation now taking place in Tokyo as Mr. 6 Eden had made allusions to it and incidentally took 7 the liberty of stating in a general and abstract 8 manner the views he has always charished, in order 0 to make clear the aspiration and attitude of his 10 country concerning the problem of perce or the re-11 covery of normal conditions throughout the world. 12

"The Foreign Minister believes that it will 13 not be entirely out of place to reiterate what he 14 has said on more than one occasion in reference to 15 the Tripertite Pact, inasmuch as this matter was 35 touched upon by Mr. Eden in his conversation with 17 Ambassador SHIGEMITSU. The Tripartite Pact was 18 concluded as, and remains, a peace pact in the sense 19 that it was entered into largely with a view to pre-20 venting a third Power from participating in the 21 22 European war or Sino-Japanese conflict, thus limit-23 ing the participants and dimensions of the war and 24 also to bringing about peace at the carliest pos-25 sible date. Japan's ideals were epitomized in the

preamble of the Pact, and it is needless to say that Japan, remaining absolutely loyal to the aims and ideals enunciated, will always find herself standing by her allies in carrying out her duty under the Tripartite Pact.

"The Foreign Minister would equally deplore 6 and regret, if by any untoward circumstances, Great 7 Pritain and this country were to become embroiled, 8 not only because of the recollection of the years 9 during which the two countries were united in alliance, 10 but also because such a tragic eventuality would be 11 12 fraught with the danger of destroying modern civili-13 zation to the undoing of the best part of Humanity. 14 "February 27, 1941." 15

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We now desire to offer in evidence IPS document 1593-A taken from the Japanese Foreign Office and duly authenticated. It is a telegram, No. 6915, dated 4 March 1941, from MATSUOKA to NOMURA, the Ambassador in Washington.

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THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1593-A will receive exhibit No. 1054.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1054 and received in evidence.)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel, the preceding exhibit, 1053, is headed "Japan's Second Offer." Can you suggest that exhibit 1053 contains an offer?

MR. KEENAN: If the Tribunal please, this 16 is not our contention of the fact, nor do we at any 17 time, at any stage of this proceeding, in offering 18 any document or witness, intend to be bound when they 19 are of Japanese origin or nationality. We are offer-20 ing it as the representation made by the Japanese 21 Government of what they contended the facts to be as 22 they were making it appear to other nations. 23

24 More specifically, Mr. President, with re-25 spect, in stating our position in answer to the Court's

inquiry, this might be considered an offer for world peace on Japanese terms.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

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MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we cannot let the Chief Prosecutor's statement go by unchallenged.

7 THE PRESIDENT: He can state his position 8 without issuing any challenge that you can meet now. 9 The Court, in effect, invited him to state his po-10 sition. He did not misunderstand us. He just 11 stated it, and I think that ought to be the end of it 12 for the time being, Mr. Logan.

MR. LOGAN: I am not referring to his statement with regard to your inquiry on exhibit 1053. I am referring to his statement that the prosecution is not bound by any of the documents or statements made by witnesses of Japanese origin. It has always been my understanding that when a witness is offered by the prosecution that he vouches for his credibility, and I know of no reason why any other procedure than that should be adopted in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: In a criminal proceeding, of course, it is the duty of the prosecution to place all the facts before the Court and let the Court draw its conclusion. Here you have a document which may or may not contain a wrong heading. If it contains a wrong heading, the prosecution are not bound by that wrong heading.

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MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, perhars I should make it abundantly clear that this is the document exactly as we found it in the Japanese archives, and it speaks for itself; and, of course, the Court will make whatever interpretation circumstances warrant.

THE PRESIDENT: We always understood that heading appeared on the original.

MR. KEENAN: The prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document No. 2530-A, another newspaper announcement relating to the new Mobilization Law, dated 8 March 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel, do you propose to read exhibit 1054?

MR. KEENAN: I beg your pardon. We do propose. In the colloquy with counsel, I had forgotten that that was not read. May I now read it?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It has been admitted and numbered, and you will read it.

MR. KEENAN: (Reading)

"Date: 7:00 P.M. March 4, 1941

"Sender: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. 1 "Addressee: NOMURA, Japanese Ambassador to 2 the U.S.A. 3 "Subject: Ambassador NOMURA's denial of the 4 war with America. 5 "No. 107. 6 7 "Concerning No. 123 of your telegram, I 8 fully appreciate the circumstances under which you 9 had to make your answer in a cautious way. How-10 ever, as I have already made an affirmative reply 11 to the question as to whether Japan will partici-12 pate in a warfare in case the United States should 13 attack Germany, at the general meeting of Budget 14 Committee in the House of Representatives and on 15 other occasions, I hope that hereafter you will act 16 in concert with me when you answer questions of like 17 nature." 18 THE PRESIDENT: The document last tendered 19 is admitted on the usual terms. 20 Give it a number. 21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 22 No. 2530-A is given exhibit No. 1055. 23 (Whereupon, the document above re-24 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 25 No. 1055 and received in evidence.)

	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
1	"EXTRACT FROM 'THE TOKYO NICHI NICHI'
2	"March 8, 1941
3	
4	"NATIONAL MOBILIZATION LAW
6	"Revised Regulations will be put in
7	Force on March 20.
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9	"The detailed regulations relative to the
10	application of the revised National Mobilization Law,
11	which were approved in the 76th session of the Diet,
12	will be put in force on March 20, it was decided at
13	the Cabinet Meeting on March 7."
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M	1	MR. KEENAN: Ve now offer in evidence IPS
o r	2	document 220C (20) from exhibit for identification
s e	3	No. 58, volume 2. This is an excerpt from a memorandum
Sc.	4	of Secretary of State Hull, dated March 8, 1941.
A	5	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
b r	6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
a m	7	No. 220C (21) will receive exhibit No. 1056.
	8	(Whereupon, the document above referred
	9	to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1056 and
	10	received in evidence.)
	11	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
	12	"Memorandum by the Secretary of State.
	13	"Washington, March 8, 1941.
	14	"The Ambassador then said that it would be well-
	15	nigh unthinkable for our two countries to fight each
	16	other on account of the destructive effects that would
	17	inevitably result in any event. I here spoke and
	18	said that my country entertained the same idea about
	19	the destructive effects of a military clash between
	20	our two countries. I then inquired of the Ambassador
	21	whether the military groups in control of his Govern-
	22	ment could possibly expect important nations like the
	23	United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or
	24	three nations before our very eyes organized naval and
	25	military forces and went out and conquered the balance

of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade 1 routes and the other four continents. Could they 2 expect countries like mine to continue to remain com-3 placent as that movement is going on? I inquired fur-4 ther what countries like mine would have to gain by 5 remaining complacent in the face of a movement to sub-6 stitute force and conquest for law and justice and 7 8 order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador 9 sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he 10 11 then said that embargoes by this country were, of 12 course, of increasing concern, and that he did not 13 believe there would be any further military movements 14 unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country 15 should force his Government, in the minds of those in 16 control, to take further military steps. To this I 17 replied that this is a matter entirely in the hands of 18 his Government for the reason that his Government took 19 the initiative in military expansion and seizures of 20 territory of other countries, thereby creating an 21 increasingly deep concern on the part of my own and other 22 countries as to the full extent of Japanese conquest 23 by force which was contemplated; that my country has 24 not been at fault and none of the nations engaged in 25 conquest have pretended seriously to charge it with

any action of omission or commission in relation to the 1 present movement of world conquest by force on the part 2 of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador 3 sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the 4 idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified mil-5 itary conquest. I then repeated the terms of the 6 Tripartite Agreement and the public declaration of 7 Hitler and MATSUOKA and other high authorities in Japan 8 9 to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite arrangement were out by military force to establish 10 a new order not for Asia alone, not for Europe alone, 11 12 but for the world, and a new order under their control. 13 I said that whatever interpretation the Ambassador 14 might give these utterances and military activities 15 in harmony with them thus far, the: American people 16 who were long complacent with respect to dangerous 17 international developments have of late become very 18 thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as 19 a matter of most serious concern in relation to move-20 ments by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge 21 of the seas and the other continents for their own 22 personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit 23 at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, 24 who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations 25 in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions

any action of omission or commission in relation to the 18 present movement of world conquest by force on the part 2 of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador 3 sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the 4 idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified mil-5 itary conquest. I then repeated the terms of the 6 Tripartite Agreement and the public declaration of 7 Hitler and MATSUOKA and other high authorities in Japan 8 to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite 9 arrangement were out by military force to establish 10 a new order not for Asia alone, not for Europe alone, 11 but for the world, and a new order under their control. 12 13 I said that whatever interpretation the Ambassador 14 might give these utterances and military activities 15 in harmony with them thus far, the: American people 16 who were long complacent with respect to dangerous 17 international developments have of late become very 18 thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as 19 a matter of most serious concern in relation to move-20 ments by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge 21 of the seas and the other continents for their own 22 personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit 23 at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, 24 who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions

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and this tremendous concern will remain and continue so long as Hitler continues his avowed course of un-2 limited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as 3 the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation 1 by force of other and distant areas on both land and 5 sea, with no apparent occasion to do so other than 6 that of capture and exclusive use of the territory 7 and other interests of other countries. The Ambassador 8 again sought to allay the idea of military conquest 0 on the part of his country, and I again replied with 10 emphasis that so long as Japanese forces were all over 11 China and Japanese troops and airplanes and naval 12 vessels were as far south as Thailand and Indo-China 13 and Saigon, accompanied by such threatening declarations 14 as Japanese statesmen are making week after week, 15 there can only be increasing concern by nations who 16 17 are vitally interested in international affairs both 18 on land and sea as they are also vitally interested 19 in the halt of world conquest by force and barbaric 20 methods of government.

<sup>21</sup> "I proceeded to comment on Japan's line of
 <sup>22</sup> activities and utterances by saying that this country
 <sup>23</sup> and most other countries only proclaim and practice
 <sup>24</sup> policies of peaceful international relationships,
 <sup>25</sup> political, economic, social and cultural. Sometimes

the policy to promote these mutually beneficial rela-1 tionships is proclaimed, such as our good neighbor 2 policy with special reference to Pan-America. And yet 3 4 all of our acts and programs and policies adopted by t<sup>1</sup> twenty-one American nations in their conferences 5 6 from time to time are made universal in their appli-7 cation, so that Japan and all other nations receive 8 the same equal opportunities for trade and commerce 9 generally throughout the Americas that each of the 10 American nations receives itself. In striking contrast 11 the new order in greater Eastern Asia is unequivocally 12 believed to be purely a program of military aggression 13 and conquest with entirely arbitrary policies of 14 political, economic and military domination." 15

Quotations from a Foreign Relations volume. The prosecution now offers in evidence IPS document 220C (22) from exhibit for identification 58, volume 2, which is excervts from a memorandum of the Secretary of State, dated March 14, 1941.

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THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220C (22) will receive exhibit No. 1057.

> (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1057 and received in evidence.)

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MR. KEENAN: (Reading) 1 "Memorandum by the Secretary of State. 2 "March 14, 1931. 3 "Excerpts. 4 "The President again returned to the Tri-5 partite /greement and said that it had upset the 6 American people because they think that a concerted 7 effort is being made by Germany and Italy to reach the 8 Suez Canal and by Japan on the other hand to approach 9 Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian 10 The Japanese Ambassador spoke more strongly Ocean. 11 than he had in his earlier talk with me, expressing 12 his belief that his country would not go South. 13 "The President finally remarked that, as the 14 Ambassador indicated, matters between our two countries 15 could undoubtedly be worked out without a military 16 clash, emphasizing that the first step in this direc-17 tion would be the removal of suspicion and fear regard-18 ing Japan's intentions. I here remarked that, of 19 course, with MATSUOKA astride the Axis on his way to 20 Berlin and talking loudly as he goes, and Japanese 21 naval and air forces in the vicinity of Indo-China, 22 Thailand and Saigon, with no explanation but with ser-23 ious inferences, the Ambassador must realize how acute 24 25 feeling and opinion in this country have become."

We now offer in evidence, if it please the Tribunal, several separate documents from the accused KIDO's diary. They are documented as a series of IPS documents 1632W. They will not be tendered consecutively but in order of date in the course of this evidence. THE PRESIDENT: We will receive them after the recess. We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken until 1100, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:) 

Ed	1	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
е	2	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
r	3	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.
38 T	4	MR. KEENAN: I will proceed to read the docu-
Du	5	ment last referred to before the Court recessed.
d a	6	If the Court please, I tendered the excerpt
	7	from Marquis KIDO's Diary, and I believe the Court had
	8	not acted upon its admission.
	9	THE PRESIDENT: We have not seen it yet. It
	10	has not been distributed.
	11	Admitted on the usual terms.
	12	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
	13	1632-W(48) will receive exhibit No. 1058.
	14	(Whereupon, the document above
	15	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
	16	No. 1058, and was received in evidence.)
	17	MR. KEENAN: Dated 3 April 1941.
	18	(Reading) "In the anteroom of the Imperial
	19	Palace Premier KONCYE consulted me about the pros-
	20	pective appointment of Admiral TOYODA as the Minister
	21	of Commerce and Industry and Lieutenant-General
	22	SUZUKI as the President of the Planning Board. I
	23	agreed with him. At 4.40 p.m. Premier KONOYE tele-
	24	phoned me saying that since the plan he had intimated
	25	to me this morning had been approved by both the War

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1	Minister and the Navy Minister, necessary arrangements
2	for the appointments would be made at once."
3	Prosecution now offers in evidence IPS
4	cocument 220-C(23) from exhibit for identification
5	58, Volume II. This is a proposal presented by the
6	Lepartment of State in Japan at a meeting of private
7	Japanese and American individuals on April 9, 1941.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
9	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
10	No. 220-C(23) will receive exhibit No. 1059.
11	(Whereupon, the document above
12	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
13	No. 1059, and was received in evidence.)
14	MR. KEENAN: (Reading) "Proposal Presented
15	to the Department of State through the Medium of
16	Private American and Japanese Individuals on
17	April 9, 1941."
18	At this time, if the Court please, I would
19	like to have the previous remarks that had been read
20	from the prepared manuscript to conform with the exact
21	language of the heading of this document, namely:
2 <b>2</b>	"Froposal Presented to the Department of
23	State through the Medium of Private American and
24	Japanese Individuals on April 9, 1941.
25	"The Governments of the United States and of
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Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

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"Without reference to specific causes of 4 recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both 5 Governments that the incidents which led to the de-6 terioration of amicable sentiment among our people should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforseen and unfortunate consequences.

