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Of

DEFENSE

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1	Monday, 24 February, 1947
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4	INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
5	Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building
6	Tokyo, Japan
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8	The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
9	at 0930.
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11	Appearances:
12	For the Tribunal, same as before.
13	For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
14	For the Defense Section, same as before.
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16	The Accused:
17	All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is
18	represented by his counsel.
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20	(English to Japanese and Japanese
21	to English interpretation was made by the
22	Language Section, IMTFE.)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

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THE PRESIDENT: Our attention has been drawn to an article appearing in <u>Stars and Stripes</u>, purporting to foreshadow the nature of the argument which would be presented by defense counsel. That article constitutes gross contempt of this court and appropriate action may yet be taken unless some explanation is forthcoming, together with some assurance against any repetition of such articles.

Every court is obliged to consider two things, and let them not be forgotten: first, the security of the country, and secondly, the prestige of the court itself. Both were utterly disregarded in that article. A deputation for the defense assured me this morning that the defense had no responsibility. I did not think for one moment they had. But the person or persons responsible are invited to come to that lecturn with their apology and assurance. Otherwise we shall take action.

I have another statement to make. This court will not hear argument already heard. The

new members of the court, those who did not hear the argument on the motions going to jurisdiction and constitution of the court, will rely upon the record; but for the attitude of those members I, at all events, should feel bound to allow the argument to be repeated for their benefit, but they don't want to hear it because it already appears in the record. In fact, they have already read it for the purposes of the motions which were dismissed last week, motions by the defense for dismissal of the case for the prosecution.

MR. HAYASHI: Mr. President, I am HAYASHI Itsure, director of publicity of the Japanese defense. I should like to make a few remarks with respect to the article just referred to by the President in <u>Stars and Stripes</u>.

I wish to assure you, Mr. President that the publicity department of the Japanese Defense Corps, either as a department or as an individual, has not made any such announcement. After seeing it we feel it extremely regretable that such an article appeared in the <u>Stars and Stripes</u>. We should like to investigate it -- into the course --or the manner

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in which this article appeared in the <u>Stars and</u> <u>Stripes</u>, and after full investigation we should like to take all measures to prevent such an occurrence in the future.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, the defense is prepared to proceed.

MR. BRACKMAN: Mr. President, I am Arnold Brackman, of the United Press, and I wrote that article. However, every ethic in the newspaper business, all ethics of journalism were broken when that story was published. I had given an order to have it killed. It was written by error. Every newspaper followed those instructions except <u>Stars</u> and <u>Stripes</u>.

One point further: It is a matter of a newspaper device, but we also put on the story -the correction of the story, which was issued a number of -- about twelve hours before it was written, an automatic release for 9:30, which was also broken by <u>Stars and Stripes</u>.

One point further, Mr. President: I have been covering the Tribunal for a number of months and at no time have I ever attempted or tried in any

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1	way to embarrass the Court or to in any way reflect
2	on the security of the Occupation itself.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are appearing here
4	as the writer of the offending article. As such
5	you are entitled to appear or to be represented by
6	counsel. Now we want to hear the editor of the paper
7	if he is available.
8	1ST LIEUT. J. THOMPSON: Mr. President,
9	the editor of the Stars and Stripes is not present
10	in Court. However, I can secure him for the Court
11	at your desire, sir.
12	THE PRESIDENT: He should appear immediately
13	after the mid-morning recess.
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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

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MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, the defense is prepared to proceed. In the preparation of the general opening statement and the opening statements of the various divisions of the defense a serious effort has been made to state the facts to be proven to the satisfaction of all the accused and their counsel. They have been prepared so as to inform the Tribunal of the general trend of the evidence.

Due to conflicts of interests, differences of opinion and the divergent official positions held by the accused, it must be apparent to the Court that it is impossible to do so completely. Some of the accused and their counsel necessarily take issue with some of the various statements of facts, reasonings, philosophies, inferences and complicities in the events as set forth in these opening statements. It is, therefore, nocessary that the accused reserve to themselves the right to present their different views of the facts in their individual opening statements and in the presentation of their individual cases.

The opening statement will be delivered in two parts: Part One by Dr. KIYOSE and Part Two

. 1	by Dr. TAKAYANAGI; and, with the Court's permission,
2	Dr. KIYOSE will now present Part One.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE. Mr. Tavenner.
4	MR. TAVENNER: Mr. President, Members of
5	the Tribunal, in view of the statement just made
6	by counsel I think it should appear of record for
7	whom and in whose behalf this opening statement is
8	made.
9	MR. LCGAN: As we explained, your Honor,
10	it is very difficult to set forth all the names
11	because some of the accused only object to part
12	of it. However, if the Court so desires, a state-
13	ment as requested by the prosecution will be made
14	upon the completion of the opening statement.
15 16	THE PRESIDENT: I take it to be the general
10	opening statement on behalf of all the accused,
17	whatever differences of oppnion they may have.
10	We are not to hear more than one general opening
20	statement, that is clear, nor are we going to permit
21	the repetition of arguments already heard. If this
22	opening statement contains arguments already heard,
23	they must be deleted.
24	MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, I
25	thought I made it clear. There are some accused
	who disagree with this opening statement in its

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1	entirety. There are some who disagree with it in
2	large part and some in small part. And if the
3	Tribunal desires, we will make a list of that
4	and present it upon completion of the opening state-
5	ment.
6	THE PRESIDENT: Such a list is desirablo,
7	but I want to make it clear: We are not going to
8	hear more than one general opening statement.
9	MR. LCGAN: Only one general opening state-
10	ment is to be given.
11	THE PRESIDENT: It will not be general,
12	of course, if there are many of the accused standing
13	cut.
14	Mr. Smith.
15	MR. SMITH: If your Honor please, I have
16	positive instructions from Mr. HIROTA to the effect
17	that he does not go along with the general opening
18	statement. Mr. HIROTA will rely on his own indi-
19	vidual opening statement to present his special
20	position in this case.
21	THE PARSIDENT: Let us have the list now,
22	Mr. Logan. We may decide not to hear this as a
23 24	general opening statement. There may not be a
25	sufficiert number subscribing to it.
	MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, at the

1	present time I understand Mr. SHIGEMITSU, Mr. HIRA-
2	NUMA, Mr. HIROTA, Mr. DOHIHARA do not join in the
3	st tement in its entirety. I understand that
4	Mr. SUZUKI also does not join. That is why I was
5	waiting until the completion of the statement until
6	we could get an entire list of those who do not
7	desire to join it; but I understand these five are
8	the only ones who do not join it in its entirety,
9	and that none of these accused intends to make any
10	general opening statement at this time. They are
11	reserving the right. It is the same way with all
12	the rest of the accused, to make their own opening
13	statements upon the presentation of their individual
14	cases towards the end of this entire trial.
15	THE PRESIDENT: What accused are entirely
16	opposed to it, Mr. Logan?
17	MR. LOGAN: Mr. SHIGEMITSU, Mr. HIRANUMA,
18	Mr. HIROTA, Mr. DOHIHARA, Mr. SUZUKI.
19	THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said they
20	did not accept it in its entirety. Some may have
21 22	rejected it completely.
23	MR. LOGAN: They are the five who reject
24	it in its entirety.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Warren.
	MR. WARREN: Your Honor, I represent the

accused HIRANUMA and accused DOHIHARA. We do not subscribe to the opening statement in any respect, and we merely want to ask the Tribunal's indulgence in permitting us to reserve our opening statement. We fully respect the right of the other counsel and accused to make an opening statement peculiar to themselves if they so desire. We do not intend to attempt to make another general opening statement on our own behalf. We shall consume no more of the Tribunal's time than we would have done under ordinary circumstances had we joined in the motion. I thank your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Who are the accused who accepted in part only?

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MR. LOGAN: We haven't any accurate list on that, your Honor. There will be very few of them, I understand.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Cunningham.

MR. CUNNINGHAM: If your Honor please, I. would like to reserve the right to object to certain parts of the opening statement at the time we present our individual case, but we do not want to be in the position of objecting to the opening statement in toto.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal, I think we are entitled to know in whose behalf this opening statement is being made. We are more interested to know that than the names of those who disagree.

THE PRESIDENT: You should know, Doctor KIYOSE.

DOCTOR KIYOSE: As Mr. Logan has just made clear, the defendants who do not agree, who do not join in this opening statement are HIROTA --- are the accused HIROTA, HIRANUMA, SHIGEMITSU, DOHIHARA and SUZUKI. The remaining accused all join in this opening statement, except for the accused OSHIMA, who, as Mr. Cunningham has just stated, disagrees in part from this general statement. But that part also is only one line.

I said one line, but counsel for OSHIMA reminds me that there is more than one line to which he objects. THE PRESIDENT: Proceed to read the opening, Doctor KIYOSE, but be careful to omit any arguments already put to the Tribunal. LR. TAVENNER: The prosecution desires to resprve the right to object to any phases of the opening statement at the conclusion thereof should they be advised it ig proper to do so. THE PRESIDENT: The defense were given that right, Mr. Tavenner, and you will have it also. The Court will recess for a few minutes. (Whereupon, at 1005, a recess was taken until 1016, after which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

17011

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor KIYOSE.

DOCTOR KIYOSE: I have just -- I completed 5 my draft and distributed it among -- to the Tribunal 6 and to other related parties. However, in line with the 7 President's recent ruling I shall omit from the first 8 line, beginning from the first line of page 14 to the 9 llth line of page 25 in the English text. This concerns 10 the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and irs based on the Potsdam Declaration and has already been argued. In 12 the Japanese text this corresponds to pages 38 to 40. 13

I made a mistake concerning the pages in the 14 Japanese text. I shall correct this later. The place 15 to be omitted is page 24, first line to the 11th line 16 line, page 25. However, there are several typographical 17 errors, so the correct statement will now be read by 18 myself and the Language Section through the IBM system. 19

THE INTERPRETER: Corrections concerning the 20 previous remark by Doctor KIYOSE: The pages to be 21 22 omitted are pages 24 to 25, from the first line of page 23 24 to the 11th line of page 25.

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DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal: The time has now come for the accused to present their defenses to the charges in the Indictment and the proofs adduced by the prosecution. in support thereof.

6 The Tribunal has with great care listened 7 to the prosecution's case these many past months. 8 It has also with great indulgence permitted the 9 defense within the framework of its concept of a 10 fair and just trial to conduct its part of the case 11 with a tenor befitting the historical importance 12 of these proceedings. Needless to say, the defense 13 to be presented will proceed with the utmost expedi-14 tion of which we are capable, hewing only to the 15 issues raised for decision. The task to be under-16 taken by us is of such grave and novel import that 17 we must at the outset invite the Tribunal's forbear-18 ance should we unwittingly stray from the standards 19 we have set for ourselves or should we deviate from 20 the precepts established by the Tribunal. 21

22 On 6 May 1945 the accused in open session 23 before this Honorable Tribunal pleaded not guilty to 24 all the counts and charges of the Indictment, except 25 the accused OKAWA. The defense will disprove each 26 and every charge of criminality lodged against them.

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1	The allegations in the indictment are
2	divided into fifty-five counts. Many of them aver
3	one and the same allegations concerning the same
4	charges viewed from different angles and seem to
5	overlap. Some of the counts refer to all the
6	accused and others refer to but a few. If all the
7	accused here were to produce evidence individually
8	and separately on behalf of themselves one after
9	another against these numerous and diverse counts,
10	much repetition and confusion would be bound to
11	arise. So the defendants and their counsel have
12	come to an agreement that they will produce as far
13	as possible, evidence in common where the offences
14	charged are in common.
15	As a result of this arrangement, the proof
16	to be presented in common has been divided into the
17	following divisions and evidence will be produced
18	accordingly:
19	Division 1 General problems.
20	Division 2 Matters concerning Manchuria
21	and Manchoukuo.
22	Division 3 Matters concerning China.
23	Division 4 Matters concerning the
24	Soviet Union.
25	Division 5 Matters concerning the

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Pacific War.

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2 After the presentation of evidence in the 3 above divisions, each accused will from his own indi-4 vidual standpoint offer evidence concerning himself. 5 It may be probable that since the interests, views 6 and actions of some of the accused were opposed to 7 each other, conflicting evidence will be presented. 8 In so doing some of the accused may, from their own 9 standpoint, demand exceptions to the facts and 10 evidence as adduced in the above five divisions or 11 may furnish other evidence in their individual 12 interest. This phase may for the sake of convenience 13 be called "Division 6. Individual cases or indi-14 vidual defenses." 15

We shall now point out a few important facts which will be dealt with under Division 1, and explain the proposed method of presenting evidence. Needless to say, the matters to be pointed out here are but a part and not all of the matters to be dealt with in Division 1, further remarks being reserved to be made at the opening of that division. The same can be said with regard to other divisions.

