

816

9.150-2

54

**ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио**

RP

DOC NO 2150
U.S.S.R. NO 150-2

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF BARRACK
CAPACITY IN KOREA IN THE PERIOD
FROM 1931 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS
WITH THREE MAPS IN TWO COPIES.

REPORT

on the Increase of the Barrack
facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

By the time of the occupation of Manchuria the total billeting capacity of the barrack facilities of the Japanese troops in Korea was for two infantry divisions with support units. The barracks and the military settlements were as a rule situated in big towns of the country: Seoul, Kheijo, Ranan, and Tsinkai. After Manchuria had been occupied by Japan, a rapid increase of the barrack facilities in Korea began to show itself, and barracks and even whole military settlements were built as a rule in Northern Korea, mainly on the areas bordering with the U.S.S.R.

From 1931 to 1941 the barrack facilities in Korea increased more than three times with capacity of seven infantry division could have been billeted there, five of which could have been billeted in Northern Korea. From 1941 to 1945 the Japanese continued to build barracks and military settlements all over the country. During this period the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Korea was increased for receiving about twelve divisions together with support units. Thus, the construction of a great number of military barracks in Korea, especially in its northern part, shows that the Japanese Command planned to transform Korea into a military base for attacking the Soviet Primorye.

- Appendix:
1. Map. "Barracks Facilities in Korea in 1931-1932".
 2. Map. "Barracks facilities in Korea in 1941-1942".
 3. Map. "Barracks facilities in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED
ARMY

Colonel

/Tsigichko/

January "30", 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. I. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: V. Tarkhov

Казарменный фонд в Корее

в 1931-32 гг.

Number of Barracks in Korea

in 1931-32.

Условные обозначения:

Conventional marks:

■ **Военные казармы**
Military barracks

Общая емкость казарменного фонда Кореи - 45.000 чел.
The total billeting capacity of the barracks in Korea ... 45.000 men.

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Железняк* (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel *Soenlov*

Ж Е Л
О Р Е



КАЗАРМЕННЫЙ ФОНД В КОРЕЕ

В 1941-42 гг.

Number of Barracks in
Korea
in 1941-42

Условные обозначения

Conventional mark

■ Военные казармы Military barracks


Общая емкость казарменного фонда Кореи - 140.000 чел.
The total billeting capacity of the barracks of Korea - 140.000 men.

Начальник Батальона
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник / (Сokolov) /
Sokolov

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Масштаб 1:2500000

Sokolov



КАЗАРМЕННЫЙ ФОНД В КОРЬЕ

В 1945 году

Number of Barracks
in Korea
in 1945.

Условные обозначения

Conventional marks:

1. ■ Военные казармы

1. Military barracks

Общая емкость казарменного фонда Кореи - 250.000 чел.


The total collecting capacity of the barracks of Korea - 250,000 men.

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Соловьев* (Соловьев)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant colonel

/Sokolov/

Масштаб 1:2500000



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##:

- 2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2073 "Report. Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."
- 2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2130 "Report concerning Puppet Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."
- 1879 "Table increase of Sungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."
- 2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."
- 1877 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. "
- 1881 "Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."
- 1883 "Report on the growth of Seaports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 1885 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."
- 2129 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2127 "Report on construction of military dumps in
Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2150 "Report on the increase of the barrack faci-
lities in lities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow,
on or about January 30, 1946,

LT. COL. TARANENKO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.

VC
use 817

A F F I D A V I T
of RODZAEVSKY Konstantin Vladimirovich
of April 11, 1946

K.V. RODZAEVSKY, born in 1907 in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Russian, higher legal education. The former head of the whiteguard organization, "the Russian Fascist Union", in Manchuria.

Q Living in Manchuria you carried on intense anti-Soviet activities directed against the Soviet Union. Tell us about them.

A Having escaped from the Soviet Union to Manchuria in 1925 I created the whiteguard organization "The Russian Fascist Union" (R.F.S.) there. "The Russian Fascist Union", the aim of which was to overthrow the Soviet power in the USSR, counted on Japan which was preparing a military attack against the Soviet Union.

I and other leaders of the Russian Fascist Union were closely connected with a number of Japanese military and statesmen, and also with the Japanese intelligence service in Manchuria, under whose direction we carried on our active sabotage work against the USSR.

Following the task set by the Japanese intelligence service the "Russian Fascist Union", directed by me, trained agents out of the whiteguard emigrants, these agents being smuggled into the Soviet Union for intelligence work for creating fascist underground organizations, for the preparation of an armed revolt and the organization of terroristic acts against the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and of the Soviet Government.

At the same time the "Russian Fascist Union" carried anti-Soviet propaganda among the whiteguard emigrants on a large scale and also published anti-Soviet literature for distribution on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Q When did you establish contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service?

A I established contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service with the aim of joint struggle against the USSR in 1931, through the Japanese secret service agent Osawa, who published in Kharbin the newspaper "Kharbinskoye Vremya" in the Russian

language. In 1932 after the occupation of Manchuria by Japan, I got in touch with the chief Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, which up to 1945 directed and controlled all the activities of "the Russian Fascist Union" and of other anti-Soviet whiteguard organizations existing in Manchuria as well.

Having obtained control of all the Manchurian white emigrants, the Japanese Intelligence Service represented by the chief Military Mission in Kharbin and Missions in other towns of Manchuria did everything for employing the whiteguards against the Soviet Union, and in the first place, for training them for an attack against the Soviet Union.

I knew of the war which Japan prepared against the Soviet Union, and of the aims she set before herself in this war, from personal talks with representatives of the Japanese military circles.

Q When and with whom had you such talks?

A General HIGUCHI, the chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, in a heart to heart talk with me at his private residence in March, 1938, said that Japan strived to turn the Soviet Far East into a buffer-state between Japan and the U.S.S.R. He called this state Far Eastern Russia and demanded that the "Russian Fascist Union" consider its sole aim the struggle for creation of such a state under the guidance of Japan.

General HATA, who had succeeded HIGUCHI at the post of the chief of the Japanese Military Mission and who recently was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, also spoke about the preparation of an attack of Japan on the Soviet Union.

Approximately in September, 1939, HATA, in his directive speech addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants" Affairs Bureau in the Manchurian Empire" created by the Japanese, said that the Kwantung Army would help the white-guard emigrants to realize their anti-Soviet hopes.

Statements to the same effect were made in the directive speeches addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants" Affairs Bureau" delivered by the succeeding chiefs of the Japanese military Mission in Kharbin: General YNANGITA in 1940-1942, and General DOI in 1943. Some leaders of the Japanese military planned to create by their military forces a united "national Russia" which would be under Japan's influence.

Those plans were inspired by General ARAKI, former Japanese War Minister.

In March 1934 during my visit to Tokyo in connection with the affairs of the "Russian Fascist Union" I visited General ARAKI in his flat and forwarded to him a secret letter from Major Akikusa, Assistant Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission. The contents of this letter, as Akikusa told me, was concerned with the activities of secret Japanese organization "The Union of Young Officers" with which both of them were connected. During my talk with ARAKI I told him of the anti-Soviet activities of "The Russian Fascist Union" of which he fully approved and promised to help us. Then ARAKI made a statement that Japan would by all means fight against the USSR to establish, as he put it, "National Russia", which would serve the interests of Japan. ARAKI allowed me to publish this talk in a somewhat milder form, as an interview in the newspaper of the "Russian Fascist Union", "Nash Put" (Our Way), and it was done.

During my second visit to Tokyo in March, 1939 for the purpose of establishing connection with the representatives of governmental circles of Japan as regards "The Russian Fascist Union", I again met ARAKI who at that time was Minister of Education.

Being at my request received by him in the premises of the Ministry of Education I informed ARAKI in brief about the work of the "Russian Fascist Union" and told him about the prospects of this work.

use ARAKI promised to help us as before, and wrote in my album his autograph: "An eternal friend of Russia, but not of the Soviets" as a token of his intention to fight to the end for the creation of "National Russia" where Japan would have unlimited influence.

General KOISO, the Japanese Minister of Colonies, who from 1933 to 1935 was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarter also told me about the aggressive plans of Japan concerning the USSR. I met KOISO twice during my visits to Tokyo.

When I first met him in the Ministry of Colonies in March, 1939 KOISO promised me his support of the anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union".

I met him for the second time in October 1939 when I came to Tokyo on an excursion organized by the Kharbin Military Mission. KOISO received me in his flat and in our conversation concerning the relations of Japan with the USSR said that Japan strove to drive Soviet Russia from the Pacific Ocean.

After the outbreak of the war between Germany and the USSR, the Japanese were talking not only about the plans of attacking the USSR but about the time of their attack as well.

When discussing with me in October 1941 my proposal to intensify the anti-Soviet propaganda carried on by the "R.F.S.", Lieutenant Colonel NIUMURA, chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, stated that Japan had her own plans and that our untimely activity might only disclose these plans.

Japan, NIUMURA went on, would start war against the Soviet Union after the German troops had taken Moscow. Then he added that the aim of Japan was to cut off the Far East from the Soviet Union and to create a new state on its territory under the protectorate of Japan.

Japan postponed the opening of hostilities against the USSR exclusively because the Red Army routed the German troops at Moscow and Stalingrad. Japan, however, did not give up her former plans of territorial gains at the expense of the USSR until recently. In December, 1942, the same Lt. Col. NIUMURA, speaking of the conditions at the Soviet-German front said that the most urgent task of Japan was the straightening of the Manchurian-Soviet frontier line along the Amur river, i.e. the annexation of the Soviet Primorye.

Q. Tell us what you know about the practical measures taken by Japan with the aim of preparing for war against the USSR.

A. The occupation of Manchuria carried out by the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1931-32 was a decisive step towards the preparation of Japan for an attack on the Soviet Union.

The editor of the newspaper "Kharbinskoya Vremya" Osawa, who was Japanese secret agent, told me during the offensive of the Kwantung Army troops on Kharbin that if the Soviet administration of the Chinese Eastern Railroad put obstacles in the way of the Japanese offensive, Japan would immediately start a war against the USSR, in case there were no such obstacles, Japan would attack the Soviet Union some time later.

The Japanese had worked out the plan of occupation of Manchuria beforehand, and it was corroborated by their own statements made during their talks with me.

While in Kharbin, I repeatedly met the Japanese NAGAOKA who was personal friend and advisor of General ITAGAKI, the former chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

NAGAOKA's permanent residence was in Dairen, and he came to Kharbin rather frequently. Almost every time when he came there he called on me in my residence and inquired about the activities of the "Russian Fascist Union", which he supported in every way.

In the winter of 1938, during one of his regular visits to Kharbin, NAGAOKA came to my place and on behalf of General ITAGAKI inquired as to my considerations concerning the question of the future reorganization of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau".

When talking with me, in reply to my complaints concerning the difficulties which we came across in our anti-Soviet activities, NAGAOKA spoke in the following way: "We, Japanese, for 25 years were preparing to create the "Manchurian State", and, as you can see, have created such a state. Likewise, you, the leaders of the "Russian Fascist Union", should act gradually and follow the plan set beforehand: at first, with the help of Japan, to create your own state extending as far as the Baikal Lake, and then up to the Urals". NAGAOKA told me during the same conversation that the "Union of Young Officers" existing in Japan at that time had played a great part in the preparation and carrying out of the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops. I had previously been informed of the same by the aforementioned OSAWA.

Q Tell us in detail, how the Japanese prepared for the occupation of Manchuria?

A At the beginning of 1932 when talking to me in his flat, Osawa said that he was a member of the Japanese Fascist organization, the "Union of Young Officers", on the initiative of which the invasion of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was organized, and that General MINAMI, the War Minister of Japan, was well aware of the plan of this invasion.

Further OSAWA told me that the head of this organization, Colonel HASHIMOTO, personally had participated in the clash between the Japanese and the Chinese troops in Mukden area which he, HASHIMOTO, had provoked.

The occupation of the town of Kharbin, which had been held by the Chinese troops till February 1932 also was provoked by the Japanese.

use

As there were many foreign consulates and settlements in Kharbin, it was of importance for the Japanese to create a formal pretext for the occupation of the town. With this aim in view OSAWA got in touch with me, as the head of the "Russian Fascist Union" and with the whiteguard General Kosmin, who was the head of one of the sections of the anti-Soviet terroristic organization "The Brotherhood of Russian Truth" and set us the task of creating a semblance of disorder in Kharbin. As Kosmin told me in October 1931, he, following OSAWA's instructions, had laid several grenades in the premises of the Japanese Military mission, the Japanese Consulate, the Japanese Military Civilians' Society and of one more Japanese office in Kharbin. This had been carried out through members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" Society. When the grenades were discovered, the Japanese published in the newspapers and through diplomatic channels protested against the alleged attempts of the part of the Chinese to blow up the Japanese officers.

In December of the same year, KOSMIN informed me that OSAWA had instructed him that he open disorderly fire in the central streets of Kharbin at night with the help of the whiteguards.

In the connection with this he asked me to place at his disposal two members of the "R.F.S." to be used for carrying out this task, to which I consented and commissioned TEREKHOV and MAKARENKO, members of the Kharbin affiliation of the "R.F.S." to KOSMIN. The provocation carried out, the Japanese newspapers reported that complete anarchy was reigning in Kharbin, and that Chinese policemen went unpunished firing in the streets and plundering the civilian population.

The Japanese Consulate in Kharbin made a protest to the Chinese authorities concerning the same matter.

At the beginning of January, 1932, a fight between a Russian customer and Chinese salesman took place in one of the Chinese shops in Kharbin.

To aggravate the situation KOSMIN, by order of OSAWA, sent several members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" Society to the said shop who made a pogrom there, which caused a mass clash between Russians and Chinese. As the result of this provocation several men were killed.

To further aggravate this incident OSAWA sent the Japanese newspapermen NAKAMURA and myself in a car with the Japanese Flag to the place of the incident.

Doing so he warned me that fire would be opened at our car. Near the place of fighting some strangers actually fired at us, and the Japanese made another protest to the Chinese authorities and to the Corps of the Foreign Consuls to the effect that the Chinese policemen were allegedly firing at the car bearing the Japanese flag, and in particular, had made an attempt on NAKAMURA and me.

Ensuing these provocations, the units of the Kwantung Army captured Kharbin on February 5, 1932 and commenced the occupation of Northern Manchuria. As soon as the occupation of all Manchuria was completed, the Japanese directly started preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Q What military preparations were made by Japan in Manchuria for an attack on the Soviet Union?

A First of all, the greater part of the Kwantung Army was drawn up to the Manchurian-Soviet border, in the Hailar area, in particular, a whole Japanese division was stationed, another division was at the town of Tsitsikar.

The commanding personnel and the Headquarters of the units stationed along the frontier consisted, as a rule, of former participants of the Japanese intervention in Siberia in 1918-1922 who spoke Russian well. As far back as 1933 Japanese Military Missions were established in most of the Manchurian towns in the frontier area for the purpose of carrying on reconnaissance work against the USSR. The personnel of these missions also consisted mostly of the participants of the Japanese intervention in the Siberia.

Simultaneously intensive construction of fortifications and airfields was carried out along the frontier of the Soviet Union. Powerful fortifications were constructed in the district of the town of Hailar, the Hingan Station and the Pogranichnaya Station. The population were strictly forbidden to come into these districts.

Military airfields were constructed in the border towns of Manchuria: Hailar, Saghalin-Ula, Tsiamusy, Lahasusu, Pogranichnaya, Mudantsian.

Along with this in 1932, an intense construction of new railroads of strategic importance was started. Among these railroads there were: Lafa-Kirin RR, which enabled the Japanese to transfer their troops from Southern Manchuria and Korea to Northern Manchuria, to the USSR frontier. The railroad

Kharbin-Saghalin-Ula in the direction of Blagoveshchensk; the railroad line Tsitsikar-Peiang, which made it possible to transfer troops from Tsitsikar in the direction of Sakhalin-Ula.

The so-called top secret railroad leading from the town of Taonan to Halun-Arshan, which made it possible to transfer troops from Southern Manchuria to the Mongolian People's Republic border.

A net of new railroads leading from Southern Manchuria to the Soviet Primorye was also built.

The building of military constructions of various kinds and of railroads of strategic importance, was going on during the whole period following the creation of Manchukuo and became especially intensified during the war of Germany against the Soviet Union.

Thus even in 1945 an intense construction of a railroad leading from Nansa Station (of the Kharbin-Tsiamysinskaya RR) to the North in the direction of the Amur River was being carried on.

During the same period the garrisons in the areas bordering with the Soviet Union were considerably reinforced.

That up to the recent time Japan was preparing for war against the USSR is confirmed by the fact that at the beginning of 1943 General YAMASHITA, who was regarded in Japan as a "blitzkrieg specialist" and who, prior to this was in command of the troops which captured Singapore, was in the area of the northern border between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

MATSUGA, one of the leaders of the Japanese state organization the "Kyo-Wa-Kai", in March 1943 spoke to me confidentially about YAMASHITA's stay in Manchuria.

The preparation for a war against the USSR was carried out in the sphere of ideological propaganda among the Manchurian population. In order to establish among the population faith in Japan and hatred toward the Soviet Union, the Japanese immediately after the occupation of Manchuria created the state political organization "Kyo-Wa-Kai" (Commonwealth of Nations) which propagated the idea of creating the Greater East Asia and of establishing in this sphere the Japanese "new order". The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society carried out intense anti-Soviet propaganda among the Chinese population and then began to spread it over among the Russian whiteguards. The

"Kyo-Wa-Kai" intensely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meetings and in press.

The activities were directed by the Japanese Central Headquarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, headed in recent years by MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of the occupation of Manchuria.

Beside the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization, the anti-Soviet propaganda was carried on by the Japanese military Missions in the towns of Manchuria, through their agents.

- Q. What part was assigned to the Russian whiteguards in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union?
- A. The Japanese had great faith in the whiteguards, who lived in Manchuria, in connection with the preparation for an attack against the U.S.S.R. and therefore tried to activize the anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards. It was plamed that during the war against the Soviet Union, the whiteguards would be used as armed force, and after the end of the war successful for Japan, they were to carry out Japanese policy in the areas amexed from the U.S.S.R. The direction of the Anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards organizations was carried out by the Japanese military missions, which in their turn were directed by the chief Japanese military mission in Kharbin.

Besides the whiteguard organizations were supported from Japan itself.

General ARAKI and General KOISO personally promised me to render any help in activising the anti-Soviet work of the "Russian Fascist Union."

use (The "R.F.S." was also supported by the Japanese organization "The Black Dragon" headed by Mitsuru TOOYAMA.

In 1935, the Japanese TOMITA, TOOYAMA's representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that TOOYAMA sympathized with the anti-Soviet activities of "the Russian Fascists" and wished us success in the struggle against the U.S.S.R.

In 1939 being in Tokyo I, with the help of TOMITO, visited TOOYAMA who repeated his wish that we might succeed and had his picture taken with me. His assistant, SUENAGA, in an interview, stated that "through the elimination of communism the ancient Rus (Russia) will emerge in new nimbus."

This interview was published in the "R.F.S." magazine, "Natsia" (Nation). Since the meeting with TOOYAMA I always felt the support of the "Black Dragon" society in my anti-Soviet activities.

"Kyo-Wa-Kai" intensely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meetings and in press.

The activities were directed by the Japanese Central Headquarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, headed in recent years by MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of the occupation of Manchuria.

Beside the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization, the anti-Soviet propaganda was carried on by the Japanese military Missions in the towns of Manchuria, through their agents.

- Q. What part was assigned to the Russian whiteguards in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union?
- A. The Japanese had great faith in the whiteguards, who lived in Manchuria, in connection with the preparation for an attack against the U.S.S.R. and therefore tried to activize the anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards. It was planned that during the war against the Soviet Union, the whiteguards would be used as armed force, and after the end of the war successful for Japan, they were to carry out Japanese policy in the areas annexed from the U.S.S.R. The direction of the Anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards organizations was carried out by the Japanese military missions, which in their turn were directed by the chief Japanese military mission in Kharbin.

Besides the whiteguard organizations were supported from Japan itself.

General ARAKI and General KOISO personally promised me to render any help in activising the anti-Soviet work of the "Russian Fascist Union."

The "R.F.S." was also supported by the Japanese organization "The Black Dragon" headed by Mitsuru TOOYAMA.

In 1935, the Japanese TOMITA, TOOYAMA's representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that TOOYAMA sympathized with the anti-Soviet activities of "the Russian Fascists" and wished us success in the struggle against the U.S.S.R.

In 1939 being in Tokyo I, with the help of TOMITO, visited TOOYAMA who repeated his wish that we might succeed and had his picture taken with me. His assistant, SUENAGA, in an interview, stated that "through the elimination of communism the ancient Rus (Russia) will emerge in new nimbus."

This interview was published in the "R.F.S." magazine, "Natsia" (Nation). Since the meeting with TOOYAMA I always felt the support of the "Black Dragon" society in my anti-Soviet activities.

You can judge of the role for which the Japanese prepared the whiteguards by the statements made by the chief of the Kharbin Military mission, General DOI, in the talk which took place in December 1943 in the train going from Kharbin to the Sungari 2 station, to which we went in connection with the so-called Sungari Russian Military detachment being formed there, told me that "Bureau of the Russian Emigrant's Affairs" created by the Japanese must consider itself to be a future Russian Government.

In several talks which I had in 1934 with Major AKIKUSA, assistant chief of the Japanese Military mission, he told me that Japan was preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. and in connection with this recommended to me to consolidate contact with SEMENOV, a whiteguard ataman, whom the Japanese considered chief of whiteguard emigrants, and whom they proposed as a leader of future "National Government of Russia."

- Q. What was the concrete way of the Japanese military missions in directing the anti-Soviet activities of the white emigrants' organization?
- A. Immediately following the occupation of Manchuria the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin established control over all anti-Soviet white emigrants' organizations acting in Manchuria, and among them the "Russian Fascist Union" headed by me.

