

Dec 27, 1946

Minutes of the Court

Reuter

I N D E X

Of

WITNESSES

<u>Prosecution's Witnesses</u>	<u>Page</u>
Leenheer, Cornelis C. (resumed)	13748
Direct by Lieutenant Colonel Damste (cont'd)	13748
Cross by Mr. Logan	13758
" " Mr. Levin	13773
" " Mr. SAMMONJI	13774
Redirect by Lieutenant Colonel Damste	13779
(Witness excused)	13780

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
	1765-A				
	1765-B				
	1765-C		Four (4) Reels of Film		
	1765-D		entitled "NIPPON PRESENTS"		13714
			(Moving Picture shown)		
5685	1766		Synopsis of Evidence - Sumatra		13781
5617	1767		Interrogation of Ernest		
			Alexander Lloyd re atrocities		
			against Australian Nurses	13781	
5617	1767-A		Excerpt therefrom		13781

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
5619	1768		Sworn Statement of Melkianus Latuperissa, Sergeant 1st Class of the N.I. Red Cross	13783	
5619	1768-A		Excerpt therefrom		13783
5604	1769		Sworn Statement of Wing Com- mander Patrick S. Davis	13784	
5604	1769-A		Excerpt therefrom		13784
5601	1770		Sworn Statement of Private Wilhelm Hagedoorn, R.N.I.A.	13790	
5601	1770-A		Excerpt therefrom		13790
5623	1771		Sworn Statement of Karel Hendrik Emile Krijgsman		13791
5646	1772		Affidavit of Mrs. A. E. Prins, (nee Rohrborn)	13796	
5646	1772-A		Excerpt therefrom		13796
5716	1773		Affidavit of Amir Bin Sarodin	13809	
5716	1773-A		Excerpt therefrom		13809
5625	1774		Affidavit of L. G. Emmels	13811	
5625	1774-A		Excerpt therefrom		13811
5635	1775		Sworn Statement of A. Suyker	13812	
5635	1775-A		Excerpt therefrom		13812

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
5636	1776		Sworn Statement of J.C. Teerlink	13813	
5636	1776-A		Excerpt therefrom		13813
5632	1777		Sworn Statement of Doctor Lo Djien Sioe	13814	
5632	1777-A		Excerpt therefrom		13814
5634	1778		Affidavit of F.R. Kramer	13820	
5634	1778-A		Excerpt therefrom		13820
5682	1779		Synopsis of Evidence - Timor and Lesser Sunda Islands		13821
5571	1780		Affidavit of Australian Private R.B. Crow	13821	
5571	1780-A		Excerpt therefrom		13821
5573	1781		Interrogation Report of Australian Army Chaplain Thomas William Bindeman	13822	
5573	1781-A		Excerpt therefrom		13822
5579	1782		Sworn Statement of Lieutenant Colonel William Watt Leggatt	13823	
5579	1782-A		Excerpt therefrom		13823
5802	1783		Affidavit of Sebastiao Graca	13824	
5802	1783-A		Excerpt therefrom		13824
5585	1784		Sworn Statement of Malkianus Augustijn		13824

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
5578	1785		Report of Captain A.C.J. De Thouars, Private C.K. Brants and 1st Lieutenant H.H.J. De Vries, R.N.I.A.	13825	
5578	1785-A		Excerpts therefrom		13826
5583	1786		Affidavit of the Australian Flight Lieutenant L.L. McKenzie	13827	
5583	1786-A		Excerpt therefrom		13827
5597	1787		Affidavit of Sergeant C.H. van der Sloot	13828	
5597	1787-A		Excerpt therefrom		13828
5596	1788		Affidavit of Controller (civil servant) W.F.H. van der Plas		13834
5803	1789		Affidavit of Carlos Jose Sequeira	13834	
5803	1789-A		Excerpt therefrom		13834
5804	1790		Sworn Statement of Ernesto Simoes	13835	
5804	1790-A		Excerpt therefrom		13835
5805	1791		Affidavit of Australian F/O W.A. Beattie		13836
5806	1792		Affidavit of Lois Antonio Numes Rodreigues	13837	
5806	1792-A		Excerpt therefrom		13837