The prosecution assumes that all military precautions adopted by the government of Japan during the years from 1928 to 1945, from the stand-

point of international law, were criminal acts in themselves. It not only avers that the policies 2 of Japan were criminal but it asserts that if a 3 nation initiates a so-called war of aggression, or 4 a war in violation of certain treaties. etc., the individuals who happened to be in office at the 6 time and participated in the decision to wage such 7 a war are criminally responsible. In other words, the fundamental proposition advanced in this case. 9 is that Japan, including the accused, continuously 10 committed alleged international crimes during the entire period of seventeen years. 12

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All the accused deny these propositions 13 with the utmost emphasis of which they are capable. 14 Counsel for the defense also represent to your Honors 15 , and respectfully point out that neither in 1928 or 16 thereafter there was in existence anywhere a principle 17 of international law that even tended to impute to 18 political acts personal responsibility upon indi-19 viduals acting on behalf of the state in its 20 sovereign capacity. 21

In this unprecedented proceeding an important 22 issue for consideration is whether or not the safety 23 measures, military and naval preparedness, undertaken 24 by Japan since 1928 were aggressive in nature. 25

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1	It is too elementary to indicate to the
2	members of this Tribunal that preparedness of one
3	nation is made in contemplation of the activities
4	and apparent objectives of another nation or nations.
5	The sinister purpose, if any, of such preparedness
6	cannot be determined apart from this vital considera-
7	tion. It may well be, and no doubt has occurred
8	in history, that a particular nation having doubled
9	its standing army has been assailed as an aggressor,
10	whereas it has later been ascertained that a neighbor-
11	ing state trebled its standing army and the act of
12	the first nation is thereafter considered logical and
13	sound.
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It is realized that only Japanese military and naval preparedness is here on trial -- not that of other countries, some of whom are party complainants -- but to the extent necessary to determine the nature of the policies and measures of Japanwe expect that we may be permitted to present briefly evidence concerning similar activities and undertakings of other nations.

9 There are three vital considerations which 10 should be outlined in this opening statement in order 11 properly to comprehend the exact nature of the internal 12 and external policies of Japan during the period 13 covered by the Indictment. These are independence, 14 abolition of racial discrimination and fundamental 15 principles of diplomacy. These are not merely the 16 policies of any particular cabinets, of which there 17 were many, nor are they principles of specific 18 political parties. Rather they are national, long 19 standing, and firm aspirations universally subscribed 20 to and cherished by the entire Japanese nation since the opening of the country to foreign intercourse in 1853, and are as important to the Japanese as are free speech, free education and freedom of religion in America.

The first of these national characteristics

1 is the fervent desire of the Japanese people to 2 preserve the nation as a perfect independent and sover-3 eign state. The treaty of "ANSEI" between Commodore 4 Perry and the Shogun not only impaired the sovereignty 5 of the nation extra-territorially but infringed upon 6 its customs autonomy and hence was most deeply re-7 gretted by all Japanese of that era.

8 The sincere desire of foremost leaders 9 throughout Japan in the Meiji period was to elevate 10 and enhance the standing of the nation to a position 11 of perfect independence and sovereignty. Since that 17 purpose was a worthy one, consistent with the principles 13 advocated by President "ilson after World War I, its 14 attainment should be recognized by this Tribunal. The 15 defense expects to prove that this principle was the 16 universal aspiration of the Japanese people. 17

The second point is the demand for the 18 abolition of racial discrimination. Racial discrim-19 ination affects those who are discriminated against 20 much more keenly than those who discriminate. However, in order to eliminate racial discrimination the standards of culture and education for this nation needed to be raised. The government and the people of Japan were not blind to these necessary requisites. Where morality and custom called for certain

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¹ modifications and improvements they willingly admitted ² their necessity and adopted them but the culture of ³ the world is not singular but plural according to the ⁴ number of nations and races concerned. Each nation ⁵ has its own history and tradition, and culture is ⁶ created and developed accordingly.

7 Since East Asia has its own culture it has 8 been the desire of the Japanese people to preserve and :9 purify it so that an equal position may be maintained 10 with all races and peoples in every respect and 11 thus contribute to the progress of mankind everywhere. 12 The aspiration for racial equality cannot be realized 13 simply by raising the position of the Japanese to the 14 standard of Europeans and Americans. By its very 15 nature the standard of all the peoples in East Asia 16 should be raised in order to attain the complete 17 abolition of discrimination. It is true that some few 18 authors might have referred to this idea in an extrav-19 agant manner, but these writers were the exception. 20 It was the unanimously held hope of the Japanese 21 people, together with all other peoples of East Asia, 22 to reach that standard attained by Europeans and 23 Americans. It is expected that this point too will 24 be proved by the defense in order to clarify and avoid 25 any misunderstanding as to any alleged theory of

Japanese racial superiority erroneously implied by 1 the prosecution. We shall further develop that 2 Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the father of the Chinese revolution, 3 4 and other leaders in India and throughout East Asia 5 expressed sympathy with this idea. If the true 6 intention of the Japanese people in this respect is 7 rightfully understood antagonism of other peoples and 8 other countries would surely vanish.

9 The third fact to be referred to is what has 10 been termed "the fundamental principles and doctrines 11 of diplomacy" of Japan. Since the Meiji Period the 12 prevailing ideal held by the government and the people 13 of Japan in respect to foreign relations was to main-14 tain peace in East Asia and thereby contribute to the 15 welfare of the whole world. This was called the 16 "cardinal principle of diplomacy" in official docu-17 ments and Imperial Rescripts, that is to say, the 18 fundamental ideal of Japan which guided its foreign 19 policy. The war with China 1894 to 1895 and the war 20 with Russian 1904 and 1905 were fought with that aim 21 and consideration in view. That is explicitly 22 written in the Rescripts declaring these wars. In 23 the actual conditions at that time, Japan was the 24 only country in the Far East which had adopted a 25 western civilization and had all the qualifications

of a modern state. Although China was a vast country 1 abundant in resources, she faced the danger of being 2 partitioned by the powers into spheres of influence. 3 Most of the regions in the south had already come under 4 the domination of several Occidental Powers. Under 5 such circumstances the Japanese people sincerely felt 6 that Japan had a special mission as a stabilizing 7 power in the East. This is not a peculiar notion 8 held only by the accused; it has been a fundamental 9 principle held for at least two generations by the 10 Japanese nation. This principle has been recognized 11 by the great powers, and we expect to prove that the 12 13 Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded and renewed as a result of its recognition. The Japanese people can 14 15 not forget the sympathy of the government and the people of the United States shown toward Japan at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, which was fought for the maintenance of that cardinal principle. That principle of stabilization was never of an aggressive nature. On the one hand, it prevented East Asia from falling into political and economic confusion, and on the other hand it promoted the common development of all Asiatic races and thus their contribution to the progress of mankind. Only in the light of the foregoing ideals can the true relations between Japan and her neighbors be fully understood.

The government and the people of Japan 1 have been especially sympathetic to the preserva-2 tion and development of China. This is well ex-3 pressed in official and unofficial documents sipce 4 the Meiji Period. The relations between Japan and 5 the Celestial Empire have often been voiced by the 6 proverb "Shin-Shi-Hosha" which means that "without 7 lips teeth are exposed to coldness," or "two wheels 8 of a car help one another." Another saying is "dobun 9 doshu" meaning that both countries use the same 10 letters, represent the same Confucian ethics and are of the same race. About 1900 Japan invited many 12 students from China, President Chiang Kai-shek being 14 one of them. Since the Chinese revolution in 1911 the Government and people of Japan extended sympathetic understanding to Doctor Sun Yat-Sen's work. While it is true that the Japanese General Staff had annual military plans, as has been pointed out by the prosecution, it is also true that the military staff never had a hypothetical military over-all plan against China. The presentation of evidence on these facts will, we believe, be helpful to the Tribunal in disproving several averments contained in the Indictment and the testimony in the record. In Count 5 of the Indictment, citing the

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whole of the particulars in Appendix A, and treaties and assurances in Appendix B and C, it is charged that the accused as leaders, organizers, instigators 4 cr accomplices formulated and executed a conspiracy with an intention to dominate the whole world in 6 cogjunction with Germany and Italy. There is no 7 greater misunderstanding than this. As to rela-8 tions between Japan and Germany and Italy, my 9 colleagues will present our case in the phase deal-10 ing with the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tri-partite 11 Pact. I should like here to treat the matter as a 12 whole concerning the ideals and aspirations of 13 Japan on the one hand and those of Germany and Italy 14 on the other.

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Much of the confusion and misunderstandings 16 are due to the interpretation of the idea of "hakko 17 ichiu," cited in the preamble of the Tri-partite 18 Pact and in the Imperial Rescript, issued at the 19 time of the conclusion of the pact. Solemn classical 20 words and phrases are fondly and customarily used in 21 our official documents, giving to the document an 22 effect of dignity but often adding obscurity even 23 to the Japanese people themselves. So much more 24 with foreigners who have different languages and 25 concepts. For example, the Imperial Rescript issued

on the conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact para-1 phrases "hakko ichiu" and says, "It is indeed a great 2 teaching of our Imperial ancestors that the Great 3 Cause shall be propated all over the eight corners 4 of the world and the whole humanity on earth shall 5 be deemed one family. To thus august teaching we 6 endeavor to adhere day and night." "The Great Cause" 7 here means "universal truth." To be "propagated" 8 here means that the said idea be made plain and 9 manifest by all the world. "To be in one family" 10 means that whole manking is to live together with 11 the feeling of fraternity in one household. As 12 said before, the culture is of a different origin 13 from that of the West and, therefore, the expression 14 is necessarily very different or even quaint to 15 Europeans and Americans, 16

17 In the proposed plan for Japanese-18 American understanding, which was the basis of 19 negatiation between the Secretary of State Hull and 20 Ambassador NOMURA, "Hakko Ichiu" is translated into 21 English as "universal brotherhood." The preamble of 22 the Tri-partite Pact should be interpreted in its 23 proper meaning. Whatever was the idea held by 24 Germany and Italy at the time of the conclusion of 25 the treaty, concrete and conclusive evidence will be

	produced to show that the Japanese Government had
1	no intention to conquer the world in cooperation
2	with Germany and Italy.
3	THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
4	minutes.
5	(Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
6	taken until 1100, after which the proceed-
7	ings were resumed as follows:)
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

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DR. KIYOSE: In Article 2 of the said Pact it 4 is provided in effect that Germany and Italy respect 5 and recognize the leading position of Japan in the 6 establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. 7 8 No word is more subject to misunderstanding than the 9 expression "New Order in East Asia" or "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The prosecution went so 10 11 far as to say that "a new order" is an idea to destroy 12 democracy and freedom and the respect for personality. 13 which are the basis of democracy. Is it not a con-14 fusion of the ideal of the Japanese nation and that 15 of other countries, or, at least, a product of asso-16 ciation with other ideas that led the prosecution to such 17 a misunderstanding? But the implication of the particu-18 lar Japanese words as used at the period under consid-19 eration, and the nature of the Japanese idea itself 20 alone are necessary for consideration here.

It was in the KONOYE declaration of November 3d and December 22, 1938, that the words "New Order in East Asia" were first officially used. As to the meaning of "New Order in East Asia" as used in the KONCYE declaration, that declaration is a document

which speaks for itself; that Japan, Manchukuo and 1 China will cooperate on the basis of good neighborli-2 ness, common defense against communism, and economic 3 cooperation. As to the relation with other countries, 4 the declaration says, "With regard to the economic 5 6 relations between Japan and China, Japan has no inten-7 tion of monopolizing China economically." It did not 8 exclude the principle of equal opportunity. We must, 9 however, remember, as the prosecution contends, that 10 it was during the period when large scale battles were 11 taking place between the two countries involving more 12 than a million soldiers. In such a period of large 13 scale conflict it was inevitable that various restric-14 tions were imposed upon foreigners as well as upon 15 nationals of the conflicting states. In connection 16 with this point, the joint declaration of Foreign Min-17 ister ARITA and the British Ambassador Craigie in 18 July, 1939, will be presented as evidence. The declara-19 tion says in part that, "the British Government fully 20 recognizes the actual condition that a large scale 21 warfare is going on in China, and the British Gov-22 ernment recognizes that the Japanese Army has a 23 special demand in order to secure its own safety and to 24 maintain peace and order of the area under its control 25 as long as the said condition continues to exist. . ."

The intrinsic content of the idea of the new 1 order as used in Japan is the "Ko-do" or "Imperial Way." 2 as it is sometimes translated. The gist of the "Imper-3 ial Way" is benevolence, righteousness and moral cour-4 age. It respects courtesy and honor. Its ideal is to 5 let everyone have his or her own part, and fulfill 6 his or her duty. It envisions ruler and ruled to be 7 of one mind and the affairs of state to be administered 8 9 by the sincere aid of the whole people. It is just the 10 opposite to the idea of militarism and despotism. It 11 is extremely difficult to express such ideals in lan-12 guage other than Japanese, but as far as the respect 13 for individual personality is concerned, there is no 14 fundamental difference between the "Imperial Way" and 15 democracy. It is unusual to adduce evidence to prove 16 such abstract ideas in a court of justice, but we must 17 do this in the present case. We shall offer a speech 18 made by one of the accused in the Imperial Diet showing 19 the difference between the "Imperial Way" and the 20 totalitarianism of Germany and Italy.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE, we prefer now to deal with another matter. Will the captain representing the Stars and Stripes come to the lectern, please. 24 (Whereupon, Captain Taylor spproached

the lectern.)