At first counsellors were appointed to each white emigrants' organization from among the employees of the Japanese Military Mission. Major AKIKUSA acted counsellor to the "Russian Fascist Union." The white emigrants organizations: "The Russian Fascist Union," "The Monarchist Association," "The Legitimists," "The Far Eastern Union of the Military," and the "Kossaks Union," under the leadership of the Japanese Military Mission spread among the emigrants large anti-Soviet propaganda and smuggled their agents into the Soviet Union with the task of conducting intelligence work and creation of an anti-Soviet underground organization.

In 1934 the Japanese military mission in Kharbin decided to unite all whiteguard organizations for the purpose of establishing centralized guidance of their activities against the U.S.S.R. In the same year the Bureau of Russian Emigrants Affairs in the Manchuria Empire was created as a united body of all those organizations. It was subordinated to the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin.

Through "BREM" in Kharbin and its branches in other towns in Manchuria, the Japanese Military missions recruited whiteguard for the purpose of sabotage activities on the territories of the Soviet Union.

A special detachment was recruited in 1936 from the members of the "Russian Fascist Union" according to the proposal made by SUZUKI, a Japanese intelligence officer of the Kharbin Mission. This Detachment was placed under the command of MATVEY PLATONOVICH MASLAKOV, a

whiteguard, my aide.

This detachment armed and equipped by the Japanese was in the Autumn of the same year smuggled across the Amur River onto the Soviet Union Territory for the purpose of terrorist and sabotage activities and also for the establishment of fascist underground organizations. The smuggling was carried out by SUZUKI and by ENOZUKA, a member of the Japanese military mission in Kharbin.

In the same year, i.e. 1936, and in the following years many other agents trained in the Japanese Military Mission were smuggled into the Soviet Union.

In 1937 the so-called secret schools were organized at the "Russian Fascist Union" and "Monarchist Union" in accordance with the order of Major ONOUCHI, chief of the 3rd Department of the Japanese Military mission in Kharbin. These schools trained future organizers of sabotage activities in the U.S.S.R. rear.

I was appointed director of the school at the "Russian Fascist Union". SUZUKI was my assistant. Those who graduated from the schools were sent to work in the Japanese Military Missions.

In 1938 instead of secret schools the Kharbin Military Mission established a special school at the mission training agents for reconnaissance work directed against the U.S.S.R. In this school were trained the organizers of anti-Soviet propaganda who later on would work in Japanese missions in the frontier area.

Whiteguard youth were students of the school. This school existed till the surrender of Japan and it especially extended its work when Germany attacked the Soviet Union.

In 1943 special detachments were formed out of the students of this school; these detachments sent agents to the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of gathering intelligence information. The said detachments were at Shitouhedzy station, Imyanpo Station and in the Hailar area.

Along with the smuggling of agents into the Soviet Union, the Japanese military mission in Kharbin carried out a great work of organization of anti-Soviet propaganda among the white emigrants and of training of detachments consisting of white emigrants for a war against the U.S.S.R.

- Q. What anti-Soviet armed detachments were formed by the Japanese of the Russian whiteguards in Manchuria?
- A. The Japanese started forming the whiteguard armed detachments in 1932.

In the middle of 1932 General KOMATSUBARA, the chief of the Japanese Military mission in Kharbin, entrusted the white guard General KOSMIN with the task of forming armed detachments out of whiteguards, these detachments were the nucleus which were to be developed into a whiteguard army in Manchuria.

Kosmin told me that according to KOMATSUBARA, this army was intended to be used in the war of Japan against the U.S.S.R.

Fulfilling the task set by KOMATSUBARA, KOSMIN immediately formed two such detachments which performed guard duties on the Mukden-Shanghai-Guan RR and the Lafa-Kirin RR, then under construction.

Beginning from 1933 the Japanese, following the order of the same KOMATSUBARA, began forming Russian police guard detachments, which carried on struggle against the Manchurian guerillas.

Such detachments were subsequently formed at the Mulin coal mines, near the Hailin Station, at the Handaohedzy station, near the Yablonia station and at other points of Eastern Manchuria.

In 1937, Major ONOUCHI, the chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, concentrated the supervision over all previously formed whiteguard detachment by subordinating them to the Handaohedzy station branch of the Kharbin Military mission. A police school was opened at this branch, where the members of the detachments received military training and were educated in the anti-Soviet spirit.

In 1938, the Kharbin Military mission established at the Sungari Station 2 a secret "RUSSIAN DETACHMENT ASANO" in which the white guard youth were trained for a war against the USSR.

This detachment was considered by the Japanese as a model of all anti-Soviet formations.

General HATA, chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin while inspecting this detachment said to its members that they formed the backbone of the future Russian Army.

I, personally, several times visited the "ASANO DETACHMENT" to give anti-Soviet lectures. In 1939, several men of the detachment participated in the Japanese provocation in the Nomangan area.

In 1943 the "Asano detachment" was enlarged and transformed into "Russian detachments of the Manchurian Army". In view of this three detachments were formed; cavalry detachment at the Sungari station, infantry detachment at the Handao-hedzy station and a cossack detachment at the town of Hailar.

The strength of these detachments amounted approximately to 1500 men.

To ensure military training for all whiteguard youth, obligatory military training was introduced in 1942 in all secondary and higher schools for the Russians by order of Lt. Colonel NIUMURA, the chief of the 3d department of the Kharbin Military Mission.

Besides the military training the whiteguard organizations directed by the Japanese Military Mission carried on active anti-Soviet propaganda and published newspapers and magazines.

In 1941 a special propaganda section was established in the Kharbin Military Mission with the aim of intensification of anti-Soviet activities. It had white emigrant newspapermen on its staff.

Besides directing the anti-Soviet propaganda among the Manchurian population this section began preparing anti-Soviet leaflets and booklets in 1941 which were to be distributed after Japan attacked the Soviet Union. I, myself, following the instructions of the Japanese, wrote such leaflets.

Thus, during a number of years and up to recent days, the Japanese Government and the General Staff, carrying out their aggressive plans of seizure of the Soviet territory, turned Manchuria into military base for an attack on the U.S.S.R., constructed fortifications, a net of railroads and highways there, increased the strength of the Kwantung Army and prepared the population of Manchuria, and among them the whiteguards, for war. But the rapid advance of the Red Army deprived the Japanese of the opportunity of bringing their plans into life.

The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me.

Signed: Rodzaevsky.

Interrogated: Counter Intelligence Officer

Major Putintsev

CERTIFICATE

The City of Moscow
April 11, 1946

I, Rodzaevsky, Konstantin Vladimirovich, sign this certificate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the case of the main Japanese war criminals.

I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the P.S.F.S.R.

Signed: Rodzaevsky

This certificate is taken by the Counter-Intelligence Officer
Major Putintsev.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, Gildenblat, M., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

EXTRACTS FROM THE BOOK
"G R E A T M A N C H U R I A N E M P I R E"
PUBLISHED ON ACCOUNT
OF THE TEN-YEAR JUBILEE

BY THE STATE ORGANIZATION KYO-WA-KAI
AND THE CHIEF BUREAU OF THE RUSSIAN
EMIGRANTS AFFAIRS OF THE MANCHURIAN EMPIRE

IN KWARBIN

1 9 4 2

At present the great ideal of the foundation of Manchoukuo spreads all over East Asia and even has its reflection in Europe. The political system of our Ally Germany is undoubtedly influenced by the ideas of the East.

Our ideal was a reality but not a phantasy, and when there is an ideal, when there is confidence and integrity, there shall be victory. One can say that the creation of Manchoukuo, as it were, brought about spiritual renovation to mankind. (pg. 61)

In April, 1932 (Dha-Tun 1st Year) in Mukden a special committee for the foundation of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was formed. The Committee was composed of: Colonel Itagaki, Captain Katakura and Mr. Sheh, later first Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo, Mr. Yui, Mr. Wen, also Messrs. Wada, Koyama and Yamaguti.

The committee fulfilled their responsible mission with exceptional zeal and successfully accomplished it by elaborating the basic instrument of the Kyo-Wa-Kai and the plan of its activities. (pg. 170)

The supreme ruler, His Majesty Emperor, now prosperously reigning, accepted the post of Supreme President of the Society and the post of Supreme Adviser was accepted by General Fonjo, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army. (pg. 171)

In 1933 (Dha-Tun 2nd Year) the basic principles of the Kyo-Wa-Kai were promulgated.

THE STATE MISSION OF KYO-WA-KAI

According to these basic principles, the main tasks of the Kyo-Wa-Kai's activities are as follows:

The ultimate purpose of Manchoukuo being a State, in the existing international situation, is the creation of a foundation so as to successfully subserve the allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against the Comintern aggression.

In this holy struggle all the peoples of East Asia must join to form the united front of the common fight with the oppressors. (pg. 172).

Thus the Kyo-Wa-Kai, as is clear from the above stated, has a special mission of great importance to spread the spirit and the ideology of the State not only among the entire population of Manchoukuo but throughout the world. For the purpose of attaining this great aim the Kyo-Wa-Kai must carry on a permanent ideological struggle for the embodiment of its ideal both inside and outside the state. The Kyo-Wa-Kai is the ideological Centre of this struggle....." (pg. 172)

To establish and consolidate closer bonds with the Nippon state, the Kyo-Wa-Kai Bureau started functioning in Tokyo.

It is necessary to say, that in certain circles of the population there existed the opinion that the Kyo-Wa-Kai was by nature a temporary organization. To dispel this wrong opinion General Minami, General Nishio and a number of other representatives of higher authorities issued special directives concerning the intrinsic nature of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. (pg. 176)

Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Nippon, the Renovation of Asia Union, the Committee of Mobilization of Spirit in Korea, the Society of Mobilization of Spirit on Formosa, the Renovation of Asia Association in the Kwantung Region, Association for Assisting the Throne on the South Islands, the Orthodox Kuo-Ming-Dan in the Renovated China, Shin-Ming-Khoi, the East Asia people's Union, the Kyo-Wa-Kai of the Manchurian Empire--These constitute the powerful ideological front, which wins illustrious victories on boundless land and sea stretches. It must be said that the Kyo-Wa-Kai is righteously a pioneer of the ideological front of the creation of the New Order and the Renovation of the Great East Asia. (pg. 182-183)

7th ALL-MANCHURIAN CONGRESS OF THE
KYO-WA-KAI

(pg. 204)

1940 (KHAN-DHE 7th YEAR)

His Majesty and the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army honored with their presence the ceremony of the opening session of the 7th Congress. (pg. 204)

8th ALL-MANCHURIAN CONGRESS OF THE
KYO-WA-KAI

1941 (KHAN-DHE 8th YEAR)

The 8th All-Manchurian Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai held its session in the Central Headquarters Building in Shinjin from October 10 to October 17. (pg. 205)

His Majesty, the Emperor accompanied by the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army honored the opening ceremony with His presence. (pg. 205)

Four delegates of the Russian emigration participated in the 8th Congress for the first time. The twofold reasons for their having been absent at the previous Congresses are as follows:

Firstly, one of a technical nature--language difficulties.

Secondly, at some places there were no special Russian Sections of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. In the course of time these obstacles had been removed and several Russian delegates specially invited for the occasion were able to take an active part in the proceedings of the 8th Congress. (pg. 205)

ALL-MANCHURIAN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF
THE KYO-WA-KAI

On February 8, 1942, an All Manchurian Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was called by the Central Headquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. The session was opened in the premises of the Kyo-Wa-Kaikan in Shinjin. The Congress was called in connection with the promulgation of His Majesty, the Emperor's mani-

festos on the collaboration with the allied Nippon Empire in her Holy-War for the Great East Asia. The session was held two days. (pg. 206)

Ensuing His Majesty, the Emperor's departure General Umedzu, the Nippon Imperial Envoy and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, addressed the delegates of the Congress with a directive which contained among other things the following:

"His Majesty Tenno Granted His Manifesto on the Declaration of War, on the same day His Majesty, the Emperor's manifesto was promulgated. All this filled our hearts with a special happy feeling.

"The aim of the Great East Asiatic War is to liberate East Asia from the harmful influence of England and the U.S.A. and by joint efforts of the East Asiatic nations to establish the New Order and provide the possibilities for the states of East Asia to bring into life the "Khakko Itiu" idea and their General prosperity.

"By this day the Nippon Imperial Army and Navy have won a series of brilliant victories in the Pacific Ocean and in compliance with His Majesty Tenno's Gracious Decree, annihilated a number of military bases of the enemy in East Asia, thus making a gigantic stride towards the organization of the New Order.

"However, to ensure the complete realization of the purposes of the war and to secure the prosperity of East Asia, we must go a long way. At such an extraordinary historical moment the present Congress is extremely opportune. The delegates to the Congress must first of all pay their attention to the general situation all over the world, and perceiving the grave significance of the international situation and tasks facing Manchoukuo they must take the lead in the movement of raising the spirit of the foundation of the state, for promotion in every way the idea of sacrifice, for elucidating the masses as to the great cause of the Holy War, for raising the spirit of the masses, in this way helping increase the national production and raise the might of the state.

"On the other hand, basing themselves on the principles of their common struggle and durable relations between Manchoukuo and Nippon the delegates must contribute to the cause of national defense so that Nippon might be sure so far as the rear is concerned.

"Thus you must fulfill what you are assigned and at the

same time you will enjoy His Majesty, the Emperor's great benevolence." (pg. 206)

The following principles of work of the Central Headquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai for the present time were given in the speech of General Miake, Chief of the ~~Central~~ Headquarters:

(a) To popularize among the masses the significance of the war for the Great East Asia.

(b) To act with confidence in the coming victory bearing in mind that wherever there is justice there is victory.

(c) The population of Manchoukuo must feel grateful to the life of today.

(d) Each and everyone should live inspired by the sentiment of the foundation of the New Order in East Asia.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.

I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: /s/ V. A. Kaplan

Seizure of Documents.

The Town of Kharbin.
September 10, 1945.

I, Lieutenant-Colonel Danshin, Victor Vasilievich, the military prosecutor of the army unit N-35289, went on this day to building N-16 on Tsitsikarskaya Street, which had previously belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army, for examination and seizure of literature which might be used as evidence against the war criminals in Japan. On arriving there I examined the library which had belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army.

During the examination I discovered a book published in the Russian language in Kharbin, in 1942, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Manchoukuo. The title of this book was as follows: "The Great Manchurian Empire." The book contained 416 pages of various articles and photos showing the activities of the Russian Emigrants' Bureau, the Command of the Kwantung Army, the political organization "Kyo-Wa-Kai" and of number of other public and political societies in Manchuria which had been organized by the Japanese.

Taking into consideration the fact that this book might be used as evidence revealing that the Japanese Government had been preparing the Manchurian military base for a war against the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, and the fact that this book might be needed as evidence by the International Military Tribunal, I, under authority, of art. 175 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R.

RULED:

To seize the above-mentioned book for forwarding it as evidence to the International Military Tribunal.

Military Prosecutor of the Army Unit N-35289.

Lieutenant-Colonel Danshin.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

CAPTIONS

FROM THE BOOK,

"GREAT MANCHURIAN EMPIRE"

- P. 28 4. General LINAMI.
6. General UMEZU.
- P. 38 General ITAGAKI, former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.
- P. 39 General DOIHARA.
- P. 86 General TOJO, Prime Minister of Japan and Marshal Tsan-Tsin-Kui, Prime Minister of Manchukuo.
- P. 140 General UMEZU, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army and Special Envoy of Japan reads his address before His Majesty the Emperor, on the account of the 10th Jubilee of Manchukuo.
- P. 142 Parade of 65,000 members of mobilization rally of the Kiowa-Kai youth in Shintsin.
- P. 168 His Majesty the Emperor and General UMEZU at the opening ceremony of the All-Manchurian Kiowa-Kai congress.
- P. 203 (left) General UMEZU, Special Envoy of Nippon and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army makes a directing speech to the participants of the Congress.
- P. 203 (right) L. NEIRONE, Italian Envoy greets the delegates of the Congress.
- P. 204 The address of welcome of Dr. W. WAGNER, German Envoy.
- P. 214 The Harbin High Courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth at the parade.
- P. 215 The Parade of Public Voluntary Detachments of the Kiowa and the High courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth.
- P. 217 (left) Cavalry General V. A. KISLITSIN, Chief of Staff of the Main Detachment of Public Voluntary groups of the Kiowa passes by the ranks.
- P. 217 (right) General YANAGITA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission inspects the training groups, of Public Voluntary Detachments of the Kiowa.

P. 225 Ataman I.U. SEMENOV visits a camp of Russian
"Seinendanovites" in Kakagashi. Right -- R. KATO --
Left -- P. I. GRIBANOVSKY.

P. 302 The 1939 Slogans of the "Anti-Cominter Day."
"Moscow Brings Destruction -- Tokyo brings Rennovation"
"Communism is the Worst Enemy of Humanity"
"If you Want to Regain Russia Join the Ranks of Anti-
Comintern".
"Communism Shall Die, Russia Shall Live."
"Long Live the Anti-Comintern".

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I.,
 a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do
 hereby certify that Book "Greater Manchurian Empire",
published by the "Kio-Wa-Kai" and Chief Bureau of
Russian Emigrants in Manchuria in 1942
 was delivered to me by the Military Prosecutor of the
Zabaikalye-Amur Military district
 on or about May 13, 1946, and that the original of
 the said document may be found in the document is
attached herewith.

I do further certify _____

/s/ Lt. Col. Taranenko
 (Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

June 28, 1946.

Mendossan

819

Doc. No. 2658

Page 1

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

The United States of America, et al)
)
 vs. : Affidavit
)
 Sadao ARAKI, et al)

Letter became Chief of Bureau Staff of Gen H.Q.

I, Lt. General Yukio KASAHARA, state under oath as follows:

I was the Chief of Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau of the Japanese General Staff in 1928. I certify that I obtained knowledge of the following matters during the said period, through my duties.

*v.G.
Kanda*

"famous Jap" "off." 1927

In 1928, Major Masatane KANDA was on special duty with the Harbin Special Mission. He served in the Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau (Intelligence Bureau) of the Japanese General Staff Office a little previously. In the photostat copies of the Japanese document consisting of 50 pages, entitled "Military Materials for the operations against U.S.S.R." which were shown to me I saw the following three items.

1. Outline of sabotage activities against U.S.S.R.
2. Important sabotage activities matters that would be carried out east of Siberia.
3. Facilities to be stationed for the sabotage purposes east of Siberia and their operations.

I saw the documents containing these three items 18 years ago. In other words, I saw that part of the document beginning from the 1st to the 16th page. That document was drawn up by Major Masatane KANDA who was on duty in the said Harbin Special Mission mentioned above.

I saw the aforementioned part of that document during the period when I was the Chief of the Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff Office; in other words, in 1928.

In order to certify the above mentioned matter, I put my own signature and date in my handwriting on the backs of the photostatic copies of the portion of the said document which I saw in 1928.

This affidavit is signed by me in my own handwriting and it is true and accurate.

Yukio KASAHARA

Sworn and subscribed to
before the undersigned
officer by the above
named Yukio KASAHARA
at the War Ministry
Building, Tokyo, Japan
this 6th day of September, 1946

/s/ John F. Hummel
John F. Hummel, Major J.A.G.D.

Certificate

I, 2nd Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Yukio KASAHARA was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence, and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said affiant.

Dated this 6th day of September, 1946,
at Tokyo, Japan.

James Murakami
2nd Lt.
Central Interrogation Section

Get 809 to 816

Dr. Kujase

820

Colonel KAWAMOTO
Attached to New Port Arthur
Kuan-Tung Army Headquarters

Dear Major KASAHARA:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter.
This will conclude our research concerning materials for military
operation against Soviet Russia.

Masatane KANDA
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4822

mil attacks in Turkey.

Dear Colonel KAWAMOTO:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter.
This will conclude our research,

KANDA Masatane
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4822

- I. General outline of sabotage activities against Soviet Russia.
- II. Principal matters of sabotage activities planned to be executed in the east of Siberia.
- III. Organizations to be established for the purpose of sabotage activities in the areas East of Siberia and their tasks.
- IV. Sabotage activities in connection with the line of transportation in North Manchuria.
- V. Sabotage activities in connection with the collection of goods in North Manchuria.
- VI. Collection of reference materials.

Berlin 4/1929
Zwane. Matsue.
4107

Study
Kankyo-0
41

Witness
 1) Official doc should have been sent - it would not be in official document
 2) not adopted by Gen Staff
 3) To prepare for war
 4) reference with the offensive
 5) DATE - 1928 - 2 There were not
 into effort? put in action -
 Books - Ev
 W a ministry ✓

Q what position did he hold in Jap. army in 1928 -
 attached - Spec Serv. Mission at Harbin.
 KANDA Masatane
 No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
 Telephone No. 4822
 Does not seem comm of Kwangtung army - would give orders
 Q. what is official business of Spec Serv. Mission?
 A. "gathering of information" - "naturally secret."
 CONTENTS Re letters - permission not given but great latitude was permitted

Additional explanation:

Peace time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our sabotage work against Soviet Russia.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA

The position of sabotage activities in future wars is very important. Particularly when we are unable to bring about the final decision in our operations against Russia by force of arms, most part of the war, from beginning to end, shall be a war of sabotage.

The affairs included in our sabotage activities against Russia are many and their activities will extend throughout the whole world. Now, I shall mention the general outline of affairs to be executed, as follows:

1. In the light of the present situation in the Soviet Union, various strifes concerning race, thought, and social classes shall be aggravated, especially the internal strifes among the Communist Parties shall be invigorated in the hope of destructing the national structure. Above all, it is necessary to unite the states of Asiatic races in the Union in opposition to European Russia.

2. In relation to the preceding article, anti-war spirit, will be instilled among the Russian Army, especially among troops of foreign races, so that the Russians will commit errors in their plans of operations in the Far East.