"It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just Peace in the Pacific: and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

"For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

"It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments. "

## of Japan respecting international relations and the 1 character of nations. 2 "The Governments of the United States and 3 of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equal-4 ly sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers. 5 "Both Governments assert the unanimity of 6 their national policies as directed toward the founda-7 8 tion of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new

era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our

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peoples.

11 "Both Governments might declare that it is 12 their traditional, and present, concept and conviction 13 that nations and races compose, as members of a family, 14 one household; each equally enjoying rights and ad-15 mitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests 16 regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the 17 pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which 18 they are bound to defend for themselves as they are 19 bound not to destroy for others.

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and nationallife will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and

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1	concepts.
2	"II. The attitudes of both Governments
3	toward the European War.
4	"The Government of Japan maintains that the
.5	purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive
6	and designed to prevent the extension of military
7	grouping among nations not directly affected by the
8	European War.
9	"The Government of Japan, with no intention
10	of eveding its existing treaty obligations, desires
11	to declare that its military obligation under the Axis
12	Alliance, comes into force only when one of the parties
13	of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power
<b>1</b> 4	not at present involved in the European War.
15	"The Government of the United States main-
16	tains that its attitude toward the European War is,
17	and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive
18	alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another.
19	The United States maintains that it is pledged to the
20	hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the
21	European War is, and will continue to be, determined
, 22	solely and exclusively by considerations of the pro-
23	tective defense of its own national welfare and se-
24	curity.
25	"ITT, China affairs,

"III. China affairs.

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1	"The President of the United States, if the
2	following terms are approved by His Excellency and
3	guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request
4	the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime to negotiate peace with
5	Japan.
6	"a. Independence of China
7	"b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from
8	Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement
9	to be reached between Japan and China
10	"c. No acquistion of Chinese territory
11	"d. No imposition of indemnities
12	"e. Resumption of the 'Open Door'; the
13	interpretation and application of which shall be agreed
14	upon at some future, convenient time between the United
15	States and Japan.
16	"f. Coalescence of Governments of Chiang-
17	Kai-Chek and of Wang-Ching-Wei.
18	"g. No large-scale or concentrated immigra-
19	tion of Japanese into Chinese territory.
20	"h. Recognition of Manchukuo.
21	"With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek
22	regime of the aforer ntioned Presidential request, the
23	Japanese Government shall commence direct peace nego-
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25	tiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government,
	or constituent elements thereof."

"The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits 2 of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.

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"Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject 6 the request of President Roosevelt, the United States 7 Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese. 8

"IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine 9 relations in the Pacific. 10

"a. As both the Americans and Japanese are 11 desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they 12 shall not resort to such disposition of their naval 13 forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. De-14 tailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for 15 determination at the proposed joint Conferences. 16

"b. At the conclusion of the projected Con-17 ference, each nation might despatch a courtesy naval 18 squadron to visit the country of the other and signal-19 20 ize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.

"c. With the first ray of hope for the set-21 22 tlement of Chinese affairs, the Japanese Government 23 will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to 24 release for contract by Americans certain percentage 25 of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly

for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

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4 "V. <u>Commerce between both nations and their</u> 5 <u>financial cooperation</u>.

"Then official approbation to the present 6 understanding has been given by both Governments, the 7 United States and Japan shall assure each other to 8 mutually supply such commodities as are respectively 9 available or required by either of them. Both govern-10 ments further consent to take necessary steps to the 11 12 resumption of normal trade relations as formerly es-13 tablished under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce 14 between the United States and Japan. If a new com-15 mercial treaty is desired by both governments, it 16 could be elaborated at the proposed conference and con-17 cluded in accordance with usual procedure.

"For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

"VI. Economic activity of both nations in

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## the Southwestern Pacific area.

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"On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carred on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

9 "VII. <u>The policies of both nations affect-</u>
10 <u>ing political stabilization in the Pacific</u>.

"A. The Governments of the United States
and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer
of territories or the relegation of existing States
within the Far E<sub>R</sub>st and in the Southwestern Pacific
area to any European Power.

"b. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

"c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East." "d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

## "Conference.

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"a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince KONOYE. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.

"b. There shall be foreign observers at
 the Conference.

"c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

"d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearringed agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.

"Addendum.

"The present understanding shall be kept as

	a confidential memorandum between the Governments of
1	the United States and of Japan.
2	"The scope, character and timing of the
3	announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon
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5	by both Governments."
6	Taken from Foreign Relations Vol. II, pp.
7	398-402.
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MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please--

MR. KEENAN: I am not through. I want to make a remark about it.

MR. LOGAN: I am sorry.

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MR. KEENAN: Mr. President, because of the 5 unusual situation existing, I ask respectfully, per-6 mission to explain to the Tribunal at this time that 7 later on in this phase we will present Mr. Ballantine, 8 Special Assistant to the Secretary of State of the 9 United States, who participated in many conferences 10 held in 1941 preceding the outbreak of the Japanese-11 12 American War.

I am offering no testimony, of course, at this time, but I am explaining to the Court that at that time he will give direct testimony as to these conferences or talks between unofficial -- those who were not officials of either Japan or the United States. We have believed it preferable to place the series of documents before the Court.

There were no officials representing the United States Government, we expect to prove, and we make this statement so that the Court will not be misled by any documents we present, nor will the record be confused in that regard. So we believe the Court will understand our explanatory statement at this time.

The prosecution offers in evidence IPS 1 document 220-C(24) from exhibit for identification 2 58, Volume II. 3 This is an excerpt from memorandum from 4 Secretary of State Hull, dated April 14, 1941. 5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 7 8 220-C(24) will receive exhibit No. 1060. (Whereupon, the document above 9 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 10 11 No. 1060, and was received in evidence.) 12 MR. KEENAN: (Reading) 13 "MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE 14 (WASHINGTON,) April 14, 1941 15 "Excerpt. 16 "The Ambassador of Japan called at my 17 apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. 18 I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both 19 the President and I suggested during our conversations 20 with him that he might care in discussions with me to 21 explore the question of improving relations between 22 the United States and Japan; that such a procedure 23 might involve a review of relations during recent 24 years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what 25 respects the courses of the two countries had div-

erged; and that this would be done with a view to 1 ascertaining whether something practicable might 2 be done toward restoring the relations of our two 3 countries to that harmonious state which existed for 4 so many decades. I said that I referred to this 5 again at this time because of the reports which 6 7 have been coming to me that certain of the Ambass-8 ador's compatriots have been working on formulation 9 of proposals and plans for improving relations be-10 tween the United States and Japan. I had been told 11 that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch 12 with the Ambassador in connection with their pro-13 posals and that the Ambassador has participated in 14 and associated himself with these plans. I added 15 that I did, of course, not know whether these reports 16 are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously 17 to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in ad-18 dressing ourselves to consideration of problems out-19 standing between our two Governments. 20

"I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort

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of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did hot know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore, to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Govern-

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ment did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

"Foreign Relations II, pp.402 - 403"

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We offer in evidence IPS document No. 220 C (25) from exhibit for identification, Volume 2, exhibit 58. This is an excerpt of Secretary of State Hull, dated April 16, 1941. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

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CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220 C (25) will receive exhibit No. 1061. ("Thereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1061 and received in evidence.) MR. KEENAN: (Reading)

"MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

"Excerpt. "(Washington) April 16, 1941

"with reference to the question of grad-16 ually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said 17 that I had been told that the document on which the 18 Ambassador and the private group of individual 19 Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained 20 numberous proposals with which my Government could 21 readily agree; on the other hand, however, there 22 were others that would require modification, expansion, 23 24 or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would 25 naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked

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	that the one paramount preliminary question about
1 2	which my Government is concerned is a definite
3	assurance in advance that the Japanese Government
4	has the willingness and ability to go forward with
5	a plan along the lines of the document we have
6	referred to and the points brought up in our conver-
7	sation in relation to the problems of a settlement;
8	to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest
9	by force and the taking of title to all property
10	and territories seized, together with the use of
11	force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the
12	principles which this Government has been proclaiming
13	and practicing as embodying the foundation on which
14	all relations between nations should properly rest.
15	"I said:
16	"'I will, therefore, hand to you as the
17	basis for my preliminary question, the following
18	four points on a blank piece of paper:
19	"'1. Respect for the territorial integrity
20	and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
21	"'2. Support of the principle of non-
22 23	interference in the internal affairs of other coun-
24	tries.
25	"'3. Support of the principle of equality,
	including equality of commercial opportunity. "

"'4. Non-disturbance of the status quo 1 in the Pacific except as the status quo may be 2 altered by peaceful means. 3 "'You can answer the questions or submit 4 them to your Government for its answer through you, 5 as you prefer. You understand that we both agree 6 7 that we have in no sense reached the stage of 8 negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely . 9 preliminary and unofficial way what action might 10 pave the way for negotiations later. ' 11 "Foreign Relations II, pp. 406-407." 12 Prosecution offers in evidence IPS document 13 1339-A (9), letter from Mr. Churchill to MATSUOKA, 14 dated April 12, 1941, handed to MATSUOKA at Moscow. 15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 17 No. 1339-A (9) will receive exhibit No. 1062. 18 (Whereupon, the document above 19 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 20 1062 and received in evidence.) 21 MR. KEENAN: (Reading) 22 "Message from the Pight Honorable Winston 23 Churchill, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign 24 Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, His 25 Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign

1	Affairs, of which a copy was handed unofficially
2	to Mr. MATSUOKA by His Majesty's Ambassador at
3	Moscow on April 12, 1941.
4	"(Note It had originally been intended
5	that this letter should be delivered to Mr. MATSUOKA
6	by Mr. SHIGEMITSU who had expected to meet the
7	Japanese Foreign Minister during his stay in Europe).
8	"Your Excellency,
9	"I take advantage of the facilities with
10	which we have provided your Ambassador to send you a
11	friendly message of sincerity and goodwill. I venture
12	to suggest a few questions which, it seems to me,
13	deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese
14	Government and people:
15	"(1) Will the Germans, without command of
16	the sea or command of the British daylight air, be
17	able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the
.18	spring, summer or autumn of 1941? Will the Germans
19	try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of
20	Japan to wait until these questions have answered
21	themselves?
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23	"(2) Will the German attack on British
24	shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid
25	from reaching British shores with Great Britain and
	the United States of America transforming their

whole industry to war purposes? 1 "(3) Did Japan's accession to the triple 2 pact make it more likely or less likely that the 3 United States would come into the present war? 4 "(4) If the United States entered the war 5 at the side of Great Britain and Japan ranged her-6 7 self with the Axis Powers, would not the naval 8 superiority of the two English-speaking nations 9 enable them to deal with Japan while disposing of 10 the Axis Powers in Europe? 11 "(5) Is Italy a strength or a burden to 12 Germany? Is the Italian fleet as good at sea as on 13 paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be? 14 "(6) Will the British Air Force be 15 stronger than the German Air Force before the end 16 of 1941 and far stronger before the end of 1942? 17 "(7) Will the many countries which are 18 being held down by the German army and Gestapo learn 19 to like the Germans more or will they like them less 20 as the years pass by? 21 "(8) Is it true that the production of 22 steel in the United States of America during 1941 23 will be 75 million tons and in Great Britain about 24 12t million tone, making a total of nearly 90 25 million tons? If Germany should happen to be

1 defeated as she was last time would not the 2 7 million tons of steel production of Japan be 3 inadequate for a single-handed war? 4 "From the answers to these questions may 5 spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catas-6 trophe and a marked improvement in the relations 7 between Japan and Great Britain, the great sea 8 Power of the West. 9 "I remain, with great truth and respect, 10 "Your Excells ey's obedient Servant, 11 "(Sd) "INSTON S. CHURCHILL." 12 I offer in evidence, with the Court's 13 permission, IPS document No. 1339-A (10), which is 14 a telegram from MATSUOKA to Churchill, dated April 15 22, 1941. 16 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual 17 terms. 18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-19 20 ment No. 1339-A (10) will receive exhibit No. 1063. 21 ("hereupon, the document above ... 22 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 23 No. 1063 and received in evidence.) 24 MR. KEENAN: (Reading) 25 "April 22, 1941

"Your Excellency,

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"I have just come back from my trip and 1 hasten to acknowledge the receipt of paper, handed 2 to me at Moscow on the evening of the 12th instant 3 by Sir Stafford Cripps with remark that it was a 4 copy in substance of a letter addressed to me dated 5 London, April 2, 1941, and forwarded to Tokyo. 6 "I wish to express my appreciation for 7 the facilities with which your Government made 8 efforts to provide our Ambassador when he wanted 9 to meet me on the continent. I was keenly dis-10 appointed when I learned that he could not come. 11 "Your Excellency may rest assured that 12 the foreign policy of Japan is determined upon and 13 after an unbiased examination of all the facts 14 15 and a very careful weighing of all the elements of 16 the situation she confronts, always holding stead-17 fastly in view the great racial aim and ambition of finally bringing about on the earth the conditions

finally bringing about on the earth the conditions
envisaged in what she calls Hakkoichiu, the Japanese
conception of a universal peace under which there
would be no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation
of any and all peoples. And, once determined, I need
hardly tell Your Excellency, it will be carried out
with resolution but with utmost circumspection, taking
in every detail of changing circumstances."