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THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, 1 please? 2 CAPTAIN TAYLOR: Charles B. Taylor, Captain, 3 Infantry. 4 THE PRESIDENT: What is your position? 5 CAPTAIN TAYLOR: Sir? 6 THE PRESIDENT: What is your position? 7 CAPTAIN TAYLOR: I am the officer in charge 8 of the publication of the Stars and Stripes. 9 THE PRESIDENT: Well, an article displaying 10 great contempt of this Court appeared in the Stars and 11 Stripes this morning. Have you any explanation to 12 offer? 13 CAPTAIN TAYLOR: The publication of that 14 article was an error due to the fact that the release 15 date appearing on the top of the copy which we received 16 from the News Service was not alhered to strictly. Nor-17 18 mally the release date that appears on copy which we receive from the News Service, if it is the same day 19 20 as our publication, we publish that story. However, 21 it is my understanding that the time prescribed for 22 release of this story was 9:30 today; that I have 23 learned since the publication of the story this 24 morning. 25

THE PRESIDENT: Why 9:30? How did your office

1	know how much of that proposed address would be heard
2	by this Court? As a matter of fact, the whole of the
3	proposed address will not be heard.
4	CAPTAIN TAYLOR: Sir, the news copy from which
5	the story we ran was a routine dispatch from a News
6	Service in every respect, except that the release date
7	was prescribed for 9:30 today.
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THE PRESIDENT: All you are entitled to 1 publish is a fair report of the proceedings of this 2 Court. You are not entitled to anticipate anything 3 that will be said or done by the Court, or by any person appearing before the Court.

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This is not the first time that newspaper has 6 offended, in spite of a warning from the Court. It 7 looks as though irresponsibles are at times in charge 8 9 of that newspaper. Trusting such people with the 10 custody of an article like that is like giving a high 11 explosive to children. How do they know what effect 12 such an article will have on the security of the 13 country? And we are all concerned about that, courts 14 and everybody else. Courts are always most careful 15 in their proceedings to protect the security of the 16 country. That appears in their dealings with public 17 documents. In Britain, and I am sure in America, it 18 is sufficient for a secretary of state to say that a 19 document cannot be safely published without prejudice 20 to the security of the country; and the Stars & Stripes 21 management should remember that, or should know it if 22 they don't know it.

We give you another warning. We expect this one to be observed. If not, we shall exercise whatever powers we have to protect the country and

ourselves. By the country, I mean the Allied Powers. 1 You are dismissed ... 2 CAPTAIN TAYLOR: Thank you, sir. 3 4 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE. DR. KIYOSE: Another obvious distinction 5 between the two is that there is no taint of racial 6 7 superiority in Japan as is found in Germany. On the 8 contrary, our people are always conscious of our own 9 limitations and are anxious to reach the world standard 10 with other peoples in East Asia. Since our new order 11 was to respect the independence of every country, it 12 never implied the idea of world conquest and it has 13 nothing to do with the restriction of individual 14 freedom. The terminology of "leadership" is understood 15 by us not to mean domination or control but only to 16 take the initiative as a leader or guide among ourselves 17 as equals. Such fundamental national ideals can never 18 be affected or changed by the inept wording of a 19 treaty or any other document, official or otherwise. 20 Later on we came to use the words "the New Order in 21 Greater East Asia" or "the Greater East Asia Co-Pros-22 perity Sphere" as including not only Manchuria and 23 China, but also other countries in East Asia. Not-24 withstanding the fundamental idea remained the same. 25 The joint declaration consisting of five articles

adopted at the Greater East Asia Conference at Tokyo 1 in November, 1943, well expresses the essence of the 2 concept of the new order in Greater East Asia. It 3 provides: 4

The countries of Greater East Asia 1. 6 through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common 7 8 prosperity and well-being based upon justice.

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9 2. The countries of Greater East Asia will 10 ensure the fraternity of nations in their region by 11 respecting one another's sovereignty and independence 12 and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

13 3. The countries of Greater East Asia by 14 respecting one another's traditions and developing 15 the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the 16 culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.

4. The countries of Greater East Asia will 18 endeavor to accelerate their economic development 19 through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity 20 and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their 21 region.

5. The countries of Greater East Asia will 23 cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of 24 the world and work for the abolition of racial discri-25 mination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and

the opening of resources throughout the world, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

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The foregoing resolution, together with the 3 speeches given at the conference by the representatives 4 of various countries will be presented as evidence. 5 Although the resolution considers East Asia as a family 6 of nations calling for mutual cooperation and amity, 7 it takes a world-wide view as far as the intercourse 8 9 among countries and development of resources and the exchange of cultures are concerned. Article 5 of the resolution is especially noteworthy. It was generally held at that time that this planet is too large as a political unit, but too small economically if it is divided into various units. Thus it will be shown that the idea of new order among us has not been that of world conquest, but is in essence strangely similar to the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States.

My duty is to outline facts to be presented to the Tribunal in concise form. Therefore, I will avoid legal arguments as far as possible. As the prosecution aptly indicated, conspiracy as the first crime specified in the Charter of this Tribunal, is only referred to and not defined in the Charter. Apart from the legality of the Charter to punish conspiracy, we cannot without definition of conspiracy determine the facts which the

prosecution charges as criminal. Nor can the defendants know what kind of evidence they are called upon to disprove.

The prosecution has cited decisions of 4 inferior federal courts of the United States in an 5 attempt to define conspiracy and seem to assert that 6 the decisions of such courts are indisputable. This 7 Tribunal is an international court and the President 8 has already expressed the opinion that because of its 9 status it could hardly be expected to take judicial 10 11 knowledge even of the Constitution of the United States 12 of America, and it is inconceivable that the Tribunal 13 could accept the decisions of inferior federal courts 14 of the United States when those same courts came into 15 existence only as a result of the provisions of that 16 same Constitution.

We submit respectfully that it is not proper to apply a particular legal theory which has developed in a certain country with its peculiar historical background at this Tribunal as if it were a general principle of law of universal application. The idea of conspiracy is unique in the Anglo-American legal system and its counterpart cannot be found in the countries following the Roman Law. Even in countries which have adopted Anglo-American legal principles, it

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is impossible strictly to apply in toto particular 1 decisions of England and America. In some countries 2 when two or more persons plot a particular crime they 3 are punished as accomplices. In that case the object 4 of the plot must be clearly illegal and it must be shown 5 that it cannot be accomplished except by adopting an 6 illegal method. In Japan it is rather exceptional to 7 punish the preparation of a crime and plot thereof 8 before the commission of a criminal act. The kinds of 9 crimes the preparation of which are punishable are 10 enumerated in the criminal code. The same, as I 11 understand it, could be said as to the criminal law 12 of other countries which have adopted the Roman legal 13 Moreover, in order to constitute a plot or system. 14 conspiracy as an independent crime, the date and place 15 of such plot or conspiracy must be specified to an 16 intelligible extent. In countries which have not 17 adopted the Anglo-American legal system, it is incon-18 ceivable, therefore, that a conspiracy could exist 19 20 from January 1928 to September 2, 1945. What I wish to submit is that the said doctrine, to-wit, the doctrine 22 of conspiracy, as has been developed in England and America as one entity, cannot be deemed to constitute international law. If the decisions cited by the prosecution mean that tho: e who join the conspiracy

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1	after the common plan was formulated are criminally
3	responsible to the same extent as the original
4	conspirators, we submit this is decidedly not a commonly
5	accepted legal principle throughout the world and,
6	therefore, cannot be applied by this International
7	Tribunal as a precept of international law.
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The method of selecting the head of the 1 cabinet since 1928 was largely a matter of chance. 2 If a cabinet falls for some reason or other, the 3 Emperor seeks, through the Lord Keeper of the 4 Privy Seal, the advice of elder statesmen (mostly 5 ex-premiers) as to who is to be the successor. As 6 the elder statesmen themselves are not an organized 7 group, those who happen to attend the meeting discuss 8 the matter and select extemporaneously a premier 9 designate after due consideration is given to the 10 exigency then existing and report the decision to 11 12 the Throne. The Emperor accepts the advice without 13 exception. Since there is no way to foretell who 14 will become the Premier until the moment the report 15 of the elder statesmen is submitted to the Throne, 16 it is impossible in Japan for a certain organization, 17 party or clique to monopolize power for any duration 18 of time, and continue a particular plan or conspiracy. 19 The so-called "TANAKA Memorial" referred to by a 20 certain prosecution witness as evidence of conspiracy, 21 is, we submit, a forgery and a travesty. Pertinent 22 documents and witnesses will be produced to prove 23 these points. 24

Section 2 of the preamble of the Indictment and paragraph 4, Section 6 of the Appendix of the

Indictment seem to consider the Imperial Rule 1 Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance 2 Political Society as something akin to the Nazis in 3 Germany or the Fascists in Italy. Nothing can be a 4 greater misunderstanding of Japanese politics than 5 this. Although this point has been partly proved 6 by cross-examination of the witness produced by the 7 prosecution, we think it necessary to prove our con-8 tention more conclusively by authoritative documents 9 and witnesses, and expect to do so. 10

The prosecution refers to the Imperial 11 Ordinance of 1936 to the effect that the Ministers 12 of War and of the Navy must be selected from among 13 14 generals and lieutenant generals or admirals and 15 vice-admirals of the active list, and goes on to 16 contend that the purpose of the Ordinance was for 17 the army to control the government and that the army 18 utilized the Ordinance for the plotting of armed 19 expansion of Japan. This is contrary to the real 20 state of affairs. This Imperial Ordinance was pro-21 mulgated after the February 26 Incident of 1936, a 22 rebellion in which Premier OKADA and other elder 23 statesmen were assaluted. It was feared at that time 24 that, if some generals in the reserve list had any 25 connection with any group of men concerned in the

February Incident, and one of them happened to be appointed War Mini Ger, that would be a serious 1 matter for the safety of this state. This Ordinance was enacted to prevent the occurrence of that kind 3 of thing. In other words, the purpose of the said 4 Ordinance was to make a thorough purification of the 5 army possible. As a matter of fact, the Ordinance 6 was effective. Its result was, contrary to the 7 prosecution's charge, to restrain those who insisted 8 on using armed force illegitimately. On this point we are ready to present evidence. Briefly speaking, 10 it is a misunderstanding of fact to think that there 11 was any military organization which controlled the 12 Japanese Government during the period specified in the Indictment.

The defense will refute the charge of 16 onspiracy among the accused for the conquest of the 17 orld in general (Counts 4 and 5); domination of East 18 ia, the Pacific, Indian Ocean and regions adjacent 19 thereto, (Count 1); or the control of China (Count 3); 20 The control of Manchuria, (Count 2). There are 21 fferences of age and environment among the accused. 22 Some of them are army or navy officers, some are civil 25 One of them any chance to meet as a whole with any 25

special object in view. They never had any occasion as a group to exchange their opinions on any such 1 matters. As a matter of fact there were real dif-2 ferences and divisions of opinion among some of them. 3 If some of them as a group were in any way related 4 with the Manchurian Incident, the China Affair or 5 the Pacific War, it was due to the fact that they 6 7 were prominent personages when those incidents or 8 hostilities which demanded concerted activities of 9 the whole nation took place. There is no such fact 10 nor supporting proof that the accused and certain divers 11 persons, who have never been named by the prosecution, 12 who are not indicted, created a conspiring organiza-13 tion and by some method or other devised a common 14 plan to conquer or dominate the world, East Asia, 15 the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, China or Manchuria. ¹⁶We will produce evidence to disprove the existence of 17 any such conspiracy of conquest or domination.

¹⁸ There is another point in this connection ¹⁹ which the defense are ready to prove. It is a mistake ²⁰ to think that there was one common and premeditated ²¹ plan throughout the Manchurian Incident, the China ²² Incident and the Pacific War. They were separate ²³ events having separate causes. Persons who were con-²⁴ cerned with one incident were different from the

persons concerned with the others. There is no such 1 fact that the former officials passed on their pre-2 meditated plans to their successors or that they 3 were accepted by them. The most obvious thing is the 4 difference between the Manchurian Affair on the one 5 hand and the China Incident and the Pacific War on 6 the other. The Manchurian Incident came to an end in 7 1933 by the Tangku Truce. After that officials of 8 the Chiang Kai-shek Government concluded agreements 9 with Manchukuo with regard to customs, postal service, 10 telegraph and railroad. In 1935 Chiang Kai-shek pro-11 mulgated the Good Neighbor Ordinance toward Japan. 12 Mr. HIROTA, Foreign Minister of the OKADA cabinet, 13 negotiated with China and formulated the "HIROTA 14 Three Principles" including the recognition of the 15 status quo of Manchuria and North China and secured 16 the consent of the Chinese Government to discuss the 17 details with those principles as the basis. It is 18 unnatural and erroneous to suppose that the China 19 20 Incident, which took place four years after the Tangku Truce, had been intentionally planned and executed by 21 22 particular individuals with the same object as the 23 Manchurian Incident in view. The necessary evidence 24 to prove the above points will be produced.

