## AFFIDAVIT of JOAN MAIRUHU

On Friday tho 5 th of May 1945 there appeared before myself, Iduard Jan Uhlonbeck, police Officer list class, a man of Ambonose race named Nairuhu Jchan, 35, occupation overseer in a NICA hospital in Morotai, who stated as follows:

At the time that I was employed as a cook for tho Japanese Toiho's in August or gop river 1944 in Kampong Soegita, Morotai, If went to Tandjons Borco to got coconuts. There I met two Indonesians named Saribin and Xoohamul. These two men confessed to me that they wore spics working for: tho UcS.A. . Saribin was fully equipped with a wireloss-cet cad Mo hand was his assistant. They both told mo that they had landed from a U.S. submarine with rations for only one and a half month. But since they had already been on the island for nearly two months and had no food loft, they were conpolled to ask mo for food. Upon tho request of these two spics, I gave then food four time. Also someone else from the village, by the nome of 00100 , eave th on food.

When my food that consisted of saigo was exhausted, I asked holp from Ocloc to supply the two spies with food frow his garden at Tanajong Gorano. it the sane time I warned delos not to reveal this matter to anyone, not oven to his wire, because it was a Hatter of extronc secrecy. Those two spies remained hidden in a cave, close to Colon's garden in Tandjong Isioc. However Oeloo became afraid, as the Japanoso issued a warning that whoever failed to report such things, ho and his whole farily would surely bo put to death.

Ouloe roportod the natter to tho village-hoadman, named Soorabaya Djocriroet, and the latter informed the Japanese. Subsquontly, I was called up, tied and baton in order to mako me confioss cvorything that had happoned.

The Jap. spy nanod Mohammad Lion also interrogated no. After being interrogated for two days, we were sentenced to death by beheading, whoroupon six Japanoso took us to tho jungle. We wore made to knool and wore bound with an iron chain. Then the Japanese cut our nocks with a sword. This happened approximately on tho 15 th of September 194.4 at 7 a....

Those beheaded were:

1. Ocloc.
2. Saribin.
3. Mairuhu, John (witness, not killed).
4. Meehanad.
-2-

Aftor sone hours I rogainod consciousnoss and could broatho gain. I floc, and aitor throe days walking I struck upon tho U.S. forces which hed landod in Morotai, and I was brought to and troatod in the U.S. hospital.

## Witnoss,

Signod, Mairuhu

This statencnt is ande on oath. Morotai 5 May 1945.

Signod: E.J. Uhlonbock. Polico Officor lst class.



The next section of this phese relates to the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians in and around these islands.
(a) Ifrst document is an affidavit nade by Major George De Vrdon TuSTLY formerly of $2 / 21$ Australien Infantry Battalion. It is Irosecution Jomphent 10. 5412. Itender this docursent for identification and the narked excerpis in evidence.

The deponent stetes that he wes with the $2 / 21$ Battilion on Amboina Island in Fcbruary, 1942; when the Japanese landed. The Austrclion forces on the Island consisted of 300 on the Ambon side and about 300 on the Laha side. The deponent becane a Prisoner in February, 194, and remained on the island until the Jepanese surrender in 1945. Thile he was a prisoner ine heard nothing as to the fate of the 300 on the Laha side of the Island and in September, 1445 , sent a party there to endeavour to trace them. No trece was found, but a Japanese medical oificor pointed out a Cairn under which he said about 200 men were buried, but he could not say whether they were Australian or Japanese.
(b) Irosecution Dosument 10 , 533 Ais a record of the eviance of LieutenantComnander INN-ICAI NAMGA, Yaverial Japuese Nevy, retired, in the Prosecution Court oi the Tokyo Naval Goneral Court Mari:ial on 3th November, 1945, and in the Tokyo Ceneral Demobilisation Court on the 22nd. December, 1945, ind the 29th December, 1945. I tender rosecution Document No. 5333 A in evidence.

NaTAGATA was a Lieutenent of the Japanose Naval Forces at Laha. I mill now read certain excerpts fran his evidence. (aze 1, para 30) "I am now goin; to tell you ebout the course teken in the operation to capiure Laha. The Laha occupation Force connenced landin; on the beach of Hitlama (this spellin is uncertain) about two o'olook aom., Jenuory 31st, 1942, and captured the airlield about 7 a on o February 3rd., 1942, with our casualties amountins to more than 100 .
"The POT taken at the airport totalled about 400 consisting of about 210 Australians, about 60 Dutch, and troops of thenative.
(races 9 and 10 , questions and answers 5,6 and 7 , omitt ing second peragraph in the answer to question $6_{0}$ )
"Q. Tell ine about the enemy POT ceptured in battle to capture the Iaha airfield.
A. In the forenoon of the lst. of Fehruary (I am not sure of the exact time,) our reconnaitrers ( Petty-Oificer OLADA and seanan lst. Class RaNATA of the Company-headquarteas platoons) captured 10 enery troops led by an Australian Aray Second It and took then to Sowacoad. And besides this, as mentioned above, on the 2nd. of February about 50 Australian POW were
taken prisoners by us when they cane to our camp to surrender.
6. How were these POIFs disposed of?
A. The first 1020 is ware bayonetted to death before our force left Sowac oad for the support of the aforenentioned penetrating unit on the lsto of Feb。Both Adjutant HiTAKYAiA and I were ai that tine near the Laha airfield in ambush leading the penetrating unit, so we did not see the scene of the execution on the spot; according to Tn3ign SA AMUIU's statement male to me afterward, these $20 \% \mathrm{~s}$ mere killed by the order on the commending oftieer Rear-Amiral Hath IMaila, because these 20 s were likely to become a dras upon the moven ent of the admiral's force in rear."
"Next I will tell you about the kiilin: of the pot ithich numbered, as I rene aber aright, 51, though mention in the above they were more than 50 .

On the 4 th of Febcuary nsign $S .-A M O D E t$ Scmacoad sent a report to RearAdairal HATA Yivil at the Laha airficld thet SkMMOTO wes at a loss with small number of guard for treatment of zois. Accorainc to the SAMaMOTO's reporic these 20.l either rebellod acainst hin or made desertions because of the misunderstanding due to dipperence of lanjuage. The Anmiral got angry hearing
 airfield that evening: where the encineer staff officer was also present.

Te were ordered by the Aimiral that we should kill them on the followi ng day because he had received a report inforain; that iols at sowacoad were in disquietude, In ccapliance with this onder on the 5 th of February, I took about 30 retiy officers and men to sowacoad; I cannot recall now from what platoon these 30 petty officcrs and men were selected. In a forest of coconut-tree, about 200 metress toward tie airfield from Sowacoad, we dug out holes, and killed 20 is with swords or bayonets. I recall, it took about 2 hours from 10 a, The process of the murder was as follows: I divided 30 petty officers and men into 3 groups, the first group for leading the $70 \% / \mathrm{s}$ out of a dwellin; house where the victims wore temporarily confined, the second for preventing disorder on their way from the house to the forest, the third for beheading or sjabjing the $20 \%$. The 20 s were sent to tie spot one by one and nade to kneel with bandase on their eyes. our men of the third group, ore at a ifine, caine out in turn either to behead a 207 vit th his sword or to stab him theough the breast with his bayonet.

These Jolls were all Australians, including 4 or 5 officors. I am sure that there was a major, whose naine was unknown to ine. All corpses were ouri ed in the koles. The names of our men then employed for this execution cannot be recalled at all. But it is certain that there were present on the spot no officer, either warrant or camnissioned, except muself. Most of the time I placed myself in the middle betweon the house and the place of the killing to do theloverall command; but I wert to the spot when the last victim was to be executed. Interpreter IILUCII was then in the dwelling house to send out the $20 \%$ from the house.
7. Did you make a report that the execution had been accomplishod?
A. Ireported it to Adjutant Hirailvain in his roon on that day, and I supnose the adjutant in his turn reported it to Admiral IMTAMYAiLA,"
(aje 12 to 15, question and answer 11, omitting only translator's note).
"Il. Tell ine about the other killings of the 30 than you have afore statci,
A. As I have said, there were billeted in the airfield barracks some 200 Australians and sone 60 Dutch men. Then our forces first entered into the airifeld, they sam that the Japanese stirength was very small. numbering only sque 170. Sone of the $20 \%$ therefore, expressed their vien through IC.UCII, interpreter: to such an effect as that they wovid not have surrenierad but would rather have continued fighting bravel if they had kiown the Japanese sirenth was so smoll, and that if they had fought more stubbornly the Jatuanese casualties would have anounted to a considerable degree. In acdition to these they vehaved thomselves disobedient in the ir assigned morks, though partly caused by the difference of languaje. And about 30 of then were considered to be espeeially disobedient. The Comanding officer heard of this fact, and he Gave Adjutant matury -1 and ine an ordm ir his room in the erening of 5 th Februany to murder these same $30-0 V_{S}$.

I had about 20 enlisied. nen kill these some 30 P0.7 about 3 p.m. on the following day, if I reneaber rizht, in a coco palm forest neer Tauli, about 700 meters fron the airfield, though I cannot recall what platoons these about 20 men belonged to. In this killings, too, the POTls were once taken in a house nearby, then called out in turn one by one, andkilled with sword or with bayonet, as before. Their corpse was suried in the hole dug for the purpose. As in the previov case I stood in the middle between that house and the spot of murder to take general cannand for the most of the time, ard I went to the spot to ritnees the last one of being killed and ascertained this bloody work had bsen finished, I reported to the Ad jutant HATAIEYAl. the accomplishment of the execution. I am not sure whether any Dutch men were included anorj the victins or not, but it is certain that the victins were all enlisted men.

Next I will tell you about another killins of the po\%.
On the 17 th or 18 th of February , I cannot recall which day, while we were taking lunch at Anbon, Comanding officcr iAMASHI disclosed his invention rather to kill all. the reainin; $20 / 3$. His reason was this our troops available for sorvice was numbered only 340 or 350 from Which various guards in various districts had to be dispatched; the desertions of the $20 \% \mathrm{~s}$ began to be noted; rumours ran among natives that the allied troops would come soon to attack us; enemy planes in fact cane for reconnaissance; if the deserting 201 s would divulge
the situation of Japanese sidc, \#e mould be faced very unfavourable situation; and all these factors mere forming a menace to the position of the Japencse forces. I asked Comandins officer, then, That is his opinion concrning the provisions of the International Lav which I understood to be stipulatin: that RFURYO" ( -0 ) should not be treated as eneny. He answored ne that I was right so far as "FURYO" was concerned, but that the cantives interned there were to be classified and called "IORIO" and therefore we would not violate the International Lav if we would kill then.

A fer days later, in the evening thile taking suppor with the Comanding officer and his dudant HaTh ZVhle at the garden in front of the comanding officur's roan, I was told by the comnanding offiecr to kill all the 20 s at Laha。

On the folloming day, probably 20th of Feb. if ny recollection is right, I fathered up saic 60 enlisted men from various platoons attached to the 1 - THLL, Horeover about 30 enlisted men fron the crep of the Minesweeper lo. 9 who were boerding at the l-NJL barracks because their ship had sunk then, fere employed by the consent of a rescrve-list officer attached to that uinesmeener.

I took the both groups of enlisted nen totalling to sone 90 to Laha froi Anbon at about 1 pou. on the 2)th. そe dug holes in a place in a coconut forest at rauli? this new place is a differeat position from that of the previous murder being $1 / 40$ or 1.50 meters away froa it, and was about 200 meters off the head-quarters of the Leha Detachnent. I divided 90 men into 9 groups: 2 groups for bloody killint, 3 groups for watching the O O ; on their ways to the killing place, 2 groups for sending 20 s out of the barracks, one group for glard ou the spot of the killing, the last one Ior energe cy. The 20 is rere carried by truck from the barraciss to the Detashment building aboit 500 neters in distance, and they wore on foot fran the Detachncit building to the spot of the killing. The same way of the killins was adopted as in the mrevious case; to have then kneel dorm with bandage over their eyes ad to kill then mith sword or bayonet.

The poor victims numbcrea about 220 in all including a few Australian officers. Interpreter II UCII was, as in the previous case, in charge of duty of sending -0 s out of the barracis; I was in the Detachinent building giving overall directions and ascirtained the final accomplishment of the affair on the spot. It took fron about 6 poin. to 9.30 p.m. Nost of the corpses vere buried in one hole, but because the hole was not bi; enough to receive all of the corpses a dugrout nearby was also used for the burial. On that dey upon my arrival at our headquarters I reported it the Conlanding offic $r$ directly and also to his adjutant.
(age 15. Uestion and answer 13).
"13. ©. Tas the order of killing $70 / \mathrm{s}$ issued by the Comanding officer HYASHI at his orn discretion?
"A. In the first three cases of themurder the orders mere with no doubt issued by Rear-Adiniral Hirai...Y. it. But as for the last case, I an not sure whether the order was issued by the Command ing officer MLYASI hinself, or it was given in compliance with the order of Rear-Adniral H.IncIWiA。"
(c) rosecution Docurent No. 5333 B is my next dooment. It is the record of
 berore the Tokyo General Court Martial on Sth Noveaber, 1945, and the Tokyo General Derobilization Court on 24th Deee $3 \mathrm{ber}, 1245$, and 12 th February, 1946. I tender this document in evidence.

This docunent refers to the killing of prisoners at Luik. It is put in evidener in conpliance with order contained on paper No. 573 permitting use of record
 whole record of evidence contained in videntiary Document No. 5333.
(d) Trosecution Doament No 5413 is an aflidavit by Major George De Verdon WISTLIY formerly of $2 / 21$ ivstralian Infantry Battalion. I tender the docunent for identification and excerots therefrom in evidence,

I will read pararraphs $3,4,5,7,8$ and 9 of this affidervit. ................
(e) Proserution Document No: 5417 is affidavit of former Major Ian Farquhar MiCRAL of $2 / 2 i$ Australian ImPantry Baitalion. I terder the document for identification and excerots therefroin in evideace。

I vill read paragraphs 2 and 3 of this dccument.
(f) Prosecution Donument Nio 5302 is the affilavit of rivate trerdun Clive BALL of Sth Division: Australian Arny Service corps. Itender it for identification and narioa excerpts thereof̂ in evidence.

The affiant describes the beating and torture of deponent and 22 other Australians because they had jone outside the cano limits. Ls a result deponent lost the use of his legs for three or four months.
(6)

Prosenution Document No. 530]. is the afridavit of rivate Jom Leslie SZARLT of 8 th Division $A_{0} A_{0} S_{0} C_{0}$ I tender the document for identification and the original in evidence.

The aff iant describes certain of the mork the Japanese made hin do in 1944. He says -
"I was put on the long carry 13 tines durin; 194.4. The last occasion was just before Christinas. The distance of tie long carry was about eisht miles over very rough rugged eountry made up of broken coral with gullies and steep hills. Te had to go on all four sametincs to craml up the hills. It took us ab out five hours to complete the journey with a load. I carried bags of cenent and 150 lb bombs. The bass of cement weighed 94 lbs . Too men rere detailed for each bay; when one could carry it no furthr the other took over. The japanese guards did not actually bash us but aade us hurry alongo"
(h) Prosecution Document ro, $530 \mathrm{~S}^{\circ}$ is an official report of the Netherlands Forces Inteliigence sergice. I tender the document for idertification and the narked excerpt in evidence.
I will read the excerpt which appears on. the last page of the dowmente
(i) Tosecution Docunent No, 5222 is an afidevit made by Flying officer Denis Brian ILSON of the Royal Air Foree. I tendor the original for identification and the marked excerpts in evidence.

The affiant and a party of 2050 prisoners of tar landed at in 00 . Island on 5 th ilay, 1943. Upin arrival the canp 7as only partly built and did not provide adequate shelter. At this camp prisoncrs mere starvod and beaten. Although most of them were sick they were compelled to work ten hours a day, mainly on the construation of an aerocrone. Clothin; aid boots mere not sunplied to prisoners. large numbers suffered from beri beri, malaria and dysentery. Hospital patients roro starved and had to su lenent their dict rith rats, aice, dogs, cats and smailse No nedical sunvlies mere providedo open trench latrines only were pernitied for the first twelte months and this resulted in spread of dysentery. over 15 months 336 died fron sicimess ard starvation.
(j) Irosenution Docurent, $1 \mathrm{~F}=529$, is an affidavit made by Flyirs officer Denis Brian dSON of tice Royal hir Jore. I tender the ori jinal for fidentification and narired ezcerpts in evidance.

This is a short affidavit and propose to read marked excerpts from "Then I arrived at Lahat Canpo..........constructin" AoRo工。trenches for the Japanese."
( Z$)$ Tosecution Doament Jo. 5292 is an affidavit by Leading Aircraftsman Fenry ITH RINGLii of Royal Air Foree. Itender this doament for identification and narled excerris in evidence.

The affiant states that 1000 prisa ers of rar ment to LIAG on funbon Island in May, 1943. Acconnodation was bad consisting for the must part of leaky tents. Food was totally inadequate. risoners mere engajed on the construction of an aerodrone. "or's was very heavy and the guards inflicted brutal beatings on the prisoncrs. Iedical supplies mere insufficient. One man, Champion, was
inurdered. In october, 124 , a draft of 600 were sent by sea bac: to Java. Trisoners mere overcromded. Only a third of a pint of drinking water was provided for each men daily. 28 died on the voyage.
(1) Frosecution Document No, 5300 is an extract fron Tar Diary of $2 / 5$ iust. Gen. Josp, of 12 septo, 1945. I tender the docunent for identification and the narked excerpts in evidence.

I shall reed the entry.
(m) Trosecution Dognnent No, 51.22 is a repart on recovered prisoners of bar by officer in Chaige, Tedieal Division, $2 / 5$ kust, Geno Hosp. I tender the document for identification and the marked excerpts in evidence.

I will read the first three paragraphs of this report.

Irefrr the court to -xhibit $157^{\prime}$ A and $67{ }^{\circ}$ s which mere put in evidence at paje 13452 of transuript. Ceriain of the photographs inciuded in that exhibit relate to prisozers recovered in finbon.
(n) Prosecution Donment No. 5303 is an affiravit made by lst. Lieut. Faul Alfred STA.SBURY of U.So Ariny Air Force. I put the docunent in for identification and the marked excerpts in evi dence.

The affiant was bombardier on a 124 thich erashed over ThI Islands on 21 Septeinber, 1 43. It was in three feet of vater cn a coral reef. The crem had sustained sericus injuries in the crash and the navigator was pinned dorn on the flight dacko A Japarese boat caise out. The airmen with the exception of the navijator mere taken prisoners. The Japanese refused to do anything for the navizator biat left him thcre to die. The rest of the aimnen were taken to Ambon, They were placed in moscuito infested cells without blankets, bedding or noscuito nets. No sunlight could penetrate the cells and there ves no ventilation. They mere starved on meevily rice. No nedical attention was Given then. For 63 deys they vere interrogated to the accompaniment of beainins almost daily, Later the deponent and the comilot mere shipped to Jayan. They were irequantly beaten by the guards. They both becane paralysed wi th beri beri bit received no treatiaent for this durinj the 60 days sea royage. The devonent renained paralysed for nine months and the co-pilot for 20 norths.
(0) Trosecution Document Mb, 5223 is a sworn interrozation of Tarrant officer IIYOSATO, YOSIIZA I of Japanese Navy. I tender it for iaent ification and the marled excerots in evidene.

On the 29th fugust, 1944, tie deponent took part in the beheading of three Anerica airmen at Sarala riscner of ar Camp. This was done on orders of superior of icers. The district had been bombed by American planes on the previous day.

That canpletes the evidence in relation to this section of the phase.

Evidentiary Document No. 5419.
In the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.

## THE UNITED STAMES OF AIEFICA GND OTHERS <br> v <br> ARAKI, Sadao and OTHERS

## AFFIDAVIT.

I, GEORGE DE VERDON WESTLEY of 284a Camberwell Road, Camberwell in the State of Victoria, formerly VX 44808 Major $G$. De V. Westley of $2 / 21$ Battalion make oath and say:-

1. I was with $2 / 21$ Battalion on Amboina Island in February 1942 when the Japanese landed. At that time Lt-Col Scott was commanding the Battalion, he was also Commanaing Officer of Gull Force. This Force consisted of the battalion and attached troops. The troops from this Force were disposed in two main bodies, approximately 800 being on the Ambon side and about 300 on the Laha side of the island.
2. I became a prisoner in February, 1942, and remained a prisoner on the island until the Japanese surrender in 1945.
3. In September, 1945, I sent a reconnaissance party to Laha to endeavour to trace the men who had been at Laha and of whom I had not heard since the surrender. Lieutenant Russel was in charge of this reconnaissance party. A Japanese Medical Officer pointed out to him a cairn under which he said about 200 men were buried but he could not say whether they were fiustralians or Japanese. Iieutenant Fussell was unable to find any other trace of the Australians who rad been at Leha.

SWORN at Melbourne in the State of Victoria this seventh day of Ocłober, 1946.
(Sgd) G. De V. WESTLEY

BEFORE ME
(sgd) W. h. Fax
Commissioner for taking affidavits and declarations under the Evidence Act, 1928.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { ReCORD OS SASIN: } \\
& \text { Kon-ichi TAKAGA1. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Who is Jieutenant Commander, IJ . retired, hose present adores is c/o Eirolsu OXA, 356, Minami-netashiki, TokaichiTachi. Eutami-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture, and tho pas born on 13th February 193, made the follolig statement, of his free will, in the presence of the prosecutor at the prosecuion court of the Tokyo Naval General. Court Marvel on November 3, 18.5 :
I. "Iffy domicile is Mo. 2 Shimonaganoki-Cho, Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
2. "I first entered the nave on June Isth, $192 \%$ and was made, after gradual promotion, to Ifoutenant Commander on
September fth, 1945. Then I 7 as placed in the retired list, on October seed of the year and arriving at the present address
"Wile I res still in service in the nave, I mas involved in a $P O$ minder incident at the time of our occupation battle of Amon Island which mas fought in connection with the Feat Pacific ar.
"Me situation at that time as as follows: The Amon Island Occupation VIces mere commanded by Major General ITO of the Japanese Amy. The main body of the ITO Detachment, Which as placed under his direct command, engaged in the occupation of Amon City. The capture of the Ia ha tiro: t Vas assigned to the force commanded by Tear Admiral? HATATBILiA, tho was then mentioned to be the Commander of the 24 NSBE; this Iaha Occupation Force consisted of the 1 ITNSIP, once infantry platoon each from the last and and Sascbo Naval Special Landing Parties, an artillery unit and an infantry platoon of the banc Naval Special Base Force, and one army infantry company despatched from the IHO Detachment.
"I as then a company commander of the I WrSIP with the rank of Jioutonant Junior grade in Special Service Officer Branch. Because Commander FAYASHI, IJY., appointed Commander of the 7 . I STP, had not Jot arrived at his post, the command. of the 7 K STSP mas assumed by Lt. Tunito HATATEJYAMA, IJN., because of his being the senior officer present of the 1 ENTSTP though he was merely the adjutant in his formal regular appointment.
"It appeared that the 21 st Minosuocpor Division panticipatod in the operation for the mineswooping purpose, though the details about it is not known to me.
3. "I am no going to tell you about the course taken in the operation to capture Jaha. The The Occupation Force commenced lending on the beach of Hitlama (this soling is uncertain) about two $0^{\prime} \mathrm{clocl}$ a.m., January $31 \mathrm{st}, \overline{1842 \text {, and }}$

3vid. Doc. No. 5353. 2.
capturod the airfield about 7 a.n. on Fobryazy 3rd ith our casualtios amounting to more then lon.
"The PO: taken at the airsort totallod about 100 consisting of about 210 Australians, about 60 Dutch, anc troops of the native.
\&. "ogarding the troatment of the POW I am going to emplain Tov as follous:

Appointed Commander of the 2. FBE, Rear Admiral HATAKBYAMA, Eisplared his flag on Teb. 5 at Jaha, but on the th or gth of tho month leaving one platoon of his forces at Iaha he moved to Ambon beceuse the ITO Detachment was about to evacuate the city. Therefore the eirect treatmont of the PO: at Ieha vas assignod to the platoon Commender, Kalvitaro SASAKI, then on the rank of farrent Officcr.
"The PO\% at Ambon City consisting of some 7,100 of Australian and Ditch solciers tho had been cantured by our army forces mere taken over from the competent army authoritios by Sonior Staff Officer Shicoki and Jngineer Staff Oificor MIZOGTCHI (both, of the 2: NSBY) end myself, after the 24 NSBF movec. to umbon City. This notrithstanding, tho affairs relating to POT, in the headmartors of the 24 MBBF were handle by the Engincer Staff Officen, MIZOGUCHI, Wile the duty diroctly to take caro of thom was placed. uncor the charge of the I K SIP. Such boing tho oese, all mattors roleting to the treatment of the POI, eithar at Ambon or Laha, Wore ropozted to Adjutant HATAKJYAMA, wo mes thon acting for the Commender of our landing party; and all these matters vere concuctod according to hie direction. After tho arrival of the duly appointed comander around Fobruary $S_{2}$ the affoirs connocted vith the PO Tas understood to havo beon roported to him by the Adjutant.

Though its eroct date emmot be rocellod, won the 1 IGSTP Das absorbod in tho 21 NSBE, Mr. HATAKGYAMA mas appointed Chiof of the Shore Guard Division in the 21 NSBE, and this division was in cherge of the twoatment of the POW.
5. "As for the killing of the POTmy statoront is as follows:

I remomber it nas about the 20th of Feorvary. In our Hoadruartors at mbon, I as told by Mr HMTNEJYMA that I shoule so to Inelia to have the PO thoro put to death. And by this I sumisod that tho docision for the killing vas probobly ascribablo to th fact thet consicorablo difficultios Oo boing confrontod ith in tho mattor of local Doace and socurity; for, taling acvantage of tho insufficiont strongth of tho dotechmont troops thore, tho desertion of the PO:I as continuousty happonine at Laha in those cays. Icading about 60 mon of my of company together sith about 30 mon
of Wines ocuor No. 9 who oro then accomornto company barracks, I arrived at tho nertcons of tho Dotachnont at abovt 2 p.m. on the very day that I rocosvou the aforomentionod ordor; as for the talling those latto porsonnol of Minoswoopor Mo. S I wos siven a verbel consont br a rororve officor of the Minos oonor. Thonoh this roscrvist oficor accompaniod us, nothing wes ciroctod or zo rostod of hite on my part.
"I briofoc those about 90 cmlistoc mon to assign thom thoir dutios. First of all the burial plece vas to bo dug by all of us. Thun tino parity yes to 00 तiviece into threo: tho first group fo: transporting tho victins from the camp to tho plece of the filling, the socond orap for p:oventing Cisturbencos, enc the thire gromp composor of some twonty mon for diroctly oneaging in the conduct of tho killing.
 ooc's situatod on poth sices of a oad ruming a littlo boyond a marsh hich lios abo t 200 notore morthoastrond from tho dotachment barmacks standing just in front of tho Dicr. Tho gmallor burial holo on the right sice of the road vas for ajout 50 cornsos, hilo tho lezzor ones dug on the loft sicle :as for all of the rost bocios.
'lecording to my monorr tho mumor of tho PO: killod 4as doout 33,. Thow ox Eil oc oithor br sworce of Japanose stric or bayonots with thoir oyes covoroc. ac. I as dirocting tho ovorall affars at the dotachent barracks. On thet der tho dotacment commondor ves in fich-bod becauso of moloria and on my part I moroly wotifiod him as rogards tho kil7in.

If I romombor wi ht tho aformontionod fatoful dood Won comoneod at about siz o'cloc: it tho orronizg one cheo
 YAN on the accomplishment of tho dooe aitor vo camo back to own hoachuctors.

I ish to add that tho aforomentionce onlistod men from Finos oun= No. 9 hace boo accomorotoc in the berracks of my compar bocuso thoir shit hac boon loet the ough hitting a winc hon ontoring the Boy of tabon.

Thon tho stotomont as complod, tho rocord inace of
 corroctos of the roco:c and effizod his sign ture and sool haroefto:

$$
(\text { Tho signcturo ond sod? on }
$$

(Signod oy) Tocao TAIBT, Justico 子nsign, I . , Rocorcior, tho Tolvy Nove? Gonoral Court liartiol.
(Signod by) Ichiro ITO, Justicc It.-Comdis. IJ. Prozocutor, the Tokyo Naval Cuncrol Court lortiol.

Brid. Doc. No. 5333.
Gamination of cousci.
(Pagos 23-35)
Accusod:- IATiGKIA Kon-ichi.
On tho fth Novombor 1945, in a pooliminery hoaring in tho Wokro Gunorel Cout-liotion, Justico It. Commenor aro Koicholu, Jomining Oificial, in tho prosonco of Justico Suo-T,inutmat Bnc Closs BE Yasuo, tho rocorcur of tho Court, owninod tho acousod in connoction ith tho caso of murcor. The wostions ane ons ine as follo:
7. Ge That aro your name, dato of birth, titlo and zonk, loger accrass, nativa placo, prosent adeross?