3. Threatening the Soviet Union by inducing the neighboring countries in the West and the South, we shall make it impossible for her to move large troops to the Far East. Through economic blockade the import of goods, especially of war materials, will be checked.

4. By destroying the transportation system we shall delay the mobilization and assembling of troops; and by creating disturbances in munition plants we shall obstruct their manufacture of war materials. The Siberian Railway is the most important point.

5. We shall isolate the Soviet Union by destroying the communication facilities and through wireless competitions. Special attention should be paid to the Far East areas.

6. Should any regime connected with the Soviet Union exist in China, it shall be destroyed.

II. PRINCIPAL MATTERS OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES PLANNED TO BE EXECUTED IN THE EAST OF SIBERIA

Russian territories east of Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia will be the zones of military operations or form the background areas for both armies, so there are very many matters for sabotage activities in these areas. I shall now outline the important matters as follows:

VG | 1. Propaganda activities and instigation will be executed in Russian territories east of Siberia to instill anti-Communist and anti-Jewish spirits among the inhabitants and troops, and anti-war movements shall be provoked.

VG | 2. As the situation becomes acute, the principal railways east of Siberia will be destroyed, and strikes will be instigated in coal mines in Siberia and the Maritime Province to bring hardships in railway transportations. Farmers will be made to oppose to the collection of grains.

3. Anti-Communist organizations will be set up in South Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien, and will be made to advance into North Manchuria and Far-East Russian territories at favorable opportunities to hamper operational activities of Russian troops. In connection with the development of the general war situation, an anti-communist regime will be established within the Russian territory, and we shall contemplate the overthrow of the Communist Government both in the Siberia and Caucasus areas.

4. We shall hope to make Outer Mongolia anti-Soviet.

5. Should any pro-Soviet regime exist in South China, we shall scheme to destroy it. Above all, we shall be careful not to let Shanghai become the base for Communist intrigues. It is also necessary to break up the troops of Feng Yu-Hsiang's factions. Should any pro-Soviet government be established in North Manchuria, we shall first of all scheme to overthrow it.

6. Regarding the stealing and interrupting of telephone and wireless communications. The wireless communication post at Hubarovsk shall be destroyed.

7. Especially in North Manchuria, the protection or destruction of the transportation system; collection of materials; or preventing the enemy from utilizing them etc., all must be executed by maintaining close relations with military operation.

III. ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS EAST OF SIBERIA AND THEIR TASKS

As the sphere of sabotage activities against Russia extends throughout the world, its organization should also cover both continents. We shall here speak how the organizations will be established and how they will carry out their activities in the Russian territories east of Siberia and in Manchuria.

1. Siberian Organization

Far before the outbreak of hostilities (it will be desirable to arrange from peace time) a military officer disguised as a member of the consulate at Novosibirsk shall be posted to study the conditions of the people and the military situation in Siberia and to frame up anti-communist movements. For this purpose, several officers with funds disguised as merchants having business relations with the farming classes will be attached to him.

With the development of situations, anti-Communist and anti-war movements shall be instigated chiefly among the farming classes in coordination with the Far Eastern, Euro-Russian, and the South Russian districts. Strikes will be started in the Kuznetzk and Chernorvskiy coal mines and the farmers shall be incited not to sell their crops. After instructing the destruction of the Siberia Railway, they will gradually withdraw to the East.

The existence of Japanese merchants who purchase wheat, butter, and live stocks and sell miscellaneous goods and farm implements in the Siberian area is not necessarily illogical. If they are properly instructed, they should be able to bring about great results. Therefore, if we advise something like an export union toward Russia and have them extend their commercial field in these areas, the execution of our intrigue will become very convenient.

2. Chita Organization

Chiefly coordinating with the North Manchurian organization, this organization shall be a guiding and liaison organ for the anti-Communist movements in the Gabaikalie areas. In addition, it shall have connections with the Siberian organization, and with the purpose of spying on military situations in the Zabaikalie areas, an organization consisting of Russians, (It will be best if we can get members of the Communist party with hostile opinions against the present government. Otherwise they shall be merchants who do not belong to any party) shall be stationed. It is desirable that this organization, too, be arranged from peace time.

1932
7- Slows

1934
9- Slows

UG

3. Blagoveschensk Organization and Heiho Organization

In accordance with the outline for the Siberian Organization, a disguised military officer shall be stationed at the consulate in the respective areas. He shall stay at Heiho and shall cooperate with a military officer disguised as a merchant engaged in smuggling in Russian territory, in planning for anti-Communist movements mainly among the farming classes in Heilungchou. Furthermore, he shall make connections with the anti-Revolutionary Army, (shall relate later), which will penetrate along the Amgun valley from the district of Nikolaevsk. The Heiho Organization shall be left in the hands of bandits maneuvering in the Northern part of North Manchuria.

4. Habarovsk Organization

Disguised military officers (including one naval officer) will be posted at the consulate in Habarovsk, and in offices of other representatives of our fishery and forestry rights, if such representatives are to be stationed. They will take charge of liaison and supervision business for the anti-Communist movements by the farming class in the areas of the Maritime Province and Heilung Province. They also shall cooperate with the Blagoveschensk Organization to destroy and disturb rail and water transportations, and to cut off the communication lines. Especially, they shall plan to destroy the wireless station in Habarovsk. They shall contact with the bandits to be employed in the lower regions of the Sungari River.

5. Vladivostok Organization

Several military officers disguised as members of the Vladivostok Consulate, merchants, or persons concerned with fishery and forestry businesses, shall be posted. They shall plan to supervise the anti-revolutionary movement in the southern regions of the Maritime Province and to appease or annihilate the rebellious Korean organizations. They shall also instigate strikes in the Sucheng coal mines. They shall take measures to contact with the anti-revolutionary organizations that will advance from the Northern Korea regions. In view of the geographical situations, all the organizations in the Maritime and Heilung Provinces shall strive to instill the anti-war spirit among the Russian troops and to make them join the anti-revolutionary organizations.

6. Saghalien Organization

With its base either in Southern Saghalien or Hokkaido, this organization will instigate the petroleum mine-workers in Northern Saghalien and lead them into anti-revolutionary movements. Simultaneously

with the outbreak of war, they shall occupy Northern Saghalien in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army to be organized in Japan proper. They shall continue to proceed to Nikolaevsk, then to Habarovsk regions along the Heilung River. Another group shall advance along the Amgun River to the Heilungchow regions and check the Russian Army. Even before the outbreak of war this organization shall make connections with the gold mines in Heilungchow Province, and shall plan routes for importation of explosives to be used in destroying railways.

7. The North Korean Organization ✓

ve / An organization shall be established at Lonan, and this will organize a Russian Army of anti-revolutionary faction; which, in cooperation with bandits, will maneuver in the regions of Chientao and Southern Ussuri, annihilating rebellious Korean organizations and destroying the railways. Then, with the development of the situation, they shall advance into Southern Maritime Province, and in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army advancing southward from Northern Saghalien, they shall try to induce the people in that region to give up communistic ideals.

8. The North Manchurian Organization ✓

Besides adding the Heiho Organization to the present organization, a formal military official or a disguised military official shall be stationed in Tsitsikar. Several military officials shall be stationed in Hailar disguised as merchants and shall engage in fur trades and Outer-Mongolia commerce. They shall corner all furs and live-stocks; and shall disturb the independence movement in Hulunpeierh, (planned by the Soviets), and shall support the movements to break away from Communism in Outer-Mongolia. Letting fur traders engage in business in Heilar from peace time will have greater probabilities than there are in Siberia.

The sabotage activities of the North Manchurian Organization based in ~~Habarovsk~~ ^{Harbin} is complicated and divergent. I shall state the important matters as follows:

a. To completely sieze the Chinese political power. If a pro-Soviet government shall be established, it shall, first of all, be overthrown.

b. To get rid of all members of the Soviet managing staff from the Chinese Eastern Railway, thereby repuking all red influence from North Manchuria.

c. Manipulation of anti-revolutionary Russians and bandits, and destruction of rebellious Korean organizations.

d. Protection and destruction of communication lines.

e. Collection of materials and preventing their utilization by enemies.

f. Intercepting, disturbing, and protecting communications.

g. Obstructing the activities of Russian intelligence organizations.

9. Taonan Organization

Formal military officials will be stationed, to hold in command the Chinese Army in this area. They shall also organize and control bandit organizations and Russian Army. They shall maneuver in the districts of Solun and Tuchiian with the purpose to cope with the enemy's irregular army and shall strive to make connections with the Hulunpeierh regions. Protection of the Taonan-Anganch railways, especially that of the Ssuping kai-Taonan Railway shall be important duty.

IV. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINE OF TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA

If the lines of transportation in North Manchuria can be utilized effectively by our army, it will be an important matter having very close relations with military operations which is part of our sabotage activities against Russia. Furthermore, there will be a difference in this intrigue according to the international relations among Japan, China, and Russia at the time of the outbreak of war. For instance, if the relation between Japan and China is good and is in a situation where these two countries are able to mutually cooperate in coping with the Russian Army, the various transportation systems in North Manchuria should be protected for our use, and the main point is to prevent the enemy's destructive activities. If, on the contrary, the relation between Russia and China is close, and these two countries shall mutually coordinate in opposition to Japan, we shall take measures to destroy the transportation systems to check the rapid advancement of Russian troops into Northern Manchuria. At the same time it will be necessary to strive to maintain, at all cost, the portions of the railways necessary for the advancement of our troops. In the former case, the mission will be accomplished relatively without

difficulty as we can have the Chinese as collaborators, but in the latter case we shall encounter great difficulties. Therefore, considering the present changing Chinese political situation, we must be prepared that future wars will inevitably be started under such conditions. So, as a study, importance will be placed in the latter case. Thus, as it is no other than the East China Railway that forms the main transportation system in North Manchuria, I shall here make the most concrete description of this railway.

A. Sabotage activity on the Eastern China. Railway

1. Destruction of the railway

In case the Russian Army should advance into the plains of North Manchuria before us, we shall take measures to destroy the East China Railway to interrupt them. Following is an outline for such measures.

a. Western Line

Points to be destroyed (only important points will be mentioned).

Nontsian bridge	305	Sajeng in length
	13	" in width
Chalantun station and the train depot.		
Buhedu station and the train depot,		
Hsingan-ling tunnel	1442.25	sajeng in length
Petorya station and the curved railways near-by.		

b. Methods of destruction

1. The troops of Russians and bandits organized at Taonan shall guard important places at Tuchiian, Solun and Hsingan-ling; and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers will be employed under their protection. With the Hsingan Mountainous regions South of the East China Railway as their base, they shall make frequent attacks along the railway lines and destroy them. The employees of Dzaimien Company and Japanese residents in Bukedu will be utilized in scouting on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be carried from the district of Mukden.
2. If, necessary, men will be secretly sent from Harbin separately for the destruction of the Nontsian bridge.

3. The Harbin and Manchuli organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize the trains.

Eastern Line

- a. Places to be destroyed (only important places shall be stated).

V 8
Mutanchiang Iron Bridge, 195 sajeng in length and 13 sajeng in width.

Three tunnels between Nagorni and Ponnolnaya, 75 sajeng, 35 sajeng, and 195 sajeng in length respectively.

- b. Methods of destruction

1. Troops of Russian soldiers and bandits organized and armed in Northern Korea shall be made to maneuver in the mountainous regions east of Mutanchiang and Homeng, and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers under their protection, shall make frequent attacks on the railroads and destroy them. Japanese residents in Pogravichiraya and Japanese employees of the Moiling Sino-Japanese Lumber Company shall be utilized to spy on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be supplied from North Korea.
2. The Pogravichiraya and the Harbin organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize trains.

II. Protection of the Railway

Southern Lines

Every effort shall be made to protect this line for the purpose to collect goods and to bring them southward, and to allow our troops to assemble in Harbin by utilizing the materials transported by the East China Railway.

- a. Points to be protected

No. 2 Sungari Iron Bridge
245 sajeng in length and 17 sajeng in width.

*
..... Linho Iron Bridge (TN*illegible)
125 sajeng in length and 8 sajeng in width.

Imaho Iron Bridge
135 sajeng in length and 9 sajeng in width.

Yaomen Station and train depot.

Kuanchengtzu Station and train depot.

Bribe and appease.

b. Measures for protection

In relation to the establishment of the Pro-Japanese Chinese government in North Manchuria, we shall bribe and appease the military authorities on the Southern Lines to collaborate with us in the protection of railways.

2. Disguised Japanese soldiers will be made to join the troops of Russian soldiers organized in Mukden, and they shall maneuver in the regions of the Southern Lines. Then, in case the Sino-Japanese coalition mentioned in clause 1 should be completed, a part of them will supervise the Chinese Army in the protection of important areas, and the rest will maneuver outside of these areas to cope with the Russian irregular army. In case our plans for coalition with the Chinese Army should fail, at least the No. 2 Sungari Bridge and the railroad south of it shall be protected by force in the vicinity of Harbin.

In case the Sino-Japanese coalition should be completed, the Chinese Army and the Chinese Police Forces shall be utilized for the strict protection of Harbin Station and its factory and the Sungari Bridge. Also, all employees of communist faction shall be dismissed.

III. Collection and destruction of rolling stocks.

It is most desirable that we collect as much rolling stocks from the East China Railway as possible to facilitate our army's future operations, and to prevent the Russian army from utilizing them. For this purpose:

- V G*
1. Funds shall be supplied to the International Transportation Company and Japanese merchants in its connection, and they shall compromise or compete with the Chinese official merchants. They shall plan to corner all the special products of North Manchuria and transport them to the south. Therefore, all rolling stocks available shall be assembled on the Southern Line.
 2. When the situation allows us to cooperate with the Chinese Army, the rolling stocks in Harbin and chief stations along the railway shall be guarded and prevent them from being stolen or destroyed.
 3. By proper destruction of the tunnels east of Hsingan-ling and Mutanchiang, we shall prevent the rolling stocks from being stolen and taken outside of the border.

4. In case our cooperation with the Chinese army is impossible, we shall immediately despatch a regular army to Harbin, and it shall be necessary at least to confiscate all the materials south of Harbin.

In case of military operation in North Manchuria by the Japanese army, a rough estimate of necessary rolling stock is as follows:

- (a) Twenty trains will be necessary each day to operate on the East-West Line and the Southern Line, both east of Tsitsikar. The particular is as follows:

Locomotives	272
Freight Cars	6,800

- (b) Ten trains will be necessary each day to operate between Tsitsikar and Manchuli. The particular is as follows:

Locomotives	82
Freight Cars	2,000

Total (a) and (b)

Locomotives	354
Freight Cars	8,600

Presuming that we shall have been able to confiscate all rolling stocks between Anta, Harbin and Kuanchengtzu, the estimated number of cars (cars in good condition) will be as follows:

Locomotives	260
Freight Cars	3,300

It is to be understood that the collection of rolling stocks, as mentioned above, will have important effect on our execution of future military operations.

If the advancement of our troops should be delayed and the Russian Army should be in a position to utilize the rolling stocks at their will, we shall attempt to destroy and burn the materials everywhere by using employees and secret agents, and at the same time, prevent the enemy from removing them into Russian territories by destroying the railways as mentioned before.

B. Sabotage activities on the Taonan-Anganch and Huhai Lines

I. Taonan-Anganch Line

We shall employ the Chinese regular army, bandits, and troops of Russian soldiers, all under the power of our organization in Taonan to execute the following:

1. If the Russian Army should try to advance southward to the vicinity of Taonan before our army gets there, we shall delay their advance by destroying the Khalkhingol railway bridge and at the same time make their maneuvers difficult by disturbing them from the side and the rear.
2. The rolling stocks shall be collected to the south of Taonan prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to make it impossible for the Russian Army to utilize them.
3. In view of the difficulty of water supply in that area, water facilities at stations shall not be destroyed by our own hands, but they shall be protected to the best of our abilities.
4. If the situation allows our army to advance to the north of Taonan before the Russian army does, we shall maneuver with the purpose to at least maintain the railway south of Tailai.
5. In the regions of the Ssupingkai-Taonan Railway, the Liao-Ho Bridge and water facilities at stations north of this bridge shall be protected under cooperation with our railway garrison troops and by supervising the Chinese regular army.

II. The Huhai Railway

The Huhai Railway shall be extended to Hailun in the near future. Then it will be of great importance to our military operations in the districts of Heiho. However, if the Russian Army should advance to the vicinity of Harbin before our troops get there, the railway will inevitably be destroyed. However, this railway was built with funds invested by the Chinese officials and civilians of Heilungkiang Province so they have far greater devotion to it than the East China Railway. By taking advantage of this feeling of the Chinese, we may be able to teach and instigate them to protect the railway with their own hands.

Needless to say, our troops will guard this railway immediately, should they advance into Harbin.

3. Sabotage activities on the waterways

1. The Sungari River

For the purpose of disturbing the entry of the Russian Heilungkiang fleet into Sungari River and collect materials in North Manchuria by waterways, we shall bribe and instigate the captains of Chinese steamers, who are mostly former Russian skippers, to explode

and sink their own steamers in shoals like Sanchan, Sanksing, Fuchin, and Tangyuan, thereby blockading the waterways.

V. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COLLECTION OF GOODS IN NORTH MANCHURIA

Collecting of materials or disturbing the enemy from utilizing them in North Manchuria, the treasure land of grains, is an important matter of intrigue to be executed prior to the war. Let us now study the Russian Army's policies on this matter.

1. If the Russian Army will be in a situation where they can concentrate their main force in the vicinity of Harbin, they will spare the railway transportation power and procure their provisions from goods on the spot. Therefore, at least, they will strive to collect the grains and livestocks in the regions north of the West Railway lines and all the grains available in Hulunpeierh for the use of their own army.

2. If the main force of the Russian Army should be retreated and concentrated at Zabaikalie and only the vanguards are made to maneuver in North Manchuria, the materials to support the main force may be procured from Siberia. Therefore, if a part of the materials in North Manchuria can be transported east to supply the army in the regions of Maritime Province, the rest will be transported to the regions of Zabaikalie. The main purpose of the Russians will be to strive to prevent the Japanese Army from collecting them.

If the main force of the Japanese Army is to concentrate in North Manchuria it will be just as necessary to depend on local materials for supplies as in the case of the Russian Army. As a measure against both cases of the Russian Army, mentioned above, we shall have to corner all materials for our use and prevent the enemy's utilization. Now I shall state some studies I have made into this subject.

1. Necessary rations for the Russian Army when they gather their main force in North Manchuria:

In case the Russian Army should concentrate a large troop in North Manchuria with ~~the~~ 30th Infantry Divisions and ~~the~~ 4th Cavalry Divisions as the main force, an annual quantity of rations necessary will be 28,000,000 pounds for 780,000 men and 40,000,000 pounds for 400,000 horses.

2. Surplus grains in the regions west and north of Harbin:

According to investigations in 1924 by the East China Railway, the surplus grains in the regions of Harbin, Anta, Chichihaerh, and the lower regions of the Sungari River shows a total of 87,900,000 pounds (including an estimated 2,500 pounds of wheat).

3. The ratio of grains in North Manchuria sent to the East and to the west:

Out of the total produce of 120,000,000 pounds of grains in North Manchuria, the ratio transported to Vladivostok (for use by the Russian Army), via the Eastern Railway and those transported to South Manchuria via the Southern Railway have become equal, as the amount going east has had a gradual rise in recent years.

When we study the figures above, the conclusion will be that:

1. If the Russian Army should make a perfect collection of grains in the regions to the west and to the north of Harbin, and if the men and horses should be satisfied with a mixture of various grains, additional transports of staple foodstuffs will not be necessary.
2. However, the amount bought by the Soviet during peacetime is only about 60,000,000 pounds, and it will be necessary to buy about 20,000,000 pounds more in order to meet their plans to collect the necessary amount prior to the outbreak of war.

Accordingly, if the time for the outbreak of war is forecasted, it will give rise to competition in the purchase of materials far before that time between Japan and Russia.

Therefore, the most influential members, recently in the field of special products, are the authorities of Chinese official merchants, and it is said that they have cornered eighty per cent of the total product. They have purchased the special products of North Manchuria with the almost valueless inconvertible paper currency, and are selling them at Talien and Vladivostok. The Chinese authorities will never forget the profits in trading Japanese goods to other countries. As this tendency is expected to continue indefinitely in the future, our policy on collecting grains will be as follows:

1. Prior to the outbreak of war, the freight rate of the South Manchurian Railway shall be specially reduced so that the amount going to the south will inevitably be increased.
2. Funds will be supplied to the International Transportation Company in a plan to corner the grains and to send them south. The rise in prices through cornering will naturally make Russian competition difficult.
3. The Chinese official merchants, especially the Kwangsin Company having power in the Heilungkiang Province, shall be appeased to send their purchased grains to Dairen. (While the present governor of Heilung Province is in office, bribery will be comparatively easy.)

- Burn Grains,*
4. As the time for the outbreak of war draws near we shall make it impossible for the outflow of grains by destroying the Eastern Railway. And we shall dispatch secret agents to burn the grains collected at Anta, Mankou and Chichihaerh.
 5. To provide against the destruction of the Southern Railway and also to collect local transportation vehicles, coach transportation between Changchun - Harbin, Changchun - Potuna, and Changchun - Wuchang shall be commenced or increased. For the protection of this transportation, an irregular army, organized either in Changchun or Mukden, shall be accompanied, if necessary.

Therefore, such a policy of cornering grains and transporting them southward will naturally concentrate the East China Railway's rolling stocks on the Southern Railway. The Taonan-Anganch Railway has not shown any effect as yet in collecting goods, but by competing in the same manner, it shall specially prevent the grain crops in the regions along the railway from being removed to the north.