In Division 1, various evidence will be produced

in connection with Japan's internal politics. The 1 prosecution alleges that for many years, even previous 2 to January 1928, the Japanese Army taught the militar-3 istic spirit to Japanese young men, and tried to 4 cultivate an extreme nationalistic idea that the 5 progress of Japan depended upon wars of conquest; 6 also that the army enforced that educational policy 7 in public schools, and concludes that this fact is 8 evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. Nothing 9 can be a greater mistake than such a view of Japanese 10 education. The educational system in the public 11 schools was modeled on the American system after 12 1872. The foundation of Japanese national ethics 13 has since then been the synthesis of Japan's ancient 14 tradition and China's Confucian teachings with 15 Occidental ethics. In 1890, the Imperial Rescript 16 17 concerning education was promulgated, in which certain 18 virtues such as loyalty, filial piety, universal love, 19 justice, public spirit and the spirit of service were 20 specified. It never included warlike spirit. The 21 fundamental principle held by the Imperial family has 22 always been peace, love and benevolence, excluding 23 extravagance and encouraging simplicity and vigor; 24 but this is different from the encouragement of war. 25 It is true that after 1929 following the example of

the United States and Switzerland, Japan adopted 1 military drill in the schools with the aim in view 2 of developing discipline of mind and body, and to 3 improve the character of youth. This was done in 4 order to make up for the deficiency caused by re-5 trenchment in armaments and military budgets by the 6 7 Japanese Government and hence cannot be considered 8 as an expression of aggressiveness. The foregoing was 9 the fundamental educational policy and no Minister 10 of Education had the power to modify it. There is 11 nothing to prove that the Government or the army 12 taught the people that the future of Japan depended 13 on aggressive war.

14 Japan being a country of small area and incapable of self-support because of meagre natural 16 resources, there is no way for Japan other than immigration, foreign trade and industrialization in 18 order to feed her rapidly increasing surplus population 19 and to maintain her economy. Since immigration was 20 restricted by many of the Western powers, Japan was 21 forced to choose foreign trade and industrialization 22 and she naturally adopted the appropriate method towards 23 that direction, especially in East Asia, which because 24 of propinquity and special interests it was natural 25 for her to do.

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Meanwhile under the storm and stress of world economic depression, England dropped off the gold standard in September 1931 and other countries soon followed her example. Since the British Imperial bloc was formed with the Ottawa Conference in July 1932, the world-wide tariff war was intensified and trade barriers became serious. Notwithstanding, Japan still maintained the principle of free trade, and when the world currency and economic conference was held in June 1933 Japan participated in it with great expectation; and Viscount Kikujiro ISHII, the Japanese delegate, enthusiastically presented Japan's point of view. However, the conference was unsuccess-ful, the United States' stand contributing heavily to that end.

In 1934 an Anglo-Japanese trade conference 1 was proposed by Great Britain and was held. Although 2 Japan sent her delegates to that conference, Great 3 Britain insisted on the limitation and allocation of 4 Japan's trade, not only within the British Common-5 wealth of Nations but even to third countries. Since 6 it was impossible for Japan to accept such a proposal 7 she withdrew from the conference and thus the nego-8 tiations ended fruitlessly. Consequently, with the 9 declaration of Mr. Ranshman, Secretary of Commerce, 10 the whole British Empire restricted Japan's trade. Meanwhile a trade conference was held between Britain 12 and the Dutch East Indies, and the fatter adopted forceful measures to prevent Japanese imports and 14 then proposed a Japanese-Dutch trade conference. Although this conference took place in June 1934, 16 adjustment of Japanese-Dutch trade was extremely difficult since the position of Japan was different from that of England. On the other hand, the anti-19 Japanese movement in China also became intensified. 20 Thus Japan, which had to depend on foreign trade for 22 her existence, was faced with a grave situation.

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23 Because of such economic stress throughout 24 the world, Japan was compelled to turn to planned 25 economy and the formation of an economic bloc for her economic self-autonomy. In particular, the consecutive five-year plan of the Soviet Union was keenly felt by Japan. Since she was considerably backward in heavy industry, she strongly felt the necessity of promoting this phase of her economy. Various measures of economic control and planning were adopted under such circumstances. They were in no sense premeditated preparation for the China Incident; **so** much less so with regard to the Pacific War. On these points we will produce evidence and statements of expert witnesses.

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Before the war, freedom of speech was respected in Japan as much as in most other countries. However, it is a truism that the propagation of communism and ultra-nationalism has been prohibited by law since 1925. Japanese people wished to maintain the system of private property and they violently abhorred having the Imperial Household subjected to disrespect. The communists deny the system of private property and they intend to destroy the Imperial Dynasty. Since 1920 the movement of the Communist Party had become active in Japan and a subversive movement to destroy private property and the Imperial Dynasty began to take impetus throughout the country. It is only natural under such circumstances that a

sovereign state should prohibit such a movement. It 1 is neither a plan nor a preparation for war. This 2 point can be easily proved by the fact that the Peace 3 4 Preservation Law was proposed by a coalition govern-5 ment of the three parties which were regarded as 6 liberals. The facts concerning the direction of 7 thought and speech will have to be shown by produc-8 ing evidence. It is needless to say that once war 9 opens a certain amount of restriction on freedom of 10 speech and other civil liberties becomes necessary 11 for preventing espionage, and it is introduced in 12 every country without exception. There should be 13 no confusion of thought on this point. The object of 14 the thought control was not only the leftist movement 15 mentioned above but also the rightist or ultra-16 nationalist movement. Some of the accused while in 17 office were responsible for the control of such move-18 ments.

There arose in Japan about 1930-1931 a socalled reformation movement (Kakushin Undo). This movement was not necessarily aimed at expansion. It must be remembered, however, that the Japanese population was rapidly increasing year after year and was almost on the point of reaching one hundred million. Natural resources were extremely limited. And as a

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result of world-wide economic depression, commerce and industry as well as agriculture were facing serious difficulties. Party politics existed at that time; and the Seiyukai and the Minseito alternately formed the cabinets. But the methodo of political contest was unfair and instances of political corruption were exposed day after day. Being excited and irritated by these facts and incidents, hot-headed young men and young officers appealed to direct action. The evidence to show the motive of this movement was partly destroyed by air raids to our regret but the remaining part and witnesses will be produced to show that the movement did not aim at aggressive war. At this opportunity it is worthwhile to point out that some of the accused contributed to suppression of this movement.

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The prosecution presents the national defense 18 plans of Japan since 1937 as evidence of Japan's 19 aggressive design. But armaments are always relative 20 as has been said before. It is not possible to 21 determine whether the national defense plan of Japan 22 was aggressive or not until and unless it is studied 23 in comparison with the plans of other countries. In 24 1937 the military neighbors of Japan were China and 25 the Soviet Union. As to China, Japan never proposed

to come to an over-all conflict and therefore had no comprehensive plan of operations; as to Russia, we shall prove the nature of Japan's military plan by presenting her second and third five-year plans and the condition of the Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union after 1936. The military or naval staff of every country makes annual plans in consideration of potential enemies but it is needless to say that the existence of such plans does not indicate that the country has the intent to wage war against other nations. It is also possible to prove that the intent of Japan was not aggressive by contrasting Japan's naval plans after the London Naval Conferences with those of the United States and the British Empire.

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The nature and scope of the right of selfdefense is a question of international law, and therefore no evidence is necessary. However, the question to what extent the right of self-defense is reserved in a particular treaty may be answered in the light of circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty. The defendants are prepared to produce the evidence relative to the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the official declarations of the parties concerned and the reservations of the governments at the time of the conclusion of the Pact, which will be of assistance in delimiting the right of self-defense implicit in the said Pact.

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This issue of the interpretation of the right of self-defense was also raised at the time of the negotiations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador NOMURA in 1941. At that time the United States showed its own view as to the extent of the right of selfdefense. The defense are prepared to produce records concerning the United States' view on self-defense.

It is also said that "every nation is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." Under international law it is well established that the party invoking such right has the sole and absolute discretion to determine the valid existence of such right.

It will be a difficult matter for foreigners to understand the relation in Japan between the high command and the authority of ordinary state affairs. It is, nevertheless, important to illuminate this relationship in order to determine the responsibility for any act or omission in the present case. This depends upon the interpretation of the Constitution of Japan, especially Articles 11 and 12 and upon established custom in this country. With regard to military affairs, the extent of the respective

jurisdiction and responsibility of the military com-1 mand (the Chief of the Army General Staff and the 2 Chief of the Navy General Staff) and of the Minister 3 of Wor of the Navy is an important issue. The juris-4 diction of various other governmental organs must 5 6 also be considered in this connection. The defendants 7 are prepared to produce witnesses to clarify this 8 point. The nature of command and the duty of 9 obedience in the Japanese Army are different from 10 those of other countries. This will be considered 11 separately with regard to peace time and war time.

Concrete evidence will be submitted to show the connection with the interpretation and application of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender.

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THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until half-past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)

1	AFTERNOON SESSION
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3	The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess,
4	at 1330.
5	MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6	Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.
7	THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.
8	DR. KIYOSE: Before resuming the reading
9	of my opening statement I should like to make a
10	remark. It was reported from this lectern this
11	morning that the accused SUZUKI did not agree with
12	the opening statement. That has been a mistake.
13	The fact is that the accused SUZUKI also joins
14	this opening statement. That fact has been reported
16	to me by his counsel.
17	We shall resume our reading from the
18	middle of page 25.
19	(Reading) This will be done for the
20	following reason.
21	When one party induces the other to sur-
22	render while employing certain mode of warfare, it
23	is naturally presumed that the former induces sur-
24	render assuming his own particular mode of warfare
25	to be legitimate. If the word "crime" happens to
	be used in such inducement to surrender, that word

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should not include such mode of warfare as is being used by that party while inducing surrender.

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THE PRESIDENT: We wish to hear Mr. Tavenner 4 on a matter. Mr. Tavenner.

MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal, an examination of Item D on page 25 and Item 18 on page 26 -- I say from such an examination of those two items it would appear that these matters are matters which come under the ruling of the Court this morning and should be deleted for the same reasons as page 20 -- page 24.

THE PRESIDENT: The point upon which I desired to hear you is the condition of the accused HIRANUMA. I understand he is not in a condition to remain in Court, and I wanted to know what the attitude of the prosecution was.

MR. TAVENNER: I had not been informed, your Honor, and it is the position of the prosecution that he should be examined immediately and his condition ascertained.

THE PRESIDENT: I directed that you be informed; and I also want to know what his counsel has to say.

Colonel Warren.

MR. WARREN: I regret that I had not been

1	informed, your Honor, and I am not sure whether
2	my Japanese counsel had been informed. He had
3	not been informed, but we understand that the Baron
4	is getting elderly and his health for some time
5	has been delicate, and if he is, we would like to
6	have him, of course, receive immediate medical
7	attention, whatever is necessary.
8	THE PRESIDENT: You have permission for
9	the accused HIRANUMA to leave the Court for exam-
10	ination. He will be represented by his counsel.
11	Dr. KIYOSE.
12	DR. KIYOSE: May I continue?
13	THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
14	DR. KIYOSE: (Reading) This we take to
15	be a correct interpretation of any such inducement
16	or declaration. Therefore, the type of warfare
17	which the Allied forces openly employed against
18	Japan should be excluded from the "crimes" provided
19	for in the Potsdam Declaration. This will determine
20	the limit of war crimes to be dealt with in this
21	Tribunal. Records, photographs and many witnesses
22	will be produced in order to show the type of
23	warfare conducted by the Allied Powers.
24	The prosecution contends that aggressive
25	war has been an international crime for a long time

and gives a definition of aggression. In order to 1 support its theory of aggression it goes on to cite 2 various treaties and agreements. As John Bassett 3 Moore has said in his "Appeal to Reason", it is 4 impossible to define what is aggression. We are 5 not going into a legal argument now. We expect to 6 have an opportunity to discuss legal problems later 7 on. However, we think it is appropriate at this 8 9 moment to point out certain omissions in the facts 10 by the Prosecution. It first invokes the Hague 11 Convention I of 1907. But this treaty does not 12 make good offices and mediation an absolute duty. 13 The contracting parties are only expected to submit 14 their disputes to good offices or mediation "as far 15 as possible" or "as far as circumstances allow". 16 The prosecution next refers to the draft treaty of 17 Mutual Assistance, which was discussed at the Fourth 18 Assembly of the League of Nations in 1923. The 19 said draft was dropped at the Fifth Assembly in 1924 and has never become a treaty. Therefore it is not binding on any power. The prosecution refers to the Geneva Protocol of 1924. This was signed by the delegates but since Great Britain withheld 24 ratification, no state ratified it. Thus the Geneva 25 Protocol has never become a treaty. This fact proves

that it has been thought too premature as well as too difficult to define and to determine aggressive war as an international crime. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 does not provide that aggressive war is an international crime.

