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Of  
WITNESSES

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I N D E X  
Of  
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
2750	1351		A Sworn Statement by Klaas A. de Weerd, Major, Artillery, Royal Netherlands Indies Army		12129
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1  
2 Friday, 6 December, 1946

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5 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
6 FOR THE FAR EAST  
7 Court House of the Tribunal  
8 War Ministry Building  
9 Tokyo, Japan

10 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
11 at 0930.

12 - - -

13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 The Accused:

18 All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is  
19 represented by his counsel.

20 - - -

21 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
22 to English interpretation was made by the  
23 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Mr. President and Members of the  
5 Tribunal, I wish to call Klaas A. de Weerd to the  
6 witness box.

7 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: Mr. President, if it  
8 please the Tribunal, preparatory to swearing the wit-  
9 ness I wish to announce that First Lieutenant J. T.  
10 Cremer and Captain G. J. Jongejans have been sworn as  
11 Dutch language interpreters.

12 - - -

13  
14 K L A A S A. D E W E E R D, called as a witness on  
15 behalf of the prosecution, being first duly sworn,  
16 testified through Dutch interpreters as follows:

17 DIRECT EXAMINATION.

18 BY MR. HYDE:

19 Q Will you state your name, please?

20 A Klaas A. de Weerd.

21 Q I hand you prosecution document No. 2750.

22 Is that a statement prepared by you?

23 A Yes.

24 Q Is it true?

25 A Yes.

MR. HYDE: I offer prosecution document No.

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1 2750 in evidence.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Are those lights intended  
3 to be on?

4 THE MONITOR: Yes, your Honor. We are having  
5 a Dutch-Japanese interpreter to come to the witness  
6 stand.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

8 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, when this  
9 statement was presented to the Tribunal in Chambers  
10 the defense entered numerous objections to it. I  
11 shall not repeat those objections at this time but we  
12 ask that they be considered as made again and renewed  
13 for the purpose of our record.

14 THE PRESIDENT: The objections were to the  
15 statement containing his opinions and conclusions, which  
16 were for the Court to form.

17 MR. LOGAN: That is right.

18 THE PRESIDENT: I do not recollect any others,  
19 Mr. Logan, but briefly re-state your objections.

20 MR. LOGAN: In addition to those, your Honor,  
21 we also objected on the ground that the statement con-  
22 tained a mass of detail which had no proper place in  
23 this case.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Irrelevant and immaterial  
25 matters. You need not state them, Mr. Logan.

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1 MR. LOGAN: And we also objected to it, your  
2 Honor, on the ground that the method of presenting the  
3 case by means of a statement which has been carefully  
4 prepared by this witness and the prosecution was  
5 inimical to the best interests of the accused in this  
6 case, which we believe far outweighs the advantage that  
7 the defense have by having this document about a week  
8 before this witness appeared on the stand.

9 In addition to all this, your Honor, we wish  
10 to present further objections at this time. This  
11 statement, in the main, contains a history of political  
12 acts which occurred in the Netherlands East Indies after  
13 December 8th, 1941. As a matter of law, those should  
14 not be permitted to be introduced in this case because  
15 up to the present time the prosecution has failed to  
16 present any evidence showing that any overt act was com-  
17 mitted by Japan prior to December 8th, 1941, at which  
18 time the evidence shows that the Netherlands East Indies  
19 declared war on Japan. It is quite apparent from this  
20 that there was no aggressive war; and furthermore, that  
21 even with respect to the counts in the Indictment under  
22 which this section is proceeding, counts 1, 4 and 5,  
23 which refer to a conspiracy charge, that there can be  
24 no claim of conspiracy if there was no war of aggression.  
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1 THE PRESIDENT: That by no means follows, Mr.  
2 Logan. Conspiracy consists of a mere agreement.  
3 We will not debate that now.

4 MR. LOGAN: Except, your Honor, that the heart  
5 of that conspiracy charge is that the object of it was  
6 to conduct an aggressive war.

7 THE PRESIDENT: As of the date of the agreement  
8 the object was clear, and it was not cancelled by the  
9 Dutch formal declaration of war. We will not debate  
10 it now. You can debate this later, Mr. Logan.

11 MR. LOGAN: I just want to point out further,  
12 your Honor, that with respect to counts 14 and 32,  
13 the charges of aggressive war, this statement certainly  
14 is not material with respect to those counts.

15 And furthermore, your Honor, we object to this  
16 statement on the ground that the political acts com-  
17 plained of in here are no different than those which  
18 any conquering nation imposes on a vanquished nation,  
19 such as is being imposed upon the conquered nations to-day.

20 THE PRESIDENT: The objections are overruled  
21 without prejudice to the right of the defense to repeat  
22 them as submissions in the course of their summing up.

23 Mr. Hyde.

24 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I don't believe you  
25 have ruled on my tender of this document in evidence.

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MR. HYDE: I will read exhibit No. 1351:

"I

"PERSONAL HISTORY

"My name is Klass A. de Weerd. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

"I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands nationality.

"After having studied law at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

"In 1938, after having been on leave in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra).

"On the 12th of December 1941 I was mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java. "

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1 "After the capitulation of the Royal  
2 Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of  
3 war of the Japanese and was confined in several  
4 camps in West-Java until the middle of September  
5 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted  
6 as Camp translator of the Java newspapers in the  
7 Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities  
8 allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought  
9 into the camps until the end of January 1944.

10 "As the situation in the islands inter-  
11 ested me in particular I spent much time in  
12 translating these items extensively into Dutch  
13 and, together with several friends, I indexed  
14 these data according to personalities and to  
15 subjects.

16 "Our intention was to prepare several  
17 studies concerning the Japanese occupation,  
18 treating subjects such as Administration Propa-  
19 ganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour,  
20 Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data  
21 about Japanese authorities.

22 "II

23 "I had already prepared notes for several  
24 of these studies when it became increasingly  
25 difficult to keep this work secret from the

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1 Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became  
2 clear that we would shortly be moved to another  
3 camp we soldered copies of our compilations and  
4 indexes in tins and buried them in various places  
5 in the camp grounds.

6 "From February 1944 until September 1945  
7 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Neth-  
8 erlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated)  
9 Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled  
10 in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese  
11 local broadcasts in Malay. During that period  
12 I continually exchanged information and observa-  
13 tions with new arrivals and through every other  
14 channel available.

15 "After 15 August 1945 I once more regu-  
16 larly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning  
17 of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of  
18 my compilations and indexes from their hiding  
19 place. In the middle of the same month I was  
20 released from the prison camp and was assigned  
21 to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding  
22 Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil  
23 Administration), later called the Allied Military  
24 Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in  
25 order to complete my work of collecting data about

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1 the Japanese occupation. A special section with  
2 a staff of twenty was created for this purpose  
3 under my direction; this section became a  
4 special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence  
5 Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

6 "In close cooperation with the Japanese  
7 Affairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C.  
8 (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps)  
9 and other officers and bureaus I collected such data  
10 regarding the Japanese occupation as were available.  
11 These data were contained in, inter alia, the  
12 practically complete newspapers and the complete  
13 Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army  
14 in Java, and a fairly complete

15 "III

16 "set of the official gazettes of the other islands,  
17 edited during the occupation period, further reports  
18 and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and  
19 other military and civilian authorities and private  
20 persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and  
21 non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese  
22 and Indonesian authorities, etc.

23 "In May 1946 I joined the Office of the  
24 Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the  
25 special task of collecting such documents as would

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1 be needed for the preparation of the prosecution  
2 of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the  
3 International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this  
4 capacity I continued my work of collecting data on  
5 the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

6 "In the middle of September 1946 I arrived  
7 at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney-General,  
8 Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for  
9 further data here.

10 "From this collected information I have  
11 prepared the attached report, entitled: "The Jap-  
12 anese occupation of the Netherlands Indies."

13 I turn to page marked 2, passing over the  
14 cover page.

15 "THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

16 "INTRODUCTION

17 "The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands  
18 East Indies for convenience has been chronologically  
19 divided into five phases,

20 "I. The period from March to August 1942,  
21 which can be designated the transition  
22 period.

23 "II. The second phase, which is characterized  
24 by the consolidation of Japanese rule,  
25 lasting from August 1942 to July 1943."

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1 "III. The period from July 1943 to  
2 September 1944, which is governed  
3 by an attempt at winning over the  
4 population by promises.

5 "IV. The period from September 1944  
6 to the beginning of August 1945,  
7 involving further development  
8 of the policy of promises.

9 "V. The period from the beginning of  
10 August 1945 to the end of September  
11 1945, involving at the last moment  
12 an attempt to create a state,  
13 friendly to Japan, in the South.

14 "The phases mentioned above have been more  
15 and less arbitrarily divided into periods and conse-  
16 quently these limits must be treated as being approxi-  
17 mate. Occasionally for a better understanding a  
18 certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one  
19 of the phases, even if the events in question extended  
20 beyond a particular phase.

21 "Japan's policy in regard to the Southern  
22 Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions  
23 alike, so that only insignificant local modifications  
24 were made, and then solely in the application and  
25 not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened

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1 in Java is treated as basic and mention will only  
2 be made of modifications in other regions of the  
3 Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations  
4 from events in Java."

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"I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

"Beginning of 1942 to approximately August 1942.

"Throughout the East Indies, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

"Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

"In addition a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of their past support of the Chinag Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

"The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

"By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both



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1 male and female, had been interned, with a few local  
2 exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or  
3 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born  
4 in the Netherlands Indies who still showed apparent  
5 affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and  
6 those Asiatics, too, who were 'suspected' of having  
7 Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According  
8 to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945,  
9 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and  
10 approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java.  
11 Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made  
12 prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the  
13 exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave  
14 labour elsewhere.

15 "Of the former Western community, only three  
16 groups were still 'free'; namely, the group of Axis  
17 subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat  
18 of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of  
19 non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly  
20 spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their  
21 'freedom' in many other ways.

22 "This non-interned Occidental community was  
23 subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied  
24 upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its  
25 henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale

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1 arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and  
2 by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well  
3 as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial  
4 were such that the victims were deprived of all rights,  
5 and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation  
6 methods.

7 "Occidentals were, whenever possible, dis-  
8 missed from their official and private positions  
9 and appointments, thus depriving the greater part  
10 of this section of the community of its means of  
11 livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen,  
12 Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage  
13 payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from  
14 Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were  
15 faced with practically no alternative than gradually  
16 to sell all their possessions. They were further  
17 handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned  
18 whatever took their fancy, generally without payment  
19 of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registra-  
20 tion and the payment of registration fees - (150  
21 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and  
22 other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military  
23 authorities made the position still more difficult for  
24 these communities.  
25

"Along with this, the use of Western languages

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1 was soon forbidden in public and business communications,  
2 and in certain places the speaking of Western languages  
3 was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke  
4 a Western language at home, were suspected by the  
5 Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that  
6 organization.

7 "At the same time, the Japanese immediately  
8 began to close down all schools. During the second  
9 period Occidental schools and education remained  
10 definitely banned.

11 "In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio  
12 broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated.  
13 This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing  
14 and registration of all wireless sets, to make them  
15 unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts  
16 from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced  
17 and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons  
18 who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite  
19 the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter  
20 alia, sentenced to death.

21 "Throughout Japanese occupation, persons  
22 suspected of having failed to comply with this  
23 prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei,  
24 tortured and sometimes tried.  
25

"The possession of certain numerous specified

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1 books in enemy languages constituted a punishable  
2 offence. Such books had to be handed over and were  
3 burnt.

4 "Old monuments, - reminders of former  
5 Occidental influence were carried away, partly  
6 destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

7 "In most places, the names of streets  
8 and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes  
9 Malay.

10 "Names of shops, commercial concerns,  
11 trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western  
12 languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese  
13 or Malay.

14 "Since the Kempei-methods were practised  
15 not only on the Occidental community, but also upon  
16 members of the other communities, all expression of  
17 democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

18 "All existing Councils wherein, hitherto,  
19 the opinion of various communities could be freely  
20 expressed on problems of administration were abolished

21 "The first to be dissolved was the  
22 Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised  
23 legislative and budgetary functions.

24 "Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal  
25 and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative

D. W. LARD

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1 "and budgetary powers, were abolished.

2 "In regions outside Java, too, the  
3 various councils which had been established on a  
4 democratic basis to give the people an opportunity  
5 of participation in the administration of their  
6 country, were liquidated.

7 "By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-

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1 in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law  
2 courts were abolished, and in their stead 'Japanese  
3 'Law Courts of the Military Government' (Gunsei Hoojin)  
4 were established. This new judiciary was provisional  
5 and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

6 "There was no provision for appeals. The  
7 decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts  
8 were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by  
9 the Appellate Court.

10 "By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese  
11 Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942  
12 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were  
13 forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this  
14 prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but  
15 also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their  
16 respective associations.

17 "The only associations excepted were those  
18 concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific,  
19 cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

20 "Even associations not prohibited were restricted  
21 in their activities; they were subjected to police  
22 supervision, and could only resume their activities  
23 after obtaining permission from the police, and  
24 registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the  
25 police. "

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1 "In practice, activities were permitted only  
2 those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership  
3 and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as,  
4 e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian  
5 Sport League).

6 "From the outset, the Japanese authorities  
7 built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

8 "Along with the first troops to land on Java,  
9 came the vanguard.

10 "These Japanese propagandist, organized in  
11 the Propaganda Section ('Barisan Propaganda') of the  
12 Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish  
13 immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese  
14 politicians, known to be disaffected. With the  
15 assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April  
16 1942 the so-called 'Tiga A' movement was established.  
17 Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry  
18 on the activities of this movement; but such commit-  
19 tees had no function other than to carry out activ-  
20 ities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

21 "These propagandists immediately seized  
22 control of all means of public expression. All public  
23 and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic  
24 activities as well as the entire Press were immediately  
25 placed under their control. For about two months after

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1 the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers  
2 were still permitted to be transmitted and to  
3 appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine  
4 had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers  
5 were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were  
6 introduced in the Malay language under the direction  
7 of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen  
8 by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's  
9 birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay  
10 language daily paper in Java, the 'Asia Raya'  
11 (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to  
12 appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the  
13 most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda.  
14 At first it was under Japanese direction; but after  
15 the Indonesian staff had proved themselves 'matured'  
16 the direction was officially handed over to them;  
17 but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese  
18 hands.