VI. A COLLECTION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

1. White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the important personages.

The organization of White Russians in North Manchuria are centered around Harbin. At present, though they have not been oppressed by the Chinese officials like the Red organizations, it is a long time since they had fled from their country and their funds and members have been so scattered, there is no organization worthy of demonstrating its powers. However, the spirit of unity is comparatively active among young men, so they are being regarded as worthy of being considered as characters to be utilized by us. Following are the main organizations:

1. Refugee's League
 - (a) Representative - Bzajilovskii. At the time when Japanese soldiers were despatched, he was the governor of a garrison at Nikolaevsk.
 - (b) Number of members - about 8,000. However, this number is a little doubtful. This organization is not strongly united.
2. Ex-officer's League (The Tsarist Army Officers' League)
 - (a) Representative - Bzajilovskii.
 - (b) Number of members - about 800.

3. Young Men's League. It is divided into the following organizations:

- (1) The Holy Cross Organization
- (2) The 13th Party
- (3) Motor-car Driver's League
- (4) White Eagle League
- (5) Russian Students' League

President - General Osipov. Number of members total about 2,700. Members are further expected to increase.

Besides these, there is the East China Railway's Chinese Employees' Cooperative Society, the chief purpose of which is to cope with the Red Labor Union. It is said that about 1,500 Russian employees have participated in this society. This organization shall need much attention in the future.

2. The names of important characters in North Manchuria are:

Gondachi
Puresikov
Hozwatt
Bzojilovskii

Gondachi no longer retains his former influence and popularity because of his cunning; and Puresikov and Hozwatt are men of the past and we can have no hope in them. Bzojilovskii is presently the representative of the Refugees' League and the Ex-officers' League and he is a character who may be considerably valuable to us, but he shall never be able to control all the White Russians. In our future utilizing of White Russians, it will be advantageous to pay our attention to the younger generations as has been stated above, so I think it proper that their leaders also should be selected from among them.

3. The connection between the White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the Far Eastern Russian Territories is in a very difficult situation. However, the ex-soldiers in the region of the Maritime Province seem to be comparatively maintaining contact with the Ussuri Kossacks. So, if we wish to organize anti-revolutionary organizations within the Russian territories, it will be best to contact chiefly with White Russians if it is in the Maritime Province, and chiefly with the farming class if it is in the regions of Heilung and Labaikaln. The connection in the latter case can be made through the Habarovsk Organization, Manchuli Organization and the Heiho Organization. (They shall be established before the outbreak of war.)

2. Kunghutze in the region on the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the connection with them.

1. Bandit activities these days are not confined to a single area. They can evade pursuits by government authorities and are able to move to any area, so their investigation is made very difficult. However, the bandit organizations in the regions of the eastern lines of the Eastern China Railway in about November 1926 are as follows:

<u>Names of Leaders</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>Arms</u>	<u>The Seat of Leaders</u>
Meng Chang-Chun	140	110	Nearby Yapuli-Tashukwei
Tien I	60	50	Nearby Shahotze
Pei Zung	40	35	Nearby Washaho
Tien Pong	130	100	Nearby Tsungsha
Nang Yang	30	20	Nearby Chow-kia-yuan
Kung Ping	50	30	Nearby Erh-chen-shun-T:
Erh Tei-Hao	70	50	Wuchang, shachengtze
Tai Tung	80	50	Shintouhotzu,
Total	600	445	Hengtaokotzu

2. Bandit organizations in the vicinity of the Sino-Russian border that have not yet completely been bribed by the Russians are as follows:

<u>Names of Leaders</u>	<u>Number of Members</u>	<u>Arms</u>	<u>The Seat of Leaders</u>
Tai Lin	300	270	Paiskoakon, North of Hunchun
Wulung)			
Shuanglung)			
Shuangyang)	700	450	Southern East of Mishan
Lulin)			nearby Hinglungkou
Yuanwang)			
Total	1,000	720	

3. Japanese nationals who have full knowledge of the bandits described above and who may be called upon to lead the bandits in time of emergency are as follows:

- (1) Persons who have connection with the Hunghutze on the China Eastern Railway: - Seisuke NAKANO, 7 Denchi-Gai Futo-ku, Harbin.

This man originally has had connections with the Jingigun Munghutze in Kitin-sheng. He had once headed these Hunghutze by request of the Governor-General of Korea and at present he is connected with a representative of the Governor-General of Korea in Harbin. He also has intimate relations with members of the "Black Dragon Society". Presently, he has a vocation of repairing arms in Harbin. At present he is employed by the Sino-Japanese Wood Company at Hailin

and he is now out to manage some Chinese at Linyang. He is not well off. Concerning his relations with the army, he does not voluntarily try to come in close contact because of his natural character, but his relation is not bad. Yoshiharu KONDO, President of the Russian Correspondence Company in Harbin, Major IIMURA, formerly stationed at Pogradichraya, and Lieutenant Commander OKANO, formerly attached to the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff and present Captain of the warship Hozu, anchored at Changking, all have special connections with him.

- (2) People having connections with Hunghutze in the regions of the border: - Bunroku NOGUCHI - stationed at Sanchakow.

This man had been a sheep merchant for a long time at Sanchakow and was a spy for the Special Service Agency at Nikolaevsk at the time of the Siberian intervention. Since then he is still keeping contact with the Pogradichraya Japanese Agency. He is of an inflexible nature and has many acquaintances among bandits and he is a person that we may use with confidence. However, he is dissatisfied with the army's careless ways of using people, and he especially has ill-feelings towards staff officers who indulge in impracticable arguments, so much care will be necessary in managing him. Major IIMURA who formerly served at Pogradichraya has special relations with him.

Other people who have connections with Hunghutze in other regions and in the Russian territories are: - Yasaburo FUKUDA; Masuo OYA (Alias - Tadayuki YAMANAKA, a reserve cavalry sergeant). Their residences are uncertain, but we can contact with them through NAKANO, who has been mentioned before. FUKUDA knows Major General MATSUI of Mukden and Major IIMURA.

Additional descriptions: - Peace-time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our intrigue against Soviet Russia.

The sabotage activities against Soviet Russia must depend on research establishments from peace-time. Therefore, from the standpoint of sabotage activities, the various present establishments are very insufficient. I shall state the main reasons as follows:

1. Not having any intelligence organization in Siberia and within the Far East Russian territories.

For this reason, the real conditions of the people and the military necessary for supervising our intrigues are entirely unknown. If it is impossible to establish formal organizations, men should be made to enter Russian territories as diplomats. If this measure is also impossible, disguised officers should be made to enter Russia. Of course, it will be difficult for them to get the full results but it will be far better than having nothing accomplished. Likewise, it will be greatly necessary to let them make often trips in these regions.

2. Lack of institutions for retaining and training anti-revolutionary elements and lack of anti-revolutionary propaganda establishments.

In supervising our intrigue against Russia, the most important duties must not be entrusted upon anti-revolutionary Russians. Therefore, due to the present lack of institutions for retaining these old elements and for training the younger generations for anti-revolutionary organizations, their attitudes towards Japan are gradually getting colder. And if this should continue as it is, we shall find great difficulty in utilizing them in the future.

To organize and maintain Russian troops in our Mukden Army will be greatly advantageous for us in using them. Furthermore, execution of anti-revolutionary propaganda activities in Russian territories should be made an important matter for the peace-time institutions for our intrigues. Of course, several of these matters are presently under consideration and are being established but greatly to our regret, they are being financed by partial expenditures of small funds. So, no matter how hard we strive we shall never be able to compete with Russia, England or the United States. This is why I hereby wish to have this reconstructed.

As I described at the beginning, our war of intrigue will be specially important in a Russo-Japanese war, so these peace-time establishments as preparations for war, must be considered with the same importance as arms and munitions. Moreover, Soviet Russia, having unified her diplomatic, military and commercial organizations, is setting up her intelligence systems to perfection in all important cities in China and Japan to say nothing of North Manchuria which is expected to become the main battlegrounds. (Lashevich, Vice President of the Eastern Railway is an ex-Army and Navy Vice Minister and Kekor, President of the same railway is an ex-military attache at the Consulate in Peking.) Russia is also supervising an intense thought-warfare in the above areas. To cope with

this present situation it will be all the more urgent to organize our establishments promptly.

Besides this, it will also be necessary to establish research organizations or intermediate organizations for trade with Siberia and Outer-Mongolia by inspiring the leading government and private organizations at the influences of the military. The advantages that will be brought about by these establishments upon our operations against Russia can never be neglected.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R, do
hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Materials
for Military Operations against the USSR"

was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military
Prosecution Department, Moscow.

on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original
of the said document may be found in the archives
of the said department. _____

I do further certify _____

/s/ TARANENKO

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

May 17, 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Colonel Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.T.S., hereby certify that on September 4, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I.T.S., I presented to Kasahara, Yukio, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", and the said Kasahara, Yukio, put his signature and date at the back of each of the first 16 pages and made the following inscription at the back of page 1 in my presence:

"I, Kasahara, Yukio, Lt-General of the Japanese Army testify the following:

I saw 3 chapters of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", photocopies of which were presented to me this day.

These chapters are:

1. General outline of sabotage activities against Russia.
2. Chief matters of sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia.

3. Organizations to be established for carrying on sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia, and their tasks.

In other words, I saw the first 16 pages of this document. It was drawn up by Major Kanda, Masatane, who at that time worked at the Kharbin Special Service Agency I saw, the said part of the document at the time when I was Chief of the Russian Section of the Section of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, i.e. in 1928.

To certify the said fact, I have put my signature and date at the back of the photocopy of the part document which I saw in 1928.

Kasahara Yukio, September 4, 1946".

This was done in the presence of interpreter A.M. Rojetskin who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

Colonel P. MOROSOV,
Investigator of the
Soviet Division of the
I.P.S.

September 4, 1946
Tokyo, Japan

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, P. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: P. Gildenblat /s/

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, the undersigned, Alexander Michailovich Rojetskin, hereby certify to Colonel Felaton Dmitriovich Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., that I am conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kasahara, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document, entitled: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ A. ROJETSKIN

A. M. ROJETSKIN

Subscribed to before

Colonel P. D. MOROSOV

Investigator of the Soviet
Division of the I.P.S.

The City of Tokyo, September 4, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: M. Gildenblat /s/

821

JG

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF
INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED
MATSUI

TOKYO.

25 April 1946.

I, military interrogator from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Senior Counsellor of Justice BAGIRAN, in the presence of Senior Counsellor of Justice P.D. MOLOZOV, with the participation of interpreter Junior Lieutenant B. A. PETROV, and secretary-stenographer L. A. MAMLINA, interrogated the accused, named below, who gave the following evidence:

1. Name -- MATSUI IWANE.
2. Age -- Born in 1879 DAI TOA SHINKO RENMEI
3. Occupation up to the time of arrest -- President of the League of the Revival of Greater East Asia.
4. Political party affiliation -- Belonged to a series of Pan-Asiatic organizations.
5. Address -- Tokyo, Sugamo Prison.

Q. What decisions were accepted in the conference of the Japanese military attaches in Europe, called in Berlin in 1929.

VG

A. In 1929 I, in my capacity of director of the second department of the General Staff, was in America and Europe. During my stay in Berlin, I called a conference of all the military attaches of Japan in European countries. At the conference we considered various current problems. We didn't touch on any political problems at the conference.

.....

Q. Did HASHIMOTO participate in the deliberations of that conference?

A. Yes, HASHIMOTO, being at that time military attache in Turkey, participated in the deliberations of that conference.

Q. A document is being shown to you which is a photo-copy of notes concerning the work of the conference of military attaches in Berlin in 1929. Were questions given in the document considered at the conference?

(A photo-copy of the said document is being shown.)

A. Having read the document shown to me, I have come to the conclusion that the notes were made by one of the persons who were present at the conference and apparently reflect correctly the contents of some of the questions which were considered at the conference.

CERTIFICATE

I, A. V. KUNIN, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with English and Russian languages, and the above is a true and correct translation.

(The Special Secret Report from Turkey No. 5)
15 Nov. 1929

/Sender:/ Artillery Major HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Military Attache to the
Imperial Japanese Embassy in Turkey

/To/ The Assistant-Chief of the Army General Staff OKAMOTO, Ren-ichiro

TITLE: SITUATION IN THE CAUCASIA AND ITS STRATEGIC USE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES

/P. 2/

The Caucasus area, various in race and religion, is affected little by Russian civilization, being located far from the center of Soviet Russia. Considering this, the Caucasus is surely an important area from the standpoint of strategems against Russia. However, because of the fact that the various races in the area are antagonistic to each other and can not cooperate in doing anything, we cannot deny that it will be very difficult to unite the whole Caucasus in rising against Russia unless by the force of military occupation.

/P. 5/

6. It would also be a good scheme to make all races in the Caucasus confront each other and consequently to bring about confusion in the area, by instigating either the idea of Greater Armenia, or the independent inclination of Georgia, or the Mussulman Movement, or the Partizan Movement of the mountaineers, etc. The idea of Greater Armenia is the most promising one as a fuse to give rise to such a situation regardless of its success. In case that this idea is advocated, there would break out a great confusion because of opposition on the part of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and, needless to say, of Turkey.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "Utilization of conditions in the Caucasus for purposes of sabotage activities" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department, Moscow.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed)
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 17, 1946.

James

April 1929

Items Concerning the U.S.S.R. Presented at the Conference of Japanese Military Attaches in EUROPE

I. Re: Investigation of situations.

1. Appraisal of conditions in and future of the U.S.S.R. by comparison of foreign with Soviet views of the U.S.S.R.
2. What policy should JAPAN adopt if any future change takes place in U.S.S.R.?
3. A study of sabotage measures to be taken by various European countries in case of war with the U.S.S.R.
4. A survey of the conditions of white Russians in foreign countries and estimate of their future activities.
5. Views on the effect on Soviet-European relations, if in the future JAPAN should end friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

II. Miscellaneous Items.

1. Opinion based upon past experience as to whether Japanese military attaches in Poland should take additional duties as military attaches in Baltic States.
2. Opinions on intelligence work against the U.S.S.R. conducted by Japanese military attaches stationed outside the U.S.S.R. (The attaches are of the opinion that ENGLAND is spending huge sums in EUROPE for intelligence work against the U.S.S.R.)
3. Opinion as to whether the Conference of Japanese military attaches stationed in different countries should be continued or not.

N.B.

Under the above-mentioned headings detailed mention has been made, but some of it is illegible beyond comprehension.

10. Reliance on foreign newspaper, in particular on White-Russian is misleading as it abounds with propaganda. It should be guarded against. (SUZUKI). According to (T.N. illegible), newspapers published in Russia are, after all, reliable.

11. (Intelligence from Constantinople is mostly British propaganda. (SUZUKI)
12. (Latvian policy is always directed by Poland and Britain, and is subject to change from time to time, but it is worthy of utilizing (KOMATSUBARA)
13. Liaison of intelligence from the various attaches in Eastern Europe is important to verify each intelligence report. Hope the Central Department will watch it more carefully. (KOMATSUBARA)
- X 14. (TROTSKY now has arrived in TURKEY, and 60 of his subordinates are to be driven out of the country, it is reported. They may be used for our espionage. (HASHIMOTO)
15. Whenever a good spy is found in a country, would it not be profitable for us to buy reports from him by collecting money from all attaches? (HASHIMOTO)
16. Question of sharing important points of espionage intelligence on Russia from TURKEY, POLAND AND VIENNA among the respective (attaches) is now being studied, it seems. (SUZUKI)

(T.N. Paragraph 17 illegible)
18. Much of the espionage intelligence on Russia from Austria is unreliable. It should be guarded against. (KOMATSUZAWA)
19. There shall at least be one conference of attaches of the respective countries in each calendar year, and it is also important that an influential man be sent from the Central (office), and it is preferable that it take place in May or June and be prearranged. (All attaches concord in this opinion).

CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the document in Japanese Items Concerning the U.S.S.R., discussed at the Conference of Japanese Military Attaches in European countries held in Berlin in April 1929 (on 4 sheets) was delivered to me by the records office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the Red Army Military Prosecution Department, Moscow.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan

October 7, 1946.

mc
822

Numerous facts of intolerable anti-Soviet activities of the Japanese military authorities of Manchuria which are absolutely contradictory to article 5 of the Peking Convention concluded between the USSR and Japan on January 20, 1925, have repeatedly been brought to the notice of the Japanese Imperial government. Below are given new facts which show that these activities have lately been carried on on a larger scale and that intense sabotage work in the USSR has been organized on the territory of Manchuria.

The Japanese military authorities often make use of the Russian whiteguard emigrants living in Manchuria for their anti-Soviet activities, using them directly or indirectly for committing terroristic and sabotage acts on the USSR territory, smuggling them for this purpose to the USSR, etc.

One of the methods of training men for sabotage and terroristic work is that of forming armed military and police detachments of Russian white guards by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria, which are on the allowance of the Japanese and Manchurian governmental offices. So, there is a special composite detachment of Russian policemen, consisting of about 50 men and receiving systematic training.

At the Pogradichnaya Station, on June 24, 1935 a special group of 32 Russian whiteguards was formed in the body of the "special police detachment for repressing banditry" at the Police Department of the Bitsian province; there is a guard detachment of 50 Russian emigrants on the territory of the Japanese subject Kondo's wood concession which runs along the Eastern line of the North Manchurian Railroad, etc. Finally, the Union of Military Emigrants having at its disposal schools for training the commanding personnel of the Russian white emigrants, military camps, etc., was created in Kharbin with the knowledge and permission of the Japanese-Manchurian authorities.

The systematic anti-Soviet propaganda carried on in the Russian language in the Manchurian newspapers and through the radio stations of Tientsin and Kharbin, calling to commit terroristic and sabotage acts against the legitimate authorities of the USSR, serves the same task of training men for sabotage and terroristic work. As there is the strictest censorship of press and radio in Manchuria, this propaganda may be carried on only with the knowledge and approval of the proper Japanese and Japanese-Manchurian authorities.

Further on, the material of investigation and sentences pronounced by various Soviet courts establish beyond doubt the direct and leading participation of the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria in the organization of sabotage and terroristic acts on the territory of the USSR.

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan can make reference to following facts:

1. The Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in session held in Irkutsk on August 31 and September 1, 1935, established by the investigation of the court following (below an extract from the sentence is given):

"In 1935 the White Guards I. V. Kobylkin and E. L. Pereladov, having secretly penetrated into the Soviet Union territory through Manchuria with the aim of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts, were held up at various dates in the East Siberian Region, having arms, incendiary cartridges and counter-revolutionary literature on them.

"Later, at the end of May, 1935, Victor Oleinikov was held up in Zabaikalye while crossing the frontier. He, too, had secretly penetrated into the Soviet territory together with two other terrorists: Michail Oleinikov and Kustov shot when attacking a border guard post. Revolvers, poisons, and counter revolutionary literature were found on the shot men and on Victor Oleinikov as well.

"It is established by the documents of the case and by the confession of the defendants that Kobylkin and Pereladov who turned out to be a white guard colonel and a white guard sub-lieutenant, respectively, living in emigration in Northern Manchuria since the rout of the white bands in the Soviet Far East in 1922 till 1935, and being members of various white guard counter-revolutionary organizations took an active part in their activities in preparing an armed attack on the Soviet Union with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet Power and of restoration of capitalism with the help of foreign intervention.

"Having counter-revolutionary convictions and pursuing these aims of his own free will as one of the chiefs of the Eastern Department of the 'Russian General Military Union', he also received and obeyed instructions of the Secret Service offices of a certain foreign power, being its secret agent.

Besides, Kobylkin holding an official position in police, helped and personally organized the smuggling of armed bands, weapons and individual agents from Manchuria to the Soviet territory to carry out espionage, and sabotage and terrorist acts.

"So, during the time when Kobylkin worked as a police supervisor at the station of Djalainor, five armed bands were smuggled from Manchuria to the Soviet territory.

"In January, 1935, Kobylkin, following instructions of the secretary of the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin, with the knowledge of the head of the military mission of the same power in the town of Manchuria, smuggled to the Soviet Union territory white guard Pereladov with the task of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts.

"Pursuing the same counter-revolutionary aims and following the instructions of the already mentioned secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, Kobylkin himself, with the help of the head of the military mission in the town of Manchuria, crossed the Soviet frontier line with weapons on him in March, 1935, but was held up. There were on him two "Mauser" and one "Astra" pistols, incendiary cartridges to be used for setting on fire stores and constructions of military importance, and a large quantity of counter-revolutionary literature.

"In organization of the transfer of agents of the secret service of a certain power and of representatives of counter-revolutionary organizations into the Soviet territory, and in transportation of weapons and receiving espionage information, Kobylkin was assisted by Victor Oleinikov who, since 1933 maintained through General Shilnikov close contact with the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin. When General Shilnikov who being chief of the Eastern Department of the Russian General Military Union had simultaneously been a secret agent of the said military mission in Kharbin, died in 1934, the direction of the activities of the white guard organization of the "Russian General Military Union" passed on to Kobylkin, and Victor Oleinikov received his instructions, both from Kobylkin and from the secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, directly, and from the heads of the military missions in the towns of Manchuria and Hailar.

"With the help of Victor Oleinikov, who had repeatedly crossed the frontier himself and smuggled Pereladov, Kustov, Michail Oleinikov and even Kobylkin himself, the latter transferred onto the Soviet territory 12 pistols with a large supply of rounds for committing terrorist acts, ten incendiary cartridges for sabotage acts, a camera with films for espionage work and poisons: strychnine and atropine, for same terrorist acts.

"Kobylkin, as it is stated in his confession and in Pereladov's and Oleinikov's evidence, got all these things, intended for fulfilling espionage, sabotage and terrorist tasks on the Soviet Union territory, from official representatives of the Military Mission of a certain power in the towns of Kharbin and Manchuria directly or through the head of the editorial office of the newspaper "Kharbin Time", Osawa.

"The same persons gave Kobylkin money for carrying on counter-revolutionary sabotage work."

