Record of Proceedings

of the

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan

The United States of America, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, the Republic of France, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines

-Against-

ARAKI, Sadao; DOHIHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIRO-TA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KAYA, Okinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuniaki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MINAMI, Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi; OKAWA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHI-GEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATO-RI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teijchi; TOGO, Shigenori: TOJO, Hideki; UMEZU, Youshijiro;

-Accused-

Official Court Reporters

Jack Greenberg, Chief Fred T. Abram James F. Barton Antoinette Duda Samuel Goldberg Robert H. Morse John J. Smith Daphne Spratt Elvira Whalen Julian Wolf Lorraine Yelden

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EXHIBITS

Pros. No.	Def. <u>No.</u>	Description	For Ident.	In Evidence
474		Supplement to exhibit No. 469, balance sheet of Comm. of Conservators for Closed Institutions		5499
475		Report by the Japanese Government on the Burma- Thailand Railway		5513

1	Friday, 13 September 1946
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4	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5	FOR THE FAR EAST Court House of the Tribunal
6	War Ministry Building Tokyo, Japan
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8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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14	Appearances:
15	For the Tribunal, same as before.
16	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
17	For the Defense Section, same as before.
18	
19	
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21	(English to Japanese and Japanese
22	to English interpretation was made by the
23	Language Section, IMTFE.)
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THE MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session. THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comvns Carr.

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MR. COMYNS CARR: My friend, Mr. Hauxhurst, has an explanation for which the Court asked two or three days ago, which he is in a position to supply now. And, if it is convenient for the Court, it would be quite convenient for me that he should intervene for a few minutes with that explanation.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hauxhurst.

MR. HAUXHURST: If the Tribunal please, the additional information to enlighten the Court on the figures of exhibit 469, which was under consideration last Tuesday, as far as they are available have now been obtained by me. In that connection, if it please the Tribunal, I would like to introduce into evidence prosecution's exhibit with the next number for the purpose of showing the explanations which I expect to make with reference to exhibit 469.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms. CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document supplementing exhibit 469 will receive exhibit No. 474.

(Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit No. 474 was received in evidence.)

MR. HAUXHURST: In connection with the securing of these certificates from the Chairman of the Committee for Closed Institutions in Japan, Mr. W. N. Rogers, Assistant Chief of the Liquidation Branch, Finance Division, who is acting under a SCAP directive dated September 30, 1945, has asked me to say that these certificates are made only from such records as the Committee of Conservators for the Closed Institutions have in their possession in Tokyo, Japan; and that the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions had nothing to do with the operations of the Central China Development Co. Ltd. or the North China Development Co. Ltd. prior to the issuing of this directive,

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This exhibit consists of two certificates, one by Mr. SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Committee, certifying to the balance sheets of the Central China Development Company and the North China Development Company as of March 31, 1945. In view of the fact that the figures which were in exhibit 469 can be easily explained by following the balance sheets, I would ask your attention to the balance sheet of the Central Chima Development Co. Ltd.

The first item on the Assets side, "Investment and Loan account" of 4 billion, 971 million, 713 thousand, 250 yen is divided into three parts: Investment in subsidiaries, 144 million, 61 thousand, 390 yen; that item appeared in exhibit 469 in exact figures. The next two, loans and advances, which aggregate 4 billion, 827 million, 651 thousand, 860 yen, is the figure that also appeared in exhibit 469.

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On the liability side of the Central China Development Company, at the top of the page, appears "China Development Company debenture account, ¥ 352,600,000.00." That was the item that the Court was inquiring about.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hauxhurst, you told us that these were loans by the companies, and we asked you to ascertain where the companies obtained the funds from which the loans were made. That is all we want you to explain, if you can do so from this document.

MR. HAUXHURST: I can, sir. On that debenture account just referred to, 334 million, 600 thousand yen was sold in Japan. In the next item, if the Tribunal please --

THE PRESIDENT: Do not read **any** more long figures if you can avoid it. You can use the expression "four billion odd," or something like that.

1	MR. HAUXHURST: The next item, "Borrowing
2	account" of five billion yen.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better make
4	a statement or write out a statement, Mr. Hauxhurst,
5	and give it to us this afternoon. Make it as brief
6	as possible and avoiding long figures.
7	MR. HAUXHURST: I could make this one
8	explanation.
9	THE PRESIDENT: My colleagues, who have
10	been reading the document, say that on its face it
11	indicates the source of these moneys. If we need
12	further assistance, we will let you know, Mr. Haux-
13	hurst.
14	MR. HAUXHURST: Thank you.
15	THE PRESIDENT: Do you take the view I
16	do not know whether you do or not that on its
17	face the documents disclose the source of the loans?
18	MR. HAUXHURST: Yes, sir, except that there
19	are certain items, for instance, overdrafts of
20	thirteen billion dollars, that they do not have the
21	information here in Tokyo because the North China
22	Development Company was located in Peiping, and they
23	do not have the figures available. There are certain
24	items
25	MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, on the part of

the defense, on the first part of this certificate 1 it shows the custody of the original records that 2 this is taken from is only a partial group of orig-3 inal documents, that some of them have been de-4 stroyed; but I think the defense will agree that 5 in the bottom part that the question the Court was 6 deciding on that first page of where the money that 7 they loaned came from, a large quantity of it has 8 9 been borrowed from the banks as set out in the last 10 paragraph thereof: started borrowing accounts, 11 Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank of 12 Japan.

MR. HAUXHURST: May I leave two figures
with the Court, taken as summarized from exhibits
471 and 470: that in China, 419 business bodies
plus the investment of the Japanese Government in
these two companies amounted to round figures of
298 billion yen, and in Manchukuo, 18 billion yen,
a total of 316 -- 317 billion yen.

I wish to thank the Tribunal for this privilege and to say that that will close any further testimony on this phase of the case unless the Court should require further information which we will be very glad to furnish.

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MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, we believe that

1	the prosecution should have placed more material on
2	the exports from these areas into Japan, or the im-
3	ports into Japan from either side of the ocean, to
4	show the relationship between the amount being re-
5	ceived and the amount of capital investment going
6	in as shown by the imports. I believe that would be
7	very material, and defense will try to bring that
8	out.
9	THE PRESIDENT: Well, if it be material,
10	the balance sheet reveals that most of the money
11	nearly all of the money loaned by the companies
12	was borrowed in China, and it suggests Chinese funds
13	are the source of the loans. That can be corrected
14	by the defense later if they have the material.
15	Mr. Carr.
16	MR. COMYNS CARR: When the Tribunal ad-
17	journed last night, I was reading exhibit 473, and I
18	was about to read a portion of it on page 10. I
19	think it is clear that this is one of the replies
20	to the demand for information on page 3 which I read
21	yesterday and which one of my friends pointed out to
22	me is dated July 29, 1944. The document I am going
23	to read is undated but bears the receipt stamp
24	"October 4, 1944."
25	THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

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MR. FURNESS: I would like to inquire from the prosecution whether or not these documents which are being introduced, document 1810-A, are part of a general file or whether they purport to be all the documents dealing with this particular subject.

MR. COMYNS CARR: The answer to my friend's ouestion is that they are part of a large file obtained from the prisoner of war information bureau. We have not been able to find on that file any other documents bearing on this particular matter.

MR. FURNESS: I make inquiry, Mr. President, because the certificate or statement of source and authenticity refers to the file, "Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam," consisting of 572 pages, dated February 3, 1944, which is a date prior to the date of any of the documents which are now being referred to.

THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution should make the whole file available to the defense, if the defense so desire.

22 23 NR. COMYNS CARR: We have not the slightest 23 objection. Indeed, I was going to suggest it myself. 24 Now I propose to read the document.

"From: Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in Siam.

"To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information 1 2 Bureau. 3 "Subject: Information re British prisoners 4 of war in Burma. 5 "I am sending you a report regarding the 6 facts A and B in Item No. 1 of the British protest 7 as stated in the Prisoner of War Supply No. 36. 8 "This matter concerns the sacrifice of the 9 administration of the prisoners of war for strategic 10 reasons and contains no material for refutation against 11 the enemy protest. 12 "Item following 'C' has no relation to us. 13 "Branch Camp No. 3 was opened in Burma 14 September, 1942 to intern 9,535 prisoners of war 15 transferred from Java. Branch Camp No. 5 was opened 16 in January, 1943 to intern 1,946 prisoners of war. 17 These camps are under the command of the Fifth Railway 18 Regiment and the prisoners of war were engaged in 19 constructing a railway between Burma and Siam. At 20 that time, provisions and rations were scarce. Quar-21 ters and establishments were poor and medical facil-22 ities were inadequate. Moreover, for strategic 23 reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by 24 August, 1943, and the work was pushed forward at a 25 terrific pace, with the result that many prisoners

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of war became ill and many died, as per attached sheet.

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"Following the opening of the railway to 3 traffic in October, 1943, all prisoners of war in 4 Burma were concentrated in Kanchana, Buri, Nonbodog 5 6 (phonetic) and Termacam, except a few who were to 7 assist the Railway Unit. Both the guarter facilities 8 and provisions have been improved at present and both 9 the number of patients and deaths have decreased considerably." 10

11 And then follow two attached tables of 12 figures. The first is described as "Prisoner of 13 War Patients during the period between January, 1943 14 and July, 1944. (Investigated by Siam Prisoner of 15 War Camp.)" It purports to give for each month the 16 total number of prisoners of war employed, the number 17 of patients in Siam and their ratio to the total 18 number employed, the number of patients in Burma and 19 their ratio to the total number employed, and then 20 in total the number of patients and their ratio to the 21 total number employed. I will only call attention to 22 the first and last columns, the percentage of the 23 total number employed, who on their own showing were 24 patients or sick, in 1943, varied from 63.2% to 79.4%. 25 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

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1	MR. FURNESS: I would like to point out to
2	the Court that that figure is obviously an error, an
3	addition to the two ratios and is not a ratio of the
4	total number of those employed.
5	MR. COMYNS CARR: My friend has not under-
6	stood the scheme of these figures. The column for
7	the ratio in Siam is the ratio of the sick persons in
8	Siam to the total number stated to be employed not
9	only in Siam but in Burma as well. In the same way,
10	the ratio given for Burma is the ratio of the sick in
11	Burma to the whole number employed. It is natural,
12	therefore, that the final figure in the last column
13	should be arrived at by adding the two ratios together.
14	It will be important to note that the worst month of
15	all was the month of October, 1943.
16	
17	CYRIL HEW DALRYMPLE WILD,
18	called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
19	resumed the stand and testified as follows:
20	DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
21	BY MR. COMYNS CARR:
22	Q Now, Colonel Wild, have you any comment to
23	make on that table of figures? Does it seem to you
24	to be approximately correct in accordance with your
25	experience?
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correc	t.							

Q Can you tell us whether in this report which is made by the Siam Prisoner of War Administration, the total figures given by him include F and H Forces which were under the Malaya Prisoner of War Administration?

A I think that they do because I do not believe that the total number of prisoners of war went in excess of fifty thousand during 1943.