19 "Other places in Java soon followed suit,  
20 so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers  
21 in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

22 "In addition a Japanese language paper,  
23 the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

24 "In her propaganda Japan referred to herself  
25 as the 'liberator', come to establish a 'New Order.' "



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1 "It stated, that 'New-Java' was to be educated to  
2 become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia  
3 Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

4 "The Japanese instituted a rigid censor-  
5 ship, which not only affected all postal, telegraphic  
6 and telephonic communication, but also extended to  
7 all photographs given to professional photographers  
8 for development.

9 Furthermore, all public utterances were  
10 subject to censorship. This did not alone extend  
11 to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to  
12 the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical  
13 companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda  
14 service.

15 "The publication of books was also subject  
16 to censorship, and only works emanating from the  
17 propaganda service appeared during the period of  
18 occupation. By these methods the Japanese had con-  
19 trol of all expressions of public opinion.

20 "During the period now being treated  
21 Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun.  
22 For instance, the use of Japanese words was immed-  
23 iately introduced for designating official services,  
24 offices, etc. and this usage gradually became preva-  
25 lent during the occupation, so that ultimately the

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1 reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely  
2 possible without knowledge of the offices, services,  
3 institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred  
4 to by Japanese words."  
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1 "The Japanese authorities introduced the  
2 Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time  
3 system and the Japanese budgetary year.

4 "The police wore the Japanese flag for cap  
5 badges. Emperor worship -- offensive to Mohammedans --  
6 was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings  
7 began with the obligatory bow in the direction of  
8 the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the  
9 words: 'Tenno Heika -- banzai.' All Japanese days  
10 of celebration were introduced. The display of any  
11 flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the  
12 Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had  
13 to be flown on all official and private buildings  
14 under strictly prescribed rules.

15 "Portraits of members of the Dutch and  
16 Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to  
17 be handed over and were burned.

18 "The possession of portraits and other  
19 pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed  
20 by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no  
21 'lese-majesty'.

22 "Postage and revenue stamps were marked  
23 'Dai Nippon,' and later new stamps were issued with  
24 texts in Malay and Japanese reading 'Dai Nippon.'

25 "The Japanese at once began to establish

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1 schools which taught only the Japanese language.  
2 When later schools for Indonesians were reopened  
3 the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese re-  
4 quirements and important subjects in the new  
5 schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs  
6 and dances, etc.

7 "In the fields of finance and economics  
8 the programs applied in the East Indies were similar  
9 despite the fact that some areas were administered  
10 by the Army, and some by the Navy.

11 "Java and Sumatra were occupied by differ-  
12 ent Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluc-  
13 cas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese  
14 Navy, with practically no contact with each other.  
15 Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these  
16 regions were administered were entirely similar in  
17 reality.

18 "The first ordinance of the Japanese  
19 Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1,  
20 introduced Japanese military paper currency with the  
21 text in Dutch, reading: 'The Japanese Government.  
22 One half guilder.' Paper money was issued similarly  
23 in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was  
24 reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper  
25 money already in circulation was retained; but later,

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1 when this old currency had considerably greater value  
2 in the open market than the Japanese occupation  
3 money, it was withdrawn and its possession consti-  
4 tuted a punishable offense. The Japanese paper money  
5 revealed differences in the various occupied areas.  
6 In Sumatra, which was originally under the same  
7 military administration as Malaya, the same text  
8 appeared on the same background as in the case of  
9 the paper money issued in Java, but in English,  
10 whereas in the other regions of the East Indies,  
11 and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

12 "In 1944, new paper money was designed  
13 and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese  
14 and Malay.

15 "This paper money was issued in unlimited  
16 quantities without backing, which soon led to in-  
17 flation, which began early in 1943 and continued to  
18 increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle  
19 of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth  
20 of its original purchasing value.

21 "All banks, both official and non-official,  
22 were closed down at once. During the course of 1942  
23 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and  
24 private banks were liquidated. The Post Office  
25 Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank

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1 which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened  
2 under Japanese names and under Japanese direction,  
3 but the balances due at the time of the closing  
4 remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of  
5 Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the  
6 deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners  
7 remained frozen, and were transferred to the  
8 Japanese established Enemy Property Administration  
9 Bureau (Tekisan Kanribu), which was charged with  
10 the 'custody' of enemy property. This institution  
11 liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and  
12 credited in its books the owners thereof, when  
13 known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

14 "Later, after May 1945, this liquidation  
15 was hastened. In Batavia the Kempei and its  
16 members were frequently the purchasers at so-called  
17 public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese  
18 occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the  
19 real price for the same article in the same paper  
20 money in the open market.

21 "All stocks of Occidental importers, as  
22 well as private possessions in the form of movables  
23 and claims for payment (when capable of realization)  
24 owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in  
25 Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan

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1 Kanribu. Possession of 'enemy property' consti-  
2 tuted a punishable offense and the holder was  
3 obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned  
4 Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that  
5 rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese.  
6 Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japan-  
7 ese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

8 "Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies,  
9 big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals,  
10 had been invested in agricultural enterprises and  
11 industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting  
12 sugar-factories, which were organized in the 'Java  
13 Togyo Rengo Kai') were brought by the Japanese under  
14 the 'Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan.' This organization  
15 had charge of the administration of 'enemy' agri-  
16 cultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the  
17 control over all other agricultural enterprises  
18 including those operated with Indonesian or  
19 Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the  
20 interests of owners. This body executed a policy  
21 directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort  
22 and to the maintenance of production required by the  
23 Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises  
24 and industries which were of no importance to the  
25 immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched

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1 over to other production, or when that was not  
2 feasible, were retained if such retention were  
3 deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the  
4 anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-  
5 Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea and  
6 rubber plantations suffered seriously, because the  
7 Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation,  
8 gave precedence to food crops. Tea plants and rubber  
9 trees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates  
10 being parceled out amongst local farmers to increase  
11 areas for food crops.

12 "A large part of the Western-owned agri-  
13 cultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire  
14 sugar industry was allotted in six or seven blocks  
15 to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was  
16 exploited by them under the continued direction and  
17 control of the above-mentioned body.

18 "Sugar production was reduced considerably  
19 and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar  
20 factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when  
21 the factories were not switched over to produce  
22 other commodities more important for the war effort,  
23 such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

24 "The possession of immovable property belong-  
25 ing to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was



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1 transferred by the Japanese to the 'Hudoosan  
2 Kanrikoodan' established by them, which handed over  
3 the property as required to the Japanese military  
4 or civil authorities for business and for personal  
5 purposes.

6 "Ownership of immovable property was  
7 drastically changed by the Japanese.

8 "The so-called 'private estates' were  
9 appropriated by the Military Government without the  
10 payment of any compensation to the owners, under  
11 Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief,  
12 Java, dated 1 June 1942.

13 "In the other islands too, such expropria-  
14 tions took place, as for instance in the Celebes,  
15 by virtue of an Ordinance No. ii of the Minseifu  
16 (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March 1943.

17 "Public utilities, including those privately  
18 owned, were seized by the Military Administration and  
19 were operated without compensation, and in some cases  
20 were allotted to private Japanese companies.

21 "Private railway, tramway and bus companies  
22 were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equip-  
23 ment of private railway companies was for a large  
24 part shipped to the Burma-Siam railway. Direction  
25 of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku

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1 (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former  
2 independent operation by private companies was  
3 obliterated. The personnel of these companies was  
4 pooled and Japanese rank designations and termin-  
5 ology were introduced.

6 "Private or semi-governmental gas and  
7 power companies as well as privately owned mining  
8 concerns were taken over and operated by either the  
9 Military Government or Japanese companies.

10 "The policy of exploitation of natural  
11 resources of the East Indies was carried on partly  
12 by the Military Administration itself, partly  
13 through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese  
14 business concerns and partly by Japanese 'national  
15 policy companies.'

16 "The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo  
17 Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government-owned and  
18 operated bank had as its chief function the financing  
19 of the development and exploitation of natural re-  
20 sources in the Southern Regions and the control of  
21 circulation and finance in those areas. This bank  
22 was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia  
23 and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to  
24 the Japanese Army.  
25

"The Japanese Government also divided up

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1 natural resources in the Southern Regions between  
2 the various Japanese applicants and allotted each  
3 of them part of those areas, usually according  
4 them monopolies.

5 "Domei was granted a news service monopoly  
6 although a local agency had started first.

7 "Press monopolies in the Southern Regions  
8 were divided among various big Japanese newspaper  
9 concerns.

10 "In the field of banking, the Yokohama  
11 Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to  
12 operate in Java, and took over the functions of  
13 private Occidental banks.

14 "The liquidation of these banks and the  
15 introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter  
16 alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts  
17 were declared to be claimable on 25th November  
18 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits  
19 backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

20 "THE SECOND PHASE

21 "August 1942 to July 1943.

22 "During the period just discussed the  
23 Japanese administrative machinery was relatively  
24 simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-  
25 in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the

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1 Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted  
2 by a simple 'central organ' and by three Army  
3 officers each administering his respective area  
4 in East, West and Central Java. Administration was  
5 carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occu-  
6 pational detachments.

7 "Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envis-  
8 aged sending out parties consisting of Japanese  
9 experts in colonial administration, technical  
10 sciences, and economy, immediately following the  
11 occupational troops. It was not, however, until  
12 the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional  
13 set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

14 "The Military Government, which at first  
15 was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed  
16 into a separate body.

17 "The gist of its functions was laid down  
18 in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-  
19 Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all  
20 powers which hitherto had been exercised by the  
21 Governor-General. The military administration  
22 (Gunsei) was divided into nine departments under  
23 the supervision of the Gunseikan. The departments  
24 were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and  
25 policy making body; Maimubu (Internal Affairs);

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1 Zaimubu (Finance): Sihoobu (Justice), Keimubu  
2 (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyobu  
3 (Economic Affairs); Kaikei Kantokubu (Audition);  
4 and Sendenbu (Propaganda).

5 "In addition from time to time a number  
6 of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without  
7 the standing of the Departments but under the  
8 Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to  
9 handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Re-  
10 ligious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-  
11 building Bureau), the Tekisan Kanribu (Enemy  
12 Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kai (Sugar  
13 Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time  
14 some changes were made, which did not affect the  
15 system. "

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1 "The structure of the pre-war Central Ad-  
2 ministration was changed thoroughly and in its en-  
3 tirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a  
4 Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police  
5 were under the Internal Affairs Department, while  
6 Public Health, Education and Labour (now under  
7 Maimubu) were handled by separate Departments or  
8 Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious  
9 Affairs had been handled by the Education and  
10 Religion Department.

11 "The Government Secretariate, the Council  
12 of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's  
13 Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Depart-  
14 ments of general administration, corresponding in  
15 name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice  
16 Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

17 "All leading positions in the Departments  
18 were occupied by Japanese. According to official  
19 Japanese information, on 1 September 1945, 23,242  
20 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military  
21 Government in Java, amounting to half the number  
22 of service personnel proper stationed there.

23  
24 "Legislative powers were exercised by the  
25 Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander  
in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java,

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1 and the Chief of Military Administration (Gunseikan).  
2 The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were  
3 not published locally, although thousands were ar-  
4 rested, tortured and sentenced under them, while  
5 those of the ~~two last~~ mentioned organs were pub-  
6 lished in Java, in the Osamu Kan Po, the official  
7 bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay.  
8 Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese  
9 edition.

10 "The institution of Advisory Councils at  
11 a later stage did not affect the legislative position  
12 in any way.

13 "Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-  
14 in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an  
15 entirely new system of local administration. Under  
16 this Java was divided into 17 'Syuu,' comparable  
17 geographically to the former 'Residencies' and one  
18 'Tokubatsu Si' ('Special City Area') comprising  
19 Batavia. The four Sultanatos in Central Java were  
20 administered by two 'Kooti Zimu Kyoku' (Sultanatos'  
21 Bureaus).

22  
23 "The former 'Provinces' of West, Central  
24 and East Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the  
25 Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three 'Gunseisibu,'  
coinciding geographically with the former Provinces

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1 but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-  
2 in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

3 "All these local bodies supplanted the  
4 former decentralized and autonomous local adminis-  
5 tration, and were placed directly under the Gunsei-  
6 kanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local coun-  
7 cils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular  
8 participation in local administration came to an end.

9 "The Syuu were subdivided into smaller  
10 units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These  
11 were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku,  
12 Si and Siku. During this second period the organic  
13 laws governing the functions of administrative bodies  
14 under the old system were abolished, and replaced by  
15 Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new  
16 administration was based.

17 "The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable  
18 to the former 'Resident') and of other local officials  
19 was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on  
20 the other made far more dependent on the Central  
21 Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced.  
22 These officials, responsible only to their superiors,  
23 had a large measure of liberty in the execution of  
24 their duties: they had powers of dismissal and ap-  
25 pointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers



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over their staffs.

1  
2 "They were empowered to issue regulations  
3 to implement ordinances promulgated by higher au-  
4 thority and also regulations concerning matters not  
5 yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were  
6 subject to the authority of their superiors and were  
7 responsible to them in all cases. According to  
8 statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authori-  
9 ties, the object the Japanese had in mind was to  
10 build up an administration which in its final form  
11 should be on the same lines as those followed in  
12 their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

13 "The four ruling Sultans were maintained,  
14 not as having hereditary title to their positions,  
15 but as newly invested Rulers called 'Ko' owing  
16 allegiance to the Japanese Army in the same way  
17 as all civilian officials did.

18 "All key-positions in the new establishment  
19 were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down  
20 to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely  
21 Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indo-  
22 nesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The  
23 Kentyoo, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by  
24 Japanese advisors.

25 "The composition of the Administrative

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1 Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister  
2 TOJO's promises. However, leading positions remained  
3 in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held  
4 an important post there was always a Japanese who was  
5 the real executive.

6 "It was not until the end of August 1945  
7 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority  
8 to their Indonesian colleagues.

9 "According to the biographies of the Japanese  
10 officials, published by the propaganda service, this  
11 corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and  
12 Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative  
13 functions in Japan proper."  
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1 "The establishment of a new administrative  
2 system in islands other than Java developed along the  
3 same lines.

4 "In the initial stage, Sumatra along with  
5 Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army  
6 Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed  
7 under a separate Gunseikanbu.

8 "The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra  
9 respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Head-  
10 quarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages  
11 by ITAGAKI, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under  
12 the Southern Theater commanded by Field Marshal  
13 TERAUCHI.