	"I am, believe me,
1	"Your Excellency's obedient servant,
2	"Yosuke MATSUOKA."
3	Prosecution offers in evidence document
4	No. 219P (73) taken from exhibit for identification
5	No. 58, Volume 1, which is an excerpt from statement
6	by Ambassador Grew to Acting Foreign Minister KONOYE,
7	Tokyo, April 14, 1941.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
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10	terms.
11	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12	No. 219P (73) will receive exhibit No. 1064.
13	("hereupon, the document above
14	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
15	No. 1064 and was received in evidence.)
16	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
17	"Tokyo, April 14, 1941
18	"No. 1779.
19	"The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)
20	to the Japanese Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
21	(PRINCE KONOYE).
22	"Excellency: I have the honor to refer to
23	my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 1738
24	of February 4, 1941, with reference to the aerial
25	bombardment of Kunming, China, by Japanese aircraft
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on January 29, 1941, at which time the American Consulate at that place was seriously endangered, and to inform Your Excellency that American lives and property were again endangered at Kunming on April 8 by a wanton and indiscriminate bombing attack by Japanese airplanes.

"On this occasion, according to the Amer-7 ican Consul at Kunming, the China Inland Mission, 8 where seven American citizens including three 9 children were residing, was badly damaged by ex-10 11 plosions and barely escaped destruction by fire. 12 At the same time, the house occupied by the 13 American-citizen clerk of the Consulate, adjacent 14 to the Mission, suffered concussion and damage in 15 the form of broken glass, fallen plaster and tiles, 16 and demolished electric light fixtures. 17

"Foreign Relations I, pp. 710-711." THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Williams.

MR. E. WILLIAMS: We tender in evidence IPS document No. 1632W (49), which is an entry in KIDO's Diary, April 19, 1941.

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THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1632W (49) will receive exhibit No. 1065.

("hereupon, the document above 1 referred to was marked prosecution's 2 exhibit No. 1065 and received in evidence.) 3 MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution 4 exhibit No. 1065: 5 "Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's 6 Diary, 19 April 1941. 7 "April 19, 1941 - (Extract). 8 "From 1:20 p.m. to 1:43 p.m. I was re-9 ceived in audience by the Emperor and reported 10 Japan's relations with the U.S. and also German-11 12 Soviet relations. Ambassador KURUSU came to report 13 to the Throne. I was allowed to hear his report. 14 I talked with Premier KONOYE concerning Ambassador 15 NOMURA's request for instructions. It was our con-16 clusion that we must bend every effort to keep good 17 faith with Germany and Italy, and at the same time 18 we ought to endeavor to realize the establishment of 19 a new order in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 20 Sphere, which is our fixed national policy." 21 We offer in evidence IPS document 22 No. 1632" (50), an entry in KIDO's Diary, April 28, 23 1941. 24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual 25 terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1632W (50) will receive exhibit No. 1066. ("hereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1066 and received in evidence.) 

MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution 1 exhibit No. 1066: 2 "'Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 28 3 April 1941. 4 "Having caught a cold I took a rest. At 5 6 .11.30 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA came to say that 7 his opinion had been asked by the Emperor what official 8 His Majesty should turn to for advice on diplomatic 9 questions when the Premier, Foreign Minister and Lord 10 Keeper of the Privy Seal were ill simultaneously as 11 is the case today, and he also asked about the 12 progress of deliberations on our policy towards the 13 U.S.A. 14 "I expressed my opinions about these questions 15 and then asked MATSUDAIRA to submit them to the Throne. 16 In the afternoon the Chief Secretary telephoned me 17 to say that the Emperor was well pleased with my 18 answer, and also conveyed to me a gracious Imperial 19 message which advised me always to take good care 20 of my health." 21 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may we 22 have document, exhibit No. 1066, referred to the 23 Translation Section? 24 THE PRESIDENT: What do you suggest is wrong 25

with it, Mr. Logan?

MR. LOGAN: The first sentence "Secretary MATSUDAIRA came to say that his opinion" should be "my opinion," that is, KIDO's. THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal refers it to the Language Section. MR. E. WILLIAMS: We offer in evidence IPS document No. 2529-A, which is an offer of the Japanese policy to increase the population to 100,000,000 by 1945. This has been duly authenticated. THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2529-A will receive exhibit No. 1067. (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1067 and received in evidence.)

1	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution
2	exhibit No. 1067:
3	"EXTR/CT FROM 'JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER '
4	"January 23, 1941.
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6	"CABINET TAKES STEP TO 100,000,000 GOAL IN <u>POPULATION</u> DRIVE
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8	"EAST ASIA LEADERSHIP REQUIRES EXPANDING
9	NUMBERS, IMPROVED QUALITIES, OFFICIALS
10	UNI
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12	"DUAL POLICY OUTLINED
13	
14	"GOVERNMENT WILL ATTEMPT TO RAISE BIRTH RATE, CUT DEATH TOLL
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16	"VARIOUS AIDS PROPOSED
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18	"Fundamental principles of Japan's population
19	policy were decided on at the special Cabinet meeting
20	in the official residence of the Premier Wednesday,
21	Domei reports.
22	"Mr. Naoki HOSLINO, president of the Cabinet
23	Planning Board, made detailed explanations on the
24	policy while the Welfare, Education, and War Ministers
25	
	expressed their opinions."

"With minor changes, in wording, however, the 1 draft of a bill relating to the population policy was unamimously approved by the members of the Cabinet. 3 In this connection a statement was issued by the Board 4 5 of Information immediately after the meeting.

6 "According to this statement, the Government has been brought to establish a new population policy 7 8 to increase the population of this country quickly 9 and incessantly, to enhance the quality of the Japanese. 10 and to correct the distribution of the Japanese race 11 so as to secure the leadership of Japan over East 12 Asia.

# "GOAL at 100,000,000

14 "To this end, the goal for the total 15 population of Japan proper in 1935" -- it says here 16 by mistake; it should be 1945 -- "has been set at 17 100,000,000. This is to enable Japan to expand its 18 population without stop, to surpass other countries 19 in the rate of population increase as well as in the 20 quality of race, to secure adequate man power for 21 military and economic purposes, and to keep the 22 supremacy of Japan over other races in East Asia. 23 "The Government will make payments to

24 newlyweds, cut the marriageable age by three years. 25 The goal is five children per couple.

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"Efforts will be made to heighten the birth rate, and lower the death rate, and for the propagation of the view of the world based on family and race instead of the individual.

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"For heightening the birth rate in this country, marriages will be promoted by special bureaus 6 designated by the Government, expenditures on weddings will be restricted, employment of women over 20 will be restricted as much as possible, and priority in materials will be given to prolific families.

### "Birth Control Banned

"At the same time, various systems will 12 be instituted for the protection of mothers and infants, 13 and birth control through the practice of abortion 14 and use of medicines will be prohibited strictly. 15

"In order to lower the death rate, the 16 Government will make special efforts for the prevention 17 of tuberculosis as well as the protection of infants 18 from death. According to a Government plan, the death 19 rate in Japan will be reduced by 35 per cent in the 20 next 20 years. 21

"As a means of elevating the quality of the 22 nation, the Government will try to redistribute 23 population with stress laid on the reduction of the 24 population of large cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. 25

"Farmers Held Static

1	"At the same time, it will keep the farming
2	population in this country at a certain level as
3	the farming villages are considered to be the best
4	source of soldiers and laborers. It will expand
5	sports facilities for the rearing of stout and healthy
6	youths, and institute a system through which young
7	men can receive special spiritual and physical training
8	for a certain period of time.
9	"In this connection, Dr. Nobumi ITO, president
10	of the Board of Information, told Domei that since the
11	establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity
12	Sphere is the greatest mission ever delegated to the
13	Japanese, they must hold the responsibility as the
14	leaders of East Asia.
15	"'To become the leader of the Orient', he
16	said, 'the Japanese must not only expand greatly in
17	number but elevate themselves in quality.
18	"'To achieve this end, individualistic
19	ideas, and the practice of birth control in various
20	forms, must be driven out of the minds of the public;
21	the view of the world based on the family and race
22	must be filtered into them, and early marriages and
23 24	child-bearing in many numbers should be encouraged.""
	We now offer in evidence IPS document No.
25	4059-A, a document taken from the files at Nuernberg

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1	and is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop, dated
2	May 6, 1941.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
4	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5	No. 4059-A will receive exhibit No. 1068.
6	(Whereupon, the document above
7	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
8	No. 1068 and received in evidence.)
9	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution exhibit
10	No. 1068:
11	THE PRESIDENT: It is a very long document.
12	MR. E. WILLIAMS: It is long.
13	THE PRESIDENT: We will hear it after the
14	luncheon adjournment. We will recess now until half
15	past one.
16	(Whereupon, at 1155 a recess was taken.)
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1	AFTERNOON SESSION
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3	The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.
э 4	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
5	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
6	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Williams.
7	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's
8	exhibit No. 1068:
9	(Reading):
10	"Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
10	"Tokyo, 6 May 1941 1110 S.
11	"Arrival 7 May 1941 100 Hours
13	"No. 685 of 6 May Most urgent!
14	"Re: Telegram No. 676 of 5 May for the German
15	Foreign Minister
16	"For the German Foreign Minister.
17	"Today I had a rather long conversation with
18	MATSUOKA whom I told the points of view contained
19	in the foregoing telegram. MATSUOKA entirely agree
20	with my trend of thought, asking me to explain his
21	conception of the present situation to the German
22	
23	Foreign Minister as follows:
24	"He read the speech of the Fuehrer yesterday
25	and is extremely impressed by the sureness and wisdom
	of the arguments. On the other hand, ROOSEVELT seems

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to him to have completely lost his head, judging from his hysterical invectives. Impressed by the Fuchrer's speech, he has sent to the German Foreign Minister through the Japanese Embassy in Berlin a telegram, of which he handed me a copy.

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"Turning to a discussion of the overall 6 situation MATSUOKA stated that he intended to acquant me with the American proposal as soon as 8 he had achieved acceptance of his viewpoint by the authoritative quarters within the country. The American proposal probably originates in a report to WASHINGTON by the American Ambassador in MOSCOW; he has known him for a long time and had a frank discussion with him at MOSCOW while on his trip back. The American Ambassador, who did not conceal his critical attitude towards ROOSEVELT, asked him what JAPAN would do in case the United States should join the war. He replied that then Japan likewise would in any case immediately join the war on the side of the Axis powers. The Ambassador tried to soft pedal this view point in that he tried to represent Japanese interference as possible in his report to WASHINGTON. He (MATSUOKA), however. emphasized most clearly that Japan would then strike. "Even on his way back to TOKYO he expected

participation in the war will continue at a duick pace. Just now he is having investigated the question whether a Japanese protest is not called for even against patrolling activity on the part of American armed forces amounting to the arbitrary creation of an American safety zone.

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"He would be grateful for the earliest
possible information on the views of the German
Foreign Minister concerning the American propsal
/T.N. to be used/ for the unavoidable domestic
political discussion.

"As to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese 12 neutrality pact, MATSUOKA reported that right after 13 14 his departure from BERLIN, he did not envision the 15 possibility of the settlement. During the conver-16 sation with the German Foreign Minister he also 17 voiced this saying he would accept only in case 18 RUSSIA showed readiness. In his opinion the neutrality 19 pact was the off-shoot of Russian fear of Germany. 20 He found STALIN absolutely willing to keep the peace. 21 STALIN assured him that there could be no question 22 of RUSSIA's concluding a pact with the Anglo-Saxon 23 powers. One of his (MATSUOKA's) motives for con-24 cluding the neutrality pact had been to provide 25 another hinderance to this pact. According to

STALIN, the SOVIET Union did not join the Tripartite 1 pact because the allied powers were not in need of 2 Russian assistance. However, in case this was nec-3 essary, RUSSIA is prepared to co-operate extensively 4 with the Tripartite powers. When I remarked that 5 the SOVIET Union wanted to protect its rear and 6 asked what attitude Japan would adopt regarding 7 American shipments of armaments via VLADIVOSTOK 8 in case of a German-Russian conflict, MATSUOKA 9 answered as follows: No Japanese Premier or 10 Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan 11 12 neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. 13 In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force 14 of necessity to attack Russia at Germany's side. 15 No neutrality pact could change this. Finally 16 MATSUOKA voiced his opinion that American partici-17 pation in the war could induce the Fuehrer to resolve 18 upon a solution of the Russian question by violent 19 means in order firmly to secure areas of supply. 20 because the war would then probably drag on for a 21 longer term. He is personally convinced of a speedy 22 victory of the German forces in this case. 23

"I thanked MATSUOKA for his frank utterances, promising him to ask the German Foreign Minister for an opinion as soon as possible."

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	"During my conversation today I have, of
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2	course, continued in my endeavors to direct Japanese
3	policy toward SINGAPORE, in opposition to American
4	interference manoeuvers and against the existing
5	Japanese tendency to pay attention primarily to
6	RUSSIA.
7	"OTT."
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1	MR. E. WILLIAMS (Continuing): I now offer
2	in evidence I. P. S. document No. 219P (74) from
3	an exhibit marked for identification under 58, Item
4	One, excerpt from communication of Ambassador Grew
5	to MATSUOKA, dated May 6, 1941.
6	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms,
7	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8	No. 219P (74) will receive exhibit No. 1069.
9	(Whereupon, the document above referred
10	to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1069
11	and received in evidence.)
12	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's
13	exhibit No. 1069:
14	"THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)
15	TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)
16	"Excerpt
17	"No. 1793
18	"TOKYO, May 6, 1941.
19	"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to
20	my note No. 1779 of April 14, 1941, addressed to
21	Prince KONOYE during Your Excellency's absence from
22	Japan, concerning the repeated indiscriminate bombing
23	of Kunming by the Japanese aircraft, and the danger to
24	American lives and damage to American property caused
25	thereby, and to inform Your Excellency that according

to information received from the American Consul at that city, the Consulate was again seriously damaged during an air raid on April 29, 1941. Window glass and screens were blown out; plaster, a large memorial tablet, and part of a wall were knocked down; and dirt and debris were blown into the Compound. Fortunately, there appear to have been no casualties."