Now, will you look at the next table, No. II.
I need only ask you about the totals at the bottom,
which purport to show the total number of deaths in
Siam as 6,500, in Burma as 1,246, and in total,
7,746. What have you to say to those figures?

A It is quite clear to me that the total figure of the deaths in Siam is an understatement.

O If it does not purport to include the figures for F and H Forces, you told us yesterday, I think, the deaths there would add another four thousand; is that right?

A Correct.

Q It would still leave it about four thousand under the figure you gave us yesterday of sixteen thousand?

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. 1	A Yes, it would.
2	Q Are you sure that all the deaths were
3	actually reported in the way you described yesterday?
4	A Certainly, in all areas where I was in Siam.
5	MR. COMYNS CARR: Now would the Tribunal
6	kindly turn back to page 7 of this document, which is
7	the last in order of dates and which is the reply of
8	the Chief of Staff of the Southern Army to the same
9	demand for information as the last one. (Reading):
10	"Dated 23 October 1944.
11 .	"From: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army.
12	"To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information
13	Bureau.
14	"Subject: Information re treatment of
15	British prisoners of war in Burma.
16	"I send you a report regarding the subject
17	mentioned above by the Prisoner Supply No. 36 dated
18	July 29, as I have received the following report:
19	"Dated 6 October 1944
20	"From: Commander of the Southern Army Field
21	Railway Unit.
22	
23	"To: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army.
24	"Subject: Report re British prisoners of
24	war in Burma.
2)	"I am sending you a report in reply to 'I'

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DIRECT

SAN 3 Secret No. 336 concerning British prisoners of war in Burma (districts allotted for the construction of railway connecting Siam with Burma.)

"1. The number of patients and deceased 4 5 prisoners of war who were engaged in the construction 6 of the railway connecting Siam and Burma are as in 7 Tables I and II. The prisoners of war include both 8 British and Dutch and there is no way to investigate 9 the British prisoners of war separately. For stra-10 tegic reasons the completion of this railway was 11 most urgent. Since the proposed site of the railway 12 line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food provisions 13 and medical supplies were far from adequate and much 14 different from normal conditions for prisoners of 15 war.

16 "During the rainy season of 1943, transportation 17 was frequently interrupted and both Japanese soldiers 18 and prisoners of war were obliged to put up with much 19 hardship. The Japanese army Medical Corps tried in 20 vain to stem the violent outbreak of malaria and sick-21 nesses of digestive organs. However, with the opening 22 of the said railway in October, 1943, both the number 23 of patients and deaths diminished with the completion 24 of provisions and facilities.

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"2. I know nothing about the insulting of

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1	British prisoners of war in Moulmein since Moulmein
2	is out of the work area."
3	BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)
4	Q Colonel Wild, what do you say about the
5	efforts there alleged of the Japanese Army Medical
6	Corps to stem the violent outbreak?
7	A I saw no signs of them.
8	Q And what do you say about the suggestion that
9	both Japanese soldiers and prisoners of war were obliged
.0	to put up with much hardship?
.1	A That is true in the sense that being in the
12	Siamese jungle in the monsoon is not pleasant for
13	anyone. In fact, there are many hardships, but these
14	hardships were not equally shared because the Japanese
15	had many facilities for overcoming them.
16	MR. COMYNS CARR: Now I desire to tender in
17	evidence prosecution's document No. 1509.
18	THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.
19	MR. FURNESS: Before we leave exhibit No. 473
20	I would like to ask that the translation be checked.
21	I have already talked to the Language Section and they
22	say there is room for controversy and I therefore ask
23	that it be checked and referred to the arbiters in
24	accordance with the rules of the Court.
25	THE PRESIDENT: We direct it be checked.

1	This is a report by the Japanese Government
2	on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Admitted on the usual
3	terms.
4	MR. COMYNS CARR: I should have said No.
5	1509-A, I am told.
6	CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7	No. 1509-A will receive exhibit No. 475.
8	(Whereupon, prosecution's exhibit
9	No. 475 was received in evidence.)
10	MR. COMYNS CARR: This was a document pre-
11	pared by the Japanese War Ministry immediately after
12	the surrender of Japan and forwarded by them on the
13	19 December 1945 to the Supreme Commander, but prepared
14	of their own motion and not on demand. I need not
15	read the whole of it today at all events and there
16	can be no controversy about the translation because
17	the Japanese and English versions were supplied to-
18	gether by the Japanese War Ministry. There are,
19	however, in the English version, as supplied by them,
20	one or two mistakes in date which I will correct.
21	There are references in it to orders by Imperial
22	General Headquarters and I should like to state now
23	that it will be the prosecution's case that' the
24	following accused were members of that body at the
25	material dates: TOJO, KIMURA, SATO on the military

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1	MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): Reading now
2	the first half of page 3:
3	(Reading):
4	"1. The so-called brutal treatment of
5	Allied prisoners of war during the construction of
6	the Siam-Burma Railway shall be divided into two
7	categories; (1) Misconduct in the form of direct
8	cruelty to the prisoners of war (the cases known as
9	maltreatment of prisoners), and (2) incidents involv-
10	ing a considerable number of deaths from illness
11	among the prisoners during the work. Cases coming
12	under the first category shall be dealt with as cases
13 14	of ordinary maltreatment of prisoners, whereas the
15	unforturnate incidents coming under the second were
16	caused under the circumstances that were unavoidable
17	during the waging of war. It should, therefore, be
18	noted that there is a distinct difference in charac-
19	ter between cases(1) and (2).
20	"2. In the present report, a plain state-
20	ment will be made of the actual state of affairs and
22	of the treatment of the prisoners of war which have
22	led to the comparatively large number of deaths from
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sickness during the construction of the railway under (1).

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1	"Under Part 1 of this report the protests
2	made by the Allied Powers will be dealt with; under
3	Part 2 a description will be given regarding the in-
4	vestigations conducted into general affairs relative
5	to the prisoners' treatment and the special cases of
6	those under protest, and finally Part 3 will give the
7	measures taken by the Japanese authorities in respect
8	to the foregoing (2) (judicial decisions).
9	"With regard to cruelty directly inflicted
10	on prisoners under (1), no data are available in Tokyo,
11	and liaison with the Japanese troops on the spot is
12	at the moment virtually impossible, for which reason
13	the cases under (1) are excluded from this report. Ac-
14	cordinly it is hoped that inquiries will be made on
15	the spot by the Allied Powers in respect thereto."
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1	MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): Then I need
2	not read the next one and a half pages, but I come
3	down to the middle of page 5.
4	(Reading): "Tentative Translation of the
5	Oral Message dated July 4, 1944 from Swiss Legation,
6	Tokyo.
7	"By the letter dated September 15, 1944"
8	'1944' should be '1942', correct date "addressed
9	to His Excellency General Hideki TOJO, the then
10	Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by the letter dated
11	December 9, 1944" '1944' should be '1942' "to
12	His Excellency Masayuki TANI, the Swiss Minister had
13	the honor to communicate the apprehensions which the
14	British Government entertained as to the maltreatment
15	accorded the prisoners of war at the Rangoon Camp.
16	The London Government furnished, at the same time,
17	a certain number of detailed facts relative to the
18	same treatment.
19	"By letter No 33/C R., dated February 1945"
20	'1945' should be '1943' "His Excellency Foreign
21	Minister answered to the Swiss Minister that the
22	facts as mentioned on the above letter did not exist.
23	"The Swiss Minister never failed to convey the
24	contents of this letter to his Government in behalf
25	of the United Kingdom Government.

DIRECT

1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):
2	Q Colonel Wild, was it true that the monsoon
3	began earlier than usual in that year?
4	A I believe it was the usual time.
5	Q Was that a subject of discussion between
6	yourself and the Japanese officers with whom you
7	had to deal on the spot?
8	A On information we had from officers who
9	had been in Burma and Siam before the war, we warned
10	the Japanese again and again that the monsoon was
11	about to break.
12	THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
13	fifteen minutes.
14	(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
15	taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
16	were resumed as follows:)
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1	"The Swiss Legation has the honor to
2	acquaint the Minister of Foreign Affairs" that
3	is to say, the accused SHIGEMITSU, "with the fact
4	that the British Government has, in a new communi-
5	cation made the following request to the Imperial
6	Government for information as regards the treatment
7	of the prisoners of war in Burma.
8	"'1. First complaint concerns area of Moulmein
9	and falls under three headings:
10	"A. Notifications: According to postcards
11	printed by the Japanese Authorities, about 20,000
12	British and Allied prisoners of war are detained in
13	or near Moulmein. Transfer of prisoners of war to
14	this camp has never been notified; and it is believed
15	that capture of many prisoners of war now in this and
16	other Burmese camps has also never been notified.
17	Nor has any notification been received of numberous
18	deaths that are known to have occurred there.
19	"B. Conditions: Conditions under which
20	prisoners of war in Moulmein camp are detained are
21	known to His Majesty's Government to be at least as
22	bad as, if not worse, than those which existed in
23	Thailand (compare the letter of the Swiss Minister
24	to His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, dated 5 July
25	1943).

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"During October and November 1942, prisoners 1 of war in Moulmein itself are known to have died at 2 rate of approximately 10 per diem; the principal 3 cause of death being dysentery. In other camps ad-4 ministered by the Japanese authorities in or near 5 Moulmein an even more appalling rate of mortality 6 has occurred amongst prisoners of war working on 7 that Burmese railway. These deaths are direct and 8 inevitable result of conditions in camps and in 9 particular of the wholly inadequate rations provided 10 by the Japanese authorities, of the latter's failure 11 to provide medicines or equipment in hospitals, of 12 almost complete lack of adequate clothing or even 13 14 footwear and of severity of labor exacted from 15 prisoners of war. 16 "C. Exhibition of prisoners: In February 17 of 1944, 25 prisoners of war were paraded through the 18 town of Moulmein. They were in an emaciated condition 19 and were forced to carry notices in Burmese stating 20 that they had recently been captured on the Arakan 21 front (which was not the case.) They were further 22 held up to ridicule and contempt by a Japanese officer 23 who accompanied the parade. Such proceeding are 24 clearly contrary to honorable standards of warfare 25 and unworthy of a nation calling itself civilized,

DIRECT

1	apart from being a breach of Article 2 of the Pris-
2	oners of War Convention.
3	"Letter dated December 4 1944 from Swiss
4	Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs again
5	SHIGEMITSU (Protest by British and Australian
6	Governments) Tentative Translation of the Letter
7	dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Mini-
S	ster of Foreign Affairs.
9	"I have the honor to acquaint Your Excell-
10	ancy with the fact that the British and Australian
11	Governments have requested my Government to convey
12	the following communication to the Japanese Govern-
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14	ment.
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"Some 150 Australian and United Kingdom sur-1 vivors from the Japanese transport steamship 'Rakuyo 2 Maru' torpedoed in South China Sea on September 12. 3 have reached Australia and Great Britain. Following 4 is a brief summary of the knowledge which has conse-5 quently come into the possession of His Majesty's 6 7 Governments in the United Kingdom and Australia regarding treatment of British and Australian prisoners 8 9 of war by Jepenese military authorities; all available 10 prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved 11 early in 1942 to Burma or Thailand. Australians were 12 sent by sea to Burma crowded into ships' holds which 13 had been horizontally subdivided so that ceilings 14 were no more than 4 feet high. Prisoners from the 15 United Kingdom were sent by rail to Thailand so 16 crowded into steel cattle trucks that they could not 17 even lie down during the journey. They were then 18 marched some 80 miles. All were sent to work on the 19 construction of a railway through primitive disease 20 infected jungle in Thailand and Burma. Conditions 21 under which all these men lived and worked were in-22 human; such accommodation as was provided gave little 23 or no protection against tropical rains or blazing 24 sun. Worn out clothing was not replaced and soon 25 many lacked clothing, boots and head covering. The

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only food provided was a punikin of rice and a small quantity of watery stew three times a day but work had to go on without respite whatever cost in human suffering or life. The inevitable result was a dreadful death rate, the lowest estimate being 20 per cent. These conditions continued until the railway was finished about October, 1943, when those not needed for maintenance work were moved to camos in Thailand and later to Singapore en route to Japan."

