

REPORT

On the Increase of the Airfield
System in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

Beginning from 1932 and during the following years of occupation of Manchuria the Kwantung Army Command undertook a large-scale construction of air-bases, airfields, and landing fields preparing a military base for the operations of the Japanese Air Forces against the U.S.S.R.

TABLE

of the Increase of the Air field
System in Manchuria

Period	Air Bases	Air fields	Landing Fields	Total
1931	--	5	--	5
1936	10	43	97	150
1941	17	74	196	287
1945	25	116	275	416

Beginning from 1937 the Japanese Command paid greatest attention to the construction of air-bases and airfield groups, to the improvement of the existing airfields and to the construction of hangars and runways.

Beginning from 1941 the work of improvement and extension of airfield system in Manchuria greatly increased and continued until the capitulation of Japan.

- Appendix:
1. Chart of the Increase of the Air Field System in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.
 2. Map, "Air Field System in Manchuria in 1931."
 3. Map, "Air Field System in Manchuria in 1936."
 4. Map, "Air Field System in Manchuria in 1941."
 5. Map, "Air Field System in Manchuria in 1945".

Deputy Chief of Department of the General Staff
of the Red Army.

January 30, 1946
Translated,
V. Tarkhov

/s/ Jsigitchko/
Colonel.

Doc. No. 2134


CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. Tarkov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ V. Tarkov

Диаграмма
роста аэродромной сети в Манчжурии
с 1931 по 1945 г.г.

Chart
Increase of the air field system
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.




Условные обозначения:
conventional signs:

Авиабазы
Air bases
 Аэродромы
Air fields

Посадочные площадки
Landing fields
 Всего аэродромных точек
The total number

888



Аэродромная сеть Манчжурии

в 1931 г.
(До оккупации)


Airfield System in Manchuria

in 1931
(before the occupation)

Условные обозначения
Conventional marks
● Аэродромы
Airfields

Всего **The total**
Аэродромов 5 Airfields

Масштаб 1:2500000
1 см на карте соответствует 25 км на местности



The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Подполковник /Соболев/
Lieutenant-colonel /Sokolov/

Аэродромная сеть Манчжурии

в 1936 г.

Airfield System in Manchuria

in 1936.



Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
 ■ Авиационные базы - Air-bases
 ● Аэродромы - Air-fields
 • Посадочные площадки - Landing fields

Всего	The total number of
Авиационных баз 10	Air-bases 10
Аэродромов 43	Air-fields 43
Посадочных площадок 97	Landing fields 97

Масштаб 1:2500000
 1 см. на карте соответствует 25 км. на местности



Начальник 6 отдела
 Генштаба Красной Армии
 Подполковник Яковлев (Соловьев)
 The Red Army General Staff
 Chief of the 6-th Department
 Lieutenant-colonel


Sokolov

Аэродромная сеть Манчжурии

в 1941 году

Airfield System in Manchuria

in 1941.



Условные обозначения Conventional marks:


- Авиабазы сухопутные Air-bases
- Аэродром сухопутный Airfields
- посадочная площадка Landing fields
- ⊕ Авиабазы морские Sea air-bases
- ⊙ Аэродром морской Sea airfields

Всего The total:

Авиабаз	17	Air-bases	17
Аэродромов	74	Airfields	74
Посадочных площадок	156	Landing fields	156

Масштаб 1:2500000

The Red Army General Staff
 Chief of the 6-th Department
 Lieutenant-colonel
 Подполковник С. С. Соловьев (Sokolov)



Аэродромная сеть Манчжурии

1945 г.

Airfield System in Manchuria

inc 1945.



- Условные обозначения: Conventional marks:
- Аэробаза сухопутная Air-bases
 - Аэродром сухопутный Airfields
 - Посадочная площадка Landing fields
 - Аэродром морской Sea airbases
 - Аэробаза морская Sea air-bases

Всего The total:

Аэробаз	25 Air-bases
Аэродромов	116 Airfields
Посадочных площадок	275 Landing



The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov

801

COPY NO. _____

ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA FROM 1934 TO 1945.

The construction of fortified districts in Manchuria was begun by the commanding authorities of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and was continued through 1945.

The disposition of the fortified districts was clearly indicative of their aggressive nature because all of them were shallow in depth and were built in zones facing directions leading to very important operation objectives on the Soviet territory.

From 1934 to 1937, seven fortified districts were built, extending 150 km. along the frontier and including 300 permanent fortifications for different purposes.

From 1937 to 1941 the construction was extended over additional frontier districts, with general length of 300 km, and 800 different permanent fortifications were built. By 1941, 13 fortified districts had been constructed, extending more than 700 km, and the number of permanent fortifications was more than 1,000.

DOC NO 2148
U.S.S.R. NO 16

From 1941 to 1945 there was further improvement of old, and construction of new fortified districts. By 1945 had been constructed 17 fortified districts on the frontier of the Soviet Union and 1,500 permanent fortifications.

ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA IN THE PERIOD

FROM 1934 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH FOUR MAPS IN TWO COPIES.

Appendix

1. Summary Table of different types of fortified districts in Manchuria up to 1945.
2. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1931". (before occupation).
3. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1936-37".
4. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1941".
5. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

January 30, 1946.

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

REPORTCONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA FROM 1934 TO 1945.

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From 1934 to 1937, seven fortified districts were built, extending 150 km. along the frontier and including 300 permanent fortifications for different purposes.

From 1937 to 1940 the construction was extended over additional frontier districts, with general length of 300 km, and 800 different permanent fortifications were built. By 1941, 13 fortified districts had been constructed, extending more than 700 km, along the front. The total number of permanent fortifications was more than 1200.

From 1941 to 1945 there was further improvement of old, and construction of new, fortified districts. By 1945 had been constructed 17 fortified districts on the frontier of the Soviet Union and in the immediate rear of it.

The total length of fortified zone along the state frontier of Manchuria in 1945 was about 800 km. where there were built more than 4,500 permanent fortifications.

A p p e n d i x :

1. Summary Table of different types of fortified districts in Manchuria up to 1945.
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DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

January 30, 1946.

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

APPENDIX I.

SUMMARY TABLEGENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA UP TO 1945.

NW FORTIFIED DISTRICTS.	Extension in Klm		Area in sq. Klm	Year of construct.	No. of construct.			
	Along the frontline	Into sq. Depth			construct.	Perm.others.	total.	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Halun-Arshansky	60	8-20	800	1939	289	789	1078	
2. Jalaiynor-Manchurian	50	10	500	1938	178	488	666	
3. Hailarsky	20	16	320	1937 ⁴	263	438	701	
4. Sahaliansky	85	10-20	1200	1936	288	231	519	
5. Tsikaivsky	100	10-40	2500	1938	542	240	782	
6. Tuksky	20	18	360	1938	64	63	127	
7. Sinshangensky	20	3-7	100	1937	107	133	240	
8. Sungarysky	80	4-6	400	1937	64	67	131	
9. Funtzinsky	26	50	700	1938	337	206	543	
10. Djaohesky	20	12	240	1937	28	136	164	
11. Hutoussky	10	11	110	1937	208	367	575	
12. Mishansky	100	10-20	1500	1934	521 ⁵⁹¹	160	751	
13. Pogranichnensky	40	6	2100	1934	440	450	890	
14. Dunninsky	80	18	800	1934	531	1299	1830	
15. Dunsinchjensky	22	14	300	1936	58	223	287	
16. Hunchunsky	65	4-12	500	1936	547	878	1425	
17. Kenhinsky	40	2-6	160	1936	38	40	78	
TOTAL		838	--	12590	--	5473	6214	10787

Chief of the 6th Department of the
General Staff of the Red Army
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOKOLOV.

January 30, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

Фортификационное оборудование

Манчжурского плацдарма

в 1931 г.


(до оккупации)

Fortifications of the Manchurian

military Base

in 1931

(before the occupation)



Условное обозначение - Conventional marks
Полевые укрепления - Field fortifications

The Red Army General Staff,
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov


Начальник 6 отдела
Тенгштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник С. С. Соколов

Фортификационное оборудование Манчжурского плацдарма

в 1936-37 гг.

Fortifications of the Manchurian military Base

in 1936-37



Условные обозначения: Conventional marks:

- ☼ Полевые укрепления - Field fortifications
- Укрепленные районы - Fortified districts.

Начальник 6-го отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel


/Sokolov/

**УРТИФИКАЦИОННОЕ ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ
МАНЧЖУРСКОГО ПЛАЦДАРМА**

в 1941-42 гг.

**Fortifications of the Manchurian
military Base**

in 1941-42



Чкалинский уезд
(Chkalinov-Manchurian
fortified districts)

Хайларский уезд
(Hailar fortified
districts)

Саялынский уезд
(Salyan fortified
districts)

Тсикинский уезд
(Tsiki fortified
districts)

Халун-Аршанский уезд
(Halun-Arshan fortified
district)

Сунгарейский уезд
(Sungaree fortified
districts)

Фуцинский уезд
(Fuchin fortified
districts)

Хулинский уезд
(Hulin F.D.)

Мишаньский уезд
(Mishan F.D.)

Рогачинская Ф.Д.

Тунцзинь Ф.Д.

Тунгсичэн Ф.Д.

Хунчун Ф.Д.

Владивосток (Vladivostok)

Харбин (Pin-chiang)

Чанчунь (Chang-chun)

Мудань (Shan-yan)

Бейпин (Beiping)

Дайрэн (Dairen)


Условные обозначения: Conventional marks:

- Полевые укрепления - Field fortifications
- Укрепленные районы - Fortified districts

Начальник 6^{го} отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник /Соколов/

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

/Sokolov



Масштаб 1:4000000


Фортификационное оборудование Манчжурского плацдарма

в 1945 году
Fortifications of the Manchuria
military Base
in 1945



Условные обозначения: Conventional marks:
 [Symbol: Dashed line with dots] Полевые укрепления - field fortifications
 [Symbol: Circle] Укрепленные районы - Fortified districts

Масштаб 1:2500000
 1 см на карте соответствует 25 км на местности



Начальник 6-го отдела
 Генштаба Красной Армии
 Подполковник [Signature]
 The Red Army General Staff
 Chief of the 6-th Department
 Lieutenant-colonel
 /Sokolov/

REPORT

On construction of military dumps
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945

802

Before the occupation there were only 7 military dumps in Manchuria.

During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria the Command of the Kwantung Army undertook a large-scale construction of military dumps and accumulated in them big supplies of armament, ammunition and equipment. Disposition and capacity of constructed dumps was coordinated with the intended large-scale offensive operations in a war against the U.S.S.R.

A vast construction of new dumps was begun in 1933 in Northern and Eastern Manchuria. The places of disposition of new dumps and their capacity were in accordance with purely operation considerations and war-time needs. Bases and first-line dumps for a war against the Soviet Union were built beforehand.

In central districts strategical bases were being constructed in such points as Harbin, Tientsin, Mukden, etc. The advanced bases were being constructed in districts of Sansin-Tsyamusi, Mudantsyan-Ninguta, Hailar, Beyantchzen, etc.

The first-line dumps were constructed in Huntchun, Yantsi, Mulin, Iishutchzen, Futsin, Sakshalin-Ula, etc.

By the beginning of 1937 total number of dumps in Manchuria reached 80 with the following capacity.

1. Ammunition dumps - about 30-35 divisional ammunition sets (about 14,000 tons).
2. Bomb dumps - about 7,000 tons.
3. Fuel depots - about 10,500 tons.

In the following years (1938 - 1945) along with the increase of number of Japanese troops in Manchuria and more active preparation for the war against the U.S.S.R., construction of dumps became more intensive.

Along with the enlargement and improvement of existing dump buildings, the construction of new bases in the regions adjacent to the frontier and accumulation of big supplies of ammunition and war materials in fortified points at the frontier of the U.S.S.R. was carried out.