Dato of Dinth - 13th Fobruory 7-93 Thit enc ronk - Lל, Commendor, rotiroc.
Jucot. Nirues - ITo. 3, Shinonagonoki-Cho, Turo City. ativo place - Vo. 55 t, Toleas"gi, Komisuai-Mura, Tutami-Gun, Wirochim Profocturo.
Precont ferass - c/o Ficorolu OI/KI, Io. 35S, Winomi-Zatashiki, Tolaichi-lMehi, Iutami-Gun, Hi: oshima Profocture.
2. (3. Couri-:onk, docoration, modal, annuity, ponsion, if cny?
$\therefore$ I am on tho 7 th Court Pank (jg) (Ju-shichi-i) and. the Lth Class Ordor of Horit (Kum- Shi-to) and I havo War\%odal of the 1951-1034 Incident, Show Co onation Nomo: i-1-Model Manchu Tuo Ouncation lodal, ar-1"odal OI the Chino Inciciont and Nomo-i. 7 .. iod.n of tho Wanchuricn zooror's visit to Japan, otc. My ponsion is not civen yot.
5. Q. Wave rou evor boch punished on charco of the cri inal case boloro?
$\therefore$ Tovor. (Tho oroming officiat, horeby, told tho acusuc. that ho voutc bo crominoe. in connoction ith tho ejovomontionot. mu dor ceso.)
2. ?. This is tho roasons yhy you aro suspoctod of the charge. Gvo vou any opinion about it? (The ozmir.ne officiol, horoby, race to tho accusca tho oviclone of crims hich is statod in the "statemont of opinion" submittod by the prosocutor to tho Taver Finistor undor dato e Yovombor 7.345 cnd hich is montionod. in the prosocutor's lottor undor samo dato rovirin this proliminany hoaring.)
A. Mat you hove rose to mo just no is ithout any mistakos, and I havon t ony particular opinion about it。
5. Q. It is uncerstood thet you hevo stetod to the prosecutor in this aut. Heve you any opinion about it? (Tho oramining official, how coy, roce to tho accuscd. tho prosocutor's hoaring-notc for the accusod.)
$\therefore$ That rou havo road just no: is nithout any mistakos.
G. G. That was tho rolation of commend bot oon tho accusod and Commencor HATMEYMY' at tho timo rhon this incictont took olaco?
A. Commandon IXTKPYMM wos, at that time, Lt. and the Acjutant of the 1 KNSIP, hilo I was a compeny commondor. scondinglt, tho ordors of Commender EATASHI, tho Commendig officor of the Party camo to

7. S. Thon, is it your opinion thet tho murdor of this cass Was porfomed by tho ordor of tho Comending Officor iivishrl?

1. ZOS, it is.

Thon tho tostimonr mas complotod, tho rocord made of it Mas rosd egain: ard as FiK Coill soid that it wos without any mistakos, ho ves cousod to arfiz his signaturo and scal bolow.

| (Signod) | Ton-Echi NITKGiLIt (Soe7) |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | the iccusod. |
| (Signoci) | Yosuo : B7, |
|  | Clur, Soconc Domobilization |
|  | Vinistry. |
| (Signod) | Koicholru OTOO, |
|  | Ganminiog Officiol., Socond. |
|  | Donobili ation Ministry. |

It tho Tolro Domobilization Court, - ITovomber 1945.

Tvic. Doc. No. 5333.
Bocord of the Socond Exomination of tho iccuscd.
(Pagos 101-118)
The Accusod: N'G:IA Kon-ichi..
On zand Decumber, 1945, in a proliminory hoaring in tho ToIFyo Gonorat Domobilization Coutt, Shinro WAT BIKI, SDO. med Poo. of TGJC., in tho prascnoc of Yasuo 1 BF , SDO . and Rec. of TGDC., ozeminoc foz the scome time Kon-ichi NuKiGnlt in connction ith tho caso of homicice with which ho was sćcusoc.

Tho zuostions anc ons ors aro as follows:

1. $Q$. Thet is youn neme?
$\therefore$ TH GITA Tom-ichi.
("ftou this zuostion and ans:or, tho owaning officor
 in comoction ith tho aso aforomontionod.)
2. 3. Is thoro anything to bo corroctod in your statononts made so far?
$\therefore$ Yos, therc are some points to bo corroctoc, hich I Gould lile to montion you about; boceusc my momory ras not altoguthor cloar and ozact at the time, I thin I mado some incorract tatomonts.
1. Q. Toll mo the orgenization of the forcos that joincd in tho oporation for the copturc of snoon Islanc?
$\therefore$ I will toll you finst that of 7 -KISSP. It tas as f011075: Commating Officor: Commancior HAYASHI, Cjutant: thon-Licutonant H TMEYM: Company Commoncr: NTK:Gillt, mysclf.
2. I Platoon (Bnsign Rimoculko EJMUDA)

No. 2 Platoo (farrat Officor Shuzo IT:GNMA)

IV. 1 " (I cennot romorber the neme of the

Commandor.)
Io. 5 " (Forment Officor Masaru YOSHI I'R:)
$\therefore$ Mochino-gun platoon (Varront Officor Kakutaro
in Infantry-gun " (Forront Officor Thenji Iroui )
Bosices the above yo hed the following attachod units.
Comunication Unit (Warrant Officor Zazuto SUM)

Modical. Sorvice Unit (I connot romombor tho namo of tho Commondor.)
Strotchor Unit (I cannot romombor the name of tho
Comandor, but ho was o Petty Officor. Bnginooring Unit (Vorront Constivetor Koigo KITHIOTO) Paymastor Unit (I connot nomonbor the nemo of tho Tocdor.)

Bosides tho above montioncd officors, thore woro followig officers in the l-KTSIP.
 Chiof suagoon

Assintant sumgoon Chior Paymestor Surgcon I, t. (I canot romurior his nome.)
Surgoon haign somozono (muv). Paymastor Jit. (Icannot romombor his nome.)
/the 5th platoon from
the 1st. Sasebo NSLP,
Chiof Wehivist Olomr Pomastor It. (jg) Yutio - M1G:

Comronding Oflicor, Commandor H:Y'SHI arrivod at mbon City ane arsumod comme on tho 9th (or 10 th ) Pcomary 1942. Boworo thet timo, djutent HMABYMN Was essuming tho comane in his oleco. The compony joinoe in this oporation ans tho and company of l-K STP, and the lst compony of tho 7 -TWSTP hed boon despatchod to Jolo Island aron (Philippinos). Tho
\& \& 4 th platoon ha bocn di potchod from tho 2nd Sascbo NSTP, / and tho 2nd platoon ond tho infontry-gun Dlatoon from tho 32nd. IVSBF, to join in tho organization of tho forco or tho l-TISIP.

Noat I ill toll you diout tho 21th WSBF. This corps as crontod on tho 5th of Fobucry, 1542, With tho 10110 ing koy porsonncl.

Comendme Docr-iomirol Hitwby:
Sonior Staff Oficor Comondor IJEI Thginoor Staff Olficor Jicutonont IIZOG CHI

It tho timo of the londing on Jubon Is. those mombors voro the only componont part of tho corps, totaly lacling the suborizato orgunirations, though
 Commen of Naval Jorecs in bettlo sftor loncing on Ambon Is.

Bosidos those navel forcos, tho main boery of tho ITO Detechmont of tho omy uncor Comane of MojorGoncral ITO ployed tho roll of copturing mion City, ned Gonorel. ITO was the Comending Gunoral or ovor-all.
forecs of the ry nace meve. Moroover, 21 st Tinos:ocpon Division joinod into tho bettlo as a surince tloot.
A. Go Tol7 mo tho courso of tho bottlo to carturo mbon Island.

I tol. you yhat I con rocall.
$\because 10.30 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{He}$ on the 30 th of Jenuary, 7.942 , owr force reachod off Hitoloma bach, ond proporod lor landing. $\therefore$ it $0215 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}$. or the 3lst mo stortce Innding undor the ordor "Start action", and. inishod landing at 5.15 a.m. Tonving a port of tho lorec thore, wo marchod to tho Joho -inicold, Thono so got ot 3.50 D.n. and bogon ilghting. But at 5 p.a. o tomporarily stopped lighting in ordor to got beck 10: a wilo to ronow proparation for futhor Iighting。

On thet night : stnyod at Sowacoac doovt 4 kilomotors nozth of tho cinitold.

On tho lst Eobruary, Do digp-tchor tho officor roconoitror to get iniomotion on onomy situction. Iftox having roughly classiziod the onomy situation ot 9.30 จ.?. c. unit to oronk through into tho airifcle bich vas onganizod bT dbout holf ftrongth of oach infontry platoon axcopt ITo. I. and ITo. 1 plotoons loft sow coad to gut inlormotion of tho situation insid. the nomy positions one to brook "irc-ontong montr. in amy iorcc of onc compeny stentod Irom So cond at s pom. Ior thu purposo of ponctrating into tho Tahn irricla from bock. (An
agrounont hod boon mado bot oon tho army nod mever that tho arifold was to bo brokon into at 3 a.m. on tho Srd of fobrunt.) Bot oon 8 and 3.30 a.n. of 2nd Fobuvary wo broko tho iro-ontanglanonts, ponotratod into onomy poritions; onc thorounon $=0$ Wore firce by onomy ith smoll arms ner mochino sums, ond ongngonont onsuod Linally turning into a hond to honci iight.
han zopoztoc tho situotion of this fighting
 loft thet plecot 3.75 c... taking with hin tho Whol. of his troopr rominime so far in ron in oreor to support tho ponctrating unit at tho Leha. inficle, onc at $5 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}$. ho got thero. Ho gevo bettlo. Pricnc-plemos bomboc tho wony moro then ton tinos; 气 largo number of cncualitioe for both

Bvid. Doc. I'O. 5335.
sidus, friund ne ioc, in the hoavy fighting loc us to stop lightimg somo timo aftor 9 a.m., ma wo got bock to Somacond for a whilo to straighton tho lino. $\therefore t 3$ D.m. cbout 50 onomy soldions cmo Sowacond to surrondor. Aftor tho suncut tho punotrating unit bogen to arrive it Somacond ono ntt anothor, and tho concontrotion of our holo troons uns acconplishod at 11 om。

On 3nd at 7 a.n. tho wol of our fore lolt Sow cood to copturo tho irfiole roaching thono nt 5 S.m. To mohino-gmmoc onomy positions to docoy onomy firing for tho purposo of finding out tha cxnct poritions of onomy guns. Brt thore was no rutuming firo fron tho onomy and it appoorod that tho onomy nos proparod for survoncor having jost tho fighting spinit. Thon IT, HTKMYN, thon tho cting Commondor of the 1-K STP, cccompmiod by an intorprutor, untored tho iriiuld ns tho porlomontairo, th onome offorod bim on ovor-al gurnondor. $\therefore 6$ nor. Vo marchod into an occupiod tho arfiold, and t nout $9.50 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}$. the amy ioreo ontrmod the ciritid Irom the bock and joinod us.

Tho above is tho summary hosrativo of tho capturo of tho Trahn airfiole mbon City nas tole to havo bodn occupiod bry tho army troops on the ind of Fiomery.
5. 3. Til mo about the onomy POW copturod in bettl to conturo tho Joha ainiol.d.

- In tho iornoon of tho lat of Fubruny (I an not suro of tho oxect tire), our rucommatrons (PuttyOlficur OK:D: anci acomen lat Glase T"N゙IF: of tho Componv-hondurartors platoons) capturod 10 cnomy troops lod by an iustralian arme Socond Tt. and toole thom to Sowncond. and buisidos thin, os montionod cbovc, on tho min of Fomery doout 50 dustralion PO: rono ticon prisonors by us whon thoy crao to our comp to sumrundon.

6. Q. Fo: more thosc POW ci voncd of?

Tho first $J 0$ POWE wors beyonottod to doath bofore our force luft Somecond ior tho cupport ol tho aforomontioncd ponotroting unit on tho ?at of Fob. Both Ajutont $\mathrm{H}^{\prime}$ TKNY: and I woro at thet time nocr tho John airiid in abus londing tho ponotrating unit, so No dic not noe tho senno of tho vxocution on tho spot; according to Ensig SIR MOTO 's statomont mado to mo aftomnac, thosc POVs woro killod by tho ordor
of the Commonding Officor Rocr-Aamiral H:TIKEYMi, bocuso thosc POTs woro likoly to bocome a drag upon the moveront of tho adniral's forec in roar.
$\therefore$ I ronombor right tho koy porsonncl thon proecnt at Sowacond moro as follows:

Sonior Steff Officor, IKKI. Thgincor Staff Officor, VIZOGTJCHI. Fncign, SAKIIOTO. Commandor of Piachino-gun PIatoon, ShS.KKI. Commandor of Infontry-gun Platoon, THOUE. Cormandor of Comrunication Unit, SU:IA.

Nort I will toll you about the killing of tho POW which numboroc, as I romombor aright, 51, though I montioncd. in tho above thoy voro more than 50.

On the 4th of Fobruary Bnsign SAKNOTO at Sovocoad sont a roport to Roor-1dniral HATKKYNHA at tho Loha airficld that SMMOTO mas at a loss ith smell number of guard for troatn nt of POIV. focording to the SHENOMO roport those POW oithor rebollod agoin him or mado dosortions boacusc of tho misuncorstandins duc to difformeo of languago. The idniral got angry hoaring this roport, and callod sdjutant HATNXYMA and mo to his roon at tho Loha airficld that ovoning, Whore the onginocr staff officor was also prosont.

Wo woro ordored by tho demiral thot wo should kill thom on tho following doy boceuso ho had rocoivod a ronort informing thot Pols t Somacod woro in disouiotude. In compliance ith this order on the 5th of Fob., I toole dout 30 Potty Officore and mon to Sowacoad; I cannot recall nor from what platoon those 30 potty officors ond mon wore soloctod. In a forest of cocomut-troc, about 200 motors toward the airficld fron Sowacoad, mo dug out holos, and killoc. POVIs with swords or bayoncte. I rocnll, it took about 2 hours Irom 10 a.m. The procoss of the murdor was as follows: I dividod 30 Potty Officors ond mon into 3 groups, tho iirst group for loadig the POWs out of a dvolling housc whore tho victins woro tomporarily confinod, tho socond for proventing disordor on thoir way from the houso to tho forost, tho third for bohoad ing or stabbing the POWI. The POVIs rore sont to the spot ono by onc and mado to lencol with bendago on their oyos. Owr mon of the third group, one at a tinc, como out in turn oithor to bohend a POW ith his sword or to atab hin through tho oronst with his boyonct.

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11 \cdot+
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Those POFs vore all fustralians, including 4 or 5 officors. I m surc that thorc was a major, thoso nome was unknom to mo. 17. corpsos wore buriod in tho holos. Tho nomes of our mon thon omployod lor this ozocution comot bo rocollod at all. But it is cortain that thoro woro prosont on tho spot no officor, oithor narrant or commissioncd, creopt nysolf. Most of tho timo I plocod mysclef in the middlo botwoon tho houso and the placo of tho killing to do the overoll commend; but I ont to the spot thon tho last victim ras to bo ozocutod. Intorprotor IKEUCHI サas then in the dwolling hourc to sond out tho POF from tho housc.
7. Q. Did you mokc e. roport that tho ozocution had boon cecomplishod?
$\therefore$ I roportod it to Ac.jutant HTNKPYiJis in his room on that day, and I suppose tho adjutont in his tum roportod it to idmiral HNTMKYNMA.
8. G. Kakutaro SiskimI nado us a statonont rogarding tho killing of tho first group of tho POW in this way. What do you think of it?
(Thoroupon tho oxmining officor road No. Ioth gucstion and onstror of the rocord of tho oxamination of Kokutoro SASNI, a vitmose of tho casc.) (sco No. HTC-30.
$\therefore$ I am suro thoro zas in mbon a Lt. -Colonol of tho Dutch POW copturod by our ommy, but of any othor suc ranking Dutch POW I nover horro. And. SisiJKI soys that 2 or 3 POW moro capturod by rocomnitrors of a platoon. Those POW might bo, I subposo, tho samo with the onomy scouting suucd lod by on officor thom our Potty-Officor OKiDA ned his mon copturod just as I montionod in this honring. Thon theso POV numboring more thon 10 wore murcorod, S'SNXI was in Sowncond as a machino-gun platoon commondor in roar.
9. Q. How many POWs woro capturod at tho timo of occupatio of the Johe airfiold, bosidos the POW montionod. above?
A. I connot rocel1 tho oxact numbor of thosc Pows, but I suppose that thero were about 800 fustralians and about 60 Dutchnon. Bosidos thoso thoro Wore some troops of tho netive tribos, but it is bolioved thos notivos mon away from tho spot won wo broko into tho airfiold. Tho POV wore givon thoir billot in tho berracks in tho airfiold.

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10. Ge Toll mo tho ectivition of our nov-l forecs aftor tho occuontion of infiold.
$\therefore$ Ronr-cuirol HATEYNi: hoistod his fleg at tho Jaha oirficle on tho 5 th of Fobmery as Comonding Officor pr tho 21 MSB. Tho main forco of tho 7-T SjP loft Iohn for imboil on the loth of the nonth, lonving a platoon of about 10 officons and mon at Irha. It was tho machino-gun platoons as I romo iour right.
17. G. Tol7 :10 bout tho othor killings of tho POF than you hvo nforo statod.

1. 's I hove soid, thoro vorc billotod in tho airfiold bonracte sonc 200 tubtralions and somo 60 Dutchen. Whn our lomeco first unturod into the airiiold, tho gow thet the Jopnore gtrongth was vory minll. numboring only rome 170 . Sone of the PO: therofore oxproscod thoin viow through I HTUHI, intorprotor, to auch on offoct $n$ s thet thoy moule not havo surroncor but rould rathor hove continuod fighting brevoly if thoy had kno:n the Joponoso ftrongth whs so moll, mod that if thoy had rought nore stubjormy tho Jopenose cabuoltios vould hovo anounted to considomblo dogroo. In addition to those thoy belnoved thonsclvos efsobodiont in thoir asoignod works, though portiy causod by tho difformeo of languago. And about 30 of thon voro considurod to bo aspocinlly disobodiont. Tho Comending officur ho rd of this fact, and ho gavo Ajutmt H TMJBYNE and mo m ordor in his roon in tho ovoning of 5 th Fobrucry to murdor those some 30 POWC.

I hed about 20 onlirtod non kill thorso sono 30 PO: mbout 3 p.r. on tho lolloving तny, if I ronombor rigits in cocomoln forost monr Touli, -bout 700 motors from the airficld, though I comot roccll that platoons thoss about 20 mon bolongod to. In this killing, too, the poor POWs foro onco toleon in a houso nonrby, thon cailod out in wum onc by ono, ne killud ith arore on rith batronot, as bolore. Thoir corpno was buriod in the holo dug for tho purpose. is in tho provious cosc I stood in tho Niddo botroon thet housc and tho pot of mireor to tolso gonor 7 commend for tho most of tho tino, and I ront to the spot to vitnosi tho last ono of boing lilliod ne ascortainod this kloody work had. boon finirhod. I roportod to tho dejutent

Bvid. Doc. No. 5333.

HIT EXY: tho cocorpismont or tho onocution. I an not aurs thethor my Dutch men woro includod wong the victins or not, but it is cort-in that tho victi"ss vore oll cnliotod ron.

Mo...t I inl tull you about mothor killing of tho PO..

On tho 17th or loth of Fobrunr, I comot rocell Wheh dey, hile oo no toking lunch at wbon, Comanding Officor HAYASHI disclosod his intontion rothor to kill onl the rowcining PO/. His ronoon whs this: our troops avail blo for sorvico tas numborod on7y 340 or 350 iron thich verious gurndit in vorious diotricts hee to bo dirpotchoc: tho coscritions of tho POF bagen to bo notod; rumours ron orong netivos thet tho diliod troops ould conc coon to atteck us; onom plenos in fact cons for roconnaiasenco; if tho coscrting $E O$ : ould Civulgo tho situntion of Jopenono aido, oo ould incod vory uniovournolo situntion; and all thoso inctore for foming a monace to the position of tho Jopmonc forcos. I adzod Commendig Oificor, thon, Whet is his oninion concoming tho provisions of the Intomationn Jove Thich I uncoratoo to bo stipulating thet "HURYO" (POF) shovic not bo trontod os onomy Ho anstorod mo that I was right so for as "TNPYO" :as concornod, but thet tho enotives intomod thore Soro to bo clasaifiod and enlod "FORYO" and thorofor
 yould kiol then.
I.B. (Tho Mromentor's Mrotc)

In our tronclation to emnot mako any dilforonco bot oon "iguryol me "HoRYO" ior tho inllowing roacoms
a. In thu Mow Rocrulations of tho homor Japomoco Movy which hec boon cistributod oung oll of the Novel unito an tho mont authoritative docunont to bo roiturod to by all nowy porcomol rogmaing tho various log 7 nettors inclucing thoss on Intomationo Io me cuctor, the tom: "HORYO" is no horo founc, though the torn "PJPRY" is urod 10 n primonom of ant. The enc holec truo ith the llamal of tho Writimo Intornotional Low and Jongos, a bools which was also publichod ace ciatributoc. by tho Maver Pinistry arong -7nost n71 noval units of onv imortonce as tho wost ctondore, if not tho solo, suico book on Intornotions Tovs nc. customs.
coording to thoso t:o docurnts - bolligornt porron, onc epturod, will bocomo "FUPYO"; thurofor
frow those idoly ronc boolse no get no mggostion thet thars can oxict my mpociol toge or stotus for bolvigorunt poreon bot－on his copturo anc his nçuiring tho status of tho prisonor of war－thet is to gnt，irom those books ：o no tole that tho inctont ho is conturod，a bolligoront is e prinonor of Tor．
b．Tho tom＂HORYO＂is uroc in collo vuinticn in
 ice＂HORYO＂is ritton 薄 虚，Milo＂UUPYO＂
偁 ito tnleo prinomor on to crpturo a ho tilo or offonding porson alive＂．Tho nonning of＂RYO＂㠻 is＂a prironos＂．Thon combinod and phranced＂HORYO＂ ne＂HURYO＂hove tho exuc moning，o prironor of uor， scoording to ithor J ponoso－Chinoso dictionnrios or Joponosc－Zglish dictionnrios 2,077 as to our comon concoption．
$\therefore$ fo duys l－tor，in tho ovoning hilo toking noper ith tho Convacing Onficor and hie idjutant H TNTMYIA at tho gardon in Iront of tho Cownmeing Oficurir mom，I äne tole．by tho Cownanding Oificor to kill 017 tho PO．n dt Jinh．

On tho folloving ang，proboibly 30th of Fob，if my rocolloction is right，I gothoron up conc 50 onliotoc mon Inon variour Dlatoons nttachod to tho I－K＂SjP． Woroovar about 50 ml irstad mon from the crom of the Minostocpor $\mathbb{M} O$ ． 9 who woro bonding nt tho 1－TITSIP borracke bocuso thoir bhip hed unit thon，voro onplowoc ber the conront ar a rororvo－list oflicor attschoc to thet ninoswocpor．

I took tho both groups of onliotod non totolling to rome 90 to Jnhe from lmbon at noout l p．ra．on tho 30th．W dug holos in ？Dlace in d coconut ionost nt Tauli；thir now blece is nifformt norition from thet of tho provijur muncor boing 110 or 150 notor anav fron it，ne was about 200 notor off tho hond－ nu rtors oi tho Lahn．Dotnchmont．I dividod 90 ron into 3 group： 2 Groupe Ioz blooct killins， 3 groums Iox atching tho POis；on thoir wexs to tho killing nl co， 2 group for monding POTs out of tho orracle，ono g－oup hor guarc on tho goot of tho lilling，the 1 at 020 2or morgoncy．Tho POir oro corrioc．by truck from tho berraciar to tho Dutnchnont building about 500 noton in distonco，and thow ：anc on foot frow tho Dotnchnont building to tho pot of
tha rillire．The remo ：on of tho killing
Contce－5 i＂．the proviour erro；to hnvo thon lmool dow．ith bordago ovor thoir owos and to rill thom ith arore on boujanct．

Tho boor victins rwb rod obout 220 in 111 including a fow Australiar．oficore．Intorprotor
 duty of rondi g POis out of tho borrocles；I tho Dotacluont builrive siving overall circotions ac ascortninod tho finol accomplinwon of tho offir the spot．It tonk from sbut 6 刀．．．．to 9.30 万． loot ji combos voro buriod in oro holo，but bocouco tio hol wne mot big orough to rocoive nll of tho compors ？dur－out noorbu non loo urcd lon tho buriol On thet doy upen ： roportod it tho g anonding Officor diroctly one aloo to his acjutant．

72．ق．Dice tho 2 th civil meincoring eorps join in it thon？

A．IT，n not ot 01.
 Olficot HAYASHI ct his on diccrotion？

A．In tho inest throo cocon of tho vurdor tho ordorn ror
 のr ion the Irst cano，I mat ruxg llothor tho ordoz サor irucd by tho Commoniog Oificor HAYASAI himocli， or it vers givon in conlinco ith tho orcor of Roar－ Actirot HaTAKEAAA。

1．Q．Do Hou lmov thot tho Intormationol Is pronibits tho muctor f POW？

A．I Wn：towght it me lmon it，but tho Colanadirg Orficor HAYASHI told ：20 thot though ：\％－oro prohibito t：kil．＂FUNRYO＂，thoro ans wo wuch prohibition con－ coming＂Hozxo＂。 I mor porsundod b＂hir ooinion are bogod his meon．

15．G．$D$ wa thinl tht it mes indionomerble nt tho ti：0 $t$ तisporo of tho POW Iro：tho ricwooint oI tho con－ cuct 1 tho oborntions？

A．Jucging frow circurstoncos thon oaisting，wo oro in Cispuioting i ituntion incood，but I do not boliovo

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then it uns unoronpably nocosnitatod to kill all or tho POM at any cost.
16. 3. Pinnoruko JfKUDA, K zuto SUWA, Jwaz INISHIMURA, Intazo…n ISTIKAiA, and Kalutaro SASAKI hnvo statod in tho folloving woy; thet is wour oninion obout thoir totomons?
(Tho ozninimg officin] thon rond tho rocords of tho ozerimntion ax thoro fivo :itmorsos.)
A. FTKUDA rtatad as if I took vith no mon of tho civilonginooring corpe to tho apot or tho murdor and Iot thon join in tho murcios, but I nover omplowed in that bloody ffoir ot 11. Bonicos this point, to oponk in dotnil, smeoports of atatoronts rindo by thono itnossos aro incorret and difforont fron foct, but I havo no:. mo porticular opinion cbout thon.

Thom tho tostimone mas complotod, tho rooord mado of it
 wistrion, ho was cucod to axtiz hic signaturo sad soal bolowe
(Signod) Kon-ichi MAKAGAVA,
Tho Accuroc.
(Sismoc) Ynmus 1 BI,
$\mathrm{SDO}, \mathrm{RCd}$, TGDC.
(Signod) Shimr w12ABIKI, SDO. , POO., TGDG.
at the Toky? Gonorn Donobilisation Court,
On zand Duce.bur 1945.

Tvic．Dc． 5353.
1．7．
Socord of tho 3xd Intorrogation of tho Bceuscd Kon－ichi THAKMal A．
（Pagos 165－165．）
O．29tin Dee bor 1045，in a prolinimer honring in tho Tolwo Gancr Dombilizotion Court，Shinvo VMPBIKI，oxerining orificion of tho Comet，in tho prononeo of Youo $A E E$ ，Rocoreor of tho Court，hole oxemintion Kon－tchi WaKhand in con－ roction ith tizo canc of horicico，in continu neo with tho provious prilinory honing，ns follows：

1．Q．het is Jour nomo？
1．No no：o in FMKG！M KOn－ichi。
（The ozwinimg oficiol tole hi＂：thet ho puld Juostion hir in comoction ith his horicico enso．）

2．G．Hov，zu nve cifforont opinion about tho ftatomont of Tuit H：ZロZyNa？
（Fioroupos tho oxtining aficint ron tho Rocore of tho and Intarogotion of Kunit HiTUKYY：i．）
$\because$ Tha ntremot of Hint Kivori is dilforont in ono points izo ：hot I tole you，but it soons to ：ho thot his ftnto－ wont in conrect．Thoroforo，wu worroct tho
 YかA．

3．Q．int ir yur opinion nbout tho ctotomot IWSHITh， S－chlai？
（Hroupen tho ox ining oflicial rond tho rocore tho

 ropioved b：：so han ho opmonchod to tho pleco hors tho 1 uxth nurcor ane crioc ut；but I comnt con－ ficanty dowy hin athtomet bocomeo of ry lnct of Nou＂．bout pther perts ar hir etntonnt I hove nothing poticulat to tho spinia．
－C．Give ao atoiloc ompmotion on tho placo it tho PO：V killing．
－Mr．I prosont you tho mops howing tho pote，hich I hy proper．Ithough I hor nothing to io ith tho firct wirdor，I hac a chonco to virit thoro aftornerds and so I con inciento tho motr ithout aistoke．

Brid．Doc．IT • 5335.
1．）

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { (S ang, the couroc prosontod tw wnps ontitlod }
\end{aligned}
$$

> " "Mnj of Tauli rhoming tho Sopt i ihrcor" roroctivoly -hich aro ettochec horovith.) (Soc Ior. HIC- 12 att choe. ? \& B)

5．3．not aro rou thimbing of tho enso no：？
A．The recor to kill tho PO murt hevo boon icou od out to chuor nocossity cuo to n imponcing aituntion． But it soows to ro nom thet eono othor moamuros ：ould hovo boon founc out thry uch ？crantic ono to copo With the situntion，becuos thome rorc，nlyyinut，still intorn e othor POW Encowhors olso on tho snwo island et the ti＂o．Ir ：nort，I coulc not but to caocuto tho ruporion＇s riors thinking thono vouln bo no
 thors coñ I ひ？forry Iron tho botto： 21 withontt ior tho POM rillod．by our honer．Thi icon is hounting rar
 rovis ith nll nu hort．
（Horounon tho or linimro azainntion niicin ampl in d tho Aofondmot tho roasone the ho so cus－ petud a －criminn ne aklec if ho he ony ozculpa－ tion ir it，Ho monoco thet ho hat any osculpotion

6．๑．H゙vo Juu nuthing moro to o：opl－in？
$\therefore$ IT ．Thnto nothig．
Ahi．th intumogntion wes conpl tod，tho rocord
 ithut wy nist？on，ho nss cousod to nifix his simnturo
－nc．norl bol．
NiTK：G．．．．．KO－ichi（signod．）

（Signod）Shine ：TMBIKI， SDO．，PO．，TGDC。


Bivic. Doc. N. . 5333.
18.

## Roc re of rupth 3eninotin 21 tho councc (Pagos 328-332)

iccuroc: IT/K:GU.. Kon-ichi.
On 12 Fowury IS16, in a prolimincre horring it tho TGDC with AB Yoru-, S10., Pc, il tho Curt, attondiag, 'T'BIKI Shinr, SDO., Pu. i tho gmet, intorrogetod ITHiG… Ror-ichi, whe hoden the chorge of howicico, as 1.llome:

1. 3. Ant is your nomo?

(Hor un tho aning oficing tole the ncounce thet he woul intorrognto hil: or the hoicido caso in hich ho tos involvoc.)
 H:Y SMI on tho lognity af ozouti g Porbofro tho fourth oncoution os the PO:; Cic yu out tho likc ruetion on the coosi ne tho and me 3nd exocutions?
 owocut tho PO: wor irnoc by Ron-atoirn H:TiKBYor.。 In thaso cous I mo:. that it ros geninet tho Intomation Lat to linj PO\%, but t tho sate tivo I the reght thet ruo anvicos men opinions har - lroney boon afforod by tho cexir-1'stafiofficore prion to tho ionuo ol thono ofocons. Tharoforo I thought it irrolovit 10: no, noro comon-ommoner, thero t. nubit on vini= to tho acural ne I juct obeyod the outurs.