14 "The Military Administration operated pursuant  
15 to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of  
16 command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

17 "In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east  
18 of a line running north and south through Bali and  
19 Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While  
20 the terminology varied, the system was not substantially  
21 different. The same principles of centralized adminis-  
22 tration were applied and relations between Japanese and  
23 Indonesian officials were the same.

24 "Administration in territory under Naval Occu-  
25 pation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters)

1 at Macassar (Celebes).

2 "The Minseihu at Macassar was under the com-  
3 mand of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern  
4 Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This  
5 Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th  
6 Southern Squadron at Singapore.

7 "Parallel with reorganization of the Adminis-  
8 tration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In  
9 addition to the Gunsei Hooin (Courts of the Military  
10 Administration), set up in the first period to replace  
11 the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court  
12 Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel  
13 and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu  
14 Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army  
15 Ordinances.

16 "The Gunsei Hooin itself had jurisdiction to  
17 try violations of Military Government Ordinances and  
18 Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force  
19 by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was  
20 shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

21 "Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief,  
22 Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Hooin  
23 their final form.

24 "Eight type of courts were set up, all bearing  
25 Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Hooin (Final

1 Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Hooin (Intermediary  
2 Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at  
3 first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts com-  
4 prised the Police Court, the District Court and other  
5 local courts corresponding to the local administrative  
6 subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all  
7 manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the  
8 Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

9 "To each court a Kensatu-Kyoku (Prosecution  
10 Section) was attached. This system was strongly cen-  
11 tralized under the Justice Department. At a later  
12 stage it was detached from the Justice Department,  
13 and combined with the police force under the Police  
14 Department which was renamed Public Security Department  
15 (Tianbu).

16 "In criminal courts with Indonesian members  
17 a representative of the Kempei attended the sessions,  
18 seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.

19 "In the initial stages the former Penal Code  
20 was maintained. Having determined that this criminal  
21 law was based on excessively democratic foundations the  
22 Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which  
23 criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving  
24 wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment  
25 were introduced for special offenses."

1           "During the Japanese occupation interference  
2 by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in  
3 trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the  
4 Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions,  
5 who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

6           "During the session only Japanese and Malay  
7 languages were allowed.

8           "Trials by the Courts Martial proper were  
9 conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was  
10 seldom available.

11           "In the other islands of the East Indies  
12 judicial powers were administered in the same manner.  
13 Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts  
14 established.

15           "At the outset of the occupation the Japanese  
16 authorities took over the Police School at Sukabumi,  
17 Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, per-  
18 manent courses for the training of police personnel,  
19 led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda  
20 courses for personnel already in the service were con-  
21 ducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East  
22 Asia and Japan's might were taught. A system of cor-  
23 poral maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the  
24 police station, for the settlement of minor infractions  
25 was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for

1 insignificant offenses was seen daily in the streets.  
2 Acertain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted  
3 the tactics of the Kempei.

4 "A separate Police Department, later the  
5 Public Security Department, was established along  
6 centralized lines and all executive functions were  
7 taken over by the Japanese.

8 "The existing Force was felt to be insufficient  
9 by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy  
10 this situation were attempted.

11 "The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of  
12 the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei  
13 methods, was organized. It was both feared and  
14 hated by the people.

15 "In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Vil-  
16 lage Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police  
17 force in all villages and municipalities. This  
18 reinforced the regular police by approximately  
19 1,300,000."

20 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.  
21 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

22 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
23 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings  
24 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hyde.

4 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, with the Tribunal's  
5 permission, Mrs. Strooker will continue the reading  
6 of exhibit 1350.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker.

8 MRS. STROOKER: I continue on page 21.

9 (Reading:)

10 "The Keiboodan had a variety of duties.  
11 It had to go into action in case of fire or other  
12 calamities, it had to assist the regular police in  
13 apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, para-  
14 troopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in  
15 its area, turned out in force during public propa-  
16 ganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of  
17 spying, chiefly in a general campaign against  
18 enemy spies.

19 "In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to  
20 train the population in guerilla action, such as  
21 cutting lines of communication, destruction of  
22 small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inade-  
23 quate weapons such as bamboo spears. This training  
24 taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and  
25 hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display



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1 of cruelty to these foreigners.

2 "A third force auxiliary to the police,  
3 was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai,  
4 which operated only in towns and served the same  
5 purpose as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruit-  
6 ed chiefly from among the Chinese.

7 "The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei.  
8 Both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although  
9 Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the  
10 official Army organization. The members of the two  
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1 latter were 'volunteers', if the required numbers  
2 were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

3 "The prison system was similarly reorganized  
4 under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for  
5 the training of newly recruited personnel as well  
6 as for the 'improvement' of personnel with previous  
7 service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings  
8 were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was  
9 inhumane.

10 "The Military Government proceeded to lay  
11 down a revised educational program with a view to  
12 reopening schools for Indonesians.

13 "Elementary education in the People's Schools  
14 was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language,  
15 songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical  
16 training was introduced. Instruction in reading and  
17 mathematics, was substantially reduced and the  
18 remainder of the curriculum abolished.

19 "The several types of intermediate schools,  
20 with their varied curricula, were abolished to make  
21 place for one standard type of intermediate school  
22 with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided  
23 into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum  
24 was very much simplified with foreign languages and  
25 general history dropped to make place for Japanese

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1 language and history. Textbooks on the history of  
2 the islands were burned and a new textbook was  
3 introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and  
4 ties of common destiny with Japan.

5 "An entirely new subject was the 'Seisin'  
6 (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity  
7 Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the  
8 Spirit should be able to overcome all material  
9 obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted  
10 to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo  
11 spears if necessary.

12 "Vocational schools were reorganized to  
13 conform with Japanese conceptions.

14 "Batavia Medical College was reopened on  
15 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the 'Foundation  
16 of New Java', under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its  
17 first president was a Japanese professor, assisted  
18 by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most  
19 of them former associate professors at that College.  
20 Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors  
21 were demoted to associate professors and succeeded  
22 by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who  
23 lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese  
24 language had been obligatory from the outset.

25 "The students pledged themselves to enter

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1 the Japanese Military Government service after gra-  
2 duation. Students were billeted and were subject to  
3 a strict and semi-military regimentation under spe-  
4 cially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in  
5 the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater  
6 East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

7 "The curriculum of the Medical College was  
8 reduced from six to four years.

9 "The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges  
10 were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on  
11 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a  
12 limited program covering three years was opened.  
13 Students were subjected to the same routine.

14 "Law College was supplanted by one year  
15 courses for the training of civilian officials and  
16 lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the  
17 Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideals and  
18 the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of stu-  
19 dents was in force. Instruction in the Japanese  
20 Language played an important part.

21 "Private education remained taboo for a  
22 long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private  
23 schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed  
24 to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to  
25 the official program."

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1 "Western teaching and education to Occidentals  
2 were prohibited throughout the occupation. This pro-  
3 hibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion  
4 of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve  
5 the suspect with the Kempei.

6 "Considerable numbers of Indonesian College  
7 students as well as graduates and prominent personal-  
8 ities from the Indonesian community were sent to  
9 Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands  
10 were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia  
11 Journalists' Conference.

12 "All sections of society were organized into  
13 corporations along fascist lines.

14 "The organization and political coordination  
15 of society was carried out among all racial and  
16 political groups as well as among practically all  
17 professions and trades, practically all economic  
18 sections of society, all cultural groups, all reli-  
19 gious groups, the younger generation, sports organiza-  
20 tions, and women's movements. The Japanese authori-  
21 ties kept a close grip on a particular social group  
22 through these organizations and used them to command  
23 aid and support from its members for the Army or the  
24 Military Government. The corporations were required  
25 regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings."

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1 They were utilized for disseminating propaganda  
2 among the members. The Japanese used these corpora-  
3 tions to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct  
4 espionage.

5 "The Propaganda Department maintained close  
6 relations with these organizations. Addresses by  
7 Indonesian officials in these organizations were not  
8 only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by  
9 the Propaganda Department. These corporations were  
10 under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu.  
11 The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes  
12 and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by  
13 Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief,  
14 Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same  
15 for practically all corporations, and stated that the  
16 corporate objective was support to the Japanese Mili-  
17 tary Government.

18 "The executives in these corporations were  
19 appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives  
20 were responsible to the central executive; both were  
21 assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with  
22 approval of the Japanese authorities.

23 "The executive body within a corporation was  
24 authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its  
25 members and membership was obligatory for all within

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1 a given group.

2 "A typical example is provided by the organi-  
3 zation of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the  
4 Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Ser-  
5 vice by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance  
6 No. 28, of the Commander-in-Chief in Java, dated  
7 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

8 "'Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is  
9 established with the purpose of coordinating those  
10 engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train  
11 their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise  
12 their capability in curing, and the care for sanita-  
13 tion, so that in this way they can give their contri-  
14 bution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical  
15 affairs.

16 "'Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medi-  
17 cal experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals,  
18 must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except  
19 enemy nationals.

20 "'Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned  
21 in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special  
22 work necessary for conducting the Military Government  
23 at the order of the Gunseikan."  
24  
25

1           "Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai  
2 can issue orders and instructions necessary for  
3 carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and  
4 8 to the members after obtaining approval from the  
5 Gunseikan.

6           "Article 21.: The Izi Hookookai is super-  
7 vised by the Gunseikan. The work of the branch  
8 officers is supervised by the Syuutyookan (Japanese  
9 Local Governor).'

10           "The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not  
11 all, other professions were similarly organized into  
12 single corporations.

13           "In all fields of economic activity there  
14 was the same picture of obligatory membership, uni-  
15 laterally binding regulations, uniform objects and  
16 Japanese executives.

17           "All artists and scholars were organized in  
18 the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

19           "The importance of a truly Oriental artis-  
20 tic expression was emphasized and Occidental  
21 influences were considered inimical. Paintings and  
22 other artistic expressions were to be and were  
23 adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on  
24 their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia  
25 Co-Prosperity Sphere. This organization, established



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1 in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as  
2 the other corporations: Japanese executives, obliga-  
3 tory support to the Army and the Military Government,  
4 etc.

5 "The Japanese attached much importance to the  
6 spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter  
7 into their own hands completely. The Indonesian  
8 Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized,  
9 was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

10 "As early as December 1942 the Japanese  
11 Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training  
12 of the younger generation to be good citizens of the  
13 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was of such  
14 paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer  
15 was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance  
16 and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese  
17 concern. The organ of control was established by the  
18 creation of April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java  
19 Youth Corps).

20 "Its aims were laid down as follows:

21 "In order to convince the youth of Java so  
22 that they will energetically cooperate with the Mili-  
23 tary Government and render assistance in the building  
24 up of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia,  
25 it is necessary that they be given guidance and

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1 training.'

2 "In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for  
3 local instructors was established, and a Central  
4 Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the  
5 direction of Japanese.

6 "Later, a Seinendan was organized in every  
7 Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength.  
8 Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were  
9 organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United  
10 Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded  
11 by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military  
12 Government.

13 "Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if  
14 insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were  
15 drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and  
16 those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the  
17 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

18 "The official training comprised instruction  
19 in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual  
20 and military training, Japanese physical training, air  
21 raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

22 "The manpower for the Booei Giyu Gun (Defence  
23 Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September  
24 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after  
25 its establishment all other youth organizations were

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1 prohibited.

2 "Sports were also brought in line. On  
3 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The  
4 Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other cor-  
5 porations. In the official explanation of the appli-  
6 cable Ordinance it said:

7 "'The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-  
8 world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java,  
9 from office-employees to school-children, and also  
10 that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering  
11 how important sports is for our spiritual and cor-  
12 poral training, for learning and developing discipline,  
13 and for strengthening the spirit and the determination  
14 to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to  
15 the War of Greater East Asia.'

16 "In every Ken and Si a branch was established;  
17 these branches were organized in their respective Syuu  
18 and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa  
19 Iku Kai.

20 "The Indonesian women of Java were organized  
21 in the Huzin Kai, founded in August 1943."  
22  
23  
24  
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1 "Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

2 " The purpose of this organization is to help the  
3 Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position  
4 of the women of the original inhabitants and also  
5 to raise the women's virtue.

6 "In order to assist in the conduct of the Military  
7 Government, the Zigyobu (Working Section), is created  
8 within the Huzin Kai; this body has to carry out work  
9 necessary for the improvement of conditions behind  
10 the front-line and in the field of savings, education,  
11 public safety and public health.

12 "In order to deepen the conviction of women in their  
13 duties towards the efforts of the defence of the  
14 country in wartime, in the first place to give instruc-  
15 tion in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to  
16 organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish  
17 a close contact with the Seinendan and Keiboodan in  
18 conducting exercises so that in future when there  
19 is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as  
20 possible.'

22 "Developments in the other islands, were  
23 roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the  
24 Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with  
25 a lower standard of efficiency among their own  
Japanese personnel, and at the same time less depend-

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1 ent on the cooperation of the local population  
2 than they were in Java, their chief granary and  
3 supply base, they tackled the process of political  
4 coordination more sketchily.

5 "III. THE THIRD PHASE

6 "From July 1943 until September 1944.

7 "As early as in the first period, there  
8 was some activity by Japanese authorities in the  
9 political field, but the policy adopted locally was  
10 characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at  
11 Batavia as a policy of 'wait and see.'

12 "Immediately after the occupation a pro-  
13 hibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No.  
14 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March  
15 1942, which read as follows:

16 "'Until further notice it shall be strictly  
17 prohibited to commit the following acts:

18 "'a. participation in any organization;  
19 attending any meetings; conducting  
20 propaganda in favour of the enemy;  
21 the posting of printed or illus-  
22 trated placards.'

23 "By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942,  
24 it was further prohibited to 'discuss, engage in  
25 activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning

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the organization and structure of the Government.'

1 "By virtue of these prohibitions certain  
2 Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by  
3 the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only  
4 released much later.

5 "In December 1942 to January 1943 a large  
6 scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who  
7 had engaged in any underground activities of any  
8 kind that might possibly be construed as being  
9 anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had  
10 been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not  
11 released until September 1945. Even after January  
12 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard  
13 against and spy upon all underground activity, which  
14 cost a very large number of victims.