Special attention was given to the equipment of region against the Soviet Primorye, where, according to offensive operations of Japanese Army, were main operation directions.

By the beginning of 1945 the number of dumps in Manchuria reached 370 with the following capacity:

1. Ammunition - more than 700 ammunition sets (about 300,000 tons).
2. Air bombs - about 12,000 tons.
3. Fuel - about 250,000 tons.

By this time in Manchuria was already constructed a dense system of dumps, filled with mobilization supplies, which was in accordance with the plan of large scale offensive operations against the Soviet Union.

- Appendix:
1. Map "Military dumps in Manchuria in 1931" (before occupation).
 2. Map "Military dumps in Manchuria in 1936-37"
 3. Map "Military dumps in Manchuria in 1941-45."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

COLONEL /TSIGITCHKO/

30 January 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I. V. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ V. Tarkhov

**ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио**

Document N 1877
USSR N 16-2

REPORT
CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION
DUMPS IN MANCHURIA FROM 1931 to 1945



Военные склады Манчжурии

в 1936-37 гг.

Military Dumps in Manchuria

in 1936-37



Условные обозначения: Conventional notation

- Склады боеприпасов Ammunition dumps
- Склады интендантские Equipment dumps
- Склады горючего Fuel dumps
- Склады химические Chemical dumps

Общее количество складов - 80
The total number of dumps... 80

Масштаб 1:2500000

Начальник 6-го отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник С. Соловьев / Sokolov

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

803

REPORT
on the increase of the barrack facilities
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

The barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1931, just before the Japanese occupation, consisted of the barracks built by Russian Tzarist government and the Chinese, with general billeting capacity for 7.5 divisions (100,000 men). All the barracks of that period were concentrated in South Manchuria and along the line of the former Chinese Eastern Railroad.

In 1937 the billeting capacity of the Kwantung Army barrack facilities was increased for receiving 12 reinforced infantry divisions, about 50% of the whole barrack facilities being built in the districts adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

The number of the barracks in Manchuria was increased three times as much from 1937 to 1941.

In 1941 the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Manchuria was already for 39 infantry divisions, from which about 8 divisions were in the Western Manchuria and the Inner Mongolia; about 8 divisions in the district adjacent to the Amour; about 13 divisions in the Eastern Manchuria; about 10 divisions in the Central Manchuria--totally, about 39 divisions (about 800,000 men).

The main part of the barrack facilities (about 75%) was concentrated in the main operation directions.

During 1941-45 the Japanese command did not cease the construction of new barracks and enlargement and repair of the old ones.

In 1945 the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Manchuria increased up to 55 divisions, and under the condition of condensed quartering it could have been increased to accomodate 17 divisions more.

Creation of large barrack facilities planned for 50-70 divisions (about 1,5 million men), shows that the Kwantung Army was not preparing for a defensive war in Manchuria, but planned large scale offensive operations against the Soviet East.

- Appendix:
1. Map "Barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1931 (before occupation)."
 2. Map "Barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1936 - 1937."
 3. Map "Barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1941-45".

1821

Page 2

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

Colonel /TSIGICHKO/

January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature: Tarkhov

Казарменный фонд Манчжурии

в 1931 году

(De ekklyazylyk)

Number of Barracks in Manchuria

in 1931

(before the occupation)



Казарменный фонд Манчжурии

в 1936-37 г.г.

Number of Barracks in Manchuria

in 1936-37



Казарменный фонд Манчжурии

в 1931 году

(До оккупации)

一九三一年に於ける
満洲の兵営豫備施設

(占領以前)


Условные обозначения:

■ 凡 例
- Военные казармы
兵 營

Общая емкость казарменного фонда
Манчжурии 100,000 чел.
満洲の兵営豫備施設總容量
十万人

Начальник 6^{го} отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник С. С. Соколов (Соколов)

赤軍参謀本部第六班長
中佐 ユコ,



Казарменный фонд Манчжурии

в 1936-37 г.г.

一九三六年(即)三七年迄の
満洲の兵営豫備施設



Условные обозначения

凡例
■ ВОРННЫЕ КАЗАРНЫ
兵営

満洲の兵営豫備施設總収容量
…八十五万人

Общая емкость казарменного фонда
Манчжурии 800.000 чел.

Масштаб 1:2500000

赤軍参謀本部 松班長
中佐 2007

Казарменный фонд Манчжурии

в 1941-45гг.

一九四一—一九四五
滿洲 兵營 宿務 統計表



Условные обозначения:

■ - Военные казармы
兵營

Общая емкость казарменного фонда

Манчжурии 1500.000 чел.

滿洲 兵營 宿務 統計表



Начальник 6^{го} отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник Л. Соловьев (Сололов)

赤軍 宿務 統計表
下在 200

REPORT

804

Concerning Japanese military settlements
in Manchuria.

In 1932 the Japanese government commenced to colonize Manchuria beginning with districts which were of greatest military importance. The first to settle in Manchuria were reserve men, who had finished the active service in the Army, by means of which was reached the accumulation of cadres for mobilization deployment of the Kwantung Army, with the purpose of preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.

Militarized camps were organized for settlers where they received 3 years' training and were used for guard service.

After the 3 years' training in camps the settlers quartered in special militarized settlements.

The main districts of settling the colonists were organized in the areas adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

By the beginning of 1936 the whole number of Japanese settlers in Manchuria was above 390,000 men.

From 1936 to 1940 about 221,000 Japanese arrived in Manchuria, of whom about 150-160 thousand were fit for military service.

By 1945 the whole number of Japanese settlers reached about one million people, of whom the adult men were used to men new divisions of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY

Colonel (Tsigichko)

30 January 1946

Document No. 2133

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2133

I, V. I. TARKHOV, Hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the attached is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2133.

V. Tarkhov (signed)
V. I. TARKHOV.

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REPORT
ON THE GROWTH OF SEAPORTS OF KOREA AND
MANCHURIA FROM 1931 to 1945

PORTS		Short characteristics		
		1931	1935-1937	1941-1945
1	2	3	4	
Yuki	Fishing port of local significance	Seaport, Shipping capacity 320,000 t. per year. Train capacity - 4 trains per day round trip.	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Base for maneuvers of light Navy forces. Shipping capacity 600,000 tons per year. Train capacity, 12 trains per day round trip.	
Rasin	Fishing port of local significance	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops shipping capacity 3-4 mln tons per year. Train capacity about 30 trains per day round trip.	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Operation and maneuver base. (Harbor Yudzin) for light forces of the Navy shipping capacity 6 mln tons per year. Train capacity 42 trains per day round trip. 13 ships of 5000 tons displacement each could be moored at the piers of the port.	
Seisin	Fishing port of local significance	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity about 1.5 mln tons per year. Train capacity of the port 12 trains per day round trip.	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity 1,700,000 t. per year 15 ships of 60,000 tons displacement each could unload at the same time at the piers and at the roadstead.	
Genzan	Inner Port of the Japanese Sea	Seaport. Shipping capacity about 400,000 tons per year. Train capacity 4 trains per day round trip.	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Naval base of light Navy forces, fortified district, hydro-aviation base.	

		Short characteristics		
PORTS		1931	1935-1937	1941-1945
1		2	3	4
Fusan	First class seaport		Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Freight turnover about 3 mln tons per year. Train capacity 20-25 per day round trip.	Seaport and main port for disembarkation of troops. Fortified district. Naval base. Shipping capacity more than 6 mln t. per year. Train capacity of the port 64 trains per day both directions. Capacity in ships, 15 ships of 80,000 tons total displacement at the moorage and 13 ships of 65,000 tons total displacement on the roadstead.
Tzinkai	Naval base		Naval base	Naval base
Andun	Fishing port of local significance. Shipping capacity 850 tons per year		Large construction works were being performed	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity 7 mln t. per year. Train capacity 8 trains per day round trip.
Dairen	First class seaport, shipping capacity about 11 mln tons per year		Seaport, shipping capacity 11,600 t. per year. Train capacity 80 trains per day both directions.	Main port of transportation of troops to Manchuria and Northern China and cargoes from Manchuria to Japan. 50 trans-ports of 200,000 tons displacement could simultaneously be unloaded at the piers and on the roadstead. Equipment of the port allowed simultaneous unloading of troops of about two infantry divisions. Train capacity of the port 128 trains per day round trip.

Short characteristics

PORTS	1931	1935-1937	1941-1943
1	2	3	4
Port Arthur	Naval Base	Naval Base	Naval Base
Inkow	Fishing port. Shipping capacity 1.8 mln tons per year	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity 1.600.000 t. per year. Train capacity 12 trains per day both directions	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity about 5 mln tons. Train capacity 40 trains per day both directions.
Kulundao	--	Seaport. Construction begun in 1936	Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity about 5 mln t. per year. Train capacity 32 trains per day round trip.

- Appendix:
1. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1931" (before occupation of Manchuria).
 2. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1937".
 3. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF
THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

January 30, 1946

COLONEL TSGITCFKO

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##:

- 2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2073 "Report. Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."
- 2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2130 "Report concerning Puppet Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."
- 1879 "Table increase of Sungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."
- 2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."
- 1877 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. "
- 1881 "Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."
- 1883 "Report on the growth of Seaports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 1885 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."
- 2129 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2127 "Report on construction of military dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2150 "Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946,

LT. COL. TARANENKO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.


**Порты и военно-морские базы
Манчжурии и Кореи**

в 1931 г.


(До оккупации Манчжурии)

**The ports and the naval bases
in Manchuria and Korea**

**in 1931
(before the occupation of Manchuria)**



The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Подполковник Жемин / Соколов /
Sokolov



**Порты и военно-морские базы
Манчжурии и Кореи**

в 1937 г.

**The ports and the naval bases
in Manchuria and Korea
in 1937**

**Условные обозначения
Conventional marks:**

- △ Морской порт (с грузооборотом 3 млн тонн в год) Sea port (with the turn-over of 3,000,000 ton yearly)
- ⊖ Военно-морская база The naval base
- ⊕ Пропускная способность порта в параз поездов в сутки as regards the number of the in-coming and out-going trains
- Рыболовецкий порт местного значения A fishery port of local importance

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник /Colonel/ Lieutenant colonel


The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department

Соколов

ПОРТЫ И ВОЕННО-МОРСКИЕ БАЗЫ Манчжурии и Кореи

в 1945 г.

The ports and the naval bases in Manchuria and Korea in 1945.




Условные обозначения Conventional marks

- ▲ (with triangle) Морской порт (с грузооборотом в год) Sea port (with the turn-over of 600,000 tons yearly)
- (with circle) Военно-морская база The naval base
- ⊕ (with circle) Пропускная способность порта в параз The daily capacity of the railway station as regards the number of the incoming and out-going trains

Масштаб 1:2500000

The Aid Army General Staff
Chief of the G-1 Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Начальник отдела
Генштаба Иностранной Армии
Подполковник (Сokolov)
/Sokolov/





Порты и Военно-морские базы
Манчжурии и Кореи

в 1931 г.