I N D E X

of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
5594	1793		Report of Major General Y. TANAKA	13838	
5594	1793-A		Excerpt therefrom		13838
5591	1794		Statement by S. OHARA		13841
5807	1795		Statement of Chung Hai Cheng	13844	
5807	1795-A		Excerpt therefrom		13844
5684	1796		Synopsis of Evidence - Celebes		13845
5518	1797		Statement of Medical Officer Doctor Mingelen, R.W.I.A.	13846	
5518	1797-A		Excerpt therefrom		13846
5520	1798		Affidavit of Major T. ODUMURA	13846	
5520	1798-A		Excerpt therefrom		13846
5535	1799		Affidavit of Y. HAYASHI	13852	
5535	1799-A		Excerpt therefrom		13852
5532	1800		Affidavit of Captain C. TANIGUCHI	13852	
5532	1800-A		Excerpt therefrom		13852
5521	1801		Statement of Colonel Michinori NAKAMURA	13858	
5521	1801-A		Excerpt therefrom		13858
5564	1802		Statement of Japanese Colonel KOBAYASHI		13864

I N D E X

Of

EXHIBITS

(cont'd)

<u>Doc.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Pros.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Def.</u> <u>No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For</u> <u>Ident.</u>	<u>In</u> <u>Evidence</u>
5533	1803		Affidavit of Lieutenant Y. NAKAMURA	13865	
5533	1803-A		Excerpt therefrom		13865
5503	1804		Affidavit of Lieutenant Com- mander C.T. Cooper, R.N.	13866	
5503	1804-A		Excerpt therefrom		13866
5504	1805		Synopsis of Man-handling and Ill-treatment by the Japanese in Report of Commandant of P.O.W. Camp at Macassar	13867	
5504	1805-A		Excerpt therefrom		13867
5538	1806		Affidavit of Captain S. N. Paul, Indian Medical Service		13875

1 Friday, 27 December, 1946

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before with the
14 exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE D. JARANILLA, Member
15 from the Republic of the Philippines and HONORABLE
16 JUSTICE JU-AO MEI, Member from the Republic of China,
17 not sitting.

18 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

19 For the Defense Section, same as before.

20 The Accused:

21 All present except OKAWA, Shumei, who is
22 represented by his counsel.

23 - - -

24 (English to Japanese and Japanese
25 to English interpretation was made by the
Language Section, IMTFE.)

LEENHEER

DIRECT

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Damste.

4 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Mr. President.

5 C O R N E L I S C. L E E N H E E R, called as a
6 witness on behalf of the prosecution, resumed
7 the stand and testified as follows:

8 BY LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE (Continued):

9 Q Major, did Japanese medical officers inspect
10 the camps?

11 A Yes, sometimes. Regarding the Chief Medical
12 Officer of the 25th Army, Colonel FUKAYA, he told me
13 that he visited Bangkinang Camp in Middle Sumatra
14 twice; that he intended to visit the other camps but
15 never did it. The officer, the medical officer in
16 charge in South Sumatra, Dr. YAMADA, told me that he
17 had to ask for permission to visit the internment
18 camps, the permission to be given by the Divisional
19 Commander. He, however, never asked for permission,
20 so he never visited the camps.

21 Q About food, would you tell us the typical
22 menu of the internees?

23 A The whole menu of the day consisted of two
24 or three meals, and the morning breakfast was two
25 ounces of rice, polished. The lunch consisted of

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 about four ounces of corn with some vegetables.
2 The dinner consisted again of four ounces of rice
3 with some vegetables. After April, 1944, we never
4 got any meat. Two or three, four times a week we
5 got fish; and most of the times the fish was a
6 kind of an oyster which was given out at the official
7 rate, the rations scale of fifty grams, being two
8 ounces a man a day. The net weight, however, what
9 we could consume, was about three per cent, the
10 rest being shells.

11 Q So there was an official ration laid down
12 by the Japanese?

13 A Yes, there was.

14 Q And what was that, do you remember?

15 A In the beginning, in 1942, 1943, it was
16 about eighteen ounces of rice, two ounces of meat,
17 about eight ounces of vegetables, about one ounce
18 of sugar. Already in 1943 it went down to about
19 eleven ounces a day. That was bulk food, being
20 rice, corn, sago or tapioca flour.