15  
16 "In 1942 the Japanese initiated the 'AAA'  
17 Movement. This name was announced on big placards  
18 displaying the following slogans:

19 "Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Pro-  
20 tector of Asia)

21 "Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader  
22 of Asia)

23 "Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of  
24 Asia)

25 "The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more

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1 striking colour than the other letters. The themes  
2 which this movement elaborated were 'Asia for the  
3 Asiatics' and hate against 'foreigners belonging to  
4 the white race' and against the 'Western exploiters'.  
5 The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of  
6 the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The  
7 language 'the Indonesian people who have the same  
8 ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese,'  
9 appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Com-  
10 mander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7  
11 March 1942. Western influence was represented as  
12 being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was  
13 represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and  
14 the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under  
15 the 'paternal' leadership of Japan was represented  
16 as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the  
17 slogan 'New Java' or 'a New Order in Java', the  
18 meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity  
19 Sphere was not defined. Use of the word 'Indonesia'  
20 in a political sense was not permitted. In most  
21 official publications the Indonesians were referred  
22 to as 'the original inhabitants.'

23 "While the AAA Movement was in full swing,  
24 further contact was sought with the Indonesian  
25 world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied

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1 with the former rule and the rate at which that  
2 rule prepared for independence.

3 "Chief among these was Sukarno, who was  
4 brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and  
5 who formed the so-called 'Ampat Serangkai' (four-  
6 leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These  
7 became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of  
8 those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate  
9 with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese  
10 promises a means of attaining the early independence  
11 for which they were striving. They believed in  
12 these promises and advocated complete cooperation  
13 with the Japanese Military Government.

14 "The Japanese also sought to approach the  
15 group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not dis-  
16 contented with the former rule and had held high  
17 office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-  
18 Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido  
19 Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former  
20 Customs and Political Systems): 'in order to survey  
21 and study the customs and the former governmental  
22 systems of the country, and to contribute towards  
23 the Administration of Java.' Nine Japanese including  
24 the chairman and ten Indonesians, including the 'Four-  
25 leaved Clover' and certain former Chiefs of Depart-



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1 ments, former professors and members of the former  
2 People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never  
3 played an important role and was abolished by the  
4 Japanese in November 1943.

5 "The first request to the Japanese authori-  
6 ties made by the 'Four Serangkai' was to be allowed  
7 to form a party. This request was considered until  
8 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl  
9 Harbour, a big propoganda meeting was held in Batavia,  
10 and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that  
11 a single party for Indonesians only would be per-  
12 mitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to  
13 wait for a decision from Tokyo.

14 "On 9 March 1943 the 'Putera' Movement  
15 was created, deriving its name from a symbolic ab-  
16 breviation of 'Pusat Tenaga Rakyat' denoting 'Center  
17 of the People's Spiritual Power,' while 'Putera'  
18 means 'knight's son.'

19 "Its aims and policy were approximately  
20 similar to those of the previously discussed cor-  
21 porations, except that the name of this people's  
22 movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera  
23 was not a party, but only a 'movement' with leaders  
24 and advisory councils.  
25

"The leaders were appointed by the Commander-

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1 in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council  
2 in which there were approximately equal numbers of  
3 Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated  
4 by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan.  
5 Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with  
6 Japanese approval.

7 "The organization of the Putera was  
8 governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-  
9 Chief, and its aims were officially described by  
10 the Japanese as follows:

11 "The object in arousing the strength and  
12 'efforts of the people is no other than  
13 'to support all measures for winning final  
14 'victory in the Greater East Asia War.  
15 'Since the work of this Movement is very  
16 'closely linked with the policy of the Dai  
17 'Nippon Military Government, all leaders  
18 'must bear in mind that they should have a  
19 'profound knowledge of, and faith in, the  
20 'aims and objectives of the Dai Nippon  
21 'Army.'

22 "In this address the Putera leaders were further  
23 urged:

24 "'Do your utmost always to be fully aware  
25 'of the existing limitations in the present

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1 'situation, and never lead the common  
2 'people astray. I hope you will do your  
3 'best to fulfill the aims and objectives  
4 'of this Movement, and that you will co-  
5 'operate in the establishment of the Co-  
6 'prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia  
7 'and build a New Java to be a member in the  
8 'family of nations within the Co-Prosperity  
9 'Sphere in Greater East Asia.'

10 "The functions of the Putera were officially set out  
11 in the following ten points:

- 12 "1. To impress upon the Indonesian popula-  
13 tion their duties and responsibilities  
14 in regard to the establishment of a  
15 'New Java.'  
16 "2. To eliminate Occidental influences.  
17 "3. To participate in the defence of  
18 Greater East Asia.  
19 "4. To foster self-discipline in bearing  
20 all mental and physical privations  
21 necessary for winning ultimate victory.  
22 "5. To deepen mutual understanding between  
23 the Japanese and Indonesians.  
24 "6. To encourage the study of the Japanese  
25 language. "

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"7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.

"8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.

"9. To encourage thrift and savings.

"10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

"The Putera was only for Indonesians. The new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the 'original inhabitants', were treated as a privileged category, while groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.

"About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called 'foreigners' were strengthened. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. 'Forbidden zones' were introduced

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1 covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern  
2 and Western extremities of Java, where no 'foreigners'  
3 were allowed to enter and for which even Indo-  
4 nesians needed a pass.

5 "The first great enthusiasm for the Putera  
6 dwindled when it became apparent that the activities  
7 of this body, to which the population had looked  
8 forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic  
9 principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda ser-  
10 vice. There was great disappointment when the  
11 originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was  
12 forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead  
13 their own youth movement.

14 "Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great  
15 changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from  
16 an offensive into a defensive position and lines of  
17 communication were seriously threatened.

18 "Against this background, on 16 June 1943,  
19 Prime Minister TOJO made a speech in the Diet wherein,  
20 inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that  
21 the people of Java had shown their readiness to co-  
22 operate with the Japanese Military Administration,  
23 they should be given participation in the government.  
24 On this occasion TOJO also promised so-called inde-  
25 pendence to Burma and to the Philippines."

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1 "In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister  
TOJO visited the Southern Regions in person.

2 "Enroute to Java, TOJO called at Manila  
3 and Singapore, repeating the promise of 'independence'  
4 for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no 'inde-  
5 pendence' was promised, but only participation in  
6 the government. The promise was coupled with the  
7 conditions that there should be complete coopera-  
8 tion with the Japanese Military Administration in  
9 order to win ultimate victory.

10 "Following this promise, in August 1943,  
11 an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu  
12 (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control  
13 remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and  
14 two others were appointed Syuutyoo (Chief of a Resi-  
15 dency) in the two smallest Residencies of Java, with  
16 actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief.  
17 Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially  
18 appointed to lower positions, which they had held  
19 before, and were incorporated into the Japanese  
20 Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding  
21 Japanese rank."  
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1 "The 'San-yo Seido' (Adviser System) was  
2 introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser  
3 to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when ques-  
4 tions were referred to him for advice.

5 "In all Residencies and also in the Special  
6 Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sang Kai,  
7 was established to advise the Resident in matters of  
8 local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-  
9 in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance  
10 prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to  
11 be appointed and elected, respective. The 'elections'  
12 were indirect with nomination of the candidates not  
13 public and the ballot not secret. The function of the  
14 Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local  
15 government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right  
16 to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could  
17 only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings  
18 were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of  
19 the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

20 "The sessions were only public for the  
21 opening address, which was drafted and censored before-  
22 hand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper  
23 were held behind closed doors. At the final session  
24 motions, discussed and settled during the closed  
25 meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed

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1       unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer  
2       than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed  
3       from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo.  
4       Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuwoo  
5       Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

6                 "This was established on 5 September 1943,  
7       by Ordinance No. 36, 'for the speedy and efficient  
8       execution of the measures of the Military Government.'  
9       Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated  
10      in advance by the Commander-in-chief. Of the remainder,  
11      eighteen were 'elected' by the various Sangi Kai, and  
12      two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure  
13      was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They  
14      were only empowered to offer advice in respect to ques-  
15      tions put by the Commander-in-Chief or the Resident,  
16      and to make suggestions relating thereto."

17                THE PRESIDENT: Would you care to rest for a  
18      moment or two?

19                MRS. STROOKER: I would like a drink, your  
20      Honor, thank you.

21                "The actual direction of affairs rested with  
22      the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuwoo Sangi-  
23      In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also  
24      the other officials of his office. The function of  
25      this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing



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1       correspondence as well as to exercise internal super-  
2       vision over the activities of the Tyuuo Sangi-In.

3       The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-  
4       in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secre-  
5       tary of Prime Minister TOJO.

6                 "Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory  
7       Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office.  
8       From the very beginning these organizations were used  
9       as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit  
10      labour and 'Volunteers' for the military organizations  
11      and to encourage the population to increase agricultur-  
12      al output and to deliver the crops to the Military  
13      Government.

14                "As a further local participation measure  
15      wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans  
16      of Central-Java in elementary education, local govern-  
17      ment at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

18                "Almost simultaneously with the establish-  
19      ment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later  
20      officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the  
21      Japanese Military Administration took the view that  
22      the Indonesian population of Java ought to give con-  
23      crete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister  
24      TOJO's promise now that it had been translated into  
25      fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their

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1 preparedness to support the Japanese Military Adminis-  
2 tration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

3 "The Propaganda service ensured that it should  
4 appear to the outside world that the inhabitants them-  
5 selves were desirous of having their own army.

6 "At the end of August 1943, an old friend of  
7 Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed 'with his own  
8 blood,' to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permis-  
9 sion to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a  
10 large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief  
11 declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was  
12 favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that  
13 he considered, moreover, that the population of Java  
14 was very rightly desirous of offering some return for  
15 TOJO's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated  
16 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Booei Giyu Gun  
17 (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland).  
18 The aim of the Corps was 'to call upon the original  
19 inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of  
20 Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence  
21 of Greater East Asia.'

22 "Article 4 laid down:

23 "The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly  
24 convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of  
25 defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake

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1 in the defence of the home country in the respective  
2 Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the  
3 Dai Nippon Army.'

4 "By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was  
5 commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was  
6 emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form  
7 part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers,  
8 but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It  
9 would not be used outside Java and would consist of  
10 volunteers.

11 "Recruiting for the first levy started immedi-  
12 ately, but with the following levies it appeared that  
13 there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each  
14 new levy each Regency was told how many 'volunteers'  
15 were required in order to bring formations up to  
16 strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese  
17 propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps.  
18 In October 1943 the training of the 'officers' was  
19 started and lasted three months.

20 "The object was to form one or more battalions  
21 of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would  
22 together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu.  
23 At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had  
24 been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task  
25 of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road

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1 junctions, bridges and other strategically important  
2 points. Weapons were only supplied to these 'volunteers'  
3 for the duration of the drills, and training mostly  
4 took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special  
5 section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army,  
6 an intelligence organization, was charged with train-  
7 ing, and at the same time made use of it both for  
8 spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them  
9 as spies.

10 "Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of  
11 Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the  
12 occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly re-  
13 cruited and partly compelled to serve as a 'Heiho'  
14 (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the  
15 Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They  
16 were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard  
17 camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho  
18 were sent off the island.

19 "The Japanese Navy similarly made use of  
20 Indonesian Heiho.

21 "Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught  
22 to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese,  
23 and the regulations were written in Japanese. They  
24 wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the  
25 training was instruction in 'Seisin' (Spirit). "

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1 "One of the important aims of Japanese prop-  
2 aganda was the increase of farming crops and their  
3 delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The  
4 island of Java had to provide large quantities of food  
5 for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting  
6 in the East. Besides, the Japanese Army of Occupation  
7 was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which  
8 before the war had barely been able to meet the essen-  
9 tial food requirements of its own population, was ex-  
10 pected to produce more. This increase in production  
11 was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over  
12 irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned  
13 Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and  
14 by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the  
15 pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of  
16 desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the  
17 climate and geographic conditions. All this further  
18 reduced the area available for food crops.

19 "It became less and less advantageous for  
20 the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Jap-  
21 anese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese  
22 adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Govern-  
23 ment to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level.  
24 As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its  
25 purchasing value, the official price for rice soon

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1 fell far below its former value relative to other  
2 commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with  
3 the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

4 "The Japanese authorities ordered that 60 per  
5 cent of the harvest of food produced had to be delivered  
6 to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat  
7 the black market in rice and other food products, such  
8 as the imposing of closed regional economic areas,  
9 enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing  
10 of rice -- except for individual consumption -- in  
11 other than 'coordinated' mills was prohibited.

12 "The propaganda service exerted all its powers  
13 to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in  
14 order to obtain more produce. It also tried to per-  
15 suade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the  
16 Japanese Military Administration.

17 "Not only in Java, but throughout the  
18 Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for  
19 the building of military fortifications, airfields,  
20 strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such  
21 labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propa-  
22 ganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlist-  
23 ment of these coolies. In this, at first, the Japanese  
24 were successful. When the inhabitants learned how  
25 these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their

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1 desire to work for them practically disappeared. This  
2 became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not  
3 return, and no news whatever was received from them.

4 "The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription,  
5 whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies  
6 had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself,  
7 and for labour outside that island.

8 "In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous  
9 campaign in which the 'Prajurit Ekonomi' (the economic  
10 warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task  
11 by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer  
12 permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also  
13 a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had  
14 to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the  
15 coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one  
16 of these was that the houses of relatives left behind  
17 were provided with a sign 'Prajurit Pekerja', and it  
18 was pointed out to the public that one should honour  
19 such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was  
20 said henceforth to guarantee special protection.  
21 Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed  
22 certain privileges in the distribution of scarce  
23 commodities, such as clothing -- a privilege enjoyed  
24 only after all government officials had received their  
25 share."

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1 "These labourers received less care than the  
2 prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was  
3 aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions  
4 and medical care. While the correct figures of those  
5 who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not  
6 known, the official estimates of the Japanese after  
7 the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of  
8 whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since  
9 the war 's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane  
10 maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were  
11 not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent  
12 altogether. During certain periods, 'romushas' who had  
13 died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily  
14 carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

15 "In religious matters the propaganda service  
16 made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from  
17 the population.

18 "These activities were especially directed at  
19 influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large major-  
20 ity of the population, while propaganda among other  
21 religions was of far less importance. Priests and  
22 preachers of an 'enemy race' were forbidden to conduct  
23 services except for people of an 'enemy race'. If an  
24 'enemy' priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among  
25 the congregation he was to see to it that the latter  
left on penalty of very severe punishment."



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1            "This policy embodied three principles. First,  
2 the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector  
3 of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be  
4 respected.