Ie fur the lourth tiro, as ot tol bofro, tho oreor

 morover tho mulbor af tho PO: to bo onocutod was vory lrege. Thoros I onic to hin the scarding to tho intometioncl 1n, onow porsomel if tokon prismor of $x$ rught not $t$ bo trontad ac hostilo traons ny longer if I ane not nistalen, and put a puoction to hir, hathor this intornotation aino Won corroct or not, sice ole, if cirroct, hothor this ought $t$ bo compliod ith in this cnoo or not. T this groution aino tho eownenot roplion thet the coptivon (HOZyO in üp moro), until thoy voro necio frmal POir (JURYO in Jopmono), coulc rightumay bo cisponoc ar as tho still in hostilo strtus. Though

Evic. DC. ITO. 5330.
20. .
it tar for tho iirst time thet weh = Cifioronco bot oon CPTIV SS (HODYO) anc. PO : (FUPYO) ans ruggostch t. ne, nd thovgh dovit till ranon unclorod in ry winc, I coulc not but $\hat{1} 110 \%$ tho commenconts intor-prot-tion bocuno i y lack of malorgo of intor-
 hich I hare $t 0110 \%$ tho ti:0, simes it ros tho roor - 1 : w comencor.
3. Q. Ir it rour opinion thet a sub reinoto hos t obor his Guporior' -rcor ovon if tho ordor is, ithout doubt, illogal?

I thinl it ionot nocosexy ior a wiborimoto to comply ith his nuporior' orecor acn it is clons thet tho rror $i=$ Goubtlorly illogl mentiroly unronson-bla. Biot tho cirowntmicos uncior hich I ins thon plocor. WRs zuito iifforont; of courco I ronsmod thot tho orcors ould bo irporaisriblo fron tho viopoint if the Intorn tionol. La, but at tho seac timo it hoc -Ise to bo coneiccorod, an tho othor hore, the t ryporiver, b-th the comanneing cruir-l anc tho commondent, hor? iscuod thoir oreore on tho brais at thoir fim: boliof thet mo min crastic mocours hoc incovitnbly to bo enrrioc. ut frm opretionnl nocosrit, in viow of uch circumetnncos thon oristing; i。s. it wos bolioved our cuporics forod thet tho onistonce of tho PO.s micht ondrngor our an onirtonco; such boing tho coso, it wns mix boliol thet I, ns s subercincto, ought to oboy tho muporiors unconcitionolly.
4. Ge It is the thot tho acenion oi tho thire ouccution
 tho cuocution; thet ho wuetoroc tho h lo monbore, ane doclarod " oro going to of tho l-illing of POin; the wh ill wluntoon th proticipet in it rholl

4. Thore mos nothing a tho mort. it tha tioc i tho sred oncuution, I orcoroc onch pl-toon commonor to ronr out
 colloctoc nocossorw mubor of won to bo omplovor in tho ozocution。
5. G. Foro tho PO:r onco billotor? at aloco to tho morth -f Touli TiJlago?

IT. ThoJ :Ore not, thetigh on tho cension of tho thire owocution ot tho POW, -b ut 30 PO: hnc boon tompornrily
 CNolling houros to tho neth of Thuli villngo boforo thoy oro finclly tolun to tho pl.co 21 tho loilling; if any no ich thot oro noc billotoc -t tho pleco

כic。 Dc. N. 5333.
21.
roforfoc to bovo, ho met h~mo montionod this tomproy Mevo.
6. G. I wow lifo rocore jurt os stotor in this curriculut vitoo? (Froup tho azoming oficict rone to tho cocucod tho copy his curriculur vitno for ordod by tho Chiof of tho Porsonncl Burcau of tho Movy Iinictry.
$\therefore$ Yors it is jutt os wou hovo rone mon, though I thins: I hoe bottor -er to it thet I mes inming ith ay foily ftor wy finiring tho highor groco couroo if t. primery cohocl until. I ‥ns onlistor in tho Tove.
7. Q. Th it is tho stcto of yur freily?

Ny proncnt froil- conrists f: Kiluro, ifo no. 44 Worn 1c; Shigorus olcost nom 25 yorm 1 ;


 clcost son, ho is silil in sorvico in tho my rriting for comobiliztion, oll or tho fonilu aro no: at honc. is nogeres tho proport- io invo mo ron ostoto, hoving onl:\% about $10,000 \mathrm{ycn}$ if moy on copasit. Thorofaro it is parriblo thet tho livolihood of the inily ill bo gotting honeor in tho curno of tinc, though thare is not ithout hopo thet thoy on range my ay ftor tho olcost son has omo back horo conobilizoc. (Horoup tho azrining offici-1 infornoc the nocuror, onco moro, tho ronson the ho wos murpoctor I tho chrogo rompeing this enso, onc - lno infornod him ho cule plone sine tho ecousoe srie ho pule

8. Э. Hove you nything oloc to toto?

Tho proront thto of win is just het I stotoc Whan prowi usly intorng to ion I hovo now nothine olno

Then tho intory gation was comlotoc, tho rocoremoro-f it has ro-e gein; ane ns tho acoucor foid thet it wo yithout ant ristalos, ho :as cousor, to affix his signeture and thw b print bolow.
(The aigneture one thuelo print by the

(Signec) $B B Y$ Y Sut, SDO. , Rcr., TGDC. (Signoc) CIT:BIKI Shinro, SDO., POう., TGDC.
it tho Toley Gonoral Dorvoilization Court,
On 12 Fobruny 1946.
 Whese procont addross is the Living Gunrtor of the Yokosulen Maval Station Hondeurrtors, nd tho mos bom on Inerch l4th, 1906, radc the following statoront, of his froc will, in the prosonco of the Proscoutor at the Prosocution Court of the Tolyy Gonornl Court Herticl on love 8, 1945:

1. "Uy dowicilo is 1717 Yono-llachi, Nki-Gun, Hirochirn Prefocturc.
2. "Mile $n$ Licutonent of the Novy, I porticipatod in the Noon Iolnch Occupation Cavoign in connoction with the Groat Pocific in in the enocity of tho Adjutont nel Sonior Officor of the 1 KITSUP. Ne in those days thore hnoponed on incicont of the rurdor of PO: on the islond.
3. "Bofore ontoring into the dotails of the incident I wish to catolnin tho orgenization of the Occupation Forcos nd the genordi viow of the oporation. Tho ovorall comenc of the oporation wos assurcel by Inajor-Goneral ITO, IJine The forcos composec of cmy troops as usce for tho enpturo of the City of mbon, thilo noval tropes vas oroloyec for taling the air ficld uncor tho emmend of Roar domirnl HATMOEYULitg montionod Comencer of tho 24 NSBF; tho forcos placed uncor his cormene "arc-
the 1 Kishe, no infontry plation onch fron the lot end 2nd Sacobo Noval Spocin]. Innding Party, and ono aruy infontry compeny. The itinos: coping Frece consistod of the 21st Minoswoopor Division.
": o bognn our londing of Hitlomn (this spolling is not curc) Boach on Jomury 31st, 1942, copturine the airficle on Fob. Bre. me danirn HiTKKY心tion hatod his flng t the Lehn iirficid on tho 5 th of tho month. In this oporation I took the cormane of the I KTSLP tropos duc to the fact that Gomandor HiYasHI had not yot arrivod at his post.
"The POU thien at the Lehe iirficle curing this oporntion :ore about 250 of sustrelion and Dutch troops, and there trac besicos the above notive tropps mounting to a considerciblo nuibor as for as I con rocnll; though tho oxnct nuwber is uncortnin。
"With the croation of the 24 ITSBE on Fob. 5, the I MIST: was put uncor tho pormenent corrend of this unit. inc if I ronombor corroct, oithor late in Fobruny or in the boginning of lirch the 1 KIVSLP mes cissolved to bo absorbed intnct into the 24 NSBF. Commencer HiYishi, Cormencor of the 1 KITSIP,

马vic. Dnc. No. 5333-B.
arrived at his post in wibon arounc Eobruary 7 th, anc was tron forrer to othor post with tho dissolution of the 1 KISLJP.
"Bntoring into tho caplenntion of tho PO: murcor incident nt Lohn I an going to state you ns follows:

It is rocollod it $\cdots$ as arounc tho 20 th of Fobruory that the incicont toole plece. At the court of inquiry I statoc the I was nint for en oporation to clonr auny gucrille olomont,
 time whon this incicont ocurroc. But if irr. NoXKGaida stoted thot ho hec proticipatod in tho incicont os tho loncor on the spot in complinnce vith the orcer of Commencor HiYasHI hich ho snic. to have boon tronmittoc by me, wuch might bo tho casc. An a mettor of fect my nomory on the mottor is voouc beenuse I :as cacoodingly busy with thoso affoirs such ns tho cloaring up of the bottlo-fought grounds, tho tolving ovor the occupation
cutics fron the omev units, the clonring oriny of gucirilla clononts, otc. Which becuno nocossitotorl by the situntion oaisting just after the occupntion of the aron."
(at this juncture tho rocorc? of tho stetonont by Kon-ichi NoJkaciait an ronct to hin by the prosccutor.)
3. "I wich to mnlec somo statomont in connoction with whet hns bocn rond just now. In tho corposition of the Lohe occupation Forcos the artillory unit and the platoon from the 32 Mraval Spocinl Bnsc Eorec vore originally a part of the I KMSIP, and thoy hac boon conpotched to Jolo Inlone till that time; thoy oromoroly rojoinod to the 1 IIISIP for tho oporation. According to my memory tho Cormonder of the Inhn Detach mont was not Chiof inrent Officor SiSixi, but Lioutonont Junior Grado Shoji SNIKIOTO, 凤 ppocin] scrvice Officer.
"nrorcover it must bo acrace that the term tho oreor rive
 stntonont should moin tho ordor of our commoncor trmonittor by mo, bocousc I $\quad$ nos thon morely tho acjutant, anc tho propor comencor had alroedy arrived di his post boforo tho incicont happoncc.
"Borices tho sbove I co not think of nnything to stato.
Thon the statomont mas comploted, the rocord made of it


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3.
of tho rocore anc affizod his sign ture and sonl horonftor.


## Tromination of Dofoncont

(Pagos 25-28)
Accusoc: - Tunito HATAKEY:NLi。
On 8th Novorbor 1945, at tho proliminnry oznninntion court of tho Tolyy Gonornl Court-Inrtinl, Justice It. Comer. Koicholua ONO the prolininory ozovinotion officor, in tho prosonco of Justico Ennign Yanuo $\therefore$ BE, tho Rocorcor of tho court, oznninod the noove montionod necusoc chnger ith honicice nootmont. Tho quostions and answors woro as follows:

1. Q. That aro your nanc, Unto of birth, affilintion, titlo on' ront, donicilo, place of birth, prosent nerross onc occupation boforo ontoring novy?
$\therefore$ Nono- Hitaterivil Kunito
Datc of birth - I4th IIorch 1906.
Affilistion - sttncho? to Naver Ministryo
Titlo anch ranl: - Commondor of tho Nove.
Donicilo - I, 717 Yono-Cho, 1ti-Guns Hirorhimen Profocturo.
Plnco of birth - some as domicilo. Ardross - Yoguchi, Kuchira-Mura, Ano-Gum, Hiroshimn Prefocturc. Occuphtion bofore ontoring navy - Nidedlo school stucont
2. G. Court rani, cocorntion, mocials, nnuity or ponsion, if any?
$\therefore$ Sth Court Ronle Jumior gracio (Ju-rolui-i), 5 th cloos

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orcor-o-morit (finu-go-to), wron moinl for tho 1931-1934 InciCont, n Mrnciakuo Tounchtion Morn, 110 Col Commornoting tho Shows Coronationg and ar modnl for tho Chinn Affar.
boon
3. G. Huve you over/punishod fre orimingl offonsos?
$\therefore$ Novor.
(Horoupon tho prolininney ozouining officor tole tho cofonent thet he youlr no: start ouostioning hin on the efororiontioned charge.)
4. 3. The ronson tive you aro wippected of the aforonentionod. chnego is thic. hant c.o you sny nbout it?
(Horoupon tho proliminny ozmining officor thon ront
to hin the oviconco of the crino hich is notoc. त.om in tho "Stetmont of Opinion", subuitton by tho Prorccutor IID to tho Novy Tiniotor uncor तoto 8 Tovomber 1815 one hich is montionce in the Prosocutor': lottor uncor some dato rofuiring this proliminery hoaring.)

Ao The nuwber of PO:i murcioro whe mot no large ns is stator in popore jurt no:r ront to mo. Accoreing to my rocollection the Pow leilloe numboror omo 100 to 150 . Boricos thic point I have no othor opinion.
5. Q. is I uncoreton', you hovo stotor to tho prosocutor in tho folloring ay. In it correct? (ith this, tho prolininary orring officor rone tho rocose of tho statoment of tho nocusoc hicin hes boon properoc. by the prosocutor.)
Ato It is oxnctiyy ns you hovo rond just no .
6. Q. hat $=25$ your rolation ith Lit. Comr. NiNG:IS in tho chnin of corrinn nt tho tire tho case tanis pleco?
$\therefore$ A an ot thet timo $\therefore$ ofuthent to the 1 Kirsip, hilo Lt, Comer. Niziakia vas ? compny comendor of our corps. Therefore the orcors by the Comencor of the Corps, Comencor Shojiro Hiynsfit, woro in romo encon tranmittoc, through me, hile at other timen, thoy wo

- givon ciroct to Miniantan by our Comperor.

7. Q. If that is so, my I uncorstond thet you tronsuittod the Comencor's ordor concorming thir cono?
$\therefore$ ite ins $n$ I romombor no\%, it rar so.

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5.
 of it was rend gein, tho cofonpant ot-tod thnt it -nn ithout mistalso so that ho $\cdots$ cos cucoct to nffiz his rionnturo and sen bclo\%.

|  | (Signoc.) |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | Dofondent - Kunito Himidkevila (Sonl) |
| (signoc) | Y ก ruo inge <br> Juntico Bnoign, IJT:, <br> Tha Roentior of tho Tozeyo General <br> Gurt-ITrti~I. |
| (Signoc) | Koichora Oivo. <br> Jurtico Lt.-Cmir., IJJ., <br> Tho Prolininery Zarmintion Officor of <br> the Tolevo Gonerel Court-l'nrti-I. |

At the Proliminery Bernination Court of tho Towe Gonorn Court-linrtinl,

On E Moveribor 1945.

## THE RBCORD OF THE SBCOND THTMRROGMIOI OF THE CCUSED. <br> (P-gos 119-129)

THE ACOUSED: Kunit HOTATHNLD
On the crse of tho homicienl abotracnt one aic by the sbovo-rontiono? secucoc the Proliminory-Ezninntion Officor Shinro MTABIKI, S Soconc Dorobilizntion Officin, Maco tho socone. intcrrognti of tho ncousod nt the ProliminoryBxaninntion Court of the Tolyyo Goncral Domobilizntion Court, on Decoribor 21 th, 1915 , no follom; Yncu2 ABE , the Recorior of the Gurt ne o Socon . Domobilizntion Officinl, attonding thoro also:

1. Q. Your nano?
A. Kunito Hirnizeynas
(Horoupon tho owninetion officor tato that ho would procood to interrognte the necurec on the enso aforemontionec.)

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2. Q. Is tho stentomont you have mato no for all corrcet?

No. I have mato some mis-stetoments, ne so I an going to set thon right.
3. Q. Ropnring tho composition of the forcer participator in tho enpture of Jobon Inlnn Kon-ichi TiKnGaid otntos lilo this; hnt is your opinion cbout it?
(Horoupon tho ozminntion officor ronत Quostion Ho. 3 onc its answor from tho recore of the scond intorrogation of Kon-ichi N:KN..... nothor nccusoc.) (Soc No. Firc-38.)
$\therefore$ Rouphly spocluing tho composition was as is stator by Nimid:ing but thoro ne somo inaccurate points in his statomont; ne I ill mथ:c my statomont on thoso point i. C 。

Tho socond pletoon and tho infentry-gun unit of tho 1 KISIP are not to bo considored ns tho reinforeoment from tho 32 NSBE, but both of thon wore attnchorl to the Jolo Detnchmont, Fhich ras ronlly \& port of tho 1. MTSTP, anr rore thon just mace to rojoin with the mein bory becousc of mbon Occupation Oporation.

As rognres tho establishmont of tho 24 MSBF , NiJKiGuit suys thet this corpe her alroniy boon crontod. nt tho timo of tho Inning on Ambon Iolnnc. An ? n-ttor of fact, howovor, at tho tino of tho leneing
 rttecher. to the Hordjunrtors of tho Thirc. Floct, though ho joinor us on bonce my ship in eomplinnce With ? tologrnohic oreor by the floot honrouncters uncor detc of Jonuory 29 th-t "Ronr-ACmirol HATMEB Yatis choll ns,umg the commenc of tho 1 KNSLP eftor tho lncing on Ambon Inlonet; ne though two of his assistent, Commencor IBTI ne Lioutonent IIIZOGUCHI, both alno nttochorl to tho Thirce Floct Honcounrtorn, come to our ship ncompnying him, too.

At thet time I could not uncorcitnce cloarly onough hnt $\cdots$ ne really monnt by the worls "shnll nsomme the Commen of the 1 KMSLP", but I Was tol? by the adnirel thet ho ould commence tho poxty in ovory ospoct, nen? overything vas to be reportod to hin thoronftor.

Boing tho acting commencer of the 1 KNSJD since sroun? the 25 th of Jonuary, I was loft to uncortninty sbout the prospect hother tho proper Cormencor of tho 1 MTSLP oulc nowly bo nunointod or not, becousc aftor tho arrival of iomirnl Hisimey:la on information

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rocehoc. to my one thet tho 1 KINSIP Would bo roorgenize. into the 24 NSBF ond thet anmirol Hisweryilit oul bocome tho commencent of tho now unit ith Cormancor IBKI ne Lioutonnnt MIZOGUCHI ns his stnff officors.

As to the oporation of tho 2lst llinonvocpor Divisio this division porticipatod in tho cmpaign brosking into the imbon Bay aron incopenclontly; tho surfnco floct hich diroctly cooperniod ith us in tho oceupation battle from the open sca Wns, ns o mnttor of foct: a. Costroyor Civision of tho Sceonc. Dostroyor Sgunतton.
4. Q. Rogarding tho progross of tho mbon Islond Occupntion Bettlo Kon-ichi NiJianalf hos soic Iile this; co you agreo with him?
(Horoupon tho Bxoming Officor rone gostion No. 4 ni the nswor from mong the rocore of tho seconc intorrogetion of tho nceucor Kon-ichi MANAGALA.) (SOO NO. HITC-36.)
A. Roughly, his st?tomont is corroct, though I vill prosont you my uritton st-tonont bocnuso his strtomont is not sufficiontly prociso in rospoct of timo and some other points.
(Horoupon the ncousor, HATMTYMIL prosontoc. a. popor ontitloc. "Summery Tiow of tho Courso of tho B-ttle fought by tho 1 KMSTAP in tho Capturo of tho In he Airfiol on mbon In nenc, "hich is mnozoct at tho ond of this prosont rocord.)
5. Go Kill you oxplain about tho PO: trloon at tho battlo of copturing tho John irfiol?

Ao Tho PO:. tolson for the first time rore somo ton Austrolion soldiors; thoy ore tolson by our scouts in tho daytime of tho int $\cap f$ Fobrunry and Woro brought in to Sonncorc. (this spolling is not sure). The socone grow of tho PO: numboring about 50 wore tole to hnvo boon enoturoc. in the seytime of the Fob. 2 ne? Doon brought to sowncorc. thou,gh I hovo no lmonlocso nobut tho circumstancos of the copture bocnusc I wns thon for into the mony s cofonso porition of tho Lrhe sirficle.

The Thire group of tho PO: numboror nout 250, consisting chiofly of durtrnlion troops nd of sono Dutch oolricra, both of whom roro taleon on the occasion of the copturc of tho In ne sirfiols only in the morning of Fobrunry 3ri.
8.

These TGere the all of the POV talton in the bettlo for copturing the Lnh Lirficle.
is to the about ton POW trlon for tho firct timo by our scouts, I honre that womirnl Fidakezy lis put thon to ronth conly in the morning of Fobrunry ant then he wis nbout to stret merchine town tho sirfiole rith -11 his troope- I co not lmon much about tho rot-ils of the killing bocuse I wos thon for into the onomy's position et the nirficle. is for ns I know the officons romeining at Someore nt that time wore armimal HATIKEYNit, Commencor IKXI, Licutonmt liIZOGUCHI,

 KEYNLi hnc hed Bneign SaNWOTO, Sonior Officor prosent of the 1 KITSLP troops at Sowacori, kill thom hon his force was about to jonvo somacore for the enpture of tho airfiold, considoring it nocoscory to got rid of tho enngor to his roar in viow of tho foct that only 2. Woalk forco consisting of a modical sorvico unit met ? commaicotion unit would bo left nt Sovocond.

The sceond croup of the POR, nbout 50 in number, Foro killoc in tho followine mnnor: Jithor on the night of the 3rd of Fobrunry or on the nozt dey, I con't rommbor acurntoly wich is corroct, a roport was for-
 tho Lohn Airficl through a eospatch ridor by Jnsion SALINOTO, tho ins then atationoc et Someond. iccording to thic roport tho PO: wro constituting a monnco agningt our unit loft -t Somacond hich ms composor? of only onc sounc of ton murre troops, fivo or siz commanicntion oporntorns nbout ton moricni corps mon ne fifty or siaty louncoc porsons; anc this roport anic tho POi, toleing ackentrge of our onknoss, behnvor robolliouc tomere tho punsis, attomptod descritions, ote.

At the In he iirficles on tho othor hene, $1 l l$ of our troops nurboring obout 150 to 170 in 111 oro thon occupior by such cutios as to roop another group of tho PO: totnlling soout 250 uncor puncts 20 voll ns to bo nort agninst ny ovontuality hich oro not unliablo to occur from outsico at such a procarious tino as was noturel inmocintoly fitor tho enpture of tho ficle. It wns uner thoso circumetencos thet RonrAmirnl HATKBY:Lit, tho hed boon lroney approhonsive of the ovor-1l unonsy situntion of tho aron hich hat. boon monifosting itscle as is writton my "Summery Vion
of the Courso of the Bettlo in the Cepturc of the Linha Airficla on Ambon Islanc", calloc NAKigaldat componycommandor, and mo into his room whore Lt. IIIZOGUCHI Was also prosent, thon ho recoivod the aforonentionod. roport by Ension SaINHOTO, and orcorad us to kill the PO: tho Torc ascuming monncing nttitude nt somnejech. Ho nedoc also at thet time thnt tho killing had to be corriod out aftor coroful propretion to insuro strict socrocy, and that riflos must not bo usod bocnusc tho sounc of the firing roulc. hove bnd offoct.

Though I consiccored, on tho one hand, that the absonco of the compony-commencer from the nirficld. :ould cousc us somc enxioty in vioy of the thon procarious rofonse situntion of the fiolr, I vas also afraic, on tho othor honc, lost some unretricvoble failure should be made if on unozoorionced officor such as a platooncommenor rould bo ontrustor with this killing of tho POW which requirod n considerable carofulnoss. Therofore I pronptly ozprossed my intontion to Acmiral HaTMKEYALI thet I Fould hovo the compony-commendor administor and suporviso this affoir porsonnlly, and With the approval of the dimiral I so orcered the company-commenclor NathaGalato
Around 4 th or 5 th of the month, probably on the 5 th
if I romombor right, tho Compony-Commencor NAKAGANA
roported to mo that he had come bencle from Somaconrl
hoving ronc tho killing of the POW thore. So I took
him to Acmiral HATAKPYilh to have him roport the
Acmirnl on the accomplishmont of the killing. Though
lntor on I $n$ roportcc in dotail on tho concitions
of tho killing, the vivic anc. oxnct picture of the
roportod dotnil fails to como up to my momory at
prosont; for I wns at that time so much occupiod
Fith various othor cutios including nogotintions with
tho nmy nuthoritios at Ambon, I was also tole nt a
later ento thet the troops lod by NaKAGAisi for the
lailling nurboroc about thirty, though I am not certain
Thich pletoon ho had picked up tho mon fron. A
rovort was nlso mace to me that tho prisoncr of tho
Win of tho highest ronk thon killor Tins $n$ mojor of
the fustralion force; of the othors nonc enn bo
rocollected to mo now.

When willor tho POif for tho third time, the victims numbored nbout 30 out of the sbout 250 PO: in total takon at tho time of our copturc of the airficle. ind this was dono also accorring to tho ordor of amirnl HaTAKYYitit. Those 250 PO: thon drom up on $\cap$ runtry on tho occasion of tho victorious formel
ontry of the main body of tho acmiral Hatamey ilia's forcos into tho airficle, bchavor thomsclves so तisturbingly apparontly out of their voxatiousnoss, moking tut-tut, clonching their fists, stmping the grouncs, anc the like, that we woro foreoc to molse thom auict and to placo thom undor moro strict ounco. Vo also noticed on that night that the PO: wore trileing a sccrot tolk in thoir borracks without going to SlCOD 2 s if instituting o mutinous intripua. Anc some of thom comittoc cosortion tnkine actont-po of the smnllnoss of our gurre strongth. Firthomoro, Thon we cmployed thom in the work of clearing off cobrisos in the battlo-fought arons, To sam in thoir attituccos somothing inczeusablo, for instonco: Thoy
bchavoc ns if thoy Foro looking com upon our troops, or thoy Fore attompting to invito congor to us through mislonding us in tho honding of bomb-ignitors or through kcoping the minod placo n sccret. Moreovor, in vicy of a very uncnsy situntion of the airficls at thnt time as is writton in my "Summny Viow of the Course of the Bettlo in the copture of the Ambon Islonc", Acmiral HAMiHLYANIA had to koop c.coloJeत slmost all of his forcos for the cofonsc of the positions there the surprisc by the enomy ${ }^{\text {i }}$ s remnants $\pi n s$ expectoc; thereforo ho coule omploy only insufficient strongth for the gunce of the POU. Thore Whs also some eviconce that the POV woro ozercising contect by tho modium of descrtors with thoir comrados romainced outside uncopturcc.

I think it tas the rosult of the consicorntion of thesc circumstoncos just montionce as woll ns of tho recolloction of tho aforestatec mutinous boheviour of
 colloc the Company-Commender and mysolf on Fobrunry 5 th no orderor Us to kill about 30 mon who voro consictored. to bo orpocinlly robollious out of the about 250 POV billotted in the borracles in the sirficld. - I in my turn, hoving nocicloc to hove this admirol's ordor bo ozocutod by the Compnyy-Commendor himsolf as boforc, geve my orior to Natkakidm to thot offoct.

On the 6th ovoning I wes roported by the CompnnyCommencer thet the killing of the nout 30 POV had boen finishoc complotoly et Tnuli ns oricroc, thouph I co not kno: the dotailoc mannor of tho killing. ill I con romombor now $W 2$ se the informntion thon I received to the offect that nall of those nbout 30 POV wore Australion ith somo officore mone thom.

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Noxt I am going to stetc about the POW killing committod for the fourth time. For some lonoth of tir aftor tho just now montionce killing of the noout 30 PO: the rost of tho POW behavor themsolvos guict and obodiont. But since after ho more then one platoon strongth eot loft nt Ink upon the witherawnl of the mnin body of the 1 KINSLPto Ambon nroun? Fobrunry loth, dosortion bogan to trlce place again among tho POW in course of time. Horeover, it eppenrod thnt they vero ozpocting on Alliod countor offonsive noninst the rogion nc worc proporing for a rosponcont action to bo tokon by thomsclves on such occasions. The fnct thet some of the doscretors droppod back to the camp gave tho risc to our suspicion neturally theit a sort of socret linison was boing conductod botwoon the POW in the comp and their frionds outside. In addition to the above, the POW who Joro reluctant in their assignce. rork enc. shoved. rofinnt nttituce bocome incroasingly numorous. Thosc changing situations of the POW nt Linh wore reported to the Commander of the 1 KISLP n.t Ambon by tho Chiof of the Inhe Dotachment, Whose nome was, if I romomber right, SNKLOTO, an Ensign.
$\therefore$ is is Writton in the "Summery Viow of the Course of Bottle", the circumstoncos in Ambon ot thot time wns also in a great procerioucnoss, and the strongth available in the city for the dofonso and gunet was so mall that it Jas impossiblo for us to sond roinforcoment to Lohe ovon in enso of omorgoney, not to say permmontly. It ras probably cuc to this rearon that Commencor HAYNSHI calloc. tho CompnnyCommencer Natidatiat and mo rounc the l7th or the l8th of Fobrunry in front of his officinl room ne gevo his order diractly to the Compnny Commoncor to kill the al romaining PO: On the nozt dny the compeny-commencor MAKAGALA roportod mo that the killing of all of tho romining PO: had becn completcly. conc at Touli; necordingly I roported the some on to Commender $\mathrm{H}_{\star} \pm \mathrm{Y}_{\AA} \mathrm{SHI}$ 。
$\therefore$ for tho dotailod mennor of the kill, I तid not honr anything oacopt thot swores or beyonots wore wsod instond. of riflos in ordor not to molec louc. roports. Though I $: 25$ toln thet tho company-commandor took With him tho onlistod mon auntoroc in tho Victorion Borracks, tho numbor of those mon has lost to my momory. In this conncction it is recollectoc, thnt in complinnce ith tho commendor's oreor I told the mon omployod in tho killing nover to bleb about the mettor

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for fone this should rench the enrs of the POU who Fore thon billottod in Gainla.
7. Q. Ths the killing of the last POW orderod by Commender HiINASHI?