21 Q So there was a shortage?

22 A There was always a shortage. The officer --
23 the ordnance officer in charge of the internment
24 camps told me that the shortage of ten per cent in
25 the bulk food was always officially accepted from the

LEHNHEER

DIRECT

1 field supply depot, the shortage being sometimes up
2 to fifteen or twenty per cent. Vegetables, which
3 were supplied in the regular amount, sometimes were
4 about -- well, ninety per cent rotten. In November,
5 1944, I remember in our camp we got instead of seven
6 ounces of vegetables a day only one ounce. However,
7 in 1945, the vegetables situation became better
8 when we had our own vegetable gardens working, and
9 we got sweet potato leaves as our main vegetable.

10 Q You told us that you know about the welfare
11 of the laborers. Do you know, perhaps, the typical
12 menu of the native laborer in Sumatra on the estates?

13 A The ration laid down by the government for
14 the laborers in Sumatra was for the male laborer a
15 pound and half a day. This amount was supplied by
16 the concerns -- by the companies every month. Outside
17 that, the laborers had their own gardens with sweet
18 potatoes, rice once a year, corn, plenty vegetables,
19 about three to five ounces of fish or meat a day.

20 Q Did your medical men consider the caloric
21 value sufficient?

22 A No. The doctors' opinion were that the
23 caloric and the protein and the vitamin value of the
24 food was very unsatisfactory.

25 Q And what was the effect of this diet on the

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 physical condition of the internees according to the
2 doctors?

3 A They went back in mental and physical --
4 they went back mentally and physically. They con-
5 tracted all kinds of diseases like pellagra and a-
6 vitaminosis, tropical ulcers and beri-beri.

7 Q What was the average percentage of sick
8 among the internees, do you remember?

9 A In the beginning about ten to fifteen per
10 cent. Later on it went up till forty, forty-five.

11 Q Did the camp leaders protest frequently
12 against these conditions?

13 A The camp leaders protested almost daily;
14 and there was one camp leader, Frater Hoppenbrouwers
15 in Bangkinang, who wrote during the two and half years
16 of his internment about four hundred letters without
17 any results.

18 Q Were the internees put to work?

19 A We had our own garden duties, wood chopping.
20 There was forced labor by the male internees in
21 Seantar on the aerodrome. It was in December, 1942,
22 and January, 1943. The women in Tandjong Balai Camp
23 were forced to sweep the streets of the village.

24 Q How were alleged offenses against the orders
25 dealt with?

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 A Beatings and punishments -- corporal
2 punishments.

3 Q Also against the women?

4 A Also against the women, withholding of
5 food for two days in Tandjong Balai Camp because
6 of an alleged crime.

7 Q Were these corporal punishments ordered
8 after proper investigation?

9 A I know only about two proper investigations
10 or two investigations by the Kempeitai after an
11 alleged crime. There was one in Brastagi Camp after
12 the outbreak of the women because of lack of food.
13 The other one in Pulaubrayan Camp. In Pulaubrayan
14 Camp the women gathered near the guard room to
15 protest against the camp order. One of the guards
16 who tried to get the women away with a stick was
17 attacked by one of the women, the stick taken away,
18 and he got a sound thrashing.

19 Q In the cases without investigation did the
20 Japanese Commandant know about the brutalities and
21 did he interfere?

22 A Yes. On the whole they knew about it, and
23 they often took part in it themselves.

24 Q How did the Japanese act against the native
25 population?

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 A I can give you some examples of the statement
2 made by Dr. Messing who was in charge of a coolie
3 camp in Middle Sumatra. When a laborer had committed
4 a crime, he was put in the dysentery barracks until
5 he died. Another one was tied to a pole for twenty-
6 four hours and was scalded with boiling water.

7 THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by "crime" --
8 a murder?

9 THE WITNESS: No, doing something against
10 the orders. No murder.

11 THE PRESIDENT: That would not be a crime.
12 BY LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE (Continued):

13 Q So there were imported coolies?

14 A They were Javanese coolies imported from
15 Java. They were used --

16 THE PRESIDENT: What sort of offense would
17 incur that punishment?

18 Read it to him.

19 (Whereupon, the official court reporter
20 read back the last question.)

21 THE WITNESS: Slackness -- well, every small
22 item -- a small -- I can't find the word at the moment --
23 everything done against the camp orders of working and
24 politeness to the Japanese.

25 BY LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE (Continued):

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 Q Were internees allowed to keep valuables and
2 money?