1	"The rescued men were on a ship which left	
2	Singapore early in September 1944. There were prob-	
3	ably 1300 United Kingdom and Australian prisoners	
4	of war on board. After she was sunk, the Japanese	
5	deliberately picked up all Japanese survivors but	
6	left the prisoners to their fate. Statements of our	
7	men constitute direct and unimpeachable evidence of	
8	the outrageous treatment by the Japanese of defense-	
9	less prisoners of war.	
10	"I add that I communicated to His Excell-	
11	ency Minister Suzuki in the letter dated November 18,	
12	that the rescued men from Gakuyo Maru according to	
13	British information, arrived in England and Austra-	
14	lia and that a public announcement would be given in	
15	both countries on the basis of the accounts of those	
16	men as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of	
17	war in Thailand and Burma."	
18	Then, "Part II MATTERS OF INVESTIGATION	
19	"General Outline	
20	"By order of the Imperial General Head-	
21	quarters, the preparations for the construction of this	
22	railway were commenced in June 1942 by the South	
23	Army with the view of using it as a ground supply	
24	route and a trade and traffic one between Thailand	
25	and Burma, being urged on by the proposal of the	

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outh Army and the construction work was virtually begun in November 1942 in hopes of completing it by the end of 1943. But while counter attacks, particularly bombings, of the British Indian Army rapidly became fierce and the situations in this area considerably serious since the end of the rainy season of 1942, our sea-transportation from Malay to Burma gradually became hard. As there could be found no 8 ground transport route for its substitute, it was 9 clearly estimated that, if the situations were left 10 as they were till the end of the next rainy season. 11 transportation to Burma would be almost entirely 12 interrupted and even the defence of the area, not 13 to mention positive actions, impossible and further-14 more the work itself quite difficult. For these 15 reasons the Imperial General Headquarters ordered 16 early in February 1943 to shorten the term of the 17 work by 4 months. With this the South Army, to-18 gether with the leading staffs of the General Head-19 quarters, urged the work on, taking the best possible 20 measures and the working troops also did their best, 21 so that the work made favorable progress for the time 22 being. However, as the rainy season earlier than 23 usual set in, in addition to the bad conditions in 24 jungles since April or March of 1943 which the Jan-25

enese Army hed never encruntered before, victims of the work gradually increased, not to sneak of the delay of scheduled work. Confronted with these bad conditions, the Imperial General Hegdquarters ordered at last to postpone the period of the work by 2 months in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence upon the operations in Burma, considering the general situations of Burma front at that time, and that the prospect of communication with Burma was becoming clear with the partial completion of the reilway and local employment of newly constructed roads and waterways peralleled with the reilway."

I will pause there.

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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now 1 resumed. 2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr. 3 BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued) 4 Colonel Wild, you were telling us that you 0 5 had warned the Japanese authorities in Siam with 6 whom you were dealing that the monsoon was about to 7 break, and I asked you what answer they gave to that. 8 From two Japanese officers on two separate A 9 occasions I had the same answer: "Not this year." 10 Now, with regard to the statement here that Q 11 in 1943 Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last 12 to postpone the period of the work by two months in 13 spite of the fact that this order had a grave influ-14 ence upon the operations in Burma, what do you say 15 about that? 16 A We were told --17 DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, is this an 18 inquiry -- is this asking for the witness' opinion? 19 THE PRESIDENT: He is just asking him to make 20 a statement of fact, whether there was any justifica-21 tion for the Japanese claim. Even if it involved 22 giving an opinion, it would be unobjectionable coming 23 from this witness. 24 From the time we arrived in our labor camps A 25

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in May, 1943, we were told again and again by the Japanese that the work had got to be finished by August. This was quite obviously a physical impossibility because my force alone had thirty miles, approximately, virgin jungle to cut through. Also, the railway itself, the lines, the tracks, had only reached Tasoa, which was a hundred miles to the south of us. From August onwards we were told by the POW Administration that the engineers had lost face because they had not finished the railway on time. From August the pressure was immensely intensified and the Japanese railway engineers appeared to be in a permanent rage with the troops working under them, and from that time onward the form of abuse used by the engineers toward the prisoners altered from saying that we were lazy to saying that we were sabotaging the Japanese war effort.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing now to read:

"It is not unnatural that a great many persons should be employed in such construction work in order to strengthen operation capacity. Though the South Army levied laborers on the spot and employed them in the work besides Japanese troops, it was so difficult to gather a great many laborers immediately that the South Army asked permission to employ prisoners of war in the work of the Imperial General Headquarters.

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Considering that the work was carried on in the rear 1 far away from the first front, and that the railway 2 would serve in the future as a trade route between 3 4 Thailand and Burma, the Imperial General Headquarters 5 complied with the request and sanctioned the employment 6 of prisoners of war. Then the forced construction 7 work was carried out in precipitous jungles speading 8 over 400 kilometers conquering natural hindrances such 9 as influence of bad weather, particularly that of the 10 rainy season and the environment injurious to health, 11 et cetera, and surmounting technical hindrances, such 12 as time-limit due to operational needs, imperfect pre-13 paration due to it, inadequate accomodations along the 14 Lines of Communication and inferior technical skill of 15 the Japanese Army. 16

"Though the Japanese Army did its best in taking the best possible measures conceivable at that time in order to improve the treatment of the prisoners of war cooperating with the Japanese trooms, laying stress on billeting, ration and health, many prisoners of war fell victim of the work at last much to our regret.

"We should like to declare the Japanese troops participated in the joys and sorrows of the prisoners of war and native laborers in the construction work,

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1	and by no means completed or intended to complete the
2	work only at the sacrifice of prisoners of war."
3	Pausing there or reading just the next
4	words:
5	"NOTE: The Director of construction cherished
6	the motto "Prisoners of war and laborers are Fathers
7	of Construction," and consequently endeavored to
8	improve the treatment of prisoners of war."
9	Pausing there, Colonel Wild, I am afraid if
10	I were to ask you to comment at large on those two
11	paragraphs it would take a lot of time, but would you
12	just deal with any special points arising there?
13	THE PRESIDENT: Is it worth while?
14 15	MR. COMYNS CARR: If your Honor thinks not,
16	I will pass on. (Reading)
17	"General outline of construction progress.
18	"Details of the Construction and State of
19	Affairs in the Earlier State (from June 1942 to the
20	middle of February 1943.)
21	"The preparations of the constructions are
22	summarized as follows:
23	"Route: About 400 kilometers from Nonpradoc
24	to Tambisaya, along the River Keonoi.
25	"Transportation capacity: About 3,000 tons
	a day to each direction.
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Period: Scheduled to complete by the end of 2 1943.

3 "Materials: Mainly to use the materials on
4 the spot and a part is transferred from the home
5 islands.

6 "Military strength: The Railway Inspection 7 Office, two railway Pegiments, the Railway Material 8 Fepot and some other auxiliary troops.

9 "Labor (auxiliary personnel): Laborers levied 10 on the spot and prisoners of war.

"In conformity with the above preparation items, 11 the South Army, setting about survey along the railway, 12 negotiations with Thailand, establishment of construc-13 tion bases, preparation of construction materials, 14 arrangements for laborers, survey of military geography 15 and sanitary arrangements, moved the railway units in 16 Burma to the construction bases one after another and 17 made them deploy. Thus it prepared for the construc-18 tion. 19

"As the negotiations with Thailand were concluded at the beginning of November of the same year, the order of the Imperial General Headquarters concerning execution of the railway construction was issued and soon after, in accordance with the above items the order concerning the construction was issued by the

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1 South Army."

1	South Army."	
2	Pausing there, the accused TOGO was Foreign	
3	Minister down to September 1, 1942. Continuing:	
4	"The Chief inspector of the Second Railway	
5	Inspection Office (staying in Bangkok) took command of	
6	the following units of which the South Army Railway	
7	Corps was composed. The 5th Railway Regiment (its base	
8	was in Tambisaya) was allotted the duty of construc-	
9	tion on the Thailand-side, and the 9th Railway Regiment	
10	(its base was in Kanchanaburi) that on the Burma-side.	
11	The main part of the 1st Railway Material Depot was	
12	deployed in Nonpradoc and the other part in Rangun.	
13	Thus the preparations made progress step by step, and	
14	virtual construction work was begun in December, comply-	
15	ing with the above mentioned orders.	
16	"The South Army Railway Corps.	
17	"The Chief Inspector of the Second Railway	
18	Inspection Office Major General Shimoda."	
19	I need not read the list of units. Continuing	
20	paragraph 5:	
21	"The Thailand Interment Camp, having finished	
22	preparations, cooperated in the construction work from	
23	the beginning by order of the South Army	
24	"Allotment of duties, business system, system	
25	of prisoners of war and outline of duties, concerning	

the construction are shown in Annex 1, 2 and 3. 1 "Allotment of Duties Concerning the Railway 2 Construction. 3 "Imperial General Headquarters. Its responsi-4 bilites were directions concerning the Railway Construc-5 tion. And its duty and business, negotiations with the 6 7 Ministry of War concerning estimate and materials; diplomatic negotiations through the Ministry of War; 8 9 orders concerning the railway construction (directives of the Imperial General Headquarters); to help supply 10 of materials necessary for the construction; direc-11 12 tions of the construction complying with the operational 13 needs; to decide whether the employment of prisoners 14 of war is appropriate. 15 "The South General Army. Chief Supervisor of 16 Railway Construction. To estimate and concentrate 17 military strength and labor necessary for the railway 18 construction. Supply, maintenance and sanitary arrange-19 ments for them. To make prisoners of war cooperate 20 with the construction units or to allot them to the units. Directions concerning the employment of 21 prisoners of war. Planning of the railway construction 22 To keep harmony between the railway construction units 23 and cooperating attached units. Maintenance of traffic 24 25 routes and waterways necessary for the construction.