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8 We offer in evidence I. P. S. document 9 No. 220C (26) from exhibit 58, Volume II, for identi-10 fication. This is a draft proposal handed by the 11 Japanese Ambassador NOMURA to the Secretary of State, 12 May 12, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 220C (26) will receive exhibit No. 1070.

> (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1070 and received in evidence.)

MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's exhibit No. 1070;

"DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON MAY 12, 1941.

"CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE

### GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN.

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"The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

"Without reference to specific causes of 6 recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both 7 Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences."

THE PRESIDENT: Is this any different from 12 that handed in this morning? 13

MR. E. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir. The one handed 14 in this morning was a proposal by some independent 15 persons submitted to the State Departments of the 16 Government. This is an official, confidential draft 17 18 proposal submitted by Japan.

19 THE PRESIDENT: The phraseology seems familiar. 20 MR. E. WILLIAMS: It is very similar, your 21 I may say, if the Court please, that several Honor. 22 of these proposals and counter-proposals, each of them 23 have phraseology very similar but differ substantially 24 in details. I continue to read from prosecution's 25 exhibit No. 1070.

(Reading continued): "It is our present
hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific. and by the rapid
consummation of an entente cordiale (amicable understanding), arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion
that now threatens to engulf civilization.

7 "For such decisive action, protracted
8 negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening.
9 Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
10 instrumentalities should be developed for the reali11 zation of a general agreement which would bind, mean12 while, both Governments in honor and in act.

<sup>13</sup> "It is our belief that such an understanding
<sup>14</sup> should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency
<sup>15</sup> and not the accessory concerns which could be deliber<sup>16</sup> ated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by
<sup>17</sup> our respective Geveroments.

<sup>18</sup> "Both Governments presume to anticipate that <sup>19</sup> they could achieve barmonious relations if certain <sup>20</sup> situations and attitudes were charified or improved; <sup>21</sup> to wit:

"1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

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"2. The attitude of both Governments toward

the European War. 1 "3. The relations of both nations toward the 2 China Affair. 3 "4. Commerce between both nations. 4 "5. Economic activity of both nations in 5 the Southwestern Pacific area. 6 "6. The policies of both nations affecting 7 political stabilization in the Pacific area. 8 9 "Accordingly, we have come to the following 10 mutual understanding: --11 "1. The concepts of the United States and 12 of Japan respecting international relations and the 13 character of nations. 14 "The Governments of the United States and of 15 Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign 16 states and contiguous Pacific powers. 17 "Both Governments assert the unanimity of 18 their national policies as directed toward the foun-19 dation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a 20 new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among 21 our peoples. 22 "Both Governments declare that it is their 23 traditional, and present, concept and conviction that 24 nations and races compose, as members of a family, 25 one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit
of their moral and physical welfare, which they are
bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not
to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of
backward nations.

<sup>8</sup> "Both governments are firmly determined that <sup>9</sup> their respective traditional concepts on the character <sup>10</sup> of nations and the underlying moral principles of <sup>11</sup> social order and national life will continue to be <sup>12</sup> preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or <sup>13</sup> ideologies contrary to these moral principles and <sup>14</sup> concepts.

<sup>15</sup> "<u>II. The attitude of both Governments toward</u>
 <sup>16</sup> the European War.

17 "The Governments of the United States and 18 Japan make it their common aim to bring about the 19 world peace; they shall, therefore, jointly endeavour 20 not only to prevent further extension of the European 21 War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe. 22 "The Government of Japan maintains that its 23 alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive 24 and designed to prevent the nations which are not at 25 present directly affected by the European War from

1 engaging in it.

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<sup>2</sup> "The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact.

7 "The Government of the United States main8 tains that its attitude toward the European War is,
9 and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive
10 measures as to assist any one nation against another.

"The United States maintains that it is
 pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its
 attitude toward the European War is, and will continue
 to be, determined solelv and exclusively by consider ations of the protective defense of its own national
 welfare and security.

"III <u>The relations of both nations toward</u> the China Affair.

<sup>19</sup> "The Government of the United States,
<sup>20</sup> acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in
<sup>21</sup> the KONOYE Statement and the principles set forth
<sup>22</sup> on the basis of the seid three principles in the
<sup>23</sup> treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the
<sup>24</sup> Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and
<sup>25</sup> relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government

to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kaishek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

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# "IV Commerce between both nations.

"When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.

"V. <u>Economic activity of both nations in</u> the Southwestern Pacific area.

"Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

"VI The policies of both nations affecting political stabil@zation in the Pacific area.

"a. The Government of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the

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1	Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine
2	Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality.
3	The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any
4	discriminatory treatment.
5	"B. Japanese immigration to the United States
6	shall receive amicable consideration on a basis of
7	equality with other nations and freedom from discrim-
8	ination.
9	"Addendum.
10	"The present understanding shall be kept as
11	a confidential memorandum between the Governments of
12	the United States and of Japan.
13	"The scope, character and timing of the
14	announcement of this understanding will be agreed
15	upon by both Governments.
16	"(ANNEX)
17	"ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
13	THE ORIGINAL DRAFT.
19	"II. Par. 2.
20	"Attitude of Both Governments toward the
21	European War.
22	"Actually the meaning of this paragraph is
23	virtually unchanged but we desire to make it clearer
. 24	by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long as Japan
25	is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation

as is mentioned in the understanding seems unnecessary.
"If we must have any stipulation at all, in
addition, it would be important to have one which would
clarify the relationship of this understanding to
the aforementioned Pact.

"III

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### "China Affair.

8 "The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed
9 in the original understanding differ in no substantial
10 way from those herein affirmed as the 'principles of
11 KONOYE'. Practically, the one can be used to explain
12 the other.

"We should obtain an understanding, in a
separate and secret document, that the United States
would discontinue her assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek
regime if Chiang Kai-shek does not accept the advice
of the United States that he enter into negotiations
for peace.

"If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.

23 "The three principles of Prince KONOYE as 24 referred to in this paragraph are:

"1. Noighborly friendship;

"2. Joint defense against communism;

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1	"3. Economic cooperation by which
2	Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly
3	in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the
4	interests of Third Powers.
5	"The following are implied in the afore-
6	side principles:
7	"1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and
8	territories;
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"2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace;

"3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement 6 to be concluded between Japan and China; 7

> "4. No annexation, no indemnitees; "5. Independence of Manchoukuo. "III.

"Immigration to China.

"The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken impression. to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past immigration legislation of the United States. that America is now taking a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in China.

"Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.

"IV.

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"Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations. "(a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of disagreement but because it

would be more practical, and possible, to determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine 2 after an understanding has been reached and relations 3 4 between our two countries improved; and after our 5 present China commitments are eliminated. Then we will 6 know the actual situation and can act accordingly.

## "Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.

8 "This proposal, (b) of IV might better be 9 made a subject of a separate memorandum. Particular 10 care must be taken as to the timing, manner and scope 11 of carrying out such a gesture.

### "V.

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## "Gold Credit.

14 "The proposal in the second paragraph of V has been omitted for the same reasons as suggested the 16 omission of paragraphs (a) and (c).

### "VI.

# "Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.

"The words, in the first paragraph, 'without 20 resoring to arms, ' have been deleted as inappropriate 21 and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the peaceful 22 policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear 23 on many occasions in various statements made both by 24 the Premier and the Foreign Minister. 25

"VIII (VII).

"Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area. "Le the paragraph (a) implying military and treaty obligation would require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in both countries, we consider it inapprepriate to include this in the present understanding.

"Paragraph (b) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has been altered for the same reason.

"In paragraph (c) (d) the words and to
the Southwestern Pacific Area' have been omitted
because such questions should be settled, as necessity
arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities
in the Southwestern areas by the Governments of the
United States and of Japan respectively.

"Conference.

"The stipulation for holding a Conference 18 has been deleted. We consider that it would be better 19 to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a conference 20 between the President and the Premier or between suit-21 able representatives of theirs will be considered when 22 both the United States and Japan deem it useful to 23 hold such a conference after taking into due con-24 sideration the effect resulting from the present 25 understanding. "

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\* "Announcement. "In regard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion of the present under-standing a draft will be prepared in Tokyo and cabled to Washington for the consideration of the United States Government." 

1	We offer in evidence I. P. S. document
2	No. 2200 (27) from exhibit for identification 58.
3	Volume II. This is a draft suggestion from the
4	Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on
5	May 16, 1941.
6	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
7	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
8	ment No. 220C (27) will receive exhibit No. 1071.
9	(Whereupon, the document above
10	referred to was marked prosecution's
11	exhibit No, 1071 and received in evidence.)
12	MR. E, WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's
13	exhibit No. 1071:
14	"(Annex 2)
15	"DRAFT SUGGESTION A HANDED BY THE SECRETARY
16	OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941.
17	"II. THE ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED STATES
18	AND OF JAPAN TOWARD THE FUROPEAN WAR.
19	"The Government of Japan declares that the
20	purpose of its Axis /lliance was and is defensive and
21 22	is designed to prevent the nations which are not at
23	present engaged in the European war from participating
24	therein, and declares that its obligations of military
25	assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Germany,
	Japan and Italy come into force only if and when one

of the parties of the pact is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European hostilities.

"The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

"The Government of Japan further declares that it is under no commitment under its Axis Alliance or otherwise which is inconsistent with the terms of the present declaration of policy and intention agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

"(Annex 3)

"DRAFT SUGGESTION B HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941.

"III. CHINA AFFAIRS.

"When this declaration of policy and intention, including the provisions of this section, is agreed upon and both Governments have given it their approval and commitment, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of China that those Governments

enter into a negotiation for a termination of 1 hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations 2 on a basis as follows: 3 "a. Neighborly friendship. 4 "Ъ. Mutual respect of sovereignty and 5 territories. 6 Withdrawal of Japanese troops from "c. 7 Chinese territory in accordance with a schedule 8 to be agreed upon. 9 "d. No annexation. 10 tte. No indemnities. 11 12 "f. Equality of commercial opportunity in terms of and with conditions of fair treatment 14 for all concerned. "g. Parallel measures of defense against 16 subversive activities from external sources. "h. The question of the future of Manchuria to be dealt with by friendly negotiations. "(Annex 4) "DRAFT SUGGESTION C HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941. "V. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF BOTH NATIONS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC AREA. "On the pledged basis of guarantee that

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Japanese activity and American activity in the

1	Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by
2	peaceful means, the Japanese Government and the
3	Government of the United States agree to cooperate
4	each with the other toward ensuring on the basis of
5	equality of opportunity equal access by Japan and
6	by the United States to supplies of natural resources
7	(such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each coun-
8	try needs for the safeguarding and development of
9	its own economy."
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Greenberg	1	We offer in evidence IPS document 219P (75)
	2	from exhibit for identification 58, Volume I. This
	3	is an excerpt from statement of Mr. Grew to MATSUOKA,
	4	dated May 17, 1941.
	5	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
&	6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
B a	7	No. 219P (75) will receive exhibit No. 1072.
r t	8	(Whereupon, the document above re-
o n	9	ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11	10	No. 1072 and received in evidence.)
	11	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's
	12	exhibit No. 1072:
	13	"THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)
	14	TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
	15	(MATSUOKA)
	16	"Excerpt.
	17	No. 1802 "TOKYO, May 17, 1941.
	18	"EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note No.
	19	1793 of May 6, 1941, concerning repeated indiscrimin-
	20	ate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the
	21	consequent danger to American lives and damage to
	22	American property, I have the honor to inform Your
	23	Excellency that the American Consul at Kunming has
	24	reported that the Consulate was again damaged during
	25	a Japanese air raid on May 12, 1941. Fragments of

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bombs were scattered in the Consulate Compound and one piece broke through a window into a residence bedroom.

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"Moreover, during this same raid, the larger 4 part of the Compound occupied by Mr. Stanley McGeary, 5 an American clerk of the Consulate, was destroyed 6 and his residence so lamaged as to render it barely 7 habitable, and for the third time recently the 8 China Inland Mission, where a number of Americans 9 live, was damaged and the residence there of Mr. E. 10 L. Crapuchettes, an American citizen, was partly 11 demolished." 12

We now tender in evidence IPS document No. 13 4060-A which is a document taken from the Nuernberg 14 files and is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop, dated 15 May 18, 1941, and is numbered 85,107-8. 16

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 18 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 19 No. 4060-A will receive exhibit No. 1073.

> (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1073 and received in evidence.)

MR. E. WILLIAMS: We now read prosecution's exhibit No. 1073:

1	"Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
2	"Tokyo, 18 May 1941 Arrival 18 May 1941
3	"No. 759 of 17 May
4	"Marginal Note: Sent on to FUSCHL under
5	No. 1573 18 May 3.25 hours Tel. Ktr.
6	"For the German Foreign Minister
7	"Re: Telegram of 15th, No. 622.
8	"Today I have carried out the instructions
9	of the above mentioned telegram during a long con-
10	versation with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.
11	"I stressed the especially immense regret
12	of the German Government that the German views of 11
13	May were not awaited before the reply to WASHINGTON
14	was sent off. Making use of the arguments of tele-
15	gram No. 592 of 11 May and No. 622 of 15 May, I have
16	pointed to the necessity of making America give the
17	most clear and precise assurance not to participate
18	in the European conflict; I also pointed out that the
19	formulation employed in the Japanese reply re Article
20	3 of the Tripartite Pact, constitutes the absolute
21	minimum of what must be demanded in view of the Tri-
22	partite Pact, The German Government must insist on
23	being immediately informed on the American reply, as
24	well as to be admitted to further negotiations be-
25	tween JAPAN and the USA."