On considering the abovesaid the Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR found I. V. Kobylkin, E. L. Pereladov and V. V. Oleinikov guilty and sentenced them to be shot.

At the closed session of the Assizes the defendants gave following evidence.

Kobylkin said:

"The power to which I and all other defendants have referred to as a 'certain' Power is Japan. I received instructions from the secretary of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, from the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Manchuria, Sakurai, and also from the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Hailar Saito and from the head of the editorial office of the newspaper 'Kharbin Time' Osawa."

Pereladov said:

"When I, giving testimony during the investigation in the court, spoke about the dependence of the counter-revolutionary organizations on the military missions of a certain Power, I meant Japan.

"Whenever a band was being formed to be smuggled to the USSR, official representatives of the Japanese military mission

participated in and sanctioned the smuggling. It is confirmed by the fact that when I expressed my wish to cross the frontier and Kobylkin consented to smuggle me, I had to communicate on this question with the secretary of the Japanese Mission, whom I had to promise to carry out a special task of sabotage -- terroristic and espionage nature set by the Japanese Military Mission, and only then my crossing was sanctioned by the mission in the town of Manchuria represented by Sakurai and by the mission in Kharbin represented by Tsuda."

Oleinikov said:

"Being abroad I was connected with the secretary of the Japanese Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, with the Head of the Military Mission in the town of Manchuria Sakurai, with the supervisor of the Department of Police, Timofeev, who was concurrently secret agent of the Japanese Military Mission, and with the supervisor of the Criminal-Detective Department, Kulikov.

"I passed information to and received instructions from Tsuda and Sakurai who paid me money for it. The 'Mauzer' pistol I got also from Tsuda."

2. On October 26, 1935 an armed group of 6 Koreans who had penetrated onto the territory of the USSR from Manchuria ran across an outpost guard of Soviet border guards on duty in the area of Northwest of the village Poltavka. Trying to put up resistance to the border guards who wanted to hold them up, the bandits opened fire, and as a result of firing two of the bandits were killed and two wounded. The remaining two bandits had managed to disappear during the firing, but were met by another border-guards outpost on duty in the same area. Being discovered, they again opened fire, and when the outpost opened retaliatory fire one of them was mortally wounded, but the other managed to run away. The following things were found on the killed and wounded Koreans: a pile of counter-revolutionary literature, two "Brauning" and two "Mauzer" pistols, two wrenches for unscrewing joints of rails and a small crowbar for pulling out spikes fastening the rails to the sleepers. The held-up wounded saboteurs, who called themselves Kimiseb and Pakenkha, testified that their band had been formed by a special Japanese military organ in Sanchagon which had sent them onto the territory of the USSR with the task of destroying railroads and organizing of railroad accidents. According to testimony given by the same persons this military organ had formed a second band of 7-8 men, which was supposed to be smuggled onto the Soviet territory 5-6 days after the return of the first band.

3. The Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army, in the session held in the town of Khabarovsk on January 20-25, 1936, heard the case of 21 defendants, and among them of the Russian emigrant, whiteguard Georgy Semen, Koreans Lin Shen-do, Kim I-seb, Pak En-kha, Tiu Hva-sun, O Gui-khen, Li En-gyn, Lin Son-khak and others. The Military Tribunal established that most of the defendants were members of the espionage-sabotage groups, smuggled onto the territory of the USSR from Manchuria in August, September and October, 1935. These groups crossed the border with the aim of carrying on espionage, of planting secret agents in the Ussuri and Primorye districts of the Far Eastern region, and of committing sabotage acts. According to the testimony given by the defendants, the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Sanchagon, and an employee of this mission, Midzuno, in particular, supplied these groups with weapons, means for carrying out sabotage activities, a camera for taking pictures of military constructions, etc. The defendants Kim I-seb and Pak En-kha, for instance, who had twice crossed the Soviet frontier in October, 1935, together with a group of saboteurs, had the task of destroying the railroad track in the important points of the Ussuri Railroad.

All the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army to various punishments.

Appendix to the note of the Embassy of the USSR to Japan of May 4, 1936.

Correct: Director of the State Central Historical Record Office

Professor V. Maksakov

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARENANKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the attached photostat of the document in Japanese "A report of the Japanese military attache in Turkey, major Hashimoto concerning the "Situation in the Caucasus and its strategic use for the purpose of sabotage activities on 23 pages, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify _____.

/s/ Lt. Col. TARENANKO, G. I.
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

October 3, 1946.

823

ne

February 16th, 1940

(The Sixth Clause of Inquiry Items) Revision of the Anti-Soviet Sabotage activities and of guidance of White Russians in keeping with the revisions.

Army Special Service
Organization (TOKUMUKIKAN)
at Harbin.

1. Reform of the anti-Soviet sabotage activities. The idea we have hitherto had regarding the anti-Soviet sabotage activities was to use the individual sabotage units under the direct leadership of the Japanese military authorities. However, to make this more effective in future, it is advantageous to establish a Far East Anti-Comintern Self-government simultaneously with the commencement of hostilities, to unite various kinds of sabotage activities by this, and to add political meanings to this.

Namely, for the White Russians residing in Manchuria and China, the above mentioned consists in raising their spirit of autonomous, positive co-operation with the Japanese Army by showing the most distinct object at the commencement of hostilities and also, for the population on the Soviet territory, it consists in giving them opportunity to join voluntarily the Anti-Comintern Self-government under the hope of establishing a liberal and peaceful independent state.

For this purpose, it is indispensable, as preparations in peace time, to strengthen what has been carried out hitherto, to complete individually every element to be united to the self-government when establishing it, and at the same time on the one hand to give the White Russians themselves administrative training, and so to give the White Russians entirely satisfactory ability beforehand to execute practical business when they are applied to every organ of the government, and local self-governing bodies and all kinds of economic systems, especially, when applied as responsible persons of the departments contacting with the people on the occasion of the establishment of a self-government.

2. Plan of guidance of the White Russians in connection with charges of sabotage activities. Regarding the former part of the above-mentioned preparations in peace time, it will suffice to follow the plan taken hitherto, however, regarding the latter part it is recognized necessary, to

..
 Add some change to the administrative organism of Manchukuo at present.

..
 That is to say, for a measure of administrative discipline for the White Russians, it is now possible to consider dividing it into two categories.

..
 Part I--is to appoint White Russians in important posts of the present administrative and economic systems and to make them undertake practical business. Considering these practical businesses, it is necessary to appoint them on responsible posts and not to confine them to such robot-like beings as former Russian public officials or company employees in Manchuria. For this purpose, special appointments must be opened for them to some extent.

..
 The central government recently enumerated where the White Russians could be used: at least, every local administrative and self-governing systems, military authorities, railway, other special companies etc., under the province, and it is required to assign necessary personnel to all parts, and to engage them in practical businesses of military affairs, police affairs, economy, industry, traffic, correspondence, propagation, judicature, etc.

..
 Part II--is to try to make use of the White Russian Emigrant Bureau and execute all the civil administrative affairs of the White Russians through the office. Namely, registration, distribution of daily necessities, social work, education, sanitation, physical training, cultural enlightenment, military affairs, commercial and industrial relation etc. are the above-mentioned.

..
 However according to the necessity of sabotage activities the existence of the White Russian Emigrant Bureau is important and it is indispensable not to dissolve this Bureau immediately into local administrative systems or self-governing systems, but to keep it existing as an auxiliary system, to utilize it, and to execute practical activities of White Russians through it. Also practicing the activity of the Kyowa-Kai (Manchukuo Psich-ho-hui) towards the White Russians without fail through the White Russian Emigrant Bureau, and it is not advisable to divide the forces into two parts.

Extremely SecretInstructions pertaining to the Sabotage Activities
Education and Training for the Year of Showa (1943)(Takeaka) (Shimoyama)
(Nakamori)(The 2nd Intelligence Conference of 1943.)
Distribution No.7 extra No.1

(Murazawa)

June 16, 1943.
Kwantung Army Intelligence Dept.The Sabotage Activities Education and training for the 18th year of
SHOWA (1943) should be based on this direction.

(SHOWA 18-6-16 (June/6/1943))

Chief of the Intelligence Dept.,
Kwantung Army, DOI, Akio

I. General Rule.

This direction is based on the Kwantung Army Headquarters Educational directions
of the 18th year of SHOWA (1943) for the special Corps with consideration of the
results obtained from the previous trainings.

II. Purpose.

The principal purpose of this is to develop and strengthen the fighting spirit,
the cognatic unity, and also to perfect osmosis of the general training subjects;
and to teach special training-subjects in a way not to disclose the real object,
which will meet the condition of enemy, geography, duties (services applied in
wartime), and especially to strengthen officer's education.

III. Methods

1. The period from Showa 18-4-1 to Showa 19-3-31 (Apr. 1, 1943-March 31, 1944)
is the Showa 18 year to be the education period of the 18th year of Showa for this
education and is divided into four periods of three months each.
2. The curriculum will be divided into two, the one being the general training
and the other the special training for enemy condition, geography, etc. and the
former shall be repeatedly trained while the latter shall be enforced in a care-
ful manner so as not to have the object disclosed.
3. The subjects which need completeness as shown in the attached Chart No.1
of the fundamental points of the enforcement of general common training are as
follows:
 - a. Spiritual training.
 - b. Disguise, camouflage, tricks
 - c. Information collecting.
 - d. Destruction of transportation especially communication.
 - e. Propaganda and agitational
 - f. "Guerilla" system of fighting.
 - g. "Sure-hit" shooting.

4. Special training is as shown in Chart 2.
5. In both cases special stress shall be placed upon staff training so as to give them thorough knowledge and capacity together with the system of division of work such as information collecting, political intrigue, destructive training, communication, etc. and laying stress on team working.
6. In education and training, besides teaching them the fundamentals repeatedly, train them actually, and, to do this, have a short period field camp training frequently, and give them one week or a month's long dated field camp training at least once in each period.
7. At each branch, mobilization training shall be carried on at least for two weeks in each period and staff-training shall be carried on separately for 10 days.

Status of each branch, however, shall be taken into consideration and the time and duration of such training may be manipulated accordingly.

8. Education and training especially the out-door training shall be carefully carried on so that the real object of it shall not be noticed.
9. Powder and bullets, explosives, and arms for the training are as shown in Chart 3.

IV. Report.

1. Each branch corps shall make a plan in accordance with this direction and report five copies of it by July 15th.
2. The principal function concerning education such as examinations, inspections, long period campings shall be planned and reported ten days before carrying it out and its result shall also be reported as soon as it is over -- also in five copies.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel BARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that "The 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section" - "Instructions pertaining to armed diversionary activities for the year 1943" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. BARANENKO, G. I. /s/
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan

17 May, 1946.

see P4
TONARI GUMI

TERASHIRO KAWABE. 1932 in USSR
MIL. ATTACHE - Emb. Moscow
4-1945 9-1945
asst. chief Gen staff
Lt Gen.
No. 1 825

TOP SECRET

The Second Intelligence Conference, 1943
Document for Distribution, No. 6

The directions in relation to the guidance
of the White Russians.

June, 1943
KWANTUNG Army,
Intelligence

CONTENTS

- No. 1 Concerning general principle.
- No. 2 Extent of those who should be treated as White Russians.
- No. 3 Concerning guiding principle.
- No. 4 Concerning cultivation of the indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.
- No. 5 Concerning reward and punishment
- No. 6 Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.
- No. 7 Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.
- No. 8 Concerning encouragement of national defense physical training.
- No. 9 Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese Language education.
- No.10 Concerning encouragement of return to farm of the city residents.
- No. 11 Concerning dispersed residents' gathering together.
- No. 12 Preparatory matters for the future reform of the organ to guide the White Russians.
- No. 13 Other matters for instruction

Separate volume

- No. 1 Gist for the intensification of the training for the White Russians young men and boys. (draft)
- No. 2 Gist for the guidance of the White Russians' national defense physical training. (draft)
- No. 3 Gist for the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language among the White Russians.
- No. I - Concerning general principle.

1. Whether they are men or women or whether they wish it or not, the White Russians shall be used powerfully and to the maximum degree for the war with the Soviet Union, especially for the secret war with the Soviet Union.

2. Belief to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife with the idea to share happiness and suffering, or life and death with Japan, shall be thoroughly established. Efforts shall also be made for the cultivation of a violent indomitable fighting spirit.

3. Those who are available shall be allowed to retain their racial characteristics and they shall be protected better than before. As to those who are not available, we should not only deny racial consideration, but we must take measures for anti-espionage against them. Bad elements shall be strictly disposed of.

No. II - The limit of those who should be treated as White Russians.

Those who can be used directly or indirectly for the war with the Soviet Union shall be treated as White Russians, considering their racial characteristics. They shall be divided as follows:

(1) Those who are being used, at present, directly or indirectly for the secret war with the Soviet Union by the Intelligence or by the other army authorities: those whom we are training and mooring with the intention to make use of in future, and their families (A).

(2) Those who can possibly be used directly for the war with the Soviet Union now or in future and their families (B).

(3) Those who cannot be used directly now and in future, but who may possibly become loyal to both Japan and MANCHUKUO and who can contribute directly to the war with the Soviet.

No. III - Concerning the guiding principle.

VC
 Out of the necessity of attaining the special object of the army, we should let the White Russians retain their racial characteristics and lead them to cultivate anti-comintern thought. Though we admit their wish to return to their homeland we should expect them to perform their duty as the nation of MANCHUKUO. At the same time, we should lead them especially to lay to heart the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia based upon the spirit of universal peace and harmony, and to rush toward the destruction of the communist regime with an indomitable fighting spirit, sharing happiness and suffering and life and death with us and wishing for their racial prosperity in the co-prosperity sphere controlled by Japan.

No. IV - Concerning cultivation of indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.

In view of the fact that there are some among the White

CITY

VC
1
Russians, especially among the city residents who are apt to forget the original mission of the White Russians, and wish only for the quiet life to no purpose, without really understanding the situation and not changing their old ways in their daily life and in other things, we must, by every opportunity, try to convince them our guiding principle. We should especially guide them to cultivate the indomitable fighting spirit to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife, excluding their negative attitude. We should lead them to guard against frivolity; discard gayety and be practical instead, and strengthen a sound and healthy spirit.

No. V - Concerning reward and punishment.

Each person shall be given a different treatment in proportion to his available value. Bad elements shall be properly suppressed or disposed of. Reward and punishment shall be given justly.

1. The following arrangement for a good treatment shall be made for those coming under 2 of Article No. II (A)

(1) Increase in rations.
(2) Reduction of taxes (to be enforced within the limit of the law, keeping in contact with the authorities in the actual place.)

(3) Convenience for children's education (priority for the use of the dormitory and support in tuition).

(4) Gratis for rewriting the foreign residential certificate.

(5) Priority in business, employment, the use of charity and relief facilities.

2. Towards the superior ones among the students and pupils, members of the Young Men's Corps, members of the Volunteer Corps and the Japanese Language School students of 2 of Article No. II proper measures shall be taken into consideration for their good treatment with the object of giving them encouragement.

3. To 3 of Article II, a special good treatment shall not be given, although racial consideration shall be given.

4. Towards the ones who will not follow our guidance and towards bad ones and their families, resolute steps shall be taken when necessary, in addition to the reduction or suspension of ration and other measures of suppression.

No. VI - Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.

It is needless to say that the White Russians who are the same race as the Red ones and who live among them should be more

prudent than the MANCHURIANS, KOREANS or MONGOLIANS. They should further refrain absolutely from having contact with the Red Russians on their own accord and keep aloof from the company of bad MANCHURIANS. In everything they must not act in such a way as to be observed with suspicion. We must lead them to intensify the system of their mutual watch and joint responsibility, while, on the other hand, strengthening inspection and secret espionage toward them and thus making assurance doubly sure for anti-espionage.

1. Prevention of their having touch with the Red Russians. Though the White Russians shall be lead to try to check themselves from getting in touch with the Red ones, this step must be taken carefully and in a clever manner so as not to excite the Soviet side uselessly.

(1) Strict investigation shall be made to see whether there is any Red one rixing into various arrangments and organizations of the White Russians, and necessary measures shall be adopted, especially as to the matters which may effect the Soviet side, they shall be submitted to the Head Office beforehand, giving the details.

(a) Ration system and ration station.

(b) Schools and places where young men and women gather together.

(c) Temples and charity and relief arrangements.

(d) Trade union, enterprises and employment.

(e) Neighbors' Society (TONARIGUMI)

(f) Residents association.

(2) It is our principle that the White Russians who keep company with the Red Russians shall be strictly punished by oral instructions. It shall be made thoroughly known that this shall be strictly observed thoroughly and the ones who will not stop shall be punished properly.

(3) The White Russians who happen to live next to the Red ones shall be removed to some other suitable places.

2. Intensification of mutual watch and joint responsibility.

(1) The neighbor's society shall be led strongly. The leaders and assistant leaders shall be selected carefully. They shall point out harmful elements by mutual inspection, and establish the system of joint responsibility in each section.

TONARIGUMI



(a) The interior inspection shall be intensified for each residents association and other kinds of associations. Their leaders shall be absolutely responsible for the conduct of their inferiors or the members. Each society or group shall establish the system of joint responsibility.

3. Intensification of general inspection and secret espionage and encouragement of early examination. Inspection and espionage by the gendarmerie and police authorities, not to speak of the special mission shall be strengthened. Suspected persons shall be inspected at an early stage.

No. VII - Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.

Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the separate volume No. 1 "Gist of Strengthening of the training of the White Russian Young Men and Boys (Draft)." Regarding the application of the Labor Service Ordinance of MANCHUKUO in order to carry out a long term camping, we must put it into operation after a decision is made by the authorities but as to the other matters, the training which are being given now shall be more strengthened and renovated.

No. VIII - Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training.

Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the "Gist of the Enforcement of the National Defence Physical Training for the White Russians. (Draft)" We are told that it is impossible to carry out this plan as a whole this fiscal year, because of the expenses, materials and other reasons. As for the Intelligence however, it has been decided that the following plan shall be put in operation in each actual place.

1. Measures shall be taken to spread and intensify all the more the training for gliders already in operation.

2. Measures shall be taken to spread and encourage all the more the making and competition of model planes which is being undertaken in some places.

3. Concerning the construction of a parachute tower, we should try to bring about the atmosphere for it, calling to the influential groups or persons in the actual places.

4. From the point of view of anti-espionage, it shall be clearly understood that the above training measures shall not be given to the White Russians only, but to general Japanese, MANCHURIANS and MONGOLIANS.

No. IX - Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education.

Concerning the diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, in accordance with the separate volume No. 3 "Gist of the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language. (Draft)" Regarding the matters, depending upon the arrangements of the MANCHURIAN Telephone and Telegraph Company and the South MANCHURIAN Railway Company, they shall be enforced after they have been decided upon by the authorities. As to the following matters, efforts shall be made to intensify and promote them in the actual places.

1. Concerning the Japanese language School already in operation, it shall be intensified all the more.

2. The White Russian residents association and the cultural societies shall quickly undertake the diffusion of the Japanese language according to the principle of the Japanese Language School.

3. Necessary propagation shall be put in practice in order to promote the interest of the general public for learning Japanese.

4. For the students of superior ability, good treatment shall be given concerning employment and allowances,

5. The Japanese language column shall be established in the Russian papers and magazines.

No. X - Concerning the city residents' return to farming.

According to the following principle, the return to farming shall be encouraged in order to lead the White Russians to contribute to food production, as well as to cultivate a sound and healthy spirit and heighten a suitable character for the personnel required for the secret warfare.

1. This shall be carried out for each race in order to facilitate the guidance of the racial movement, based upon political espionage standpoint.

2. This shall be carried out voluntarily, apart from the special emigrants, according to the following principle.

(1) This plan shall be based upon the city population dispersal plan which is being carried out by the MANCHUKUO Government. It shall be guided in a positive manner by the colonization organs in provinces and "HSIEN" (district).

SMRR
Tel
Tel

See
CITY
PEOPLE

(2) In order to facilitate the enforcement of the above plan, attention shall be paid to the following details.

(a) Those who have experience in farming and who have financial influence shall be leaders and the White Russian proletarians shall work under them.

(b) Mechanical farming shall be preferred, but it shall absolutely adopt the system using substitute fuel.

(c) Places shall be selected, as best as possible, where building materials can be obtained without difficulty.

(d) Concerning the obtainment of seeds, proper steps shall be quickly taken by the adjustment committee through the relative organs of the province of "Hsien."

(e) The place shall be chosen taking into consideration the guidance of the White Russians and transport facilities. The residents shall be gathered together as best as possible.

No. XI - Concerning the gathering together of the dispersed residents.

In order to facilitate the guidance and training and also inspection and anti-espionage we must try to gather together those White Russians who live dispersed in various places as best as possible. This shall be carried out following the preceding Article No. X.

No. XII - Preparatory matters for the future reform of the White Russians guiding organ (given orally).

No. XIII - Other matters for instruction.

Concerning the enforcement of collective education of the military training instructors.

1. It is scheduled that a collective carping education shall be given by the Head Office for five days from 1 July with the object of convincing the White Russian military training instructors in various places of the guiding principle and instruct them the method of guidance of practical courses. Each branch office shall select the participants as follows, and report to the Head Office by 25 June.

(1) HAILAR Branch Office
HAILAR 2 MANCHURI 1 YAKOSHIH 1 SANHO 2

(2) MUTANKIANG Branch Office
MUTANKIANG 2 MULUNG 1 HENZIAOHOTZU 1

(3) CHEIAMUSSU Branch Office
CHEIAMUSSU 1

(4) HEIHO Branch Office.
HEIHO 1

(5) MUKUDEN Branch Office
MUKUDEN 1 HSINKING 1

(6) DAIREN Branch Office
DAIREN 1

(7) Head Office
HARBIN 3 TSITSIHAR 1 APULONI 1

(2) Concerning the transfer of the jurisdiction of the guidance of the White Russians in the HSINKING Special City to the HARBIN Special Mission. It is scheduled that the guidance of the White Russians in HSINKING Special City shall be placed under the direct control of the Head Office from 1 July. Regarding the details, instructions shall be given separately. The MUKUDEN branch office shall take charge, as before, of the guidance of the White Russians in various places in KIRIN Province, and in view of the status quo of KIRIN and the district around the "dam", investigation shall be made so as to have the instructors reside permanently for the guidance of the White Russians around these places. The concrete plan shall be handed in by the end of June.