Ao I thinlk Commancor HAYASHI ordorod this too in

8. Q. Had tho Thirc Floot Hoadquertors boen over noked its opinion regoreing tho cisposition of the POW?

Ao is for mysclf I c.o not know about the mattor of such higher lovol.
9. Q. How about the POW tokon by the amy in the casc of the Ambon Island. Occupation Comprign?
A. The PON taken by the army totalled nbout 800 including both histralion and Dutch. The 24 MSBF took ovor from tho amy nround Fobrunry 12th or 13 th the cherge of those POW in Golala. And the 24.NSBF in its turn by the oral order through Stoff Officer MIZOGUCHI, Who then lookod aftor the affairs relnted to tho POV, had the I KNSLP talce chorge of the POV Comp at Galaln with the puarci of onc pletoon strongth. Accordingly oither Warront Officor SiASiIKI or Bnsign FUIKUDits so far as I can recolloct, though I m not sure which of thom, whs cespretchoc to the PON Camp to assumo the grarce cuty.
is for as I have been told none of those POW wns killoc.
10. Ge Dir you compile nay list of the POW capturor by the Navy?
A. As I uncerstend the Stiff Officer MIZOGUCHI Ths proparing for it, though nothing was hoord about it rince then.
11. G. It is said thot about 30 cnlistod mon bolonoing to lincslocpor No. 9 thon elroady sunk wore included in the mon whom Compnny-Commnncer NAKiGalis took with him in tho cnse of the killing of the Inst group of the PON; c.o you know noout it?

Aso I heve no knorledge about it.

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12. Q. Was it then understuoc to you that the killino ol tho POI is prohibitod by tho intornationnl ln?
A. Yos. I knosit fully nt that time.
13. Qo If you uncoistood it, why do you thin the killing vas committod?
A. I think tho kiljine Ths cono in tho lioht of the circumstonces thon existing, $i . c$ o in vion of tho fact thet the surrounding situntion was vory precerious and thet the portont thet the POV mioht mutiny was oxtromoly noticoable, thoro oxistod not s smoll oossibility that no oursclvos rould bocomo of thoir victim instonc if thoy rould bo lot nlonc.

Thon the intorrogntion of tho nccusod Tis complotod, tho rocord mode of it wns rond to tho necusod; and as the
 to nffix his signoturo and thumb-print boloT.
(The signaturo wic thumb-print of the secusod)
(Signoci) Ynธu๐ ABE,
Rocorcor, Socond Domobilizotion
Ministry.
(Signcl) Shinro WTMBIII,
Proliminnry Examinotion Officor, Sccond Domobilization Ministry.

At tho Proliminary Court of the Tokyo Demobilizntion Court, On Docombor 24th, 1945.
jvic. Doc. MO. 5333-B.

## The Thirc Interrogntory of the Accusca.

> (Pagos 324-327)

Tho Accuscd - HATAKBYiLh Kunito.
On 12 Fobrunry 1946, in the third oxmination in tho Court of the Domobilization Ministry in Tokyo, WAABIKI Shinro, SDO Poo. of TGDC in the proscnce of $B$ B Ynsun, SDO, Rec. of TGDC, continuod the oxomination of Hamakeyilit Kunito hold on the chorge of abottor to a murcior casc. The oucstions and answors are as follows:

1. a. Mnet is your nomo?
A. Hithintyilit Kunito.
(Heroupon the oxomining officiol told him thet ho :ould oxminc him for the cesc abovo-mentionoc..)
2. Q. In that capocity wore you collod to Cormondont Hirnisyilli, whon you rocoived the orcors to oxecute tho POis around 5th or 6th of Fobrunry?
A. is the Commencing Officor, HiYASHI, of I IMTSLP hac not yot arrived at his post on thet dny, I गns callod in to roccive the oricers in the enpacity of acting Commending officor of 1 KNNSIP.
3. 3. In that enpacity then, when the ordors of the oxccution of POils was dolivorod on about 20 Fobrunry?
A. The ordor was directly doliverod to the compony commencor NaKigaliat Kenichi from the Commenting officor; I Jis attonding thoro as nejutent. is a rulc, ordors of the Commenting Officor are to bo celivorod circetly from the Comnding Officor, though somotimes they aro given through tho adjutant. As ndjutent is tho assistent to the Commenting Officor, it is nocossary for him to be woll acauaintod with Conmonding Officor's policios ond intontions in conoral, so thet won on ordor is givon, tho adjutnt is usunlly with him, and. if not, ho is orcinnrily told about tho ordor boforo or aftor its actunl delivery.
1. G. Dic you capross any opinion of yours, then the orcior of tho oxocution was givon?
A. I lenc: that the ozocution of PO:Vs is in principlo a violation of intornotional law ond also of rules cons corning lone vorforc. So when the Commendent

Hataigyali tole me at first his intontion that he voulc kill poll duc to their rostive attitude, I proposod hin to put thom undor a strictor guard, and thon take some other monsuros aftormards. But Commonernt HatizeYivis somed to have beon strongly convincod that it would. be bettor to dispatch tho POVE nt oncc, becouse, ho was afrnic, if ho laft the mattor as it was, thore might oo chanco onough that We oursolvos would bo annikilntod by the robollious PO:Vs. is for mo, I took it for grantod to oboy tho Commondont sinco my ndvico had once boon donior; this thought of minc, morcover, had bcen strengthonce through my oxporionces curing tho war.

Again, about 20 Fobrunry, When I was summoned to the Commending Officor HiyisHI, before the ordor of ozocution I think the Commencing Officor himself advisod the Commendent rogercing tho illognlity of tho cacoution of POVIs.

But it sooms thet the dedmiral had been dotermined. to nct nccording to his om conviction in viow of the gonorn fifnirs on the islond of imbon ond the robollious atmosphoro among the POWs, Ant the ordor Was ovontuolly cwlivorod from tho Commeng Officor HAY:SHI.
5. Q. Is it true that the Cormony Commondor NAKRiGANH niso stntcr his vions whon he was oiven the orcor of oxocution fron tho commending officor HiyASHI round 20 Pcbrunry?
A. Yos, I romombor, ho dic.
6. 3. Doos tho fofonent think that the suporior's oreor should bo oboyad, ovon whon tho ordor is clonrly unl nvful?
$\therefore$ It is very difficult to cocide hether the ordor is unlowful or not; it doponces upon the difforoncos of tho gunlity of culture and opinions betwoon the comenter ne his subordinato. If tho oricer is construer to bo plainly ngninst the lot, the suboreinete may stato his o:n opinion obout it; but whon tho commencor insists upon corrying out his oreor, the subordineto should oboy, I think

Of courso, it mey sonctimos happen thet the subordinato ourposoly 'irobeys tho commender's ordor one. -ets othoryise, but in this ense he roos so upon his on rosponsibility, consiccoring the situntion in acnorel.

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7. G. Is tho dofoncint's cnroce truthfully roprosontod in this curriculum vitao of yours?
(Horoupon tho oxmining officinl renc to tho dofondent tho copy of the curriculum vitac of tho dofoncant thet hnd boon formarded from the Chiof of Porsonncl Bureau of Mnvy Ministry.)
A. Thore aro no mistrkos.

By tho way, boforo I was admittod to the Noval Golloge I hnc finishoc K̄̄ryo Micde School of Hiroshimn City in Mrreh 1925.
8. Ao Tor bout your Aomostic uffaies?
A. Wifo Suzuko ( 33 yonrs), Enughtor Yoko (12 yonrs) ned son Tarckuni ( 5 yonrs); wo hovo no othor proporty excopt nbout 7,000 yon on coposit.
9. Q. Hoy is your stato of minc at prosont?
$\therefore$ It soms to mo that the gonornl situntion in thoso cays Wes tho principal factor for Ronr-ximirnl intokoyoma, the Commendant, to dotormino upon tho ozocution of POWs, in ordor to provont the untownec necidont; ond I think thet the commendant was compollod to tolso such monsuros; mnybe ho coulc co othorvise in such o psychologicel crisis he was confrontoc with. But it is truly regrettablo thet he cid not nceopt my opinion about the mottor, onc at tho omo timo I socl ne cxtromo pity
for those POV who lost thoir piocious lives through the ozocution, I con't hoip proying for tho ropose of thoir souls from the bottom of my hocrt.
(Horoupon tho oxnaining officinl tolc the defondent about the grounds upon wich tho defondant mos hold in sucpicion, nd thet tho dofondent could plond his cnse if ho nould, but the dofondent snid that ho hod. no plon to offor.)
10. (.) Hevo you nnything olso to sny?
$\therefore$ No, I havo nothing clsc to sny in porticular.

Thon tho tastimony $\because n s$ complotec, tho rocord mncio of
it wns rond agnin; ance ns Hotaloyom soic that it vas vithout

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17.
ant mistokes ho was cousod to affix his signoturo and scol bolow.

The sceuscd.
Hartionyalat Kunito (Sionod)
(Sionoci) ABE Ynsuo, STO, Rer, TGDC. Clorl, Soconc Domobilization Ministry.
(Signed) Wambile Shinro, SDO, Poo. TGDC.
Bxomining Officiol
Scconc Domobilizntion Ministry.
at tho semc count ns nbove, 12 Tobrunxy 1946 .

Subject: Laha Battle In Ambon Island

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I landed at Hitrama before dawn on January 30, 1942 as a warrant officer leading a section of the second company. After landing, acting under the orders of superiors, accompanied by others in the section sought a guide, as we did not know the way to Laha. Accompanied by an old man and having ascertained our way we advanced towards Laha.

We arrived at Sowakodo that afternoon and after a short rest, we opened action. When we ceased action, we took up billets in Sowakodo.

We attacked several times without success, although suffering heavy casualties. While regretting over the loss of so many comrades, a shot fired from the enemy's trench mortar fell a cocoanut palm and a banana tree, and as I had no time to mun away, I received a wound in the right shoulder. As it was my right arm, I retired to the rear for medical treatment in Sowakodo. Although I do not remember the exact date of the incident, but I believe it happened in the evening of February 1, 1942.

Laha was captured at dawn on February 3, 1942.
Since I was wounded, I did not participate in Laha battle, but remained with the rear unit.

The section under my command and others entered Laha on February 3, but I could not on account of my wound. Though I don't remember the exact date but I think it was in the evening of February 6 that I entered Laha, the ancient Tauri village, by a barge, and was billeted in a house, which was formerly used as a school. Unable to move freely on account of my wound, I did not go beyond the billeting area and thus could see only its neighbourhood.

I first saw the allied prisoners at Sowakodo on my way to fetch meals at the army kitchen. At that time I did not know how these allied personnel come to be prisoners of the Japanese force. However about a month after that incident I discovered that they had surrendered.

The prisoners were detained in the school building at Sowakodo, which was situated on the other side of the temporary Japanese army kitchen. It was in the evening when I saw them and they were inside the cage.

Next time when I saw them, I believe it was in the morning of February 2 and there were about 8 or 9 escorted by Japanese soldiers.

On the same evening I saw another bunch of about ten also escorted by Japanese soldiers. As I was not able to take part in the night raid with others in the evening, I went to fetch my meal at the kitchen, when I saw some thirty allied prisoners again.

At dawn on February 3 weroeived the report of the capture of Laha. When I went tc fetch my rues 1 on the same morning I estimated there were something liko 4 ? Eliiod pusonors. But this is only a rough estimbe, as I did int telis the trouble to count them.

The temporary Sowalondo ciges were divided into two sections, one smaller one for the oficicors ard the larger for n.c.os and men. I got to know later that there were one wajur, one medical captain and two or three others in captivity. I also saw the prisoners in the same cage on the 4 th and 5th of February.

Though I don't know the exact date, ofter we had finished our noon meal on or about the 6th, Commander of the Company, NAKAGAWA, arrived at Soewakodo with a party of Japanese troops of about a platoon strong (40) in two barges. He announced the disposal of the Allied prisoners, according to the order of the Landing party, and arrangements were made forthwith and the first execution took place after about an hour. Though uncertain, the prisoners were executed in a forest near Laha, located some 350 metres from the cages. The weapons used for execution were mostly Japanese swords, but bayonets also were used. The method was that each prisoner had his hands tied behind his back and was taken to the place of the execution and made to sit down directly in front of the prepared position, his neck slightly stretched downwards, but not blindfolded, and in this way they were executed. I saw the executions up to the 27 th or the 28 th man, but because I didn't see the rest I don't know what had happened to the remainder.

The strength of the party which Company Commander NAKAGAWA brought over was divided into three parts, half of them was detailed for guard duty and about ten of them carried out the executions. The remainder over ten in number acted as escorts of prisoners. There were about 60 wounded men at Sowakodo at that time and I believe about 20, who could walk, had seen the executions. But because it happened four years ago, I don't remember the names nor the faces. of those who were present at the execution. I recolloc* only the si.gnolman, YAMASHITA, by name but he was killed while in night operation in the middle of August 1943.

IKMUCHI, who was the interpreter of the Company Commander, NAKAGAWA, seemed to question the prisoners on the spot. But as I stood some distance away as an observer and because I don't know English at all, I didn't understand what they were saying.

I don't remember the names and the faces of the executed allied prisoners because I had seen them for the first time in my life. I don't remember clearly the number of those who were executed, but I believe they were 10. And I don't also remember the names and the faces of the executioners. However, if I see them again, I may be able to recognize them. Although I am not certain, but men who carried out the executions were mostly those of YOSHIHARA Platoon, reinforcements from the lst SASBHO Special Landing Farty, and partly some of them might have been those from the air base. Because the platoon commander, YOSHIHAPA, was killed in action, the senior warrant officer of the company took command of this platoon. I con't know whether the senior warrant officer of the platoon directly carried out the executions or not, but it is certain that he was present on the spot.

The reason why the YOSHIHARA ylatoon had been attached to the Kure lst Special Landing Party, was as follows. The latter had captured Legaspi (in the Philippines) prior to taking imbon, and in the transfer, left the 3 rc platoon of the 2 nd company and half of the infantry, artillery behind and so in this way the strangth of the company became diminished; thus it became necessary to reinforce.

I don't know the exact reason why the execution was entrusted to the hands of the YOSHIHARA Shotai, but according to the rumor circulated later on, the YOSHIHARA Shotai, which was the reinforcement from the lst Sasebo Special Landing Party had lost not only its commander but relatively suffered heavy casualties and was seeking revenge; thus they volunteered themselves to the task.

About ten days after the capture of Laha, the platoon was quartered in Victoria Barracks for about one month, after which they were reincorporated in the Saseho lst Special Landing Party (the Shiga party) which I believe had its base at Timor at that time, but I don't know where they are now. I think ten men out of this platoon were detailed as executioners and another ten as escorts, and the rest as guards. I can't say definitely because four years passed before now, but I can say it is a little certain.

It. NAKAGAWA, who had been sent according to the orders of the Landing Party, was a responsible leader on the spot at Sowakodo. But as he was sent there by orders and acted under orders, he was not primarily responsible. The responsible man was Capt. HATAK MYAMA, who has given the orders, but the man who saw it carred out was It. NAKAGAWA.

One senior NCO took charge of the platoon on behalf of the commander after the death of YOSHIHARA. But as I said before, it is certain that the senior NCO received orders from the Company Commander
and passed them on to his subordinates and saw them executed, but it is not certain whether he himself carried out the orders or not. Because he came to the platoon as one of the reinforcements, I didn't associate with him at all, and I don't remember his name nor face now after so many months.

Though I can't say definitely, but accordine to a rumor the guards of the prisoners were drawn from 934 Seaplane Base Construction Unit and the Land Based Construction Unit. Though I don't remember accurately, but there were four or five shifts with two guards every time.

The reason why the Base Construction Unit took part in the battle was due to the fact that they had come to reinforce from the sea party on account of the lst Kure Special Landing Party had been nearly wiped out by a series of hoavy casualties. Men of the Base Construction Unit were non-combatants and mechanics. They were not armed and had to take arms from the dead and wounded of the lst Kure Special Landing Party and do guard duty. And I remember there was a man seeming to be a lieutenant in charge of these units. I think he might have been the commender of the guards.

I remember the Base Construction Unit depart for some other area aftor the end of the battle, but a part of the land based Construction Detachment stayed in Laha for some two or three months. On account of the lapse of time I don't remember it clearly.

I know of nobody except the interpreter IKBUCHI who would be likely to know the names of the prisoners at Sowakodo.

Before and after receiving meals at the kitchen, not being able to speak in English, we tried to talk with the prisoners in Japanese or by signs. I remember they were such simple words such as Nippon, Japan, Fujiyama and Zentsuji, Shikoku.

Because I came in contact with the foreigners for the first time in my life and as I didn't know English, I don't remember how the prisoners look like, as all western people look alike to me.

If I remember right, among the Japanese troops in Sowakoeda, the only person I remember is the interpreter ITUKADA. But there may havo been some others of the old lst Special Landing Party, but I don't know.

I don't remember whether the interpreter, TAKADA, was present at the execution or not.

To tho best of my rocollcction, their porsonal belongings were soarched and thoy woro subiocted to physical examinations. This happenod twice in front of tho headquertors of the Landing Party at that time. The oxaminer was the chief warrant officer, SUFA, assisted by socond warrant officer of the Wireless Platoon and anothor warront officer. Though I don't ronembor their names, I may be ablo to recognizo thom if I see them again. His rank was a chief petty officor at that time.

They had confiscated a. few of the prisoners' porsonal belongings aftor the examination. If my memory doosn't fail me, the prisoners' belongings consisted of money purses, mirrors of the field, tobacco, pocket books, fountain pons, and poncils, etc. A small cuantity of cigarettes woro given to the allied prisonors daily.

Although I am not cortsin, but I hoar Warrant Officor SUWA left for Kei Islands when tho $24 i h$ Base Construction Unit were trensforred and lator he went bacis to Impen aftor a turn at Sourabaya. The Farrant Officer, $\mathrm{SUWA}_{\text {, }}$ dicint ${ }^{r}$, go to the front because he was the Commander of a Wirclose Platoon, and he was extroardinarily a big fellow and his uniform was always an extra big one. I know hin well.

I think it was about three or four $0^{\prime}$ clock on about the 6th of February 1942 when I left Sowakodo to Leha in berges. The executions were still going on at tho time I departod. After I returned to Laha, It. NAKAGAFI cane back vith his party. It right have beon about tro hours after we entered Laha. Those who could walk and those who could be transferrod among the wounded were brought back from Sokoeda to Laha in barges. Those who romainod behind were nurses and wounded. I believo I remained in Laha on the 6 th , 7 th and tho 8th. We left Laha for Victoria sonetime aftor four on the 8th, when we saw 10 or more prisoncrs working on the jetter. I didntt see any other nrisoners anywhere olse. The reasor, is that because I have only been able to see in the neighbourhood of the barracks and could not go anywhere near the aerodrome bocause I havo not jet ontirely rocoverod.

Some 10 days after I was transforred to Victoria I learned for the first time that there wore about 150 allied prisoners at the Laha aorodrone. About a month aftor my transfor to Victoria barracks, I entored the Ambon hospital from malaria. I romainod in the hospital for about one and a half months. Somotime in the midde of March wilst in hospital, I hoard thet the prisonors captured in Laha had boen disposed of. During the invasion of Ambon, the attacking Japanese force had encountered stronger resistance than it had expectod and as the capture seemed to pass the schoduled date, the commander sent for naval and acrial reinforcements by means of which he succooded in capturing Laha. Though the numbers and the nancs of the werships are not clear,
but the destroyers and minesweepers rushed into the bay and opencd fire. In the courso of action one minesweeper struck a minc and sank. Another minosweepor was lost, it is said, duo to cllied forces outside the bay. I actuolly sem the miceli of one, bui hoard only the story of the other. The survivors of two mineweopers wore ali accomodated in Victoria Barracks. Having had no zoinforcenonts from Kure lst Specicl Lnnding Party, they wore put on guard Ambon under strongth. Thoy were rescued fron the sea with hordiy anything on and consequently they were given some old clothes to wear and captured allied arms. I was also told, although doubtful, that they wore made to guard the Paso districts.

If I remombor right, thore were about 100 survivors from both minesweopors. The story that I had heard went on to say that the survivors regretted the loss of so many lives that thoy sought for revenge. As they couldn't give up this intention, the sonior officer of the section made a request several tines to Rear Admiral HATAKBYAMA Koichiro, the commander at that time. At first his request was turned down, but at last it was accuiesced and ordered Lt. HATAKEYAMA to carry out the plan who in turn conveyed tho same to the aforesaid sonior officer, and according to the rumor, the survivors carricd out the executions between 15th-20th of Fobruary. The manner of executions ras, it is said, both bcheading and bayonetting. The place and time is not clear. I don't know the names and feces of the executioners because I didn't live with then. It was in the hospital that I heard the runor about tho executions.

Though I don't know the nanc of the magazine, I had read in some Japanese magazine that during the Laha battle about 18 allied personnel who had escaped out of the Ambon Island was found out by the little Japanese boat at Oranbai and was taken eway to Laha. But I don't know the manner of their execution. Apart from the Sowakodo and Iaha executions, I don't know of any othor nor heard of any other.

All the above is the fact, but it is incvitable that there is a fen mistakes in dates, bocause four years had elapsed. The fact is the fact to the and, and the rumor is the rumor to the end. I don't think there is anyone who knows the fact better than I among the lst Kure Special Landing Party. I don't know whether there is anyone who knovs anything about it or not. I have written all the facts I know and all the rumor I heard. I an sure there is not a single fact that I an ashaned of kcoping it secrot.

Evidentiary Document No. 5332 .
I, SX. 16852 Capt Kinnish Vivian PAFISH of AFIY $\operatorname{rEADQUAF} . T E F . S$, LIELBOUF.NE make oath and say:
1.

I am an officer of the Australian Military Forces and am an English-Japanese interpreter.
2. Annexed hereto and marked "A" is a true copy of a statement in Japanese made by HAMANISHI Shigeo on 16th November, 1945, which I have checked against the original held by the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Internees, Army HQ.
$B$.
The original statement cannot be made available immediately as it is required for the trial of JAFANESE concerned in the massacre of Australian PVi at LAFiA, AMBOINA.

Sworn before me at WELBCUKNE this 6th day of June, 1946. )

> (SgC) K. V. Farish Capt.
(Sgd) (?) Capt.
An offic $r$ of the Australian Military Forces.

## THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA $\frac{\text { AND OTHERS }}{\mathrm{V}}$ <br> ARAKI, Sadao AND OTHERS <br> AFFIDAVIT

I, IAN FARQUHAR MACPAE of 14 Hyrniong Grove Hawthorn in the State of Victoria, formerly VX44787 Major I. F。MACRAE of $2 / 21$ Battalion. Australian Imperial Forces, makes oath and say:-
1.

I was captured in Ambon on ind. February, 1942, and taken to TANTOEY CAMP: At this camp there were 291 Australia prisoners. There was a Dutch prison camp across the road, the senior Dutch officer being Colonel KAPITZ.
2.

About the middle of 1942 Dutch troops were order
to unload bombs from ships. Colonel KAPITZ protested to the Japanese authorities. Capt ANDO the Japanese Commander of AMBON Town visited the camp and addressed the Dutch telling them if anyone would not obey his orders and unload the ship he would execute them on the spot.
3.

The Japanese discovered that Dutch prisoners well sending letters to their wives who were interned in another camp. As a result of this on 12th July, 1942, 34 Dutch prisoners including nine officers, two doctors and a padre were assembled with their hands tied. At about 1400 hours a platoon of Japanese marines under Capt. ANDO, armed with star pickets, length of piping and pick handles, commenced to beat the Dutch. They continued until all of the prisoners had been beaten into unconsciousness. Capt ANDO then struck each of the unconscious prisoners on the head with a pick handle. The scene of the beating was slippery with blood. Thirteen of the prisoners suffered single and double fractures whilst two of them sustained fractured skulls. Three of the prisoners died, two from fracture. skulls and one from ruptured kidneys.
4. On 25 th October, 1942, two hundred and sixty three Australian prisoners and about 300 Dutch prisoners were shipped from AIMBON to HAINAN.
Sworn at MELBOURNE in the State of , Victoria this the 3rd. day of October, ) 1946, Before me (Sgd) Illegible
( $\mathrm{Sg} \alpha$ ) I. $\mathbb{M A C K A E}$

A Commissioner of the Supreme l Court of Victoria for taking Affidavits.

## Evidence of NE 1677 Private VEPRUN CITVE BAI工.

Verdun Clive Ball, being duly sworn by His Honour, states:
My full number, name, rank and unit are NX 1677 Private Verdun Clive Ball, 8th Division A.A.S.C., attached to $2 / 21$ Aust Infantry Battalion. My home address is Casmell Street, Peak Hill, New South Vales.

I was captured on 3 February $19 / 2$ and confined in Tan Toes camp. I was released on 10 September, 1945.

I san the bashing of the Dutch personnel from the camp. I cannot identify any of the Japanese guards involved. The distance from the camp to the hill where the beating took place was about 150 yards. The guards who did the bashing were not local guards and were taken away later.

I was one of the 23 Australians who were beaten, We volunteered the information that we had broken camp. A certain number were taken from the camp and eight of the remainder volunteered their names, ie were told the punishment would be lighter if we did this. I mas taken to the same Japanese Headquarters on the hill outside the camp. Te went before a Japanese IsLand Commander, Capt. Handory who asked us question through an interpreter. In the room we were bashed with pick handles in front of the captain. One of the guards who bashed me was niclonaned "Horseface"。

After we had been beaten in the room we were taisen outside and tied together in a row, with one hand in front and one behind, whilst I was there I saw Irciuchi come out and belt one of the Australians who was there when we arrived with a pick handle. He had a broken am and was belted all over the back

I was bashed again that night and tied up for the night. This occurred about dusk, ie were tied around a tree in a ring, making a complete circle. We had to stay there all night and were not allowed to lean back against the tree. Then we asked for water individual guards mould give us a drink. ie did not get any food until the next morning, when the usual ration of rice was brought up from the camp.

Next day I was again bashed; this mas the heaviest beating of them all. The Japanese guards beat us with pick handles and pieces of bowser pipes. I was hit mostly from the small of the back down to the knees. I do not know tine names of the men involved but I could identify them by sight. They were regular prison guards at the time but were later shifted. Two are still oil Amon Island; there may be a lot more but I have not seen then.

While I was at the Headquarters, I san a truck cone up. Ten men were loaded on to the truck and cre jnto a motor car. He was compietely unconscious and may have been ciead. I dio not know what had happened to these eleven men as they were at the Headouarters befone we arrived. During that tine I know they were bashed because we culd hear thern screaning practically every night. They were tortured by some of the guards privately. I never saw those eleven men again after they had been talien away.

The Japanese guards put lighted cigarettes on the back of my neck and once on my forehead. They used to flick me with their fingers in the one spot on the forehead for a considarable tine to give me a headache。 I sam them put lighted cigarettes on some of the Australians ${ }^{\text {t }}$ noses to put them outo

Some of the men who were with me when I was bashed received worse treatment than I did; they lay dom and mere kicked and tied up. I was put in hospital as a result of the beatinc but the Japanese sent dom word that I was not to be kept in hospital and. I was then sent back to the hut. I was in bed for about three weels. I practically lost the use of my legs and for three or four months after I was just able to get about by shurflince Gradually I regained my strength. I cid licht work and was ordered by the doctor not to go out to mork. However, I did a little wcrk later on on the wonking parlies.

I mas present when Private Tait was beaten, in about Septenber 1944. He wes accused of stealing binoculars from an air raid chelter. He was brought back to the camp and I saw everything from the kitcher where I was morking. He was bashed at the guard house in the camp and was only about 30 jard.s amay fromme, across the road. He mas beaten by a guarc. nicimamed "Frillneci:" Thiuchi was present and sam the bashingo then the Comandent cane out, he hit him a couple of times on the head with a light stick and rolled him over a couple of tines so that the other guard could hit hin more. T/O ieimra was also present.

Frivate Tait was beaten with pick handles. Two pick handies were broken on him: eventually they got one strong enough. He was knocked unconscious tro or three tiaes; then the Commandant threw water over him and. when he came to he was beaten acain. In the end, he was left lying in the rain for about half an hour. our Officer tried all the time to have him ronoved and eventually he mas taken away to inospital on a streticher. He never recovered properly. He lost the use oi his legs and could only just get about. Eventually, he died.

Not meny of the Australians who mere beaten lost the use of their legs as much as I did; those who were fat did not suffer so bady
but the thin ones did. If normal weight is 10 stone 7 lbs., but my weight when I came out of camp was about 9 stone. I was down tc about 8 stone 7 lbs , at one time.

Up till one year ago the food was reasonable; you could live on it, During the last year, hovever, from August until the end of the war the rations were about 4 ounces of rice per day and a small issue $c$ rotten potatoes that no-one else could eat.

It was a regular thing for someone to be beaten every morning, or jumped on or kicked. We were beaten for not being able to get abou quickly or for being a bit late in coming out of our huts; it was generally for very paltry thingse Ikiuchi was the main one who beat them on sores or ulcers. He hit Major Westley one day on an ulcer for being late on parade.

I certify that the above evidence is true and correct.

Taken and sworn before me at Morotai
on this 25 th day of September 1945
A. Liansfield

Cammissioner


# Evidence of NX 40912 Private JOHN ITSLIE SEARANT. 

John Leslie SEARANI, being duly sworn by His Honour, states:
Miy full number, name, rank and unit are NX, 40912 Private John Leslie Searant, 8th Divo A.AnS.C. attached to 2/21. Aust。 Infentry Battalionc IIy home address is Lambeth Street, Glen Innes, Nos, I.

I was taken prisoner on 3 February 1942 at Ambon, and confined at Tan Toey. I was released on 10 September 1945.

I saw the beating of the Dutch persomel on 12 July 1942. About 30 were beaten altogethere They tere beaten up on the hill at the H. $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{o}}$, , about 250 to 300 yards from the camp. The Japanese guards hit them with sticks, piece of iron, pick handles and anything they could lay hold of. They were hit all over the body and head for about 20 minute or half an hour: it may have been longer. Iven after they had fallen down the guards continued to beat then. This was witnessed by most of the men in the camp. I could not identify any particular guard engage on this beating.

I saw the Japanese place a large number of bombs in a transport shed i the centre of the camp area in about october 1942. They were placed i the officers' quarters and about 50 or 70 yards from the hospital. The Americans bombed the canp on 15 February 1943. There were no morlkings on the camp to show that it contained prisonersmof-war. As a result of the dump being hit, 10 men were killed and quite a number injured by shrapnel.