(До оккупации Манчжурии)


一九三一年に於ける
滿洲及び朝鮮の
港湾及び海軍基地

（滿洲吉領以前）

- Условные обозначения**
凡例
- Рыболовецкий порт местного значения
地方的規模の漁港
 - △ Морской порт (с грузооборотом)
 - 海港 (貨物取扱量千万噸)
 - ◎ Военно-морская база
海軍基地

Масштаб 1:2500000
1 см на карте соответствует 25 км на местности

亦軍參謀本部才六到張
中位 1/307
Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник Яковлев / Сокорев/



**ПОРТЫ И ВОЕННО-МОРСКИЕ БАЗЫ
Манчжурии и Кореи**

в 1937 г.
 一九三七年に於ける
 満洲及び朝鮮の
 港湾及び海軍基地

Условные обозначения

- △ Морской порт (с грузооборотом в млн. тонн в год)
- ⊙ Военно-морская база
- ⊙ Пропускная способность порта
- Рыболовецкий порт местного значения

当該港の 1 日 1 回 列車 1 本 1 往復 の 通 車 能 力 有 結 核
 地方的規模の漁港

赤軍参謀本部才六班長
 中佐 ヲコウ

Начальник 6 отдела
 Генштаба Красной Армии
 Подполковник /Семин/ /Скоков/



Порты и военно-морские базы

Манчжурии и Кореи

в 1945 г.

一九四五年に於ける
満洲及び朝鮮の
港湾及び海軍基地

Условные обозначения

- △ Морской порт (с грузооборотом в млн. тонн)
- Военно-морская база
- ⊙ Пропускная способность порта в парках поездов в сутки

一昼夜の列車数に表はされたる
当該港の通過能力

Масштаб 1:2500000

赤軍参謀本部第六班班長
中佐 宇佐美 正
Начальник отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник 宇佐美 正 (Соколов)

Document No. 1883

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1883

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the attached is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1883.

Menshova (signed)
M. MENSHOVA

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Strictly Confidential

(TITLE PAGE)

(TITLE) Plan of Stationing Meteorological Service System in Chahar-Suiyuan

(Date) December 1937

(Reported by) Kwantung Army Headquarters

Title: Plan of Stationing Meteorological Service System in Chahar

1. Object

To establish promptly a general and aeronautical meteorological service system in the Mongolia area north of the Inner Great Wall and thus enable more accurate weather forecasting service in Japan and Manchuria and especially to strengthen aeronautical meteorological service system in preparation for a war with Soviet Russia.

2. Outline

For the time being, have them controlled directly by the army and allocate stations by taking into consideration military operation position of troops and special agencies. Upon completion, gradually transfer the control to the local government and make them permanent establishments.

Secret telegram 11 Feb 1938 -- No. 172 addressed to the Vice-Minister and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff by the Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army. (p.60)

The establishment of anti-Soviet fortifications is scheduled to be made during 1938 and 1939 on the spots not yet started as well as the spots regarded as specially important among the locations of fortifications mentioned in Special Order No. 301. (Necessary funds will be provided by Manchukuo budget.) The outline of the plan will be submitted to the General Staff Office within few days. In order to execute this plan, moreover, since the increased number of men attached is remarkably insufficient in view of the present fortification work, I beg you to inquire immediately into the ways of making the following temporary increases for about two years from March 1938 in the number of men attached.

Four Field Grade Officers, Engineer; six Company Grade Officers, Engineer; four Field (Company) Grade Officers, Artillery (Skillful Marksmen and men experienced in putting guns in position are preferred); three warrant officers, Engineer; eight non-commissioned officers, carpenter; four non-commissioned officers, Artillery (observers); four non-commissioned officers, Intendence; twenty-four Assistant-Engineers; forty civilian employees.

Dispatch 12 Jan 1938 -- KWAN SAN CHI No. 23 (TN No. of dispatch) addressed to Vice-Chief of the War Office UMEZU, Yoshijiro; by Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY; TOJO, Hideki; requesting consideration of the establishment of meteorological organs in the CHAHAR and MONGOLIA districts. (p.11)

Because the new establishment of meteorological observation organs is of vital importance from the standpoint of the CHINA Incident and anti-Soviet strategy, it must be promptly completed based on the plan separately bound. I beg you will immediately consider the following items of the plan in question and understand, furthermore, that after the start of work in the actual place where the troops are stationed in MONGOLIA, this plan will transfer control to the same troops.

1. Increase of officers in charge of the meteorology attached to the headquarters of troops stationed in MONGOLIA.
2. Provision for the budget required (special military expenditure).
3. Induction and education of the following number of men.

Classification	Number of Men	Remarks
Persons required for chief of the observatory	6	Fully experienced men, three of whom must be of considerable dignity (persons required for the chief of the observatory in CHANGCHIANKON, TATUNG, and SUIYUAN).
Observation assistant-engineer	3	Superior persons who are capable of becoming engineers in the future.
Observation men	10	Seven of whom are soon to come from the Artillery and Engineering school and three having the same ability.
Wireless operators	15	Persons who have been educated for meteorological wireless and general wireless.
Note		It is hoped that in the dispatch of the above persons, travel expenses to MONGOLIA will be paid.

4. Equipment

If possible, they must be supplied with the actual articles.

Draft for code telegram, 24 Jan. 1938--reply #1 to KWAN SAN dispatch--addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army by Vice-Chief of the War Office, relative to the prohibition of newspaper articles concerning the opening of air-routes between EUROPE and ASIA.

Regarding the prohibition of publications in papers concerning the air-line connections between JAPAN and GERMANY, I beg to inform you that the Home Ministry authorities, having the view that the parties concerned in the negotiation, the plans for regular air service, the aviation companies, etc. are contained within the scope of the prohibition, are making efforts in order that everything may be done well. Furthermore, I caution you that the purport of your telegram has been brought to the attention of the Home Ministry.

Secret telegram, 17 Jan. 1938--KWAN SEN telegram No. 1 addressed to the Vice-Minister by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
(P. 13)

Regarding air-line connections between JAPAN and GERMANY general prohibition cannot be fully expected, because the publication of newspaper accounts is prohibited only as regards the negotiation itself in spite of agreement that the absolute secret should be strictly kept from other countries. Therefore, I hope that this matter will be corrected as follows, and be immediately corrected in MANCHUKUO.

(Including everything except the announcement by the Japanese Foreign Ministry relating to the regular air-line connections between EUROPE and ASIA.)

Dispatch.

12 Jan. 1938--KWAN SAN CHI No. 20 (TN No. of dispatch) addressed to the Vice War Minister; UMEZU, Yoshijiro; by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army; TOJO, Hideki; relating to the presentation of topographic materials for strategic areas of far eastern Soviet territory and OUTER MONGOLIA. (P. 19)

The above is submitted as follows:

1. Topographic materials for strategic areas for far eastern Soviet territory and OUTER MONGOLIA. No. 302

1. Map of news gathering organization in eastern Soviet districts.

1. Map of news gathering organization in northern Soviet districts.

1. Map of news gathering organization in western Soviet districts.

1. Map of news gathering organization in OUTER MONGOLIA districts.

1. Map of wireless networks in the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

Draft of inquiry, 25 Jan. 1938--RIKU KAN IITSU No. 25 (TN Discrepancy in dispatch numbers exists here.) addressed to Vice-Chief of Staff by the Vice-minister with regard to the extension of the term of military service of enlisted men of 1935 belonging to the units in Manchuria. (P. 35)

I beg you to extend for the time being the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in March in units under the commander of the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, I beg you for the time being to continue extension of the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 attached to the Third Railway Regiment and to the 1st and 2nd Motor Regiments whose period of service has at present been extended. If there are no objections, I should like you to inform the KWANTUNG Army unofficially, and also inform me of the schedule for release from the extended term of military service.

(After no objection was received)

Draft of reply, 29 Jan. 1938--RIKU IAN IITSU No. 32 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army by the Vice-Minister. (P. 35)

In reply to your inquiry dated 11 Jan--KWAN SAN #36,1---I beg to inform you that the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in March attached to units under the commander of the Kwantung Army is, for the time being, scheduled to be extended.

Furthermore, the enlisted men of 1935 attached to the 3rd Railway Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Motor Regiments, who have at present had their term of service extended, will be, for the time being, subjected to further extension of service.

Dispatch 11 Jan 1938--KWAN SAN No. 36, 1---addressed to the Vice-Chief of War Office UMEZU, Yoshijiro, by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army TOJO, Hideki; pertaining to the extension of military service of troops in Manchuria. (P. 35)

In view of the purport of the Ordinance 41 of War Ministry dated September 1937 I consider that the soldiers in active service belonging to the units in Manchuria whose service will expire at the end of Feb. this year, ought to have their services extended according to Ordinance No. 5 of the War Ministry as long as the present situation continues; but I wish to get your unofficial report as early as possible, as this decision has influences upon various matters.

In addition to this, I beg to inform you that it is desirable that the conscripts of 1937 be educated in Manchuria and I believe in the possibility of their accomodation by means of making some supplementary establishment.

Reply 27 Jan 1938--SAN MITSU No. 293-2 of Army Dept. in Imperial Headquarters--addressed to the Vice-Chief of War Office UMEZU, Yoshijiro by the Vice-Chief of the Staff TADA, Shuui relating to the extension of military service of the conscripts of 1935 belonging to the units in Manchuria. (P 35)

I have no objection about your inquiry of RIKU IAN MITSU No. 25 concerning the above. I wish to add that it is difficult in the present situation to schedule the time of release from the extension of military service.

Dispatch 25 Jan. 1938--KAN SAN CHI No. 47--addressed to the Vice-minister of War, UMEZU, Yoshijiro; by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, TCJO, Hideki; relating to the presentation of a rough sketch. (P. 45)

The above is submitted as follows:

1. Rough sketch of far eastern Soviet territory, one five-millionth.
2. Rough sketch of western SIBERIA, one five-millionth.

To the Chief of Army Ordnance Central Depot, dated 20 Dec. 1937--RIKU IAN MITSU No. 619. (P. 84)

Arrange for the Kwantung Army to be supplied as per enclosure; the expenses will be drawn from the Manchurian Incident Fund.

Directive dated 20 Dec. 1937--RIKU IAN MITSU No. 619--addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army by the Adjutant-General. (P. 84)

Pursuant to orders, I notify you that your army will be supplied as per enclosure.

OUTLINE OF KWANTUNG ARMY'S COUNTER MEASURE IN UNITING EAST HOPEH GOVT. WITH the New NORTH CHINA GOVT. BY THE HEADQUARTERS OF KWANTUNG ARMY 18 Jan. 1938. (P. 42)

--- POLICY ---

In uniting the EAST HOPEH Govt with the new NORTH CHINA Govt, let us have a special regard for past circumstances and endeavour to cement more closely the ties of friendship existing among JAPAN, MANCHUKUO, and CHINA.

--- OUTLINE ---

1. The truce will be effective until the conclusion of a formal agreement and in case of future dissolution, the establishment of non-fortified zones and other substantial provisions favorable to us, based on the truce and on accompanying arrangements, will be secured as before.
2. We will endeavor to make the EAST HOPEH Govt remain as one special ward in HOPEH Province, acknowledging its peculiarity and not making any radical change in the staff hitherto concerned with the EAST HOPEH Govt.
3. The agreement on TUNGHLING region in NORTH CHINA between the Kwantung Army and the EAST HOPEH Govt. and the agreement on the management of TUNGHLING region in NORTH CHINA between MANCHUKUO Govt and EAST HOPEH Govt will be succeeded to by the new govt.
4. The agreement and contract which has been made between EAST HOPEH Govt and MANCHUKUO will actually as a principle be succeeded to by the new government and several sort of benefits and facilities actually enjoyed hitherto by MANCHUKUO which the EAST HOPEH Govt has recognized will be acknowledged by the new government.

The concrete contents are generally as follows:

- a. The agreement of 12 April 1934 on friendship between MANCHUKUO and EAST HOPEH Govt will be generally recognized, provided that MANCHUKUO retains the right to demand the necessary revision in accordance with the changes in the situation.
- b. MANCHUKUO Govt officials hitherto dispatched to the EAST HOPEH Govt will be succeeded to by the provisional government with the same condition and method as that of the EAST HOPEH Govt. And furthermore, after taking over, the provisional government will handle the exchange of staffs with MANCHUKUO and other matters in the same manner as in the EAST HOPEH Government.