3. Concerning the tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA. The tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA which used to be undertaken by the Japanese Language School, the Concordia (HSEH-HO) Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc. shall not be given this fiscal year. There will be no objection, however, to the Concordia Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc., making use of the HARBIN Exhibition which is to be held from 1 August to 20 September.

4. Concerning the control on the removal of residence of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO. In view of the fact that the ration system is getting complicated and also of the principle of intensifying the city population dispersal plan and anti-espionage arrangements, the change of abode of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO shall be controlled as follows:

1. Removal from farming villages to cities shall be checked.

2. Though the return to farming and the gathering together shall be much encouraged in moving the White Russians into the district belonging to the other secret mission control organ, report shall be made mutually between the organs concerned.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that
the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section."-- The Direct-
ions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians"
was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department,
Moscow.

on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said docu-
ment may be found in the archives of the said department. Moscow.

I do further certify _____

_____.

/s/ Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,
17 May, 1946.

8-26

PLAN FOR CARRYING OUT THE TRAINING OF
WHITE RUSSIAN YOUTHS IN THE SPECIAL
IMMIGRATION SETTLEMENTS, KHARBIN SPECIAL
SERVICE AGENCY.

See p. 5-6

CONTENTS

1. Object
2. System of Instruction
3. Training Instructors
4. Personnel in charge of local training
5. Term of Training
6. Outline of types and programs of Training
7. Trainees
8. Funds necessary for Training
9. Outline of Education
10. Methods of Assistance.

1. OBJECT.

Training of white Russian youths in the special immigration settlements taking into consideration their characteristics must involve appreciation of the spirit of the foundation of the Manchurian Empire and a heightening of their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo. At the same time we must promote their anti-communist, anti-Soviet feelings and confirm their enthusiasm for the restoration of their fatherland as a means of cultivating personnel for espionage work against the Soviet threat in case of emergency.

2. SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION.

The commander of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization shall be responsible for the uniform training of the white Russian youths in the immigration settlements. The commander of the HARBIN SPECIAL Duties Organization shall appoint Japanese officers as training instructors for instruction of local training. These instructors will take charge of all planning and leadership after they have fully conferred with group leaders (including all general "ATAMAN" and below) and the head of the local office. Training in TANGYUAN immigration settlement and its execution will be made the responsibility of the commander of the CHIAMUSSU Special Duties Organization.

3. TRAINING INSTRUCTORS

Training instructors will take charge of military training and civic education and at the same time will be responsible for anti-espionage control. He will also help with the duties of the local office and will submit reports at the appropriate times on their supervision and leadership.

Training instructors will consist of Japanese officers with Japanese non-commissioned officers attached to them. As assistant officers, the Russian officers and non-commissioned officers from the Special ASANO BUTAI will be despatched. Training instructors will draw up a training program for the new term before it begins, and have it sanctioned by the commander of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization.

4. THE PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF LOCAL TRAINING.

The training school headquarters shall be established in the office of the immigration settlement and the group leader will be in charge of the training.

The group leader shall appoint two white Russians from within the immigration settlement as his assistants in military training and civic education and also shall appoint a number of white Russian leaders in every village for the same purpose.

The assistants and leaders appointed for this military training shall be selected from the personnel discharged from the ASANO Unit and the assistants and leaders appointed for civic education shall be selected from leading members of the local Russian community. Occasionally the HARBIN Special Duties Organization will send out Japanese and white Russian lecturers. All personnel stationed at the local office will assist the group leader in civic education.

5. TERM OF TRAINING.

The term of training will extend from 1 April to 31 March the next year.

The standard training period shall be 300 hours a year for military training and civic education.

6. OUTLINE OF TYPES AND PROGRAMS.

Training will be divided into two types...training by individual communities and collective training.

(1) Training by individual communities.

From 1 April to the end of February the next year, except for the farming season of sowing, reaping and harvesting, the standard period for military training shall be 90 hours a year and for civic education 30 hours. The leaders will be responsible for the execution of the military training and civic education of each community. The personnel in charge of the training shall not only go around to each community to give his personal leadership, but will also post assistant trainer appropriate in each community to give direct instruction. This can be done by combining two or more villages into one according to circumstances.

In connection with this education, the students will have to do appropriate labor service to assist in cultivating their spirit of cooperation. As far as civic education is concerned, we aim to contribute by its means to the enlightenment of the general public as long as there is no interference with the education of the students themselves.

(2) COLLECTIVE TRAINING

In March, the last month of the training term, collective training will be carried out for about a month (a period totaling 180 hours). For military training squads and sections will be organized on a village basis for the performance of ceremonial drill, battle drill and field service with the discharged members of ASANO Unit as the staff. The students' aggressive spirit and will to cooperate must be cultivated by drills and battle maneuvers, night actions, field duty, indoor duty life, cooking, games and hunting; leadership and training must be such as will prepare them against bandits attacks and enemy maneuvers from the exterior.

The students' closing ceremony will be held on 31 March (the great Cossack festival day in the Far East) on which occasion the group leader shall publicly honour all those of outstanding merit. School children and all other kinds of corporate bodies will be asked to join and there will be all kinds of sports and games.

7. TRAINEES

These comprise young immigrants of 18 to 30 and physically fit, who are divided as follows:

1. Trainees discharged from the army who are keeping in practice;
2. Preparatory trainees not yet enlisted (18-23 years old).
3. Untrained students (24 to 30 years old).

8. FUNDS NECESSARY FOR TRAINING.

As a rule the funds for subsidizing special settlers and for training will be used to meet the expenses for personnel, equipment, training materials and other sundry expenses; the Commandant of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization will be responsible for checking and apportioning the expenditure of these funds.— Other measures in addition to this budget may be taken with the permission of the commandant when recognized as being especially necessary.

9. OUTLINE OF EDUCATION.

(1) Spiritual education. The spiritual education imparted by means of military training and civic education shall promote an intensive cultivation of their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo and their anti-communist urge for the restoration of their motherland. Its main object will also be to accompany the specific military training in cultivating a spirit of fierce aggression and disposition to stand up to hardships and privations. The training items are as given in Appendix No.1.

(2) Military Training.

As given in Appendix No.2.

(3) Civic Education...is to give them an understanding of the history of Japan and Manchukuo and of Japan's mission and to cultivate their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo. At the same time, their anti-Soviet urge for the restoration of their motherland will be cultivated by teaching them the history of the Russian people and the actual conditions in the Soviet; and by exalting their consciousness of their mission as young men who bear the whole burden of the white Russians and their fate. They shall also be given a general knowledge and education in such things as Manchurian laws, economy and geography to make them the backbone and nucleus of the settlement. The training items are as given in appendix No.2.

DOC. 1971

10. METHODS OF ASSISTANCE

Outstanding students will be allowed to participate in the KYONAKAI Japanese language groups' visit to Japan while outstanding students who are full-grown and of enlistment age shall receive special consideration in their treatment after they have joined ASANO Unit. These and similar measures of encouragement will be taken to promote the advancement and improvement of this education.

APPENDIX 1.

SPIRITUAL EDUCATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION.

CLASSIFICATION

SPIRITUAL
EDUCATION

- 1. Greek Orthodoxy.
 - 2. The traditions and virtues of the Cossack.
 - 3. The mission of the white Russian Youth.
 - 4. The Japanese spirit.
 - 5. The true meaning of the establishment of the Japanese army.
 - 6. The aggressive spirit and military discipline.

(The most important element of a powerful army).
 - 7. Exemplary and inspiring tales of bravery and loyalty in Japanese and Russian history.
-

CLASSIFICATION

CIVIC
EDUCATION

1. Russian history
2. The new world order and Japan's imperial mission
3. Outline of Japanese history.
4. The history of the establishment of Manchukuo and the Empire-building spirit.
5. Outline of the laws and economy of Manchukuo.
6. Their duty to Manchukuo as its nationals.
7. Facts about the Soviet.
8. International conditions.
9. Miscellaneous civic morals.

REMARKS

- 1) Military education, spiritual education and civic education shall be separated and in view of the special characteristics of the Russians, spiritual education should rouse their racial ardor.
 - 2) Civic education should augment their quality as citizens of Manchukuo.
-

APPENDIX 2.
STANDARD OF REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY TRAINING.

<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	<u>FOR PREPARATORY TRAINEES BEFORE THEIR ENLISTMENT</u>
<u>TRAINING MATERIALS</u>	
<u>INDIVIDUAL DRILL</u>	1. They will perfect themselves in all the basic routine performed by soldiers in battle.
<u>TROOP DRILL</u>	1. They will thoroughly familiarize themselves with all close-order movements. 2. They will perfect themselves in all the movements of a squad warfare and will learn the rudiments of troop drill.
<u>FIELD DUTY</u>	1. They will perfect themselves in the movements and technique of patrols, sentries and liaison-men. 2. They will be trained to carry out route marches, without failing. 3. They will acquire the rudiments of camping out.
<u>TYPE OF TRAINING</u>	
<u>TRAINING MATERIALS</u>	<u>TRAINEES DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY WHO ARE KEEPING IN PRACTICE.</u>
<u>INDIVIDUAL DRILL</u>	They will review all basic battle movements and at the same time, they will be enabled to perform the function of assistant instructors.
<u>TROOP DRILL</u>	1. They will revise all close-order and battle movements. 2. They will be taught the movements of a squad commander in detail and those of a platoon commander in outline.
<u>FIELD DUTY</u>	1. They will review all the movements of liaison, searching, policing, marching, and camping out and at the same time they will be enabled to perform the function of class teachers.

TRAINING MATERIALS

FOR UNTRAINED STUDENTS

INDIVIDUAL DRILL

1. They will perfect themselves in all the basic routines performed by soldiers in battle.
-

TROOPS DRILL

1. They will familiarize themselves with all close order battle movements and will be enabled to perform the function of squad leaders.
-

FIELD DUTY

1. They will perfect themselves in the movements and techniques of patrols, sentries and liaison men.
 2. They will be trained to carry out route marches without failing.
 3. They will acquire the rudiments of camping out.
-

TYPE OF TRAINING

FOR ALL THREE TYPES OF TRAINEE

TRAINING MATERIALS

MILITARY LECTURES

They will be taught an outline of all essential matters concerning the functions of each branch of the service, and the regulations and manuals of officers' rank.

INDOOR DUTY

TRAINING

The custom of emphasizing discipline and courtesy, and especially that of stressing obedience and harmonious cooperation will be cultivated and their good qualities of leadership developed as the backbone of the settlement.

GYMNASIUM

Efforts will be made to develop physical strength and energy or to impart an outline of them and also to train a vigorous personality.

REMARKS

1. The unenlisted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type and additional training and revision shall be given both to discharged veterans and to those without any training at all. The unenlisted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type. Their abilities for every type of leadership will be cultivated.
2. In each type of training emphasis will be laid on action at night.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that
"the 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section"--"The plan to
carry out the education of White Russian Youths in the special emigrant
district"

was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department,
Moscow.

on or about March 21., 194 6, and that the original of the said docu-
ment may be found in the archives of the said department. Moscow.

I do further certify _____

/s/ Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17 May, 194 6.

The Principles of the Japanese Propaganda Campaign against Outer Mongolia

Separate paper No. 3 of distribution document No. 8 related to the second conference of Intelligence Section in 1943.

Published the Intelligence Section of Kwantung Army
June 16th 1943.

Contents.

- I. Preface
- II. Propaganda Measures Towards Outer Mongolia
- III. Chief Items of Propaganda
- IV. Explanation of Chief Propaganda items and general methods of execution.

I. Preface

1. In accordance with the point of view of treating the Soviet Russia and Mongolia as one unit, Propaganda in Outer Mongolia should in its fundamental idea conform with the propaganda principles against the Soviet Union; but in actual propaganda the special characteristics of Outer Mongolia must be taken into consideration. This guide will point out only these special points and give necessary explanation thereof. Propaganda towards Outer Mongolia, therefore, shall in general rules follow the propaganda principle towards the Soviet Union and in its expression follow this guide.

2. In executing propaganda according to this guide, contents and methods of propaganda shall be judiciously selected and adjusted within the prescribed limits, according to the existing circumstances.

II. Propaganda Measures Against Outer Mongolia

The same measures shall be taken as towards the Soviet Union except the following unique points:

Document No. 1957

1. The ultimate objective of propaganda in Outer Mongolia is positively to induce the Outer Mongolians to become anti-Soviet, that is, to cooperate with Japan, and in attaining this final objective the propaganda work shall go through something like the following steps:

Stages	Object	Probable Phenomena	
1st Stage	Frustration of public confidence in the present government	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wholesale clean-up 2. Cattle slaughter by the people (Delivery evasion) 	Out-break of a Russo-Japanese war at a certain time.
2nd Stage	Opposition of the military and the populace against the present government.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Out-break of riots and revolts. 2. Oppression by the Red Army 	
3rd Stage	Estrangement from and resistance against the Soviet Union, i.e. cooperation with Japan.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Numerous riots & revolts. 2. Birth of an autonomous government under the leadership of the Japanese Army. 3. War against Russia 	

In each stage of the propaganda work, attempts shall be made, with a view to the ultimate, as well as the immediate objective, at the attraction of the Outer Mongolians, especially soldiers, towards our camps, that is to say, at the obtention of pro-Japanese and cooperative elements.

2. The Outer Mongolians possess peculiar manners and customs, while the standard of their civilization is generally low, being exceedingly inferior to the Soviet Russians though slightly more advanced than the Inner Mongolians. In our propaganda work, therefore, we must have recourse not only to such expressions and instances as approximate to the actual circumstances but also to novel expressions in order to arouse their curiosity.

3. Since Outer Mongolia is a country of a small and weak race, situated in addition between two great powers, Japan and Russia, the inhabitants have a tendency of worshipping the powerful. With view also to their uncivilized conditions, we should as occasion calls, attempt to show off (plainly display or suggest) our might in connection with our propaganda work.

4. For the sake of propaganda effects, the racial similarity between the Japanese and the Mongolians shall be utilized to direct the Mongolians to harbor racial hatred and hostility against the Russians.

5. The Mongolian race has for all ages been emotionally hostile to the Chinese race. Therefore, in our propaganda work no mention shall be made as to the relations between these two countries.

6. Heed shall be given to the fact that although there is not much difference between the Inner and the Outer Mongolia so far as written language is concerned, there is a great deal of difference in the matter of spoken language.

III. Chief Items of Propaganda

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere.

3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, the government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular, an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union.

6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy,

protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas, in such a way hinting an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

7. By propagandizing the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

IV. Explanation of Chief Propaganda Items and General Methods of Execution.

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated. (Corresponding to No. 1 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The Government of the people's revolutionary party is a general term comprising the party government, communism in Outer Mongolia and the socialistic system.

The communism in Outer Mongolia has been imported in its entirety direct from the Soviet Union, and with no great thought foundation, it is nothing more than an incidental by-product of the people's sympathy with the overthrow of the old feudalism. So, there is no zealous devotees of the thought itself, while the majority of the people show no understanding, no interests.

Again, the socialistic system is not necessarily very attractive to the general public. Only the younger generation knows no other system. As for those middle-aged or aged, the attraction of the system does not go beyond the realization that it is slightly better than feudalism; or rather, it may be admitted that they are internally annoyed at the rapid strides of science ever since the socialistic revolution.

On the other hand, the so-called leaders of the "Choi-barsun" Party, which is now in power, are not only exceedingly anxious to keep up their enormous might and influence, but also are well aware that once they lose power they will be immediately and inevitably massacred. Submitting tamely to the command of the Soviet Union, therefore, they are continuing with their desperate efforts,

by fair means or foul, for the maintenance of their power; in the past they completely subdued all the uprisings that broke out in several occasions and now they have installed their followers in all the important positions. So, their party is most anxious to maintain the status quo, while at present there is scarcely any other power to offer resistance.

But since the post-revolution history of Outer Mongolia testifies that racial opposition would inevitably arise within the party or the army, the foremost emphasis should be laid on the propaganda among party members and army personnel.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Almost identical with the corresponding item in the principles of propaganda towards the Soviet Union.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere. (Corresponding to No. 2 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. Strong in racial consciousness and exclusive, the Outer Mongolians have never liked submission to the Soviet Union; but as a result of their habits for several hundred years, they are prepossessed by the idea of absolute obedience to the powerful (or to the feudal lords, in olden days). If we should enlighten these people in this respect, while at the same time carrying out Nos. 5 and 7 of the Items of Propaganda, we should surely succeed in fostering an anti-Soviet tendency.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Giving familiar examples such as shortage of commodities, conscription of men and live stock, increase in imposition, and so on, we should make the Outer Mongolians realize firstly that all these were the result of their cooperation with the Soviet Union. Secondly, unlimited mobilization of men and materials from the unproductive Outer Mongolian land not only for domestic use but even for the defense and existence of the enormous Soviet Russia or even for sending far west to bear the brunt of the German attack would eventually perish Outer Mongolia altogether.

V. G.

Thirdly, the United States and Great Britain are at present allied with the Soviet Union solely for the purpose of defeating Germany, and once Germany collapses they would be sure to collide with the Soviet Union. In other words, Outer Mongolia, so long as she remains submissive to the Soviet Union, will be subject to Soviet exploitation. These foregoing ideas shall be propagated.

As for party members and younger generation, our propaganda work shall dwell persistently and with novel wordings on the proposition of whether it was the objective of the Outer Mongolian Revolution to cause the ruin of Outer Mongolia through cooperation with the Soviet Union.

3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians. (Corresponding to No. 3 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. This part should read exactly the same as the corresponding part of the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union. In particular, among the intelligent Outer Mongolians including those who have studied in the Soviet Union, there appears to be a tendency of thinking highly of Stalin and comparatively ignoring Choibarsun. It is necessary for us to take advantage of this trend.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated. (Corresponding to No. 4 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The party government in Outer Mongolia, it is observed, is an exact copy of that in the Soviet Union, that is, the actual power is in the hands of the party itself although the outward execution is committed to government organs and the like.

In the Mongolian society, however, the power of ostensible organs such as the government, the military, and so on has been so overwhelmingly strong since olden days that every momentous question has had to be decided in the form of a joint conference of responsible representatives of such organs.

Also in the Mongolian society there has been traditional oneness of military and administrative affairs and ordinarily military leaders possess great voting right. As a proof of this, we have the cases of military leaders playing an active part in the frequent civil wars of Outer Mongolia. Furthermore, the manpower mobilization in Outer Mongolia is growing more and more extensive so that there remain at present only a very small number of men that are purely civilians. Therefore, in order to bring about internal disturbances we must needs approach the army and instigate them to armed revolt (or to semi-bandit activities, to begin with).

(b) General Methods of Execution. As long as the party government continues to exist, bloody clean-ups will never come to an end and it would be impossible to shake off the Soviet fetters. With this theory, side by side with excitement of racial consciousness (Item No. 5), we should instigate chiefly military commanders to armed revolt.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union. (Corresponding to No. 6 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. Under this item no special explanation is necessary. Among the items of plotting and propaganda for Outer Mongolia, the one that has the largest scope of application is the excitement of racial consciousness. With view especially to the extreme stubbornness of the Mongolians' racial consciousness, we should tactfully weave this subject into all the other items of propaganda, for that would invariably awake a responsive cord in the hearts of the Outer Mongolians.

In this connection, however, care should be taken to direct their racial strife only against the Russians, and under no circumstances whatsoever against the Japanese, the Chinese, and so on.

In the case of this item, it is also a great advantage to make use of religion, for in the monotonous life of the Mongolians religion is all but the only thing that could offer spiritual comfort.

6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy, protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas in such a way hinting an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

Note: This item hardly requires a special explanation.

7. By propagandizing the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

Explanation. Utter failure of several rebellions in the past and hesitation thereafter to plot another in spite of the general public's unwillingness to remain submissive to the Soviet Union and to the party now in power, have been due solely to the belief that the Soviet Union is great and invincible.

So, once we have succeeded, with the help of examples, in convincing the Mongolians of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union, rebellions after rebellions would inevitably occur in utter turmoil, and herein lies the necessity of the item.

The fact, it is apparent, that both traffic and communications between the Soviet proper and Outer Mongolia is extremely difficult suits our purpose beautifully.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section." -- "The Principles of Japanese Propaganda campaigns in relation to Outer Mongolia" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department in Moscow.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed)
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17 May 1946.

"Mc Manus" 730

objected to reading of partial doc - "
but solemnly - if learned counsel had waited ten
mins. would have heard all - "
"do not understand Russian - "

① LEAD

② KAWABE - Kiyoe - JAP WITNESS.

③ Mc Manus.

④ ~~new phase no bodily violation - it was original part.~~

VSE

form "you have reversed yourself"
"Reversed unto yourself. right to admit"

W/ if you think original does not exist?

E/ we had no such part

W/ tribunal must be corrected.

I am supported by one of my colleagues
who listens very carefully and who has
a good memory - " - Longbe

830

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America, and others,)

VS

) ss AFFIDAVIT

Sadao ARAKI, and others)

Kawabe

I, Torashiro KAWABE (age 56) hereby state under oath as follows:

1. I served as a military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from January 1932 to March 1934.

2. I admit that the five sheets of documents which were shown to me represent photographic copies of the original of the report which was written in my own handwriting and sent to the General Staff Office at Tokyo from Moscow on 14th July, 1932. I affixed my signature on the back of each photographic copy which I recognized.