I saw the beating of about 23 Australian prisoners on about 19 or 20 November 1942. These men had been accused of breaking camp. The Japanese took them up the hill to the Headquarters where they : belted theri until they could not stand. Those who could not stand were tied orect to a tree. The guards used pick handles and pieces o hose pipe to belt the Australians. They were hit mainly around the back. Ileven in particular were belted all over the body.

A Japanese guard nicknamed "Gold Tboth" was one involved in the beatin I cannot identify any of the others.

I saw eight of the men who came back to the camp after the beating. They pere very badly bruised down the backs of the legs and on the buttocks. I did not see the eleven again. I saw them being taken awa: from the hill, some in a staff car and some in a truck, but never saw them again.

I was put on the "long carry" 13 times during 1944. The last occasion was just before Christmas. The distance of the long carry was about
eight miles over very rough, rugged country made up of broken coral with gullies and steep hills. We had to go on all fours sometimes to craml up the hills. It took us about five hours to complete the journey with a load. I carried bags of cement and $150-1 \mathrm{~b}$. bombs. The bags of cement weighed 94 lbs. Two men were detailed for each bag; when one could carry it no further the other took over. The Japanese guards did not actually bash us but made us hurry along. Sometimes we had good guards who would give us a fair go, but on one occasion we were guarded by some Koreans who kept us moving all the time.

At that time my weight was about 7 stone 6 lbs. liv normal weight is 10 stone 6 lbs. I was in hospital just a fter we mere taken prisoner but not after that.

I used to go out on morking parties. We did all classes of work, such as carrying cocoanut logs, digging tunnels and building tank traps and pillbores: we also had to carry cement blocks. Thile I was on these working parties I received quite a few bashings for trying to ease up on the work a bit. In the majority of cases, it was for no reason at all. We were given four or five smacks across the buttocks with a stick and a couple of times were hit on the head, I was knocked over a couple of times. I do not know the names of any of the guards involved in this. While digging the base for an oil tank on one occasion I saw a Japanese ghard nicknamed "Five in one" bash same of the Australians. He used to smack them on the face with his hand and mock them dom; when they had fallen he used to kick themb

I certify that the above evidence is true and correct.

Taken and sworn before me at llorotai ,
on this 25 th day of September 1945
A. MANSFIRID

Comnissioner

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0 \text { ORIITICATI }
$$

- The understgmed CFARTMS TONGEBEL, firse Ifortenent. ReN.I.A.
 SERVICE (NEPTS beirg fixat duty swom on wath deposea and gtatea
 copies of the orselnal docurento entitled:
Nefisreoort of interrogation (TJo. 800) of Boediney
Poisnue with mnozed sworn statorent of some in Marey
with Badish treassation, cancernine the murater on
twenty eigh persuns - 25 Ambonoss men, 4 Ambeanss
woren anc. 9 whtits mon - by Juxurese on the istand
Arboina in the month of Juyy 1943.
which cocunonts are parts of the officiel records of the Nefis.

Signeture:
Charles Jongereel

Beterin, "th June 1946。

Subserviod and sworn to refort re $\mathrm{K}_{0} \mathrm{~A}_{0}$ de WBRD, first Idevtenant, RoN.T.A Figher officiai atlauned to the office of the Atburney Generai, DrBu.
s/ K. A. de NGard

AMBONESE: Twenty Eight persuns-- 15 Avibonesemales, 4 Arbonese woen \& 9 Eur peen men; Apparently were killed, Amboina, Aubon Islenci, Juiy 1943.

Informant: BOMIMAN Potinus, Monaconces.
Reliability: Average intelligence and a good observer; information considered relieble.

Person Responsible: Japanese (names not stated). AVBOINA, ANBON ISLAND, July 1943: while informant was internec. in the forcer firtillery berracks, he sew 15 Abonese meles 4 Abonese women \& 9 European men (Informent assumes they were Austreliens), standing with their hands tied behind their bick: noer the guerd house. They were later taken away under heevy escort \& were followed by Japanese soliiers carrying shovels. None of these people wore seen agein, \& informant essunes that they were executed.

Nefis
INIBRE, RTBPORT NO. 890
Signed. \& Witnessod. Statement.

PRSON I DA: BODDIMAN - Informant.
Naze: BOBDIMAN Potinus.
Rank:
Ace:
28
Dete of Birth:
19/5/16.
Place of Birth: Kahockoe, Poeloe Baneke, Meraico.
Nationality:
Remarks:
Intelli ent, obsorvant with eood menory. Gives e clear account of his experiences and of himself. Appears to be a rinn of integrity and initiatief.

Saja jene bermara P。 EOBDIMAN bangas Sangir panekat fuselier sle.stb.nr. 32878 , kuetika saja bereda di Ambon dan bertompat di kpg. Bentene di calan tengsi artillerig (Belenda poonje coeloe) selekoe Heiho peca boelan Juli 1943, makes saja. nelinat 5 orang tawanan Australie, 15 orene Abon lolaki preinan den 4 oreng Aribon perempoean semoe tengannja di kiat dan bordjalon dj noeke tangei terseboet serta di henter oleh buberepa oren Djepen jen mana is aca membawah sekop (schop) ian klewens.

Oren 2 janc terikat tencennje itoo, di beweh cii bolekeng dari tengsi terseboet saja tica lihst apa jang teleh djaci dengan orene 2 itoe; totapi tilo borepa la a maka berepa Djepen jene nee bowh oreng 2 itoo teleh kombeli cenen ackop (schop) can klewang, tetai oreng 2 tersebuet tica ede.

Saja berage lenen soenggooh 2 bahwa somoee oreng 2 jang torikat tengan itoe teleh di boench (poton leher) oleh Djepen 2 itoe, sebeb nercka nombori melenon den lain 2 kopeda orene 2 tewenen hustrelic.

Merauke, tes 29 November 1944. Seja jene memberi keteraneen serte, bertende tangen can bersoempa di hadapan tusan Officier clari N.I.O. SEc. Boerimon.
SEC. K. Ce MUNIEN.

## Trenslntion:

I, P. Beedicen, of Sensirese raco, rank of fusilier, No. 32878, while I was ot Anbon querterec. st the former Dutch artillery berracks at Kompoens Bonting anc wilo I wes workine in the Heiho (Labour Corps) in July 1943 saw 5 sustralian PW, 15 habonese rele civilians end 4 aribonese (femele) wowon all with heris tied and they pessed in front of tho barracks aforesaid escorted by a nuiber of Japs carryine shovels and sword. Those with their hends tied aforeseic wexe teken behind the barracks eboverentioned. I ia not see what heponca to these poople but before long the Japs who z: ? oscortec then case beck with the shovels enc swords but without the poople aforeseid. I think end really believe thet all those persons who hed their renc.s tied were killed by beheadinE by the Japo nentioned because they he ivon fooc and othor thines to the Austrilian PWs.

Merauke 29th Noveaber 1944
I who ake this ceclaration sign and. sweer before NIO OFFICLR. SEd. BOEDIMAN
S.C. K. de Munter.

IN THE NATTER OF JAPANESE WAR CRIES AND THE ILL-TREATIEAT OF BRITISH ARD ALLIED PRISONERS OF TAR ON HAROEKOE ISLAND, AMMON GROUP.

## AFFIDAVIT

1I, No. 145281 Flying-Officer D FINIS BRIAN MASON, R.A.F., at present stationed at COSFORD near wOLV:HFAMP TON and with permanent home address at 15, Chalkpit Terrace, DORKING, Surrey, make oath and say as follows:-

1. After being taken Prisoner of War in March 1942, I was sent through various prisoner of war carps, till on eth January, 1943, I reached 'Yaarmarkt' Camp, Soerabaya, Java. found a camp which already had four thousand prisoners of War of mixed nationalities. It was here that preparations were begun for the despatch of working parties of Prisoners of War | to HAROEKOE Island, and other islands in the area, for the construction of airfields.
2. I found general living conditions much as at other camps, but with the splendid additions of such as a factory in full working order, making 'Peanut Butter' for sale at reasonable prices. Canteens selling fruit, fresh butter, eggs and a varied stock of chocolate and tinned goods, ell over and above the Japanese scale of rations which was principally rice, with a limited amount of vegetables, and also a very, very limited. amount of frosh meat. Football and general recreational games were permitted. Radio loudspeakers were installed for local broadcasting etc.; we also had two film shows showing Japanese propaganda films. A Japanese movie camera staff visited the camp and took special shots of Prisoner of Tor camp life.
3. 

We very soon learnt the reason for all this. The
Japanese fere fattening us up so that we might be in good physical condition to build Airfields in various parts of Japanese occupied territories. The first week in April 1943 the Japanese camp officials began preparing these working parties for drafting to the various islands. Ono morning the fit Prisoners of Weer were told to parade on the square. The sick were told to stay in their quarters so that the Japanese Medical Officer could inspect then to see if they were fit to proceed on working parties. The Japanese Medical Officer duly arrived, borrowed a cycle and rode around the camp. Upon return to the camp office ho duly stated that all sick in quarters were now fit and should all be included on the nominal rolls of working parties. It is to be noted that this Japanese Modicel Officer did not once stop or enter a building for the purpose of examining the patients. On the parade ground the Japanese Medical Officer duly walked un and down the ranks of the supposedly fit men and duly passed everybody as fit for inclusion in the working parties without examining any single man.
4.

Prior to my draft leaving on this working party, each
Prisoner of War was issued with two pairs of canvas rubber boots, maximum size9s. Those Prisoners of War who required a larger size than $9 s$ had to go without footwear.
5. This draft left Soerabaja on lIth April 1943. A total of two thousand and fifty Prisoners of War, both British and Dutch were all consigned to Harockoc. Other drafts were also included in the convoy and proceeded to AMBOII and CTRAM Island.
16. As regards tho Harockoe draft, they boarded a Jananese ship named MAGCIE MARU. Accomodation was provided in the
I holes, where a wood platform had been eroctcd helf way between the two decks. Instead of walking below, one had to crawl | below with ones kit. Officers and Doctors end othor ranks $=11$ jumbled up together. Each nan had to himself for living, cating and sleaning and storing his kit, tho space of 5 square feot $x$ a headroon of 4 feet, making a total of twonty cubic feot. During the whole voyoge drink in the form of tee was issued in unlimited quantities. Food was very pocr, consisting of two meals a day, each meal being approximately 100 grammes ( $3 \frac{1}{2}$ ounces) of Rico Pap, vith an addition to the evening meal fi a small mensure of soup conteining about one ounce of vegetables and one quartor ounce of shark fish. Washing facilities wore almost non existant. Exercise was linited to the very fev occasions during the voyage that we wore permitted to go on deck for roll call and visiting the latrines. During the last week of the voyage, when the Prisoners of War vere beginning to go sick, a fev mon at a time were permitted on deck under the direct supervision of the Japanese Major AMAMI.
7. This Japonese Major Anani had addressed us prior to our leaving Socrabaya and informed us that "in future he was to be our commander and that we were to look at his 'bloody' face and that our lives were to be his safety", to use his very words. We were well to remomber his words.
8. Dysentry and general sickness soon begon. One morning the Prisoner of $\pi r$ Doctors started to orgonise a Prisoner of War sick parade on the forepart of the ship. The Jopenese kiajor Anami and a Japanase "errant Officer who was nicknaned "yellow boots" duly attended this sick parace. "Yollow beots" proceeded to beat up those Prisoners of Mar who reporte? sick, using the flat of his spord and beating them until they 11 replied that they were not sick. So ended the sick parade.
9. No life seving equipment was issued to the Prisoners of Tar. The firefighting services were non existent, and there were no life boets on board.
10. AibBIIMA town vas roeched on Ist May, 1943, and it wes there that it vas discovered that the shin's holds were full of petrol, bormbs and amunition. Harockoc islend was eventually reached by mysclf and the perty of two thousand and fifty Prisoners of Tar on 5 th licy, 1043. We landed at night in a very heavy tropical rainstorm and discovored that the camp was only partly built and was still undor construction.
11. The naxt morning the sick, who amountec to about $50 \%$, were weeded out and the remainder of the Prisoners of War commenced to complate the construction of the camp, which was composed of bamboc huts covered with a local paln leaf. No tea or even water was provided to drink for the first four days. , The first meal was proviced after 26 hcurs and this consisted of sloppy rice of $3 \frac{1}{2}$ ounces ( 100 grames). Food for the first week |was anpalling. Me only had moals once in every twenty four hours which consisted every time of sloppy rice. Tater was eventually discovered in an adjoining river which was used for drinking and cooking. This river was highly polluted, as the | natives used it as a. latrine.
12. Squadron Leeder PITTS, Royal Air Force, was the senior British Officer in the camp, with Scuadron Leacer HOPIISS, Royal Air Force as second senior (now dead). The British Medical Officers were: Flight Lieutenant PHILPS, and Flight Lieutenant FORBES, Royal Air Force. The senior $\mathbb{N}$ therland 3 sast Indies Forces Doctor wes: Captain BUIING.
13. The Japanese Major (now Colonel) Anami was in charge of all Prisoner of War Camps in the district using Haroekoe as his Headquarters. The Japanese 2nd. (now Ist) Lieutenant KURISHIMA was camp commandant. His staff consisted of the Japanese Sergeant NORI as second in chorge, the Korean KASIAMA as Znglish-Japanese interpreter, plus about one hundred Koresns.

* 74 . - On the third day after arrival at this conp the Japanese
- said that the major task of construeting a Japenose Airfield
- must begin the nezu day. Working parties would consist of as
- meny Prisoners of War as possible working in two shifts from
- daylight to dark.

15. It was pointed out to the Japenese Lieutenent KURISHIMA by the Prisoner of Wrr Officers that obviousiy the Prisoners of Tar were not in a fit state at present to comence heavy work for the following reasons:-
(i) Partial sickness of almost all Prisonors of War when they left Jove.
(ii) Gonoral conditions on board shin, such as overcrowding, loss of sleen, lack of exercise, and general bed feoding.
(iii) Very bad feeding since arrival at Harcekoe.
(iv) Very little sloep since arrival at Haroelcoo owing to sleapirig on the wet and flooded ground.

All of these points were disregerded by the Jananese and the next morning the working perties begen. Later this seme day all Prisoner of War Ufficers left in camo, wero paraded and soverely beaten up by Sergeant Mori and Lt. Kurishima, presumably as intimication tactics.
16. After about the first week the sick rate anongst the Prisoners of War was so high (principally Dysentry) that the Jejanese were very worried and orderod 211 Prisoners of "Tar in camp that cculd crawl to build sleeping platforms in the barracks. On, I think, it vas the eighth dey, thero were so many sick that all Airfield working parties were stopped and the whole Prisonor of War cann Was turned into a hospital area. I took over inside working perties under the direction of Sergeent Mori and ell the Prisoners of Var that could possibly do a little work, caried on improving the camp. The difficult part of this was, that Sorgeant Mori would not givo me a froc hand. I was on expert at camp construction and he knew absolutely nothing.
17. The existing latrines were only open trenches and the flies were breeding in multitudes and carrying the dysentry germs to all and sundry. The camp was irmediately on the edge of the sea. I requested Serceant Mori to give me the materials and permission to construct a latrine imediately over the sed, explaining that the existing sanitery accommodetion was cousing the spread of disease in the cerp. Pormission wes refused. Later a Japenese Medical Officer arrived, and I repeated my request to him. He duly considered it and turned it down giving as reasons the following: "That the dysuntry germs would pollute the sea, spread all over the world and thus would reach Japan." At this stage rubbish in the camo was disposed of under Sergeant Mori's instructions in open holes fag in the ground, these simply provided breeding places for the flies. I pointed out to Sergeant Mori how dangorous this was, land recuested permission to build an incinerator, and thus burn the rubbish. This was refused on the grounds that Allied iAircraft would see the smoke from the incinerator.

- I8- After three huncred Prisoners of War had died in this I camp over a pericd of one year, I eventually persuaded the Japanese to let me build a Iatrine over the sea. They never did grant permission to builc an incinerator. During this period of one year, I repeatedly asked pormission and material to alter the pernicious systen of open trench latrines. This was refused repoatedly. The Japanese remedy to overcone the "fly" nuisance was to issue an ordor thet "all Prisoners of Mar, including officers, were to cetch so many hundred flies a day, the catch to be counted at night by the Prisoner of Tar Company Commanders". I repeatedy stresscd in conjunction with the Prisoner of Nar Ifodical Officer that this mothod was of little use and that the remedy was to stop the flies breoding by adopting my recormendations as regerds sanitary arrangements. As the sicknoss got vorse and the death rate began to croop upwards, the Prisonor of Hor Nedical Officer made repoated roquests to the japanose for supplies of medicines and better food. The small cuantities as supplied were hopelessly inaciequate.

19. The whole camp of Prisoners of "wer at this time vere existing on a 24 hour ration of 150 grames ( $5 \frac{1}{2}$ ounces) of rice. The Jepanese wore apparentiy uncer the improssion that very sick men would rocover and get well again on this diet, and soon be fit once nore for heavy namua? vork on the construction of their airfield. In a very short tine almost evory Prisoner of War had Beri-Beri to add to his troubles and the death rate was mounting daily to as much as 14 and 15. After a few weeks of this high death rate tho Japanese docided that working parties, sick included, must carry on the construction of the airfield. I witncssed the first parade of the sick men at 2 p.m. one day. Attending the parade wero pationts, Prisonor of War Medical Officers, the sanior camp Prisoner of Har Officer, the Japanese Modical Officer, Lt. Kurishime, Sgt. Mori and Kasiana.
20. A Jepanese geve the order to stop forward to the first patient, who was a Dutchmen. The Japenose thon asked what the trouble was. The Prisoner of Tar Medical Officer explained thet it was a bad case of Beri-Beri and the patient could barely walk. So Sgt. licri thon geve the pationt a terrific clout in the snall of the back with a bamboo pole which was about 6 ft long by abovt 2 inches in diametre. This clout litorally picked the patient uo about 2 foet into the air and deposited him about 5 feet fron where ho had beon standing. I buried this patient a fer days leter.
21. And so it went on. The 5.0.7. Nedic:1 Officers protested and were beaton up for thoin trouble. This is a typicel cxemple of dozens of such parades that wont on by all of the Jepanese mentioned above when they more scoking sick P.O.V. for working partios.
22. Hospital conditions were almost incescribable. The P.O. . Medical Oificors and staff struggled on manfully against almost hopeless odds. Not only was there starvation and an alnost complete lack of merical supplies, but also savage brutality to sick P.O.W., P.O.T. Medical Officers and their staffs by Sgt. Mori and Kasiana, ofton aldod and abottod by It. Kuashime. The patients in general vere looking like living slrejetons. Thosepatients who could either walk or stageer used to go on |to the sea beach and gather sea vermir sueli es shatis ctc., fook these and share with thetr woaker omacaus. Others eaught lrats and mice and aI工 wont into the cooking Dotin their alI most hopoless task of trying to get sufficiont tood to keep alive.

Dogs and cats went the same way into the cooking pot, but

- when these were obtainable they wore cooked in the camp kitchen for the benefit of the camp as a whole. The slck P.O.W. Were as eager as possible to gain sufficient strength to stagger on to the Japanese working pertios, as those got a little extra food in the way of very snall issue of moat and vegetables. Also other mothods of obtaining food outside the camp were sometimes possible, such as exchenging personal possessions with the natives. Also Sct. Nori was trading in a big way and exchanging erticles for food with the P.O. .

23. Malaria was also on the upgrade when I took over the reconstruction of this cemb. I stressed to Sgt. Mori the importance of my being pormitted to carry out anti-nalaria measuros on the outskirts of the camp. Numerous applications were also made to Lt. Kurishima both by myself and the P.0.7. Modical Officers which were persistently refused, until we had been in the camp sone twelve months. Even after this, anti-malaria precautions were only allowed to be carried out in a most unsatisfactory manner.
24. The avorage woring hours for P.O. . at this camp wore as follovs:-

6 a.m. Reveille
$6.30 \mathrm{E} . \mathrm{m}$.
$7.45 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}$.
8. a.m.-1 p.m.

Breakfast
Roll call and Parade Work


Midey meal All P.O." , work All insicie canp working parties augmented by those who had been wortring outside the camp - 2.11 carrice on until dark with camp fatigues.

Thus the men never sew the inside of their barack in the daylight or had any form of recreation. 耳ven bathing in the adjacent river had to be carried out in the dark.
25. During the whole of the poriod soent in this canp. i.e. some 15 months, the only recreation we had was two football matches, two concerts and for the first three months only, Sunday evening Charch services. No Red Cross supplies of any kind wes ever received. In Iivy 1944, the Jepenese let us write one postcerd home, morale increased a little at this, but these postcards vere burnt and as far as I cen trace, not one over left the islend, About 100 lettors and six cablograms were received at Caristmas 1943, this good luck cheered the recipients up no end.
26. The: usual sloppings and beatings went on in this cemn as in all others, in the majority of cases for the most trivial offences and very ofton for no offence at all.
27. The clothing and foctwers situation, pomicularly the latter, beceme very coute aftex the risst few nonths as the P.O.T. were woming aimost contjmously on Conl surfoce. $0: 1 y$ once, did the J.n.n so issue a ferm items of Doch uniform clothing, which was holpiessly inadertate fow the whole cano. 1 And for the last your in the camp alnost $=11$ P. G. F. hed no footwear of any kind,
28. Lots of $\mathrm{P}, \mathrm{O}, \mathrm{W}$, were having trouble with their eyes, principally through mainutrition. Sore weint quite plind, some scmi-blind. Many attompted to carry on with the outside working
parties as the only hope of obtaining sufficient food to keep them alive. These conditions were particularly bad on
I the airfield consturetion job, owing to the very fierce glare of the sun, shining on the Coral surface. "e asked the
Japanese to supply sun glasses.
29. After we had been in this carp for sone weeks, the Japanese gave us permission to have a small shop, nd purchase local supplies of fruit, eta. Sgt. Mon controlled the purchases, and also the selling side under two P.0.7. officers, namely $F / O$ Robson and F/O Corbet, R.A.F. Only those who worked hard were permitted to purchase these very limited supplies of goods on a coupon system. Thus the stick had very little opportunity of buying anything. I understand from the two named officers, that at least ion ono month Set. Mri's account had to be written off to the extent of five hundred guilders, which of course rent, that the P.O.W. had to foot the bill. At another occasion the P.O.V. fund at the canteen had to pay for a supply of five pigs that reeve delivered for Japanese consumption, to the extent of one hundred end cignty guilders, and so the story of corruption could go ch. After a time, provided P.0.T.'s mortised hard, the supply of rice was increased to 400 grammes a dey.
30. As regards A.R.?. precautions inlthe comp, although vo repeatedly requested the Jannese permission to provide shelter accommodation, it was some months, before pornisslon was obtained and then the 0.0 . W. had to dig these in their spare time. I have already explained their mor'sing hours, so it cen be clearly understood what spiro time the men had. As regards A.R.P. trenches on the airfield, it was not until wo had been on the airfield for a year, that provision was made in this respect, although plenty of allied aircraft were operating in the vicinity.
31. After we had occupied this camp for several months, the buildings started to collapse, and the Japanese gave me permission to rebuild the whole camp, working under the direct instructions of Sgt. Mort. So, using semi-rsick ?.O.T. as a labour force, I rebuilt the thole cen. Te also organised large areas as gardens. These better living conditions, together with quantities of vegetables from the gardens, greatly improved the health, morale and spirit of the whole comp.
32. Of the two thousand and fifty P.O.T. that started in this camp, three hundred and eighty six died and pere buried there. In addition a party of six hundred very sick left to return to Java in Uctober-Novembar 1943, and at later dates various other small parties of sick left to return to Java.
33. I consider that the causes of death of the $386 ? .0 .7$. who died on this island, can be attributed to the following:
(i) General brutal ill-treatment and beatings by Sgt. Mri, who consistently vised berioon sticks and poles and also a ride leathon samite belt with a heavy brass bookie ot the end to beat Prisoners with. Simitar methods tow =iso used by the noreen interpectic. Ch stans.
(ii) Constant monnatrition cousac by fnsufioiont food jusiod by the Japanese overeat and agecatetea ky the euthowisce socle petrie reduced on instructions bi Th. mithra and Sgt. Mort.
(iii) Refusal by the Japanese in charge of us, to allow us to build a proper trench labrine system and a similar refusel to aliow us to dispose of rubbish by burning, in orcer to prevent fries breeding and check the spread of dysentry.
(iv) Lack of medical supplies. The Japanese never geve us any medical attention whatever.
(v) I regard Mojor (now Lt-Col.) Anami who whs in charge of all P.O.T. camps in the Haruek:0e area, as being primarily responsible tor ihese conditions, I aiso regard the ferojroc emo staff as heving a large share of the responsibility for conditicns. Tnese include:-

It。 KUnISHINA,
Sgt. MORI,
Interpreter KASIANA.
34. Descriotions of tyo of these Japanese are es under:-

Lt. IURISIIMA

Sergeant MORI

> About 5"7" tall, normally in good health, weishs about 10 stone, usual Jopenese features with close cut, black hair. Hebitually wears elasses and presumably vas in a Japenese cavalry reginent, as he wone jack boots with spurs. He tcld me that he was a railway station master by profession. Speaks ? lot of English.

Known by aI] P. 0. . We as "BAMBOO MCRI", is akcut "?'" tall, Weighs normally. in good hoelth, about 10 stone, 12 los.; is very muscular with veny wide and powerful shoulders. Usual Jepanese features with usual Japanese short b. ack heir. Is very nartioular about his dress and is aimost a non-smoker. Speoks a little English.
35. Annexed to this affidavit and marked mxhibit A', is a nominal roll of prisoners of wre tho died and were burice on Harockoe island. It was part of my duties to keep a record of all those who died. The British Officer in command of Heroekoe island was Saucdron Leader PIrIS.

SWORN by the said IENIS ERIAI MASONT, )
at 6, Spring Gerdems in the City of ${ }^{\text {, }}$ D. B. Mason
Wostminister this Bth day of February, 1946.) (Sga,; D.B. MisON.
Before ne
A. M. Bell-Moctcnaid 1/ajor
(Sgd.) A. IT, Eoll-Moortonald.