- c. The existence and functions of MANCHUKUO's organs (custom office, police office, and communication bureau) existing in border region of EAST HOPEH Govt will be recognized as they are.
 - d. The compensation case for damages caused the Manchurian people by the TUNG-CHOW INCIDENT will be succeeded to by the Provisional government in the event that the negotiation had not been completed before the annexation of the EAST HOPEH Govt.
 - e. The total amount of the ¥1,250,000 loan of Manchurian Central Bank to EAST HOPEH Govt. dated 14 September 1934 will be succeeded to.
 - f. The total amount of the ¥2,000,000 loan of Manchurian Industrial Bank to the EAST HOPEH Govt., dated 18 May 1935 will be succeeded to.
 - g. The total amount of the ¥800,000 loan of the East Asia Industry Association to the EAST HOPEH Govt. will be succeeded to.
 - h. The credit of the Manchurian Telegram and Telephone Co. Ltd to the EAST HOPEH Govt. will be succeeded to.
5. The Provisional Government of Chinese Republic must be made to newly acknowledge or agree upon the following matters:
- a. The MANCHUKUO deputy dispatched to the EAST HOPEH Govt. will leave there simultaneously with the annexation of the same government and shall newly reside in PEIPING.
 - b. Matters relating to the mark of the boundaries.
 - c. Arrangement relating to anti-comintern.
 - d. A close police connection will be conducted between the Manchukuo Government and the Provisional Government. Mutual connection which is now established between both governments will continue to exist until formal agreement is reached.
 - e. The garrisoning of Manchurian troops at MALANYU (TUNGLING guard) shall be recognized.
 - f. The use and passage of EAST HOPEH region for the movement and supply of Manchurian troops in the border district of southern JEHOL shall be recognized.

- g. In connection with the guard of JEROL area, the search within EAST HOPEH areas shall be recognized.
 - h. Matters relating to the connection of transportation, communication, and aviation.
 - i. Matters to help each other in connection with circulation of money and exchange.
 - j. In revising the custom duties' rate and other custom system in the whole of NORTH CHINA after the unification of EAST HOPEH Govt. with the new NORTH CHINA Govt., they will be adjusted in relation with MANCHUKUO.
 - k. To recognize the operation of gold fields in EAST HOPEH region by the TEHOL LIVING CO. LTD.
 - l. The harnessing of hydro electric power of LIAN-HO will be a joint enterprise with the MANCHUKUO Government.
 - m. To conclude and carry out a lease of land 523.68 (321,185 sq. meters) (hitherto mainly for Japanese military use) in KUPEIKOU, LIYUN Province.
6. Concerning the necessary matters on every preceding paragraph, the MANCHUKUO Govt. shall make the necessary agreement with the new NORTH CHINA Govt.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. NO. _____

I.P.S. NO. 751

Statement of SOURCE and AUTHENTICITY

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary 1st Demobilization Bureau

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached JAC, dated 9 Feb. - 3 March, 1938, and described as follows:

"Manchurian Daily Confidential Files"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):
1st Demob. Bureau (War Ministry)

Signed at Tokyo on this
20 day of Sept, 1946.

/s/ Kaneo Ishibashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Shinaji Kobayashi

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

20 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd Lt.

Investigator
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T/4 Tozuchi

JJG
809-70815
Room

Military--Topographical Data (Informations)
for the Purpose of Landing Operations
in the Northern Sea. Vol. II.

Secret!

1941 March

Prepared by Shipping Trans-
port Headquarters, CTARU
Branch.

/Page 1/

Contents

Vol. 2

Chapter I Investigation of the Region of "PARANA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Customs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 1

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Chapter II Investigation of the Region of "UTCHOROKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 1

Bird's-eye View No. 1.

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Chapter III Investigation of the Region of "SCOCHINAYA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 2

Bird's-eye View No. 2

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Chapter IV Investigation of the Region of "IHCHA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 3

Bird's-eye View No. 3

Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 2.

Chapter V Investigation of the Region of "OBURUKCINA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 4

Bird's-eye View No. 4

Chapter VI Investigation of the Region of "KURUTO KOROWA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Customs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 5

Bird's-eye View No. 5

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Chapter VII Investigation of the Region of "KOMPA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 6

Bird's-eye View No. 6

Chapter VIII Investigation of the Region of "OROSUICI".

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1. Geographical Features
 2. Inhabited Area
 3. Roads
 4. Communications
 5. Harbors
 6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
 7. Meteorological Observations
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Map No. 7

Bird's-eye View No. 7

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Chapter IX Investigation of the Region of "KEFUTA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities
10. Etc.

Map No. 8

Bird's-eye View No. 8

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Chapter X Investigation of the Region of "KIKUCHIKU".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 9

Bird's-eye View No. 9

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Chapter XI Investigation of the Region of "UTOKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities
11. Other Informations

Map No. 10.

Bird's-eye View No. 10

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Chapter XII Investigation of the Region of "NORTH KISHIKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

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Chapter XIII Investigation of the Region of "SOUTH KISHIKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map. No. 11

Bird's-eye View No. 11

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Chapter XIV Investigation of the Region of "OPARA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 12

Bird's-eye View No. 12

Chapter XV Investigation of the Regions of "YAINA" and "OZERUNCI".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 13

Bird's-eye View No. 13

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Chapter I. Investigation of the Region of "PARANA".

1. Geographical Features

(1) Location:

It stands near the point of Long. $160^{\circ} 00'$ E, Lat. $59^{\circ} 20'$ N.

Fishing Block NO. 565

(2) Coast:

In "PARANA" District there are ranges of mountains running from north down to south and at the front of them there is a valley which meets the seashore.

At the both corners of valley there are hills which project into the sea and make cliffs. In the distance of about 6 kilometers south to the PARANA River there is a sandy beach, and the district north to the PARANA River there is a cliff which is difficult to climb up.

(3) Rivers:

(a) The PARANA River: The mouth of the river is about 70 meters wide in case of the low tide and about 300 meters wide in case of high tide. The bottom of the river is consisted of sands and gravels. The north bank of the river makes a sand-hill, while south bank a cliff. The depth of the river is about 1 meter in case of low tide. There are some spots where it is possible to wade. In case of high tide a launch can go up against stream. The velocity of stream is rapid in case of low tide, while slow in case of high tide.

(b) Lakes:

There is a lake of elliptical shape, its long diameter being 9 kilometers and short diameter 4 kilometers, at about 80 kilometers upper reaches of the PARANA River.

(4) Forest:

Around this district there is a steppe and forest. The interior may be found, but the details remain unknown.

2. Inhabited Area.

The PARANA Village:

It stands on about 6 kilometers upper reaches of the PARANA River. It has a population of about 600, and the number of houses is about 120. The inhabitants are fishers in the river, hunters and farmers on a small scale.

3. Roads

(1) Railway: None

(2) Roads:

The north coast is not good for passing, while along the south coast there is a way for passage.

4. Communications

(1) Wired Telegraph and Telephone:

Details are unknown.

(2) Wireless Telegraph:

They have one in the PARANA Village and one at the station of State Political Department which is on the south bank of the mouth of the PARANA.

(3) Post Offices:

There is one in the PARANA Village.

5. Harbors

(1) Anchorage:

It is about 2,500 kilometers off the coast.

(2) Difference between the ebb and flow of tide:

8 meters at its highest, 5 meters at ordinary times.

(3) Depth of Water and Nature of the Bottom:

It is about 7 meters deep at the spot where is 500 meters off the coast. The bottom is consisted of rock, but covered with sands.

(4) Sunken Rocks:

There is a line of sunken rocks in the distance of about 300 meters off the cape which is on the right hand in the NO. 565 Fishing Block. On the left hand there is a line of sunken rocks in the distance of about 200 meters off the coast.

6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation

(1) Coal and Petroleum: None

(2) Clear Water: The water of the PARANA River is available for drinking.

(3) Resources:

It is possible to send adrift the lumber down from the upper stream of the PARANA River. The remaining fishers' boats of NICHIRO are as follows:

The Boats with Three Wings -- 2

7. Meteorological Observations

In general it has many fair days and a little rainfall. From the end of July to August, it is foggy. In September stormy weather comes very often. cf. The Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 1.

8. Military Affairs

(1) Military Powers:

The Frontier Guard stations on the south bank of the mouth of river. The members of this guard including the commander are 8. These members come together at CHIGIRI, about 50 kilometers south to their station, after the fishing season is over.

(2) Airplanes: None

9. Customs

(1) As for the education and cultural institutions of the inhabitants, no details are known.

(2) Industry

The aquatic industry consists mainly in fishing, while the agricultural industry in raising vegetables and potatoes. Fur industry is most prosperous.

10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Same with 8.

2550

TABLE OF METEOROLOGICAL STATISTICS IN PARANA

YEAR MONTH WEATHER		1935					1936					1937					AVERAGE	REMARKS
		MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.		
WEATHER	CLEAR						42	37	46			20	23	30				
	HALF CLOUDY						12	20	20			47	20	52				
	CLOUDY						17	25	13			10	21	10				
	RAIN						9	9	46				12					
	LIGHT RAIN						10	2	4			13	12					
	FOGGY						10	7	13			10	12	8				
	SNOW																	
TEMPERATURE			8.10	0.70	12.80		7.7	0.60	12.88			9.96	12.58	13.51				
	MAX.						24	22	22			20	21	21				
	MIN.						0.5	4	6			4	6	6				
VELOCITY OF THE WIND							2.787	2.430	2.048			1.443	2.594	1.718				
	MAX.						6.87	7.4	4.14			4.5	15.5	4.5				
	MIN.						0.12	0	0.644			0	0.1	0				
ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE			768.5	770.4	779.7		760.9	761.5	754.6			765.4	761.5	758.2				
	MAX.						770	773	714			773	771	769				
	MIN.						745	740	740			756	747	743				
HUMIDITY							71.0	72.1	57.5			81.6	84.6	76.5				
	MAX.						87	90	88			98.3	97	94				
	MIN.						20	38	46			38	51	38				
EVAPORATION QUANTITY												3.34	2.17	2.09				
RAINFALL												4.07	4.15	4.43				
												1.10	2.17	0.025				
DIR. OF WIND	1 ST DIR.						N	SW	NW			NNW	W	NE				
	2 ND DIR.						SW	NNE	SW			N	SW	E				

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2550

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Michinori Ureshino hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Official of the General Affair Division of the 1st Demob. Bureau

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated March, 1941, and described as follows: File of "Investigations Re Maritime Provinces for Purpose of Landing Operations" prepared by Shipping Transport Headquarters, Otazu Branch.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Asahigawa

Signed at Tokyo on this

10 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Michinori Ureshino
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Yoshifusa Amano

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

10 day of Sept , 1946.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUS
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator I.P.S.
Official Capacity

AFFIDAVIT OF A WITNESS

Khabarovsk.

March 28, 1946.

I, Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R., at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Major POGRANITSKY P. N., with Major PASHKOVSKIY A.A. as an interpreter, interrogated and warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness named below, who testified:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Surname, name, father's Name | - Murakami Keisaku
Lieutenant-General |
| 2. Age | - Born 1889. |
| 3. Position held | - Commanding General
of the 2nd Army. |
| 4. What political party belongs to. | - Does not belong to any political party nor any society. |
| 5. Address | - Khabarovsk. |

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Q. Do you speak Russian?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree to give testimony in Russian?