3 A No. On the first of May, 1943, all the
4 valuables and money were taken away from the
5 internees. The money was never returned. The
6 valuables, some of them, were returned after the
7 surrender.

8 Q What was the death rate in your camp?

9 A Between about six to eight per cent in our
10 camp.

11 Q Do you know the death rate in South Sumatra?

12 A In South Sumatra 364 men died, making the
13 rate of twenty-eight per cent. In Palembang 102
14 British died, being fifty-three per cent.

15 Q Were the camps visited by high-ranking
16 Japanese officers?

17 A Yes, sometimes. I remember one visit in
18 Si Rengo Rengo Camp of General YAHAGI, the Chief of
19 Staff of the 25th Army. This happened in July, 1945,
20 and the visit was planned for General TANABE, the
21 Commander in Chief of the 25th Army; but after his
22 visit of the three women camps at Aek Pamenke he
23 was too tired, according to what General YAHAGI told
24 our camp commander.

25 Q Did General YAHAGI make a thorough inspection?

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 A No. He walked through the camp from one
2 end to the other where all the internees were lined
3 up and walked back. He did not speak to any of
4 the internees, not even to our own camp leaders.
5 They were not allowed to address him.

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1 Q Had the camp leaders ever asked for a Red
2 Cross inspection?

3 A Yes, various times there was a request for
4 Red Cross inspections, but it was always refused.

5 Q How did the camp internees look after the
6 Japanese surrender?

7 A They looked very thin or very swollen be-
8 cause of pellagra. The children had to stand still
9 in the growth. My own boy who I didn't see for two
10 and a half years, being about ten when he left me
11 and about twelve and a half when he came back, had
12 not grown an inch.

13 Q Do you happen to know about other murders
14 or cruelties?

15 A I know of the murder of five Chinese on the
16 13th of March 1942 in Medan who were beheaded by
17 members of the Kempei Tai, their heads placed on
18 stakes and shown to the public.

19 Q How do you know?

20 A I have read the statements from eyewitnesses.
21 Another murder on the 15th of March 1942 of three
22 British civilians at Sinbolon Estate near Seantar.
23 This was told to me by a Dutch police officer who
24 was ordered to investigate the murder. He told me
25 this on the 9th of April 1942, and he made a statement

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 sometime in 1945.

2 Q A statement to what effect?

3 A He was ordered by the Kempei Tai in Seantar
4 to find out what happened to three British civilians
5 who were murdered, and after he had found out that
6 the murder was done by some Japanese, he never heard
7 anything about it, because as far as he was concerned
8 then the investigation was closed.

9 Q Do you happen to know the names of these
10 Britishers?

11 A The names were Cameron, Bruce and Campbell,
12 all three employees of Harrison and Crossfield.

13 I know of one other murder on the 15th of
14 March 1942 of twenty-two Dutch troops who were taken
15 prisoner on the 14th of March at Tiga Rungu, about
16 thirty miles north of Seantar. After being captured
17 by the Japanese they were kept over during the night
18 and killed the next morning.

19 Q How do you know?

20 A They were people -- were soldiers of the
21 home guard who were taken prisoner just about ten
22 minutes after I went through there. We got the first
23 news about it the next morning. The next time we
24 heard about it was on the 9th of April '42. And when
25 working with No. 4 War Crimes Investigation Team we

LEENHEER

DIRECT

1 got a statement from a native eyewitness.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Has evidence already been
3 given about this incident?

4 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: No, it has not.

5 Q Have you omitted anything that might be said
6 in favor of the Japanese toward the internees in
7 Sumatra?

8 A Yes. I may say only one Japanese who was a
9 resident of Asahan Province, a civilian named KOSHI,
10 did try his best to relieve the women internees there
11 of their sufferings.

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: That is the end of
13 my direct examination.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

15 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please.

16 CROSS-EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. LOGAN:

18 Q Major, who built Sungei Sengkol Camp?

19 A Sungei Sengkol Camp?

20 Q Yes.

21 A Sungei Sengkol Camp was build by Chinese
22 contractors and native laborers under the direction --
23 I beg your pardon, do you mean Sungei Sengkol Camp?

24 Q Yes.

25 A Sungei Sengkol Camp was built in about 1910

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 by the Arendsburg Tobacco Company. It was built as
2 a hospital and was used as a hospital up till the war.
3 It consisted of eight barracks.