Exhibit A referred to in the Efifdavit of Flying Officer D. B. Mason R.A.F.g sworn before me on 8 th day of Fobruery 1946. /s/ A. . To Tell-Macdonald

Irjor RA Legal Staff
HAROEXOE ISLISD
AMBON GROUP HET
NOHTNAL ROLL OF DSAD


| Grave $\mathrm{No} .$ | Name | Initial | Rank | $\begin{gathered} \text { Serv- } \\ \text { ice } \end{gathered}$ | - Scrvice Number | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P.O.W. } \\ & \text { Minnber } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Assendelft-De-Coningh | C.F. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Soleier } \\ & \text { Col } \end{aligned}$ | $D$$R$$R$$R$$R$$D$$R$$R$$R$$D$$D$$D$ | $\begin{aligned} & ? \\ & 7118974 \\ & 93330 \\ & 970589 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 10925 \\ 633 \\ 1328 \end{array}$ |
| 2 | Smith | D.7. |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | parsons | G.V.B. | Cnl |  |  | - 676 |
| 5 | Eekhout | B. I.A. | Sgt/M |  |  | 4224 |
| 6 | Fienmington | W. 3. |  |  |  | 489 |
| 7 | Green | R.F. | LAC |  |  | 1846 |
| 8 | Kortelink | E. |  |  |  | 6000 |
| 9 | Ruitenbach | W.A. |  |  |  | 6634 |
| 10 | Moll | P.J.H. |  |  | 108296 | 6305 |
| 11 | Crawforth | - ${ }_{\text {N }}$. | Gunner | 1(RA) |  | 1682 |
| 13 | Isaacs | J.A. | AC | R | 1272715 | 1590 |
| 14 | Varnett | R. | LAC | R |  | 905 |
| 15 | Lucas | J. |  | D |  | 6183 |
| 16 | Ridley | E.L.G. | AC7 | R | 1252008 | 2220 |
| 18 | Edverds | F. | Lac | P. |  | 1697 |
| 19 | Lakeman | \%. H . | Col | R |  | 519 |
| 20 | Wolff | J.if. |  | D |  | 2930 |
| 21 | Elenbaas | P. N . |  | D |  | 10936 |
| 22 | Beard | A.B. |  | R |  | 1420 |
| 23 | Peters |  | ACI | R | 932780 | 1258 |
| 24 | De-Vink | P. F . |  | D |  | 4509 |
| 25 | Westlake | D.C. |  | R |  | 224.0 |
| 26 | Koning | A. N. |  | D |  | 3241 |
| 27 | Draper | J.A. | F/S | R | 518877 | 277 |
| 28 | Bristow | R.P. | F/S | R | 520381 | 29, |
| 29 | Bolsham | A. $0^{\text {a }}$ | Sat |  |  |  |
| 31 | Poole | J.K. | Sg | 去 |  | 7538 |
| 32 | Tipple | A.T. |  | B |  | 894 |
| 33 | Andress | D.? |  | D |  | 4898 |
| 34 | Horne | K.L. |  | R |  | 751 |
| 35 | Winch | I. G. |  | $\underline{R}$ | 1214361 | 1066 |
| 36 | Parker | M.F. | Lic | $\xrightarrow{8}$ | 1030258 | 1210 |
| 37 | Romer | A.I. |  | D |  | 6589 |
| 30 | Schurink | 3.1. | Inc | , | 64.5529 | 1982 |
| 40 | Stokes | L. ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | $\ldots$ |  | 836 |
| 41 | Grend | A.J. |  | R | 934676 | 2272 |
| 42 | Murohy | R.A. |  | R |  | 1792 |


| Greve No． | Name | Initial | Rank | Servicc | Service No． | $\begin{gathered} \text { P.O.V. } \\ \text { NO. } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 43 | Domont | H．${ }^{\text {W }}$ 。 |  | D |  | 7545 |
| 4.4 | Broad | T．M． | $\mathrm{F} / \mathrm{S}$ | F | 363418 | 287 |
| 45 | McManus | F。 |  | R | 1026769 | 1796 |
| 46 | Fender | J． | LaC | R | 1103623 | 1842 |
| 47 | Cooke | F．G． | LAC | P． | 1177719 | 1398 |
| 4.8 | Adelink | E： |  | D |  | 74.18 |
| 49 | Brown | J．${ }^{\text {a }}$ ． | Coz | R | 1004010 | 562 |
| 50 | Macdison | X R 2 | S\％ | R |  | 357 |
| 51 | Lee | A．G． |  | R |  | 1559 |
| 52 | Dommers | M，J． |  | D |  | 5369 |
| 53 | Bdwards | S．J． |  | n |  | 1493 |
| 54 | Tyler | CoJ． | LAC | I |  | 980 |
| 55 | Bevley | E．T．C． | F／S | R |  | 297 |
| 56 | Potter | V．J． |  | R | 913914 | 1016 |
| 57 | Holmes | F．C． | L． 1 C | R | 1161052 | 1220 |
| 58 | Storey | Ti． |  | R | 1303164 | 1691 |
| 59 | Thompson | A．A．W． |  | E |  | 14.57 |
| 60 | Hooker | A．E． | Cnl | R |  | 4.00 |
| 61 | Tarren | C．T． | CnI | R | 917055 | 434 |
| 62 | Webstor | J．S． | $A C$ | R | 1290450 | 1157 |
| 63 | Rogerson | J． | 401 | P | 052920 | 787 |
| 64. | Ward | C．S． | CII | R | $003259$ | 439 |
| 65 | Peris | J．G． | Stir | A | c19445 | 2146 |
| 66 | Methley | J． 7 | FiO | R |  | 182 |
| 67 | French | D．Na， | ACI | P | 1073634 | 1298 |
| 68 | Paumen | H．H，ت． |  | D |  | 3353 |
| 69 | Docherty | G，${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  | R | 631275 | － 104 |
| 70 | Foley | S．T． | AC | R | 1330709， | 1892 5.89 |
| 72 | Glaze | R．C． | L＾C | R |  | 1752 |
| 73 | Me Ras | D． | L．AC | R | 978807 | 1307 |
| 74 | Morgan | J．S．A． |  | N |  | 2052 |
| 75 | Gosden died 31．5．43 | A．I．S． | L．CC | R | 184677 | 1350 |
| 76 | Linthwaite | D． | AC | R | 1380368 | 1443 |
| 77 | McConey | P． | AC | R | 1205336 | 1514 |
| 78 | Seddon | T． | AC | R | 1036234 | 1554 |
| 79 | Friend | F．I． |  | NT |  | 721 |
| 80 | Mest | A．D． |  | R |  | 1460 |
| 81 | Uitorcijk | M． |  | D |  | 11013 |
| 82 | Maersen | A． |  | D |  | 6199 |
| 83 | Goey | 71． | IAC | R |  | 1340 |
| 84 | Carty |  | AC | R |  | 2469 |
| 85 | Trigg | C．C． |  | 31 | $1095592$ | 7729 |
| 86 | Taylor | J． | LAC | R 8 | $858990$ | 1837 |
| 87 | Limmage | C．T． | Cul | R | 953374 | 449 |
| 89 | Kollisson | H．F。 | ${ }_{\text {A }} \mathrm{CO}^{-1}$ | R | 128170 | 229．7 |
| 90 | Carson | S． | Col | R |  | .615 |
| 91 | Flement | S．I． |  | R | 729359 | 935 |
| 92 | Medley | サ，サ。 | AC II | R | 1535231 | 1447 |
| 93 | Clerk | D．T． | AC I | R | 924830 | 1483 |
| 94 | Hayes | M． | IAC | R |  | 1647 |
| 95 | Hunslip | J．C． |  | D |  | 1009 |
| 96 | Harris | I．E． |  | R |  | 1857 |
| 97 | Walker | $\mathrm{R} \cdot \mathrm{C}$ ． | ISC | R | 10075，46 | 1951 |
| 98 | Newble | E．${ }_{\text {S }}$ |  | R |  | 1013 |
| 99 | Worsley | $\mathrm{S}=\mathrm{A}$ 。 | AC I | R | 1070593 | 730 |
| 100 | Komen | C． |  | D |  | 5989 |
| 101 | Mahoney | D． 17. | IAC | $\underline{R}$ |  | 1170 |
| 102 | Barnes | J．L． | Gunner | A | 1771718 | 21.14 |
| 103 | Stacey | C． | L＾C | R |  | 848 |
| 104 | Jones | A．D． | Sldr | A |  | 2145 |
| 105 | Jess | T．J． | Cpl | I | 548834 | 405 |


| Grave No． | Name | Initial | Fank | Service $\begin{gathered}\text { Scrvic } \\ \text { No．}\end{gathered}$ | $\mathrm{co} \mathrm{P.O.W}$ No. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 106 | Huizen | TV．J． |  | D | 3010 |
| 107 | Kelsell | $\square$ | Cbl | I | 520 |
| 108 | Raoburn | G．I． | $\therefore \mathrm{C}$ | R | 1223 |
| 109 | Cloeve | T． | Gunner | A 1587829 | 2115 |
| 110 | Doans | J．M． | LAC | R | 1490 |
| 111 | Heyboer | $G . B$ ． |  | D | 5759 |
| 112 | Devis | R．E． | Col | R | 476 |
| 113 | Castell | A．E．B． | F／S | I 364568 | 284 |
| 114 | Hunter | J。 | Slr | A 6000 | 2752 |
| 115 | Paxton | A． | LAC | It 630239 | 739 |
| 116 | Arendse | S．F． |  | D | 4920 |
| 117 | Van Arenthals | J． |  | D | 7384 |
| 118 | Belk | m | SIdr | D | 494.4 |
| 119 | Ameljden－Van－Duyn | E． |  | D） | 74.61 |
| 120 | Walsh | P．J． | IAC | R 54.9567 | 890 |
| 121 | Schonhage | I．A． |  | D | 3323 |
| 122 | Watmore | G．H． | Sldr | A | 2130 |
| 123 | Ironmonger | R．7． | Sgt | R 519418 | 368 |
| 124 | Windhouver | J． |  | D | 10995 |
| 125 | Hunter | G．O． | LAC | R | 1878 |
| 126 | Manning | I．G． | LaC | P． 912481 | 1117 |
| 127 | Van－Der－Beelr | $C \cdot R$ ． |  | D | 10740 |
| 128 | Roos | J。 |  | D | 6600 |
| 129＂ | Reinders | H．A． |  | D | 10951 |
| 130 | Christie | R．C．M． | ACI | R 982397 | 1706 |
| 131 | Grant | J．B． | Sgt | R ${ }^{\text {R }}$ | 354 |
| 132 | Way | $J . M$ ． | ACI | R 926461 | 947 |
| 133 | Happel | M．J。 |  | D | 5677 |
| 134 | Beaumont | K． | LAC | R | 1391 |
| 135 | Sneelres | H．II． |  | D | 6783 |
| 136 | Bronsgeest | S．？． |  | D | 5168 |
| 137 | Snith | H．R． | Sgt | D | 3437 |
| 138 | Poldermahs | J．J． | Sgt | D | 4104 |
| 139 | Fiutchins | C．E． | AC | R 625111 | 769 |
| 140 | Tobias H | H．A．J．T． | Sgt | D ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | 3473 |
| 141 | Parlow | D． | AC | R 1497415 | 1200 |
| 142 | Burncll | J．R． | LIC | R $\quad 933307$ | 1354 |
| 143 | Bearschers | J． | Sgt | D 6017 | 4672 |
| 144 | Driver | C．e＇． | Cpl | R 648111 | 493 |
| 145 | Furniss | C．A． | LAC | R 868690 | 1498 |
| 146 | Palmer | T．${ }^{\text {a }}$ | LAC | R 1304124 | 2015 |
| 147 | Carborry | J． F 。 | ${ }_{4} \mathrm{Cl}$ | R 950121 | 2031 |
| 148 | Llove． | $\pm$ 。 | Lic | R 621950 | 1815 |
| 149 | Guthrie | C．S． | CpI | R 130361 | 589 |
| 150 | Jenkins | S．G．R． | AC | R | 9.44 |
| 151 | Taylor | H． | ACI | R 1291754． | 1015 |
| 152 | Gibson | E，G． | IAC | R 913057 | 2295 |
| 153 | Boogert | A．F． |  | D | 5093 |
| 154 155 | Cummings | J．S． | $A C$ | R R | 2204 |
| 156 | Jansch | G．F． | Sgt | D | 4230 or |
| 157 | Fitzpatrick | M． | Sldr | A 8474.18 | 2141 |
| 158 | Durno | J．E． | LAC | R 1123370 | 1377 |
| 159 | Dezentje D | D．F．D．C． |  | D | 5341 |
| 160 | Roso | A． |  | D | 11004 |
| 161 | Middleton | $F$ 。 | ACl | R 1078252 | 797 |
| 163 | Van Anstel | P．C． | Sgt | D（ 153 MJ ） | 3917 |
| 163 | Harper（151 M Seletar | r）$A \cdot T$ 。 | AC | R 640\％57 | 1658 |
| 164 | White | S．U． | L．C | R 632234 | 2047 |
| 165 | Weatherley | $P=$. | LAC | R 7.6322 | 902 |
| 166 | Loveridge | C．H． | $A C$ | F． 949187 | 1508 |



H.M.S. Jupiter

| Grave No． | Name | Initial | Rank | Servico | Service No． | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P.O.T. } \\ & \text { NO. } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 290 | Hilliard | $J . R$. | Chr | A | 1779353 | 212.4 |
| 291 | Hind | J．F． | Sgi | R | 564645 | 34.2 |
| 292 | Ballinger | A，TV．$B$ ． | $\therefore \mathrm{SC} 2$ | R | 1401299 | 1028 |
| 293 | Loveridge | N．J． | ACI | R | 1205726 | 752 |
| 294 | McAllen | J．J．B． | AC2 | R | 1024863 | 2184 |
| 295 | Geely | G．W． | IAC | R | 634171 | 1702 |
| 296 | Westun | C．C． | IC | R | 1261430 | 1779 |
| 297 | Mansbury | W． H ． | LAC | If | 626655 | 1288 |
| 298 | Curtis | m．P．I． | ACI | R | 930326 | 1701 |
| 299 | Robinson | F ． | LAC | R | 1004752 | 1544 |
| 300 | Broekhuysen | M．J． |  | D |  | 10385 |
| 301 | Walror | M．S． | 1. | R | 1173011 | 1095 |
| 302 | Street | N．S． | LAC | R | 1182033 | 1750 |
| 303 | Muir | A． | LAC | R | 574540 | 1803 |
| 304 | Dumbleton | A． | AC2 | R | 1139355 | 1562 |
| 305 | Nunn | R．T． | IAC | R | 933127 | 1948 |
| 306 | Thomas | H．G． | LAC | R | 529304 | 1114 |
| 307 | Bevsichem | J．A． |  | D |  | 4241 |
| 308 | Head | C．E． | P／0 | R |  | 228 |
| 309 | Isaacson | H． 2. | LiC | R | 750952 | 1648 |
| 310 | Hill | G． | C01 | R | 649400 | 420 |
| 311 | Nash | T．S． | LAC | R | 625255 | 795 |
| 312 | Uren | B． | ${ }^{\text {AC }}$ | R | 1147220 | 923 |
| 313 | Hert | J． | CyI | R | 1255250 | 700 |
| 314 | Bus | I．J．M． |  | D |  | 5206 |
| 315 | Beards More | E．J． | A．C． | R | 644622 | 1711 |
| 316 | Devonport | G． | L．A．C． | R | 1650110 | 893 |
| 317 | Denekamp | Fi． |  | D |  | 4254 |
| 318 | Sayer | W．B． | L．A．C． | ir | 645390 | 1751 |
| 319 | Mullins | S．G． | L． H ．C． | R | 1253430 | 830 |
| 320 | Brinkman | C．J．J． |  | D |  | 5147 |
| 321 | Monts | P．M． | L．A．C． | R | 970802 | 1810 |
| 322 | Annis | F． | I．A．C． | R | 907763 | 859 |
| 323 | Beckman Lepre | H．P． | Sgt | D |  | 3937 |
| 324 | Harris | A．T． | I．f． C ． | R | 653946 | 1121 |
| 325 | Allon | S．W． | A．C．I | R | 122974 | 1919 |
| 326 | Mayor | D． |  | D |  | 7421 |
| 327 | Chappell | J．E． | A．C．I | R | 1187467 | 1481 |
| 328 | Orscin | A．IR． | L．A．C． | R | 902187 | 1521 |
| 329 | Wrjeght | J．F． | Col． | R | 642779 | 548 |
| 330 | Waters | G．L． | F／S | ？ | 521440 | 299 |
| 331 | Garder | I．J． | A．C． | R | 1501578 | 1464 |
| 332 | Williams | D．C． | F／S | R | 510721 | 290 |
| 333 | Bonnett | I．M． | L．A．C． | R | 917074 | 1630 |
| 334 | Brooks | H． H ． | A．C． | R | 1201681 | 1549 |
| 335 | Darwin | J． | Col． | R | 926872 | 473 |
| 336 | Van Essen | D．M． |  | D |  | 4926 |
| 337 | Ponny | F。E。 | L．A．C． | R 11 | $10(8 ?) 830$ | 7213 |
| 338 | Hardy | H．A． | L．A．C． | R | 1196796 | 1740 |
| 339 | Edverds | $F$ 。 | Cpl． | 1 | 508081 | 426 |
| 340 | Haig | E．H．S． | A．C． | R | 1195599 | 1333 |
| 341 | Hall | $\mathrm{G} \cdot \mathrm{A}$ ． | L．A．C． | R | 94.0901 | 2271 |
| 34.2 | Saywell | G．V．I． | I．A．C． | R | 912125 | 1953 |
| 343 | Groonev ld | J． |  | D |  | 126.15 |
| 344 | Goulty | R．R． | A．C． | R | 1334864 | 1533 |
| 345 | Mascn | F．P． | Cpl． | R | 909374 | 602 |
| 346 | Miller | B． | L．A．C． | $\lambda$ | 515996 | 1.255 |
| 347 | Ven Mil | J．G． |  | D |  | 4937 |
| 348 | Protz | L．C． | Cr 7. | R | 763144 | 575 |
| 349 | Thompson | G．S． | A．C．I | R | 1356432 | 898 |
| 350 | Palmer | K．E． | I．A．C． | R | 924405 | 940 |
| 351 | Jervis | E． $\mathrm{N}^{\text {．}}$ | L．A．C． | R | 1282273 | 1147 |



386 graves, total in all Haroekoe.

IN THE NATTER OF JAPANESE WAR CRIUES AND THE ILT-TRTATMEMT OF BRIMISH AND ALLIED PRISOINRS OF TAR ON HAROBKOE ISLAND, $\operatorname{IMBONT}$ GROUP.

AEEIDAYIT


I, HO. 145281 Flying-Officer DAIIS BRIAN MASON, K.A.F.' 2173
at present stationed at COSFORD near wOITBHAMPTON and with' permanent home address at 15, Chalkpit Torrace, DORKING, Surrey, make oath and say as follows:-

1. After being taken Prisoner of War in Mrech 1942, I was sent through various priscner of war caips, till on 8 th Janu ry, 1943, I reachec 'Yaarnarikt' Camp, Soerabaya, Jeva. There I found a camp which already had four thousand Prisoners of War of mixed nationalities. It was here that preparations were begun for the despatch of working Dartios of Prisoners of War I to FAPOEKOE Island, and other islands in the area, for the construction of airficlds.
2. I found gencral living conditions much as at othor canns, but with the splendid acditions of such as a factory in full working order, making 'Peanut Butter' for sale at reasonable prices. Canteens selling fruit, fresh buttor, eggs and a varied stock of chocolnte and tinned goods, ail over and above the Japanese scale of rations which was principally rice, rith a limited anount of vegetables, and also a very, very limited amount of frosh meat. Football and general recrectional games were permitted. Radio loudspeakers were instelled for locel broadcasting etc.; we also had two film shows showing Jepanese propaganda filns. A Jcpenese mevie camera staff visited the camp and took soecial shots of Prisoner of War camo life.
3. We very soon loarnt the reason for all this. The Jepanese were fattoning us up so that we might be in good physical condition to build Airfields in various perts of Japanese occupied territcries. The first week in April 1943 the Japanese camp officials began oreparing these working pertics for draiting to the various islands. Ono morning the fit Prisoners of Wer vere told to parade on the scuare. The sick were told to stey in their quarters so that the Jepanese Medical Officer could inspect then to see if they were fit to proceed on working parties. The Jrpenese liecical officer duly arrived, borrowed a cycle and rode around the camp. Upon return to the camp office ho duly stated that all sick in quarters were now fit and should all be incluced on the nominal rolls of working parties. It is to be noted that this Japenese Modical. Officer did not once stop or enter a building for the purpose of examining the patients. On the parade ground the Japanese Medical Officer duly walked un and down the ranks of the supposedly fit men and duly passed everybody as fit for inclusion in the working parties without examining any single man.
4. Prior to my draft leaving on this working party, each Prisoner of war was issued with two pairs of canvas rubber boots, meximum size9s. Those Prisoners of War who required a larger size than 9 s hed to go without footwear.

This draft left Soerabaya on Ilth April 1943. A total of two thousand and fifty Prisoners of Wrr, both British and Dutch were all consigned to Harockoc. Other drafts were also included in the convoy and proceedod to AMBOIT and CERAII Island.
16. As regares the Forockoe draft, they boarded a Jananese ship named MAGCIE MARU. Accomodation was provided in the
| holes, where a wood platform had been eroctcd h lf way between the two decks. Instead of taltring below, one had to crawl below with cnes rit. Officers and Dectors and othor ranks 11 jumbled up together. Bech man hed to himself for living, cating and sleeoing and storing his kit, the space of 5 square feet x a headroon of 4 feet, making a total of twenty cubic fect. During the whole voyoge drink in the form of tes was issucd in unlimited quantities. Food was very poor, consisting of two meals a day, each meal being approximately 100 grammes ( $3 \frac{2}{2}$ ounces) of Rico Pap, with an addition to the evening meal of a small messure of soup contrining about one ounce of vegetables and one quartor ounce of shark fish. Washing facilities were almost non existant. Exercise mas limited to the very fow ocesions during the voyage that we wore permitted to go on deck for roll cill and visiting the latrines. During the last week of the voyage, when the Prisonors of War vere beginning to go sick, = few mon at a time were pernitted on deck under the direct supervision of the Japanese Major AMAMI.
7. This Jepenese Major Anani had addressed us prior to our leaving Scerabaya and informed us that "in future he yas to be our commander and that we were to look at his 'bloody' face and thet our lives wore to be his safety", to use his very words. We were well to remomber his words.
8. Dysentry and general sickness soon begen. One morning the Prisoner of $\pi r$ Doctors sterted to orgenise a Prisoner of Wor sick par de on the forepart of the ship. The Jopenese Mojor Anami and a Japanese Verrant Officer who was nicknamed "yellot boots" duly attended this sick perade. "Yellow beots" proceeded to beat up those Prisoners of War who reported sick, using the flat of his sword and beating them until they 11 replied that they vere not sick. So ended the sick parade.
9. Ho life soving equipnent was issued to tho Prisoners of Tar. The firefighting services were non existent, and there were no life boets on board.
10. AIBCIMA town ves reached on 1st May, 1943, and it vas there that it was discoverod that the shin's holdswere full of petrol, borbs and amurition. Haroskoe islend mas eventually reached by mysclf and the party of two thousand and fifty Prisoners of Tor on 5 th liny, 1043. We lended at night in a vory heavy tropical rainstorm ind discovored that the carn was only partly built and was still undor construction.
11. The naxt morning the sick, who amounted to about $50 \%$, Were weoded out and the remainder of the prisoners of War commenced to complete the construction of the camp, which was composed of bamboo huts ccvered with a local palm leaf. Ho tea or even water was proviced to drink for the first four days. , The first neal was proviced after 26 hours and this consisted of sloppy rice of $3 \frac{1}{2}$ ounces ( 100 grames). Food for the first week Was appalling. we only had moals once in every twenty four hours which consisted every time of sloppy rice. Water was eventually discovered in an adjoining river which ves used for drinking and cooking. This river mos highly polluted, as the |natives used it as a latrine.
12. Squadron Leeder PIITS, Royal Air Force, was the senior British Officer in the camp, with Squadron Leader HOPKIIS, Royel Air Force as second senior (now dead). The British Medical Officers were: Flight Lieutenant PFIIPS, and Flight Lieutenant FORBES, Royal Air Force. The senior $N$ therland Zast Indies Forces Doctor was: Captain BUNING.
13. The Japanese Major (now Colonel) Anami was in charge of all Prisoner of War Camps in the district using Haroekoe as his Headquarters. The Japanese 2nd. (now Ist) Lieutenant KURISHIMA was camp commandant. His staff consisted of the Japanese Sergeant MORI as second in charge, the Korean KASIAMA as English-Japanese interpreter, plus about one hundred Koreans.

* *14.- On the third day after arrival at this camp the Japanese
- said that the major task of constructing a Japenesc Airfield
- must begin the nezu day. Working parties would consist of as

1 meny Prisoners of wor as possible working in two shifts from

- daylight to dark.

15. It was pointed out to the Japanese Lieutenant KURISHIMA by the Prisoner of Wer Officers that obviously the Prisoners of "ar were not in a fit state at present to comence heavy work for the following reasons:-
(i) Partial sickness of alnost all Prisoners of War when they left Jave.
(ii) General conditions on board ship, such as overcrowding, loss of sleep, lack of exercise, and general bed feciing.
(iii) Very bad feeding since arrival at Haroekoe.
(iv) Very little sleep since arrival at Haroekoe owing to sleaping on the wet and flooded ground.

All of these points were disregerded by the Japanese and the next morning the working parties begen. Later this seme day all Prisoner of War Officess left in camp, were paraded and scverely beaten up by Sergeant Mori and Lt. Kurishima, presumably as intimidation tactics.
16. After about the first week the sick rate amongst the Prisoners of War was so high (principally Dysentry) that the Japanese were very worried and crderod 211 Prisoners of War in camp that could crawl to build sleeping platforms in the barracks. On, I think, it was the eighth day, there were so many sick that all Airfield working parties were stopped and the whole Prisoner of War camp was turned into a hospital area. I took over inside working parties under the direction of Sergeent Mori and all the Prisoners of War that could possibly do a little work, carried on improving the camp. The difficult part of this was, that Sergeant Mori would not give me a free hond. I was an expert at camp construction and he knew absolutely nothing.
17. The existing latrines were only opon trenches and the flies were breeding in multitudes and carrying the dysentry gerrs to all and sundry. The camp was immediately on the edge of the sea. I requested Sergeant Mori to give me the materials and permission to construct a latrine immediately over the sea, explaining that the existing sanitary accommodation was causing the spread of disease in the canp. Pormission wes refused. Later a Japanese Medical Officer arrived, and I repeated my request to him. He duly considered it and turned it down giving as reasons the following: "That the dyscntry germs would pollute the sea, spread all over the world and thus Would reach Japan." At this stage rubbish in the camo was disposed of under Sergeant Mori's instructions in open holes
lag in the ground, these simply provided breeding places for the flies. I pointed out to Sergeant Mori how dangerous this was, land recuested permission to build an incinerator, and thus
burn the rubbish. This was refused on the grounds that Allied Aircraft would see the smoke from the incinerator.

I8- After three huncred Prisoners of War had died in this camp over a period of one year, I eventually persuaded the Japanese to let me build a latrine ovor the sea. They never did grent permission to builc an incinorator. During this period of one year, I repontady asked pormission and material | to altor the pernicious system of open trench latrines. This was rofused repoetedly. The Japonese renedy to overcome the "fly" nuisance was to issue an order that "all Prisoners of var, including officers, vere to catch so many hundred flies a day, the catch to be counted at night by the Prisoner of Var Company Commanders". I repeatedy stresscd in conjunction with the Prisoncr of Nar lifedical Officer that this nothod vas of little use and that the remody was to stop the flies breeding by adopting my recorrendations as regerds sanitery arrangoments. As the sickness got worse and the death rate began to crecp upwaras, the Prisonor of Tar Medical Officer made repoated requests to the Jopanose for supplies of medicinos and botter food. The small cuantities as supplied were hopelessly inadequate.
19. The whole camp of Prisoners of Ner at this tine vere existing on a 24 hour ration of 150 gremnes ( $5 \frac{1}{2}$ ounces) of rice. The Japanese vore apparentiy under the irprossion that very sick men would rucover and get well again on this diet, and soon be fit once moro for heavy namual work on the construction of their airfield. In a very short tine almost every Prisoner of War had Beri-Beri to add to his troubles and the death rate was mounting daily to as much as 14 and 15. Aftor a few weeks of this high death rate the Japanese decided that worling parties, sick includec, must carry on the construction of the airfield. I witnossed the first parade of the sick men at 2 p.m. one day. Attending the parade were pationts, Prisoner of War Medical Officers, the senior camp Prisoner of Var Officer, the Japanese Modical Officer, It. Furishime, Sgt. Mori and Kasiana.
20. A Japanese gave the order to stop forvard to the first patient, who was a Dutchnen. The Japenose then asked what the trouble was. The Prisoner of Tro Medical Officer explained thet it was a bad case of Beri-Beri and the pationt could barely walk. So Sgt. iliori then geve the patient a terrific clout in the small of the back with a bembno oole which was about 6 ft long by about 2 inches in diametre. This clout literaly picked the patient up about 2 fect into the air and deposited him about 5 feet fron where ho hed been standing. I buried this petient a few days later.
21. And so it went on. The P.C.7. Nediccl Officers protested and were beaten up for thoir trouble. This is a tyoicel oxemple of dozens of such perades that wont on by all of the Joponese mentioned above when they wore scoking sick P.O.W. for working parties.
22. Hospital conditions wer almost indescribable, The P.O.V. Medical Officers and staff struggled on menfuliy against almost hopeless odds. Not only was there starvation and an aimost complete lack of medical supplies, but also savage brutality to sick P.O.W. P.O.F. Modical Officers and their sterfs by Syt. Mori and Kasiama, ofton aided and abotted by It. Kumashime. The patients in genoral rere looking like living skejetons. Those petients who could either walk or staggor used to go on Ito the sea beach and gather sea vornir sucl as snails cte., fook these end share with thetw voaker omondus. Dthers caught Irats and mice and aİ wont into the conking pitin their alI most hojoless task of trying to get sufficient food to keep alive.

- Dogs and cats went the same way into the cooking pot, but
- when these were obtainable they were cooked in the camp
kitchen for the benefit of the camp as a whole. The sick
P.O.W. were as eagor as possible to gain sufficient strength to stagger on to the Japanesc working perties, as these got $\therefore$ Iittlo extra food in the wey of very sroll issue of moat and vegetables. Also other nothods of obtaining food outside the camp wore sometimes possible, such as exchenging personal possessions with the natives. Also Set. Nori was trading in a big way and exchanging erticles for focd with the P.O.V.

23. Malaria was also on the ungrade when I took over the reconstruction of this camp. I sizessed to Sgt. Mori the importance of my being nermitted to carry out anti-malaria measuras on the outskirts of the camp. Fumerous applications Were also made to Lt. Kurishime both by myself and the $P \cdot 0.7$. Medical Officers thich vere persistently refused, until ve had been in the camo some twelve months. Even after this, anti-malaria precautions mere only allored to be carried out in a most unsatisfactory manner.
24. The average working hours for P.O. . at this camp wore as follovs:-

| $\begin{aligned} & 6 \mathrm{a} \cdot \mathrm{~m} \cdot \\ & 6.30 \mathrm{a} \cdot \mathrm{~m} . \\ & 7.45 \mathrm{a} \cdot \mathrm{~m} . \\ & \text { 8. a.m.-1 p.m. } \end{aligned}$ | Reveille <br> Breakfast <br> Roll call <br> and Parade <br> Mork | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \mathrm{p} \cdot \mathrm{~m} \cdot-2 \\ & 2 \cdot-\mathrm{m} \cdot \\ & 5 \cdot 30 \mathrm{p} \cdot \mathrm{~m} \cdot-70 \mathrm{p} \cdot \mathrm{~m} \cdot \mathrm{~m} \end{aligned}$ | Middey meal <br> All P.O." Work <br> All insice canb working parties eugmented by those who had been worlting outside the canp - 211 carricd on until dark with camp fatigues. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

Thus the men never saw the inside of their barack in the daylight or had any form of recrention. Even bething in the adjacent river had to be carried out in the dari.
25. During the whole of the period spent in this camp. i.e. some 15 months, the only recration wo had was two football matches, two concerts and for the first three months only, Sunday evening Church services. No Red Cross supplies of eny kind was ever received. In if.y 1944, the Jepanese let us. write one postcerd home, norale increased a little at this, but these postcards vere burnt and as far as I oen trace, not one ever left the islend, About 100 lettors and six cablograms were received ato Chustias 1943, this good luck cheered the recipients up no end.
26. The usual slappings and beatings went on in this cemp as in all others, in the majority of cases for the most trivial offences and vory ofton for no offence at ill.
27. The clothing and foctwen situation, paricularly the latter, beceme very noute arter the urst fow minths as the P.O.T. were woming aimost contimously on Con? sufface.
 clothing, which mas holpuessly fladeruate fow the whole camp.
1 And for the last your in the canp elinost 211 P. 0 . T. hed no footwear of any kind,
28. Lots of 9.0 W. Were having troublo th their eyes, principally through mainutrition. Some vent quite blind, some scmi-blind. Nany attempted to carry on vith the outside working
parties as the only hope of obtaining sufficient food to
keep them alive. Thase conditions vere particularly bac on
the airficld consturetion $\mathrm{inb}_{\text {, owing to the very fierce glare }}$ of the sun, shining on the Coral surface. Te asked the
Japenese to supply sun glesses.
29. After we had been in this camp for sone weeks, the Japanese gave us permission to heve a small shop, nd murchase local supplies of fruit, ete. Sgt. Mozi controlled the purcheses, and also the selling sice under two P.0. . officers, namely $F / O$ Eobson and $F / 0$ Corbot, R.A.F. Oniy those who worked herd were permittod to purchase these very iimited supplies of goods on a coupon system. Thus the sicels had very little opportunity of kuying anything. J. understand from the two named oificers, thot at ieast icr ono month Sgt Mori?s account had to be written of to the extent of five huncrod guilders, which of course noont, that the Po. O.W. had to foot the bill. At another occasion the P.O.W. fund at the canteen hed to pay for a supply of live pigs that were delivered for Japenese consumption, to the extent of one hundred and oignty guilders, and so the story of corruption could go on. After a time, provided P.O.".'s morled hord, the supply of rice was increased to 400 grames a day.
30. As regerds A.R.?. orecavtions in the conp, although we repeatedly requested the Japnese permission to provide sholter accomodation, it was some months, berore pornission vas obtained and then the $0.0 . W$. hed to dig these in their spare tine. I have alreedy expleined their working hours, so it cen be cloarly understood what spere time the men hed. As regares A.R.P. trenches on the airfield, it wes not until we had beon on the eirfield for e. yoar, thet provision was made in this respect, although plenty of allice circraft were operating in tho vicinity.
31. Aftor we had occupied this camp for several months, the buildings started to collapse, and the Jepanese gave me pernission to rebuild the whole camp, worixing under the direct instructions of Sgt. Mori. So, using semi--siok ?.0.t. is a labour force, I rebuilt tho thole comb. Te also organiced large areas as gardens. These better living conditions, together with quantities of vegetables from the gardens, greatiy improved the health, norale and spirit of the wole canp.
32. Of the two thousand and fifty P.O.7. that startec in this carp, three hundred and eighy six cied end verie buried thore. In addition a perty of six handred rery sick left to return to Java in uctober-Novembor 1943, and at Inter dates various other small parties of sick lufi to retuen to Java.
33. I consider that the crusas of death of the 385 ?.0.7. who died on this island, can be attributed to the folloving:-
(i) Genoral brut-l ill-treatment and beatings by Sgt. Mori, who constistentiy usad buruon sticks and poles arid also a wide leatios semwe belt With a heavy brass buokle ot the end bact


(ii) Constart malmentrition cousod bu Ensutifiont food issmod ky the japsnese coy-theit and aggruvated ry the adthoriscic somio oung reducec on instructions by Th. ari innita and Sgt. Mori.
(iii) Refusal by the Japanese in charge of us, to allov us to build a proper trenck labrine systom and a similar refusel to allov us to dispose of rubbish by burning, in order to prevent finies breeding and check the spread of aysentry.
(iv) Lack of medical supplies. The Japonese never geve us any medical attention whatevar.
(v) I regerd Major (now Lt-Col.) Anami who Was in charge of 2.11 P.O.TM, camps in the Karockoe area, as being primarily mosponsthie tor these conditions. I ilso megard the Heroziroc enmo staff as having a large share of the responsibility for conditions. Tnese insIude:-

It。 KURISEIMA, Sgt. MORI, Interpreter KASIANA.
34. Descriptions of two of these Japanose are as under:-

It. IUURISHIMA

Sergeant MORI Known by aij P. O.N. as "BaMB00 MCRI", is abcut "'6" tall, Weighs nomelly, in good herlth, about 10 stone, 12 Ibs.; is very muscular with ve:y vide and powerful shoulders. Usual Jepanese features with usuel Japanese short bisek hair. Is very partioular about his dress and is aincst a non-smoker. Soeoks a little Englash.
35. Annexed to this affidavit and marked Exhibit $A$, is a nominal roll of prisoners of war tho died and were burice on Harockoe island. It was part of ny duties to keep a record of all those who died. The British Officer in comand of Heroekoe islend wes Sauadron Leader PImis.