A. Yes, I agree. But I request certain difficult or unfamiliar expressions to be translated into Japanese.

Q. It is possible to arrange. Mr. PASHKOVSKIY, an interpreter, takes part in the interrogation. Does it suit you?

A. Yes. Perfectly.

Q. Tell your service record?

A. In 1910 I graduated from the Military Academy, was promoted to the rank of sub-lieutenant and appointed a commander of a platoon of the third infantry regiment of the guards division. In 1913 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and entered the military College. In 1916 I graduated from the college and returned to the regiment where I served before the college. In 1917 I was appointed an officer of the War Ministry Department for Research of the World War I. In 1919 I was sent on mission to Europe (Poland, Latvia, Germany, France) where I studied military History for three years. In 1920 I was promoted to the rank of captain. In 1922 I returned to Japan and was appointed an instructor of military history. In 1925 I was promoted to the rank of major. In 1927 I was appointed an officer of the Training and Maneuver Department of the General Staff.

This department was responsible for the organization of the Imperial maneuvers and for the training of the Staff officers. In 1929 I was again appointed an instructor of tactics at the military college and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1931 I entered the

War Ministry as an officer of the Section of the General Department. In 1933 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel and appointed the commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment in Shizuoka. In 1934 I was transferred to the Infantry Academy as a commander of a training regiment and also as an instructor of field service. In 1935 I was appointed the chief of the War Ministry section for organization of military educational establishments. In the same year I was transferred to the post of the chief of the War Ministry General Department. In 1936 I again returned to the Military College as an instructor of military history. In 1937 I was promoted to the rank of major general and in 1938, I was sent on mission to Manchuria as a commander of a temporary brigade in the Southwest of Manchuria invaded at the time by units of the Chinese Army from the North China, and the task of my brigade was to restore order there. I commanded this brigade for a year. In 1939 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the 39th Division quartered in Central China in the town of Hankow.

In 1941 I was appointed director of the Institute of Military Science and Technique which was under the Inspector of troops training. In 1943 I was appointed director of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization and Warfare. In the same year I was again sent on mission to Manchuria as the Chief of the Military Academy where battalion commanders and regimental commanders were trained in questions of coordination of arms. In 1944 I was appointed Commanding General of the 3rd Army and there I stayed up to the capitulation.

Q. Tell what was the method of teaching history of wars at the College. What main ideas were put into teaching of History?

A. The lectures dealt with the following questions:

1) Power of the Russian Army and 2) organization and structure of this army, study of training of the Russian Army in detail. The following ideas were developed in this course of lectures -- ideas of expanding the Japanese influence onto the continent, ideas of the occupation of Korean and Manchurian territories for the purpose of maintaining our nation, obtaining raw materials for industry and for the purpose of obtaining markets.

Q. So the aim of teaching history of wars was to imbue the officers with the idea that Japan needed territories which she had to conquer in future wars?

A. Yes.

Q. The characteristic feature of the Russo-Japanese War is, that for the first time in history Japan attacked Russia without declaring war. I am interested in the following, how you, as a teacher of History of Wars, explained the students this attack on the enemy without declaring war. Did you consider this attack to be right and explained it as a certain achievement of Japanese strategy and tactics or did you explain this fact differently?

A. This action contradicts the international law. Up to the present time it has been explained as follows: On February 5, 1904 Japan sent an ultimatum to the Russian Government. It meant cessation of peaceful relations. I understand that strictly speaking, an ultimatum is not a declaration of war, but from the point of view of morality the attack on the enemy after presenting an ultimatum may not be considered as a crime. It seems that in this ultimatum it was stated that if Russia did not fulfill the demands of Japan, Japan would take measures at her will.

Q. Did you explain it in this way to your students?

A. Everybody in Japan understood it so and therefore I had no need to explain this fact. We did not consider this question to be serious and therefore during the war against America we repeated the same mistake, having attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941.

Q. What military aims had Japan, and how these aims reflected in teaching of history?

A. Japan occupies a very small territory which does not provide vitally important resources. Therefore it was necessary to occupy the territory of Manchuria, a part of China and the islands in the South, to extend our territory. This idea was reflected in teaching of history.

Q. What do you know about the "Red Book" and its contents?

A. This book was composed in the Chief Training Inspection Department under Marshal MUTO and KAWASHIMA, the predecessors of YAMADA. As material, two Soviet books were used: Field Service Regulation and Battle Service Regulation of the Infantry of 1936.

Q. For what purpose was the "Red Book" published?

A. The Japanese Army regarded the Red Army as the future enemy. The Red Army had its own organization and its own tactics. Therefore the Japanese tactics had to be adapted to that of the Russian Army to be able to fight against the Red Army. This book gave some instructions to the Japanese officers what tactic methods had to be applied by Japanese in order to conquer Russians and to oppose our own tactics to that of Russians.

Q. Was there an order to the Army which obliged all the officers of the Japanese Army to study the "Red Book"?

A. There was an instruction of the Chief Training Inspector that all the officers should study the "Red Book" thoroughly.

Q. While being the teacher of tactics did you give to the students lessons on tactics on the map of the U.S.S.R.?

A. Yes.

Q. Often?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were the tactic lessons in the Military College given on the maps of the Soviet Union?

A. It was supposed that war would not take place on the territory of Japan proper and therefore all the lessons on tactics were given on the maps of territories of other states, the Soviet Union and Manchuria in particular.

Q. What parts of Manchuria were chosen as objectives for practical lessons on maps?

A. Mostly the lessons dealt with the map of Eastern Manchuria bordering with the Soviet Primorye.

Q. How do you explain that the lessons were mostly conducted on the maps of Eastern Manchuria, bordering with the Soviet Primorye?

A. We considered that most probably the war would break out just on this frontier between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

Q. What were the tasks of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization in 1943?

A. First, we were interested in the maximum increase of the production of aircraft and factories, and we set ourselves the task of producing forty thousand aircraft a year. Second, we were occupied with the problem of increasing the production of sea vessels. We set ourselves the task of producing vessels with the total tonnage of one and a half million tons a year. Third, we were interested in exports of products from Manchura, Korea, and from the Southern regions (Annam, Siam) to Japan. We had a shortage of 1,500,000 tons of rice a year. Fourth, the question of dispersion of the population and industry in case of air raids was studied. Fifth, the sphere of foreign policy we set ourselves the task of studying the problems of consolidation of the bloc of Eastern Asia countries under Japanese hegemony.

Q. What do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base for an attack on the Soviet Union?

A. I know that in 1942 there was a plan of an attack on the Soviet Union from the Manchurian military base. The strength of the Kwantung Army had been increased beforehand for this purpose, highways and strategic railroads had been constructed, about two hundred airfields had been constructed, as well as fortified areas, ammunition dumps, many plants. As for instance, in Mukden, a tank, an automobile and an aircraft plant, in Laloyang - a plant for production of explosives.

Q. From what sources do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base?

A. I made my conclusions about the preparations for war from my personal observations when I was Commander of the temporary brigade and later on Commanding General of the 3rd Army in Manchuria.

Q. In what direction were the military operations against the Soviet Union to be conducted from the Manchurian military base?

A. Offensive operations were supposed to be conducted in the direction of the town of Voroshilov.

Q. How do you know about it?

A. I myself did not see the operation plan, but heard from General NAMOTO, my predecessor in the post of the Commanding General of the 3rd Army, that the eastern part of Manchura in the direction of Voroshilov was considered the main direction of the offensive.

Q. What directions did you, as Commander of the 3rd Army, receive from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, concerning the operation plans of a war against the Soviet Union?

A. While I was Commander I got the instructions only on defence but I knew about the offensive plans from my predecessor.

Q. When was the plan of offensive changed into the plan of defence?

A. The plan of offensive was changed into the plan of defence in 1944.

Q. What were the subjects of the training of the officers while you were the Commander of the 3rd Army?

A. The practical lessons with officers on the defence of the frontier fortified areas, were conducted on the maps and in the field. Then in April - May 1945 we received an instruction from the Kwantung Army Headquarters saying that the defence should be planned deeper into the country, approximately in the Mulin area. After that we conducted training in the said area.

Q. To what period belong the war games on the maps of the Soviet Union where military operations were directed towards Blagovestichensk, Spassk and Voroshilov?

A. In 1937 we chose areas East of Pogramichnaya Station for our tactical exercises.

Q. Why did the Japanese provoke the Nomongan conflict with the Red Army?

A. There was a desire to demonstrate the strength of the Japanese Army and to test that of the Red Army. From the general point of view it was to no purpose. At that time I was a brigade commander in Southwestern Manchuria and participated in a conference in Chiang-Chung in April, 1939. General UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army gave instructions not to yield an inch to Soviet border-guards as far as the questions of determining the frontier were concerned. He said that if frontier was not definite, it should be determined independently in favor of Japan. Commanding General of the 23rd Division, KOMATSUBARA followed UEDA's instructions to the letter. I consider both the Kwantung Army Headquarters and UEDA, who gave the instructions to independently decide any altercations in favor of Japan, responsible for that incident.

Q. And what is your own estimation of the causes of Japan's defeat in this war?

A. First, the war was beyond the strength of Japan in all respects, and in the first place because its industry was too weak and could not satisfy military needs. Second, it can be explained by an error in strategy. The area of military operations was too extended, instead of being fixed to one place. Thirdly, there were some diplomatic errors. The alliance with Germany was disadvantageous for Japan. It would have been far more advantageous to enter into an alliance with Great Britain. Besides, Japan did not succeed in preventing Germany from fighting against the Soviet Union, and when the war broke out could not make Germany cease fighting before the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. The second diplomatic error was the war with America.

The spring of 1941 was the most convenient time for conciliation with America. The American Government's reply was favorable for Japan, but instead of agreeing with it, Japan started war. Then the capture of Singapore was the proper moment to bring the war with Britain to an end, but it was not done either. The invention of atomic bombs and radio location played a great part in the surrender of Japan. Our Navy was strong enough, it had many ships and aircraft, but as soon as the Americans started using radio location, our bombers and submarines were located beforehand, and the Japanese Armed Forces lost their advantage of surprise. Even in the night the Americans located the Japanese Navy and carried accurate fire.

There were also some smaller factors: poor organizations of economy, it was necessary to coordinate the work of various branches of industry, but we were late in doing it.

Q. Whom do you consider to be the most important war criminals?

A. Lord Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO, who was the chief advisor to the Emperor and was obliged to submit the name for premiership. Marquis KIDO made a bad choice. Then Prime Minister and War Minister TOJO who started the war against America. Navy Minister, Admiral SHIMADA who attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Chief of the General Staff, SUGIYAMA. (dead) Chief of the Navy General Staff MAGANO who was the Emperor's adviser on the questions of Navy operations. Together with SHIMADA he bears responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister TOGO who negotiated with America, then broke the negotiations and gave consent to declaration of war on America. MINAMI, Dairo -- Member of Privy

Council. He was preparing a base for a war against the USSR, the Manchurian military base in particular. UMEDZU who was the Kwantung Army Commander in 1941 and at the beginning of the Nippon-Chinese War developed and extended the Chinese Incident, turning it into a big war. After Germany attacked the USSR, he concentrated large armies on the frontier and was preparing for a war against the Soviet Union, threatening the Red Army. OSHIMA Hiroshi is greatly responsible for the war. On his proposal, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact and later the Tripartite Alliance. He did not follow the situation of Germany, and did not prevent Germany in due time from attacking the Soviet Union. TANI Masayuki who was Foreign Minister in TOJO Cabinet and as such is naturally responsible for the war. He had been Ambassador in Nanking and supported the Provisional Government of WAN-TZIN-WEI. The minutes of interrogation are read by me personally, are quite clear to me, are written down from my words correctly and to this I sign my name.

WITNESS:

Lt. Gen. MURAKAMI KEISAKU.

INTERROGATED:

Acting Military Interrogator of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo

Major POGRANITSKY.

INTERPRETER:

Major PASHKOVSKY.

SECRETARY-STENOGRAPHER:

Miss KRZHISELEVSKAYA.

The interrogation began 13:15 and finished 17:00. On page 5 of the minutes, I made a correction, read: 1,500,000.