5            "For the second point the Gunseikan declared that  
6 religious associations would soon be authorized to  
7 carry on their activities and that they had the  
8 noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East  
9 Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

10           "For the third point, the Gunseikan declared  
11 that the cooperation of the Islamic community in  
12 respect to education was acceptable in so far as it  
13 was directed at full support to the Japanese Army  
14 and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia  
15 Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious  
16 education would be permitted and officially sup-  
17 ported with books and other facilities.

18           "The Syuumubu established a permanent training  
19 centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks  
20 in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty  
21 kiais and oelamas each.

22           "These courses were also used to test whether  
23 Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a  
24 means of selecting suitable collaborators. These  
25 accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural

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1 population, and were responsible for the production  
2 and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient  
3 supply of labourers and for enlistments as 'volunteer'  
4 or heiho.

5 "The Japanese adopted the old device of working  
6 on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to  
7 persuade the kiais and oelamas to declare the  
8 Greater East Asia War as a 'sabil' (holy) war against  
9 the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the  
10 Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the  
11 'common ancestry,' the 'common race' and the 'des-  
12 tiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians'  
13 were pointed out.

14 "In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances  
15 occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The  
16 Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu  
17 (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he  
18 was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular  
19 kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one  
20 day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his re-  
21 ligious institution, leaving the direction of the  
22 Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

24 "From November 1943 the Mashumi became the or-  
25 ganization through which the Japanese authorities  
ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it

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1 carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded  
2 public opinion and executed espionage.

3 "The relationship between the Mashumi and the  
4 Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last  
5 the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the  
6 Syuumubu.

7 "Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka  
8 (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under  
9 locally prominent Kiais. They had the duty of making  
10 Military Administration policy understood in the  
11 villages. These agencies were gradually extended  
12 even to the smallest local subdivisions under a  
13 local Kiai.

14 "The Syuumubu issued a publication called  
15 'Asshu'lah,' edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese,  
16 but printed in Arab script, the only script the  
17 orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was dis-  
18 tributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

19 "The Japanese also made several efforts to  
20 coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively  
21 few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class.  
22 The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials  
23 of the many Chinese associations (which had all been  
24 dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization,  
25 but the effort completely failed."

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1 "The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish  
2 the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few promi-  
3 nent pro-Nanking Chinese.

4 "The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the cus-  
5 tomary lines, with its leaders appointed by the  
6 Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the  
7 Japanese Military Administration as the prime object.  
8 No action was taken on their own initiative and the  
9 organization was used to disseminate Japanese pro-  
10 paganda and as an espionage organization.

11 "At the same time the Japanese made certain  
12 concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese  
13 private school education, and for sending small re-  
14 mittances to their families in Japanese-occupied  
15 parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

16 "The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle  
17 strata of technical and administrative occupations,  
18 were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in  
19 the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available  
20 for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained  
21 Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

22 "The first effort to secure the cooperation of  
23 the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The  
24 Eurasians who had been regarded as 'aliens,' gra-  
25 dually began to be treated as belonging to the

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1 indigenous population next to the Indonesian group.  
2 The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians  
3 had to realize that from then on they were to feel and  
4 act as members of the Greater East Asia community  
5 under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce  
6 their western ancestry.

7 "The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit  
8 number of their children to village schools which had  
9 so far been reserved for Indonesian children.  
10 Separate schools for Eurasian children remained for-  
11 bidden.

12 "In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided  
13 to dissolve the Putera and to replace it by an or-  
14 ganization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts  
15 to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

16 "According to the Japanese it had failed to reach  
17 the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the  
18 total population of Java and supplied the man power  
19 for army and labor services and the production of food  
20 crops for the Japanese. The movement became too  
21 strongly nationalistic.

22 "The new organization followed a pattern used  
23 in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with  
24 the organization for the distribution of essential  
25 supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of

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1 Java was divided into small communities of about 20  
2 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Asso-  
3 ciations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on cen-  
4 tralized lines. They were headed by a Kumityoo, who  
5 was appointed from above and who was responsible for  
6 the execution of the orders given to him. All  
7 existing associations, social, fire precautionary,  
8 agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

9 "The duties of this institution were very ex-  
10 tensive. Not only distribution, but also regular  
11 training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare  
12 were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the  
13 community had to lecture at least once a week to his  
14 people on Japanese ideology and the practical appli-  
15 cation thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims  
16 in regard to the population were extolled according  
17 to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service.  
18 This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially  
19 trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

20 "Other meetings were held for larger units  
21 (called Aza; a village was divided into two or more  
22 Aza) once a month. One member of each family had to  
23 attend these meetings.

24 "All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi,  
25 including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members

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1 of the organization. Only membership gave distri-  
2 bution facilities.

3 "On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were  
4 working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially  
5 dissolved and the 'Jawa Hooke Kai' (Corporation for  
6 Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic  
7 groups was officially installed. This corporation  
8 remained as the instrument of Japanese control un-  
9 til August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

10 "According to the official explanation accompany-  
11 ing the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the  
12 Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the  
13 Military Administration to carry out its instruc-  
14 tions in an atmosphere of 'friendly cooperation' with  
15 all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to  
16 see that these instructions reached all the people  
17 and it was to work in close relationship with the  
18 Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for  
19 seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive  
20 support of the Military Administration. According  
21 to this explanation the Jawa Hookoo Kai was in fact  
22 an executive body, based on the principle of com-  
23 plete coordination of all inhabitants and was,  
24 therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

25 "The central direction of the Jawa Kookoo Kai

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1 was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and con-  
2 sisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau  
3 under the supervision of the central direction had  
4 several Indonesians. Branches were established in  
5 all localities. The Ku Hooko Kai, the smallest union,  
6 supervised one or more Aza which in turn supervised  
7 a number of Tonari Gumi.

8 "The leader of these local Hooko Kai was the  
9 head of the local administration, assisted by a  
10 council (Kaigi), appointed by him. A session of the  
11 Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when  
12 ways and means of promoting assistance to the  
13 Military Government had to be discussed.

14 "The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the  
15 Jawa Hooko Kai. Their task was:

16 "a. active support to police and Keibooden  
17 (village guards) in the defence of their country  
18 and during air raids, against enemy parachutists,  
19 enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.

20 "b. to make the inhabitants understand the  
21 aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military  
22 Administration.

23 "c. stimulation of increased food production;  
24 encouragement of delivery of these products to the  
25 authorities; the distribution of daily necessities."



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1 "d. general support to the Military Administra-  
2 tion, e.g., by protecting members of families of  
3 Heiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romushas  
4 (coolies) who had left their villages.

5 "e. mutual help and assistance.

6 "The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations  
7 pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, in-  
8 cluding the Japanese. The Huzin Kai (Womens' Cor-  
9 poration), the Mashumi (the Islamic Corporation), the  
10 Kakyoo Sookai (Corporation of Chinese), the Tai Tku  
11 Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Sidosya  
12 (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were  
13 all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

14 "The activities by the Eurasians for their  
15 mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by  
16 the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in  
17 prison during the occupation as a result of ill treat-  
18 ment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by  
19 crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or  
20 sentences by courts martial.

21 "Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured  
22 in such a way that false confessions were a daily  
23 occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh  
24 victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A  
25 typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak

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1 on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200  
2 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the  
3 local nobility, were executed on an entirely un-  
4 founded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the  
5 Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei.  
6 Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies  
7 were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases  
8 where people of all races were most cruelly tortured  
9 on the strength of reports of a usually entirely  
10 innocent conversation, by means of the 'water-cure,'  
11 electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa con-  
12 strictors, etc."

13 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.  
14 We will adjourn until half past one.

15 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
16 taken.)

17  
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## AFTERNOON SESSION

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Strooker.

4 MRS. STROOKER: I will continue reading from  
5 page 44 where I left off, your Honor.

6 "Outside Java the same policy was adhered to  
7 in regard to political and religious activities.  
8 Here again, following TOJO's promise, a number of  
9 prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed  
10 to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to  
11 the Sangi Kai (local Advisory Councils) were estab-  
12 lished but this process was considerably slower  
13 than in Java. Territories administered by the  
14 Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under  
15 Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes,  
16 Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuoo Sangi-In  
17 (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never  
18 reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuoo Sangi-In  
19 for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in  
20 February 1945. No organization similar to the  
21 Putera was permitted in spite of requests from  
22 Indonesian intellectuals.

23  
24 "Compared with Java, propaganda in the other  
25 islands was more concentrated on the younger genera-  
tion."

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1            "'Volunteers Corps' similar to the Giyu Gun  
2 were established.

3            "The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were  
4 given full play during the course of 1944. Using  
5 the slogan of 'Asia for the Asiatics' and teaching  
6 religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all  
7 sections of society by holding courses of instruc-  
8 tion. The first group to be dealt with was that of  
9 school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads  
10 of villages, minor officials of the civil service,  
11 higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers  
12 and personnel of all government offices. Even the  
13 smallest group was given attention in turn.

14            "This propaganda, however crude, was to some  
15 extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions  
16 and the distress and hardships suffered by the  
17 population.

18            "The Japanese clearly realized the potential  
19 dangers of this situation. It was the task of  
20 the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in  
21 some other direction by way of distraction from  
22 Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing  
23 campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially  
24 against the United States and Britain, which countries,  
25 together with Holland were held responsible for all

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1 the sufferings of the population.

2 "IV. FOURTH PHASE

3 "September 1944 - August 1945.

4 "The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile  
5 had considerably changed. The break-through at  
6 Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very  
7 foundations of the Japanese defense. The TOJO  
8 Cabinet was succeeded by the KOISO Cabinet, which  
9 recognized that it had to face the isolation of  
10 the Southern Regions, and the necessity for the  
11 Japanese troops there to stand by themselves, and  
12 that it was more and more important to gain popular  
13 cooperation.

14  
15 "When the way in which TOJO's promise was going  
16 to be realized became known in August 1943, disappoint-  
17 ment was expressed rather clearly among those prom-  
18 inent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in  
19 Japan's promises. The Japanese were warned that  
20 they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspir-  
21 ations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain  
22 the full cooperation from this group.

23 "On 7 September 1944, in the Diet, Prime Minister  
24 KOISO, after having promised Korea and Formosa equality  
25 of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, made a promise of  
independence for the East Indies. (Exhibit No. 277)."

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1 "In this speech it was not made clear exactly  
2 what region would gain independence when granted.

3 "The promise of independence was conditioned on  
4 the people defending their own territory for the  
5 support of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity  
6 Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence  
7 was only defined by reference to membership in the  
8 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an  
9 application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.

10 "Previously, towards the end of August 1944,  
11 the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed  
12 confidentially of the contents of this statement,  
13 and issued certain secret orders to various Japanese  
14 organizations. Those orders, Prosecution documents  
15 Nos. 2756 and 2757, were recovered in the building,  
16 used by the Gunseikanbu during the Japanese occupation  
17 of Batavia."  
18

19 With the Court's permission I offer in  
20 evidence prosecution's document 2756.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document  
23 No. 2756 will receive exhibit No. 1352.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit  
No. 1352 and received in evidence.)

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1           MRS. STROOKER: I beg to be allowed to read  
2 exhibit No. 1352.

3           THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

4           MRS. STROOKER: (Reading): "SECRET.

5           "Notification regarding measures ensuing from  
6 the Proclamation of Admission of the Independence  
7 of the East-Indies.

8           "From: Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps

9           "To:" (blank)                   (September 1944)

10          "We hereby notify you that, based on the Prime  
11 Minister's proclamation regarding the granting of  
12 the independence of the East-Indies at the 85th  
13 Special Session of the Diet today, the 7th of  
14 September, it is decided that the Army will meet the  
15 situation properly generally in accordance with the  
16 following stipulations:

17          "1. The purport of the granting of independence  
18 shall be thoroughly understood (based on the Prime  
19 Minister's speech).

20          "2. It is not permitted to touch upon the time  
21 /T.N. of the granting of independence/ the sphere of  
22 the East-Indies nor the form of government until  
23 these are finally decided.

24          "3. National consciousness must be raised to  
25 the highest degree; especially during the execution

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1 of the war this must be utilized to strengthen  
2 defence, co-operation with Military Government, and  
3 to make Japan and Java one and inseparable.

4 "4. There shall be no great alterations in  
5 the operations and the business structure of the  
6 Military Government. However, participation in  
7 the Government shall be enlarged and strengthened,  
8 and political training shall be carried out.

9 "5. Nationalistic speeches and activities  
10 shall be actively allowed; for that purpose the  
11 following measures shall be taken:

12 "a. Permission to sing the national anthem  
13 and to use the national flag;

14 "b. The use of nationalistic terms such as  
15 'the Indonesian people' shall not be restricted.

16 "c. The appointment of nationalists.

17 "d. Those advocates of independence who are  
18 connected with the Communist Party shall not be  
19 allowed to exist.

20 "6. Investigation and study necessary for  
21 independence executed by the local inhabitants under  
22 the guidance of Military Government shall be recognized.

23 "7. Thorough measures shall be taken for the  
24 spreading of the Japanese language, the adoption of  
25 Japanese institutions and the infusion of the Japanese



culture.

1 "8. There shall be no distinction between the  
2 natives and other races, especially those who are  
3 to be treated as local inhabitants, but they must  
4 be made to understand the elemental point that they  
5 must participate in the construction of a new  
6 society, and must co-operate with all their might.

7 "9. All Japanese must realize and put into  
8 practice the mission of this new era in which the  
9 divine work of HakkoIchu(T.N. Same as 'ichiu')  
10 (T.N. the whole world one family) is to be carried  
11 out. Especially the idea of colonial subjugation  
12 has to be banned; and towards the natives we must  
13 be like parents and elder brothers and sisters,  
14 approaching them with affectionate feelings while  
15 instructing and guiding them sternly. Haughty and  
16 arrogant speech or behavior shall not be allowed under  
17 any circumstances.

18 "10. In guiding the public opinion stress shall  
19 be laid on the raising of national consciousness,  
20 the intensification of war-mindedness, confidence  
21 in and reliance upon Japan and the desperate determina-  
22 tion to win complete victory ensuing therefrom, and  
23 on the manifestation of leadership in carrying out  
24 these things."  
25

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1 "11. Looking at the other side of the joy on  
2 the granting of independence we naturally anticipate  
3 the confusion accompanying shifts and changes of  
4 powers, but it is absolutely forbidden to meddle  
5 in these; we must guide them always standing aloof.