"MATSUOKA pointed to his oral communication 1 to HULL, reported in telegram No. 733 of (groups 2 garbled), as well as to his conversations with the 3 British and American ambassadors, reported in tele-4 gram 750 of 15 May, which showed that he would not 5 jolt the Tripartite Pact. During a secret Cabinet 6 7 Session he had called upon all members of the Govern-8 ment clearly to acknowledge Japan's obligations under 9 the Tripartite Pact on their part too, in all of their 10 conversations. All members of the Cabinet had agreed 11 unanimously. Besides he views the chances of the 12 Japanese-American Negotiations most skeptically, and 13 as heretofore he counts on America's entry into the 14 War in the near future. His sole motive in the neg-15 otiations with USA is, if possible, to postpone or 16 prevent the entry of the United States into the war 17 and furthermore to eliminate the increase of the 18 present American assistance to England. 19

"HULL has not yet taken a stand regarding the Japanese proposal, merely promising a study which would take a certain amount of time. He will immediately inform us of the American reply, also keeping abreast, and as far as possible consulting with the allied governments of Germany and Italy on the further course of the negotiations. When I demanded to

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be admitted to the coming phase, he replied that he would meet our desire to a great extent; he could, however, not promise always to await the views of the Axis powers, especially when a quick utterance was absolutely essential. I cogently requested MATSUOKA to do nothing without Japan's allies in these negotiations, which concerned the Tripartite Pact in its entirety.

"Domestic political influences, to whose 9 pressure MATSUOKA has yielded in the face of the 10 allegedly imminent American entry into the War, can 11 be found among certain anglophiles of the Court, 12 such as Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, ex-13 ponent of industry and big money, such as Minister 14 Without Portfolio OGURA, and some influential Navy 15 16 officers with whom Ambassador Admiral OPTURA/TN: 17 NOMURA/ has apparently worked together in WASHINGTON. 18 This group was joined by elements of the army who 19 want to gain time in order to retain freedom of 20 action in view of the uncertainty of RUSSIA's future 21 attitude. Minister of the Interior, HIRANUMA, has 22 probably acted in the same way; he had to resign when 23 the German-Russian non-aggression pact was concluded, 24 being a champion of a German-Japanese alliance against 25 HUSSIA. Finally, the activist group which is closely

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
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1 We now offer in evidence IPS document No. 2 220C (18) from exhibit for identification 58. Volume 3 II, which is an excerpt from a summary of conversa-4 tions prepared by the Department of State on May 19, 5 1942 but relating to conversations between United 6 States and Japan in 1941. 7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 9 No. 220C (18) will receive exhibit No. 1074. 10 (Whereupon, the document above re-11 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit 12 No. 1074 and received in evidence.) 13 MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's 14 exhibit No. 1074: 15 "SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS 16 "MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 17 "(WASHINGTON,) MAY 19, 1942. 18 "ACCOUNT OF INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERN-19 MENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 20 1941. 21 "Excerpts. 22 "The equilibrium in the Far East which had 23 been established by the Washington Conference treaties 24 of 1921-1922 became seriously disturbed by the setting. 25 up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime

under Japanese control under the name of "Manchukuo". This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.

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"During the years that followed, Japan went 6 steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by 7 force of arms. In December 1934, she gave notice of 8 her intention to terminate the naval treaty of Feb-9 ruary 6, 1922. She then proceeded with intensified 10 construction of military and naval armaments, at the 11 same time undertaking, from time to time, limited 12 actions directed toward an extension of her domination 13 over China and involving disregard and destruction of 14 the lawful rights and interests of other countries, in-15 cluding the United States. 16

"'In July 1937, the armed forces of Japan 17 embarked upon large-scale military operations against 18 19 China. Invading forces of more than a million men oc-20 cupied large areas along the seaboard and in the cen-21 tral provinces. In these areas there were set up 22 puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls 23 and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the inter-24 ests of the invading country.

"'It has been clear throughout that Japan

has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that

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region.

"'Previous experience and current develop-11 ments indicate that the proposed "new order" in the 12 Pacific area means, politically, domination by one 13 country. It means, economically, employment of the 14 resources of the area concerned for the benefit of 15 that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of 16 other parts of the area and exclusion of the interests 17 of other countries. It means, socially, the destruc-18 tion of personal liberties and the reduction of the 19 conquered peoples to the role of inferiors. 20

21 "'It should be manifest to every person that 22 such a program for the subjugation and ruthless ex-23 ploitation by one country of nearly one-half of the 24 population of the world is a matter of immense signi-25 ficance, importance and concern to every other nation

wherever located.

"'Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats.'"

We offer in evidence IPS document No. \* 1 1383B (18), a telegram from OSHIMA to MATSUOKA, dated 2 May 20, 1941. 3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. 4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document 5 No. 1383B (18) will receive exhibit No. 1075. 6 7 (Whereupon, the document above re-8 ferred was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 9 1075 and received in evidence.) 10 MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's 11 exhibit No. 1075:: 12 "Copy of the Telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA 13 to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dispatched on 20 May 14 (T.N. Year is missing) (1941?) No. 567 15 "In connection with the rumor that you are 16 going to America, I heard various rumors here concern-17 ing the problems of the negotiation between Japan 18 and America. Although from the interview with 19 Ribbentrop on 5th May, I learned that it was not a 20 mere rumor. Although I intended to go on without 21 touching this matter, in view of the tendency of 22 this matter, and considering the future of Japan and 23 of the influence of the Tripartite Pact, I can not 24 remain without some deep thoughts. As I believe that 25 it is my duty to inform you of the opinion of the

German staff and also of my frank opinion, I send the separate telegrams No. 568 and No. 569.

"What I want to mention to you now is as follows:

"You showed me the reason why you did not inform this matter to the Italian Ambassador in Germany two times recently. However, presently I have no intentions of sounding out the problem of the confidence in me or of my position towards the people during the present critical period when the whole of our nation should act upon the 'Way of the Imperial Subjects' as its primary principle. Much less do I try to sound your opinion, for the practice and technique of diplomacy belong to your department.

"But what I cannot understand is that you think it is unnecessary to have me report the opinions of the Staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-American Agreement which has a very delicate relation with the Tripartite Pact, is about to be concluded. Therefore, from the standpoint of my duty as an Ambassador to Germany, I could not keep silent, and I expressed my opinion frankly in the separate telegrams, although it might be unnecessary. I beg you to take these circumstances into consideration. (End)"

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"Copy of the Telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. No. 568

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117. On 3rd May Foreign Minister RIBBFNTROP asked me to visit him. When I called on him I was informed about the telegram regarding the Japanese-American negotiation. He said that although the telegram was to be kept a secret from me and the Italian Ambassador, as a friend to me, he revealed it to me for my personal understanding, since the matter is extremely serious. He then showed me the draft regarding the agreement proposed by America on 16 April. The draft consisted of four articles. He (RIBBENTROP) confessed that he was quite at a loss to understand the real intention of the Japanese government, so I answered him that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, as you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) had clearly stated on your previous visit to Germany. I further told him that, accordingly, there was no reason to conclude such a treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Thus, I avoided being concerned in this matter.

"2. But on 9th of May RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him again, and he showed me OTT's telegram of the draft of the intermediary answer of Japan to America and also the telegraphic record of the con-

ference between you and OTT which was held on 6th 1 of May. RIBBENTROP seemed to have understood the 2 affair clearly from the frequent telegrams sent by 3 OTT, and according to the said intermediate reply, 4 it is supposed that Japan has consulted regarding 5 the understanding with America to a considerable ex-6 tent, and to tell you frankly, according to the in-7 8 formations that Germany has gathered, from various 9 sources, there is a report that the proposal was made 10 by Japan. Gathering from the conversation of For-11 eign Minister MATSUOKA and OTT, it seems to me that 12 Foreign Minister MATSUCKA was compelled by a certain 13 group to consent to it. Moreover, it is reported 14 that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA during the course of 15 that conference stated that Japan will participate 16 in a Russo-German war, if it should break out. When 17 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently, 18 he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going 19 to attack SINGAPORE, but it seems that you have 20 changed your opinion. 21 "I have some doubts as to the true inten-22 tion of ROOSEVELT.

"If you should become obliged to conclude this agreement in order to avoid the participation in a remotely possible war, the Tripartite Pact would

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in reality become meaningless even if it may be possible to hit upon some legal pretext. Moreover, I believe that in Japan's progress, she will lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After lengthy thoughts concerning this problem, I thought of the following two plans from the German viewpoint.

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"(a) Plan to refuse the proposal of America.

"(b) Plan to conclude the Japanese-American agreement under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending 'convoy' patrol lines.

"RIBBENTROP asked my (Ambassador OSHIMA) opinion, saying that he wished to report plan (a) to the Fuhrer as he believed it to be a good one. Therefore, although I did not receive any instruction, I conjectured the intention of the Japanese government from common sense, and, as my personal opinion, insisted upon plan (b) explaining that (b) would be much more advantageous to Germany. The reasons that I explained to RIBBENTROP were as follows:

"If plan (b) are adopted, Germany will be able to fight a single combat against Britain and terminate the war in a short time. Again, although it might be wishful thinking, perhaps the 'ROOSEVELT faction' may recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless, and would make it a reason to alleviate America's assistance to Britain.

"Even in case of its failure, it is useful 6 at least for escertaining ROOSEVELT's actual inten-7 tions concerning the assistance to Britain. Thirdly. it will enable those Japanese who want the cooperation 9 with America to realize its impossibility. However, 10 RIBBENTROP said that America would utilize this negotiation to estrange Japan from Germany, as long as 12 this negotiation continued, and he repeated the same thing in telegram No. 545 (dispetched to TURKEY, No. 11). He further stated that it is possible for America to utilize it as propaganda material to convince the anti-war faction in America that America could now advance to the Atlantic Ocean because of the elimination of apprehension in Pacific area, and 19 consequently the situation would become very dangerous 20 to Germany. Therefore, he did not agree with my opinion, and said that at any rate this problem has 22 not yet been decided by the Fuhrer, so he wanted 23

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1 to send a telegram on the evening of the same day 2 to the Fuhrer, who was out of BERLIN, for a decision. 3 At the same time, he wished to report my opinion to 4 the Fuhrer. Then I asked him whether or not he 5 had consulted with Italy already. To my question 6 he answered that Italy had already received all 7 the reports from Ambassador INDERLI, but he had 8 not yet consulted directly with the Italian govern-9 ment, but that as soon as he received the decision 10 of the Fuhrer, he wished to send the telegram to 11 OTT so that he might consult Italy. 12

"2. As I made a promise to Prime Minister 13 MUSSOLINI to visit him at the beginning of this 14 month, I started for ROME on the night of the 10th. 15 On the morning of the 12th, Minister BISMARCK visited 16 me, and by orders of RIBBENTROP, he showed me the 17 telegraphic instructions to OTT and added that the 18 Italian government had the same opinion as Germany. 19 After I read that instruction, I recognized that the 20 Fuhrer had made a different decision from that of 21 RIBBENTROP. In the afternoon of 13th, RIBBENTROP 22 flew unexpectedly to ROME and met MUSSOLINI and 23 CIANO on the same day, and asked me to visit him 24 on the morning of the 14th. When I went to see 25 him, he showed me the telegram from OTT concerning

the interview on the 12th, between you (Foreign 1 2 Minister MATSUOKA) and the two Ambassadors of 3 Germany and Italy in Tokyo. He expressed deep 4 discontentment at your statement that you had 5 been in a position where you were compelled to 6 commence with the negotiation with America and 7 that because of internal reasons, you were unable 8 to await the arrival of opinions from Germany and 9 Italy. He asked reproachfully why couldn't you 10 await the telegraphic instructions when they were 11 sure to arrive in several days. I told him that 12 although I was not aware of the circumstances. 13 I guessed that Japan was compelled to take such 14 a measure because of the following reasons: It 15 was necessary for Japan to conclude the agreement 16 as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in 17 Japan such important negotiations as this must be 18 privately reported to the Emperor. I added that 19 I believed that the agreement was not made out of 20 inconsideration to Germany and Italy. RIBBENTROP. 21 however, would not readily accept my words. He 22 said that when you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) 23 visited Germany, he met you (MATSUOKA) many times 24 but he did not hear anything substantial concerning 25 the Japanese-American agreement which is closely

related to the Tripartite Pact. He said that it 1 came as a great surprise to him when he received 2 such a report soon after you (Foreign Minister 3 4 MATSUOKA) returned to Japan. He continued that 5 frankly he was much afreid that the agreement might 6 make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. 7 He also said that as he (RIBBENTROP) had remarked 8 the other day, he did not believe ROOSEVELT from 9 the very beginning, and that although his opinion 10 was to advise Japan to refuse the American proposal 11 he had to send a telegraphic instruction contrary 12 to his own opinion. Hearing that I told him that 13 it was a great pity to have a misunderstanding 14 between Japan and Germany concerning this matter. 15 so I gave advice to him that it was very necessary 16 to inform OTT of his opinion, to make the facts 17 clear and certain. When I visited Foreign Minister 18 CIANO on the evening of the same day, it seemed that 19 an interview had already taken place between RIBBENTROP, 20 MUSSOLINI and CIANO, since CIANO expressed the same 21 opinion as RIBBENTROP. 22 "3. No sooner did I return to BERLIN on 23 May 17th, than I was asked by Vice Minister WEISEGGER 24

to visit him. When I called on him, he, by the telegraphic order of RIBBENTROP at FUSSELL, showed

me a draft of Japan's answer to America which was 1 telegraphed by OTT on the 14th, and the draft of 2 the instruction of the German government to OTT 3 concerning Japan's answer to America. He (WEISEGGER) 4 said that as he received the order only to show me 5 (Ambassador OSHIMA) the telegram, he will not express 6 any opinion, but that in view of the present political 7 situation, the German government had a deep concern 8 9 about the result of this problem. He added that 10 the German government attached great importance to 11 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement to OTT to 12 the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. 13 in case of a Russo-German war. He (WEISEGGER) 14 then asked me whether or not Foreign Minister 15 MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs 16 between Germany and Russia when he returned from 17 his stay in Germany. I told him that I did not 18 know what the Foreign Minister had revealed con-19 cerning Japan's attitude toward a Russo-German 20 war, but that in Japan, such an important matter as this should be decided by the Emperor, and that 22 probably Foreign Minister MATSUOKA must have expressed his personal opinion. I further added that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany I had

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1	no doubt that you (MATSUOKA) were aware of the real
2	relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia. (End) "
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1 "Telegram No. 569 sent by Ambassador 2 OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. 3 "1. As I reported in the separate telegram. 4 the German government has a deep dissatisfaction con-5 cerning the problem of the Japanese-American agreement, 6 and has much apprehension about the future of the 7 Tripartite Pact. Since America is actually partici-8 pating in the war, if Japan, ignoring the present 9 circumstances, should conclude an agreement with America, 10 it would be very natural for Germany to suspect that 11 Japan is trying to check America's participation in 12 the war, and at the same time trying to avoid her own 13 obligation of participating in the war. When you came 14 to Germany, all the people in Germany heartily wel-15 comed you, and delighted in the strengthening of the 16 'Axis'. Since this is directly after that occasion. 17 the feeling that Germany was betrayed is very strong. 18 "2. I am well aware of Japan's desire to 19 solve the China Incident as soon as possible in order 20 to have time to spare for politics, economy and other 21

fields. However, the European war is developing very
favourably for Germany and Italy. In a few months,
very important developments are expected, and if at
this time Japan should lose the confidence and trust
of Germany and Italy who will become the leaders in

Europe, simply for an immediate profit, it is very unfavourable. Needless to say, America seems to have proposed the agreement as a temporary measure for estranging Japan from the Tripartite Alliance. I am fraid that such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war.