1 "Then the Railway Inspection Office. Commander 2 in Charge of Railway Construction. Inspection survey 3 and construction of the route according to the rail-4 way construction plan. Employment of the railway units 5 and attached units. To make prisoners of war and 6 laborers cooperate with the railway units or to allot 7 them to the units. Directions concerning the employ-8 ment of prisoners of war. Negotiations with the Intern-9 ment Camp concerning the employment of prisoners of 10 war. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health 11 of prisoners of war. 12 "Then, Railway Regiment. Commander in charge 13 of Railway construction in the allotted district. 14 Construction of railway in the allotted district. 15 Employment of the allotted and cooperating prisoners 16 of war according to the directives of the commander in 17 charge of railway construction. Negotiations with 18 persons in charge of supervising prisoners of war. To 19 take care of billeting, maintenance and health of 20 prisoners of war. 21 "Then, Internment Camp. To assist and control the railway construction in the capacity of the super-22 viso of prisoners of war. They were also to make 23 prisoners of war cooperate. . . Negotiations with 24 25 the railway constrction units concerning the employment

of prisoners of war. Chiefly to take care of billeting maintenance and healf of prisoners of war and to request assistance to the units concerned. Execution of the business of supervising prisoners of war. "

1	Now, the other two annexes on pages 12-a
2	and 12-b I do not propose to read, but it is im-
3	portant to observe the chain of responsibility as
4	shown there, particularly the one on 12-b. That
5	shows direct chain of responsibility from the Super-
6	visor of the Internment Camp to the POW Intelligence
7	Bureau and through that to the Ministry of War, and
8	also from the Commander of the Railway Regiment, the
9	Railway Unit, through the Commander of the Southern
10	General Army to the Imperial General Headquarters.
11	I will omit the first part of page 13 and
12	begin at Section II. (Reading)
13	"State of Affairs in the Period during
14	which the Construction was urged on.
15	"From the middle of Feb. 1943 to the middle
16	of July, 1943.
17	"How and why the construction period was
18	cut short.
19	"Since the end of the rainy season of 1942,
20	the counter-attack on Burma of the British Indian
21	Army became so rapidly violent and the situations
22	in this area so serious; the British Army being
23	steadily reinforced with military strength and goods.
24	Besides, the only transport route by sea became so
25	dangerous as was almost interrupted by the enemy's

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disturbance both from the sea and air. Hence the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters keenly felt the necessity of completing the railway connecting Thailand and Burma and intended to urge the construction.

6 "Namely at that time transportation of 7 military strength and goods with which the Burma Army 8 Group was being greatly reinforced to cope with the 9 critical situations in Burma caused by the counter-10 attack of the British Indian Army, relied on the sea 11 route from Singapore alone. But in addition to the 12 shortage of shipping this route was extremely 13 menaced both by the enemy planes and submarines and 14 thus the prospects of transportation increasingly 15 became dark. Though we tried to cut a road from 16 Rohand to Moulmein via Mesot. it was unsuccessful 17 as too many trucks were required and the labor was 18 out of proportion to the effect. At last we faced 19 such plight as we had to rely upon forced supply 20 executed by small boats.

"This transportation by force could be barely executed by taking advantage of the rainy season and was expected to be available only till September 1943. Under the circumstance that suspension of the sea transport and general counter

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attack of the British Indian Army were expected immediately after the rainy season, a ground transport route for its substitute was absolutely necessary for the Japanese Army. Moreover, it was expected that unless it was completed by the end of the next rainy season, the Army group operating in Burma would come to a crisis and at the same time the construction of the railway connecting Thailand and Burma would become quite difficult.

"The Imperial General Headquarters, not to 10 mention the South Army, were much anxious about the 11 circumstance and discussed the counter measures 12 and tried to find a break in the deadlock. Finally 13 they could not but conclude that there was no other 14 way than to complete by the end of the rainy season 15 16 the railway connecting Thailand and Burma under construction at that time and intended to cut short 17 the construction period, having been driven to the 18 19 last extremity.

"Then, the Imperial General Headquarters consulted with the South Army, and being aware of many difficulties such as shortage of military strength, labor and materials, great amount of the work, destructive influence of the rainy season and unhealthy surroundings, yet both agreeing upon

1	speeding up of the work by all possible means and
2	shortening of the work, took necessary measures
3	respectively. Namely, estimating the whole amount
4	of the earth-work from the result of the survey
5	executed by that time and prudently examining the
6	military strength, labor and materials the Headquarters
7	lowered the construction guage (from 3,000 tons a day
8	in each direction to 1,000 tons) and as to military
9	strength, labor and material, took every measure
10	possible in the capacity of the Central office, ex-
11	pecting to shorten the construction period of 4
12	months and to complete the work by the end of
13	August 1943.
14	"They can be summarized as follows:
15	"To restore the 4th Battalion, the 5th Rail-
16	way Regiment in Kwantung to the home regiment. To
17	alter the demobilization schedule of the 4th
18	Auxiliary Railway Unit and to prepare for its allot-
19	ment to the railway construction units.
20	"To deliver 150 kilometers rails which are
21	under charge of the central office and reserved in
22	the south area, many rock-drills and a large quantity
23	of explosive.
24	"To despatch medical veterans in order to
25	intensify measures against malaria.

"As the tactical situations in East New 1 Guinea were critical at that time, and breakdown of 2 the fighting front in this area expected iminent. 3 4 quick reinforcement to the front of West New Guinea 5 and Banda Sea areas was being carried out; transpor-6 tation units, supply depots and airfield construction 7 units which could be diverted to this purpose, were 8 despatched or were en route to these areas. As to 9 laborers, they were insufficient to a certain degree, 10 owing to the necessity of building up self-support 11 industry on the spot caused by insufficient supply 12 to the South Army, airfield construction for de-13 fense and despatching laborers to the above diverted 14 units; shortage of labor was rising even in the 15 over-populated Java. Then the South Army, according 16 to the order to cut short the construction period 17 of the Thailand-Burma railway, diverted the following 18 units which had been by that time employed in urgent 19 operational duties to the railway construction, and 20 at the same time ordered that each sector commander 21 of Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Malaya and 22 Java districts should give assistance to the railway 23 construction, and took appropriate measures especially 24 in the systematic supply and maintenance of 25 laborers. As to prisoners of war, they were

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	transferred there all the way from French Indo-China
1	and Java, taking into consideration the above men-
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3	tioned situation. Thus we tried to increase labor
4	capacity.
5	"The 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit" and then
6	a list of units which I will not read.
7	"Two internment branch camps in Malaya.
8	(about 10,000 prisoners of war).
. 9	"A motor-car company and 300 trucks."
10	Q Pausing there. Colonel Wild, can you
11	tell us anything about the epidemic prevention and
12	water supply depot?
13	A I assume that they were units working
14	with the Japanese Army and not prisoners of war.
15	I never encountered them.
16	Q Did you ever hear of them?
17	A No.
18	Q And what about the field hospital of the
19	21st Division?
20	A That would be entirely the Japanese. None
21	of our men were in Japanese hospitals.
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MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read: "Transition of situations. Because of the arrival at the construction spot of the military strength, labor, POW's and construction materials reinforced according to the above measures, the work further progressed since the end of March.

7 "After Major General SHIMODA's death Major 8 General TAKASAKI succeeded him as the commander of the 9 railway construction, and arrived at the spot in the 10 middle of February of the same year, and the work was 11 being eagerly carried on as before.

"Contrary to our expectation, the rainy season
set in one April in Thailand and in the middle of
April in Burma, which influence upon the work and
supply were tremendous.

16 "At the same time, cholera which had been 17 prevalent in some areas of Burma, was spread over the 18 border line between Thailand and Burma, and simul-19 taneously with the setting-in of the rainy season, 20 became increasingly prevalent. June was its most prev-21 alent time when there broke out about 6,000 cases (of 22 which 1,200 were the POW's) of which about 4,000 23 proved fatal (of which about 500 odd were the POW's). 24 Thus many fell victim of the work in a short time. As 25 this fact inspired fear in the laborers on the spot,

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many fled away and even some cases stole out of a hospital. The situations, dangerous both from the viewpoint of epidemic prevention and the work itself, were brought about.

"As cholera was prevailing, the Headquarters not only disptached medical authorities there, but sent some staff officers in order to make them take necessary steps, and the South Army, also, often dispatched principal medical officers and some staff officers in order to cope with the situation: the construction units fulfilled their duties, overcoming unfavorable circumstances: the prisoners of war 12 earnestly cooperated with them." 13

Pausing there: Will you tell me. Colonel Q 14 Wild, first of all, about those figures as to cholera 15 deaths among prisoners of war? 16

If the figure of 500 fatal cases of cholera 17 A 18 refers to June only, I should say it was about correct. 19 If it is meant to be the total figure, it is a great 20 understatement because in F Force alone we lost 700.

21 Q What about the medical authorities from 22 headquarters and from the Southern Army?

23 I recall seeing a Japanese major going around, A 24 medical major going around one of the camps on one 25 occasion. But that was the only visit he paid to our

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Q Would this be a suitable point for you to tell us about Dr. Woolfe?

A We heard at the Niki Camp at the end of March that about twelve of our men were still at Konquita Camp. Konquita was the cholera camp which I mentioned earlier about thirty miles south of us. We, therefore, got permission from the Japanese to send Assistant Surgeon Woolfe, an Anglo-Indian, to Konquita. He found eight of the twelve men in a small tent. Four of them were suffering from cholera. They had had no food or attention from the Japanese for several days, and were lying in their own filth.

Woolfe paid three visits to the Japanese medical major whom I have mentioned whose hut was in that camp. He asked for medical supplies from quite a well-stocked dispensary there. All he was given was some disinfectant to wash his own hands with. He made a strong appeal to this Japanese medical major, saying that the men would die without medical attention. The Japanese major said, "It can't be helped; if they die, they die." Woolfe then tried to move these men to a neighboring Australian camp. He offered to pay for the transport out of his own money. This was refused. He then carried the men, one by one,

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and hid them at the side of the road. The Australians were then contacted and recovered the men whom they took to their camp.

I got this report verbally and in writing from Assistant Surgeon Woolfe immediately he returned from Konquita.

Q I might ask you this at this moment. You speak of paying for things out of your own money. What money did you receive, any of the prisoners of war receive?

A After we had been in Siam for four months we got officers' pay, and also pay for men who worked. With stoppages by the Japanese to pay for our accommodation and food and clothing, officers' pay worked out at about one-fifth of what they were entitled to.

Q And what about other ranks' pay? A They were paid for the days on which they worked.

Q In what currency was this paid?

A It was in hundred tical Siamese currency; hundred tical notes.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read: "On the other hand, as an emergency road for automobiles and the newly constructed railway were often destroyed and the bridges often washed away

because of the long heavy rain, the ground transportation was apt to be tied up, and as it was impossible to sail up the Keonoi to the upper reaches for one month, its rising being slow, we were frequently faced with a crisis.

"Particularly, the construction unit on the 6 Burma-side, having no parallel waterways, toiled and 7 moiled at the construction of a rain-tight road, by 8 9 which it could transport necessary materials. For this reason, the railway construction work was inevi-10 tably suspended for a while. The construction unit 11 on the Thailand-side, waiting the rising of the Keonoi, 12 13 made use of it and narrowly escaped starvation. At 14 that time though rations to units in the innermost 15 regions was below the standard owing to such circum-16 stances, yet considering the characteristics of the 17 prisoners of war food, scores of cattle were driven by 18 land in order to supply them with meat.