6 "12. Although the insatiability which springs  
7 from the Indonesian character may sometimes provoke  
8 our resentment, we must not be hostile, but guide  
9 them, sternly indicating the established policy;  
10 a so-called flattering attitude is not allowed.

11 "13. As for the instruction of the Volunteer  
12 Defence Corps, on this occasion particularly we  
13 must scrutinize the attitude of officers and men  
14 towards them, and the main points of the instruction  
15 in order to deepen the feeling of unity; and we must  
16 not let them get the feeling that they form an inde-  
17 pendent army.

18 "Special attention shall be paid to the training  
19 of instructors. This also applies to the Hei-Ho (T.N.  
20 auxiliary troops).

21 "14. In observing the real situation of the  
22 people we must not fall into the superficial view  
23 that the aim of securing their confidence in Japan  
24 and raising their war-mindedness has been attained,  
25 by judging from their enthusiasm and festive excitement;

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1 but we must observe them, guiding them firmly and  
2 continually according to our principle of guidance.

3 "15. Planning and execution in the field of  
4 general direction shall be the duty of Military  
5 Government, and others must co-operate with it.  
6 There must be no inconsistency whatsoever in carrying  
7 out the policy.

8 "16. In general the several functions will be  
9 as follows:

10 "a. The 7th day of September is designated  
11 as National Independence Commemoration Day, and the  
12 week from the 7th until the 13th shall be the National  
13 Festival (temporary name) and thanksgiving functions  
14 will be performed at that time.

15 "b. On the 7th the Provincial Governors  
16 shall assemble and the Commander-in-Chief will  
17 indicate the policy to cope with the new situation.

18 "c. On the 8th it is anticipated that a  
19 ceremony will be held at which the representatives  
20 of the inhabitants will express their gratitude.

21 "d. On the 9th or the 10th a special session  
22 of the Council shall be convened in every province  
23 and the special municipality, and on the 11th, a  
24 special session of the Central Council."

25 I may mention that I forgot to read the date,

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1 your Honor: 7 September 1944.

2 I tender in evidence prosecution document  
3 2757.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document  
6 2757 will receive exhibit No. 1353.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
8 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit  
9 No. 1353 and received in evidence.)

10 MRS. STROOKER: I beg the Court's leave to  
11 be allowed to read prosecution's exhibit 1353.

12 "CONFIDENTIAL

13 "Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlighten-  
14 ment attendant on the Proclamation re Recognition  
15 of the Independence of the EAST-INDIES.

16 "GUNSEIKAMBU (Inspectorate of Military  
17 Administration).

18 "September 7, 1944. (Showa 19)

19 "Policy.

20 "Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-  
21 Chief, to promote the racial consciousness of the  
22 INDONESIANS and to incite this into a hostile feeling  
23 for the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate  
24 the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

25 "Outline."

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1 "1. The promotion of the racial consciousness  
2 of the INDONESIAN Race by the establishment of  
3 racial ideals shall be planned.

4 "2. The responsibility and efforts of the race  
5 shall be stressed, in addition to which they shall  
6 be made to realize their aggravated mission for  
7 the complete prosecution of the War, and the  
8 inspiration which may be aroused shall be incited  
9 into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution  
10 of the War to exterminate the U.S.A. and BRITAIN.

11 "3. Measures necessary for the Independence  
12 shall be left entirely to the ARMY, and they (T.N.  
13 the people) shall be made to understand the necessity  
14 of offering themselves entirely for defense and  
15 services to the Military Administration during the  
16 War.

17 "4. They shall be made to look back upon the  
18 process of the glorious spreading of creed of  
19 'Hakko-iu (T.N. same as ICHI-U, i.e. making the  
20 whole world as one family) and the realization of  
21 the national policy of the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) by  
22 means of the independence and participation in the  
23 government of BURMA and the Philippines; in this way  
24 they shall be induced to increase their confidence  
25 in and reliance upon the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) and also

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1 to manifest their deep emotion for the August Virtue  
2 of His Majesty and the sincerity of their devotion  
3 to the Emperor.

4 "5. Those who have blamed persons co-operating  
5 with the Army or those who have been negative in  
6 their co-operation with JAPAN while maintaining  
7 a dubious attitude, shall be ostracised, and the  
8 fact that co-operation with the Military Administra-  
9 tion implies the prosperity of INDONESIA shall be  
10 clarified, thereby forcing out and checking all  
11 critical speech and actions.

12 "6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the  
13 GREAT EAST ASIA Conference and the Joint Declaration  
14 of GREAT EAST ASIA, and by the process of realization  
15 (T.N. of the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to  
16 become conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding  
17 the construction.

18 "7. In order to check the enemies' counter-  
19 propaganda beforehand, they shall be reminded of the  
20 past when they groaned for ages in misery under  
21 Jewish Oppression under the external appearance of  
22 dazzling splendour, by tracing back the history of  
23 the atrocities of the U.S.A., BRITAIN and HOLLAND.

24 "8. The co-operation of the CHINESE Residents,  
25 HALF-CASTES and ARABS is also worthy of attention."

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1 "It shall be emphasized that these people, too, while  
2 basking in the new glory similar to the INDONESIANS,  
3 must, together with the latter, exert themselves  
4 towards the construction of a new society; and the  
5 policy of concord of all the peoples with the INDO-  
6 NESIAN Race as the nucleus shall be adhered to.

7 "9. The new policy shall be glorified by  
8 utilizing the actual results and the present con-  
9 dition of the co-operation of the people, the policy  
10 of the organization of the Volunteer Defence Corps  
11 and the participation in the Government as the  
12 background.

13 "Measures.

14 "1. Every kind of information-organization and  
15 primitive method shall be utilized.

16 "2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins;  
17 there shall be no suspension of publication on  
18 Sundays; and on the first and second days four page  
19 newspapers shall be issued.

20 "3. As for movies, the functions during a week  
21 after the official announcement shall be filmed and  
22 edited, by also taking into consideration the effects  
23 in foreign countries.

24 "4. In the broadcasting the text of the official  
25 announcement in TOKYO, the statement of the Commander-

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1 in-Chief and the talks of the Authorities of the  
2 Military Administration, etc., shall be repeated,  
3 accompanied by clear and cheerful music. Moreover,  
4 the inspiration and the determination of the native  
5 inhabitants shall be put in the daily programmes.

6 "5. The national flag of Great JAPAN shall be  
7 hoisted for one week from the day of the Official  
8 Announcement.

9 "6. The details of this Outline shall be planned  
10 and executed by the Department of Propaganda in co-  
11 operation with the Bureau of Native Affairs.

12 "To be distributed for office-purposes to:

13 "Department of Propaganda (including news corres-  
14 pondents),

15 "Bureau of Native Affairs,

16 "Bureau of Japanese Affairs."  
17  
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1 "The promise made on 7 September 1944 by  
2 Premier KOISO was announced in Java by the Commander-  
3 in-Chief in the following words:

4 "As for the nation that will be set up in  
5 the future it would be a just and true nation that  
6 will become a link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-  
7 prosperity Sphere and has the duty to contribute to  
8 the development of Greater East Asia under the leader-  
9 ship of Dai Nippon.

10 "Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise  
11 the standard of the nation that will be set up so that  
12 it would become one of the Greater East Asiatic nations  
13 in the true sense, then it is very necessary that they  
14 train themselves ceaselessly to become a Greater East  
15 Asiatic people until the final victory is achieved,  
16 i.e., by thoroughly convincing themselves as a Greater  
17 East Asiatic people.

18 "Suppose the final victory will not be won,  
19 then the construction of Greater East Asia can not be  
20 materialized, and as a matter of course, the East Indies  
21 will not get their independence.

22 "Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all  
23 their efforts to win the final victory in a sphere  
24 of perfect friendship between all nationalities.

25 "They must patiently endure all hardships and  
they also must remove all obstacles that might come

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1 up in the future.

2 "And, therefore, while waiting for the ar-  
3 rival of the amount of that glorious independence, all  
4 the inhabitants must work hard for the continuance of  
5 this war. With such an attitude the duties for the  
6 future can be fulfilled.'

7 "The 'gratitude' of the Indonesians for  
8 KOISO's promise remained the theme on which the Japanese  
9 propaganda continued to play for months to come.

10 "At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters  
11 were instructed to advise the Ministry of War as to  
12 what area should be declared 'independent' the date on  
13 which it was to take place, and the form of the new  
14 Government and state.

15 "The Military Government of Java in reply  
16 submitted a report entitled 'Gist of Measures for  
17 Guiding Independence', in which it was proposed to  
18 make Java independent first. Measures suggested to  
19 strengthen the national consciousness were the creation  
20 of the Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of  
21 the State), and increased participation in the admin-  
22 istration.

23 "Only two practical steps were taken at first  
24 to carry out KOISO's promise. On 8 September 1944  
25 the population was allowed henceforth to fly the

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1 Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag but  
2 only on certain specified holidays, subject to strict  
3 regulations as to place and size. On Government build-  
4 ings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was  
5 to be flown. On that same date permission was given  
6 to sing the 'Indonesia Raya'-song (Song of Great In-  
7 donesia) as the national anthem.

8 "On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief  
9 convoked a special session of the Tyuuko Sangi-In  
10 (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the  
11 question of how the Indonesians could show to Japan  
12 and her arm their intense gratitude for the promise of  
13 future independence, and how the will of the people 'to  
14 fight to bring about the destruction of America and  
15 England could still further be enhanced.'

16 "Another extraordinary session of the Tyuuko  
17 Sangi-In was held on 17 November 1944, and a motion  
18 was adopted to lay down a so-called 'Pancha Dharma'  
19 (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a 'compass'  
20 for the Indonesian population.

21 "This 'Pancha-Dharma' reads as follows:

22 ""For the Indonesian People, to wit:

23 "1. We, along with other nations in Greater  
24 East Asia, are in this war one in life and death with  
25 Dai Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all

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1 sincerity because this present war stands up for jus-  
2 tice and righteousness.

3 "12. We found an Indonesian State that is  
4 independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous  
5 and that always will value the spiritual merits of  
6 Dai Nippon, and that will live as a true member in the  
7 family-sphere of Greater East Asia.

8 "13. We will sincerely endeavor to achieve  
9 a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating  
10 our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop  
11 the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's  
12 culture.

13 "14. While maintaining strong and lasting  
14 friendly relations with the nations of Greater East  
15 Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart  
16 and with an unwavering mind while we will always be-  
17 lieve in God Almighty.

18 "15. With a united and burning desire we  
19 strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting World  
20 Peace based on the family-conception of the whole man-  
21 kind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu.'

22 "On 1 December 1944 participation in the Ad-  
23 ministration was extended to the appointment of Indo-  
24 nesean 'HukuOSyuutyokan' (Vice Governors) in several  
25 Syuu, and of more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) to the

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1 various Departments of the Gunsoikanbu. A Sanyo-  
2 Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established to meet re-  
3 gularly to advise the Gunsoikanbu in the periods of  
4 when the Tyuuo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was  
5 not in session.

6 "Meanwhile the propaganda service had intro-  
7 duced a new slogan for the 'Benteng Forjuangan Jawa'  
8 (Java One Fortress). The object was to bring the popu-  
9 lation to the maximum war effort in view of the threat  
10 of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air  
11 Raid Defense and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine  
12 but besides, the population was worked upon by the  
13 powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla  
14 fighting. They were instructed in the methods of  
15 destroying small enemy formations with primitive  
16 weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass  
17 action.

18 "During a propaganda meeting in Batavia ef-  
19 figies of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Van der Plas (a  
20 prominent Dutch administrator) were burned after having  
21 been paraded through the whole town. American, British,  
22 and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled  
23 upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration.  
24 Religious propaganda urged the Moh~~am~~medans to declare  
25 Holy War on the Occidental Powers."

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1           "Three new semi-military organizations were  
2 established during this period, and the Tonari Gumi,  
3 finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboo-  
4 daain the defense of the village. On no occasions  
5 were these simple villagers ever told that such action  
6 on their part in war time would constitute a violation  
7 of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the op-  
8 posing party to treat them as 'franc tireurs'.

9           "This training had an unintended result. One  
10 night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer  
11 Defense Corps at Blitar (East Java) made a surprise  
12 attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured  
13 the arms as well as key-points in the town, for instance,  
14 Kompei HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange etc.  
15 Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued,  
16 the victims being all non-Indonesians and included  
17 Japanese. In the course of the next days the movement  
18 was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out  
19 by violence and bloodshed.

20           "There was also increasing resistance against  
21 Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially  
22 against the delivery of agricultural produce and the  
23 recruiting of native labor.

24           "In order to overcome this resistance, strong  
25 measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian

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1 officials who were held responsible for the poor re-  
2 sults in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substi-  
3 tuted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite poli-  
4 ticians. These new officials had come to the fore  
5 through the Java Hookoo Kai, or through the religious  
6 courses. The new arrivals in the Indenosean adminis-  
7 trative corps were not fully competent, and they always  
8 had Japanese advisers. Approximately one-third of the  
9 corps was staffed with nationalists favourably dis-  
10 posed towards the Japanese. Required delivery of  
11 foodstuff and recruitment of coolies and volunteers  
12 were not achieved by many Ken.

13 "The Japanese realized that they were in-  
14 creasingly dependent upon the co-operation of the people  
15 and that they would have to bear the consequences of  
16 their own propaganda.

17 "In September 1942 already, Count Hideo  
18 Kodama, then adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of Java  
19 visited Tokyo to try to arouse interest in local views  
20 concerning the East Indies. In November 1943 Sukarno  
21 was sent to Japan and pressed Premier TOJO to grant  
22 independence, but obtained no definite answer. At the  
23 end of 1944, HAYASHI, the then highest civil adviser  
24 to the Java Military Government went to Tokyo with the  
25 consent of the Commander-in-Chief in Java to try to

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1 persuade Japan to support puppet-independence for the  
2 East Indies.

3 "A Ken Koku Gokuin (Academy for the Building  
4 of the State) was instituted on 29 April 1945 with the  
5 object of influencing the minds of the future 'leaders'  
6 of the 'independent' state and of imbuing them with  
7 ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere  
8 led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this  
9 leadership.

10 "Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher  
11 authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945,  
12 a conference took place at Singapore, attended by  
13 Chiefs of General Affairs Departments of all areas  
14 under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising  
15 Java and Sumatra and commanded by ITAGAKI. At this  
16 conference the Soomubutyoo of Java explained to what  
17 extent the national consciousness of the Indonesians  
18 had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact  
19 that there was no other way to regain the confidence  
20 of the population but by carrying out the promise of  
21 independence.  
22

23 "Field Marshal TERAUCHI's Headquarters at  
24 Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Head-  
25 quarters on 'independence'. Java promptly responded  
with a proposition to declare the whole of the Nether-



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lands East India independent within a year. Singapore  
dodged the issue and said that it was not yet time to  
initiate independence.