8 "3. Aside from the point that if Japan solves 9 the China Incident with the support of America, she 10 will leave an uneradicated root of future calamity, I 11 express my apprehension that should Japan lose this op-12 portunity to expand southward and the possibility of 13 attacking SINGAPORE at random, she will invite the con-14 tempt of not only America and Britain, but also those 15 of Germany and Italy. And, should America, taking 16 advantage of the elimination of fear in the Pacific 17 area, reinforce her assistance to Britain, the devel-18 opment of the European War would greatly be affected 19 although America may avoid nominal participation in 20 the war. Subsequently, Japan may suffer from some un-21 expected calamity. Moreover, should Japan abandon her 22 right to leadership in the Southern regions for the 23 sake of America, it is clear that Japan cannot stress 24 the leadership to Germany and Italy. This will mean 25 that Japan abandoned her great mission to establish

1	a new order in the Greater East Asia.
2	"4. Last autumn, Japan concluded the Tripar-
3	tite Pact, and the road our people should follow was
4	made clear. But, if Japan should conclude the Japa-
5	nese-American Agreement now, our people in Japan would
6	be bewildered as to which path they should follow.
7	Moreover, our friendly countries will despise Japan
8	and will not trust Japan any longer. Subsequently,
9	Japan will fall into international isolation, and will
10	gain nothing. Therefore, I hope earnestly that the
11	Japanese Government will embody the following two
12	points, if the conclusion of the agreement is unavoid-
13	able:
14	"(a) As conditions to the conclusion of the
15	Japanese-American Agreement, it is absolutely necessary
16	for Japan that she should make use of her situation
17	over America, and establish the idea of the Tripartite
19	Pact, by upholding the principle that Japan is to facil-
20	itate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain.
21	Again, Japan should demand America's neutrality in
22	the European war, and at the same time, make clear that

Japan has an obligation to participate in the war,

based upon the Tripartite Pact. If America does not

accept our proposal, Japan must not conclude the agree-

ment."

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"(b) It is most unfavourable for Japan to give the impression to Germany and Italy that the Japa-nese government is compelled to conclude the agree-ment on account of the increasing influence of a party in Japan that wants status quo. The conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement will only make Germany and Italy increasingly suspect that Japan took this action in order to avoid the obligation to participate in the war. Therefore, concerning the Japanese-Ameri-can negotiation, Japan has to exchange frank opinions with Germany and Italy, and must thoroughly convince Germany and Italy about the purport of article (a)." 

	MR. E. WILLIAMS: Offering in evidence
	IPS document No. 1383-B (20), a telegram from OSHIMA
	to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dated May 21, 1941.
	4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
	5 CLEAK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
	6 No. 1383-B (20) will receive exhibit No. 1076.
	7 (Whereupon, the document above re-
	<sup>8</sup> ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
	No. 1076 and received in evidence.)
I	MR. E. WILLIAMS: We read prosecution's
1	1 exhibit No. 1076:
1	<sup>2</sup> "Minister - Vice-Minister. submitted separately.
1	<sup>3</sup> Chief of AMERICA Bureau. Chief of EUROPE-ASIA Bureau.
1	4 Translator's Note. These notations were marked in
	<sup>5</sup> the margin.
	"SECKET Embassy CHO Code.
	7 "(Translator's Note. In the copy, there are 2
	stamps indicating TOP SECRET.)
	"Dispatched A.M. May 21, 1941 from BERLIN.
	"Arrived P.M. May 21, 1941 this office.
	"To the Foreign Minister from Ambassador OSHIMA.
	<sup>23</sup> "No. 575.
	"The JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement now under
	negotiation, is thought to be important change in
	the national policy, and it concerns greatly with

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1	the plans of the JAPANESE military and naval
2	attaches in Germany. Therefore, recognizing the
3	fact that it is necessary to transmit this agreement
4	to them beforehand, telegrams No. 567, No. 568, and
5	No. 569 were sent exclusively to both attaches today,
6	the 20th. As regards this matter, I wish you will
7	inform the War Minister, the Naval Minister, the
8	Chief of General Staff, and the Chief of the Navy
9	General Staff."
10	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel.
11	MR. KEENAN: May it please the Tribunal, we
12	offer in evidence IPS document 2200 (28) from ex-
13	hibit for identification 58, Volume 2, an excerpt
14	from memorandum of conversation between Ambassador
15 16	Morris and the Secretary of State, 28 May 1941.
17	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
18	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
19	No. 220C (28) will receive exhibit No. 1077.
20	(Whereupon, the document above re-
21	ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
22	1077 and received in evidence.)
23	MR. KEENAN: (heading)
24	"MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION. (WASHINGTON)
25	May 28, 1941.
	"The Ambassador commented that under the

Japanese consitutional system other ministers in 1 addition to the Foreign Minister are consulted in 2 matters relating to foreign policy. 3

4 "The Secretary said that in his consideration 5 of the matters we have been exploring a difficulty 6 has been presented by questions involving the relations of our respective countries toward the 7 8 European war. Mr. MATSUOKA since his return from 9 Europe, according to reports widely published in the 10 press, has been making declarations on every occasion in regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting Germany in the event of American entry into the war. 14 He said that, if we went into an agreement with 15 Japan, critics would assert, unless the Japanese 16 Government could clarify its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the event that the United States should be drawn into the European war through action in the line of selfdefense, that there was no assurance as to Japan's position. The Secretary referred to the President's speech of the previous evening and reviewed that the Secretary had previously said publicly and also to the Ambassador in regard to the attitude of this country toward maintaining the freedom of the seas

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against Hitler as an essential measure of selfdefense.

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"The Secretary then brought up the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and asked the Ambassador to indicate what the Japanese Government had in mind,

"The Ambassador indicated, in reply to specific 7 questions, that such evacuation would not include 8 troops retained in China under the provision of 9 cooperative defense against communistic activities. 10 He contemplated an arrangement being negotiated with 11 China similar to the Boxer Protocol under which 12 Japanese troops would be stationed for an indefinite 13 14 period in North China and Inner Mongolia. The Am-15 bassador said he could not indicate approximately 16 how many troops it was proposed to station in China 17 under such an arrangement or define precisely the 18 areas in which the arrangement would be operative.

<sup>19</sup> "The Secretary commented that it seemed to him <sup>20</sup> important that relations between China and Japan should <sup>21</sup> be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent <sup>22</sup> promise of friendship between the two countries; that <sup>23</sup> the continued presence of Japanese troops in China <sup>24</sup> would be a factor operating against such friendship, <sup>25</sup> as the presence of these troops tended to produce <sup>26</sup> incidents and friction."

1	MR. KEENAN: Prosecution now offers in evidence
2	IPS document 220C (29) from exhibit for identification
3	58, volume 2. This is American draft of proposal,
4	dated 31 May 1941, handed to Ambassador NOMURA.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
6	MR. KEENAN: I wish to state respectfully to
7	the Court that the prosecution places great emphasis
8	upon this document for reasons that will be obvious
9	in its examination.
10	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
11	No. 220C (29) will receive exhibit No. 1078.
12	(Whereupon, the document above referred
13	to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1078 and
<b>1</b> 4	received in evidence.)
15	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
16	"American Draft Proposal Handed to the
17	Japanese Ambassador (NOMURA) on May 31, 1941.
18	"Washington, May 31, 1941.
19	"Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commit-
20	ment.
21	"The Governments of the United States and of
22	Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation
23	and conclusion of a general agreement of understand-
24	ing as expressed in a joint declaration.
25	"Without reference to specific causes of

recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences..

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6 "It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

<sup>13</sup> "For such decisive action, protracted negoti<sup>14</sup> ations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both
<sup>15</sup> Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instru<sup>16</sup> mentalities should be developed for the realization of
<sup>17</sup> a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile,
<sup>18</sup> both Governments in honor and in act.

"It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.

"Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved;

to wit: 1 2 "1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the 3 character of nations. 4 5 "2. The attitudes of both Governments toward 6 the European war. 7 "3. Action toward a peaceful settlement be-8 tween China and Japan. 9 "4. Commerce between both nations. 10 "5. Economic activity of both nations in the 11 Pacific area. 12 "6. The policies of both nations affecting 13 political stabilization in the Pacific area. 14 "7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands. 15 "Accordingly, the Government of the United 16 States and the Government of Japan have come to the 17 following mutual understanding and declaration of 18 policy; 19 The Concepts of the United States and "T. 20 of Japan respecting international relations and the 21 character of nations. 22 "Both Governments affirm that their national 23 policies are directed toward the foundation of a last-24 ing peace and the inauguration of a new era of 25

reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples. 1 "Both Governments declare that it is their 2 traditional, and present, concept and conviction that 3 nations and races compose, as members of a family, 4 one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting 5 6 responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of 7 8 their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound 9 to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsi-10 11 bilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of 12 other nations.

"Both Governments are firmly detemined that
 their respective traditional concepts on the character
 of nations and the underlying moral principles of
 social order and national life will continue to be
 preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or
 ideologies contrary to those moral principles and con cepts.

"II. The attitudes of both Governments toward
the European war.

<sup>22</sup> "The Government of Japan maintains that the
<sup>23</sup> purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive
<sup>24</sup> and is designed to prevent the participation of nations
<sup>25</sup> in the European war not at present involved in it."

<sup>1</sup> "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to
 <sup>2</sup> involvement through acts of self-defense.

<sup>3</sup> "The Government of the United States maintains
<sup>4</sup> that its attitude toward the European hostilities is
<sup>5</sup> and will continue to be determined solely and exclusive<sup>6</sup> ly by considerations of protection and self-defense;
<sup>7</sup> its national security and the defense thereof.

8 "III. Letion toward a peaceful settlement
9 between China and Japan.

10 "The Japanese Government having communicated 11 to the Government of the United States the general 12 terms within the framework of which the Japanese Govern-13 ment will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settle-14 ment with the Chinese Government, which terms are 15 declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony 16 with the KONOYE Principles regarding neighborly friend-17 ship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories 18 and with the practical application of those principles, 19 the President of the United States will suggest to the 20 Government of China that the Government of China and 21 the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a 22 basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a ter-23 mination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful 24 relations. 25

"Note: (The foregoing draft of Section III

1	is subject to further discussion of the question of
2	cooperative defense against communistic activities,
3	including the stationing of Japanese troops in
4	Chinese territory.)"
5	THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break,
6	Mr. Keenan. We will recess now for fifteen minutes.
7	(Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
8	taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
9	were resumed as follows:)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunel is now 1 resumed. 2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief of Counsel. 3 MR. KEENAN: (Reading) 4 "IV. Commerce between both nations. 5 "When official approbation to the present 6 understanding has been given by both governments. 7 the United States and Japan shall assure each 8 other mutually to supply such commodities as are, 9 respectively, available and required by either of 10 them. Both Governments further consent to take 11 necessary steps to resume normal trade relations 12 as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce 13 and Navigation between the United States and Japan. 14 If a new commercial treaty is desired by both 15 16 Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as 17 possible and be concluded in accordance with usual 18 procedures. 19 "V. Economic activity of both nations 20 in the Pacific area. 21 "On the basis of mutual pledges hereby 22 given that Japanese activity and American activity 23 in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful 24 means and in conformity with the principle of non-25 discrimination in international commercial relations,

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1	the Japanese Government and the Government of the
2	United States agree to cooperate each with the other
3	toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan
4	and by the United States to commercial supplies of
5	natuaral resources (such as oil, rubber, tin,
6	nickel) which each country needs for the safe-
7	guarding and development of its own economy.
8	"VI. The policies of both nations affecting
9	political stabilization in the Pacific area.
10	"The Japanese Government and the Government
11	of the United States declare that the controlling
12	policy underlying this understanding is peace in
13	the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental
14	purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute
15	to the maintenance and the preservation of peace
16	in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial
17	designs in the area mentioned.
18	"VII. Neutralization of the Philippine
19 20	Islands.
21	"The Government of Japan declares its
22	willingness to enter at such time as the Government
23	of the United States may desire into negotiation
24	with the Government of the United States with a
25	view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutrali-
	zation of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine

	independence shall have been achieved."
	2 The following annex is a part of the
	document as delivered.
	4 "ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE
	5 JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
(	"III. Action toward a peaceful settlement
-	between China and Japan.
8	"The basic terms as referred to in the
5	above section are as follows:
10	Nefighborly friendship.
11	"2. (Cooperative defense against injurious
12	communistic activities including the stationing of
13	Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to
14	further discussion.
15	"3. Economic cooperation by which China
16	and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimi-
17	nation in international commercial relations.
18	"4. Mutual respect of movereignty and
19	territories.
20	"5. Mutual respect for the inherent
21	characteristics of each nation cooperating as
22	good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus
23	contributing to world peace.
24	"6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and
25	naval forces : rom Chinese territory and Chinese