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The Indictment from Count 37 on provides 6 for a group of crimes under the title, "murder", 7 and charges crimes of murder against the defendants 8 for the loss of lives due to the act of war. The 9 10 defense contends that the loss of lives due to the 11 act of war does not constitute murder. This, we 12 believe, is an accepted theory of international 13 law and is too obvious to call for any authority. 14 The state of war in this instance came into existence 15 when the first shot was fired. Therefore, we will 16 produce evidence to show that the loss of lives 17 referred to in Counts 37 to Count 44 in the Indictment 18 occurred after the state of war existed.

The prosecution asserts that in all cases of aggressive war those who are in official position should be treated as common felons; that is, murderers, brigands, pirates and plunderers and should be punished as such. It goes on to say that such is a generally recognized principle of international law. Does the prosecution refer to the primitive

age in which international law did not exist? 1 Since international law came into existence there 2 3 has always been a distinction between war as an act 4 of sovereign states and acts of brigands or pirates. 5 This seems to us the first principle of international 6 law.

7 In case a war is waged by the will of 8 the state, it becomes an important question in 9 international law whether individuals who are in 10 official positions of the state are ipso facto 11 criminally responsible. The Allied Powers contend 12 that this World War II was fought by them for the 13 maintenance of international law. We take it, 14 therefore, the Allied Powers will have no objection 15 to the strict interpretation of international law. 16 The prosecution refers to this point several times 17 in the opening statement. It maintains this although 18 it is fully aware of the danger of proceeding without 19 precedents. For our part, we are convinced that 20 international law as it existed from 1928 to 1945 imparts no responsibility to individuals in official 22 positions for the act of the state. Even the new 23 Charter of the United Nations, the latest pronounce-24 ment of international law, does not propose such a 25 doctrine. Therefore, we believe that the provisions

concerning individual responsibility in this Charter. something which the Potsdam Declaration we submit did not contemplate, are ex post facto law. For this reason we will produce evidence to show that international law as it existed during the period indicated by the Indictment did not impute criminal responsibility to individuals for the act of the state.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE, you have been putting for some time arguments which have already been put, but you are attempting to camouflage the arguments by alleging that you are about to introduce evidence which can only be argument.

DR. KIYOSE: I shall resume from paragraph

21.

The Prosecution frequently compares incidents 1 which occurred during the Pacific War with acts of 2 Germany during the European war. It asserts that 3 terrorism and atrocities occurring during the Pacific 4 War were of the same type that Germany committed. 5 and that these acts were not incidental errors on the 6 part of the individuals but premeditated acts com-7 mitted in pursuance of a national policy. Counsel 8 for the Defense are prepared to show that the central 9 government and high command strongly desired that the 10 rules and customs of war be strictly observed and that 11 civilians and even enemies who had given up arms, 12 be treated humanely. For that purpose "The Battle-13 field Manual" was issued in January 1943 and distri-14 buted to all soldiers, while the Navy on its part 15 16 endeavored to have these rules and customs of war 17 properly and thoroughly understood by its personnel, 18 and violators were tried by Court Martial. The Army 19 and Navy Chiefs of Command at the front were always 20 emphatic in stressing this point. We must admit, 21 however, that during the later period of the war 22 when the communications with the home country were 23 cut, battlefields isolated, orders from the command-24

ing officers became impossible, food became scarce 1 and the very existence of the Japanese soldiers pre-2 carious, or when they met with cruel guerrila war-3 fare by natives inhumane acts may have been committed. 4 As to the prisoner of war labor of non-commissioned 5 officers and officers, we contend the orders were 6 that such labor should be performed voluntarily. On 7 these matters we are prepared to produce concrete 8 facts in Division 1. Intentional violation of human 9 decency as was alleged to have been committed against 10 the Jews in Germany was never present in Japan. We 11 are prepared to produce evidence to explain the differ-12 ence between the war crimes of Germany and the alleged 13 acts of the accused. 14

Division 2 is provided for the purpose of disproving crimes as alleged by the prosecution to have been committed in Manchuria since 1931. It relates to Count 2, Appendix A, Count 18 and Count 27. Count 44 also relates to this division to some extent. There is ample evidence which the accused will present under this division.

The Lytton Report, which the Prosecution presented, says in part: "... the issues involved

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in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle any one to express a definite opinion upon them."

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In order to show the special conditions in Manchukuo, Japan's special rights and interest in Manchuria and their legitimacy will be proved. Why did Japan acquire special rights and interests in Manchuria? Why did the Japanese go to Manchuria? Japan is a country of small area and a large population. As long as emigration was possible the problem was hoped to be partly solved by that. In 1908 Japan's emigration to the United States was virtually stopped by the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement." .t that time Mr. Jutaro KOMURA, Foreign Minister, spoke at the Imperial Diet as follows: "In order to prevent our people from scattering around remote foreign territories, it has become necessary to concentrate them to this district (Manchuria) and administer them with their joint cooperation --- The Japanese government in considera-

tion of these points will follow the established policy with regard to the immigration to the United States and Canada, and is faithfully enforcing the restriction of immigrants." This declaration has been taken in Japan as having previously been understood by the United States. With regard to Japan's 5 relations with the United States an agreement was 6 reached between Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State of the 7 United States and Mr. ISHII, Japanese representative, 8 in December 1917. It says in part: "The govern-9 ments of the United States and Japan recognize that 10 territorial propinguity creates special relations 11 between countries, and consequently, the Government 12 of the United States recognizes that Japan has special ¹³ interests in China, particularly in the part to which 14 her possessions are contiguous." The agreement was made in the form of exchange of notes. The agreement 16 was cancelled later, but before its nullification 17 our people had done much in Manchuria. This achieve-18 ment cannot be taken away by the nullification of the 10 Lansing-ISHII Agreement.

At that period the authorities in Manchuria 21 maintained their power in cooperation with Japan.

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Since 1925 the national rights recovery movement arose 1 throughout China. The situation in Manchuria was 2 vitally affected. In 1928 Chang Tso-Lin was killed 3 and the Manchurian authorities adopted the Chinese 4 Republic flag. As soon as the Kue-min-tang (Chinese 5 Nationalist Party) stepped into Manchuria, Japanese-6 Manchurian disputes continuously increased. In 7 1931 there were more than three hundred pending 8 problems. We will show these facts by evidence. 9 Japan had a legal right under treaties and 10 agreements to maintain the Kwantung Army in Manchuria 11 in order to protect her rights and interests in the 12 Kwantung Peninsula and Manchuria. In 1931 the total 13 of the Kwantung Army consisted of eight battalions 14 of infantry, two batteries of artillery and one in-15 dependent garrison (six battalions of infantry), 16 making 10,400 men in all, it being less than the number 17 of fifteen soldiers per kilometre of railway lines in 18 Manchuria, provided for in the additional articles to 19 20 the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905. The forces under the 21 control of Chang Hsueh-Liang, on the other hand, 22 consisted of 268,000 of the regular army and hordes 23 of irregulars. The Kwantung Army was a small force 24

of 10,400 encircled by more than 200,000 Chinese. 1 Its duty was to protect the South Manchuria Railway, 2 which extended one thousand kilometres, and Japanese 3 nationals numbering one million two hundred thousand 4 scattered all over the vast expanse of Manchuria. 5 Under these circumstances in the emergency that arose 6 it was necessary for the Kwantung Army to take prompt 7 measures of self-defense. 8 The Prosecution contends the occurrence at

9 Mukden on September 18, 1931, was a planned action 10 11 on the part of Japan. The defense will produce evi-12 dence to prove the true cause of the incident, which 13 resulted in armed conflict. Once a conflict occurred, 14 the Kwantung Army for its own self-defense and for the 15 execution of its own duty had to defeat the Chinese 16 forces. We will show the details of the incident by 17 producing the testament of General HONJO. The govern-18 ment of Japan did not wish to see the situation ag-19 gravated and tried its best to stop the incident. 20 but the situation grew from bad to worse against its 21 will. The truth of this situation and the attitude 22 of the League of Nations and of the United States will 23 be explained by producing pertinent documents, and 24

has already been shown by testimony and documents already presented by the Prosecution.

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While the Kwantung Army was fighting with 3 the Chinese forces for self-defense, the inhabitants 4 in Manchuria started a self-rule movement for Manchuria 5 for various motives, such as the consideration for the 6 welfare of the various peoples, anti-communism, the 7 desire of the Mongolian people for independence from 8 the Chinese Republic, the discontentments of the var-9 ious generals against Chang Hsueh-Liang, and the de-10 sire to restore the Chin Dynasty. In February 1932 11 12 the Administrative Committee of the North East prov-13 inces was created, and on March 1 the government of 14 Manchoukuo was inaugurated. The outline of these 15 activities will be explained and proved.

16 After the establishment of Manchoukuo the 17 Japanese were permitted to acquire Manchoukuoan nation-18 ality. It is true that some number of the Japanese 19 nationals became officials, and directly participated 20 in the development of the country. But these all 21 were after the new State was created. In September 22 1931 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister 23 of War of Japan instructed the Japanese officials in

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1	Manchuria not to participate in the establishment of
2	the new State. In other words, notwithstanding the
3	Lytton Report, the birth of Manchoukuo was the result
4	of a voluntary independence movement by the inhabi-
5	tants of Manchuria. Evidence will be produced to
6	prove this fact.
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The Manchurian incident was settled in May 1 1933. During 1935-1936 China was inclined to 2 recognize the de facto status of Manchuria. Other 3 countries began to recognize Manchoukuo. Especially 4 the Soviet Union, which now sends prosecutors to 5 this Tribunal, agreed to respect the territorial 6 integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo in 1941. 7 The third division concerns China. The 8 counts relating to this division are counts 3, 6, 9 19, 27, 28, 36, 45 to 50, and 53 to 55. 10 The responsibility for the Marco Polo Bridge 11 incident does not lie upon Japan. It will be noted 12 that Japan along with the other powers had a right to 13 station some armed forces in North China and was 14 allowed to hold field maneuvers under the Boxer Pro-15 tocol of 1901 and its appended notes. Moreover, in 16 this area Japan had other important lawful interests 17 and a considerable number of her nationals residing 18 there. Had the incident been settled locally, as was 19 20 desired by Japan, the conflict would not have been 21 aggravated to such a magnitude and there would not 22 have arisen any question of aggressive war. There-23 fore, we will also prove that China was responsible for the enlargement of the incident and that Japan 24

throughout the whole incident adhered to the policy

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of non-aggravation and tried its best to settle the question locally.

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On July 13 the KONOYE Cabinet declared as follows: "Even now the Army will adhere to the 4 policy of no-aggravation and local settlement and will avoid to its utmost effort any action which 6 might lead to a war. For this reason the Japanese Army has approved the conditions submitted by the 8 representatives of the 29th Army signed at 8:00 p.m. 9 of the 11th, and will watch its execution."

But China did not stop hostile acts. The 11 assault at Lanfong, the Kwan An Men incident, the 12 atrocities at Tungchow, etc. continuously occurred. 13 China began to take on an organized war attitude. 14 On July 12, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek ordered a 15 mobilization applicable to a large area. Meanwhile. 16 the concentration of the Chinese forces in North China 17 became increasingly intense. The Japanese forces in 18 Fengtai were encircled and violently attacked by the 19 Chinese forces. On July 27 the Japanese forces in 20 China decided to take up arms for self defense. 21 The actual conditions during this period will be ex-22 plained and proved by documents and witnesses. 23

Japan notwithstanding still persisted in the policy of non-aggravation. Chiang Kai-Shek continued continued to strengthen his forces. On August 15 the Total Mobilization Order was issued. The general headquarters was established; Chiang Kai-Shek himself became commander-in-chief of the army, navy and the air forces. The whole country was divided into four war districts: First War District (Hopei-Charhar), Second War District (Charhar-Shansi), Third War District (Shanghai), Fourth War District (South China), for each of which respective army forces were allocated, and thus a total war basis against Japan was completed.

10 It can be said that hostilities on a large ¹¹ scale commenced at this time, although even then 12 diplomatic relations between the two countries were ¹³ continued. Because of the menacing conditions just ¹⁴described, on August 31 Japan sent three divisions ¹⁵to North China in order to safeguard her lawful ¹⁶ interests. The name of the Japanese Army in China was changed to the Japanese Forces in North China. The commander of the Japanese Forces in North China was instructed to secure the stabilization of the Peiping-Tientsin area and to break down the warlike intention of the opposition and to bring the conflict 22 speedily to an end. Even at this stage Japan only 23 sought to restore friendly relations and order and 24

tranquility in North China and abandonment of anti-Japanese policy on the part of China.

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The Japanese government first designated 3 this conflict "The North China Incident" because it 4 thought its extent could be limited to North China. 5 But it spread to Middle China in August contrary 6 to Japan's desire, the cause of which will be ex-7 plained later. China, ignoring the Shanghai truce 8 which was concluded in 1932 by the good offices of 9 British, American and other representatives, con-10 structed military bases in an unfortified area, and 11 concentrated forces of more than 50,000, while the 12 Japanese marines in that area were not more than 13 4,000, thereby jeopardizing Japanese lives and 14 interests there. Lieutenant OYAMA, company commander 15 of the special marine detachment of the Japanese 16 Navy, was wantonly shot to death by the Chinese 17 Army. On August 15 Japan decided to send troops to 18 Shanghai for the protection of lives and properties 19 of her nationals. It was under such circumstances 20 that the conflict in Middle China started. In other 21 words, it was China that aggravated the incident and 22 expanded its scope and magnitude. We will produce 23 witnesses concerning these facts for the considera-24 tion of the Tribunal in determining the responsibility 25

for these hostilities.