"Subsequently, on 20 May 1945, at the insti-  
gation of ITAGAKI, a meeting was called of all Chiefs  
of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that  
the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed  
to convene a 'Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin' (Committee  
for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This com-  
mittee was installed on 28 May 1945 and took a solemn  
oath of loyalty to live and to die with Japan."

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1            "'Naval' territories (Borneo, the Celebes,  
2            the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented  
3            at this conference, and measures discussed only  
4            related to 'Army' areas which narrowed down to  
5            Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged  
6            behind that of Java, and it was not until February  
7            1945 that a Central Advisory Council for Sumatra  
8            was installed.

9            "The Committee for the Study of Preparations  
10            for Independence consisted of approximately 60 mem-  
11            bers, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one  
12            Eurasian. A Japanese was Deputy Chairman, and  
13            seven others were 'special members.' The Committee  
14            had an Administrative Bureau with a Japanese Deputy  
15            Chief.

16            "The Ordinance founding this Committee  
17            required that its findings had to be reported to  
18            the Gunseikan. Later, a new 'Committee for the  
19            Preparation of Independence' would be formed. It  
20            was clearly stipulated that the 'Committee for Study'  
21            was to confine itself to study and was not empowered  
22            to make any decision.

23            "The Committee met twice, from 29 May to  
24            2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings  
25            were not open to the public. Among other things, a

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1 constitution resembling that of the Philippine  
2 puppet-state was drafted.

3 "There was disappointment when it was  
4 learned that the Committee had no power to make  
5 decisions and had to restrict itself to Java.

6 "On 17 July 1945, the Supreme War Direction  
7 Council decided to adopt the policy of granting  
8 'independence' to the East Indies as soon as pos-  
9 sible. (Prosecution document No. 2759, Court exhibit  
10 No. 1350).

11 "This decision reached Java on 21 July  
12 1945. According to directives from Tokyo, the  
13 territory of the new state was to comprise the  
14 whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a  
15 'Committee for the Preparation for Independence'  
16 was to be set up in the near future.

17 "Emphasis was laid upon the necessity for  
18 safeguarding the requirements for military operations.  
19 The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon,  
20 which had submitted in June 1945 that the establish-  
21 ment of the puppet-state should not take place before  
22 the middle of 1946, and that the above-named Committee  
23 should at the earliest be set up towards the end of  
24 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

25 "Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at ITAGAKI's

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1 Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held  
2 of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs  
3 Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions  
4 concerned. At this Conference a scheme was drawn  
5 up for guiding preparations for so-called independence,  
6 wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

7 "THE FIFTH PHASE

8 "August-September 1945.

9 "In the beginning of August 1945, Field  
10 Marshal TERAUCHI received telegraphic orders from  
11 Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian  
12 puppet-state as much as possible, and to create  
13 this state in September 1945. In pursuance of this  
14 order, on 7 August 1945 TERAUCHI decreed the estab-  
15 lishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for  
16 the Preparation for Independence).

17 "This was effected by proclamation of the  
18 same date, reading as follows:

19 "'Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese  
20 Southern Army).

21 "'Concerning the 'Committee for the Prepara-  
22 tion for Independence of Indonesia.'

23 "'Based on the proclamation of the Japanese  
24 Government of 7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun  
25 has consistently been taking measures to guide the

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1 Indonesians. Owing to the spiritual awakening of  
2 the people up to this moment, they have all succeeded  
3 in achieving much and fast progress in their train-  
4 ing for government and for the defense of the country  
5 with burning enthusiasm.

6 "In response to the activity and the whole-  
7 hearted efforts of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun  
8 expresses its approval of the installation towards  
9 the middle of August of a Committee for the Prepara-  
10 tion for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee  
11 shall accelerate all measures concerning the final  
12 preparations for the installation of the Government  
13 of an independent Indonesia.

14 "12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945.'

15 "On the same day on which the proclamation  
16 of Marshal TERAUCHI was published in Java, the  
17 Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-in-Chief) of Java also  
18 issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was  
19 stated:

20 "The desire to become an independent  
21 nation has now reached a high point and is flaring up  
22 all over Indonesia. It was in response to the ex-  
23 pression of this desire that the Dai Nippon Teikoku  
24 solemnly promised to grant her independence, in  
25 accordance with the basic principle of the

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1 Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the  
2 ideals of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole  
3 population has exerted itself to its utmost to honor  
4 the national obligations and the stronger became  
5 their determination to bring the war to a success-  
6 ful conclusion, so that the foundations for their  
7 independence could be built up fully and speedily.  
8 And now, as an independent nation, constituting a  
9 link in the chain of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of  
10 Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place  
11 in the battle-line for the common defense of Greater  
12 East Asia.'

13 "The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government)  
14 on this occasion stated the following:

15 "The independence of Indonesia as a  
16 member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East  
17 Asia, is based upon humanitarian principles so as to  
18 contribute in the formation of a new world order.  
19 Therefore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesians and  
20 their intense enthusiasm conform with the basic  
21 ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit  
22 of Hakko Ichiu.

23 "A new nation will have to meet some  
24 essential requirements: it must have sufficient  
25 strength, while its administrative machinery should

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1 be organized in a smooth and simple way. Therefore,  
2 the first duty is to bring the war now being faced  
3 by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To  
4 this end the Indonesian nation must develop its  
5 war potential to its full extent, and together with  
6 Dai Nippon fight unceasingly to achieve final victory  
7 in this Greater East Asia War.'

8 "A few days of silence on the subject of  
9 independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued  
10 to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between  
11 Japan and Indonesia: 'To live or die with Japan.'

12 "Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation  
13 of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including  
14 Sukarno, was flown to TERAUCHI's Headquarters at  
15 Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11  
16 August. They were told by the latter that it was  
17 originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo  
18 to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese  
19 Government. On account of difficulties and dangers  
20 of communications and pressure of time, the Field  
21 Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents  
22 of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the  
23 Imperial Government.

24 "The main points were:

25 "a. The Japanese Government had been pleased

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1 to institute a Committee for the Preparation for  
2 Independence.

3 "b. The territory of the New State would  
4 include the entire Netherlands East Indies.

5 "c. The date when independence would be  
6 proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at  
7 the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon  
8 as preparations were completed.

9 "d. The independent Government would be  
10 installed first in the island where preparations  
11 had been first completed. Subsequently this Govern-  
12 ment would be gradually extended to include areas  
13 where preparations had been completed.

14 "e. All Japanese demands in connection  
15 with the military situation were to be complied with.

16 "f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the  
17 Committee, which further consisted of thirteen  
18 representatives from Java, three from Sumatra and  
19 five from territories under naval occupation. Those  
20 members were appointed on nomination by local Japan-  
21 ese military commanders.

22 "On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java  
23 reported the news of Sukarno's return, and he was  
24 welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the  
25 Commander-in-Chief and many of the military and



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1 Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile the Committee  
2 members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali,  
3 whose names were now published, were flown to Java,  
4 after having received their instructions from the  
5 military or naval authorities of those areas.

6 "Originally the first meeting of the  
7 Committee was fixed for 19 August.

8 "On 15 August, however, members of the  
9 Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitu-  
10 lation.

11 "During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945,  
12 the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth  
13 leaders, prominent during that period, met at the  
14 residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer  
15 MAEDA. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred  
16 with the Soomubutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department)  
17 and MAEDA. It was decided to proclaim independence  
18 the next morning.

19 "The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu  
20 Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for  
21 the Study of Preparations for Independence) was  
22 hastily altered, and on the following morning the  
23 Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a  
24 microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda  
25 service on the veranda of his house."

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1 "The population of Java was still un-  
2 informed, except through rumor, about the capitula-  
3 tion of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been un-  
4 fitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from  
5 Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-Chief,  
6 the Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat  
7 secret.

8 "The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese  
9 propaganda service, and the local broadcasting  
10 stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no  
11 mention of anything but the announcement of indepen-  
12 dence and the proclamation of the constitution.

13 "On 21 August 1945, the papers published,  
14 next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14  
15 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the  
16 Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia,  
17 the following words:

18 "'Dai Nippon is and will always be a  
19 friend to Indonesia, immutably and forever. We  
20 never will forget our oath; united in life and in  
21 death.'

22 "Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese author-  
23 ities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has  
24 been called the 'stolen week.'"  
25

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1                   This concludes the direct testimony of this  
2 witness. With the Court's permission he may be  
3 cross-examined.

4                   THE PRESIDENT: It has been a pleasure to  
5 listen to you, Mrs. Strooker.

6                   MRS. STROOKER: Thank you, your Honor.

7                   THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.  
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CROSS

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. LOGAN:

2 Q Major, on page three of your affidavit  
3 you state that after the Japanese troops entered the  
4 Netherlands Indies they interned a group of influential  
5 persons in the administration of the country's affairs.  
6 Isn't that a usual procedure done by an Army of  
7 Occupation?  
8

9 A My report is based upon investigations in  
10 the Netherlands East Indies and upon large scale  
11 investigation in other -- I do not know whether in  
12 other countries during the occupation similar measures  
13 have been taken. My report is -- restricts itself  
14 to the Netherlands East Indies.

15 Q Well, may I ask you this, Major: As an  
16 army man wouldn't you say that that was proper procedure  
17 for an Army of Occupation?

18 A The point is that not only prominent sections  
19 of the Occidental population have been interned, but  
20 practically the whole white population; and that I think  
21 is unusual.

22 JAPANESE INTERPRETER: Owing to the fact that  
23 simultaneous translation can not be done, translation  
24 will be done according to the relay system.

25 THE NETHERLANDS INTERPRETER: The witness' answer:

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1 "Not only prominent sections of the population had  
2 been interned, but practically the whole white population  
3 of these islands and that I think is unusual in  
4 occupied territory."

5 Q The internment of these people, Major,  
6 was basically a security and control measure by the  
7 Japanese occupational forces, isn't that so?

8 A This was not only a security measure. I  
9 think that it is evident from documents introduced in  
10 this Court during these days; but it was obviously  
11 the deliberate intention on the part of the Japanese  
12 to eradicate Western influences.

13 Q Now, Major, I am not interested in conclusions.  
14 I would appreciate it if you would confine yourself  
15 to answering the questions, if you mind.

16 A The facts are these: That document issued  
17 by the Japanese Government and studied by me indicate  
18 that --

19 Q Well, Major, what I am interested in knowing  
20 is whether or not these measures of internment which  
21 were taken by the Japanese occupational forces were  
22 basically security and control measures?

23 A Confining myself -- restricting myself to  
24 facts, I have to state that in no document I found  
25 any indication of anything but that this internment

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1 was solely a security measure.

2 Q Perhaps you didn't understand me, Major. I  
3 am asking you as an army man, from your experience,  
4 isn't it proper for the occupational forces to take  
5 basic security and control measures by interning  
6 those people in control of the country which is occupied?

7 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I object to this  
8 question. It is calling for a conclusion. The Major  
9 has testified as to things that he saw. He has made  
10 a report as the document indicates. He is now being  
11 asked to give testimony, conclusive testimony, opinion  
12 testimony as an army officer. It is improper cross-  
13 examination, I submit.

14 THE PRESIDENT: All your questions are questions  
15 for the Court, Mr. Logan. We know that invading  
16 armies do take security measures, but never by interning  
17 on a wholesale scale such as he testifies to.

18 If you ask him whether in fact the internment  
19 of any Japanese was called for by the facts of the  
20 case, I will permit him to answer. It would be better  
21 to ask him what was the conduct of the Japanese prior  
22 to the internments.

23 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, he stated  
24 facts in his affidavit here and we must assume, naturally,  
25 that he is claiming what was done was wrong.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: If you suggest to him  
2 that the conduct of the Japanese warranted their  
3 internment he may answer. That is a question of fact.

4 The objection is upheld.

5 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

6 Q How many people, Major, are there in the  
7 Netherlands East Indies?

8 A The population is approximately 70,000,000.

9 Q How many of them born were Occidentals born  
10 in the Netherlands Indies?

11 A Before the war the situation was that there  
12 were 250,000 Occidentals, the majority of which were  
13 born in these islands.

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1 Q And how many of those 250,000 lived in Java?

2 A I have no exact information, but it can be  
3 assumed that the majority of these 250,000 lived in  
4 Java.

5 Q And out of that 250,000, or slightly less  
6 than that in Java, only 62,000 were interned; is  
7 that right?

8 A That is not entirely correct. It has to be  
9 borne in mind that apart from these 60,000 civilian  
10 internees there was a number of 45,000 military per-  
11 sonnel also interned as prisoners of war.

12 Q Well, would you say including that 45,000  
13 there were about 100,000 in Java interned?

14 A That is correct.

15 Q Then that would leave about 100,000, slightly  
16 more than 100,000, who were not interned; is that  
17 correct?

18 A That is correct.

19 Q Is this statement correct on page 3 of  
20 your affidavit, that by the end of 1943 it may be  
21 said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands  
22 Indies, both male and female, had been interned with  
23 a few exceptions, men and women above 65 or 70 years  
24 of age?

25 A That is perfectly correct.



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1 Q Do I understand that about 100,000 of the  
2 people of Java were over 65 or 70 years of age?

3 A That would be entirely incorrect, because  
4 we are dealing here with Occidentals not born in  
5 the Indies.

6 Q Wasn't that what you were talking about in  
7 your affidavit, and what we have been talking about  
8 here?

9 A The question put to me was, what was the  
10 Occidental population of the Netherlands East Indies.  
11 I included the Occidentals born in these islands as  
12 well as outside the islands.

13 Q Am I correct in saying that there were only  
14 about 50,000 full-blooded Dutch in all the East Indies?

15 A I am not entirely clear about the meaning of  
16 the question. Do you mean to say whether before the  
17 war there were no more than 50,000 Occidentals of  
18 pure Dutch extraction in the islands?

19 Q Yes.

20 A I wish to stress that these figures are not  
21 part of my investigations; also, I have no information --  
22 no correct information now, but I do think that the  
23 figures are somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000.

24 Q Then there were about 150,000 Eurasians,  
25 is that correct?

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1           A    That should be approximately correct.