Signed: MURAKAMI KEISAKU.

Major POGRANITSKY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Merishove (signed)

C E R T I F I C A T E

March 28, 1946

The Town of Khabarovsk.

I, the undersigned Major A.A. Pashkovsky hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that I am well conversed in the Japanese language to make oral translation into Russian and that I give my promise to translate the testimony of Murakami Keisaku correctly.

I am duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely false translation according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code:

Pashkovsky.

The certificate is taken by acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Pogranitsky.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The Town of Khabarovsk.

March 28, 1946.

I, the undersigned Julia Georgievna KRZHIZHEVSKAYA, hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo POGRANITSKY that as a secretary-stenographer I promise to take short hand notes of the minutes of the interrogation of MURAKAMI KEISAKU correctly and decipher them correctly

I am duly warned that for the purposely false minutes I bear criminal responsibility according to Articles 16 and 192 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

KRSHUZHEVSKAYA.

The certificate is taken by
Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R.
at the International Military Tribunal
in Tokyo.

POGRANITSKY.

C E R T I F I C A T E

The town of Khabarovsk March 28, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Murakami Keisaku hereby certify to the acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that I as a witness to the case of the principal war criminals promise to tell only the truth.

I am duly warned that for giving false testimony I bear criminal responsibility according to article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: Murakami Keisaku

The certificate is taken by
Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R.
at the International Military Tribunal
in Tokyo.

POGRANITSKY.

Affidavit of Genzo YANAGITA

Name: Genzo YANAGITA

Age: 53
Nationality: Japanese
Education: Received higher military education
Rank: Lieutenant General
Last position: Commander of the Kwantung Province
Defense Army

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, conducted the interrogations in Moscow on February 27, 1946.

Genzo YANAGITA /s/

/Page 1/

Q. When were you promoted to a commissioned officer?

A. I was commissioned a sublieutenant in 1914 /Taisho 3/, which is the starting rank of officers.

Q. Where did you start your military service?

A. I assumed the post of a platoon commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Division (Japanese Army).

Q. How long did you stay in that regiment?

A. I had four years' service in that 18th Infantry Regiment before I was promoted to lieutenant and attached to the 2nd Section of the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Headquarters. After ten months' service with the Army General Staff Headquarters I entered the Army General Staff College in 1919 /Taisho 8/.

Q. In what year did you graduate from the Army General Staff College?

A. I graduated from the college in 1922 /Taisho 11/ as a lieutenant and returned to the 18th Regiment. I was promoted to captain in the summer of 1923 /Taisho 12/ and was appointed company commander. At the end of 1923 /Taisho 12/ I was attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, taking charge of military budget affairs.

After serving in the War Ministry until 1927 /Showa 2/, I was appointed a resident-officer in Europe for the purpose of studying life in Europe, Russian language, and military science.

I arrived at Riga at the beginning of 1927 /Showa 2/ and remained there for about one year, during which time I mastered the Russian language and read books on the Soviet Union.

Page 2/

Then I travelled in Europe for several months and was in Estonia for two months. As I had no concrete duty, I pursued mostly my own studies. In 1929 /Showa 4/ I went to Poland and served for three months with the 15th Infantry Regiment at Tebrin. During that time I familiarized myself with the general conditions of the regiment. In the spring of 1930 /Showa 5/ I came back to Japan by way of Germany, France, Great Britain and U.S.A. I was again attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and served in the Military Affairs Section until 1932 /Showa 7/.

Q. In what year were you promoted to major?

A. I was promoted to major in 1930 /Showa 5/ before I returned to the War Ministry. In 1933 /Showa 8/ I was appointed a military attache to the Japanese Legation in Poland and held the concurrent post of military attache to the Japanese Legation in Roumania. I was promoted to lt-colonel in the summer of 1933 /Showa 8/.

In 1934 /Showa 9/ I came back to Japan and was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the 2nd Section (the Intelligence Section) of the Kwantung Army. I held this position till the summer of 1935 /Showa 10/. Then I returned to the War Ministry and was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the Conscription Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. I became the chief of this Section in the summer of 1937 /Showa 12/ and was promoted to colonel at the same time. After a service of one year, I was appointed the Regimental Commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division at SUNWU, Manchuria, which post I held for a year.

In 1939 /Showa 14/ I was promoted to major-general and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the 11th Army at Hankow, Central China. I was appointed the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin, which position I held for three years.

/Page 3/

Later in 1943 /Showa 18/ I was appointed the Divisional Commander of the 33rd Division in Burma. I was promoted to lieutenant-general at the end of 1942 /Showa 17/. In the summer of 1944 /Showa 19/ I was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters and retired from military service. It seems to me that I was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters because of the failure of the Burma campaign.

NOTE
Gen. made head
Taiwan Iron Control

The War Ministry had me appointed President of the Taiwan Iron Industry Control Association. I went to Taiwan in 1944 /Showa 19/ and during my service /with the Association/ I endeavored to heal the wound, which I had received during my military service. This post was under the direct command of the Governor-General.

In April of 1945 /Showa 20/ I was brought back to Tokyo and appointed the Commander of the Kwantung Province Defense Army. I was taken prisoner on the 22nd of August of that year.

- Q. What did you know in 1931 /Showa 6/ about the occupation of Manchuria?
- A. I did not expect at all the occupation of Manchuria, but later I understood that the occupation was not an unexpected occurrence to the military.
- Q. Who among the military do you think were in favor of the occupation of Manchuria?

Kanji Ishihara

A. The persons who played the active role in the Kwantung Army were Colonel Seishiro ITAGAKI, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and Lt-colonel Kanji ISHIHARA, his Assistant. These persons had a strong influence in the Kwantung Army as brave and energetic officers, although their ranks and positions were not necessarily high and important. Later ITAGAKI became War Minister, ISHIHARA, Chief of Operations Section of Army General Staff. As for the officers who were active for the occupation of Manchuria among the military authorities in Tokyo, I name ARAKI, then War Minister, Major-general SUGIYAMA, then Director of the Military Affairs Bureau (later became Chief of Army General Staff and War Minister twice), Colonel NAGATA, then Section Chief of the

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DAI TOA RENMEI

War Ministry (assassinated later), Colonel CBATA, and Major-general TATEKAWA. To this group belonged General Iwane MATSUI (later President of the Greater East Asia Federation) /"DAI TOA RENMEI"/.

Q. Can you name persons who as individuals took part in developing Manchuria as military base?

A. First of all, the commanders of the Kwantung Army took part in this affair. At the time of the Manchurian occupation, General HONJO was in command of the Kwantung Army. Next Marshal HUTO (who died soon thereafter), General HISHIKARI (till 1934), General MINAMI (till 1935), General UEDA (1936-1939, resigned, taking to himself the responsibility for the NOMONHAN Incident), Lieutenant-general UBEZU, who was appointed as Ueda's successor, served until 1944 (summer) when he was appointed Chief of the Army General Staff. His successor, General YAMADA, filled the post till the unconditional surrender.

Q. What kind of agencies took the leadership in establishing military base in Manchuria?

A. The Army General Staff, the War Ministry and the Greater East Asiatic Affairs Ministry.

AYUKAWA

Q. What were the parts played by AYUKAWA and MATSUCKA in converting Manchuria into a military base?

/Page 5/

A. AYUKAWA was the leader of all industries in Manchuria and under his leadership, an army arsenal and aviation factories were built in Mukden. In addition, heavy industries of Manchuria started their development under his leadership. On that occasion Japanese capitalists invested large amounts of capital in heavy industries. The development of heavy industries in Manchuria played a great role in preparing for the war against Soviet Union.

Zainboku

Matsushita, prez

SMRR

MATSUCKA was the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company /"MANRITSU"/. His role was to extend the network of railways and to take an active part in developing industries belonging to that company.

Q. How did the Japanese military officers prepare for the war against U.S.S.R.?

A. The answer is as follows: - All instructions on tactics, as well as on topography, were given chiefly on the materials concerning U.S.S.R.

In military training and military publications, a great deal of attention was paid to the problem of tactical study on U.S.S.R.

Moreover, a book named the "Red Book" was issued about 1937 /Showa 12/ for the use of the Japanese Army. The book contained materials regarding the tactics of the Soviet Army and the means necessary in fighting the Soviet Army.

In the military Academy the students studied the Russian language chiefly.

/Page 6/

Q. What do you know about the Special Kwantung Army Manoeuvre /"KANTOKUEN"/?

A. In August, 1941 /Showa 16/ I received the order concerning the duties of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin. The stamp "KANTOKUEN" was put on this order.

Q. What concrete motion did you make for carrying it out?

A. The "KANTOKUEN" plan was drawn up as preparation of the Kwantung Army for the war against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, it was necessary for the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army to prepare necessary materials for carrying out the "KANTOKUEN" plan. That is, supplementation of the enumerated intelligence duties, training of intrigue units and scouting units, and drawing up a plan for strengthening the propaganda against U.S.S.R. As for the propaganda, the victorious offensive of Germany against U.S.S.R. should be reflected therein.

In the same manner, the staff of the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army was strengthened in order to strengthen the intelligence duties and

to win over to our side those who had charge of Russian military duties, so as to have allies in the Russian Army.

It was directed that these plans be carried out and the preparations be completed by the end of September or the beginning of October of 1941 /Showa 16/.

- Q. From whom did you receive those directions?
- A. I received them from General UMEZU, the Commander of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Were you given leaflets for strengthening the propaganda?

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- Q. Yes. I received from the Army General Staff Headquarters some leaflets for strengthening propaganda. Others I prepared myself. Thus we received several times from Tokyo leaflets which were prepared by the Army General Staff Headquarters. In addition, directions concerning the contents of leaflets were given through the Kwantung Army Headquarters, by the Army General Staff Headquarters. We drew up these leaflets and expanded them. In the third instance, we ourselves designed the contents of the leaflets and expanded them in accordance with the plan of propaganda.

The general contents of these leaflets were: firstly, anti-Soviet and defeatist propaganda; secondly, propaganda for the consolidation of the various classes of the Manchurian inhabitants with the Japanese people.

Photographic illustrated charts of the above-mentioned contents were sent to Harbin from the Army General Staff Headquarters.

- Q. From whom did the Army Special Service Agency receive the directions on propaganda?
- A. From the Commander of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Did you have anything to do with the White Russians while you were the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin?

- A. Yes. By orders from the commander of the Kwantung Army, we had to train White Russians as instigators, propagandists, scouts, and saboteurs. White Russian forces were disguised as forces in the Manchurian Army.

Some of the White Russians worked in the Army Special Service Agency, performing propaganda and scouting functions.

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- Q. Name those Commanders of the Army Special Service Agency of Harbin whom you know.

- A. I succeeded Lieutenant General Hikosaburo HATA as Commander of the Army Special Service Agency. The Commander before Lt-General HATA was General HIGUCHI. General DOI succeeded me, and was in turn succeeded by General AKIGUSA.

- Q. Did you have close contact with the leaders of the White Russians in Manchuria?

- A. KISLICHIN, Secretary-General of the White Russians, also SEMYONOV, MATOKOVSKY, ROZAEVSKIY, SHEPUNOV, GARDEEV /phonetic/.

- Q. Was there any school for the training of White Russians as scouts, saboteurs and propagandists, at the time you were the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin?

- A. As I have already stated, by command of General UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army, the Army Special Service Agency was responsible for preparing and training White Russians as future propagandists and scouts. In the Japanese Army Special Service Agency, the Sixth Section, under Section Chief Colonel Suenari SHIRAKI, was in charge of this business. Major MURASAWA was his assistant.

In the training course under the charge of the Sixth Section between 20 to 30 propagandists and between 10 to 15 scouts were trained at the same time. The term for the training of propagandists was three months and for the training of scouts, eight to ten months (on the last occasion, it was six months).