I admit that the date of dispatch of these documents coincides with the date of the photographic copy of the envelope.

3. I admit that the other four photographic copies which were shown to me are the copies of the original of the record which Lt. Colonel KASAHARA of the General Staff Office had Lt. Colonel KANDA transmit to me in Moscow on 16th July, 1932. The first page of the said four is a copy of my own handwriting, but I think the other three are probably copies of the record written by YAMOKA who was my assistant.

Torashiro KAWABE

To certify the foregoing, I affixed my signature of my recognition on the back of the first sheet of the photographic copies of the documents.

Torashiro KAWABE

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kawabe, Torashiro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 3rd day of September, 1946.

ARTHUR A SANDUSKY
Captain, J.A.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 2d Lt. John Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kawabe Torashiro, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 3rd day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

2d Lt. John Hattori

Handwritten notes:
"URINE"
"P/S/INC"

116

831

Doc. No. 2660

Page 1

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)
)
 vs.) SS AFFIDAVIT
)
 ARAKI, Sadao, et al.)

I, Torashiro KAWABE (56 years old), state, under oath, as follows:-

1. I, Lieutenant-General Torashiro KAWABE, was the Deputy Chief of General Staff from April 1945 till October of the same year. At that time the Chief of General Staff was General Yoshiji UMEDZU.

2. The decision concerning the surrender was made by His Majesty the Emperor on August 13, 1945. On August 14, 1945, the decision concerning the surrender was communicated to the Allied Powers by radio. The formal signature of surrender was made by Japanese representatives on September 2, 1945.

3. All of the secret and top-secret documents and records of the General Staff had been burned in Tokyo during the time from August 13, 1945 until the day we received from the Allied Powers the orders prohibiting the burning of documents.

Among the documents burned were documents of mobilization plans, military operation plans, and the documents referring to the guidance of the war, as well as records of Supreme War Council.

At that time the burning of secret and top-secret documents was done by persons whose ranks were lower than those of the chiefs of sections of the Army General Staff.

When the documents were burned. General UMEDZU, Chief of Army General Staff, was in Tokyo.

I do not know whether or not any written or oral orders were issued concerning the destruction of all documents of the Army General Staff Office.

Furthermore, I do not know whether or not any documents of Japanese General Staff have been concealed.

(Signed) Torashiro KAWABE

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kawabe, Torashiro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 5th day of September 1946.

ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY
Captain, J.A.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Raymond K. Nimura, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kawabe, Torashiro was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 5th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

(Signed by) Raymond K. Nimura
2d Lt. AUS

31-32

Violation of Order

.38-39

83 ✓

*I don't want it argued -
forced to agree to make a non-aggression pact
don't say*

A F F I D A V I T

✓ C

Name: Shun AKIKUSA

Age: 51

Citizenship: Japanese

Education: College graduate

Rank: Major-general

Last occupation: Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army.

Interrogation was done in Moscow on the 22nd of February, 1945. The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S.J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

- Q. Enumerate posts you have occupied in the Japanese Army.
- A. I was graduated from the Military Academy and appointed Second Lieutenant in 1914. Being Second and afterwards First Lieutenant, I served as officer attached to a company in the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in 1918-1923, and I worked as interpreter during the Intervention of Japan against Russia in 1919, being despatched to the Third Division stationed in Chita at that time.

In 1923 I was promoted to Captain and appointed Company Commander, at which post I served for two years till 1925.

In 1925 I entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, studied Russian for one year, and afterwards was ordered to Harbin for one year in order to practice the Russian language, as a trainee of the War Ministry. Then I returned to the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo. After serving as extra-staff officer of headquarters of the regiment for one or two months, I was despatched to the General Staff Office. I took the post of officer-interpreter there for two years, and for two years more served there in the General Affairs Section of the Second Department.

*§ "Sentencing re all witnesses
re. status. w/ admit.
w/ will comply Rosen oppbe*

In 1932 I was promoted to Major and appointed teacher of the Russian language in the Military Academy in Tokyo and taught the language for one year and then was transferred to the Harbin Tokumu-Kikan (the Harbin Special Service Agency), where I assisted the chief of the agency for three years; then I returned to Tokyo, worked in the General Staff Office as officer attached to the Russian Section of the Second Department for one year.

- Q. Where did you serve since that time?
- A. Since then I served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Administrative Office of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q. It is not true. Until 1937 you served in the Second (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff, and then were transferred to the War Ministry, served there for three years, and again returned to the General Staff. If so there seems to have been the interval of three years during which period you were not in the position of intelligence officer, but such a case cannot occur usually. What were you doing in the War Ministry for those three years? You were engaged in your speciality, weren't you?
- A. Yes, I was a teacher in a school in those three years where reconnaissance officers of the War Ministry were trained.
- Q. When were you promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel?
- A. In 1936 when I began to serve in the General Staff Office I was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.
- Q. When were you promoted to Colonel?
- A. While I was chief of the Reconnaissance Officers' Training School.
- Q. In 1940 you were transferred to the Second Department of the General Staff Office. What was your duty and how long did you serve there?
- A. At the rank of Colonel I served for two years as Extra Staff Officer in the General Staff. In reality, however, I was ordered abroad those two years. And after returning to Tokyo in 1942 I was appointed Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison in Huton, Manchuria, which is situated opposite to the city of Iman and stayed there for more than two years.

"Ruling change and military circles"

Q. When were you promoted to Major-General?

A. In 1943 while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison I was promoted to Major-General.

Q. When were you appointed Chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency (Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army)?

A. It was in February, 1945, and I remained in that post until the surrender of Japan.

Q. Did you participate directly in the occupation of Manchuria in 1931?

A. No, I didn't participate in it.

Q. What do you know about the transformation of Manchuria into a military base of attack on the Soviet Union?

A. The Japanese Government increased the Japanese troops in Manchuria and newly constructed railways, roads, airfields, various kinds of storehouses and other military equipments for the purpose of turning Manchuria into a military base against the Soviet Union. I saw these facts in person while I was an assistant officer of the Harbin Special Service Agency.

Q. How many airfields were there in Manchuria in 1936?

A. There were 9-10 airfields in 1936. In 1942 the number of them increased a little more, but I cannot tell you exactly how many there were.

Q. How many railways were there in 1933?

A. In 1933 there were two railways.

Q. And in 1936?

A. Before 1936 the third railway was newly constructed and in 1942 the number of the trunk railway lines increased 5-6 times as many as before.

Q. For what purpose were these equipments in Manchuria constructed?

16 A. For the purpose of starting aggressive operation against the Soviet Union.

Q. You served for three years in the War Ministry as a teacher of the school where reconnaissance officers were trained. Tell me what lessons were taught there.

A. The Foreign states, art of collecting and arranging reports and investigation of foreign languages were the basic lessons.

Q. What were the supplementary lessons besides these?

UC | A. The supplementary lessons given to the reconnaissance officers were to learn specially the future intelligence aim and practice radio business, and to study how to keep secrets.

Q. Were sabotage activities taught?

" A. In these two or three years they have been taught.

Q. Do you know the names of the officers who taught sabotage activities?

A. I don't know their names.

Q. What did you teach yourself?

A. I taught the art of intelligence.

Q. Where was your school?

A. Our school was situated in one part of a building at Kudan, Tokyo, under the administration of the War Ministry, and the school was a small two-storied building.

Q. By what name did the military call your school for the people near it? Had the school any number?

UC A. The school was called the Koho Kimmu Yoin Kenkyusho (The Research Institute for the Rear Service Personnel) for the people.

Q. What did the ordinary people take the school for?

A. The ordinary people thought that it was a part of the War Ministry.

Q. What do you know about the military operations at Changkufeng?

2369
A. I know that there occurred hostilities near Changkufeng in 1938 and its aim was to reconnoitre in force the real might of the Red Army by fighting. In the encounter participated a Japanese division of the Korean Army and it ended in the defeat of Japanese troops. Two more divisions from the Kwantung Army were dispatched to the place of the encounter, but as the battles ended before their arrival, these two divisions of the Kwantung Army couldn't participate in the encounter.

Q. By which side was the encounter at Changkufeng started?

VB
A. The Japanese Government reported that at first firing was opened by the Red Army, but afterwards I could reach the conclusion that the encounter was started by the Japanese Army.

Q. Do you recognize that the encounter was an aggressive one and was commenced by the initiative of Japan?

A. Yes, I recognize it.

Q. Tell me what you know concerning the encounter at Nomonhan.

A. The incident occurred in 1939 and I think that this encounter was the same as that at Changkufeng. In the encounter participated a division of the Kwantung Army and several other independent forces and the commander of these forces was Lieutenant-General Michitaro KOMATSUBARA, the former chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency and the former military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, and for the purpose of relieving these Japanese forces a division of the Kwantung Army was newly despatched, but as the Japanese Army was defeated before its arrival, it couldn't participate in the battles.

Q. By which side's initiative was the encounter started and what was its cause?

- v 6
- A. I think that the encounter was started to reconnoitre the real might of the Red Army. And the encounter at Nomonhan was started by the initiative of Japan, but the Japanese Government, as it did in the case of the Changkufeng Incident, gave a false conception to the Japanese people that the Nomonhan Incident also was started by the Mongolians and that Japan was only obliged to defend its own territory.
- Q. Who do you think are responsible for the encounters at Changkufeng and Nomonhan?
- A. I think that the General Staff, the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army are responsible for the Emperor and the nation.
- Q. Who was the chief of the General Staff then?
- Prince Kanin
A. The chief of the General Staff was His Imperial Highness Prince Kanin.
- Q. What do you know concerning the plan of Kan-toku-en (A special grand maneuver of the Kwantung Army)?
- A. From the conversations with Colonel Saburo HAYASHI, Chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff and other officers, I learned that the plan of the Kan-toku-en was quickly drawn up after the start of attack on the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 and its contents were the plan of preparation of military operations for the purpose of taking military aggression against the Soviet Union by Japan. And in connection with my duties I was personally aware of some measures with regard to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan.
- Q. When did Colonel Saburo HAYASHI speak to you concerning the plan of the Kan-toku-en?
- A. In autumn, 1942.
- Q. Where?
- A. This conversation took place in an office room of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff.

- Q. Who drew up this plan personally?
- A. The chief of the First Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters drew it up.
- Q. Was the plan investigated in the General Staff?
- A. Yes, the plan was revised and authorized by the General Staff.
- Q. Who were in reality engaged in the plan in the General Staff?
- A. The chief of the First Department of the General Staff revised it, but his name I forgot, and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the General Staff, authorized it.
- Q. And was TOJO connected with the plan?
- A. As General TOJO was then the War Minister, without his consent this plan could not be drawn up, he was concerned in the plan, of course.
- Q. Do you know yourself anything about the contents of this plan?
- A. I could form the general idea concerning the contents of this plan with the aid of several data investigated by me while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison. That in 1942 by the Fifth Army, one part of the Kwantung Army enforced a war game as a means of preparing the realization of the Kan-toku-en plan.
- One of the designs of the war game was as follows: The Fifth Army was to give a blow to the Red Army from the east side of Lake Hanka, interrupt railways and in this way isolate Maritime Province and the south corps of the Red Army from the central part of the Soviet Union.
- Q. Did you see any documents stamped "Kan-toku-en"?
- A. Yes, in 1943 I saw such documents concerning a financial account of the expenditure which was paid out of the Kan-toku-en budget. These documents also testify the active preparations for the realization of the plan.

VE

Q. How do you happen to know about the increase of the number of soldiers in Manchuria, the construction of new roads, etc., responding to the Kan-toku-en plan?

A. I learned about these facts by my own inspection when I arrived at my new post as Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison.

Q. You told that you were abroad from 1940 till 1942. Tell me the import of your duty in this period.

A. I was ordered by the General Staff to Europe in order to investigate the administrative organization of the countries occupied by Germany. The object of the investigation was to make my inspections available to the solution of problems concerning the administrative organization of the areas which would be occupied by Japan in the war with Great Britain, China, America and in case of a war against the Soviet Union.

Q. How long did you stay in Europe?

A. I went to Europe in 1940 and stayed there for about two years.

Q. Accordingly you returned to Japan in 1942. What countries did you visit?

A. Yes, I returned to Japan in 1942 after visiting Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. And I visited Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries only for the purpose of making an ordinary journey. My duty was done chiefly in Berlin.

Q. Did you send any report from Berlin to Tokyo concerning your duty?

A. Yes, having learned from the attache that the Kwantung Army was preparing for aggression against the Soviet Union, I sent a telegram.

Q. What did you say in that telegram of yours?

A. I wrote in the telegram the data I collected and when I returned to Japan I wrote a report.

- Q. From where did you obtain the data for the purpose of investigating the order and administration for the occupied territories by Japan?
- A. For the purpose of investigating the administrative organization I availed myself of the data obtained from newspapers and magazines and reports from the Japanese officers and civilians in Germany and other countries.
- Q. Did you know that Germany mobilized working power of the occupied territories and directed it to its industries?
- A. I didn't know about it.
- Q. And do you know the fact that Germany used P.O.W.'s in its munition industries?
- A. One of the Japanese nationals saw P.O.W.'s used in the coal-mines in Ruhr when he went there.
- Q. And did you hear many foreign people were massacred in its occupational territories?
- A. I heard that Jewish people were massacred.
- Q. When you returned to Japan, did you propose in your report that such order as Germany held in its occupational areas be applied in Japanese occupational districts?
- A. Only within the bounds of general matters, I concluded my argument that investigation of this problem theoretically be further made in view of the necessity of the investigation of nationalities in the occupied territories and the results of the type of German administration in its occupational countries. It was merely a theoretical conclusion, not touching any actual detail. For I couldn't relate any actual detail on account of the scarcity of my knowledge about it.
- Q. Were you ever connected with White Russian emigrants during your service in the Harbin Special Service Agency?
- A. (We used White Russian emigrants as spies and propagandists. the data for the propaganda used by them were printed in the Press "Harbinskol ureneya".
- Q. Did you inspect the publication of the data?
- A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the ASANO detachment?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that detachment?

A. As far as I remember, the detachment was organized from White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station in 1938.

Q. What was the number of the persons of the detachment?

A. There were 200-300 men in the ASANO detachment.

Q. What was the aim of the detachment?

A. The detachment was enlisted into the Manchurian Army and was to be controlled by a commander of the Japanese Army in case of war with the Soviet Union.

Q. Can you firmly recognize the fact that Japan availed herself of White Russian emigrants in espionage and sabotage activities on a large scale?

A. Yes, I can firmly recognize it.

Q. What do you know about the fact that the Russian emigrants were used in the above-mentioned purposes?

A. The Japanese side used the White Russian emigrants as spies, propagandists and saboteurs, and in order to create disturbance in the Soviet Union territory, Japan organized three detachments of the White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungair Station, Hailar and Hengtaohotsu.

Q. Who was the commander of the Sungari Party?

A. It was Colonel Smirnov. I don't remember exactly who were the commanders of the Hailar and Hengtaohotsu detachments. The commander of one of the two parties was Peshkov, but I don't remember which detachment he commanded.

Q. Do you know yourself Smirnov?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. How were you connected with Russian emigrants while you were an assistant of the Harbin Special Service Agency?

- A. I participated in establishing "the Russian Emigrants Bureau" in Manchoukuo.
- Q. How many Russian emigrants were there in Manchuria?
- A. I think there were approximately 70,000 White Russian emigrants in Manchuria then.
- Q. What was the purpose of "the Brem" (the Russian Emigrants Bureau) in itself?
- A. It consisted in bringing together White Russian Emigrants around Japan for the purpose of widely enforcing anti-Soviet movement.
- Q. Did "the Brem" work under the control of Japan in such a way?
- A. Yes, "the Brem" existed completely under the control of Japan.
- Q. In Harbin there was a school for saboteurs. Who was the director of this school?
- A. Yes, in Harbin existed such a school, and Major MURATA was the director.
- Q. When was this school established?
- A. This school was established in about 1943, and in 1945 still existed.
- Q. What kind of persons were allowed to enter the school as students?
- A. They were officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Japanese Army.
- Q. Tell me in detail concerning the White Russian Emigrants Fascist Party.
- A. Such a party existed in reality, of which leaders were Rozaevoky, Matkovaky and Dolov.
- Q. What was the purpose of this party?
- A. The purpose of the party was to make anti-Soviet and anti-Jews activities.

- Q. What was the role of the intelligence organs concerning the establishment of the Fascist Party?
- A. When I went to my new post in Manchuria in 1933, the Fascist Party (the Russian Fascist Alliance) already existed. While I was staying in Manchuria, the Alliance was given financial assistance by Japan and used in anti-Soviet propaganda. I know well Rozaevsky and Matkovsky, the leaders of the Alliance. A general Kosmin participated temporarily in the Alliance, but afterwards quarreled with the other leaders of the Alliance and left the Alliance.
- Q. What kind of assistance was given to "the Brem" in Harbin by Japan?
- A. While I was an assistant of the Harbin from 1933 till 1936, "the Brem" did not receive any financial aid from Japan because it had its own funds, but from about 1937 it began to receive financial aid from the Japanese budget. When "the Brem" was transferred to the Manchoukuo Government in 1944, the monthly sum of financial aid from Japan in Harbin city alone must have been more than ten thousand yen.
- Q. Tell me about "the Intelligence Detachment", which belonged to that Special Service Agency.
- A. The duty of what was called "the Special Detachment" that belonged to the Harbin Tokumu-Kikan, consisted in disturbing the Red Army in the rear in case of war with the Soviet Union.
- Q. How many members were there in this "Special Detachment"?
- A. Approximately 200.
- Q. Was this detachment composed in consideration of its members' quality?
- A. Half of the detachment were Japanese soldiers in active service and another half Japanese nationals subject to the compulsory military service.
- Q. Were there any White Russian emigrants in this detachment?

1. No. but Russian emigrants were united into other sabotage detachments (guerilla warfare) at the Second Sungari Station, in Hailar and Hengtachotsu.
- Q. Did the Russian emigrant detachments and your "Special Detachment" work positively in 1945?
- A. With regard to what was called "the Special Detachment" of the Japanese Army, which belonged to the Harbin Special Service Agency, in conformity with the order received from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, on the 10th of August, 1945, I ordered Colonel MAKINO, commander of that detachment, to prepare for its activity. Colonel MAKINO divided the detachment into three and posted them to the eastern region of Harbin, but as I received the report of the surrender of the Japanese Army on the 15th of August, I don't know anything about the further movement of that detachment.

As for the Russian emigrant disturbance detachments, I don't know anything.

- Q. Were there any sabotage detachments of this kind which belonged to the other Special Service Agency in Manchuria?
- A. Colonel OMORI, an officer attached to the Second Section of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, who had some experience about such a matter gained from his former office in north China by the directions of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army drafted a plan of the organization of a Peace Maintaining Troop (the Special guerilla detachment) in order to disturb the Red Army in the rear, composed of four kinds of members, that is, of the personnel of the Special Service Agency (its branch alone, with the exception of Mukden), the police, the military police and the Japanese regular forces. But in consequence of the refusal of the police to participate in this Peace Maintaining Troop on the 1st of August 1945, the troop was composed of three kinds of members (the personnel of the above-mentioned Special Service Agency, military police and Japanese regular forces).

This Peace Maintaining Troop was to have the duty of positively taking security precautions against spies in time of peace, and to disturb the Red Army in the rear in time of war as I already mentioned. Such troops were organized in Chichihaerh, Mukden and Mutanchiang.

Each troop had several peace maintaining battalions; the

- A. (continued) Mukden Troop had 8-9 battalions; the Chichihaerh and Mutanchiang Troops had 5-6 battalions; that is, there were 20 battalions of this kind in all.

The Commander of the Mukden Troop was a general officer ranking with the commander of a division, whereas the commanders of the other two troops were officers ranking with the commander of a brigade.

- Q. Tell me if there were special units in each battalion.
- A. In each battalion there was one intelligence company.
- Q. Were there any special units of saboteurs in each battalion
- A. The two companies of each battalion were called peace maintaining companies and it was planned that each battalion should have a detachment for sabotage activities which was to be composed of the native Manchurian people and Russian emigrants. The organization of such a detachment was already started when I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Agency, that is, in February and ended at the end of June, 1945.

The above-mentioned Peace Maintaining Troops had no connection at all with "the Special Detachment" of the Harbin Special Service Agency. The latter had only the duty of carrying out battles in the rear of the Red Army, while the principal duty of the Peace Maintaining Troop was to take positive security precautions against spies to keep order and to suppress riots in the time of peace and to execute sabotage activities in the rear of the Red Army as a secondary duty in the time of war.

The answers to the questions were written by me and I affix my signature hereto.

Shun AKIKUSA (Signature)

The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S. J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

S. Rozenblit (Signature)

The military Interpreter - First Lieutenant Tastenko.

A. Tastenko (Signature)

C E R T I F I C A T E

MOSCOW.

February 22, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Ivanovich LASTENKO, military interpreter, hereby certify to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate oral speech into Russian and that I promise to translate correctly testimony of AKIKUSA, Shun.

I have been duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: LASTENKO

Subscribed to before
Colonel ROSENBLIT,
Assistant Prosecutor for the
USSR at the International Military
Tribunal in Tokyo.

Signed: ROSENBLIT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signed: M. GILDENBLAT

OATH

I, AKIKUSA, Shun, Major-General of the Japanese Army, hereby promise to testify only the truth on the case of near criminals of Japan, included in the first list.

I give this oath to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I have been duly warned that for giving false testimony I should bear criminal responsibility under the Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: AKIKUSA, Shun

February 22, 1946

MOSCOW

Sworn and subscribed to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

/s/ Colonel ROSENBLIT

Military Interpreter: Lt. LASTENKO

M. M. LITVINOV'S DIARY.

Talk with Yoshisawa, Japanese Foreign Minister
over a cup of coffee on December 1931.