2           Q    You also state in your affidavit, Major,  
3           that when the Japanese occupational forces came in  
4           all the bank balances were immediately frozen. Isn't  
5           that the usual procedure for ~~an Army~~ of Occupation to  
6           follow?

7           MR. HYDE: Mr. President, again I submit  
8           that the testimony of this witness is a report of  
9           what he saw. He does not purport to indicate in  
10          there whether it was usual or unusual. I submit  
11          that it is improper cross-examination.

12          THE PRESIDENT: The question invades our  
13          province. It is for us to say what are the powers  
14          and authorities of an invading army under public  
15          international law. It is for the witness to state  
16          the facts to which that law might be applied. Even  
17          if the Major were an authority on public international  
18          law, we still would have to decide questions of law.

19          MR. LOGAN: May I be heard on that, your  
20          Honor, please?

21          THE PRESIDENT: Public international law  
22          is no longer a question of fact for an international  
23          body like this, which is here to apply public inter-  
24          national law.  
25

          MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we have

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1 a witness here who has set forth a number of acts,  
2 which he states were done by the Japanese Army.  
3 There are several ways in which we can cross-examine  
4 this witness on those acts. One is by inquiring of  
5 him whether or not this was the usual method which  
6 was adopted by any invading army.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The powers of an invading  
8 army are determined by public international law,  
9 which we alone decide. You may examine him as to  
10 the facts with a view to our applying the public  
11 international law. If in his statement he has ex-  
12 pressed any views about those matters we will disre-  
13 gard what he says. I told you in Chambers that we  
14 were going to take from this witness only answers of  
15 fact, and not expressions of opinion or conclusions.

16 MR. LOGAN: I am examining him, your Honor,  
17 only on statements of fact which he has made in his  
18 affidavit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: You may ask him whether the  
20 facts were not such as to warrant what the Japanese  
21 Army did in any particular case. Even that may be  
22 too much. It may be that all you can ask him is  
23 what were the facts which preceded the Japanese ac-  
24 tion.

25 MR. LOGAN: By asking him, your Honor, as

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1 you suggest, as to whether or not the facts war-  
2 ranted that would be asking his opinion. That is  
3 just what I wanted to avoid doing.

4 THE PRESIDENT: I said that might be too  
5 much, and I went on to say you can ask him what was  
6 the conduct of the Japanese before the Javanese  
7 internment.

8 You can review your proposed cross-examina-  
9 tion during the recess, Mr. Logan.

10 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

11 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
12 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
13 were resumed as follows:  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

5 Q Major, what bank balances were frozen?

6 A All bank balances.

7 Q And if these bank balances hadn't been  
8 frozen, I suppose the Dutch could have used the money  
9 and withdrawn from the bank and bought ammunition,  
10 perhaps, or some other articles which would have  
11 endangered the success of the occupation, isn't  
12 that so?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan, as I am reminded  
14 by a colleague, this is really argument with the wit-  
15 ness and not cross-examination.

16 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal pleases, it is  
17 my understanding from the statement before the  
18 recess that we could inquire into what acts of  
19 the Javanese could possibly have brought about the  
20 things that were done by the Japanese.

21 THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the witness,  
22 did the Javanese borrow money from the banks to buy  
23 arms to use against the Japanese?

24 MR. LOGAN: I do not see where that would  
25 be very helpful, if the Tribunal pleases, because

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1 the witness has stated in his affidavit that these  
2 bank balances were immediately frozen. I want to  
3 know what is wrong with it. In other words, this  
4 witness has testified to all these acts; and, in-  
5 stead of setting forth in his affidavit what was  
6 wrong with these, to try to point out to the Tribunal  
7 where it was illegal, perhaps, for the Japanese to  
8 have done what they have done. All he does here  
9 in his affidavit is set forth the bare facts. I  
10 want to find out what was wrong with them.

11 THE PRESIDENT: In other words, you are  
12 asking the witness to judge the Japanese. We will  
13 do that.

14 MR. LOGAN: No. I am not asking that, if  
15 the Tribunal please. My point is that all these --  
16 instead of the prosecution setting forth these acts  
17 and showing where they were wrong, which the burden  
18 is on them to do, they merely set forth the acts;  
19 and I am trying to find out from the witness what he  
20 claims is wrong with it.

21 THE PRESIDENT: In other words, you want  
22 to argue with him.

23 MR. LOGAN: No, I do not want to argue with  
24 him, your Honor.

25 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot ask him any

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1 question which involves a judgment by him of whether  
2 the Japanese were right or wrong in what they did.

3 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

4 Q You state in your affidavit, Major, that  
5 the Javanese were prohibited from using their  
6 radio. If that restriction had not been placed,  
7 would it not have been possible for the people there  
8 to endanger the success of the Occupation?

9 THE PRESIDENT: We know that occupying  
10 forces, to feel secure, must exercise some super-  
11 vision over the use of the radio and other means of  
12 communication. Why ask him? We could tell him.

13 MR. LOGAN: Then, may I take it it is the  
14 Tribunal's position that the Japanese Occupation  
15 force were within their rights in turning these  
16 people in administration and banning the use of  
17 radio and burning books and abolishing certain coun-  
18 cils as in accordance with international law?

19 THE PRESIDENT: That is a testy observation,  
20 not justified by anything said by me. The question  
21 is whether the Japanese were justified in doing  
22 what they did. That will be ascertained by getting  
23 from this witness the facts of the particular case  
24 and letting us weigh them up in the light of the  
25 law.

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1 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

2 Q Do you know, Major, if any of the Javanese  
3 people used their radios to get in communication  
4 with the Dutch government?

5 A Attempts have been made on a few occasions  
6 to get into touch with the Netherlands Government  
7 through transmitters, not wireless receiving sets,  
8 which were mentioned in the statement.

9 THE PRESIDENT: I will place no limit on  
10 you in getting from this witness, if you can, facts  
11 as to the behaviour of the Javanese which would tend  
12 to show the Japanese took only necessary measures  
13 of security, but they must be facts, not opinions.

14 Q Then, Major, would you say it was necessary  
15 in order to prevent espionage and sabotage that the  
16 radios be sealed?

17 MR. HYDE: Mr. President, I respectfully  
18 suggest that that question also calls for his opinion.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.

20 Q Was any such use made of the radios to make  
21 it necessary to do this?

22 A Cases which I know of where transmitters  
23 have been used to contact the Netherlands Government  
24 occurred in the course of 1943, while receiving sets  
25 had been sealed as far back as April '42. That is



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1 one year and six months before these cases occurred.

2 Q With respect to these books that were burned,  
3 did any of them contain any anti-Japanese sentiments?

4 A Naturally one of the first categories of  
5 books to be burned were those which contained anti-  
6 Japanese sentiments.

7 Q Were the councils which were in existence  
8 at the time Japanese occupied the Netherlands East  
9 Indies -- were their sympathies anti-Japanese?

10 A In answer to this question, a direct answer  
11 I can not give; I can only say that these councils  
12 were made up of representatives of all the various  
13 communities in Java, in the Indies, and it is possi-  
14 ble or probable that among them there were those  
15 who had anti-Japanese sentiments.

16 Q Was there any restriction in these councils  
17 with respect to the representation of the Javanese  
18 people on them?

19 A As far as I know, there was no restriction  
20 on the grounds of racial descent, so that all  
21 Javanese could be representatives on these councils.

22 Q When the law courts were abolished a new  
23 system was set up by the Japanese, isn't that so?

24 A The witness' answer is, "That is correct."

25 Q And these new law courts administrated crim-

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1           inal and civil law in the Netherlands East Indies?

2           A   That is correct.

3           Q   It was merely a substitution of one system  
4           for another, isn't that so?

5           A   I have only pointed out that old courts  
6           were abolished and new courts were instituted.

7           Q   Were there any riots or disorders amongst  
8           the Javanese people which required a regulation  
9           that they could not meet in groups except under  
10          police supervision?

11          A   Indeed, when the Japanese forces entered  
12          Java robbery by gangs have occurred. Raiding  
13          parties and gang robberies have occurred.

14          Q   So that it was necessary to enforce such  
15          regulations, is that so?

16          A   It is not clear to me what the advantages  
17          were of instituting new courts in this connection.

18          Q   I am not speaking about courts, Major, I am  
19          talking about meetings of various associations  
20          under police supervision.

21          A   To my mind, it must have been desirable at  
22          the beginning, at the outset, to prohibit gatherings  
23          and associations. I wish to point out, however, that  
24          when I say associations I meant gatherings, the  
25          ganging together of people, but I do not include the

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1 prohibition of associations.

2 Q Prior to the occupation -- Have you finished  
3 your answer?

4 A Yes, answer finished.

5 Q You understand English, don't you, Major?

6 A I do understand English.

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Q Prior to the Occupation, Major, were the public radio broadcasts and moving picture activities controlled by the government?

A Before the war broadcasts, public broadcasts, were handled by the NIROM, which was a private concern but which was bound by regulations laid down by the government.

Q And were anti-Japanese sentiments broadcast over these radios up to the time of Occupation, perhaps two months thereafter?

A As and since the Netherlands East Indies were at war with Japan, there is no doubt that some anti-Japanese broadcasts have been made after the outbreak of war and before the occupation.

Q Is that same thing true with respect to moving pictures and the newspapers?

A Naturally in the newspapers, as well, anti-Japanese sentiments have been expressed. As far as films, cinematographical films, are concerned, the film industry in Java was backward and I do not know of any pictures having been made which expressed anti-Japanese sentiments.

Q Were the radio and newspapers used for this purpose for about two months after the Occupation?

A The answer is no. Newspapers, films, and

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1 radio broadcasts came immediately under Japanese con-  
2 trol and what I have seen of papers and what I have  
3 heard over the radio contained nothing which I thought  
4 could give any offense to the Japanese, which would  
5 lead to restrictive measures.

6 Q What is the literacy in the Netherlands East  
7 Indies? Am I correct in saying it is about seven per  
8 cent?

9 A Literacy -- the correct figures about literacy  
10 in the Netherlands East Indies are not known to me.  
11 I think it is possibly slightly more than seven per  
12 cent. I think it is approximately ten per cent, and  
13 the ten per cent refers to the whole population of  
14 the Netherlands East Indies, to all of the seventy  
15 million people.

16 Q How soon after the Japanese Occupation were  
17 the schools closed?

18 A The same day of the Occupation.

19 Q When were they reopened?

20 A The Indonesian primary schools were reopened  
21 after the Emperor's birthday on the 29th of April.  
22 They were reopened with a provisional curriculum.  
23 This all refers to those schools that were not used  
24 for billets or otherwise occupied by the Japanese Army.  
25 It was not until August, 1942, that all Indonesian

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1 primary schools were reopened with the new curriculum.

2 Q And did they continue to teach the same  
3 subjects with the addition of certain courses in the  
4 Japanese language, Japanese songs and dances?

5 A As I pointed out in my statement, subjects  
6 such as general history -- such subjects as general  
7 history were dropped and other subjects were generally --  
8 other subjects of a non-political nature were main-  
9 tained but they suffered from the introduction of  
10 Japanese language, Japanese dances, music, etc.,  
11 into the curriculum.

12 Q Were the history courses changed to eliminate  
13 any anti-Japanese sentiments that might have appeared  
14 in the history courses prior to the Occupation?

15 A General history as a subject was entirely  
16 reorganized, reformed, and about anti-Japanese senti-  
17 ments which I don't think --

18 Q At the bottom of page 9 of your affidavit  
19 you make a statement --

20 THE MONITOR: Mr. Logan, I don't think the  
21 witness had finished his statement yet.

22 MR. LOGAN: I am sorry.

23 A (Continuing) It was not merely a question  
24 of dropping, or eradicating, occasional anti-Japanese  
25 sentiments. The whole subject was reformed, entirely

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1 new general history was introduced giving the purely  
2 Japanese view on it.

3 Q I presume the books that were used prior to  
4 the Occupation gave the view of history from the Dutch  
5 viewpoint, is that so?

6 A Before the war not only was Dutch history  
7 taught but also general world history, and I don't  
8 believe that there was any particular prejudice in  
9 that teaching.

10 Q At the bottom of page 9 of your affidavit,  
11 Major, you have a statement to the effect that the  
12 basic principles upon which these regions -- I am  
13 referring to all the regions in the Netherlands East  
14 Indies -- were administered were entirely similar in  
15 reality. Do you mean by that civil or militarily  
16 administered?

17 A I meant to say in this that administration  
18 in the islands outside of Java, as well as administra-  
19 tion in Java, was along the same lines laid down in  
20 Tokyo.

21 Q I am asking you if you mean civil or military  
22 administration.

23 A As I point out later on in my statement, the  
24 Netherlands East Indies is divided in various areas,  
25 some under the Navy, some under the Army. In both

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1 areas there was a military administration. I mean  
2 an administration carried out by officers, service  
3 officers, over the civilian population.

4 Q Was the administration conducted by civilians  
5 or by military men?

6 A In Java there were three distinct categories  
7 of officers. The first category consisted of regular  
8 Army officers of whom, for instance, the Gunshikan  
9 was one. The second category consisted of civilians  
10 who, for the purpose, were given a military rank,  
11 while the third category consisted of civilians only.

12 Q Now let us take the teachers. Were they  
13 Japanese people or were they natives who taught the  
14 schools?

15 A Teachers in primary schools were chiefly  
16 Indonesian with only a scattering of Japanese.

17 Q How about the other higher schools of learn-  
18 ing?

19 A The same is true for intermediate schools.

20 Q How about colleges, law schools and medical  
21 schools?

22 A I have mentioned the situation in the higher --  
23 institutions of higher learning where I said that the  
24 medical college at Batavia was instructed chiefly by  
25 Japanese.



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1 Q Was that the only medical college where  
2 Japanese instructors were used?

3 A Under Japanese Occupation there was but one  
4 medical college in the whole of the NEI.

5 Q All the other instructors were not Japanese,  
6 is that it?

7 A I have stated already that at Batavia Medical  
8 College all the professors were Japanese.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Will the defense counsel  
10 please restate whether he referred to the one Batavia  
11 Medical College or to all medical colleges?

12 MR. LOGAN: Maybe I didn't make myself clear.  
13 Maybe I didn't understand you.

14 Q The way I understand it, all the medical  
15 colleges had Japanese instructors, or was it just one  
16 school that had them?

17 A In the whole of the Netherlands East Indies  
18 there was only one medical college and that one was at  
19 Batavia.

20 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until  
21 half past nine on Monday morning.

22 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment  
23 was taken until Monday, 9 December 1946, at  
24 0930.)

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6 Dec