4 Q So the condition you found when you arrived
5 there had existed since some time previous to your
6 arrival in that camp, is that correct?

7 A No, that is not correct, because the camp was
8 opened on the 15th of March 1943 and I arrived on the
9 17th.

10 Q I understood you to say it was built in
11 1910, didn't you? For what was it used from 1910
12 to 1943?

13 A I told you before that it was used as a hos-
14 pital by the tobacco company for the laborers of the
15 estate up till the war.

16 Q But the condition of the buildings and the
17 condition of the latrines and lavatories and so forth
18 were the same when you arrived there as what they had
19 been previously, isn't that correct?

20 A For the number of lavatories and so forth,
21 yes. But not for the condition in which the buildings
22 were because they were more or less dilapidated, having
23 grass roofs which have to be maintained every year.
24 The hospital being empty for about one year, no main-
25 tenance had been done during that time.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q ~~Was~~ there any attempt made by internees to
2 fix the roofs of these barracks?

3 A Yes, there was. They asked for material for
4 the roof and when that was given the roofs were repaired
5 but that happened in 1944.

6 Q In any event, Major, this camp wasn't one
7 that was constructed by the Japanese for these
8 internees, is that correct?

9 THE PRESIDENT: That follows, Mr. Logan.

10 A That is correct.

11 Q How about the Si Rengo Rengo Camp? Was that
12 one that existed previous to the time it was used for
13 internees?

14 A Si Rengo Rengo was a hospital built for the
15 internees.

16 Q By whom was it built?

17 A As far as I know by a Chinese contractor with
18 native labor.

19 Q Were the buildings that were erected similar
20 to other buildings that were used for purposes of
21 internees during the war?

22 A They differed from the buildings I have seen
23 in Aek Pameinke Camp; some of them were erected special-
24 ly for the internees too.

25 Q Were the buildings suitable for that climate?

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 A Well, all the building -- the huts were atop,
2 which is a dried grass, are very hot at night -- during
3 the day time; they are cold at night.

4 Q Is that a typical condition for houses in
5 that climate?

6 A Yes, it is.

7 Q Did you ever see any medical officer inspect
8 either of these two camps to which you were confined?

9 A No. No, sir, I did not.

10 Q And your testimony with respect to other camps
11 is purely hearsay, isn't that so? By that I mean it
12 is what somebody else has told you.

13 A No, sir, it was what I have read from sworn
14 statements.

15 Q In any event, Major, it is something you don't
16 know of your own knowledge. You either read it or
17 heard it from somebody else, isn't that so?

18 A I can only say that I have read it from a
19 sworn statement which was officially made during my
20 work in the No. 4 War Crimes Investigation Team at
21 Medan.

22 Q We will pass that, Major. With respect to
23 food at these other camps, you don't know anything
24 about that of your own knowledge?

25 A Not from my personal experience because I wasn't

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 there.

2 Q Now, at these two camps to which you were
3 interned, did the food situation get worse as the
4 war went on?

5 A Yes, the food situation got worse especially
6 in Si Rengo Rengo because Si Rengo Rengo was situated
7 about 200 miles from the capital and from the two
8 nearest supply depot stations.

9 Q You know it to be a fact, don't you, Major,
10 that the Netherlands East Indies there isn't sufficient
11 food raised or grown there for the consumption of the
12 people that inhabit those islands?

13 A I haven't studied that problem and I cannot
14 tell you.

15 Q Well, then, perhaps you can answer this, Major:
16 In your investigation did you make any inquiries as to
17 the importation of food by means of shipping?

18 A You mean importation by the Netherlands Gov-
19 ernment or by the Japanese Government?

20 Q By either.

21 A There was rice imported from Siam and Burma
22 before the war. During the war I don't know of any
23 imports.

24 Q Didn't you think it necessary in your investi-
25 gation to determine why there was a food shortage to

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 inquire into whether or not the shipping was cut off?

2 A The Netherlands Government already started
3 before the invasion of Sumatra of growing food stuffs
4 on all the estates where possible.

5 Q That might be quite true, but my question was
6 directed to any investigation you made and, if you didn't,
7 why you didn't make it with respect to shipping being
8 cut off during the war.