1	waters as promptly as possible and in accordance
2	with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and
3	China.
4	"7. No annexation.
5	"8. No indemnities.
6	"9. Amicable negotiation in regard to
7	Manchukuo."
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1	If the Court please, I would like to offer
2	with its permission an explanation that it is we
3	believe it will be obvious from the foregoing and
4	subsequent documents that we were requested by the
5	Japanese to state the United States, to state its
6	
7	views with reference to the European War, and this
8	was compliance with that request.
	We offer in evidence IPS document 220-C(30)
9	from exhibit 58 for identification, Volume II. This
10	is American statement handed to Ambassador NOMURA,
11	May 31, 1941.
12	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
13	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
14	No. 220-C(30) will receive exhibit No. 1079.
15	(Whereupon, the document above
16	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
17	No. 1079, and was received in evidence.)
18	MR. KEENAN: May I be permitted to state to
19	the Court that this document relates to the last read
20	and it is an oral explanation, as it so states.
21	I call the Court's attention respectfully,
22	at this time, to our previous exhibit 1070, dated
23	May 12, 1941.
24	(Reading) "American Statement Handed to the
25	Japanese Ambassador (NOMURA) on May 31, 1941.
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1	"May 31, 1941. Unofficial, Exploratory and
2	Without Commitment.
3	"Oral Explanation for Suggested Amendments
4	to the Japanese Draft."
5	The draft referred to, I believe, is the
6	exhibit that I just called the Court's attention to.
7	"Introductory Statement.
8	"A few minor changes have been made in
9	phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.
10	"In the list of points enumerated on page
11	two of the Japanese draft, the title of Section III
12	has been altered to conform more accurately to the
13.	subject matter, the word 'Southwestern' has been omit-
14	ted from point numbered five and, in view of the new
15	subject matter under point Six (for explanation see
16	infra), part of the subject matter under point six
17	in the Japanese draft has been incorporated in an addi-
18	tional section, the title of which is therefore listed,
19 20	and part of the subject matter in Section VI of the
20	Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see
22	infra).
23	"I. The concepts of the United States and
24	of Japan respecting international relations and the
25	character of nations.
	"The first paragraph has been omitted inas-

1 the part of the Government of the United States con-2 tains an elaboration of this Government's viewpoint 3 toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated 4 by Chancellor Hitler.

5 "III. Action toward a peaceful settlement 6 between China and Japan.

"As laready stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.

9 "The statement in the Japanese draft has been 10 rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the 11 same time to avert raising questions which do not seem 12 fundamental to the basic subject and which are contro-13 versial in character and might present serious diffi-14 culties from the point of view of the United States.

"The statement in the Japanese Annex and Sup-16 plement in regard to this section has also been re-17 vised in a few particulars in conformity with the con-18 siderations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In 19 addition, point numbered three in regard to economic 20 cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear 21 that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic 22 relations the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, a principle to which it is understood the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have long subscribed and which principle

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forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term 'troops' in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.

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"As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

"'IV. Commerce between both nations.

"A statement is included in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

"V. <u>Economic activity of both nations in</u> the Pacific area.

"The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.

"VI. The policies of both nations effecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

"This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-out statement of the fundamental

purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is 1 to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document 2 may speak for itself on this all-important subject. 3 "The statement of fundamental purpose has 4 been assigned a section by itself in order that it 5 may gain added emphasis. 6 "The statement in the Japanese draft in re-7 gard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in 8 9 a new section bearing number VII. 10 "The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established 11 12 position of the United States that the question of 13 immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to 14 attempt to include a statement on this subject would 15 stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the 16 agreement. 17 "VII. Neutralization of the Philippine 18 Islands. 19 "The phraseology of this section has been 20 altered so as to bring it into conformity with the 21 language of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 22 24, 1934. 23 "Addendum 24 "In view of the traditional policy of the 25 United States and various practical considerations

1	in the United States, important difficulties would
2	be presented should the Government of the United States
3	endeavor to keep secret the understanding under refer-
4	ence together with its annexes. This Government could
5	probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for
6	a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes
7	that the two Governments should work out procedures
8	covering the scope, character and timing of the annouce-
9	ment of the understanding and of at least the definite
10	substance thereof.
11	"Foreign Relations II, pp. 451-454."
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"ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

## "II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

"The position of the Government of the 6 United States toward the military movement of con-7 quest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secreatry of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

11 1 ... is waged by them (the aggressor powers this is not an ordinary war. It is a war of assualt by these would-be conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and which are resisting in self-defense ..... Such is the movement which is extending rapidly throughout the world.

"'If experience shows enything, it shows 21 that no nation anywhere has the slightest 22 reason to feel that it will be exempted from 23 attack by the invader, any more than, in a 24 town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citi-25 zen might expect to be free from attack. ""

".. Every thinking men can answer the ques-1 tion for himself by simply calling the roll of 2 the wretched victims of world aggression who 3 are now in a condition of seri-slavery, and 4 whose every hope of again enjoying the bless-5 ings of civilization depends only on the defeat 6 or failure of the movement of conquest. So it 7 is in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, 8 Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania, Luxemburg, 9 France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia."" 10 I hear the question being propounded by a 11 counsel as to what this has to do with it. I want 12 to make it clear that this is a part of the state-13 ment that was handed to the Japanese Ambassador. It 14 is an integral part of the document. 15 16 "... The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations have lost everything that makes 17 18 life worth living, it is high time that the remain-19 ing free countreis should arm to the fullest extent 20 and in the briefest time humanly possible and set 21 for their self-preservation.

<sup>22</sup> "'..Events have shown beyond possible ques <sup>23</sup> tion that the safety of this herisphere and of this
 <sup>24</sup> country calls for resistance wherever resistance will
 <sup>25</sup> be most effective...This policy means, in practical

application, that... aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in the maximum quantity. So--ways must be found to do this.

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"... Those nations that are making resistance are primarily seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties. Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own sefety. The United States both in its direct defense effort and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for the nations that are offering resistance means security for us, sid to them is an essential part of our own defense. Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater re-sources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that every free nation enywhere is a bastion of strength to all the remaining free peoples everywhere.

"'.. Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time. It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas.

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"'..Some emong us, doubtless with the best of intentions, still contend that our country need not resist until armed forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United States, until the inveding countries had acquired complete control of the other four continents and of the high seas, and thus had obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicepped defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely dangerous view.'

"The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of selfdefense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by

1 force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental con-2 sideration -- that of the inglienable right of self-3 defense. The only other attitude this Government 4 could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some 5 fifteen countries in Europe which elso were told, 6 as our country is being told, that they would not 7 be molested but that if they should undertake to 8 resist beyond their own boundaries they would be 9 charged with being aggressors and with having as-10 sumed the offensive. A similar course by this 11 nation from the standpoint of effective defense 12 against the Hitler movement of world conquest would 13 be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint 14 of reasonable precautions for its safety. 15

"In the light of the existing situation, 16 Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove 17 the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense 18 by this country and other countries similarly situa-19 ted, whereas for any other nation to request that 20 the United States desist from any such resistance 21 would in its actual effect range the country making 22 such request on the side of Hitler and his movement 23 of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the 24 person who should be addressed in support of peace, 25 rather than those whom he is attacking for the pur-

1	pose of bringing about their complete subjugation
2	without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.
3	"'Yes, it makes a difference who wins
4	the difference whether we stand with our backs
5	to the well with the other four continents
6	against us and the high seas lost, alone de-
7	fending the last free territories on earth
8	or whether we keep our place in an orderly
9	world.'
10	"Foreign Relations II, pp. 446-451."
11	440-491.
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	We offer in evidence with the permission of
1	the Court, IPS document 220-C(31) from exhibit for
	identification 58, Volume II. This is an informal,
3	oral statement handed to NOMURA by Secretary of State,
4	31 May 1941.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7	Nc. 220-C(31) will receive exhibit No. 1080.
8	(Whereupon, the document above
9	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
10	No. 1080, and was received in evidence.)
11	MR. KEENAN: (Reading) "American Informal and
12	Unofficial Oral Statement Handed to the Japanese
13	Ambassador (NOMURA) on May 31, 1941.
14	"The Government of the United States will at
15 16	some appropriate stage prior to any definitive discus-
	sion talk over in strict confidence with the Chinese
17 18	Government the general subject matter involved in the
	discussions, especially as it relates to China.
19 20	"Foreign Relations, II, page 454."
21	We offer in evidence IPS document 220-C(32)
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23	from exhibit for identification 58, Volume II, which
24	is an excerpt from memorandum of Secretary of State
25	Hull, dated June 2, 1941.
	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2	No. 220-C(32) will receive exhibit No. 1081.
3	(Whereupon, the document above
4	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5	No. 1081, and was received in evidence.)
6	MR. KEENAN: (Reading)
7	"MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
8	"Excerpts
9	"June 2, 1941.
10	"The Ambassador of Japan came to my hotel
11	apartment at his request.
12	"I then very slowly and deliberately asked
13	the Ambassador whether it was his considered judgment
14	that his Government seriously and earnestly desired
15	to enter into a settlement, for peace and non-
1,6	discriminatory commercial relations and friendship
17	generally in the Pacific area. He promptly replied
18	that that was his jdugment. I remarked that, in the
19	light of the loud statements which MATSUOKA and others
20 21	were daily making, the question which I propounded
21	was sharply raised, and that one was forced back to
23	the inquiry of whether Japan really is seeking this
24	sort of settlement, or whether she is only seeking
25	a way to get out of China, to the principles which would
	have to underlie a settlement establishing peace

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1	THE PRESIDENT: You left a line out.
2	MR. KEENAN: (Continuing)
3	"seeking a way to get out of China,
4	and otherwise to go forward with methods and practices
5	entirely contrary to the principles which would have
6	to underlie a settlement establishing peace, non-
7	discriminatory commerce and fair friendly relations
8	in the Pacific area. The Ambassador reiterated his
9	view that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.
10	"Foreign Relations II, pp. 454-455"
11	THE PRESIDENT: A line was omitted.
12	MR. KEENAN: I read it into evidence after
13	the Court corrected me. Which line is it?
14	THE PRESIDENT: I am not asking it to be
15	corrected twice, Mr. Chief of Counsel. Apparently
16	you did read the line.
17	MR. KEENAN: Thank you. I am grateful
19	to the Court for calling my attention to the omission.
20	We offer in evidence IPS document No. 219P-76
21	from exhibit for identification 58, Volume I. This is
22	an excerpt of a statement from Mr. Grew to MATSUOKA,
23	dated 4 June 1941.
24	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
25	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
	No. 219P-76 will receive exhibit No. 1082.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1082 and received in evidence.) MR. KEENAN: (Reading) "THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA) "No. 1817 "TOKYO, June 4, 1941 "EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note to Your Excellency No. 1803 of May 22, 1941, concerning damage inflicted on properties of the Methedist Episcopal Mission at Chungking by Japanese aircraft on May 9 and May 10, 1941, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that properties of the same Mission at Chungking were again seriously damaged by Japanese 16 aerial bombardment on June 1, 1941. "According to information received from the

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> 17 18 American Embassy at Chungking, a section of the 19 hospital of the Mission at Tai Chishang, in the center 20 of the city, was badly damaged by a direct hit. A 21 second bomb damaged the compound wall, and the home 22 of an American missionary received damage from stones 23 through the roof. This property has been damaged on 24 at least four previous occasions.

> > "In addition, the newly built Lewis Memorial

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Institutional Church of the same Mission, located at a distance of about seven hundred yards from the hospital mentioned above, was completely wrecked by a direct hit. This property has likewise been damaged on at least four previous occasions.

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"Foreign Relations I, p, 714"

Prosecution offers in evidence IPS document
2200-33 taken from exhibit for identification 58,
Volume II. This is an excerpt from memo. of a conversation between Secretary of State and "apanese Ambassador,
dated June 4, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2200-33 will receive exhibit No. 1083.

> (Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1083 and received in evidence.)

1	MR. HARDIN: (Reading)
2	"MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION
3	"(Washington) June 4, 1941
4	"ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT
5	OF THE UNITED STATES
6	"II. The Attitudes of both Governments toward the
7	European war.
8	"The Government of the United States de-
9	clares that, so far as its attitude toward the
10	European war is concerned, it does not end will
11	not resort to any aggression aimed to assist any
12	one nation against another.
13	"Colonel I"AKURO said that the Japanese
14	would be quite prepared to drop the foregoing sug-
15	gestion if we on our part would be prepared to drop
16	our proposed sentence in the first paragraph reading,
17	'Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply
18	to involvement through acts of self-defense.'
19	"Mr. "AKASUGI said that they desired to
20	have inserted at the beginning of Section II a new
21	paragraph reading as follows:
22	"'It being the common aim of both
23 24	Governments of Japan and the United States to
24	establish world peace, they will join forces with a
23	view to preventing the extension of the European war

and restoring peace. '

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"Mr. Hamilton raised for consideration the question of whether the idea underlying the proposed paragraph could not be incorporated in the first section. He pointed out that an express reference of this kind under Section II, which deals with the attitude of the two countries to the European war, might be regarded as inconsistent with the President's declared attitude in regard to the question of a present American effort to bring about peace in Europe. He suggested also for consideration whether it might not serve the purpose desired to change the word 'our' to 'all' in the first paragraph of Section I, which in our draft reads as follows:

"'Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed to (toward) the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.'

"Mr. "AKASUGI said that they would leave this point for further consideration and that we might also consider whether the words could not be incorporated in some other section or in a section by itself." "With reference to Section III, Mr. WAKASUGI proposed an entirely different formula. The formula in our draft and the formula he proposed are shown in parallel columns as follows:

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"FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31

"The Japanese Government having communicated 6 to the Government of the United States the general 7 terms within the framework of which the Japanese 8 Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful 9 settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms 10 are declared by the Japanese Government to be in 11 12 harmony with the KONOYE Principles regarding neighborly 13 friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and 14 territories and with the practical application of 15 those principles, the President of the United States 16 will suggest to the Government of China that the 17 Government of China and the Government of Japan enter 18 into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous 19 and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and 20 resumption of peaceful relations. 21

## "FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE

<sup>23</sup> "The President of the United States will <sup>24</sup> suggest to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek that it <sup>25</sup> will enter as soon as possible into a negotiation with <sup>26</sup> Japan on the basis of the KONOE three principles and the practical application of these principles for a termination of hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations.