I attended each time the special ceremonies which were held at the beginning and at the end of the training course. I gave them words regarding the performance of their future duties.

- Q. What is the ASANO Unit?
- A. It is a unit composed of White Russians for sabotage activity.
- Q. Tell me by whom it was organized.
- A. It was organized by the Kwantung Army Headquarters about 1936 /Showa 11/. Lieutenant-Colonel YAMACKA, as Assistant to the Chief of the Second Section took charge of it.
- Q. Was the ASANO Unit still in existence at the time you were the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency?
- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. Did the Kwantung Army Headquarters know of its existence?
- A. Of course. In general, we did nothing without the directions of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. By his command the ASANO Unit was included in Manchoukuo Army. The members wore the uniforms of the Manchoukuo Army.

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- Q. How many soldiers were there in the ASANO Unit?
- A. It was composed of five companies. Most of them were posted in the neighborhood of the Second Sungari Station and the rest in Hengtaohotzu and Hailar. The unit had about 700 soldiers in general.
- Q. What was the duty of the ASANO Unit?
- A. The duty of the ASANO Unit was to train sabotage units in case of a war against Soviet Union. The commander was Colonel ASANO (a Japanese) of the Manchoukuo Army.
- Q. What agencies paid money to it?
- A. The Manchoukuo War Ministry paid the money until 1941, but it was paid by the Kwantung Army Headquarters since the special plan of the Kwantung Army manoeuvre /"KANTOKUEN"/ was drawn up.

- Q. Did the Army Special Service Agency store military uniforms of the Soviet Russian Army for the ASANO Unit?
- A. Yes, the Special Service Agency had a number of complete sets of the uniform of the Red Army soldiers (military uniform) prepared for the ASANO Unit in case of war.
- Q. For what purpose was the military uniform of Soviet Russian soldiers stored?
- A. To have the saboteurs of the ASANO Unit put them on in order to deceive the Red Army.
- Q. From the standpoint of international law and customs of war, what do you think of the preparation of this intrigue unit whose members are to wear Soviet military uniforms in order to be dispatched into the Soviet Union?

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- A. Of course, it is wrong in a little way, and I think it proper not to resort to it.
- Q. For what purpose did you do it?
- A. These articles (Quantity: 20-30) were sent from the Army General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo.
- Q. Who sent them?
- A. They were sent by the 2nd Section of the Army General Staff Headquarters, but I don't know the individuals who sent them.

Kingoro Hashimoto Do you know Kingoro HASHIMOTO?

- A. Yes, I know him.
- Q. Can you state anything about him?
- A. He retired from active service in the Army in 1937 /Showa 12/ with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. I am a graduate of the Military Academy of the 26th Term Class, while he belonged to the 23rd Term Class. After graduation from the Army General Staff College, he worked in the Russian Division of the Army General Staff Headquarters, and later became Chief of that

division. He was the most intimate friend of Hikosaburo HATA. A short time before retiring from active service, HASHIMOTO was transferred from the Army General Staff Headquarters and became the Commander of the Army Special Service at Manchuli. He was the military attache to the Japanese Legation in Turkey in 1933 /Showa 8/.

- Q. Do you know the reason why HASHIMOTO retired from the army?
- A. In February, 1936 /Showa 11/ the so-called "February 26th Incident" occurred in Japan, in which the young officers presented their demands. HASHIMOTO had close contact with groups of these young officers and so he was defamed by this incident, although he was not arrested. He retired two years after this incident.

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- Q. What did HASHIMOTO do after his retirement?
- A. HASHIMOTO organized the Loyal Association *Red Handed association* /"SEKISEI-KAI"/.
- Q. What activities did the Loyal Association /SEKISEI-KAI/ organized by HASHIMOTO do?
- A. This had a leaning toward fascism after the model of Hitler's and Mussolini's parties. He presented to the masses the problem of fascist propaganda.
- Q. Do you know anything about the organization organized by HASHIMOTO under the name of Japan Youth Party /"DAI-NIPPON-SEINEN-TO"/?
- A. He had as his own aim the unification of young people. The system of the organization was just identical to that of Hitler Jugend of Germany. The members of the party, however, were older than those of the Hitler Jugend.

I wrote this statement -- Genzo YANAGITA /s/

The interrogator: Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Tribunal in Tokyo. /s/

The Military Interpreter: Lieutenant DINKEVICH /s/

Oath

Japanese Army Lieutenant-General Genzo YANAGITA

I swear to testify nothing but the truth concerning the trials of Japanese Class-A war criminals. I swear this before Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I have been warned that if I give false evidence I shall be held responsible under Article 95 of Criminal Code R.S.F.S.R.

In Moscow, Feb. 27, 1946 /Showa 21/

Genzo YANAGITA /s/

Administered by:

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. /s/

Lieutenant DINKOVICH, Military Interpreter. /s/

811

T A B L E

OF THE INCREASE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE TROOPS IN KOREA IN
THE PERIOD 1931 - 1945.

YEARS	Infantry Division	Division Depot	REQUIREMENTS				TOTAL			
			Infantry	Artillery	Tanks	Air	Manpower	Guns	Tanks	Planes
1931- 32	2	--	--	2	--	1	30,000	300	--	70
1941- 42	2	2	--	3	--	4 (airfield service battalion)	120,000	800	30	200
1945	9	5	1	4	1	11 (airfield service battalion)	360,000	1,500	170	400

January 30, 1946

Deputy Chief of the
General Staff Department
COLONEL TSLITCHKOCERTIFICATE OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, S. Bronstein, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

SIGNATURE: /s/ S. Bronstein
S. BRONSTEIN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##:

- 2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2073 "Report. Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."
- 2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2130 "Report concerning Puppet Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."
- 1879 "Table increase of Sungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."
- 2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."
- 1877 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. "
- 1881 "Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."
- 1883 "Report on the growth of Seaports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 1885 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."
- 2129 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2127 "Report on construction of military dumps in
Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2150 "Report on the increase of the barrack faci-
lities in lities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow,
on or about January 3rd, 1946,

LT. COL. TARANENKO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF CONSTRUCTION OF
NETWORK OF RAILROADS AND HIGHWAYS
IN KOREA FROM 1931 TO 1945

The general length of railroads in Korea at the beginning of 1931 was 3,865 km; they were single lines and partially narrow-gauge railroads. The main railroads were

Singishu - Seoul - Fusan

Kajnei - Genzan - Rynsan

Taiden - Moppo.

The length of highways by the beginning of 1931 was about 17,000 km, out of them 6,000 km. of automobile roads.

In 1941 the general length of railroads in Korea was 2,000 km more and the length of the highways increased - more than three times, and amounted to about 5,800 km. of railroads and to about 53,000 km. of highways (half of them automobile roads).

In 1941 three new railway lines were constructed leading from Korea to the borders of Manchuria to the towns of Manpotsin, Keisantin and Tumen; the connecting line Kheidzyo-Kogen (213 km), was built; the construction of the second gauge of the railway Fusan-Seul-Singisyu, was started as well as the construction of new lines; from Keisyu to Seul (via Eisen, Keihokuantu and Teisen), and the Tokay Railroad Fusantin-Santiyoku-Anpen (along the eastern coast of Korea).

The intense construction of highways was also carried out, mainly in Northern Korea and particularly in her northeastern part, near the U.S.S.R. territory. By the beginning of 1945 the railway network in Korea reached the length of 6,600 km. (i.e. 7900 km of single lines); that added more than 4,000 km of railroad network compared with 1931.

The length of highways by the same year reached about 60,000 km (one-half of them automobile roads).

From 1941 to 1945 the laying of the second line of the railroad Fusan-Seul-Singisyu, was completed, the building of the railroad Keisyu-Eisen-Keihokouanto-Teisen-Seul finished and the construction of the coastal Tokay railroad, which was built in its northern part from the Anpen to Santioku continued.

Thus, from the time of Manchurian occupation the Japanese had intensely equipped Korea with railroads and highways, particularly in her northern part, preparing to use Korea, in addition to the Manchurian military base, for an attack on the USSR.

- Appendix 1 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1931-1932".
" 2 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1941-1942".
" 3 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1945".
" 4 Map, "Automobile roads in Korea 1931-1932".
" 5 Map, "Automobile roads in Korea 1941-1942".
" 6 Map "Automobile roads in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I. S. DOLITSKAYA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ S. Dolitskaya

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##:

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"Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946,

LT. COL. TARANENKO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.

Железные дороги Кореи

1945г.

Railroads of Korea in 1945.

Условные обозначения:

- Двойные железные дороги (Double track railroads)
- Однопутные железные дороги (Railroads for truck)


Общее протяжение в однопутном исчислении - 7900 км

Conventional marks:
The whole length 7900 km.

Начальник 6 отдела
генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *С. С. Соколов*

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel *Sokolov*

Масштаб 1:2500000



Автомобильные дороги Кореи

6.1931-32гг.

Automobile roads
of Korea in 1931-32.

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
Автомобильные дороги.
Automobile Highways


Общее протяжение - около 6000 км.
The total length - 6,000 km.

Начальник 6 отдела
генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник
Семанов

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant Colonel
Sokolov

ЖЕХИМОР

Масштаб 1:2500000



Железные дороги Кореи

В 1941-42 гг.

Railroads of Korea

in 1941-42.

Условные обозначения:

- Двухпутная железная дорога
- Однопутные железные дороги

Общее протяжение — 5.800 км, в
однопутном исчислении — 7.967 км

Conventional marks:
Double track roads
Railroads (single track)

The whole length — 5.800 km
In single track — 7.967 km.

Начальник 6 отдела
штаба Красной Армии
подполковник
С. С. Соколов

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Ж Е Л Е З Н Ы Е
Д О Р О Г И

Автомобильные дороги Кореи

В 1941-42 гг.

**Automobile roads
of Korea in 1941-42.**

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
— Автомобильные дороги
Automobile highways

Общее протяжение - около 26000 км.
The total length - 26000 km.

*Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник *С. Яковлев**

The Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant Colonel
Sokolov

ЖЕЛТОЕ МОРЕ

Масштаб 1:2500000

Железные дороги Кореи

в 1931-32 гг.

Railroads of Korea in 1931-32

Условные обозначения:
— Обыкновенные железные дороги
— Электрические железные дороги
Общая протяженность — 3.865 км

Conventional tracks:
Railroads (Electric track)
The whole length — 3865 km.

Начальник 6 отдела
департаamenta Красной Армии
подполковник
С. С. Ракалов

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Ж Е Л

Автомобильные дороги Кореи

6 1945 2004

**Automobile roads
of Korea in 1945**

Условные обозначения
Conventional marks:
Автомобильные дороги
Automobile Highways

Общая протяженность - около 30 000 км.
The total Length - 30 000 km.


*Начальник 6 отдела
генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник*

Сороков

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Сороков

Масштаб 1:2500000



813

ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР $\frac{9.150-6}{58}$
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

DOC. NO 2132 &
U.S.S.R. NO 150-6

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF THE NET-WORK OF
AIRFIELDS IN KOREA IN THE PERIOD FROM
1931 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH THREE
MAPS IN TWO COPIES.

9.150-b

Copy No....

REPORT

on the increase of the airfield network
in Korea from 1931 to 1945

Beginning in 1931 and during the following years, the command of the Japanese Army in Korea undertook a vast-scale construction of land and sea air bases, airfields and landing fields, preparing a military base for the operations of the Japanese Air Forces against the USSR.

Table
of the increase of the airfield system in Korea

Period	Air Bases	Airfields	Landing Fields	Total Number
1931-32	-	8	-	8
1941-42	4	21	28	53
1945	5	25	33	63

Beginning in 1932 the Japanese command paid the greatest attention to construction of air bases, airfield groups, to qualitative improvement of the existing airfields and to construction of hangars and runways.