9 A The investigation I made concerning shipping
10 and cutting off of food supplies was only in one case
11 that was the reason given to me for the transfer of
12 the Muntok internees to Lubuklingau.

13 Q What was the reason?

14 A The reason given to me by Major General
15 YAMAMOTO, the Chief of the Intendence of the 25th Army,
16 was lack of shipping transport -- shipping space, --
17 because the food had to come from Palembang to Muntok
18 by ship.

19 Q Did he also tell you that a number of ships
20 containing food stuffs were sunk by Allied submarines?

21 A No, he never did.

22 Q In any event, in order to alleviate this food
23 situation you were permitted to have your own vegetable
24 gardens in 1945, is that correct?

25 A We had vegetable gardens outside the camp

LEENHLEER

CROSS

1 worked by the camp people.

2 Q And you got the food, the vegetables, from
3 those gardens?

4 A Yes, as I told you before we got the sweet
5 potato leaves from those gardens.

6 Q You also talked about forced labor in some
7 of these other camps. You, of course, did not person-
8 ally see that, isn't that so?

9 A That is right.

10 Q And you also talked about beatings and corporal
11 punishments in other camps, particularly this incident
12 where the women protested about camp order. You did
13 not see that either, did you?

14 A No, I did not.
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1 Q As a matter of fact, you never heard of it
2 until years after it occurred and that was only by
3 virtue of some statement you saw, isn't that true?

4 A No, I already heard it in the camp itself
5 during the internment.

6 Q Did you personally take any statements of
7 anybody who saw these women beaten?

8 A No, I did not.

9 Q And this statement you made about Japanese
10 commandants knowing about these thrashings and
11 taking part in them, you don't know that of your
12 own knowledge either, do you?

13 A Yes, I do. I have seen the camp commandant
14 of Sungei Sengkol thrash one of our boys.

15 Q I am asking about the thrashings to these
16 women.

17 A No, I didn't see them personally.

18 Q What rank was this commandant that thrashed
19 this boy in your camp?

20 A Sergeant.

21 Q Did you ever see any Japanese commandants
22 thrash their own soldiers?

23 A No, I did not.

24 Q Did you ever hear of it?

25 A No, I did not.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q Now, you didn't see this incident where
2 the laborer who you say had committed a crime was
3 sent to a dysentery barrack, did you?

4 A No, as I told you it was -- I got it out
5 of a statement made by Doctor Messing, the medical
6 officer in that hospital.

7 Q Do you remember what crime this particular
8 laborer committed?

9 A No, I do not.

10 Q I suppose your answers would be the same
11 with respect to this incident of the man who was
12 tied to a pole?

13 A Yes, it would be the same.

14 Q Did you compile these figures you submitted
15 of 6 and 8 per cent deaths and 28 per cent deaths
16 and 52 per cent deaths, or was that compiled by some-
17 body else and given to you?

18 A They were compiled out of the statements
19 from the camp leaders and camp doctors after the war.

20 Q Did you compile them or did somebody else
21 compile them for you?

22 A They were compiled already in the statements.

23 Q Was the 6 to 8 per cent of deaths in your
24 own camp also compiled by somebody else?

25 A No, it was compiled by myself. Those 123

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 people died within 10 months out of the 2000.

2 Q Now, when this Japanese general visited
3 your camp in July 1945, was the camp all dressed
4 up especially for this occasion?

5 A About 10 days before the visit a civilian,
6 Japanese civilian, came to camp, inspected the camp,
7 and gave the orders for cleaning of the camp because
8 the general wanted to visit the camp. Every morning
9 and every afternoon a certain number of internees
10 had to try and clean the drains and grounds better
11 than they were, supervised by the Japanese civilian.

12 Q So that when he visited the camp he saw it
13 at its best, is that right?

14 A It would be the best of the worst conditions,
15 yes, sir. The internees were specially dressed up
16 for the occasion. Everybody had to wear a shirt.

17 Q Were there shirts available for everybody?

18 A Can you repeat that question?

19 Q Were there shirts available for everybody?

20 A Everybody had some kind of shirt.

21 Q Did the commandant of that camp tell you
22 that he was trying to make an impression on the
23 general so that the general could get -- the general
24 could take back a favorable report as to conditions
25 at that camp?

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 A My idea that it was not the camp commander
2 himself who wanted to make the favorable impression,
3 otherwise he didn't need to have any special civilian
4 there to look after the work.