SWORN by the saic LENTS DRIAI WASON, ) at 6, Spring Gertens in the City of ) D. B. Mason Westminister this Sth day of Fcbruary, 1946.) (Sga.; D.B. MASON.

Before me
A. N. Eoll-Mochenald Major
(Sgd.) A. Z, Bell- Minotonald,

Mxhibit A referred to in the affidavit of Flying Officer D. B. Meson R.A.F., sirorn before me on 8 th dey of Pebruary 1946. /s/A.M. Fell-Macdonald 1ajor RA Iegal Staff

## HAROETOR ISLAID

AMBON GROJP NET
NOITNAL ROLI OF DPAD
NOTES
$D=$ DUTCH
$\left.\begin{array}{l}\hat{R}=\mathrm{R} \cdot \mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{o}} \mathrm{F} . \\ \mathrm{A}=\mathrm{ARIV}, \\ \mathrm{N}=\mathrm{MAVY}\end{array}\right\}$
$\mathrm{N}=\mathrm{MAVY}$, BRITISH

No. Grave No = DIED \& BURIBD AT SEA? OR? PORT?


| Grave No． | Name | Initial | Renk | Servic | Service No． | $\begin{aligned} & \text { P. } 0 . \mathrm{NO} . \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 43 | Domont | F．${ }^{\text {W }}$ 。 |  | D |  | 7545 |
| 4.4 | Broad | T． 17 | F／S | R | 363418 | 287 |
| 45 46 | Fender | F。 |  | R | 1026769 | 1796 |
| 47 | Cooke | Fi， | LAC | R． | 1177719 | 1398 |
| 48 | Adelink |  |  | D |  | 74.18 |
| 49 | Brown | T． | CO | R | 1004010 | 562 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 50 \\ & 51 \end{aligned}$ | Mace La ison | 4.8 | S3t | R |  | 357 |
| 52 | Dormers | If．${ }^{\text {A．}}$ 。 |  | D |  | 5369 |
| 53 | Bdvards | S．J． |  | R |  | $1<93$ |
| 54 | Tyler | $C_{\text {c }} \mathrm{T}^{\text {a }}$ | LAC | R |  | 980 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 55 \\ & 56 \end{aligned}$ | Bevley | E．V．C． | F／S | R |  | 297 |
| 57 | Holmes | F．C． | Lic | R | 9161014 | 1016 |
| 58 | Storey | \％． |  | $\stackrel{\text { n }}{\text { R }}$ | 1303164. | 1691 |
| 59 | Thompson | A．A．W． |  |  |  | 14.57 |
| 60 | Hooker | A．${ }^{\text {E }}$ 。 | C） 1 | R |  | 4.00 |
| 61 | Warren | C．7． | CpI | R | 917055 | 434 |
| 62 | Webstor | J．S． | $A C$ | R | 1290450 | 1157 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 63 \\ & 64 \end{aligned}$ | Rogerson | ${ }^{\text {J }}$ ． | ${ }^{\text {ACl }}$ | R | 552920 | 787 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 64 \\ & 65 \end{aligned}$ | Tard | C．S． | $\mathrm{col}_{5}$ | R | 903259 | 439 |
| 66 | Methley | J．1． | F，o | R | 9： $9 \cdots$ | 182 |
| 67 | French | D． $\mathrm{N}^{\text {c }}$ ． | ACI | R | 1073634 | 1298 |
| 68 | Paumen | H．H．${ }^{\text {a }}$ 。 |  | D |  | 3353 |
| 69 | Docherty |  |  | R | 637275 | 2154 |
| 70 | Foley | S．R． | AC | R | 1330769 | i892 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 71 \\ & 72 \end{aligned}$ | Bronsgoest | E．Th． |  | D |  | 5189 |
| 73 | Me Ras | R， | IAC | R | 978807 | 1.07 |
| 74. | Morgan | J．S．C． |  | 1 |  | 2052 |
| 75 | Gosden dicd 31．5．43 | A．İ．S． | LiC | R | 184677 | 1350 |
| 76 | Iinthwaite | D． | AC | R | 1380368 | 1443 |
| 77 | McCooey | P． | $\triangle \mathrm{C}$ | R | 1205336 | 1514 |
| 78 | Seddon | $T$ ． | ${ }^{1} \mathrm{C}$ | R | 1036234 | 1754 |
| $79$ | Friend | H．İ． |  | N |  | 721 |
| 81 | Uiterijik | A．D． |  | R |  | 1460 |
| 82 | Miarsen | A． |  | D |  | 11013 |
| 83 | Goey | Ti． 1 。 | IAC | R |  | 134：） |
| 84 | Corty | コ．こ。 | $\triangle \mathrm{C}$ | A |  | 2169 |
| 85 | Trigg | C．C． |  | 1 | 1095592 | 1729 |
| 86 | Taylor | J． | LiC | R 8 | 858990 | 1837 |
| 87 | Limmage | C．T． | CuI | R 9 | 953374 | 449 |
| 88 | Rilliamson | I．T． | AC II | R 5 | 547930 | 911 |
| 90 | Carson | S， | Cn7 | R | 128）：93 | 269 |
| 91 | Element | S．H． |  | R | 229，59 | 935 |
| 92 | Medley | サT． | AC II | Q 1 | 1535231 | 14.7 |
| 93 | Clark | D．T． | ${ }^{\text {AC }}$ I | R | 924830 | 1483 |
| 94 | Heyes | M． | LAC | R |  | 1647 |
| 96 | Faris | J． |  | R |  | 1025 |
| 97 | Walker | R | LAC | R 1 | 10075，46 | 1554 |
| 98 | Newble | E．S |  | R |  | 1013 |
| 99 | Worsley | S．A． | AC I | R I | 1070593 | 730 |
| 100 | Komen | C． |  | D |  | 5989 |
| 101 | Mahoney | D． 17. | LAC | R |  | 1170 |
| 102 | Barnes | J．L． | Gunner | A 1 | 1771718 | 21.14 |
| 103 | Stacey | C． | LSC | A |  | 848 |
| 104 | Jones | A．D． | SIdr | A |  | 2145 |
| 105 | Jess | Y．J． | Cpl | R | 548834 | 405 |



| Grave No． | Nome | Initial | Ran＇ | Survi | Sorvice <br> ice No． | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{P} . \mathrm{O} . \mathrm{W} . \\ & \mathrm{NO} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 167 | Trickett | H．F． |  | R | 1047807 | 1012 |
| 168 | Peat | İ． | Sgt | R | 623243 | 363 |
| 169 | Giles | H .1 。 | Linc | R | 1187680 | 1967 |
| 170 | Bell | R．A． | AC | R | 1285444 | 1410 |
| 171 | Muir | H．A． | Cpl | n |  | 429 |
| 172 | Lanscowne | R．H． | AC2 | R | 1283315 | 1162 |
| 173 | Bodenham |  | Gnr | A（riA | A）1638466 | 2113 |
| 174 | Holden | J．I． |  | R | 1063408 | 951 |
| 175 | Feriton | E． ． | AC2 | R | 1310875 | 1863 |
| 176 | Rahkena | J。 | Sgt | ， |  | 4109 |
| 177 | Pratt | A．P． | IAC | R | 357884 | 1956 |
| 178 | Lake | R．D． | Cpl | R | 923642 | 402 |
| 179 | Van Mourick | J．B． |  | D |  | 7389 |
| 180 | Stocks | P． H ． | LaC | P | 1112375 | 2259 |
| 181 | Hilditch |  | LAC | R | 977060 | 815 |
| 182 | Jenkinson | G．W． | AC1 | R | 1309534 | 1435 |
| 183 | Pijkman | R． |  | D |  | 54.68 |
| 184 | Lie－Soei－Dhoon |  |  | D |  | 74.13 |
| 185 | Hazelmood | A．S． | A．C．II | R | 1219747 | 2005 |
| 186 | Honig | C． |  | D |  | 4235 |
| 187 | Hanton | N． H ． | Col． | R | 916072 | 465 |
| 188 | Hyde | A．V． | L．A．C． | R． | 1281762 | 1129 |
| 189 | Rich | A． |  |  | 1.448643 | 671 |
| 190 | Lister | R．B． | Col． | R | 953356 | 4.4 |
| 191 | Higgins | S．W． | L．A．C． | R | 923617 | 1083 |
| 192 | Howe | h． W ． |  | R | 902670 | 11138 |
| 193 | Motherscdele | T． | Sgt | I | 562215 | 331 |
| 194 | Moorhouse | J． |  | F． | 640837 | 194.5 |
| 195 | Baldwin | E． $3 . J$ ． | C力1 | R | 1163540 | 483 |
| 196 | Geraerds－Thesingh | C．D．L． | Sldr | D | 32694 | 5542 |
| 197 | Ball | G． | I．A．C． | R | 1005091 | 1035 |
| 198 | Smith | V．C． | I．A．C． | R | 522718 | 1746 |
| 199 | Penteney | \％． | Sgt／Pil | ot R | 1377544 | 683 |
| 200 | Nichols | E．C． | L．A．C． | Ih | 960097 | 1798 |
| 201 | Schoevaert | H．J． |  | D |  | 6705 |
| 202 | McKinnon | D． |  | R | $\geq 346094$ | 1575 |
| 203 | Rove | A．F． | Cpl． | R |  | 719 |
| 204 | Ven－Mourick | B．B． | D |  |  | 7442 |
| 205 | Caesar | H．TV． | Cpl | A（AA | A） 1452791 | 723 |
| 206 | Morling | F．R． | L． $\mathrm{A} . \mathrm{C}$ ． | R | 3.209502 | 1167 |
| 207 | Dobbie | R．J．C． | A．C．II | R | 785101 | 2160 |
| 208 | Hopkins | D． | L．A．C． | R | 64.4602 | 1243 |
| 209 | Lund | R．A． |  | R | 1131417 | 1816 |
| 210 | Day | K．J． |  | A | 266354 | 2148 |
| 211 | McKinley | F． | Cpl | R | 1002171 | 601 |
| 212 | Klein－Poelhuis | J．A． | Set | D |  | 10507 |
| 213 | Fraser | H．A． | F／L |  | Ex－PWD Mal | ye． 159 |
| 214 | Marlisa． | C．W． |  | D |  | 6220 |
| 215 | Scadding | G．C． | A．C．I | R | 907348 | 1638 |
| 216 | Cunningham | T． | I．A．C． | R | 1054118 | 933 |
| 217 | Johanzoon | E．J． | Sgt | D |  | 3215 |
| 218 | Stephens | A． | A．C．I | R |  | 1685 |
| 219 | Thompson | T．A． | Cbl | R | 54.2694 | 568 |
| 220 | Ragan |  | Sgt | R | 532118 | 692 |
| 221 | Bower | E．T． | I．f．C． | R | 1306741 | 1000 |
| 222 | Marchant | R．G． |  | R | 914463 | 1174 |
| 223 | Thornley | V． | A．C．I | R | 1104988 | 1264 |
| 224 | Barton | J． | L．A．C． | R | 1.069791 | 804 |
| 225 | de－Bruin | R． |  | D |  | 7966 |
| 226 | ilfoore | F．R． | F／O | R |  | 200 |
| 227 | Parry | E．L． | Cpl． | R | 1022071 | 532 |
| 228 | Dunlop | J．P． | L．A．C． | R | 955904 | 1367 |
| 229 | Moore | $\mathrm{C} . \mathrm{R}$ ． | L．A．C． | R | R 80313 | 1178 |



| Grave No. | Nane | Initial | Rank | Servico | Service No. | P.O.T |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 290 | Hilliard | J.R. | Cnr | A | 1779353 | 2124 |
| 291 | Hind | J.F. | Sgt | - | 564645 | 342 |
| 292 | Ballinger | A.W. B. | AC? | R | 140129 | 102 |
| 293 | Loveridge | iv.J. | ACI | R. | 1205726 | 752 |
| 294 | Mcallon | J.J.B. | AC2 | R | 1024863 | 2184 |
| 295 | Geely | G. $\mathrm{T}^{\text {c }}$. | LAC | n | 634171 | 1702 |
| 296 | Westun | C.C. | 1. | R | 1267430 | 1779 |
| 297 | Wansbury | TV. H . | IAC | R | 626555 | 1288 |
| 298 | Curtis | A.P.L. | ECI | R | 930326 | 1701 |
| 299 | Robinson | F . | LAC | R. | 1004752 | 1544 |
| 300 | Brockhuysen | M.J. |  | D |  | 10385 |
| 301 | Walkor | M.S. | AC | F. | 1173011 | 1095 |
| 302 | Strset | N.S. | LAC | R | 1182033 | 1750 |
| 303 | Muir | A. | IAC | R | 574540 | 1803 |
| 304 | Dumbleton | A. | AC2 | R | 1139355 | 1562 |
| 305 | Nunn | R.T. | LaC | P. | 933127 | 1948 |
| 306 | Thomas | H.G. | LaC | fir | 529304 | 1114 |
| 307 | Bevsichen | J.A. |  | D |  | 4.241 |
| 308 | Head | C.E. | P/O | R |  | 228 |
| 309 | Isacson | Fi.A. | LaC | R | 750952 | 1648 |
| 310 | Hill | G. $\mathrm{W}^{\text {a }}$. | Cpl | R | 649400 | 420 |
| 311 | Nia.sh | T.S. | LAC | R | 625255 | 795 |
| 312 | Uren | B. | AC | R | 1141230 | 923 |
| 313 | Hert | J. | Cpl | R | 1255250 | $\begin{aligned} & 700 \\ & 5205 \end{aligned}$ |
| 315 | Beards Morc | E.J. | A.C | R | 64.4622 | 1711 |
| 316 | Devonport | G. | I.A.C. | R | 1650110 | 893 |
| 317 | Denekanp | H. |  | D |  | 4254 |
| 318 | Sayer | W. B. | I.A.C. | R | 645390 | 1751 |
| 319 | Mullins | S.G. | I.A.C. | R | 1253430 | 830 |
| 321 | Brinkman <br> Monks | P. ${ }^{\text {C.J. }}$ | L. A.C. | R | 070802 | 1810 |
| 322 | Annis | F.W. | I.A.C. | R | 907763 | 859 |
| 323 | Beckman Lepro | H.P. | Sgt | D |  | 3937 |
| 324 | Hareis | A.T. | I.f.C. | R | 653946 | 1121 |
| 325 | Allen | S.W. | A.C.I | R | 1229744 | 1919 |
| 326 | Mayor | D. |  | D |  | 7421 |
| 328 | Orsan | A. ${ }^{\text {d }}$ | I.A.C. | R | 902187 | 1521 |
| 329 | Wri.ght | J.F. | Cpl. | R | 642719 | 548 |
| 330 | Waters | G.L. | F/S | R | 521440 | 299 |
| 331 | Garder | I. J. | A.C. | R | 1501578 | 1464 |
| $3{ }^{2}$ | Williams | D.C. | F, |  |  |  |
| 334 | Brooks | $\mathrm{H} . \mathrm{H}$. | A.C. | R | 1201681 | 1549 |
| 335 | Darwin |  | CbI. | R | 926872 | 473 |
| 336 | Ven Essen | D.M. |  | D |  | 4926 |
| 337 | Ponny | F.E. | I.A.C. | R 1 | $110(8 ?) 830$ | 1213 |
| 338 | Hardy | H.A | I.A.C. | R | 1196796 | 174.0 |
| 339 | Edvards | F. | Cpl. | R | 508081 | 426 |
| 340 34.1 | Haig | E.H.S. | A.C. | R | 1195599 | 133 |
| 34.1 | Hall | G.A. |  | R | 94.0901 | 2271 |
| 342 343 | Seywell | G.7.R. | C. | R | 912125 | 1953 |
| 34.4 | Gouity | R.R. | A.C. | R, | 1334.864 | 1533 |
| 345 | Mason | F.P. | Cpl. | 8 | 909374 | 602 |
| 346 | Miller | B. | L. $\mathrm{A} . \mathrm{C}$. | 1 | 515996 | 1255 |
| 347 | Van Mil | J.G. |  | D |  | 493.7 |
| 348 | Protz | I.C. | Col. | R | 7631.44 | 575 |
| 349 | Thompson | G.S. | A.C.I | R | 1356432 | 898 |
| 350 | Palmer | K.E. | L.A.C. | R | 924.405 | 940 |
| 351 | Jorvis | E.N. | I.A.C. | R | 1282273 | 1147 |



386 graves, total in all Haroekoe.

## AFFIDAVIT OF DMNIS BR IAN 1LASCN.

Ig NO 145281 F/O DENTS BRIAN MASON, RAF, at present stationed at Cosford nr. Wolverhampton ${ }_{3}$ and with permanent home address at 15 ? Chalkpit Terrace, Dorking, make oath and say as follows:-

When I arrived at LAHAT Camp from Anboina town on 18 August 1944 I found that there was no accommodation for my pariy as the camp was already very badly overcromded. The Japs took us to sone huts on the outskirts of the camp that had been occupied by a Javanese Labour Battalion from Java.

Fart of the huts mere still occupied by the remainder of the Battalios ioe, their rotting corpses o Te ha d to dispose of these corpses and extend the existing accommodation to make room for the incoming party of British and Duich EsiVo

This new part of the camp was now joined to the existing oned
A Jap staff were of course already operating; this was augmented by the addition of Jap Lt, Kurishina. Jap Sgt, Nori, Korean interpreter Kasana and numberous Koreans,

Senior Eritish Officer was hajor Gibsong HA/AA。
A few days later Najor (now Colo) Anami joined the camp.
Accomodation was shockingly overcrowded, each Pil of which there were about four thousand, mas lucisy to have 12 sq . ft. per man. Ny party had to lie on the earth iloor.

Water was reasonable, being obtained from a spring.
Food was very bad, consisting of never more than 150 grammes of rice a day and nothing else.

Sickness and deaths among the Psll still continued at an alaming ratec Working parties still continued principally loading ships.

No $c$ lothing, boots or bedding etc, was issued to us.
No recreation or Church services were allowed. Nor were any letters or Red cross parcels ever received by us while we were there,

Iredical supplies were almost unobtainable. The only medical supplies we had, mere those scrounged by the Psil from the Jap stores whilst loading the ships.

I Zven the British $O C$ camp and all the FV Officers, including the very f sick had to work constructing $A R P$ trenches for the Japanese.

With regarà to personalities there was a particularly brutal and cruel Korean named TAMINOKA who tas employed in the FN cookhouse. Trevjously I had been badiy beaten by the man at ITANG Camp. He used to take a s pecial delight in maltureating British Officers. I remembe two FW Oflicers in particular. whom he almost killed in this camp. They were F/O Meathrel and F/O JeReece, now both dead. KAillnoil was nicknamed "CYCIORS"。