¹⁹ "The above-mentioned difficulty of transporta²⁰ tion caused delay of supply and gave rise to malaria,
²¹ endemic, and gastroenteric disorder, together with
²² malnutrition. Coupled with difficulty in medical
²³ supply, the number of the patients increased in spite
²⁴ of the toil of medical units.

"It is clear that the prisoners of war who

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1	were not used to wild life, would greatly suffer."
2	Q Pausing there: Just tell us about this
3	question of the River Keonoi, would you, Colonel Wild?
4	A The rivers rose when the monsoon started, and
5	our river was fully navigable up to Niki from May until
6	October.
7	MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:
8	"Towards the end of April, Major General
9	TAKASAKI, the commander of the railway construction,
10	caught malaria, and yet he continued to fulfill his
11	duty until he fell down on bed. The situations came
12	to the worst.
13	"The working units, however, endeavored to
14	fulfill their duty, overcoming all difficulties.
15	"How and why the period of construction work
16	was delayed by two months and state of affairs during
17	that period. (From the middle of July to October, 1943.)
18	"Confronted with the state of affairs above-
19	mentioned, the Imperial General Headquarters dispatched
20	the Director of Transportation and Communication and
21	members of the General Staff to the scene of construc-
22	tion work to observe the state of affairs there, and
23	came to the conclusion that if the forced work were to
24	be continued with the aim of completing the plan by
25	the end of August, nothing but unnecessary sacrifice

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would follow; and considering the general situations 1 of Burma front at that time, the prospect of communi-2 cation with Burma becoming clear with the partial com-3 4 pletion of the railway, and local employment of newly 5 constructed roads and waterways parallel with the rail-6 way, order was at last given to delay the completion 7. of the construction work by two months in order to 8 reduce victims, in spite of the fact that this order had 9 a grave influence upon the operations in Burma area. 10 Major General Ishida was newly appointed to the director 11 of construction for perfect realization of this scheme.

"Major General Ishida, the new director of construction, arrived at his post on the sixteenth of August 1943. He aimed at the completion of the work by the end of October, renewed the organization of the staff, endeavored to stimulate the morale, and was always in the van of the party, the main object of reorganization being in the innovation and improvement of the supervision of working conditions.

"He cherished the slogan, 'Prisoners of war and laborers are fathers of construction,' corrected the erroneous idea of 'mastership' prevailing among the officers and men, and was foremost in making personal inspection and improvement of the normal life of the prisoners of war."

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1	Q	Pausing there: Colonel Wild, did you ever
2	see Majo	or General ISHIDA at the time?
3	А	No, never. He was never in my area or any-
4	where in	n my vicinity.
5	Q	Did you come across any trace of an improve-
6	ment of	conditions of the prisoners of war between
7	July and	October 1943?
8	A	The worst months from the point of view of
9	treatmen	nt and driving of the men were August and
10	Septembe	r.
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18 19	Part .	
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1	MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:
2	"The rainy season which culminated in August,
3	gradually reduced the amount of rainfall, and the work-
4	ing party did their best for the completion of the work,
5	surmounting ever increasing difficulties in the inner-
6	most regions. The activities of the water line of
7	communications making use of the River Keonoi and the
8	strenuous efforts of the working troops and the coopera-
9	ting units in carrying on forced work favored the
10	coordination between the preservation of military
11	strength and labor (completion of supply work begun at
12	the ending of the rainy season in September at the ends
13	in the inner regions) and the execution of tasks.
14	"Thus, on the seventeenth of October, 1943,
15	the two railways, started from east and west, 415
16	kilometers in length, were joined together at Konkoiter
17	and the formal ceremonies for the opening took place on
18	
19	the 25th of the same month.
20	"Conditions after the completion of the Con-
21	struction (from Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1945).
22	"With the completion of the construction work,
23	the South General Army, in accordance with the general
24	situation at that time, took greatest care in restoring
25	the health of the prisoners of war, enlarged and
	improved the sanitary arrangement at Thai Internment
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Camp and endeavored to concentrate prisoners of war at salubrious quarters where billeting and supply were easily accessible, two branch camps of the Malay Internment Camps being merged to the Main Internment Camp in Singapore.

"The railway working troops cooperated in the concentration activities, rendered services in sending back invalid prisoners, in accommodating billet facilities, and employed not more than one thousand healthy prisoners in urgent and indispensable supplementary construction work, the rest being left with lessened labor. By special order of the Director of Construction, a monument was erected each in Thailand and Burma to console those departed spirits of the prisoners of war and ordinary laborers engaged in this construction work, a mass was held and their souls (deeply venerated in the fasion of Imperial Japanese ceremony.)"

19QDid you attend that ceremony, Colonel Wild?20ANo, but certain British and Australian prison-21ers of war were told to attend it.

Q What was their report when they came back?
A The average comment was, "If the Japanese
think they are going to get away with it after the war,
with this sort of humbug, they are very much mistaken."
MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing:

and the second

1	"The railway working troops also wheeled round
2	successfully into Burma, and from March 1944 on, the
3	remaining work was carried out entirely by a party
4	mainly composed of the 4th Special Railway Unit, and
5	part of the staffs of the Thai Internment Camp cooperated
6	in the remaining work while the main body tried to
7	regain their physical strength, only making preparations
8	for sending prisoners back to Japan.
9	"From that time on, thousands of prisoners of
10	war were employed for maintaining railway services until
11	the end of the war, being taken special care of the
12	preservation and improvement of their health.
13	"During this period, there were no small
14	Sasualties suffered by the Allied air bombing."
15	Passing over several pages to page 20, para-
16	graph 3, in the middle:
17	"Bad sanitary conditions. Malignant malaria
18	is prevalent in those regions where the construction
19	work was carried on. Morcover, such epidemics as
20	cholera, pest, small-pox, etc., are raging all the
21	year round. The influence of the rainy season and the
22	native laborers brought into these regions made worse
23	the sanitary conditions there.
24	"Another hindrance to be specially noticed is
25	the fact" oh, I need not read that. We have had it

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before. And then passing over to the middle of page 23:

"But with the rising of waters in the River 3 Keonoi since June, land traffic was superseded by 4 water traffic, the water line of communications was 5 stretched, and by the end of July, establishment of 6 the water line of communications was completed be-7 tween Pancon and Niike (270 km); on the other hand, 8 9 the Government of Thailand was urged to offer ships : from March on, ships were gradually gathered together 10 11 and by the end of July more than 700 tugboats and 12 1200 lighters were secured, by which critical situa-13 tion of supply could be entirely swept away.

14 "During this period, the activities in the 15 upper rapids of the Water Transportation Corps of the 16 Imperial Guard Engineer Regiment, the activities on 17 the water of the personnel from the company serving 18 on land and from the motor car company, the efforts 19 of the line of communication troops in the unified 20 employment of these activities, together with the 21 water transportation supply carried out by the intern-22 ment camp itself, enabled to discharge the duties of 23 supply work during the rainy season.

²⁴ "During the time when transportation and
 ²⁵ communication both on land and on water had been sus-

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pended, shortage of supply was locally covered by 1 sending and receiving stocks accumulated in various 2 parts of the inner regions. Special consideration 3 was given to the daily food especially the side 4 dishes, of the prisoners of war, and from the middle 5 of May on, herds of cattle were driven by land into 6 the inner regions every several days. This was suc-7 cessful and nearly one thousand of cattle were se-8 cured on the Thai side alone. 9

"On the Burma side, where there were no 10 waterways available, supply had been going on smooth-11 ly until the middle of April, but with the rainy season 12 13 setting in about that time, its influence was consi-14 derable, and in June, railway bridges and road bridges 15 on the Mezari and Winyau were swept away. The working 16 troops concentrated their efforts on relay inter-17 communication and maintenance of the road, held to the line of supply desparately and could barely con-18 19 tinue supply, but near Niike in the inner regions 20 motor trucks broke down one after another, the supply 21 was suspended and some of the troops were withdrawn 22 from that region. But with the rising of waters, 23 waterline of communications was stretched from the 24 side of Thailand and in July, supply could be made as 25 far as Niike.

	"As is evident from the above-mentioned
1	circumstances, difficulty of transportation in supply
2	arose from the influence of the rainy season, and dis-
5	tress existed in various parts of the inner regions.
5	All the Japanese working troops and a little less than
6	one third of the prisoners of war were suffering from
7	the influence. Details of supply for the prisoners
8	of war are given below.
9	"Japanese army stationed in Thailand and
10	Burma Army Group were responsible for supply to the
.11	internment camps, but since the establishment of line
12	of communications early in April 1943, the task of
13	supplying provisions was assigned to the railway unit.
14	"In supplying provisions to the prisoners
15	of war, special attention was paid for allotting fixed
16	rations in accordance with various prescriptions of the
17	law, and at the beginning of 1943 an addition of 50 gr.
18	in the supply of both staple food and supplementary
19	rations was decided upon by the South Army. Further-
20	more, provisions were revised and several times the
21	amount of the fixed rations for the POW's was in-
22	creased on account of their being engaged in heavy
23	labor.
24	"As is mentioned above, the branch intern-

"As is mentioned above, the branch internment camps situated innermost regions suffered from

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1	shortage of rations in the same degree as the Japan-
2	ese soldiers during the rainy season. In order to
. 3	facilitate the supply work at the ends, executed by
4	the internees themselves, the construction party de-
5	livered 30 motor trucks and scores of boats succes-
6	sive since the latter part of March 1943.
7	"Besides this, the internment camp had
8	about 50 motor trucks and about the same number of
9	boats, and was actively engaged in transporting
10	supplies."
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Greenbe	1	AFTERNOON SESSION
	2	The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
	3	1330.
rg	5	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
&	6	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
В	7	
art	8	CYRIL HEW DALRYMPLE WILD,
0	9	called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution,
n	10	resumed the stand and testified as follows:
	11	DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
	12	BY MR. COMYNS CARR:
	13	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.
	14	MR. COMYNS CARR: Might I mention to the
	15	Tribunal that I am not pausing at every statement
	16	which Colonel Wild might comment on or refute. Where
	17	he has already given evidence which is contrary to the
	18	statements in this document, I don't think it neces-
	19	sary for him to repeat that, unless there is some-
	20	thing special.
	21	I was at the bottom of page 24: (Reading)
	22	"(1) Accuisition in large quantity of sup-
	23	plementary rations, especially vegetables, was dif-
	24	ficult, and during the dry season they were liable to
	25	be spoiled while they were being carried a long dis-

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1	tance; while during the rainy season, they were al-
2	weys lacking owing to the difficulty of transmort-
3	stion. To cope with these situations, a great effort
4	was made to encourage growing of veretables so as to
5	be able to do without the supply of supplementary
6	rations, and considerable results were obtained in
7	this way. Fishing in the River Keonoi had to be pro-
8	hibited for a long time (from May to September) as
9	cholera was prevailing along its banks, which was a
10	prest hindrance to better nourishment.
11	"(j) Articles of luxury for internees
12	(butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, black tea, etc.)
13	were specially supplied by the South Army.
14	"(k) Share suits of clothes were supplied
15	by the South Army, but were not by any means enough.
16	"(1) The difficulties of supply work dur-
17	ing the rainy season were as above-stated. Enemy
18	ccunter-attacks in Burma with the end of the rainy
19	season could clearly be foreseen. Therefore, an army
20	group en route to Burma (two divisions, part of troops
21	under direct control of the Army, individual soldier
22	and civilian employee) marched along the railway under
23	construction from April to September 1943. It was
24	natural that the construction troops assisted them
25	with munitions and there occurred no small stortage

in the store of provisions.

and privations."