5 Q You are just guessing there, Major. I am
6 asking you if the commandant ever told you that?

7 A No, he never told me.

8 Q Now, with respect to the murder -- the kill-
9 ing of these 5 Chinese and 3 British civilians
10 and the 22 Dutch troops. I notice that they all took
11 place on March 13 and March 15, 1942; is that correct?

12 A That is correct, sir.

13 Q Was that at or about the time of the
14 surrender?

15 A No, sir. On the 12th of March the Japanese
16 invaded Sumatra and on the 27th of March they
17 surrendered -- the Dutch surrendered.

18 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
19 minutes.

20 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess
21 was taken until 1100, after which the
22 proceedings were resumed as follows.)
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LEENHEER

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

5 Q Major, the killing of these five Chinese,
6 three British civilians, twenty-two Dutch, occurred
7 before the surrender; isn't that so?

8 A Yes, that is right, sir.

9 Q And you didn't see any of these killings?

10 A No, I did not.

11 Q Now, with respect to the five Chinese, how
12 many statements did you see on that?

13 A At least four.

14 Q Did you personally take any statements?

15 A No, I did not.

16 Q Did you talk with any eye witnesses?

17 A No, I did not.

18 Q Did you take any statements with respect
19 to the three British civilians?

20 A I did not take the statement, but I acted
21 as an interpreter.

22 Q I understand you only made one, only took
23 one statement, and that was of a Dutch police officer;
24 is that correct?
25

A I did not take a statement.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q Acted as interpreter?

2 A Acted as interpreter.

3 Q Did you act as interpreter or take any
4 statement from any other eye witnesses to the killing
5 of those three Britishers?

6 A Yes, I acted as an interpreter for taking
7 statements of two Dutch police officers.

8 Q And you have given us the substance of what
9 they told you; is that right?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Now, with respect to the twenty-two Dutch
12 troops, did you take any statements from any eye
13 witness?

14 A No, I did not.

15 Q How many statements did you see with
16 respect to the killing of these men?

17 A One statement and one report.

18 Q Did you make any investigation at all,
19 Major, on your own along the lines that these men
20 may have been killed while fighting?

21 A Yes. They were not killed while fighting
22 because they were taken prisoners, and they were
23 kept over the night in a shed.

24 Q Yes, I understand you said that, Major;
25 but I am asking you if you, yourself, made any

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 personal investigation by examination of eye
2 witnesses to determine whether or not these men were
3 killed while actually fighting?

4 A No, I did not, because it was up until I
5 left Sumatra impossible to reach the village and
6 the place where it happened.

7 Q Where are your children today, Major?

8 A Well, I had to send my boy to Switzerland
9 last year because he has -- had lost just before
10 he was interned the sight of one eye, and during
11 internment, according to the doctors because of
12 lack of protein, he got blind.

13 Q Has he recovered?

14 A He was sent to Holland and was operated on,
15 and he has about eighty per cent of his eye sight
16 back at the moment. He is, however, still suffering
17 from occupational malaria which he contracted at
18 the camp.

19 Q How is the other child?

20 A About the other child, she was two and one-
21 half when she went in the camp and about five and
22 one-half when she came out. She is quite all right
23 now.

24 Q What was the condition with respect to
25 medical supplies in these two camps to which you

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 were confined?

2 A As I told you before, they were very scarce.

3 Q Do you know if they were available or could
4 have been obtained anywhere?

5 A I told that after the war huge stocks were
6 discovered and a huge amount of quinine was sent into
7 the camp -- Japanese and Dutch made.

8 Q Do you know where they were stored and if
9 they were stored down there during the war?

10 A There was a store in Medan, and one in
11 Seantar; and the other places in Sumatra I don't
12 know.

13 Q Do you know how long those stores had been
14 there prior to the end of the war?

15 A The Dutch stores must have been there from
16 before the war. The other stores, I don't know.

17 Q Do you know if the Japanese knew that those
18 stores were there?

19 A They were in the hands of the Japanese,
20 and there was a Japanese in charge of it.

21 Q In your investigation, Major, did you
22 ascertain how many Japanese soldiers died of sick-
23 ness and disease down there?