Mr. Y. thanked for the courtesy and attention paid to him during travelling and for breakfast arranged for him. I told him that we learnt with satisfaction of his having been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had signed the Peking agreement and in such a way had personally participated in laying the foundation of our present relations, and therefore we were glad that the preservation of those relations was then in his hands. The preservation of peaceful and friendly relations with all our neighbors including Japan is a foundation of our foreign policy.

Mr. Y. replied that he was proud of the role he had played in establishing relations with us.

After his appointment he was not in contact with his Government and therefore could not speak on its behalf, but he personally was in favor of preserving and improving relations with us and therefore he was glad to hear from me of similar intentions on our part.

I concurred with Yoshisawa that prior to the exchange of opinions with his colleagues in the Government he could not make any official statements on behalf of the Government, but that his personal views of relations between our countries were also valuable. I also concur with Y's supposition of the possibility and desirability of improving these relations, and think that it could be achieved by some new act. We are conducting negotiations with Poland, are starting negotiations with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Roumania with the aim of concluding pacts of non-aggression and neutrality. We have concluded such pacts with Germany, Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The pact with France has been initialled. When these negotiations are completed and the pacts signed, we shall be bound by the pacts of non-aggression with all our neighbors with the exception of Japan.

We consider that this gap should be filled, otherwise there will be a queer situation that Japan will be our only neighbor who has no pact of non-aggression with us. Such a pact expresses the peaceful policy and intentions of the Governments, and it will be well-timed especially now when the future of the Japanese-Russian relations is the subject of speculations in Western Europe and America. The conclusion of this pact would put an end to these speculations. I therefore decided to make use of the opportunity of forwarding through Yoshisawa a proposal, to the Japanese Government to open negotiations concerning the conclusion of the non-aggression pact.

This proposal took Yoshisawa, just as well as Hirota who attended the talk, obviously by surprise. Having inquired in detail about the progress of negotiations with other countries mentioned by me in

the course of our talk, Yoshizawa again repeated that he had been suddenly called from Paris to Tokyo and had, therefore, no time to make the policy of the new cabinet clear to himself, but that he certainly would not forget to forward our proposal to the Government. He asked whether that proposal had been made by us before, through Hirota, or comrade Troyanovsky. Comrade Karahan made it clear to him that in Tokyo in 1928 and even in 1930 there were conversations on the subject. I added that, of course, we did not expect to receive an official reply from Yoshizawa, which we would be forwarded through comrade Troyanovsky, or Hirota, but I was interested to know Mr. Yoshizawa's personal opinion.

Y. refrained from further talk on that subject and asked me whether I wanted to forward anything to Tokyo.

The copy is correct.

DIRECTOR OF THE STATE CENTRAL RECORD
OFFICE OF THE U. S. S. R.

Professor Maksakov

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. V. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ A. Kunin

Doc. No. 2369

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a copy of M. M. Litvinov's diary-record of his talk with Oshisawa, Japanese Foreign Minister of December 31, 1931 on 3 sheets was delivered to me by (the Central State Historical Record Office of the U.S.S.R.) on or about June 7, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in (the Central State Historical Record Office of the USSR in Moscow.)

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan
2 July, 1946.

U.S.S.R. NO. 230-1

Copy from the copy
of the translation.Verbal Note Delivered by Uchida to Troyanovsky on December 13, 1932STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALVERBAL NOTE

It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupulously respect the sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each other's border. Different opinions may be maintained, however, concerning the proper time and methods of bringing these satisfactory relations to the formal conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. Some people are of the opinion that in view of the fact of the existence of different problems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by means of a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement. On the other hand the opposite opinion is adhered to by those who believe that first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement.

✓6) To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations on the subject between the two governments in this case seem to be untimely--

Perhaps at present it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations; as to the negotiations which were referred to, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created. For the time being it will be of avail if both governments will confer together on peaceful methods of preventing and solving locally all sorts of difficulties that may accidentally arise due to the fact that the Japanese and Soviet troops are stationed so close to one another. The creation of a Japano-Soviet-Manchurian committee to prevent border incidents may become one of such means.

The note was delivered to Troyanovsky by Uchida December 13, 1932.

The copy is correct.

Director of the State Central Record

Office of the U.S.S.R.

May 21, 1946

Professor Maksakov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, B.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: V. Kaplan

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel Taranenko, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the text of the verbal note delivered by UCHIDA to TROYANOVSKY on December 13, 1932, on 2 sheets was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR on or about May 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in (the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

July 2, 1946.

The note is delivered by Troyanovsky to Uchida of January 4, 1933 about the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of non-aggression, on three sheets.

The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became acquainted with the contents of the verbal note of the Japanese Foreign Office of December 13 of this year in which the Japanese Government declined for the present the proposal of the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, made on December 31, 1931 in Moscow by Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Yoshizawa who was returning to his country to occupy the post of Foreign Minister. In the above verbal note is recognized the existence of the opinion in Japan to the effect that "in view of the existence of different problems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by means of a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement." This argument reflects the similar viewpoint of the Soviet Government and it was the point of departure in its proposal of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that this opinion is shared by the Japanese circles.

Unfortunately, we must state, that the Japanese Government did not find it possible to follow this point of view and adhered to the opposite opinion cited in the verbal note in the following vein: "first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement."

The consistent development of this argument will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and the refusal of all nations to use war as an instrument of settling controversies, the latter being the essential element of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agreements is pertinent only between two states which have no controversies. Under the conditions of the present economic and political interdependence between nations such state of affairs is hardly existing, nor is it possible, especially between two states which are more or less close neighbors.

The solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out new ones in the future, particularly if the policy of the state develops along the line of aggression and extension of its sphere of influence.

It is noteworthy that the states, whether close neighbors or no neighbors at all with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which concluded non-aggression pacts with it, by no means admitted the absence of any mutual claims or controversies. Particularly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics quite recently gave its consent to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with a neighboring state, with which it has a disputable border and to which it has well grounded territorial claims.

The substance of non-aggression pacts, as well as the substance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact lies in the principle that the states involved, taking into consideration the existence of controversies between them at present, or the possibility of new controversies in the future, refuse to settle them by the use of force. The Soviet Government on its part in no way considers that between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan there are controversies which cannot be settled, or which the Soviet Government refuses to settle by peaceful means. The negation of this would be contradictory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan are signatories. Proposing a non-aggression pact with Japan, the Soviet Government has in no way ignored that international instrument, but meant to consolidate it by means of bilateral agreement to amplify it and to adapt it to the peculiarities of the relations between both nations. The proposal of the Soviet Government was not called forth by the considerations of the moment, but resulted from all its peaceful policy, and therefore continues in force for the future. On the other hand, it is permissible to doubt that the refusal of one party to conclude the non-aggressions pact would contribute to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the solution of all controversies and the settling of all misunderstandings ..."

Delivered to Troyanovsky by Uchida January 4, 1933.

The Copy is correct: Director of the State Central Record office of the U.S.S.R.

Professor Maksakov.

May 21, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, B.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document:

Signature: V. KAPLAN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the text of the note is delivered by TROYANOVSKY to UCHIDA of January 4, 1933 about the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of non-aggression, on 3 sheets was delivered to me by (the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR) on or about May 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in (the Central Historical Records Office of the USSR)

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

July 2, 1946

*Copy for the copy of
836 the translation
Verbal Note*

Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by
Sugesida by the order of Uchida Foreign Ministry
to the Plenipotentiary

The note delivered on January 4 to the Foreign minister by the Soviet ambassador in reply to the verbal note of December 13 last year presented by the Foreign Minister to the ambassador on the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the USSR, which was proposed by the Soviet Government, contains an argument based on the misinterpretation of the viewpoint of the Japanese Government; besides, it contains expressions hardly desirable in view of the interests of the friendly relations between both countries. In the course of conversation between the Vice-Foreign Minister and His Excellency which took place after that the former brought this fact to the attention of the Ambassador and recommended that the Soviet Government should pay its serious attention to it.

The Japanese government feels it necessary to take the advantage of this new opportunity to propose that the Soviet Government further deliberate this problem.

In the note of the Soviet government dated January 4 it is stated that, "the consistent development of this argument, will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and those contained in the Kellog-Briand pact," and that "the Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agreements is pertinent only between the two states which have no controversies." To refute this idea the Japanese government can only insist upon the Soviet Government's thorough deliberation of the statement contained in the verbal note of the Japanese Government which reads: "To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations between the two governments in this case seems to be untimely," and "it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations: as to the negotiations mentioned above, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created."

The statement contained in the Soviet note to the effect that "the Solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out new ones in the future, particularly if the policy of the state develops along the line of aggression and extension of its sphere of influence," attracted most serious attention of the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government accepts the explanation of the Soviet Ambassador to the effect that the phrase "the country" did not imply Japan. Need it be said that following the dictates of her constant feeling of justice, Japan has no designs of armed aggression. Indeed, we must say that in the above verbal note the Japanese Government maintained that "It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupulously respect the Sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each others border."

It is necessary to add that the Soviet Government published the details of the negotiation prior to having received an acquiescence of the Japanese Government. As a matter of principle the Japanese Government had no objections to this being published since the Government of the USSR would consider it necessary to do so, as vice-Foreign Minister made clear to the Soviet Ambassador. But the fact is that the Soviet Government unexpectedly did it though no definite agreement of the opinions of both governments had been effected as to the time and methods of publishing.

This step on the part of the Soviet Government, contradictory to the international custom, took the Japanese Government un-awares and it must confess, that it finds it difficult to understand what considerations made the Soviet Government do so.

Delivered February 13, 1933 by Sugeshida, Director of the First Section of the European-American Department p. proc. Foreign Minister Uchida to Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy Spilvanek to be forwarded to the Ambassador.

The copy is correct: Director of the State Central Record office of the USSR.

Professor Maksakov.

May 21/1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, B.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document

Signature s/ V. Kaplan

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U. S. S. R., do hereby certify that copy of the translated text of the Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by Sugesda by the order of Uchida Foreign Ministry to the counsellor of the Embassy for delivery to the Plenipotentiary, on 3 sheets was delivered to me by the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. on or about June 7, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the State Central Record Office in Moscow.

I do further certify _____

(signed) Lt. Col. Taranenko
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

July 2, 1946.

837

The CONTENTS OF THE NOTE OF THE DEPUTY
GENERAL CONSUL OF THE USSR IN KHARBIN
OF OCTOBER 25, 1934, CONCERNING UNLAWFUL
ARRESTS OF THE SOVIET EMPLOYEES.

To: Mr. Si-Lui--Ben,
Special Agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North
Manchuria.

No. 011/39 of
October 23, 1934.

UB
Mr. Special Agent,

In his numerous talks with you Consul-General Mr. Slavutsky repeatedly called your attention on his own behalf as well as officially on behalf of the Soviet Government, to the condition of guarding the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and requested that you should take measures to ensure the guarding of the line.

I would like to remind you of Mr. Slavutsky's statement made on behalf of the Soviet Government as far back as December 15 of last year in which he indicated that "the Functioning of the Chinese Eastern Railroad has lately been carried on in conditions of incessant violations of exploitation rules, attacks on trains, destruction of tracks, murders of railroad agents, committing violences against them, seizure of railroad property and the destruction of it. Unfortunately, the Manchurian authorities not only have not taken and are not taking sufficient measures to assist the Chinese Eastern Railroad and guard it, but have directly participated and are participating in the activities detrimental to the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railroad as well as detrimental to the USSR rights thereto."

Unfortunately, parallely with the growth of attacks on the Eastern line of the railroad, the guarding of the line, has not improved, but even has gradually assumed a catastrophic character. It came to that, that the Guard Troops Headquarters considered it possible to officially inform in their letter of May 19 that the guard troops had been removed from freight trains to the Eastern line.

In connection with the foregoing situation and these new measures of the guard troops Headquarters, Mr. Slavutsky made a protest to Mr. Shimomura acting for you, insisting that urgent

measures be taken by the high Manchurian authorities.

However, I am obliged to state that neither Mr. Slavutsky's protest; nor repeated and almost daily presentations of Mr. Bendura, deputy assistant Chairman of the Board, and later on the presentations of Mr. Kushnetsov, assistant chairman of the Board, who came from Tokyo, made to Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, chairman of the Board, gave no results.

VC | I can't but point out that all these acts just coinciding with the actual breakdown of Tokyo negotiations on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the breakdown arranged by the Japanese-Manchurian party, are considered by the Soviet Government as disorganizing the functioning of the Chinese Eastern RAILROAD AND AS a grave violation of the treaty rights of the USSR to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and reflect the aspirations of aggressive elements trying to seriously darken and even upset the relations between the two countries which was repeatedly brought to your notice by Mr. Slavutsky in his talks with you.

I am authorized to make a protest against the said acts of local authorities, and I believe, Mr. Special Agent, that you will take measures to set free Soviet citizens, railroad employees, who were illegally arrested, and to restore normal functioning of the railroad in compliance with existing treaties pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

Awaiting your prompt reply, I beg you to accept, Mr. Special Agent, the expression of my profound respect.

N. Raivid,

Consul-General of the USSR in Harbin.

Correct: Maksakov,

Director of State Central Record Office of the USSR.

CERTIFICATE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ A. Kunin

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U. S. S. R., do hereby certify that the text of the official statement of the superintendent of Consulate-General in Kharbin of October 23, 1934. was delivered to me by Chief of State Central Historical Records Office of the USSR on 4 pages. on or about April 28, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/
Signature and rank.

Tokyo, Japan

June 14, 1946.

No. 359

December 15, 1934

TO : Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, Chairman of the
Board of the Chinese
Eastern Railroad.

Dear Sir,

The Director of the railroad in his protest of November 20, 1934 No. 111, 9/1009 states that the seizure of offices and premises belonging to the railroad by various institutions in Harbin as well as along the line, has become widespread, especially of late. It may be seen from the Director's protest that in the period from 1930 to October 7, 1934, 101,230 square meters of railroad buildings (29,353 square meters in Harbin and 71,927 square meters along the line) were illegally occupied by the following institutions:

The Japanese military command occupied 299 premises with a total floor space 79,867,36 square meters, guard troops - 132 premises, 9,237,79 S. M., Railroad Police - 19 premises, 1,112,34 s.m., Commander-in-Chief's office - 15 premises, 991,48 s.m., Harbin Post Office - 9 premises, 489, 07 s.m., Ministry of Transportation - 1 premise, 115,30 s.m., Police Department - 4 premises, 143,45 s.m., Village Police - 16 premises, 693,67 s.m., Frontier Police and Police Guard Detachment - 21 premises, 4,932,67 s.m., the Great Harbin Administration - 4 premises, 2,446,86 s.m., Department of Education 8 premises, 986 s.m., Telephone Network - 3 premises, 120, 56 s.m., private people - 2 premises, 173,99 s.m. on the whole 534 premises with a total floor space 101,280,54 s.m. were illegally occupied.

Illegal seizures are distributed as follows:

1930 -	1.687, 99	Square meters.
1931 -	95, 49	" "
1932 -	57.187, 72	" "
1933 -	31.236, 25	" "

Before October 1, 1934 11,073, 09 s.m. It may be seen from these figures that almost all seizures took place in the period of 1932 - 1934.

Further the Director of the railroad points out that appeals to the Railroad Police are to no purpose as the officials of the Railroad Police illegally seize the premises themselves. Smashing locks and doors, opening doors with skeleton keys or with specially selected keys was their usual method of penetration into the railroad flats due to the inactivity of the Railroad Police (the details see in the said protest of the Director of the railroad).

But even after October 1, 1934 the said illegal acts have not ceased, but even increased which is conformed by a number of protests and telephone messages of the Director of the railroad during November and December of this year.

Not only temporarily vacant premises of the railroad are occupied, but often are occupied the premises in which live the employees of the railroad who are forcibly moved into other people's flats or thrown out bag and baggage into the street. All sorts of institutions participate in these illegal seizures of railroad premises. Most of the seizures have been effected by the Japanese military, but not less active in that respect were the institutions which are specially called upon to maintain law and order, and in particular to protect railroad property, viz., guard troops, railroad and general police, etc.

Even the institutions of the Ministry of Transportation and of the Ministry of Education had a hand in this, and, finally, some private offices and people. All this is detrimental to the interests of the railroad and its personnel and stands in the way of its smooth running.

I have already called your attention to the illegal seizures of railroad premises and in particular to the illegal seizures of the living quarters of its personnel, but nothing has been done to protect the rights and interests of the railroad and the seizures are going on and even increasing.

I categorically protest against such illegal acts and insist upon effective measures being taken to clear off the premises which were illegally seized and protect the railroad personnel from the outrages.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: Bandura

"The Copy is correct :
Director of the State Central Record Office of the U.S.S.R.
(MAKSAKOV)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, Kunin, A.V., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature /s/ A. KUNIN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I.,
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby
certify that copy of the letter of the Vice-President of
the Chinese Eastern Railroad Board of December 15, 1934 No. 359
about the occupation of the C.E.R. premises by the Japanese
forces on 5 sheets was delivered to me by the Director
of the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR
on or about 12 May, 1946, and that the original of the said
document may be found in the Central State Historical Records
Office of the USSR in Moscow.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. TARANENKO, /s/
Signature and rank.

Tokyo, Japan

June 19 1946.

839

*

Excerpt from: Notes on the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador OSHIMA at Fuschl on 18 April 1943.

The Reich Foreign Minister then once more emphasized that if Japan felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons, the current year was without doubt the best opportunity for attacking Russia, which would certainly never again be as weak as she is now.

We had reliable information according to which the Russians are newly constructing a large number of airfields in the East from which they themselves as well as the Americans would one day certainly attack the Japanese Island Empire with their bomber squadrons. The Japanese estimate of the strength of the Russians as 800,000 men in Siberia is, in our opinion, however, over-estimated. Our estimate is only 250,000 men, who, in addition, are second-class soldiers, since all the Siberian Divisions had already been battered by the German armies last winter. If, however, Japan was not in the position to beat the Russians quickly and decisively, it would be better for her not to attack. However, she would then under all circumstances have to launch a new attack in some place against the British or the Americans. Ambassador Oshima explained that he did not know the views of his Government but understood that for the last 20 years all plans of the General Staff had been worked out for an attack on Russia and were still directed towards such an attack. If success in that direction could in any way be expected, they would certainly attack. If, however, Japan did not do so now, she would certainly shortly launch an attack against the Anglo-Americans. The risk on this side was becoming ever greater through the constant increase of their Air Force, which, therefore, had to be beaten ever anew. The Japanese Air Force had for a long time been inferior at the fronts, now, however, it had again caught up with this advantage and was on its part superior to the enemy. Fundamentally, he could, however, say that Japan throughout the whole of its history had never yet remained on the defensive in war.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 520.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
hereby certifies.

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting
General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal,
and that as such he has possession, custody and control of
all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents
admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled
cause.

That the document to which this certificate is
attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic
document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the
course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified
as Exhibit USA 159.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence
as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military
Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary,
and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein
certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy
of said photostatic document in order to verify the
existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further
establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is
unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany this 16th day of April
1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal

Levin object: open. Statement went beyond what about - "arguments" - "quoter evidence at length" Keenan 55 PPS - others longer.

to quote from ^{speech made at a} Correspondent dinner - "speedy trial"

Maimed: PIX - Eja
Lohn Seat - re used Hand

Josephine Kilday

Japan

Well - "work" - "no precedent" + "understand" in Japan - "She saying methods of work in the same way"
A - page 31 - Overton name of art + Se -
A - page 31 - Overton name of art + Se -
A - page 31 - Overton name of art + Se -

Well "Among things of the time being worked in question the ability of a man like this"
1944/5 Royal Air Force + Chief -
1944/5 Central and Control Sect
Since May 1946 - actual Japan
From. prop. Japan.

TABLE OF
VIOLATIONS OF THE STATE FRONTIER OF THE U.S.S.R. BY THE JAPANESE
FROM 1932 TO 1945.

No.	Incidents	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
1	Frontier violations by the Japanese military (by units, groups of, single army-men)	-	15	45	130	62	69	124	387	59	136	229	414	144	36	Before 1937-321 cases From 1938 to 1945- 1529 men
2	Violations of the U.S.S.R. territorial waters by Japanese vessels	-	25	48	105	87	215	210	203	120	19	64	123	92	19	1350
3	From among those vessels were held up	-	11	-	-	-	79	22	9	18	7	36	39	23	19	263
4	Violations of the U.S.S.R. Frontier by Japanese aircraft	-	6	32	62	31	43	40	83	56	61	82	119	171	3	789
5	Smuggling of spies over to the U.S.S.R. territory (total of the held up)	-	10	125	108	69	208	1754	217	241	302	222	140	146	124	3666 men
6	Smuggling of counter-revolutionary literature over to the U.S.S.R. territory	-	-	-	22	19	37	176	222	55	150	61	129	113	-	Before 1940-431 cases From 1941 to 1944- 453 pieces
7	Captivity of Soviet citizens	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	4
8	Transfer of bands on to the territory of U.S.S.R.	14	-	-	1	1	4	19	14	4	2	-	2	5	2	68
9	Seizure of the Soviet territories	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
10	Opening fire at Soviet territory citizens, borders detachments, vessels, etc.	-	19	51	46	36	51	61	104	65	24	24	24	39	7	551
11	Our losses: (Killed)	(7	-	1	4	10	6	40	12	-	1	2	-	-	-	83
	(Wounded)	(3	-	2	1	18	-	58	25	-	11	-	1	1	-	120
12	Taking photos of our territories	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	36	10	-	-	-	-	-	72

Note: Under 1 the number of cases but not of individuals is indicated up to 1937. Beginning from 1938 to 1945 the number of individuals that violated the state frontier is indicated.

February 20, 1946

Peoples Commissariat for
Home Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
Chief of the Frontier corps Lieutenant-General Stakhanov.