1 This further conflict with the Republic 2 of China was designated as the China Incident and 3 not as the China war. A state of belligerency was 4 not declared nor recognized by either of the parties 5 or in fact by any other power. Actually Generalissimo 6 Chiang Kai-Shek did not declare war upon Japan until 7 the Pacific war broke out in 1941. This should 8 appear, we presume, rather strange to the Occidental 9 mind. The objective of this conflict on our part 10 was to induce the Chinese leaders then in power to 11 reconsider their stand against Japan, thus restoring 12 to a natural and proper state the disturbed Sino-13 Japanese relations. It, was, however, the attitude 14 assumed by the Communist Party of China that actually 15 gave rise to a decided anti-Japanese movement in the 16 greater part of the Republic. Moreover, Generalissimo 17 Chiang Kai-Shek had come to countenance various 18 activities of the Communists ever since the Sian 19 Incident in which his sensational kidnapping was 20 successfully carried out. The Japanese government 21 regarded this new step on the part of the Generalis-22 simo as a lamentable deviation more or less short-23 lived. At the inception, there was neither diplomatic 24 rupture nor disrupted treaty relations between Japan 25

and China. Members of the Chinese army who sur-1 rendered themselves to our hands were released and 2 those nationals of the Republic of China residing in 3 Japan at that time were not treated as enemy persons 4 but were allowed to pursue their own occupations 5 unmolested. One of our aims in not declaring war 6 with the Chinese Republic was not to restrict the 7 rights and interests of the third powers by the appli-8 cation of rules of war. Nevertheless the hostilities, 9 against Japan's desire, spread far and wide. Con-10 sequently it became quite unavoidable that those 11 nationals of neutral Powers who happened to be in the 12 Japanese occupied territories should suffer therefrom 13 to some extent. Hence the conclusion of an agreement 14 known as the ARITA-Craigie agreement between Japan 15 and the United Kingdom.

16 Had there been waged a declared war the 17 question of application of the Nine-Power Treaty to 18 the situation would never have been raised, for 19 treaties would cease to be in force automatically or 20 at least be suspended during hostilities so far as 21 China and Japan were concerned. As a matter of fact, 22 however, declaration of war was not resorted to by 23 the Republic of China or by the Empire of Japan, thus 24 leading to an anomalous situation wherein the question 25

of application of the said treaty became an issue. 1 There had occurred in the Orient five very 2 extraordinary happenings within the period of fifteen 3 years between 1922, when the Nine-Power Treaty was 4 concluded, and 1937 when the China incident broke out. 5 The first of the five items is this: The Republic 6 of China, after the conclusion of the Nine-Power 7 Treaty, made it a national policy to oppose Japan 8 and insult her in every way possible, and illegal 9 boycott of Japanese goods was resorted to generally. 10 China went so far as compiling text books for her 11 public schools so that anti-Japanese sentiments were 12 widely disseminated among the younger generation. 13 The second is: The Communist Internationale 14

which determined its new strategy against Japan during
those years, and the Communist Party of China which
acted in conformity with the directives of the former;
also the acquiescence of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime
in the latter's behavior.

The third is: The resolution to reduce Chinese forces adopted at the Washington Conference was not only not carried out but, on the contrary, war lords and military cliques in China raised and maintained huge bodies of troops many times greater than those existing before. Besides, they made extensive

1	preparations for war with Japan by importing modern
2	arms and implements of war in large quantities.
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1	The fourth is: The National power of the	
2	U.S.S.R. was expanded tremendously since then. The	
3	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not being a party	
4	to the Nine-Power Treaty and never under the commitment	
5	of the said treaty, made its pressure felt along the	
6	entire Sino-Soviet boundaries extending not less than	
7	3,000 miles. In fact, a very wide area comprising	
8	Outer Mongolia was under the influence of the U.S.S.R.	
9	although China still claimed sovereignty.	
10	The fifth is: The world economy since the	
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12	conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty was seen to veer	
13	from economic internationalism to national protection-	
14	ism.	
15	The Nine-Power Treaty is, it must be noted,	
16	a treaty without a provision as to expiration. What	
17	kind of tales these five happenings tell will be clarifie	d
18	later; evidence to be presented in due course will	
19	speak for itself. Here it must be stated, however,	
20	that under these circumstances the Nine-Power Treaty	
21	had become so unrealistic that its strict application	
22	to the situation was impossible. Hostilities were going	
23	on, though neither China nor Japan declared war upon	
24	the other. In the territory of the Republic of China,	
25	whether it was under Japanese occupation or not to	
	carry out the provisions of the said treaty to its	
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1	very letter was practically impossible. The defense	
2	contends that failure strictly to adhere to the treaty	
3	in these given circumstances does not necessarily	
4	constitute a crime and upon that thesis the defense	
5	will prove that the five points above stated indisputably	
6	so altered the situations contemplated by the said	
7	treaty as to render its effective application nugatory.	
8	The prosecution has made it a point to charge	
9	the accused as being responsible for economic aggression.	
10	The defense will show that there had been no economic	
11	aggression in China. Furthermore, we submit that an	
12	aggression in the economic sense does not constitute a	
13	crime.	
14	Now about the assertion of the prosecution	
15	concerning narcotic drugs. The prosecution avers that	
16	Japan caused an influx of narcotics into China and by	
17	this means wanted to crush the war efforts of the Chinese	
18	on the one hand and on the other turn the proceeds	
19	from the sales of the drug into its war chest. We	
20	invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that	
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invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that here in Japan we have had special experience in the gradual reduction of opium eaters in Formosa. In Formosa a government monopoly and control of the said drug was set up throughout the years when the island

ras under our jurisdiction and Japan by such policy

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put an end to illicit traffic in opium and through these means reduced by degrees the number of addicts.

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Japan, wherever possible, applied this policy 3 4 to China where the use of drugs is an ancient and widespread custom principally due to the traffic 5 6 engaged in by the Western Powers. Concrete facts and 7 figures in this connection will be given as well as 8 to show that proceeds from the sale of opium in China 9 were not utilized by Japan as part of war expenditures. 10 Finally, let it be said that the accused had no connection 11 whatsoever with such matters.

12 Atrocities perpetrated by some Japanese 13 troops in several parts of China, while admittedly most 14 regrettable, are believed to be unduly magnified and 15 in some degree fabricated. We shall endeavor to 16 The clarify this matter by showing the true condition. 17 Japanese government and the responsible commanders made 18 it a policy to prevent such occurrences and where 19 such deplorable facts came to their knowledge, to mete 20 out due punishment to the perpetrators of the crimes. 21 Maintenance of friendly relations with the Chinese 22 people was and still is one of the salient principles 23 of our national policy. It is quite unthinkable that 24 the accused, some of whom were holding key positions 25 in the Tokyo government or entrusted with important

expeditionary forces abroad should lightly commit or disregard such misconduct. These charges laid upon some of the accused are, we believe, without foundation and we shall leave no stone unturned to prove that none of the accused ever ordered, authorized or permitted such acts or deliberately and recklessly disregarded his legal duty in this connection.

As to the matters related to the Soviet 8 Union, aside from the conspiracy counts, the specific 9 counts are 17, 25, 26, 35, 36, 51 and 52. That these 10 accusations are beyond the pale of this Tribunal has 11 been already pointed out heretofore. Especially the 12 Changkufeng and the Nomonhan Incidents are closed issues 13 14 between the Powers concerned. This is clear beyond 15 peradventure of doubt by the conclusion of the treaty 16 of neutrality between Japan and the USSR in April 1941. 17 Both the Changkufeng Affair and the Nomonhan Incident 18 resulted from ambiguities concerning the boundaries 19 between Manchuria and the USSR. Needless to say these 20 border incidents do not fall in the category of an 21 aggressive war. The frontiers between Manchukuo and 22 the Poviet Union once defined, the outstanding differences 23 were settled then and there. That the boundaries Japan 24 defended were ultimately right can be verified by the 25 evidence which we shall present. It may be added here

that these disputes had no relation to the policy of the Tokyo government or the plans of the Kwantung Army. True circumstances of our despatch of troops on these two occasions will surely demonstrate that Japan had no intention of waging war against the USSR. We shall also show that the Japanese government followed and "absolute pacific policy vis-a-vis Russia."

8 The prosecutors representing the Soviet Union 9 endeavored to establish an aggressive intention on 10 the part of Japan by displaying the 1941 annual program 11 of the General Staff. But let it be remembered that 12 the said program was hypothetical and was not to be 13 put into execution unless the hypothetical war, for 14 which the program was made, materialized. To our mind, 15 any Power may devise such programs without arousing 16 the suspicion of others. This is purely a matter all 17 the fighting services of all nations are duty bound to 18 do. Therefore, we can never conclude from the mere 19 existence of such a program ominous intention by any 20 government. As stated in my earlier remarks, military 21 preparations in themselves will not prove the existence 22 or non-existence of an aggressive intention unless they 23 are compared with similar preparations of other Powers. 24 We will prove that the USSR had a plan of operation 25 in 1936 by which simultaneous attacks upon Germany and

1 Japan were contemplated. After 1939 when the Nomonhan 2 Incident occurred, the Soviet armed forces operating 3 east of Lake Baikal were to be doubled over those 4 maintained by us in Manchuria and Korea. The prosecution 5 also stressed the presence of Japanese reinforcements 6 in Manchuria during 1941. Japan kept some forces in 7 Manchuria after 1941. That is guite true. However, 8 these forces were meant solely for our defense. In 9 support of this assertion there will be no better 10 evidence than the above stated reinforcement plans 11 of the USSR coupled with the maneuvers by that army 12 along the borders of Manchuria and the USSR during 13 that period. Special mention should be here made that 14 tremendous forces of the Soviet Union trespassed across 15 the borders from the south of Hutung in the early part 16 of August 1945 and actually invaded Manchuria. The 17 decision for such an aggression was made as early as 18 February 11, 1945 at Yalta. This was clearly in violation 19 20 of the neutrality treaty still in force between the USSR and Japan. That our defensive measures adopted 21 22 at that time in Manchuria were justified will be 23 conclusively shown.

We proceed to division V, the Pacific War, involving Counts 1, 4, 5, 7 and 16, Counts 20 to 24 inclusive, Counts 29 to 34 inclusive, Counts 37 to 43

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inclusive, and Counts 53 to 55 inclusive. For more logical presentation the subject matter of some of the above counts will be treated separately later in greater detail.

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There existed before the war close relations 1 between the three Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan. 2 This relationship was by no means made in anticipation 3 of the Pacific War. We shall submit adequate evidence 4 in order to prove this point. The seventh Congress of 5 the Communist Internationale planned its primary 6 destructive objectives against Germany and Japan and 7 consequently they were obliged for their self-pro-8 tection to cope with this situation. Expecially for 9 Japan, this was a really alarming development. 10 11 Communism was engulfing our neighbor state, China, 12 instigating political and social revolution. Assistance 13 was extended from the Soviet Union in the shape of 14 Russian technique of revolution as well as personal 15 emissaries. These activites have been in progress ever 16 since 1923 when Dr. Sun Yst-sen and M. Joffe issued a 17 joint declaration expressing mutual sympathy between 18 the two parties. This was an extremely dangerous 19 situation for the well being of the Japanese Empire. 20 Thus followed the joint defense against communism by 21 Japan, first with Germany and then with Italy. The 22 proposal of Joint defense of China and Japan against 23 communistic activities was enunciated in three prin-24 ciples by Mr. HIROTA, Foreign Minister. These 25 principles were included later in the KONOYE statement

1 in 1938. In defending against the menace of communism. 2 since the interests of Germany and Japan were identical, 3 the two Powers concluded an agreement on November 25, 4 1936, known as the Anti-Comintern Pact. Needless to 5 say, this Pact was not made in anticipation of the 6 Pacific War. In Article 2, the Pact stipulated that, 7 "The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite 8 third States whose internal peace is threatened by the 9 subversive activities of the Communist Internationale 10 to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this 11 agreement, or to take part in the present agreement." 12 Again, the so-called secret understanding attached to 13 this instrument never aimed at aggression against any 14 third party. The understanding merely provides that 15 the parties will not take such measures as may 16 lighten the burden of the USSR if and when one of the 17 parties should become the object of an unprovoked 18 attack by it. and is entirely negative in nature. In 19 1939 negotiations were entered into in an attempt to 20 strengthen the Anti-Comintern Fact, but they were 21 abruptly ended by the unexpected conclusion of the 22 German-Soviet non-aggression treaty. These negoti-23 ations did not have for their object an unfriendly 24 attitude toward Great Britain and America. 25

The Tri-Partite Pact between Japan, Germany

and Italy was given wide publicity, but its stipula-1 tions are quite simple. War between Japan and America 2 was also never made its object. Rather, it was the 3 very avoidance of war between America and Japan that 4 was contemplated in the agreement. The evidence will 5 prove that there was no effective collaboration between 6 Germany and Japan and Italy and will emphasize that 7 Germany urged Japan to enter the war against Russia. 8 This Japan refused to do. 9

Germany sought the assistance of Japan in 10 their war against Britain. Japan refused to cooperate 11 with Germany, but acted independently. Germany negoti-12 ated the Tri-Partite Pact to keep the United States out 13 of the European War. This was not accomplished. The 14 evidence will show that General Marshall stated in his 15 16 annual report to the President of the United States 17 during the war that there was no military cooperation 18 between the two countries, that is, Germany and Japan.