SWORN by the said
DMNIS ERTAN MASON
at 6 Sprinc Gardens in
the City of Westminster
this 8 th day of February, 1946.

```
D.B.ITASON
)
)
) D.B.IFASON
)
)
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BEFCRE IE
(Signed) AoIraBell Macdonald, Major, Legal Staff, Office of the Judge Aövocate General, London.

IN THE MATTER. OF JAFANESE WiR CIILES AND THE GENEFLL ILL-TKEAMENT OF PRISONEKS OF WAR AT LIANG CAMP ON AMBON ISLAND, MALUCCAS, FROM 3 May, 1943, TILL OCr1OBEE, 1944.

I, No. 1295339 LAC HENRY KITTEFINGHAM, Royal Air Force, with permanent home address at Glatten Road, Sawtry, Huntingdonshire, make oath and say as follows:-
1.

I was taken prisoner in Java in February, 1942. I stayed there for some months. In late April, 1943, a large draft of us collected at Sourabaya to go over to Liang on Ambon Island. We arrived there on 3 May, 1943. This group of Prisoners of War numbered somewhat over one thousand and was commanded by Major L. N. Gibson, R.A. Major Gibson was in charge of this group of Prisoners of War all the time he was there.
2.

We actually disembarked at Ambon town and had to march two days to reach Liang. The conditions on this march were very bad. Hen were constantly dropping out through the heat and lack of food. In fact even some of the Japanese guards were dropping cut. Those who did so were beaten up and belaboured with bamboo poles, rifle butts and such like to make them get on. If they could not move they were just left lying by the side of the road and were picked up later on. We surfered terribly from thirst those two days and a good many people drank the dirty village water which resulted in a severe outbreak of dysentery at Liang Camp later on.
3.
fir list arrived. There was one barracks which could accommodate about 60 men. For the rest there were only leaky tents, which kopt the sun off but that is all that could be said for them.
4. Our work at this camp was constructing an aerodrome. It was very heavy work and involved dragging logs about and clearing virgin jungle to make dispersel bays and runways. Our food was just pig-swill. It consisted of burned rice and vegetables and very occasionally we had a little meat. A sample dey's menu would be first thing in the morning rice pap which wes rice boiled up into a porridge-like consistency, at midday a handful of rice and some vegetables or rice soup and at night another handful of rice and some more vegetables. We usually got slightly more vegetables at night. The quality of the food improved a little as soon as we took over the management of cur own kitchen but the quantity of the food was always insufficient. Sometimes we were able to get local produce from the Island, bought in the camp shop. I believe several people died of malnutrition during the time that we were on this island. As far as I an concerned my oye-sight which before the war was

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perfectly all right has been seriously affected as a result of lack of the necessary vitenins.
5.

Mecicel supplies I know were in very short supply although es fer as I am concerned when I went into hospital with tropical ulcers I was given some yellow powder which did ne a lot of good. The medical staff at the camp hospital was a mixed Dutch and Eritish what might be called a Field Ambulance Unit. There was, I believe, a Japanese medical officer called Lieutenant SHAMiADA but he never did anything to help us.
6.

As regards our treatment when we were at work all the guerds with very few exceptions treated us with the usual brutality and we were constantly being beaten with bamboos, picl-shafts and rifle butts. A guard I can remember who was particularly brutal was the Corporal in charge of the construction of the aercalrome. I cannot remerber his name but would remember him if I saw a photograph of him. He treated us particularly badly and was always very brutal with the light duty party which consisted of the hospital cases who were getting better. Another guard called "Blueshirt" and another called "Donald Duck" were also, I remember, particularly brutel to uw and took a delight in beating people whenever they could.
7.

I remember the Champion incicent quite well. I did not see the beginning of it as I was working on Major Gibson's Staff in the Japanese Camp office but $\ddagger$ saw Champion carried in on a stretcher and I saw Hajor Anami and Major Gibson arguing together cver him. Later I saw Charpion tied to a post inside the guard room. He stayed there all that night till the following morning: On the following morning I sew him being put in the back of a lorry with a rope round his neck like a halter, anc picks and shovels were thrown into the lorry with him. Various camp guards and Ifeutenant Oida, who was then the camp Commandant, went with Chamrion on the lorry. They had been gone about quarter of an hour when I heard a rifle shot. Then the lorry was back again inside another 15 minutes. Champion was not in the lerry then and I never seiv him again. Wile I was in the office some days later one of the Japanese orderlies cane up and told me to fill in the casualty book that Champion had died of dysentery at Ambon
8.

Another incident I witnesses was when
Sergeant Hajor SATU (whose nicknane was "Yellow Bocts") who was in charge of the camp guards beat up Pilot Officer IVES. Satu was a lunatic in the exact sense of the word as whenever the mcon was new or full he becare almost insane. We always expected trouble fron Satu at those times. On this particular occasion Pilot Officer Ives was in charge of a working party in one of the dispersal bays on the aerodrome. Satu came up to Ives and said that we were not working fast enough. Then, in order to show off
to the varicus Japanese Guards who were watching, he ordered Ives t.o help him carry a long pole with six baskets of earth slung fron it. Satu was a very powerful man, whereas Ives was not very strong owing to lack of food and privations generally, Even so a load of six baskets of earth was practically impossible. Eventuall: the two of then managed a load of four and Satu got much amusement out of watching Ives stagger with this enormous load. Satu ordered him to do it again. Ives refused and then Satu went completely mad. First of all he thrashed him with bamboo poles and broke a number on him. Then he orciered the guards to bind Ives' hands behind his back. Then he got hold of some cocoanut tree roots whic are long whippy brown tendrils like boot laces. With these he slashed Ives across the face a ereat many times. Finally he asked the guards to bring his sword and we thought that Ives was going to be murdered. However, the guerds were not able to find the sword and Satu contented himself with knocking Ives out by punching him in the face and stomach. That closed the incident.
9.

The Japanese Camp Commandant after
Lieutenant Ouida was Lieutenant SHIOZAWA whom we thought at first was going to be a reasonable man but he turned out to be uncooperative and brutal to us in erery way he could. He used to egg on the guards to make us work harder and use any methods they liked to do so. He used to make us work on our half days off building carp roads and such like. The compancer of all Prisoners of War on the Island Group was a man called Major ANAMI. He was a thoroughly unpleasent men and I regard him as being responsible for all our privations on the Island. Furthermore he did not consider it beneath hin to go in amongst one of our working parties and beat up people with his sword scabard as an example to his junior officers.
10. In October, 1944, I left the Island with a Craft of about six hundred to go back to Java. Captain BentlyTaylor was in charge of our perticular draft. We were crammed into a snall coast vessel and conditions on board this ship were appalling. There was no lying room. We used to have to sit in each others laps in order to make room for the really sick cases. I was acting as a medical orderly during the voyage and for the first seven days and nights I hardly had any sleep at all trying to clean up the sick and to make them as comfortable as possible. It is almost impossible to imagine the conditions. The food was putrid and there was very little of it. We were allowed a third of a pint of water a day to drink and we had to use salt water for washing and cleaning ceople up. We very often weren't allowed to have salt water. The hold where many of us existed were battoned down all the voyage except for a few planks which were taken off at night. Many of the Prisoners of War were just skin and bone. When they tricd to sit up their bones almost stuck through their skin. Many of ther had no clothes as they had all (been up with dysentery and the dirt on board the ship. There esse

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were millions of lice and we all suffered acutely from them. What with the lice and the flies and dysentery stools all over the place it was a miracle to me that we did not have a serious epidemic. We were on board abcut a month and during that time only 28 people cied. When we arrived at Sourabaya Sergeant Major Satu (Vellow Boots) and liajor Anami met us. I consider 胜ajor Anami personally responsible for conditions on this voyage. In all fairness I cennot blame the Japanese Sergeant who was O.C. Ship. He was a medical Sergeant and did what little he could to help us. For example when we called at llacassar he got us some vegetables.

We never at any time on Ambon Island got any hed Cross supplies. A few of us got an occasional letter.

SWORN by the said HENEY KITTERINGHAM at 6, Spring Gardens, in the City of Westminster, this 1945 . day (Sgd) H. KITTERINGHAM
of

BEFORE IE

> (Sgd) M. BeLL MACDONA D, Major

I certify that this is a true copy of the original affidavit.
(Sgd) Illegible Major Legal Staff
Office of the Judge Advocate General.
 Pix. Dot on bina side lf To strim. Puple vel mo $P$ oturbill aो $\mu$
(5) Pulu beo vites


(3)

I VX 108282 Capt. J. H. Smith, Military History Sec. A.M.F. make oath and say

1. I am an officer of the Australian Military Forces.
2. Annexed hereto and merked Exhibit "A" is a true extract from the War Dairy of $2 / 5$ Aust. Gen. Fospital which I have in my possession in the course of my duties.
3. The orisinal cannot be made available.

Sworn before me at Melbourne) This 20 th day of May 1946 )/s/ J, Smith, Capt.
/s/M, Baehlan, Capt.
An Officer of the
Australian Military Forces

Extract of War Ijens of ais Aust Gen Hospital 1? Sep 194.
Place
NOROTAI 12 Sep

Zxtmet of
Summery of stents and Information.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 64 \text { Australian and ' Dutch Recovered prisoners } \\
& \text { of dor were ngeived fir on Angina. Included in } \\
& \text { this uurber were } 38 \text { stretcher eases. The } \\
& \text { patients ere in a very well and emaciated } \\
& \text { condition and were all suffering from } \\
& \text { malnutrition, a number being severely ill. } \\
& \text { One patient died early in the morning of } \\
& \text { 13.9.45. Bed state at midnight } 1020 \text { equipped, } \\
& 578 \text { occupied } 448 \text { vacant. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Signed A. J. Murray Colonel Commanding $2 / 5$ Aust Gen Hospital.

This is the extract marked Exhibit A from the fer Diary of the $2 / 5$
Aust Gen Hospital referred to in the declaration mede by VX108282 Capt.
J. H. Smith dated 20 May 1946.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { /s/ M. Baehlan, Capt. } \\
& / \mathrm{s} / \text { J. Smith, Capt. }
\end{aligned}
$$

1. 

I am an officer of the Australian Military Forces.
2.

Annexed hereto and marked Exhibit $C$ is a copy of the Feport on Recovered PWs ex hmboina by O.C. Ledicel Div $2 / 5$ A.G.H. which I have in my possession in the course of my duties.
3.

The original cennot be nade available.
Sworn before me at Melbcurne )
this 20th dey of Nay, 1946 . )
(Signed) DOUGLAS LicBAIN
(Signed) M. Lachlen Capt. An Officer of the fustrelian
Military Furces.

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { COFY OF REPOFI B. LT COL M. L. POWELI ON PW EX AMEOINA. } \\
& 2 / 5 \text { Aust. Gen Hosp. } \\
& \\
& 74 \text { Sept. } 45 .
\end{array}
$$

## FEPORT ON EECOVEEE P.WS. EX AIEOINA.

The cutstanding inpressions of these 65 men over the first 48 hours observation are as follows:-
I. 15 were extromely emaciated, hollow-eyed, palli had swollen abdomens anc ankles and extensive ulceration in inferior extremities. This group was strongly periniscent of Belsen and one, shockingly wasted, died without regaining full consciousness. Fcur others of this group are giving concern and are not cut of danger.
2.

A large group of about 45 were a fairly homogeneous ccllection exhibiting various stages of malnutrition, beri-beri, tropical ulcers and anaemia. Sone of this group had been able to bear their weight and walk with assistance in the prison camp and on the naval vessels which brought them to Mcrotai.

1
3.

The remainder, some 6 to 8 , were in quitc good. condition apart from obvious loss of weight.

Their mental condition is surprisingly good, intense relief is predominent, coupled with a certain excitation expressed by a desire to talk volubly to all listeners of their experiences. This phase is giving way in a very small number to a temporary depression of spirit and oceasionally tears.

Morale is high and they all bear the imprint of doggedness and resource without which they were lost.

It is singularly moving to see a grossly emaciated man weighing about $4 \frac{1}{2}$ stone quite philosophically arranging his head more comfortably on his pillow by the simple expedient of grasping his forelock with a thin wasted hand and moving by this means his head into the desired position.

| 5, In regard to specificity of diagnosis investigations are incomplete. At present it is apparent that |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| the following conditions will be identified. |  |
| 2 | Beri Beri, wet and dry with gross hypo-proteinaemia, haemodilution anaenia (mainly macroscopic) and varying degrees of cardiac decompensation. Tendon reflexes are absent in about $80 \%$. |
| b | Malaria will appear in a high percentage, pyrexia with positive blood films are already in evidence. |
| c | Hook-worti, ascaris and strongaloides infestation will be heavy. No specific bacillary pathogen has been isolated. No amoebic infestetion has been identified as yet. |
| c. | There is one case suggestive of sprue. |
|  | There is evidence of residual pigmentation of pellagra in three cases. |

f. Scurvy is conspicuous by its absence.
g. Visual impairment is present in 6 cases. Its cause as yet uncertain.
h. Tha post-morter on the fatal case showed bilateral basel pneumonic consclication in addition to extreme emaciation.
This is the report, marked
(Signed) M. I. POVELL Lt.Col Exhibit "C", by Lt.-Col M.L.Powell O.C.Medical Division 2/5 Aust.Gen Hospitel dated 14 th Sept, 1945 , $2 / 5$ Aust. Gen Hosp. referred to in the declaration of Capt.
Douglas McBain dated 20 th Miy, 1946.
(Signed) M. LACHLAN Capt.

区 XXX XXXXXXX
RESTRICTED Classification changed from ＂CONFIDEITIAL＂to＂RESTRICTED＂ by order of the Secretary of War
By／s／T．R．C．King，It．Col．Inf
WAR DEPARTMENT
Judge Advocate General＇s Department
United States of America

IN THE MATTER OF THE MURDER OF id LT。EDTLRD F．SKUZINSKI，THE BEATING AND IMPRISONMENT UNDER IMPROPER CONDITIONS OF NINE AMERICAN AIRMEN AT AMBON，AMD THE TRANSPORTATION OF SEVEN AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR WIDER IMPROPER CONDITIONS FROM AMBON TO OFUNA，JAPAN．

Deposition of PAUL A．
STANSBUEY lIst LT．ASN 0734399

Taken at
：Letterman General Hospital Presidio of San Francisco， Calif．
： 3 October 1945.
：William E．Stewart，Jr．， Agent，SIC，CD，VSC．
：William J．Stewart，Jr．， Agent，SIC，CD，NSC．

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## 区区XXXXXXXXXX RESTAICTED /s/ T.R.C.K.

Q. Whet is your name, age, rank serial number and permanent address?
A. Paul Alfred Stansbury, 28, 1st Lt., 0734399, 1209 4th Avenue, Ashbury Park, New Jersey.
Q. On whot dates wcre you inducted, sent overseas, and returned fron overseas?
A. I was inducted on 30 Jenuary 194 ned want overseas in April 1943 as a bombardier on a 5. 24 and vas returned to the United States on 1 Octobor 1945.
Q. Were you ever a prisoncr of war of any of the Axis powers?
A. Yes. Of Jepan.
Q. State the organization with which you were serving at the tine of your capture, and when, where and by whon you were teken into custody, or othervise made a prisoncr or an internee.
A. I was serving with the 380 th Bomb Group, 530th Squadron, 5 th Bomb Cormand and was captured on 21 September 1943 in the Kai Islands by a Joranesc navel unit.
Q. Where wore you kept and what vere your novenents while you were in such custody?
A. After ny capture I was held on the Kai Island about five doys and then noved by plane to Ambon, ambonia Island, in the Spico Island group. I was held hore 68 days and then noved by ship to Ofun=, Japan, sriving there on 12 February 1944. I mas held at this prison for one month and then noved by train to Omori where I remained fron 13 Mrech to 27 dugust, 1944, and then was noved by train and ferry to Zentsuji where $I$ romained until 23 June 1945, and last was noved by ferry and train to Iokiroshi, Japan, where I renained until libereted.
Q. Were you an eye-witness to any illegal conduct, either by way of onission or comission, on the part of Axis nationals or soldiers which resulted in the death or serious injury of any American national?
A. Yes.
Q. Describe in detail the conduct which you believe to be illegal, giving particulars as to the nature thereof, the nene and identification of the victin and of the accused.

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A. About $4: 15$ p.n. on 21 September 1943 the $B-24$ on which I was a. bonbardier was shot down over the Kai Islands and ofter this plane crashed nine of the ten-man crow were able to get out of the plane. This plane had crashed about 1,000 yards off the island in three fect of water on a coral reef. One man in the crew, the navigator, 2d Lt. Edward F. Zkuzinski of Grand Rapids, Michigen, was pinned down on the flight deck by the top turret which had fallen on his back. I did not see this man in this position as I had been injured in the crash and was stretched out on the wing. This men's position mos described to me as stated and after we had been on the recf about an hour and a half and were still unable to remove the navigator whose screans and conversation were audible to me as I lay on the wing, a small dugout boat cone out fron the shore. The first pilot had given the navigator some morphine. According to the description I received fron the other crew nembers, the navigator was on his hands and kneas but able to twist and raise his head above the water which was then about at his chest. One of his legs whs fractured and he was bleeding profusely and suffering from internal injuries. The dugout boat contained one Japanese narine, a privote and a native. Because of the navigator's condition and the need of his imnediste removal from the plane ve surrendered to these two individuals. After we surrendered out wrist watches were collected and more marines led by one Japanese naval officer, an ensign, came out to the rcef and placed the nine of us in a bont. We were taken ashore despite our protests and they refused to do anything to assist the navigator. On the next morning the pilot, lst Lt. Wilbur Morris, was taken out to the plane and saw the navigator still pinned down but with his head subnerged beneath the water. We were led to believe that the navigator would be buried but we do not know if this actually happened. I do not know the identity of any of the Japanese involved in this incident.

On the third doy after our copture we were novod by boat to Langoon, the capitol of this Island, where all nine of us were interrogated and remained eight or nine days. Then we were sent by plano to Ambon, Ambonia Island. We were treated very ;rell at Lancoon. Upon our arrivil at Anbon

Page Three (3) of 2 pages. /s/ P.A.S.
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we were net by a Japanese naval comander who was in command of the entire base and who assigned the six enlisted nen in the cres to one cell and then the three officers, inclucing nyselw, were placed in separate cells. These cejls vere in an ancient Dutch prison fort. The walls were of heavy brick and the roof of wood. E-ch cell was about $9^{\prime} \times 9^{\prime}$ and about $20^{\prime \prime}$ high. There was no ventilation, no sunlight and the cells vere thick with nosquitoes. Wo had no beds to sleep on nor any blankets. We received one rice bell three times per day. This was just a little smaller than a baseball and the rice was covered with worms. We also received about a half an evaporated rilk can of hot weter three times a day with our neal and this was all the food we received. During our trip fron the Koi Islands to Langoon the Gunner, Surgeant Bowan, had received some medical care for cuts on his face and hands. Ho:ever, all the rest of us were injured and never received any medicel care. For the next 68 days we lived in these cells with an interrogation nearly every day. During these interrogations all the onlisted men, the co-pilot and myself were beaten. I do not know whether the pilot was beaten or not. The number of beatines I took here were too many to count. In all of these interrogations, with a few exceptions, we were questioned by a civilian interpretor named Ickies. F. is about $5^{\prime} 4^{\prime \prime}$ or $5^{\prime} 5^{\prime \prime}$ and quite bowlegged. His pormanent home was in Tokyo. On a few occasions I was also interrogated by a Japanese navy ensign whose brother had attendod ny ilma M ter, Columbin University. I mas never beaten by the ensign but when Ickies interrogeted us he beat us and also had the other Japanese naval personnel in the roon do likewise. One of these Japanese guards who beat me and the others was a Sargeant Major in the Japanese Navy whon we nicknamed "Tojo". He was about 5'11" tall, weighed about 225 pounds, and was constantly brageing as to his wrestling ability. His head was shaped like a pear and it was he and Ickies who adninistered the greater part of the punishnent to us. /The interrogation was directed as to our planes, organization, strength, training and airficld layouts./ ifter we had been in tris prison for seven days the pilot, Morris, was flown to Tokyo and I did not see hin again until February, 1944, at Ofuna. Ifter 30 days in this

Page Four (4) of 2 pages. /s/P.A.S.
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## $\mathbb{\mathbb { X }} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X}$ KESTHICTED /s/ T.R.C.K.

prison two of the enlisted men, Jones and Scott, the engineer and radio oberator, were flown to Tokyo and the remaining four enlisted men were moved by truck to a prison cenp about four or ilve miles distant from this prison and they wore hold therc until later joined by the two of us left in this prison. /The co-pilot and nyself stayed in this prison for 68 days in all under the daily interrogations and frequent beatings and the living conditions described before. All of us had sustained serious injuries in the crash of our plane and despite these were forcod to live in a prison and take these daily beatings. Ist Lt. Wilbur L. Morris, the pilot, had susteined cuts about the body. 2d Lt. Robert M. Russell, the co-pilot, had sustained small cuts about his back, crms and legs and had a broken nose. T/Set. Paul Jones the engineer, hed a broken leg and many cuts. T/Set. Scott the radio operator, had cuts about the face and legs. S/Set. Charles Bownan the gunner, had broken ribs, broken breastbone, and deep cuts on the face, nouth, arms and less and had lost a great doal of blood and passed out many times during his inprisonment. S/Sgt. Chester Brown, the tail gunner, whose right arn had beon broken in two placos and had sustained a dislocated right olbow and many cuts, S/Set. Curti's Marren, the nose gunnor, had a broken right collarbone and several cuts, S/Sgt. Clayton Ruhland, a gunner, sustained a deep gash in the hoad and cuts in the leg and a dislocated knee cap , and I had a broken loft collarbone, sone broken ribs and several gashes in ny left knes and right ankle. We asked the naval cormander in charge of this base for nedical care upon our arrival hore and as often afterwards as we were able to see hin. We vare laughed at and recoived no medical care. In addition to personally asking the comander I also asked Ickies, but to no avail, though oz one occasion Ickics sent a Japanese medical corpsman to see me in ny cell and this corpsman gave me sone salve to rub on my broken collarbone telling me this vould cause it to knit and heal. I threw the salve away. I caught malaria in this prison and never received any medical care for this. There can be no question that the comandant, the naval comander of this base, knew of the living conditions in this prison, the physical condition in which the men were and the daily beatings and interrogations. I was warned of this by the comandent before imprisonment. He told me the
$\mathbb{Z} \mathbb{K} \mathbb{K} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} \mathbb{X} X \mathbb{X}$ RESTRICTED /s/ T.R.C.K.
choice was mine, that is to talk and be sent to a good place or just remain here under the conditions such as I have described. Throughout our 68 deys of imprisonment here I counted 18 raids by Anerican planes. During these raids we wore kept locked in our cells where the snoke would be vory thick and broathing would becone very difficult. We wore told that wo could not use the airraid shelters because we were not prisoners of war but captives. Therc werc ample shelters for us to use hore. None of us hore were ever wounded in these air raids. When the four cnlisted men wore taken from this prison after 30 days to the prisoner of war carip four or five miles distant they did receive some medical care from a Dutch doctor who was also a prisonor. I learned this later from Bownan, Brown, Warren and Kuhland, the four men who were transforred. Finally, on 7 December 1943, the co-pilot and myself were taken out of this prison and taken by motorcycle to this prisoner of war camp where our enlisted mon had been taken previously. Thore I received some quinine for my malaria and some pills for our very rundown condition, and some very good food. The Dutch doctor said he did not have, nor could he get, any anaesthesia nor plaster of Paris to set ry shoulder or Brown's right arn. My weight had gone from 187 at the tine of my capture to 148 . I remaincd at this camp until 12 Deceriber 1943 when Russell and I and the four enlisted men of our crevt vere put aboard a merchant vessel, about a 6,000 ton ship. In addition to the six of us there was a U. S. Navy Licutenant, J. G. Yuglovich of Seattle, "ashington, also put aboard with us. Thore were about 100 Jananese scilors aboard who were returning to Japan and $a$ cargo of nickel ore. Nine Japanese naval enlisted personnel were assigned to guard us throughout this trip. Wh vere aborrd this ship 60 days before docking in Japan. We had to wash this ship daily, were forced to march in goose-step style for the pleasure and armserent of our guards, and forced to do pushing up exercises or calesthenics until we dropped and then wore beaten for failure to hold our position. we vere beaten several tines with a wooden cane about the size of a Japanese sword because during the nipht we for locked in our hold and not allowed to use the lotrine. We kept a can in the hold and used

Page Six (6) of 9 pages. /s/ P.A.S.
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this and when this was discovered all of us wore beaten by our guerds．One dey on this trip I vas told by one of the guards to pick up sone heavy mats used for sleeping．I tried to pick them up and couldn＇t because I was too weak．I was wearing only a pair of shorts at the time and this guard took a lighted cigarette and jabbed it into ny back three times．On the next day I came down with beri－beri and lost the use of ny hands and legs．I received no treatment of any nature for this． 2d Lt．Russell also cane down with the same and lost the use of his legs and began to lose the use of his hands． Fron then on both of us had to be carried wherever we went． This paralysis of my hands and legs lasted nine nonths and Russell＇s lasted about 20 months．I have full coordin－ ation of the hands and legs nov but Russell does not． We were kept in the bow of the boat and were barricaded in at night．We vere told that if the ship were torpedoed we were going down with her．After 60 days of this we arrived at Ofuna，Japan，and it was there that I received my first nedical treatment for beri－beri but nothing was done for ny shoulder because of the lack of facilities for proper treatment．Fuhlend，who had sustained a broken kneecep in the crash has a permanent injury．He can walk only a short while before the leg bothers him and he was advised that it is too late now for surgery．Jones need to have his leg rebroken and reset and I need to have my collarbone rebroken．Brown＇s arn will need to be corrected by surgery if this is possible．／Of the Japanese naval personnel assigned as our guards on this boat trip one was naried Yamashita（phonetic）and another was named Meisha（phonetic）．The latter had been a policemen in Tokyo before the var．I cannot recall the identity of any of the other guards．

Q．Do you know the nane of，or cen you describe nny dis－ tinguishing characteristics of cormanding officer of the camp，or other officer or official responsible for the actions of the person guilty of such conduct？

A．I do not know the identity of the ship captain or any other officials aboard this ship．The Japanese naval comander who was the base commandant at Ambon was a very good looking Jap，supposedly well bred and well educated

Page Seven（7）of 2pages．／s／P．A．S．
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RESTRICTSD /s/ T.D.C.K.
and spoke excellent English，but I an unable to identify hin further．

Q．Do you have，or know the location of any physical evidence，such as photographs，relating to this incident？

A．No．
Q．Do you know the name of or can you identify any other eye－vitnesses to this incident？

A．Only those of us who participated in the above－described incidents，lst It．Wilbur L．Morris，the pilot，2d Lt． Robort M．Russell，the co－pilot，T／Sget．Paul Jonos，the engineer，T／Set．Scott，the radio operator，S／Sgt．Charles Bowman，the gunner，S／Sछt．Chester Brown，the teil zunner， S／Sgt．Curtis Warren，the nose gunner，end S／Sgt．Clayton Fuhland，gunner．

Q．Does the testimony you heve Eiven herein cover all the pertinent details of this incident phich you are able to renember？

A．Yes．
$/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Paul } A \cdot \text { Stansbury }}{\text { PAUL A STANSBURY }}$

Page Eight（8）of 2 pages．
City and : SS.

County of SANT FRAICISCO :
I, DAUL A. STANSBURY, of lavful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of ny interrogation, consisting of 5 pages, including this and the ti.tle page, and that all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
$/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Paul A. Stansbury }}{\text { PAUL A. STANSBUTY }}$
Subscribed and sworn to before mo this 8 dey of OCTOBSR, 1945, at San Francisco, Colifornig.

My commission expires:

$$
\mathrm{/s} / \frac{\text { Julian S. Egne }}{\text { Capt J.A.G.D. }} 0
$$

STATE OF
Countyyof
I, , of lawful age, being duly syorn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions asked and answors given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing pages, including this and the title page, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence initialed each pege of the deposition and affixed his signature thereto.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
$\qquad$ , 19_, at $\qquad$ .
My comission expires:
STaTE OF CALIFORNIA:
City and : SS.
County of SAI FRAMCISCO :
I, MILLIAM E. STEWART, JRo, certify
that (Name) PAUL $A$. STANSBURY , (Ranla) Ist Lt. (ASN) 0734399 , personally appeared befिore ne on the 3d day of October, 1945, and testified concorning war crimes; and that the foregoing is an accurate transcrintion of the answers given by (hin) (her) to the several questions set forth. Place: San Francisco, California $/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { William E. Stevart, Jr }}{\text { WILIIM E. STETHT, Jil: }}$ Datc: 3 October 1945 Agent, SIC, CD, NSC.

Page 5 of 5 pages.
i CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:
$/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Edvin } \mathrm{F} \cdot \text { Svare }}{\text { EDTIN F. SVIFE }}$ ED ${ }^{\text {TIN }} \mathrm{F}$. SVIFE, , lst Lt., Inf.

KIYOSATO YOSFIZAKI, after havine been duly sworn, testified at the lorotai Prisoner of War Camp, Morotai Island, Netherlands East Indies, on 28 Nierch, 1946, as follows:-
Q. State your neme, age, nationality, marital status, religion and home address.
A. Kiyosato YOSiIZAKI, 36 years old, Japanese, merried, Budhist Ibusukicho, Ibusuki Gun Kąoshima Province, Japan.
Q. What is your rank in the Navy?
A. Warrant Officer.
Q. When were you inducted into the liavy?
A. 30 June, 1932 I joined the Navy.
Q. When did you first come to Ambon Island?
A. 25 June, 1942, I came to Ambon and was attached to the 24 th Navy Division at Victoria Garrison.
Q. When were you assigned to the Garara Prison Camp?
A. I was assigned to Garara Frisoner of War Camp from 23 January 1943, to 10 March , 1943. Then until 10 May, 1943, I was in Victoria Garrison. On 11 May, 1943, I was again assigned to Garara Camp and stayed until 2 liay, 1945.

Were there any American fliers executed at Garara Camp in 1944
A. On the 28 th of August, 1944, the districts of Ambon and Garara were very heavily bombed by American B-29 planes. I think there were elehty planes. Due to this bombing Vietoria Garrison was on fire. Also part of Carara Camp was on fire. On the afternoon of 28 Ausust between 5 and 6 o'clock W/0 UEMULA brought three Americans to Garara Camp. At that time I was busy repairing tents which were bombed but I heard that the three Americans were placed in three separate cells. The next morning at about 8 o'clock W/O UEMUHA ordered me and said, "Today we must have the execution of the three prisoner so we must get ready." He also said, "You must execute one of the prisoners." At $2.300^{\prime}$ clock in the afternoon of 29 August, 1944, a truck was ordered and myself, UELUFA, IKEUCFI the driver and the three Americans all loaded into the truck. After about a five minute drive we arrived at the execution place. It was near the Jp soldiers' cemetery. It was about 150 meters from the cemetry. The truck stopred about 30 meters from the execution place. The execution place was off of the road and on a small hill, there was tropical jungle all around the hill. When the truck stopped UEMUFA ordered
me to go to the execution place quickly, so I left for the place. When I arrived at the place of execution I found two holes already dug. Then our wruck first ascived I saw lst. It. NCGI of the Navy and inve soldiers whose names I do not know standing waiting for us. As scon as the truck stopped, IKEUCHI roported to this Lieutenant and said, "Here we are." When UEFITMA ordered me to go to the execution place I went alone leaving Lt. NOCI and the five soldiers at the truck. About three or four minutes after I arrived at the execution place, Lt. NOGI came to the execution place. About five minutes later one of Lt. NOGI's soldiers arrived with one American prisoner. He was already blindfolded and his hands were already tied in back of him. The soldier rade him kneel in front of one of the holes, facing one of the holes that was already dug. It was the hole on the rigit. This soldier then returned to the truck. I then stoped up behind this American and beheaded him. I only swung the sword once. I hit the dmerican squarel.y on the back of the neck. The American's head dropred forward and hung ageinst his chest. Immediately the american fell into the hole dead. The hole was six feet long, three feet wide and one and a half meters deep. hen the soldier made the American kneel he knelt at the eastern end of the hole. I also was standing at that end. The sword I used for killing the American belonged to W/O UEMUFA. He lent it to me just before we lef't Garaia Camp. I think the blace of this sword was two feet and two inches long and the handle was about ten inches long. The whole sword therefore was three feet and two inches long. I used both hands to swing the sword. I stood directly behind the American with my feet about two feet apart. I raised the sword over my right shoulder and swung with both hands. I am right handed. After I had killed the American I retired about fifteen meters away from the execution place in some bushes. The reason I did this was because my duty was finished and I was also very excited and upset and I didn't want to see any more executions. After I had retired to the bushes in about two or three minutes I saw a soldier bring another blindfolded American past me. I didn't see this Anerican executed because from my place in the bushes I could not see the execution. About five minutes later the third blindfolded American came past my place, accompanied by a soldier. About five or ten minutes after I saw the third American being taken to the execution place, It. NOGI called from the bushes and said, "Come. We must bury the Americans and clean the place. The execution is all finished." So I went back to the execution place. When I got there I saw It. NOCI and three soldiers. I looked into the two holes and in the richt hand hole was the American that I had executed, and in the left hand hole were the two remaining Americans, I looked into the holes and the bodies were not moving. They were quite dead. After I had looked into the holes the three soldiers and myself started to cover the bodies
over with dirt, We worked at this task about forty minutes before the burial was finished. During this time Lt. NOGI stood and watched. When we were all finished each hole had a small hump or mound of earth over it. I put a flower on each erave. Then the three soldiers and myself raked the छraves until thej were smioth. After this was done Lt.NOGI, the three soldiers and myself all saluted the graves. After this Lt. NOGI went back to his car and returned to Naval Feadquarters at Ambon. Then the three soldiers and myself walked back to the road end walked to the Japanese soldiers' cemetery. When we reached that place the truck came from Garara to fetch us. We arrived at Garara Camp at about 5 $o^{\prime} \mathrm{clock}$ in the afternoon.
Q. I hand you this stenographic note-book and pen and ask you to draw, upon it, a diagram of the place of execution, showing the position of the graves, all men and soldiers there, the American's position, the road, and any and all other information you may have.
A. I cannot draw very well but I will give you directions and you will please do it for me.
Q. Please write upon such diagram, in Japanese, a statement of what it is. Also sign and date such document and I will annex it to your ce tificate as an exhibit.
f. I have done so.

子. Were you and Lt. NOGI and the three soldiers the onl ones at the execution place?

1. Yes. We were the only ones present. IKEUCFI, UEMUNA, the driver, and the two remainine soldiers stayed at the truck and I think they left and returned to Garara Camp as soon as the iast American was taken to the execution place.
Q. You stated thot Lt. NOGI was waiting at the execution place when you arrived. Where did he come from and how did he get there?
2. I think Lt. NOCI came from Naval Feadquarters at Ambon and came to the execution place in his car taking the five soldiers with him.

Who was It, NOGI?
All I know is that he came from Naval Headquarters in Ambon. He was very tall about six feet tall, complexion white, black hair, military hair cut. He wore no glasses.

Who ordered Lt. NOGI to come to the execution?

1 तथntiory Document No.52.23.
Fape 4.
A. I think that the order came Irom Naval Headquarters in Ampon to the Naval Folice Headquarters. I think that It. NiIY $\quad \mathrm{ZAKI}$ ordered Lt. NUGI to execute the Americans.
C. Who executed the other two Americens?
A. Lt. NOGI
Q. How do you know?
A. On the day and at the place of the execution immediately afte: all the Americens were killed, Lt. HFOG called me from the bushes and told me. He seid what I have already told you and he also said, "Now the execution is finished, and I executed the other two Americans." I didn't say anything to him, and that was all he said. I was very upset.
Q. Why were these fmericans executed?
A. On the morning of the execution, after UELIFH.A ordered me to kill one of the Americans, I was worried so I asked UEMUFA why these Americans were to be killed. He said I shouldn't worry beceuse everything was ordered by superior officers.
Q. Were these Americans given a hearing or a court martial?
A. I don't know.
Q. Were they given a hearing or court martial while at Garara Camp?
A. No.
Q. Who ordered W/O UEIUKiA to have the Americans executed?
A. I think the order came from It. MIYAZAKI, but I think Capt. ShIFIOZU gave the original order.
Q. Where are Capt. SHIFOZU and Lt. MIYAZAKI now?
A. Both of them are in No. 3 Compound.
Q. What were the three Americans' names, ranks, and descriptions:
A. It has been so long ago and they only steyed at Garara one night so I don't remember anything except that two were very tall. They were ell wearing khaki uniform with long trousers. I don't know whether they were officers or enlisted men.
Q. Where were these Americans captured?

A. IKEUChI told me that they were captured on Ceram Island that is all I know.
Q. What was your rank at the time you executed the American?
A. I was a Sergeant Miajor.
Q. Were you under direct orders from W/O UEliUFA?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you have disobeyed UEliUhA's order to execute the American?
A. I couldn't refuse because of Japanese army discipline.
Q. Was force, threats, duress or coercion used in taking this statement from you?
A. No.
Q. Was any promise of reward, immunity or consideration given as a result of this statement?
A. No.
(Signed) KIYOSATO YOSHIZAKI
NETHEKLAIVDS EAST INDIES )
ISLAND OF HOFOTAI ) SS
I, KIYOSATO YOSFIZAKI, being duly sworn on oath, state that I had read to me and understood the translation of the foregoine transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein, consisting of four (4) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

## (Signed) KIYOSATO YOSHIZAKI

Subscribed and sworn to before me this thirtieth day of March, 1946.
(Sicned) JOHN D SCHWENKEK, Capt., F.A Investigating Officer, War Crime Investigating Detachment.

NETHEELANDS EAST INDIES )
ISLAND OF MOFOTAI )SS
I, MASAO DOUE, T/3, ASN 30111100, War Crimes Branch, being duly sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the question and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese

Evidentiary Dumaco
-
to English respectiveiy, and that arter heing transorided, I
$\therefore \quad$ truly trenslated the foregoing deposicion containing tinee (3) pages to the witness; that the wicness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.
(Signed) MASAO DOUE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 C day of Larch, 1946.
(Siened) JOFiN D SCHWENKER,
Capt., F.A.
Investigating Officer, Warcrin
Investigating Detachment.

## CEFTIFICATE

I, JCFN D. SCFIWENIEF, Capt.,
0-544384, Fh, certify that on 28th day of Larch, 1946, personelly appeared before me KIYOSATO YOSHIZAKI, and according to $\operatorname{liSAO}$ DOTE, qave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein; that after his testimony had been trenscribed, the said KIYOSATO YOSFIZAKI had read to him by the said ircerpeter the same and affixed his signature tereto in my presence.

Island of Norotai,
NETHEFLAI DS EAST INDIES 30 th day of lierch, 1946.
(Signed) JOFN D. SCHWENKER, Capt. F.A. Investigating. Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment.