Beginning in 1942 the work of improvement and extension of airfield network in Korea continued up to the moment of the capitulation of Japan.

- Appendix:
1. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1931-1932".
 2. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1941-1942".
 3. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
Colonel

/Tsigichko/

January 30, 1946.

Translated V. Serkhov

Аэродромная сеть Кореи

в 1931-32 гг.

Airfield System of Korea
in 1931-32.

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:

- Аэродромы - Airfields

Всего: The total:
● Аэродромов - 8 Airfields - 8

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Сколов* (Сколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel *Sokolov*

Масштаб 1:250 000

Аэродромная сеть Кореи

в 1941-42 гг.

Airfield System of Korea
in 1941-42.

- Условные обозначения:**
Conventional marks:
- 1. Морская авиабаза 1. Sea air-bases
 - 2. Морской аэродром 2. Sea airfields
 - 3. Авиабаза сухопутная 3. Air-bases
 - 4. Аэродром сухопутный 4. Airfields
 - 5. Посадочные площадки 5. Landing fields

Всего **The total:**

1. Авиабаз	4	1. Air-bases	4
2. Аэродромов	21	2. Airfields	21
3. Посадочных площадок	28	3. Landing fields	28

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Сokolov* (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel *Sokolov*

Масштаб 1:2500000

M O R E

Аэродромная сеть Кореи

в 1945 г.

Airfield System of Korea

in 1945.

Условные обозначения: Conventional marks

1. Морские авиабазы	1. Sea air-bases
2. Морские аэродромы	2. Sea airfields
3. Сухопутные авиабазы	3. Air-bases
4. Сухопутные аэродромы	4. Airfields
5. Посадочные площадки	5. Landing fields

Всего: = The total:

1. Авиабаз 5	1. Air-bases 5
2. Аэродромов 25	2. Airfields 25
3. Посадочных площадок 33	3. Landing fields 33


Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник /Сколов/

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

/Sokolov/

Масштаб 1:2500000

Ж Е М О Р Е



REPORTOn construction of fortified areas
in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

Prior to the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese there were in Korea a few coast fortifications in the Hensan and Zinkai areas.

After the occupation of Manchuria and in connection with the preparation for a war against the Soviet Union by Japan, the Japanese command started a large scale construction of fortified areas directed toward Vladivostok on the north-east and east coast of Korea.

In 1936 the Japanese started construction of the Rashin fortified area, that covered the whole coast from Yuki up to Seisin inclusive. From 1940-41 the Japanese started the construction of the Kenshin fortified area, which was a continuation of the Rashin fortified area, northward and which included the right bank of the river Tounintsyan from its mouth to the town of Kenkhin.

By 1945 the Rashin and Kenkhin fortified areas were equipped with a ramified net of permanent and field construction. In the Rashin fortified area there were up to 15 batteries of large calibre artillery and in that of Kekhin - up to 55 guns and over 100 machine guns in pill-boxes.

In 1936-37 an intensive construction of the Genzan fortified area was started, which covered the entire coast of the Eiko Bay and the Islands in this bay.

In 1945 the Genzan fortified area was equipped with 40 calibre guns.

From 1943 the construction of the fortified Tsinkai area was started which by 1945 covered a large territory including Fuzan, and the islands adjacent to the coast of Korea in the areas of Fusan and Tsinkai.

Besides the fortified areas of Rashin, Kenkhin, Genzan and Tsinkai, a construction of fortifications in the areas of Tsinnampo and Reisui, was started in 1941-45, these fortifications were to be turned into a large fortified area.

- Appendix: 1. A map "Fortification in Korea in 1931-32".
2. A map "Fortification in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLONEL /TSIGITCHKO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Z. BRONSTEIN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: S. BRONSTEIN

Фортификация на территории Кореи

1931-32


Fortification of Korea in 1931-32.

Условное обозначение:
 Conventional marks:
 Отдельные укрепления.
 Separate fortification

Начальник 6 отдела
 Генштаба Красной Армии
 Подполковник /С. С. Соколов/

The Red Army General Staff
 Chief of the 6-th Department
 Lieutenant-colonel
 Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000



ФОРТИФИКАЦИОННОЕ СООРУЖЕНИЕ КОРЕИ

В 1944-45 гг.

Fortification of Korea in 1944-45.

Канхенский УР (Kanheng fortified districts)
Пулеметы - 100
Пушки - 55

Расинский УР (Rasin fortified districts)
15 батарей тяжелой артиллерии

Генсанский УР (Gensan fortified districts)
40 орудий тяжелой артиллерии

Цзинькиайский УР (Tsing kai fortified districts)

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
Штрихованная область - укрепленный район (fortified district)
Точка - отдельные укрепления (separate fortifications)

Начальник 6 отдела
генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник Семин (Семин)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Ж Е Л Т Е

REPORTOn construction of military
dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

The general capacity of military dumps in Korea up to 1931 did not exceed:

Ammunition dumps for 10-15 division sets of ammunition.

Fuel dumps for 15,000 t.

Food and forage dumps, commissary, chemical and other property - 40-50 depots.

After the occupation of Manchuria, Korea became a rear supply base for the Kwantung Army; in connection with preparations of Japan for a war against the USSR the number and capacity of dumps in Korea, and the accumulation of war supplies, there, were rapidly increasing.

During the period 1931-1941 Korea, and particularly, her Northern part, was covered by a dense net of different military dumps. Large ammunition dumps, fuel and other war materials depots were built, in the towns of Khoiren, Yuki, Rashin, Seishin, Ranan, Kanko and Genzan. Old dumps in towns: Heijo, Seoul, Fusan, Chinkai and others were considerably enlarged.

In 1941 the general capacity of military dumps in Korea was:

Ammunition dumps for 50 division sets of ammunition.

Fuel dumps for 60,000 t.

Food, and forage dumps, commissary and other property - about 200 depots.

From 1941 to 1945, in connection with considerable increase of the Japanese troops in Korea (concentrated for an attack on the USSR), the amount of dumps was still being increased by building new dumps, enlarging existing ones, and by turning civilian warehouses into military dumps

In 1945 there were in Korea:

Ammunition dumps with capacity for 150 division sets of ammunition.

Fuel dumps for 130,000 t.

Food, and forage dumps, commissary and other property 336 depots.

- Appendix:
1. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1931 -32".
 2. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1941 - 42 ".
 3. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

30 January, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, S. DOLITSKAYA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: S. Dolitskaya

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.##:

- 2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2073 "Report. Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."
- 2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."
- 2130 "Report concerning Puppet Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."
- 1879 "Table increase of Sungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."
- 2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."
- 1877 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945. "
- 1881 "Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."
- 1883 "Report on the growth of Seaports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."
- 1885 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."
- 2129 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
- 2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2127 "Report on construction of military dumps in
Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2150 "Report on the increase of the barrack faci-
lities in lities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow,
on or about January 30, 1946,

LT. COL. TARANENKO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.

ВОЕННЫЕ СКЛАДЫ В КОРЕЕ

в 1941-42 гг.

Military Dumps in Korea

in 1941-42

УСЛОВНЫЕ ОБОЗНАЧЕНИЯ: Conventions marks:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. ● СКЛАДЫ ВОЕПРИПАСОВ | 1. Ammunition dumps |
| 2. ○ СКЛАДЫ ГОРЮЧЕГО | 2. Fuel dumps |
| 3. ○ СКЛАДЫ ПРОДФУРАЖА И
ИНТЕНДАНТСКОГО ИМУЩЕСТВА | 3. Equipment dumps |

ЕМКОСТЬ: The capacity of dumps

1. СКЛАД ВОЕПРИПАСОВ НА 50 ДИВИЗИОН-
Ammunition dumps for 50 divisions
set of rounds
2. СКЛАД ГОРЮЧЕГО НА 60.000 ТОНН.
Fuel dumps for 60,000 ton
3. СКЛАД ПРОДФУРАЖА И ИНТЕНДАНТСКОГО
Equipment dumps - 200
ГРУЗОВО ИМУЩЕСТВА - 200 ХРАНИЛИЩ

НАЧАЛЬНИК 6 ОТДЕЛА
ГЕНШТАБА КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ
ПОДПОЛКОВНИК (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Военные склады в Корее

в 1945 году

Fortification of Korea

in 1945.

Ключевые обозначения:

Conventional marks:

- 1. ● Склады боеприпасов
- 2. ○ Склады горючего
- 3. ○ Склады продовольствия и интендантского имущества
- 4. Ammunition dumps
- 5. Fuel dumps
- 6. Equipment dumps

Емкость: The capacity of dumps:

- 1. Складов боеприпасов на 150 дивизионных боекомплектов, set of rounds
- 2. Складов горючего на 130,000 тонн, Fuel dumps for 130,000 ton.
- 3. Складов продовольствия, интендантского и другого имущества - 536 хранения.

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel Sokolov

Военные склады в Корее

в 1931-32 гг.

Military Dumps in Korea
in 1931-32.

Условные обозначения:

Conventional marks:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. ● Склады боеприпасов | 1. Ammunition dumps |
| 2. ○ Склады горючего | 2. Fuel dumps |
| 3. ○ Склады провизии и
интендантского имущества | 3. Equipment dumps |

Емкость:

The capacity of dumps:

1. Склады боеприпасов на 10-15 дивизионных боекомплектов
2. Склады горючего на 15.000 тонн
3. Склады провизии, интендантского и другого имущества - 40-50 хранилищ

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Соколов* (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Военные склады в Корее

в 1941-42 гг.

Military Dumps in Korea

in 1941-42

Условные обозначения: Conventions marks:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. ● Склады боеприпасов | 1. Ammunition dumps |
| 2. ○ Склады горючего | 2. Fuel dumps |
| 3. ○ Склады проформы и
интендантского имущества | 3. Equipment dumps |

Емкость: The capacity of dumps

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Склады боеприпасов на 50 дивизион-
боекомплектов. | Ammunition dumps for 50 divisions
set of rounds |
| 2. Склады горючего на 60.000 тонн. | Fuel dumps for 60.000 ton |
| 3. Склады проформы, интендантского
имущества - 200 траншей. | Equipment dumps - 200
trenches |

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov

Масштаб 1:2500000

Военные склады в Корее

в 1945 году

Fortification of Korea

in 1945.

Ключевые обозначения:

Convention marks:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. ● Склады боеприпасов | 1. Ammunition dumps |
| 2. ○ Склады горючего | 2. Fuel dumps |
| 3. ○ Склады продовольствия и
интендантского имущества | 3. Equipment dumps |

Емкость: The capacity of dumps

- Складов боеприпасов на 150 дней -
Ammunition dumps for 150 divisions
ЭМОННЫХ БОЕКОМПЛЕКТОВ. set of rounds
- Складов горючего на 130.000 тонн.
Fuel dumps for 130.000 ton.
- Складов продовольствия, интендантского и
другого имущества - 536 хранения.

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov

Военные склады в Корее

в 1931-32 гг.

Military Dumps in Korea in 1931-32.

Условные обозначения:

Conventional marks:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. ● Склады боеприпасов | 1. Ammunition dumps |
| 2. ○ Склады горючего | 2. Fuel dumps |
| 3. ○ Склады провизии и
ИНТЕНДАНТСКОГО ИМУЩЕСТВА | 3. Equipment dumps |

Емкость: The capacity of dumps:

1. Склады боеприпасов на 10-15 дивизионных боекомплектов (set of rounds)
2. Склады горючего на 15.000 тонн (Fuel dumps for 15.000 ton)
3. Склады провизии, интендантского имущества - 40-50 хранения

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник *Соколов* (Соколов)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel *Sokolov*

К О Р Е Я