Japan's planned economy and military and 20 naval preparations prior to the fall of 1941 were defensive in nature and also not undertaken in anticipation of the Pacific War. Comparison of the British and American navies and their programs with that of Japan, as well as the study of the annual programs of the Japanese neval command, will conclusively

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disclose per se the latter's non-aggressive purpose. 1 The prosecution asserts that the Japanese Navy con-2 structed in the mandated territories fortresses and 3 established bases of operations in violation of the 4 terms of the mandates and treaties. But this, too, 5 we maintain is without foundation. A fortress must 6 be provided with specific defensive facilities against 7 attacks from land, sea and air, while a base of 8 operations is incomplete unless it is equipmed with 9 supply facilities for providing the fleet in action. 10 We shall show that what were installed actually were 11 either communication facilities of peaceful nature or 12 temporary establishments for naval maneuvers, all of 13 which were permissible. 14

Much of the atrocities and cruelties alleged 15 to have been committed by Japanese forces against 16 prisoners of war did not come to the knowledge of many 17 of these accused until they were disclosed in this 18 Tribunal. Others had no authority to restrain them 19 even though they were aware of the fact. Again, 20 others did their best to restrain and punish the 21 perpetrators of such crimes. Evidence will show that 22 there was neither the opportunity nor available means 23 to stop them before the crimes were committed. We 24 shall submit evidence that no defendant ever formulated 25

1	a common plan, or ordered, or authorized or permitted
2	atrocities or deliberately and recklessly disregarded
3	his legal duty to take steps to prevent observance of
4	the laws and customs of war in this respect.
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1 Coming now to the causes of the Pacific 2 War itself, a situation inviting the closest and 3, most impartial scrutiny, we shall prove that it en-4 sued because of the supreme necessity of Japan to invoke the right of self defense. With your permis-6 sion, let us remind this Honorable Tribunal that since 1937 Japan was unwittingly involved in largescale hostilities tantamount to war with China, but which were treated by the world at large as being "short of war." We naturally expected that third Powers would recognize this peculiar situation. In fact, Great Britain did so in the joint declaration with the Japanese Government dated July 22, 1939, issued as a result of the Tientsin Incident and declared that His Majesty's Government fully recognized the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress. In what way the Washington Government regarded this situation we were not sure, but suddenly on July 26, 1939, notification of abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, a firm basis of the trade relations 22 between the two countries since 1911, was received. 23 Misunderstanding began to grow. From that time on 24 the United States brought to bear upon Japan every 25 kind of pressure and inteimidation. The first was

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economic pressure. The second was the help extended to the Chiang Kai-shek regime with which Japan was in a life and death struggle. The third was the progress of encirclement by the United States, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies; in concert with China a ring was thrown and tightened by them around Japan. These three steps after 1939 were adopted one by one, their intensity increasing in vigor as time went on. A typical example of economic pressure thus brought to bear upon us Japanese will be recited here. In December 1939 the moral embargo was extended in scope, and in addition, aircraft and its equipment and instruments and machinery for construction of aircraft and for refining gasoline were added to the prohibited list. During July 1940 the Washington Government put an embargo on scrap iron. Considering the system of iion production then prevailing-in Japan, scrap iron was an item of crucial importance. A heavy blow was thus dealt to this key industry of Japan. In August of the same year, the United States further put restrictions on the export of gasoline for aviation purposes. Upon the whole, Japan's yearly need of oil was estimated at 5,000,000 tons, the very minimum required for the 25 nation's subsistence including her national defense.

Since its annual home production of this fuel was 1 not more than 300,000 tons, this deficit had to be 2 made good with imports from abroad. By this time, 3 the only available source was the Dutch East Indiea. 4 Accordingly, a mission headed by Mr. I. KOBAYASHI, 5 Minister for Commerce and Industry, was sent there 6 and later Ambassador YOSHIZAWA was ordered to con-7 tinue the thread of negotiations with the Dutch East 8 Indies authorities at Batavia. But all these efforts 9 came to naught, because the leaders of the Dutch 10 Indies were working in close concert with America 11 12 and Great Britain. The same kind of obstacles were 13 also interposed by the authorities of French Indo-14 China and Siam, and our normal and necessary imports 15 of rice and rubber were thus hampered.

Now about the second point, assistance extended to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The United States granted on November 20, 1940, an additional loan of \$50,000,000 to the Chungking Government, apparently in retaliation for the treaty between Japan and the Wang Ching-Wei regime which was concluded the same day. Moreover, the United States authorities made it known that a further sum of \$50,000,000 was contemplated, to be offered for use in stabilizing Fapi, the Chinese currency. Following

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this step, the London Government also made it known 1 that a grant of L1,000,000 would be forthcoming. 2 These are but a few of the examples, to say nothing 3 of the continuous supply of materials to Chungking 4 by the London Government. As soon as the rainy 5 season came to a close that year, Great Britain re-6 opened the Burma Road to traffic and directly for-7 warded arms and munitions to the Chiang regime. 8 In addition, the French Indo-China route was being 9 utilized by the other nations as a line of supply 10 to the Chungking Government. In 1941 application 11 of the Lend Lease Act was extended to China. We 12 shall produce direct evidence of these facts. 13 • 14 Here we come to the third point, an iron 15

ring of encirclement thrown around Japan by the 16 several powers. In December 1940, the flower of 17 the American Pacific Fleet was concentrated in the 18 Hawaiian waters, constituting a demonstration against 19 Japan. The British Government on November 13 of the 20 same year established at Singapore the headquarters 21 of the Far Eastern Command, all of Malaya and Burma 22 as well as Hongkong coming within its orbit. That 23 government also began to undertake a formidable 24 military expansion, a system of organizing British possessions in East Asia into a close unit with

Australia and New Zealand. Conferences participated 1 in by representatives of America, Great Britian, the 2 Dutch East Indies and the Chiang Kai-shek regime 3 took place in rapid succession during those days. 4 5 A parley in Manila, held in April 1941, among the 6 British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, the 7 United States High Commissioner in the Philippines, 8 the United States Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic 9 Fleet and the Dutch Foreign Minister, attracted our 10 attention. Further, military councils were held 11 between the delegates of Great Britain and General-12 issimo Chiang Kai-shek at Singapore about the middle 13 of June. Particulars of these parleys will be dis-14 closed by evidence.

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Reacting to these numerous manifestations, the Government of Japan hastened to take steps in order to avoid the imminent calamities. The Ambassador of Japan at Washington was requested since the spring of that year to do his best so that the deplorable tension might be ended and relations between America and Japan smoothed out. Parleys between the United States Chief Executive and the Japanese Ambassador, negotiations between the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador were incessantly held, these sessions reaching several score in

number. The Tokyo Government exerted every effort 1 in order to effect a peaceful solution of all out-2 standing differences. The Japanese Premier offered 3 4 to meet and negotiate directly with the Chief Execu-5 tive of the United States somewhere in the mids* of 6 the Pacific in an attempt to settle the matter 7 peacefully once and for all. Another envoy was 8 dispatched to Washington to this end. A minister-9 ial change en bloc was undertaken in the middle of July to carry through successfully the Japan-America negotiations, this being the last final step that an independent sovereign state could take for the purpose of diplomacy. However, all of these efforts were of no avail. On July 25, 1941, the government at Washington took steps to freeze all our assets within the United States. This resulted from a misconstruction of Japan's peaceful sending of troops to French Indo-China. Britain and Dutch East Indies also followed suit immediately, although at the time treaties of commerce and navigation were still in force between Japan and Great Britain and the Netherlands, so that the freezing of Japan's 23 assets by Great Britain and the Netherlands was in 24 violation of those treaties. 25

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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed. THE PRESIDENT: Dr. KIYOSE.

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DR. KIYOSE: With your permission, let us again 4 remind this Honorable Tribunal that Japan was quite 5 unable to keep its population alive by the products 6 raised within the Empire alone. Japan had to obtain 7 necessary commodities by foreign trade. By the freez-8 ing of assets by the United States, Britain and the 9 Dutch East Indies, more than half of Japan's foreign 10 trade disappeared and the toil of eighty years' stand-11 ing was wiped out. These were the results of the 12 foregoing steps legally or illegally taken by America. 13 Great Britain and the Netherlands. The inalienable 14 right to live was deprived from the Japanese people. 15 16 Just about that time, America at last put an embargo 17 upon oil by an executive order issued on August 1st, 18 making good the veiled notification given to Ambassador 19 NOMURA on July 24th. Japan's navy was thus to lose 20 mobility after her oil in stock was exhausted; solution 21 of the China Incident was made practically impossible; 22 Japan's defense was emasculated. Hereupon the stark 23 question of self-defense presented itself before the 24 whole nation as a cold and hard fact. This demanded 25 immediate solution.

In short, fundamental factors justifying the 1 exercise of the right of self-defense were entirely 2 3 complete by that time. Notwithstanding, Japan did 4 not exercise this right at that time. On the contrary, 5 it was still willing to bear the unbearable, endeavor-6 ing to the utmost to eliminate somehow factors that 7 might lead to a casus belli. Its strenuous efforts 8 to this end will be fully proved by evidence, at once 9 strong and convincing.

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Japan's will to peace, Japan's sincere efforts to attain peaceful settlement did not bear fruit. America's note on November 26, 1941, made it finally crystal clear that not one single factor contributing to a casus belli could be settled by pacific means. Thereupon. the Japanese Government, after threshing out the opinion and observations of its various departments, and after the utmost care and deliberation, was forced at last to resolve upon recourse to the right of selfdefense. This was on December 1st. However, even after the actual date on which the use of this right was decided upon, the war order issued contained an explicit proviso canceling all naval and military operations if a compromise should be effected between Japan and the United States. In that case, the combined fleet was to come back to home waters.

The prosecution is of the opinion that Japan 1 was defective in communicating her intention to fight 2 and that this must constitute a crime. The defense 3 4 maintains the following facts: In the first place. due explanation will be developed concerning the time 5 6 in which the Japanese note was handed to the United 7 States together with particulars about this diplomatic 8 procedure. On December 6, 1941, Washington time, the 9 Japanese Foreign Ministry sent a dispetch to the 10 Japanese Ambassador at Washington intimating that a 11 note in English to be addressed to the State Department 12 was ready.

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Though the time in which the note in question was to be presented would be some time thereafter, they should be careful in the preparation of the document and be always in readiness to handle any matters in this connection, the dispatch instructed. All these telegrams were intercepted by the United States. Now, that note comprised fourteen parts in all. Our Embassy at Washington was in receipt of thirteen parts on the evening of December 6. The United States intercepted that part of the dispatch by 9:30 p.m. December 6, and the President gave them personal perusal. The last part was also intercepted on December 7. About the time when the said part was received, another dispatch

1 arrived at the Embassy indicating the time at which 2 the important note should be delivered; that time was 3 one o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. Where-4 upon, Ambassador NOMURA hastened to make an engagement 5 with the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, to meet 6 him at one o'clock p.m. Had the note been delivered 7 as was intended at one o'clock p.m. December 7, 1941, 8 the delivery would have preceded the attack at Pearl 9 Harbor, which took place at 25 minutes past 1:00 p.m., 10 Washington time. But the Embassy's deciphering and 11 typing took so much time that, as the prosecution 12 cointed out. Ambassador NOMURA was unable to arrive at 13 the State Department until 2:00 p.m. and handed the 14 note at 2:20 p.m. If the Ambassador could have deliv-15 ered the note on his arrival at the State Department, 16 the time of delivery would have been thirty-five min-17 utes after the attack at Pearl Harbor, but as the Ambas-18 sador was kept waiting for twenty minutes, the delivery 19 of the note was fifty-five minutes behind time. 20

As the Tokyo Government had sent the greater part of the dispatch the night before, and the remaining part was sent so as to be received early in the morning in order that the note should safely be delivered prior to 1:00 p.m. December 7th, that is, before the commencement of military operations, and if the routine business of the Embassy had gone smoothly, notification would have been made as was anticipated, some time before the attack. But owing to circumstances beyond the control of Tokyo, the delivery of the note was delayed as above stated. These facts the defense will prove in due course.