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"The reason adduced by Mr. "AKASUGI for this change was that it was desired to avoid giving any impression to the Japanese people that there was 6 involved any question of an American mediation between 7 8 China and Japan.

9 "The Japanese then offered an alternative 10 formula, concerning which they wished to make reser-11 vations on minor points, reading as follows:

12 "'The Government of Japan having announced 13 the general terms within the framework of which the 14 Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of 15 a peaceful settlement of the China conflict, which 16 terms are declared by the Government of Japan to be 17 in harmony with the KONOYE principles and with the 18 practical application of those principles, the Pres-19 ident of the United States, relying upon the policy 20 of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to 21 the Chinese Government at Chungking that that Govern-22 ment and the Government of Japan enter into a negotia-23 24 tion for a termination of hostilities and resumption 25 of peaceful relations.'

"Mr. Hamilton then asked Colonel IWAKURO

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whether it was his conception that upon the conclusion of this agreement it would be the Wang Ching-wei regime or the Government at Chungking which would constitute the Government of China.

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"Colonel IWAKURO said that the Japanese now recognized the Wang Ching-Wei regime as the Government of China and regarded the Government at Chungking as a local regime. The proposed understanding contemplated negotiations by the Japanese Government with Chungking. As regards the outcome of the negotiations, there were three possibilities, which he charted on a piece of paper, attached: (a) that the Chungking Government might become absorbed into the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-Wei, (b) that the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-Wei might become absorbed into the Chungking Government, and (c) that both the Nanking Government and the Chungking Government might be coalesced into a new government. The Japanese Government proposed to leave this matter to be decided by the Chinese themselves.

"Mr. WAKASUGI then offered an amended annex on the part of the Japanese Government in connection with Section III. The formulae in the draft of May 31 and in the Japanese redraft are shown in parallel columns:

"FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31 1 "The basic terms as referred to in the 2 above section are as follows: 3 "]. Neighborly friendship. 4 "2. (Cooperative defense against injurious 5 communistic activities -- including the stationing of 6 Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to 7 further discussion. 8 "3. Economic cooperation--by which China 9 10 and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. 11 12 "4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and 13 territories. 14 115. Mutual respect for the inherent 15 characteristics of each nation cooperating as good 16 neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contrib-17 uting to world peace. 18 "6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and 19 naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese 20 waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with 21 an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China. 22 "7. No annexation. 23 "8. No indemnities. 24 119. Amicable negotiation in regard to 25 'Manchoukuo.'

1	"FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAP ANESE
2	"The basic terms as implied in the KONOYE
3	three principles and the practical application of
4	those principles are as follows:
5	"l. Neighborly friendship.
6	"2. Cooperative defense against communistic
7	activities including the stationing of Japanese
8	troops in the Inner Mongolia and certain areas of the
9	North China.
10	"3. Economic cooperation.
11	"4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and
12	territories.
13	"5. Mutual respect for the inherent
14	characteristics of each nation cooperating as good
15 16	neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus con-
10	tributing to world peace.
18	"6. "ithdrawal of Japanese troops from
19	Chinese territory in accordance with agreement be-
20	tween Japan and China.
21	"7. No annexation.
22	"8. No indemnities.
23	"9. Recognition of 'Manchoukuo.'
24	"Mr. "AKASUGI explained that, with refer-
25	ence to caption three of the foregoing annex, the
	Japanese did not wish to expand the wording in the

caption beyond the mere statement 'economic coopera-1 tion,' as they wished to leave the matter to be 2 dealt with by negotiations between Japan and China. 3 Mr. Hamilton observed that in the Japanese Oral 4 Explanation of May 12 this point had been expanded 5 by the statement 'by which Japan does not intend to 6 exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of 7 China a limitation in the interests of Third powers and 8 9 that we had substituted the phraseology 'by which China 10 and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimina-11 tion in international commercial relations' in the 12 interest of clarity. Mr. Hamilton here emphasized 13 the importance which this Government attached to the 14 application of the principle of non-discrimination in 15 international commercial relations. 16

"Mr. Hamilton noted that in caption six 17 where we had suggested the wording 'military and 13 naval forces' the Japanese in their new draft had 19 restored the term 'troops.' He asked whether it was 20 not intended by Japan to withdraw their naval forces. 21 Colonel IWAKURO said that in normal international 22 intercourse war vessels visited ports of other countries, 23 and, moreover, at Shanghai foreign powers, including 24 the United States, normally maintained marines or 25 corresponding naval units. They had used the English

word 'troops' as translation of the Japanese term 'guntai' which was not restricted to army forces. He said that it was Japan's clear intention to withdraw all armed forces whether of the army or the navy engaged in the present hostilities, and he had no objection to the use of the term 'armed forces' if that would cover better what was meant. He added that it was his understanding that 'Chinese Territory' included Chinese territorial waters.

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"Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of all the points made in connection with Section III and the annex pertaining thereto.

"Mr. WAKASUGI said that the Japanese hed no changes to offer with respect to the text of Section IV, but that they desired the withdrawal of our annex relating to restrictions upon trade during the present international emergency. He stated that such an annex would weaken the force of the stipulation in Section IV. He said that they thought that the word 'available' in Section IV would cover what we had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the point.

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 25 an alternative wording for Section V. The formulae
 26 of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative

draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows: 1 "FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31 2 3 "V. Economic activity of both nations 4 in the Pacific area. 5 "On the basis of mutual pledges hereby 6 given that Japanese activity and American activity 7 in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful 8 means and in conformity with the principle of non-9 discrimination in international commercial relations, 10 the Japanese Government and the Government of the 11 United States agree to cooperate each with the 12 other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by 13 Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies 14 of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, 15 nickel, )which each country needs for the safeguarding 16 and development of its own economy. 17 "FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE 13 "V. Economic activity of both nations in 19 the Southwestern Pacific area. 20 "Noting that Japanese expansion in the 21 direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared 22 to be of peaceful nature. American cooperation and 23 support shall be given in the production and procure-24 ment of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, 25 nickel) which Japan needs."

"Asked what were the reasons for the proposed changes, Colonel IWAKURO explained that Japan had no suspicion that the United States would engage in activities other than peaceful in the Southwest Pacific area, and he felt that the United States should accept Japanese declarations in regard to the peaceful character of their aims. The reason for restricting the application of this section to the Southwestern Pacific area, which we had broadened to include the whole Pacific area, was that it was the Japanese desire to devote this section specifically to the Southwestern Pacific area on account of the special interest which the Japanese people had developed therein.

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"He pointed out that Section VI covered the whole Pacific area. Mr. Hamilton raised the question whether the pledge in regard to peace might be incorporated in Section VI, retaining, however, in Section V a statement pledging both countries to the application of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He emphasized the importance which this Government attached to such statements. He pointed out in reference to commercial relations that in an earlier draft we had proposed the wording 'on the basis of equality of opportunity'; that the

Japanese had objected to that phraseology on the 1 ground that Japanese had no clear concept of the 2 implications of the term; and that, as we had been 3 given to understand that the Japanese would not object 4 if we used phraseology contained in a recent speech 5 by the Secretary, we had in our draft of May 31 6 substituted such phraseology. Mr. Hamilton said that 7 we would make note of the question of a possible 8 change in the draft. 9 "With reference to Section VI, Mr. WAKASUGI 10 offered an alternate draft, which includes an addi-11 tional paragraph. The formulae of our draft of May 31 12 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in 13 14 parallel columns, as follows: 15 "FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF MAY 31 16 "The Japanese Government and the Government 17 of the United States declare that the controlling 18 policy underlying this understanding is peace in the 19 Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose. 20 through cooperative effort, to contribute to the 21 maintenance and the preservation of peace in the 22 Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs 23 in the area mentioned. 24 "FORMULA PROPOSED BY JAPANESE "The Japanese Government and the Government

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of the United States declare that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

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"The Government of Japan declares that it has no intention to establish military bases within the area of the "estern Hemisphere nor to entertain any political designs therein. Similarly, the Government of the United States declares that it has no intention to establish military bases in East Asia or in the Southwestern Pacific area; nor to entertain any political designs therein. The Government of Japan and the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the "estern Hemisphere.

"Their objections to the wording of our draft were that they thought the phraseology somewhat redundant and that they did not understand what we meant by the word 'controlling'. They indicated a willingness to accept the word 'basic' for 'controlling' after Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to explain. There was no discussion of the second paragraph other than a statement by the Japanese that they would be willing to have the contents embodied in an annex. Mr. Hamilton

-	said that we would take note of the proposal.
1	"Mr. WAKASUGI said that they desired to
2	offer no changes with respect to Section VII, but
3	they desired the inclusion of an annex on the part
5	of the Government of Japan reading as follows:
6	"ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF
7	THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
8	"VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
9	"The Government of the United States will
10	accord in the Philippine Islands to the Japanese
11	subjects a non-discriminatory treatment.
12	"Mr. MATSUDAIRA said that what they had
13	in mind in this point was to provide for non-discrim-
14	ination in matters both of Japanese immigration and
15	establishment. Mr. Hamilton observed that the quota
16	system in the Philippine Immigration Law was on a
17	non-discriminatory basis. Mr. MATSUDAIRA admitted
18	this, but indicated a desire for a larger quota.
19	"There was no further discussion. Mr.
20	Hamilton said that we would report to the Secretary
21	and it was agreed that Mr. MATSUDAIRA and Mr. Ballan-
22	tine would keep in touch as to the next step.
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24	"Foreign Relations II, pp. 458-464."
25	We offer in evidence IPS document No.
	1632" (51), which is an entry in KIDO's Diary of

June 6, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 1632" (51) will receive exhibit No. 1084.

("hereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1084 and received in evidence.)

MR. HARDIN: (Reading)

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 June 1941.

"At 9:00 a.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned me to sav that Ambassador OSHIMA had an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and that Germany had at last decided to attack Russia. Hitler had intimated his desire for Japan's participation in this war against Russia, though he did not say so. Prince KONOYE also said that the Liaison Conference in this connection would be held this morning, and he asked me to report this fact to the Throne. I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty, and was received in audience from 10:20 a.m. to 11:05 a.m. His Majesty discussed at full length the matter mentioned above during the whole period. I had a talk with the Chief Aid-de-Camp at

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11:10 a.m. and asked him to keep in close touch with 1 me with regard to the same. Premier KONOYE made 2 Mr. HOSOKAWA, Secretary to the Premier, bring the 3 telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to me, and he asked me 4 to study it. I read it and returned it. I was 5 6 granted an audience with the Emperor from 1:10 p.m. 7 to 1:30 p.m. to report on the substance of the 8 telegram. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to 9 the Palace, and was received in audience by the 10 Emperor to report on the recognition of Croatia and 11 on the telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA. Foreign 12 Minister MATSUOKA intimated to me his opinion as to 13 the future outlook of the relations between the 14 Soviet and Germany. According to his opinion as 15 regards the German-Soviet relations, the conclusion 16 of an agreement was sixty percent possible and the out-17 break of war forty percent in spite of Ambassador 18 OSHIMA's observations. I had a visit from M/TSUDAIRA, 19 Minister of the Imperial Household Department at 2:10 20 p.m., and he informed me of such matters as the visit 21 to Japan of Wang Ching-Wei and the circumstances 22 concerning the change of the Lord Chamberlain. At three 23 in the afternoon the Chief Aide-de-Camp informed me 24 25 of the opinion of the War Minister concerning relations between the Soviet and Germany, which confirmed the

1	opinion of the Foreign Minister, which was that
. 2	the outbreak of war was not so imminent as Ambassador
3	OSMIMA expected."
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	We tenden in evidence TDC decument 0000 24
1	We tender in evidence IPS document 2200-34
2	from exhibit for identification 58, Volume II.
3	This is excerpt of informal statement handed by
4	Secretary of State Hull to NOMURA, June 6, 1941.
5	THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7	No. 2200-34 will receive exhibit No. 1085.
8	(Whereupon, the document above
9	referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
10	No. 1085 and received in evidence.)
11	MR. HARDIN: (Reading)
12	"INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL ORAL STATEMENT
13	HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE
14	AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 6, 1941
15	"Excerpts
16	"From such study as it has so far been
17	possible to make of the revisions which the associates
18	of the Japanese Ambassador offered on June 4 it is
19	disappointing to note a vast difference between the
20	proposal as it now stands with these revisions and the
21	original document on which earlier discussions were
<b>2</b> 2	based. The successive Japanese revisions appear to
23	have gradually narrowed down the extent of the advances
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25	in the direction of a liberal policy and to have
	carried the proposal away from the fundamental points

which the Government of the United States considers 1 are involved in establishing and preserving peaceful 2 conditions in the Pacific area. The impression that the 3 Secretary of State derives from the proposed revisions 4 as a whole and from recent manifestations of the 5 Japanese Government's attitude is that they evince 6 7 a disposition (1) to stress J apan's alignment with 8 the Axis, (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of 9 an intention to place Japan's relations with China 10 on a basis which in the opinion of the Government of 11 the United States would contribute to a lasting 12 peace and thus to future stability in the Far E-st, 13 and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in 14 regard to policies of peace and of non-discriminatory 15 treatment which are the fundamentals of a sound 16 basis for peace in the Pacific area. As the Secretary 17 of State has indicated, this Government has not wished 13 to take an initiative in commenting upon the merits 19 of the proposed peace terms between Japan and China; 20 comment has been offered upon this matter because 21 under the proposed understanding this Government would 22 be expected to take some action with regard to these 23 terms.

> "Foreign Relations II, pp 467-468" THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until

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