5,559 "To sum up, under the circumstances in that period, billeting and supply could not be anything but unsatisfactory, and both Japanese Army and prisoners of war were obliged to endure hardships

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DIRECT

1	Q Pausing there, Colonel Wild, what do you
2	say about this question of growing of vegetables
3	and fishing?
4	A The area that F force was in, there were
5	no men to grow vegetables even if we had been en-
6	couraged to do so because anybody who was anything
7	approaching fit was taken out to work on the rail-
8	way. As regards fishing, the Japanese occasionally
9	threw hand grenades into the river Keonoi, and our
10	men were sent in to swim for the fish.
11	Q Who got the fish?
12	A The Japanese used to give one of them
13	usually to the swimmers.
14	Q What about these articles of luxury?
15	A We got tea at the regular issue, sugar
16	very occasionally; but the butter, cheese and coffee
17	were quite unknown.
18	MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)
19	"Billeting.
20	"Billeting facilities in Thailand were
21	sqmewhat different from those in Burma.
22	"On the Thei side, the working party had
23	the advantage of utilizing the watercourse for
24	supply during the rainy season, and employed the
25	method of deploying on the whole line and of

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1	working all along the line simultaneously; curtail-
2	ment of the construction period, however, necessi-
3	tated quick deployment in the inner regions, and
4	there was no time to build enough cottages (a kind
5	of hut made of bamboo poles and 'chaku' roofplant
6	called nipper-house to billet the working party.
7	Tents were generally used, only key points of con-
8	struction having billeting facilities. The South
9	Army, therefore, issued almost all the campaign
10	tents on hand to the construction party, to acco-
11	modate nearly fifty thousand men, and afterwards
12	ten odd thousand for supplementary use.
13	"On the Burma side, consideration had
14	from the outset been given to the supply work
15	during the rainy season, and method of working
16	from the ends had been taken in order to steadily
17	push forward working sectors by gradually esta-
18	blishing supply from the starting point. Groups
19	of billating huts (nipper-houses) were built at
20	intervals of from 5 to 10 km, tents being some-
21	times used for carrying about during movements.
22	"The POW's in the Internment Camp,
23 24	following the example of the construction party,
24	built huts by themselves, and the construction party

cooperated with them when necessary. Considerable

working personnel were allotted for the work of the Internment Camp itself and for the improvement of its supervision and maintenance. (Attached Table I)

"Since May, after the setting-in of the rainy season, camp life proved defective: a wet pit was especially unwhosesome; every effort was made to raise floors and specied beddings were exchanged for new ones. At the same time, nipperhouses gradually took the place of tents. Only bembee poles could be obtained on the spot, roofplant (chaku) being imported from other districts.

"But the supply of chaku was not sufficignt owing to the difficulties of securing and transporting them in large quantities. Thus, nipper-houses were built almost everywhere excepting the inner regions about 100 km. along the line of construction. But oven those nipper-houses were not complete to bear the heavy rain coming down every day.

"In order to accomodate the marching troops, (into Burma) preparation were made for arranging resting places with tents (standard capacity 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity 500 men) were almost completed early in May. "These facilities were utilized by the

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
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1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):
2	Q Pausing there, die you see anything of
3	thece tents they speak of?
4	A We, ourselves, got certain amount of rotten
5	canvas pieces of tents which were used for roofing
6	material as there was no atap palm. One detached
7	party of ours of about six hundred men were accommo-
8	dated under canvas which they carried about with them.
9	Otherwise, I saw none except tented camps used by
10	the Japanese alone staging camps on the way up,
11	and there was a POW tented camp at Kanburi.
12	MR. COMYNS CARR: Resuming reading:
13	"Sanitary arrangements.
14	"Outline of Medical service.
15	"1. Taking into consideration the character-
16	istics of this construction work area, preservation
17	of health of the working party was a matter of great-
18	est concern, success of this railway construction
19	depending upon it. The South Army, therefore, at-
20	tached greatest importance to the service of sani-
21	tation, and, following the example of building a
22	canal at Panama, made reenforcement in sanitary
23	organization. The main body of the South Army Epi-
24	demic Prevention and Water Supply Corps, which was
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	the only standing epidemic prevention water supply

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corps throughout the South Area, was allotted the duties of service of sanitation; at the same time almost all the sanitary organizations under the direct control of the South Army were exhaustively concentrated and were placed under the control of the Director of Railway Construction.

"Moreover, necessary medical service corps were extracted from the army corps engaged in first line operations and were allotted to the medical organization. Considering the situation of the general operations at that time, this effort can never be underestimated.

"In taking care of the health of the prisoners of war, the system of the supervising organization of prisoners of war was mainly followed, and about 900 medical personnel of the Allied captives and some of the Japanese medical personnel were engaged in the service. About fifty-five invalids were in charge of one medical personnel, and this ratio was high compared with those of Japanese army (100 cases to one medical personnel attached to a unit) and ordinary working party (200-300 cases to one medical personnel). But the composition of sanitary corps belonging to the Internee camp was not suited to field

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maneuverability and could not be made to display its ability to the full.

"At the outset, the Thai Internment Camp was in cooperating relationship with the construct tion party, and the service of sanitation was being carried out by the corps itself, Japanese medical corps going to its assistance when necessary. But there arose the necessity of intensifying the general control of the medical service, and in July, 1943 this camp was placed under the control of the Director of Construction, after which unification of medical service was realized, resulting in the innovation of medical activities."

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DIRECT

1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):
2	Q Pausing there, Colonel, is there any
3	truth at all in all these statements about the
4	sanitary arrangements and the medical assistance
5	
6	provided by the Japanese?
	A None whatever that I saw, and I should
7	like to point out that some medical officers and
8	orderlies were invariably treated as ordinary
9	prisoners of war, which accounts for their lack
10	of field maneuverability.
11	MR. COMYNS CARR: Omitting paragraph 4
12	and continuing: (Reading)
13	"Why there was a difference in the number
14	of casualties between the POW's and Japanese Army.
15	"Japanese army, especially railway units,
16	were only about 4,000 in number, even when two
17	regiments were put together. Naturally enough
18	they were employed mainly for supervision of con-
19	struction work and in the delicate technical work,
20	POW's being mainly engaged in usual tasks.
21	"The result was that the decline of phys-
22	
23	ical strength on the part of the Japanese army was
24	not so remarkable as in the case of the prisoners
25	of war; this is why some differences is noticed
	in the figures indicating the results of medical

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1	activities under the same conditions.
2	"Compared with the Japanese, prisoners
3	of war were not so well accustomed to the primitive
4	life and had less power of resistance.
5	"Many cases of tropical ulcer occurred
6	on account of their dress (knee-breeches), which
7	accelerated their decline of physical strength.
8	"The number of the deaths among the POW's,
9	Japanese army and laborers are approximately as
10	follows:
11	Total Deaths
12	"POW's about 50,000 about 10,000 (20%)
13	"Japanese Army about 15,000 about 1,000 (7%)
14	"Laborers about 100,000 about 30,000 (30%)
15	"7. Colonel Kitagawa, Chief of the South
16	Army Railway Medical Corps, was killed by an aero-
17	plane accident while actively engaged in making
18	arrangements for the supply of medical materials."
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1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):
2	Q Now, pausing there, Colonel, is there
3	really any substance in this suggestion that the
4	Japanese were better suited to meet these hardships
5	than your men?
6	A I think that was successfully disproved by
.7	the Burma Campaign which followed.
8	Q What do you say about the dress of your men-
9	causing them to be exposed to tropical ulcer?
10	A It is true that the mistake was discovered
1 1	by the British Army that covering the knees was
12	better than wearing shorts in the jungle, but it is
13	a ridiculous remark here because men were wearing
14	nothing below the knees. They had no boots or
15	shoes or stockings.
16	MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please
17	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.
18	MR. LOGAN: The defense does not quite
19	understand the purpose of the prosecution in intre-
20	ducing a document, and we assume they vouch for its
21	credibility, and then examining the witness on the
22	stand concerning that document. They are, in effect,
23	anticipating a defense of all the defendants by so
24	doing. This matter should more properly be brought
25	out in rebuttal rather than on direct examination

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	such as this kind.
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2	MR. COMYNS CARR: This document is the con-
3	fession of the Japanese Army with regard to the
4	Burma-Siam railway. It also incorporates such ex-
5	cuses as they could think of. I rely upon the docu-
6	ment for the confession. I rely upon this witness
7	to destroy the excuses.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Objection overruled.
9	MR. COMYNS CARR: (Reading)
10	"1. Outbreak of cases and its counter-measures.
11	"(a) How malnutrition occured.
12	"In November 1942, after the prisoners of
13	war had begun their work, members of the South Army
14	Medical Corps were despatched to the scene of their
15	activity in order to inspect and further improve
16	their treatment in respect of supply and maintenance.
17	Increase of fixed rations was made (50 gr. both in
18	staple food and meat) and additional mosquito-nets
19	and blankets were delivered. But since the setting-
20	in of the rainy season, in May 1943, traffic was
21	sometimes suspended, and in the inner regions fixed
22	fations had to be reduced by half, while the con-
23	struction work was forcibly carried on. The work
24	made such rapid progress that the workers had no
25	leisure; either time or material was not found enough

1 to complete billeting facilities and sanitary condi-2 tions were anything but satisfactory. 3 "Under such unfavorable conditions, and as 4 a result of forced work, since the middle of 1943 de-5 cline of the physical strength of the POW's was 6 conspicuous, many cases of malnutrition appeared and 7 the number of deaths increased. Therefore, serious 8 cases were gradually transferred to the vicinity of 9 Bangkok to receive treatment. Those who were in a 10 stage of convalescence were assembled near Kanchana-11 buri, given small work and were allowed to recuper-12 ate there. For the rest, less amount of work was 13 allotted, as much ration as possible was provided and 14 every effort was made to restore their physical 15 strength. Thus in 1944, they gradually regained 16 their physical strength and the number of deaths 17 dwindled." 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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BY MR. COMYNS CARR: (Continued)

O Pausing there, Colonel Wild, did you ever see this increase in rations, both in staple food and meat, that is spoken of?

A One of our chief complaints was that our rations were always below, well below, any scale which we were supposed to be getting. The only increase of rations which occurred was when we got back to Kanburi in November, 1943.

> MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read: "2. How Cholera broke out.

"Prevention of acute infectious diseases, together with precautions against malaria, was a most painstaking task, and in order to prevent infection through water all the sanitation water filters available by the South Army were assembled in this construction area and they numbered 454 (including 7 motor-car filters).

"Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Section composed of one Allied medical officer and four noncommissioned medical officers and privates, equipped with a set of sanitation water filter (B or C) and considerable amount of epidemic prevention and emergency sanitary materials, were allotted to every working company of the Prisoners of War and every

DIRECT

1	necessary measure was taken for prevention, medical
2	examination and attendance. The headquarters of
. 3	the medical corps was at Kanchanaburi, and was active
4	in coaching the prevention, in the examination and
5	disinfection of bacteria and in other precautions.
6	"Every one of those who were going to the
7	construction area, was inoculated against cholera.
8	"Cases of cholera first broke out among the
9	local laborers on the side of Burma in November 1942,
10	and in spite of desperate effort to check it, cases
11	spread into Thailand across the frontier in April,
12	1943.
13	"At the time of its outbreak, the number of
14	cases among the natives swelled and shrunk with alter-
15	nating intervals until at last, since May, there
16	broke out cases among the Japanese and POW's. There-
17	fore, the South Army often dispatched medical per-
18	sonnel to the scene to coach prevention. Every working
19	party and sanitary organ did its best in prevention
20	activities, sometimes entirely suspending construction
21	work. At last, by the end of July, the plague quieted
22	down except in some quarters. Although more cases
23	broke out afterwards, they gradually dwindled away
24	and in October completely died down. In June staffs
25	of the medical Bureau in the War Department were

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1	dispatched to the scene.
2	"Outbreaks of cases by the end of June
3	1943 are as follows:
4	lst Period NovDec. 1943 43
5	2nd Period FebMar. 1943 48
6	3rd Period AprMay 1943 586
7	4th Period June 3d - June 30, 1943 2046
8	TOTAL 2723
9	"The grand total by August 10 was about
10	6,000, of which about 4,000 died. Among these
11	figures, about 1,200 are the cases of prisoners and
12	it is our greatest regret that about half of them
13	never survived.
14	"The main causes of such raging were:
15	"(1) Fugitives among the native laborers
16	suffering from cholera dispersed bacteria.
17	"(2) Cases broke out on the upper reaches of
18	the River Keonoi and infected the construction work
19	area.
20	"(3) Imperfect prevention instruction on the
21	part of civilian employee in charge of the POW's,
22	who was poor in the knowledge and ability and infer-
23	ior in the quality.
24	"(4) Difficulty of supplying epidemic prevention
25	materials due to pressed transportation.

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1	"It was largely due to the activities of
2	the Sanitary Organs that the epidemic died down in
3	comparatively short period and that great bursting
4	out could be prevented, in spite of the unfavorable
5	conditions under which they had been placed."
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.1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):
2	Q Pausing there, you dealt almost entirely
3	with I beg your pardon.
4	THE MONITOR: We have not finished reading
5	the translation yet.
6	MR. CONYNS CARR: Sorry.
7	Q You dealt generally with matters of cholera
8	and I do not want to repeat it, but what do you know
9	about these water filters which were supposed to have
10	been supplied?
11	A I did see one. It was permanently stationed
12	at Songkrai Bridge.
13	MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:
14	"3. How cases of malaria occurred.
15	"Greatest emphasis was laid on the preven-
16	tion of malaria in the service of sanitation. Malaria
17	prevention party was organized (composed of 341
18	officers and men, allotted at the ratio of one
19	party to 5,000 laborers) and allotted to each unit,
20	and was controlled by the South Army Epidemic
21	Prevention Water Supply Corps; every possible science and
22	technique was put into active use by them.
23	"The following five items were measures of
24	prevention.
25	"(a) To give complete knowledge and train-
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DIRECT

1	ing of malaria prevention.
2	"(b) To prevent biting of mosquitoes,
3	to prepare mosquito-nets and clothing, to fumigate.
4	"(c) To prevent the breeding of mosquitoes
5	and to exterminate them, drainage, oil-sprinkling,
6	cleaning, etc.
7	"(d) To take 45 dozes of sulpher-quinine
8	and 3 dozes of 'Plesmohin' internally per capita per
9	month; every Japanese, prisoner and native laborer
10	is required to take the same quantity.
11	"(e) Early discovery and separation of
12	the case and keeper of 'malaria protozoan';
13	"Doctor Kimura, Professor in the Research
14	Institution of Tropical Medicine, authority on malaria-
15	prevention, came to the assistance of this service
16	as a non-regular member of the staff of the South
17	Army.
18	"The ration per month of malaria cases
19	occurring during this construction work is as follows:
20	"Japanese Army 1-7%
21	"Prisoners of War 0-11%
22	"Local laborers 10-20%
23	"N.B. The ratio per month of malaria cases
24	occurring in New Guinea area rose to about 20%.
25	"As is shown above, the ratio of malaria

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cases occurring among the Japanese army is comparatively low, but by the end of the construction period, the ratio of the keepers of malaria protozoan among the Japanese had risen to nearly 100%, and only by internal use of dozes could some of the units prevent the attack of malaria. Generally speaking, the ratio of cases per month was about 4% throughout the Japanese and prisoners of war, which was a rather favorable indication compared with those of other theatres of war, and we may conclude that satisfactory results were obtained from the preventive measures." BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)

Q Pausing there, what can you say about that
list of malaria prevention methods?

Firstly, it is quite incorrect for the 15 A Japanese to suggest that they gave our medical officers 16 17 any knowledge or training. We had first class 18 medical specialists -- tropical medical specialists --19 among our officers and the Japanese notion as to 20 tropical hygiene was purely medieval. Eight-man 21 mosquito nets were issued in fairly large quantities to us after we had been in the jungle about two months. 22 23 They could not be used as the men were crammed 24 so closely together on the sleeping platforms. There 25 was nothing for the man to sleep on, so the mosquitoes

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came up through the sleeping platform and the thing
became a mosquito trap. There was no preventive
oiling of pools whatever, and lastly, it says here
that the Japanese were taking prophylactic dozes
of quinine and plesmohin, but there was never enough
to give preventive dozes to prisoners of war.

7 Q Have you any comment to make on the figures 8 given?

A In my own force, apart from the three
thousand who died, ninety-five percent of the survivors had malaria when they came out. The local
laborers in our area had a percentage at least as
high.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read: "4. Tropical Ulcer

"Tropical ulcer which was prevalent among
prisoners of war was incurable and we found difficulty
in its remedy. As a precautional measure, we made
war prisoners put on leggings made of bamboo and had
them wear boots. As a remedy permanganic acid salvarsan
were used. In addition to these measures, each unit
made ointment from lard by itself, and used it.

"Inert skin, bare legs and insufficient auxiliary medicine such as disinfectant due to inexperience of the Japanese Army etc. were the reasons

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why this disease was prevalent especially among
prisoners of war. Though we despatched medical veterans
to the infected districts and made them study it,
a complete remedy could not be found because of
inexperience of the Japanese Army."
BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued) :

Q Pausing there, what do you say about that?
A Well, the standard medical work of tropical medicine says of tropical ulcers, "This terrible disease
is common to white soldiers campaigning in the tropics,
to undernourished coolie labor and overdriven slave
gangs"; and we came into all three categories.

Q Is it true that it is incurable, or did your
 medical officers succeed in curing it when they were
 given a chance?

A They did cure them as long as the drugs and dressings which we brought with us held out. In fact, they cured me. But we had nothing in the later months except hot water for dressings, hot water for medicine and banana leaves as dressings. If we had had lard we should have eaten it.

MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing to read:

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"5. Other prevailing diseases. 1 2 "Generally speaking, coupled with mal-3 nutrition, many cases of dysentery, beriberi and 4 gastroenteric disorder occurred. Pestilence and 5 smallpox against which great precautions were taken 6 broke out fortunately only a little at the beginning 7 of 1943. 8 "As above mentioned, various diseases were 9 so prevalent that the percentage of the war prisoners 10 in service was from sixty to seventy percent in the 11 average. But it fell to forty percent in the inner-12 most and most unhealthy areas. On the contrary about 13 eighty percent was maintained in good controlled and 14 healthy areas. Of about fifty thousand war prisoners. 15 about three thousand were in hospital on 8th July, 16 1943. 17 "(6) State of occurrence of war prisoner 18 cases is shown in Annex 2. 19 Supply of medical supplies. "3. 20 "The South Army layed great stress on 21 supply of medical supplies to these construction 22 units and tried to prepare abundant malaria medicine 23 and materials for epidemic prevention. Though quinine 24 which was produced in Java was sufficiently supplied 25 and materials for epidemic prevention, especially

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sanitary water-filters, were nearly sufficient, the 1 South Army suffered from shortage of medical supplies 2 in general, as the other medical supplies were all 3 4 transported from the home islands and quantity supplied 5 from the central office to the South Army was about 6 50,000 boxes (about 1700t) in 1943 and about a half 7 of 1943 in 1944, of which 20 percent were lost as 8 result of sinkings. The Bangkok Field goods depot 9 eagerly endeavored to supply the construction units; 10 nevertheless it could not supply in so large quantity 11 as was expected because of insufficient stocks and 12 difficulty of transportation. The South Army ordered 13 that ratio of supply to the war prisoners and to the 14 Japanese troops should be equal.

"4. To sum up, we took every measure possible under the circumstances and did our best to maintain the health of the prisoners of war. The main reasons why such a miserable result was brought about in spite of our efforts are as follows:

"(1) As a result of the forced construction work, various defects were brewed. Especially, the work was commenced without sufficient sanitary arrangements.

"(3) In addition to bad conditions of the roads, traffic during the rainy season was tied up, so that

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 supply was very difficult and the standard of ration fell down. "(4) Mixing of the native laborers who had no knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks. "5. Main body of foremen were Koreans and their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygien could not be thorough. "It is quite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
 "(4) Mixing of the native laborers who had no knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks. "5. Main body of foremen were Koreans and their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygiend could not be thorough. "It is quite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
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 "It is quite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
⁹ the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and
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many invalids and deaths occurred."
11 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:
12 Q Pausing there, in the first place I will
13 come to ask you about the figures given when we come
14 to the table at the end of the document, but about
15 this statement that the medical supplies to the war
prisoners and the Japanese troops were to be equal,
17 what do you say?
A Japanese medical inspection rooms were gen-
19 erally reasonably well stocked and adequate for the
needs of their own men. We were getting no drugs.
21 (Reading):
"Chap. III - Outline of the Supervision and
Employment of the Prisoners of War.
"Sect. I - How the War Prisoners became to
25 be employed.

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"1. It is natural that the labor which is 1 primary constituent of this building requires an 2 enormous number of the assistant workers, in addition 3 to the troops. Therefore, though the local laborers 4 (Thailanders, Malayaians, Burmese, Chinese, Javanese, 5 Annamese) were raised, it was very difficult to get 6 7 a large number of laborers without delay, on account 8 of various circumstances, and moreover, those natives 9 who are inferior in their physical conditions and 10 ability could not be made the leading part of the 11 labor for this construction which ought to be completed 12 in a short time. 13 "2. Hereupon the South General Army requested 14 the senction of the General Headquarters concerning

the employment of the war prisoners. The General Headquarters sanctioned the employment of the war prisoners, because this construction was partly a work to be done far from the front, and partly bore the mission of the trade-route between Thailand and Burma.