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Besides, we shall also try to prove the fol-7 lowing facts with a view to providing this Honorable 8 Tribunal with materials which we hope will be useful 9 for its decision whether the attack on Pearl Harbor 10 was a surprise attack or not. The State Department 11 authorities considered Japan's note to the United States 12 dated November 20, 1941 as the last one, and after Nov-13 ember 26 the whole matter was thrown into the lap of 14 the fighting services. On the morning of November 27, 15 1941, the highest official of the State Department 16 stated that the matter of relations with Japan was in 17 the hands of the Army and Navy. On the same day the 18 Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff sent 19 war warnings to the forces in Hawaii. 20

As previously stated, the American authorities deciphered the Japanese note, excepting the last part, by the evening of December 6th, and this last part was deciphered December 7th early in the morning, the President being in receipt of it at about 10:00 a.m. the same day.

The United States Lepartments of War and Navy 1 were both in possession of intelligence suggesting that 2 diplomatic rupture was at hand, and by conjecture that 3 an imminent attack was to be anticipated. The Hawaiian 4 Department was also in possession of an instruction 5 that the policy to induce Japan to commit the first 6 overt act should not be construed as restricting the 7 department to a course of action that might jeopardize 8 its defense. Also it was directed to undertake 9 reconnaissance prior to Japanese hostile action. No 10 wonder that between 6:33 and 6:55 a.m. Lecember 7 11 12 (Hawaiian time) the U.S. Navy shot and sank a Japanese 13 midget submarine in the contiguous waters. We are 14 adducing the above facts in order to show that the 15 Pearl Harbor attack at 7:55 a.m. on December 7 16 (Hawaiian time) did not come as a surprise attack.

It is contended by the prosecution that the Japanese note in question does not amount to a declaration of war with the reasons assigned as stipulated in Article I of the Hague Convention III. In interpreting a document, circumstances giving rise to it must be weighed carefully to say nothing of its letter. Moreover, a document of this nature must always be studied as a whole, and not judged only by its wording and sentences. In the political atmosphere prevailing at

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1	that time, some of the responsible American authorities
2	observed, as was stated before, that after November 26
3	matters were put into the hands of the fighting services.
4	The Japanese note is a diplomatic document of considerable
5	length consisting of not less than 2,400 words, which
6	must be treated as a whole. We find in the Japanese
7	note the following passages criticizing the American
8	stand toward Japan and making it clear that there was
.9	no means left for Japan but to resort to arms. After
10	confessing the difficulty the Japanese Government
11	experienced in understanding the American attitude,
12	the note observes: (I) "The peace of the world may
13	be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable
14	formula through recognition of the reality of the
15	situation and mutual appreciation of one another's
16	position. An attitude such as ignores realities and
17	imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely
18	serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation
19	of negotiations." (II) "The American Government,
20	obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said
21 22	to be scheming for the extension of the War."
23	(III) "Whereas the American Government, under the
23	principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling
25	international issues through military pressure, it is
	exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other
2024	

1 nations pressure by economic powers. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international 2 3 relations should be condemned as it is at times more 4 inhuman than military pressure." (IV) "All the items 5 demanded of Japan by the American Government ignore 6 the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to 7 destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor in 8 East Asia. This demand of the American Government, 9 falling as it does in line with its above-mentioned 10 refusal to cease from aiding the Chunking Regime, 11 demonstrate clearly the intention of the American 12 Government to obstruct the restoration of normal rela-13 tions between Japan and China and the return of peace 14 to East Asia."

Briefly, the above parts of the note make plain in the position of the Japanese Government, being deprived of the hope of further negotiation, that it was forced to have recourse to the last final step for the very sake of its self-defense. On the evening of December 6, 1941, even upon reading thirteen parts of the Japanese note, the President said: "This means war."

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At the end of the note it was pointed out that "the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the

American Government has finally been lost. The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." This was tantamount to severance of diplomatic relations and in the light of the tense situation then existing is unmistakable notification of Japan's intention of commencing war.

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Because of necessary limitations, only some 10 of the most important issues have been touched upon in 12 my present statement. There still remain numerous 13 others but these have been deferred for treatment in 14 the opening statements to be made later at the inception 15 of several divisions of the defense case as I have 16 previously outlined.

Mr. President, and Members of this Tribunal: 18 I hereby beg your permission to express my sentiment of profound thanks for the generosity and patience with which you have given a fair hearing to the lengthy remarks I have made on behalf of the accused. We shall now go forward and present evidence of importance in 23 great abundance. It is our firm belief that it will be 24 worthy of your esteemed credence and consideration. Truth we all here seek is not a matter of

proving that one party is entirely right and the other absolutely wrong. Truth in the human sense often envelops itself with human frailties, but we must plumb, even though painfully, but with impartiality, the deeper causes that prompt modern global wars. The way to peace must eradicate the vices underlying the present world. Whether the tragedy of modern wars might be due to racial prejudice or unequal distribution of natural resources or mere misunderstanding between governments or to the cupidity and covetousness of the favored or the less happy peoples, the cause must be ferreted out in the interests of humanity.

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By finding the true and deeper cause or causes of this war and incidents during the period indicated by the prosecution, the guilt or innocence of the accused can be fairly determined, serving at the same time to guide the present and future generations in the direction and endeavor for a lasting world peace.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

MR. TAVENNER: Mr. Fresident, and Members of the Tribunal: The prosecution desires to point out that the opening statement by Dr. KIYOSE offends in several additional instances the principles announced by the Tribunal to the effect that matters heretofore argued should be deleted. They are as follows: ¹ page 3, personal responsibility for criminal acts per-² formed by individuals acting on behalf of the state; ³ the last half of page 25, interpretation of the Potsdam ⁴ Declaration; page 26, the construction of non-criminality ⁵ of aggressive warfare, or, rather, the contention of non-⁶ criminality of aggressive warfare.

THE RESIDENT: Paragraphs 17 to 20, inclusive, seem to me to cover the lot without regard to the pages. MR. TAVENNER: That disposes, then, of those matters.

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Now, we are of the opinion that glaring examples appear in the opening statement of recital of alleged facts which are irrelevant to the issues charged. We will endeavor to present proper objections when the evidence is introduced, and we are satisfied the Tribunal will ignore, for the present, those matters which appear on their face to be improper.

THE PRESIDENT: Very largely it is a statement of the law, or purports to be. It is certainly more than a statement of fact. The doctrine of individual responsibility can never be a question of fact, as Dr. KIYOSE asserts.

We are wondering how much of the second part is objectionable for the same reasons.

MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

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1	THE PRESIDENT: We told Dr. KIYOSE to omit
2	all his arguments of law that had been put already,
3	but he did not to so. The second part of this opening
4	may be put with the same disregard of our instructions.
5	We want to be sure that it isn't.
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MR. TAVENNER: I think each one of the 1 objections which I referred to in the second document 2 relates to matters which have been argued. 3

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4 THE PRESIDENT: I have not read the second 5 part. That may be.

6 MR. TAVENNER: There is a possibility that 7 my statement may not be correct as to the second one . 8 relating to conspiracy, but I think that has been 9 covered also.

10 THE PRESIDENT: The opening statement must 11 be a statement of the evidence intended to be adduced 12 and not arguments on the law.

13 MR. TAVENNER: I would now like to refer to 14 another objection to the opening statement made by 15 Dr. KIYOSE. We object to those statements made in the 16 gourse of that opening statement which are not susceptible of proof and which are beyond a proper defense of the accused. I refer particularly to that class of statements which appears on page 40 in which the statement was made: "Maintenance of friendly relations with the Chinese people was and still is one of the salient principles of our national policy." It is our view that could have no purpose except a political one.

THE PRESIDENT: It is what it was that matters, not what it is now. It may be susceptible of 1 proof; I would not say offhand.

2 MR. TAKAYANAGI: Mr. President and Members 3 of the Tribunal:

With the permission of the Tribunal, we pro-4 pose to discuss the law of the Charter with a view to 5 refuting seriatim the interpretations placed upon it 6 7 by the Chief of Counsel in his opening statement. As 8 far as possible we shall follow the order in which 9 the Chief of Counsel developed the thesis of the 10 prosecution and divide our discussion into the follow-11 ing eight sections:

12 1. The Potsdam Declaration and the law of 13 the Charter.

2. Conspiracy.

3. War of Aggression.

4. War in violation of treaties, etc.

5. Murder.

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6. "Conventional" war crimes.

7. Personal responsibility.

8. The nature and purpose of the new doctrine of international law proposed by the prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. TAKAYANAGI, all those matters that you refer to are outside the proper scope of an opening of the defense' evidence. MR. TAKAYANAGI: With great respect I want to draw the attention of the Tribunal to three points.

THE PRESIDENT: In your closing address you 3 may, perhaps, refer to all of them. It was necessary 4 for the prosecution in their opening to explain the 5 law to some extent, and you have been committed to 6 combat what the prosecution claimed was the law on 7 8 two occasions. Now you are attempting to reopen the 9 questions of law at a stage when it is not permissible. 10 In your concluding address we shall hear you fully on 11 the law as far as necessary. Let it be clearly under-12 stood by all that we are not shutting out a single 13 argument that the defense can produce, but we are 14 preventing unnecessary repetitions of argument and arguments at the wrong stage of the case. Now we are not going to allow you to continue if you have infringed any direction of the Tribunal in the statement that you have prepared.

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1	MR. TAKAYANAGI: I want to say just a few	
2	words. First, the Chief of Counsel in his opening	
3	statement was given an opportunity to elucidate in	
4	a comprehensive manner the law of the Charter as the	
5	prosecution understood it. It is not only require-	
6	ments of natural order as we conceive it but a	
7	matter of fair play that the accused be allowed to	
8	elucidate the law of the Charter as a whole as the	
9	defense understands it at the beginning of the defense.	
10	THE PRESIDENT: I will state the matter again	
10	in case you did not hear me before. The defense have	
12	already been allowed to state their view of the	
13	Charter as fully as Mr. Keenan stated his view.	
14	MR. TAKAYANAGI: Another point is the Chief	
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	of Counsel's elucidation of the law of the Charter,	
16	like a piece of art, constitutes an organic whole	
17	inspired by a definite philosophy. The legal questions	
18	raised by the defense so far were on certain specific	
19	aspects of the law only and the defense has not yet	
20	had an opportunity to state its views on the legal	
, 21	arguments of the prosecution as a whole and especially	
22	on its philosophy inspiring them all.	
23	THE PRESIDENT: Probably without realizing	
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it you are endeavoring to infringe the law of the Charter. There is no provision in the Charter for

what you are trying to do now. The Charter now confines you to an opening statement and you are not making one. While professing to uphold the Charter, you are disregarding it. If what you propose to read to us is not an opening statement, we are not going to listen to it.

7 MR. TAKAYANAGI: We will omit all those 8 parts which have been brought before and we will 9 bring out only those parts which have not been 10 touched upon or which may be looked at in a new 11 light until we shall prepare the matter until 12 tomorrow morning. Also, I should like to draw the 13 attention of the Tribunal that it is the honest 14 desire of the defendants on whose behalf I propose 15 to make this statement that the interpretation of 16 the Charter be presented to the Tribunal not 17 at the summation but at the very beginning so that 18 the fundamental legal questions which are pertinent 19 to their destiny but also have a far-reaching effect 20 in international law and may become a precedent for 21 future generations be fully and carefully considered. 22

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. TAKAYANAGI, the procedure laid down in the Charter is binding upon us. That procedure is that at this stage we hear an opening statement by the defense. We are confined to that and so are you. We will hear an opening statement;
 that is, a statement of the evidence you intend to
 adduce.

4 Doctor, we think that we should adjourn now -- it is nearly four o'clock -- to enable you 5 6 to reconsider what you have written and with a view 7 to your confining what you are going to say to an 8 opening statement in the proper sense. I repeat 9 again that at a proper stage we will hear every 10 argument of law that you have to present so far as 11 you have not presented it. In your concluding 12 address you may refer to it fully but not now. We 13 will adjourn --

DR. KIYOSE: Mr. President, I wish it to be understood that Dr. TAKAYANAGI is not speaking for all defendants and that he is speaking only for his own client.

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
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
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THE MONITOR: Although Dr. TAKAYANAGI has stated that he was speaking about the desire of all accused, that is not the case. He does not represent all accused.

May I state that there are several additional defendants who do not participate in the opening address which I made. There are more accused who have expressed -- who have disclosed the intention





NOTE:

The attached pages are corrected pages and should be substituted for the corresponding pages in the record.

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MR. TAKAYANAGI: With great respect I want 1 to draw the attention of the Tribunal to three points. 2 THE PRESIDENT: In your closing address you 3 may, perhaps, refer to all of them. It was necessary 4 for the prosecution in their opening to explain the 5 law to some extent, and you have been permitted to 6 combat what the prosecution claimed was the law on 7 two occasions. Now you are attempting to reopen the 8 questions of law at a stage when it is not permissable. 9 In your concluding address we shall hear you fully on 10 the law as far as necessary. Let it be clearly under-11 12 stood by all that we are not shutting out a single 13 argument that the defense can produce, but we are 14 preventing unnecessary repetitions of argument and 15 arguments at the wrong stage of the case. Now we 16 are not going to allow you to continue if you have 17 infringed any direction of the Tribunal in the state-18 ment that you have prepared.

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