²¹ "At that time the Army, as a whole, had a
²² view that it is not against the Geneva Treaty on the
²³ War Prisoners to employ the prisoners of war in such
²⁴ a work.

"3. Consequent to the sanction, in the

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beginning of the preparation for construction, the South Army ordered the railway troops to supervise a part of prisoners of war and to engage them in the preparation work. After that, subsequent to the organization of the Thailand camp, the South General Army made those of the camp be engaged in the construction work under their control.

"4. And after the considerable progress of the construction, especially as it became more and more indispensable to increase the labor, because the term for the construction was shortened, a great number of war prisoners in Java, Borneo, Singapore and Indo-China were transmitted to the Thailand Camp and newly two branches of the Malay Camp were attached to the commander of the construction troops."

Then I can omit down to paragraph 5 at the top of page 34:

"5. On the employment of prisoners of war, 18 they were not attached separately to working troops 19 on the spot. As regards employing them on the spot, 20 the branch leaders of the camps and the commanders 21 of battalions and companies negotiated together and 22 regulated the working hours of employed members. 23 That means that, after the camps were put under the 24 control of construction commanders, the camps delivered 25

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1	the required number of persons to the required places
2	in accordance with the orders of the construction
3	commanders, who were not entitled to interfere in the
4	business of supervision itself, according to the above
5	mentioned method of employment, and the construction
6	troops cooperated in improvement of the supervision
7	as far as their circumstances permitted."
8	MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may I
9	be heard a little further on that objection I made a
10	moment ago?
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THE PRESIDENT: I realize that this is not a 1 confession by any of the accused, but the conspiracy 2 is alleged not merely against the accused, but against 3 others as well; and this may be an admission by one of 4 those others. Such an admission may yet be regarded 5 as evidence against all, but the Court has that matter 6 under consideration. It has reserved its decision on 7 that point. Apart altogether from conspiracy, it may 8 be regarded, perhaps, as an admission by some person 9 10 or persons for whom the accused can hereafter be 11 established as responsible. As it stands, it may not, 12 without some connection, be evidence against any of 13 the accused, but we expect that connection to be made 14 later if this is to be used, of course. It would be 15 remarkable if in proceedings like this a document 16 eminating from the Japanese Government could not be 17 used in evidence subject to the accused being con-18 nected with the allegations contained in it. And 19 above all, as you know, we are not bound by the strict 20 rules of evidence, but must receive every document for 21 its probative value, and hearsay is admissible here, 22 and hearsay may be contained in a document as well as 23 in any oral statement. Subject to hearing what you 24 have to say, Mr. Logan, it appears to me that only by 25 the strictest adherence to the most technical rules

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of evidence could we exclude this. Of course, the 1 prosecution has the choice of anticipating the de-2 fense and meeting it with evidence in their case in 3 chief, or, of waiting to give evidence in rebuttal. 4 They have selected the former course.

MR. LOGAN: Well, if the Tribunal please, E may I say a few words? 7

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I invited you to do so. 8 MR. LOGAN: What we had in mind was this: 9 If the prosecution succeeds in disproving this docu-10 ment, what have they accomplished? Certainly the 11 defense did not introduce this, and we did not expose it 12 to this proof, and it is not a confession of any of these 13 accused, as your Honor said. The prosecutor said it 14 is a confession of the Government. Now the Govern-15 ment is not one of the defendants on trial here, and 16 certainly its disapproval cannot be used -- cannot be 17 held against any of the accused. In other words, 18 your Honor, this document was written by the Prisoner 19 20 of War Information Bureau after the war was over. 21 It is not connected with any of these accused, and, in 22 effect, it is setting up a straw man for the purpose 23 of knocking him down through this witness. That is 24 what we are objecting to.

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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

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DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, on the cover of 1 2 the Japanese version of this document it is written 3 as its author, it gives as the author of this document, 4 "Central Investigating Committee Concerning Prisoners 5 of War." I wish to state, like Mr. Logan, that this 6 Central Investigation Committee Concerning Prisoners 7 of War is not an official institution of the Japanese 8 Government; whereas, the Prisoners of War Information 9 Bureau is an official Japanese organ. 10 THE MONITOR: Slight correction there: 11 "My colleague, Mr. Logan, has stated that this was 12 prepared by Prisoner of War Information Bureau. It 13 was not. It was prepared by the Central Investigating 14 Committee, and this Central Investigating Committee, 15 unlike the POW Information Bureau, is not an official 16 Government organ. 17 DR. KIYOSE (Continuing): In the certificate 18 attached to this document it is written that the date 19 on which this document was prepared is unknown, and 20 that it was prepared by Legal Investigation Bureau --21 Section. The Legal Investigation Section is chiefly 22 concerned with military trials, and not with the 23 prisoners of war. Judging from these facts, it 24 seems as if this document is a reference book, so to 25 speak, to keep inside the said Section, and not a

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document to be published -- to be made public -- and 1 that this document had been prepared by a few Govern-2 ment officials. 3 THE MONITOR: Slight correction there: 4 "It seems to me that this document was probably com-5 piled by two or three or probably more Government 6 7 officials only as a reference, and this was not in-8 tended to be a report to be published to outside --9 official report to be published to outside. 10 DR. KIYOSE: I overheard the interpreter 11 to use the word "public." That reminds me of the 12 fact that in the case of a document of the Japanese 13 Government which is intended to be published to the 14 outside, they are generally dated -- always dated --15 and the name of the responsible person is written. 16 Therefore, I consider that this document should not 17 be treated as an official document of the Japanese 18 Government, and I should like the prosecution to 19 investigate about this matter further. 20 THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the ob-21 jection is not to the evidence actually, which is 22 clearly admissible under the Charter, but to the method 23 which you are employing in examining this man on a 24 document which you rightly tendered. That is the 25 position as I understand it. Of course, it comes

clearly within Article 13-c(2) of the Charter. Now 1 the only analogy that I can give is a proceeding 2 3 taken -- a deposition taken in a bankruptcy proceed-4 ing which is subsequently used in criminal proceedings 5 against the bankrupt. The Crown must tender the whole 6 of the document. That has been done here. But, 7 there is no reason why the Crown should not also give 8 evidence to show that part of the document is not in 9 accordance with fact. They can accept part, and they 10 can also give evidence against the remainder -- to 11 combat the remainder. That is guite a common practice. 12 That is what I understand Mr. Carr to be doing here, 13 and I see nothing wrong with the method. The objec-14 tion is overruled. 15 MR. COMYNS CARR: I will continue to read, 16 beginning at the middle of page 38: 17 "2. Supply and sanitation during the transportaion. 18 "As for the supply, the staple food was re-19 ceived from the Army in agreement with the South 20 General Army Intendance Ordinance, the side dishes 21 were served after the menu was drawn up. The actual 22 condition was regularly reported to the Army. 23 "The side dishes of fixed quantity were ac-24 quired with great pains from all over Thailand, Malay, 25 and French Indo-China and a great effort was made to

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improve the menu.

"Regards to the sanitation during the trans-2 portation, an overseer sent from a prisoner camp 3 4 took charge of it and it was ordered that he would 5 act in concert with medical institutions concerned 6 through a commander of the nearest station. As the 7 actual instances show, the commander paid a special 8 attention to keeping up such prisonor's health as 9 it was on his arrival and inspected the management 10 of transportation of prisoners at the station, and 11 issued orders carefully about the supply, sanitation ,12 and treatment." 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continuing): 1 What have you to say about -- I don't think Q 2 you will need to say anything more about the side 3 dishes and the menu. You have dealt with those. But A about this -- about somebody being appointed at the 5 station to look after sanitation during the railway 6 journey? 7 I saw no signs of any overteer during trans-A 8 portation by train, as I mentioned earlier. We just 9 used the tracks. 10 THE MONITOR: What is it, "tracks"? 11 THE WITNESS: Railway tracks. 12 THE MONITOR: What do you mean by using the 13 tracks? 14 THE WITNESS: Relieved ourselves on them. 15 (Continuing) The only sanitation provided in A 16 the camps was an open trench latrine. 17 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued) 18 (Reading): 19 "3. Transportation by ships. 20 "1. Since the beginning of the war, Japan lost 21 rapidly as it is known a large number of vessels. 22 "2. The counter-measure for the want of 23 vessals and the conditions of transportations were 24 25 as follows:

1	"A. Counter-measure of transportation.
2	"i. From the beginning to the middle of
3	1942: Tonnege per head 5 gross tons.
4	"ii. From about the middle to the end of
5	1942: Tonnage per head 2.15 gross tons.
6	"iii. From about the beginning to the middle
7	of 1943: Tonnate per head 1-2 gross tons,
8	"iv. From about the middle of 1943:
9	Tonnage per head 1 gross ton."
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1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued) 2 Pausing there, what is the allowance in a Q 3 British troop ship? 4 About eight tons. A 5 MR. COMYNS CARR: Continuing: 6 (Reading): 7 "Since 1943, it was made a rule that the 8 horses were not transported on account of the want 9 of vessels, though the transportation of them was 10 indispensable for the operation. 11 NOTE 12 "1. A horse cannot be dismembered to 13 reduce the tonnage, as a lorry can. 14 "2. A horse cannot be packed up as a mer-15 son can be. 16 "B. The situation of transportation. 17 The condition of the closely packed carrying of the 18 troops, owing to the rarid loss of vessels, can be 19 understood through Note I. The instances are as 20 follows: 21 "a. One division which was to be trans-22 ported to deploy in the central pacific and con-23 sisted of about 15,000 men, about 200 automobiles 24 and munitions of about 2 months (for example, the 25

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1	29th Division) was transported by only three shins,
2	each 8,000 or 10,000 gross tons in all."
3	I needn't read the name.
4	· "Further in a case of a transportation to
5	be deployed in the Central Pacific, about 6,000 men,
6	about 60 automobiles and other munitions were car-
7	ried from Fuzen, Yokohama to Guam in a vessel of
8	6,000 gross tons.
9	"c. In the Southern districts (for ex-
10	ample, the Fugo-Maru, 1,900 gross tons, which were
1 1	vessels alloted to the transportation from Shinga-
12	pore to Rangoon.) the vessel was made the best us of,
13.	by rationing banana" - I am afraid the print is very
14	bad- "and so on as a sustenance to avoid cooking in
15	a ship. Such sort of transportation was called a
16,	'Benana' transportation. In a 'Banana' transport-
17	ation, the actual situation was about 29 men per
18	'tsubo', when the whole of men on board is divided
19	by all 'Tsubo' of berths."
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1	BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued)
2	Q Pausing there, will you explain what that
3	really means in space allotted to a man?
4	A The principle was that wooden tiers, three
5	feet with three feet space between them were
6	built right up in the holds and bunkers.
7	THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
8	half past nine on Monday morning.
9	(Whereupon, at 1500, an adjournment
10	was taken until Monday, 16 September 1946, at
11	0930.)
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