24 A No, I did not.

25 MR. LOGAN: That is all.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President.

2 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

3 BY MR. LEVIN:

4 Q Major, it is customary, is it not, for
5 prisoners of war to work in the kitchen?

6 A As far as I can say from statements I
7 should say it is, but I don't know from my personal
8 experience because I was not a prisoner of war.

9 Q Now, Major, when you were assigned to
10 assist in the investigation which you made, will
11 you state whether or not they assigned for investi-
12 gation only those camps or places where the reports
13 were that the internees and others had been in-
14 properly treated?

15 A No, they were for all the camps.

16 Q And in your investigation did you find any
17 reports where the Japanese had treated the internees
18 and others properly?

19 A As I told you before, the only case I know is
20 of a man who tried to do his best for the internees
21 was a resident of Asahan -- KOSHI.

22 Q You knew or saw nothing in writing from any
23 high Japanese officials as to the manner or method
24 in which these men should be treated?
25

A The reports we got in writing from the

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Japanese H. G., 25th Army, was party from memory,
2 partly from not original copies. As I told you,
3 everything was burned, all the official documents
4 were burned after -- around the 15th of August,
5 1945, from the Southern Expeditionary Corps. That
6 also said that the internees should be treated just
7 the same as PW's.

8 MR. LEVIN: That is all.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Counsel SAMMONJI.

10 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

11 BY MR. SAMMONJI:

12 Q You stated, Mr. Witness, with respect to
13 the conditions of the transfer of women internees
14 from the Padang Camp to the Padang Jail on the basis
15 of an affidavit --

16 THE MONITOR: Women internees and children.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

18 Q -- whose affidavit was it that you based
19 your report on, your comments on?

20 A It was an affidavit by Frater Hoppenbrouwers.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Who was he, a clergyman?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, he was a Catholic
23 clergyman.

24 Q You testified, Mr. Witness, that many
25 Japanese officials were sent to Medan after the

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Japanese surrender?

2 THE MONITOR: A great quantity of drugs
3 was discovered in Medan and Seantar after the
4 Japanese surrender.

5 Q How were you able to know that there were
6 many drugs there, stocks of drugs?

7 A There was a statement from the head
8 pharmacist of the firm, Rathkamp, in Medan, who
9 made the official stock when drugs and all stores
10 were handed over by the Japanese to the Netherlands
11 officials.

12 Q Then I should like to inquire about the
13 killing of three Britishers at Sinbolon. Have you
14 found other evidence besides the statement made by
15 the Dutch police officer?

16 A No, not yet, because the circumstances
17 are also there not favorable for interrogations on
18 the spot. The Dutch police officer stated that he
19 dug up the bodies of the three Britishers after
20 about five days of the murder, and no evidence was
21 found on the bodies that they were slashed with
22 knives, but they were shot.

23 Q Was the reason why these three Britishers
24 were killed mentioned in the statement?
25

A No, sir, it was not.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q Did you make an investigation on that sub-
2 ject?

3 A Yes, but the police officer wasn't present
4 during the murder; so he didn't know.

5 Q Then I shall inquire about the killing of
6 the Dutch soldiers in Salong. Have you investigated
7 into evidence in addition or besides the statement
8 that you referred to by the native?

9 A You mean the murder at Tigaroenggoe?

10 Q Yes, at Tigaroenggoe.

11 A No, as I told you before, we couldn't go to
12 the place there because of the political circumstances.

13 Q Have you ever personally investigated as to
14 the location, locale of the killing?

15 A I, myself, was at about four miles dis-
16 tance of the place where those boys were captured.
17 About 120 Dutch and Dutch native troops were con-
18 centrated in the village of Penatangraja.

19 Q Now, what I am asking you, Mr. Witness,
20 is whether or not you investigated as to the loca-
21 tion where the Dutch prisoners of war were killed?
22

23 A That is what I am trying --

24 THE PRESIDENT: Do you know what he means?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. That is what I
am coming to.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q Have you investigated as to the place
2 where the Dutch soldiers were killed?

3 A The Dutch soldiers were killed along the
4 high roads from Seantar to Brastagi, about thirty
5 miles from the village of Seriboedolok, at a very
6 small village of Tigaroenggol.

7 Q Have you seen the bodies?

8 A I have not seen the bodies because I
9 couldn't go there.

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1 THE PRESIDENT: We understand it is just
2 hearsay, that he didn't see anything.

3 THE WITNESS: It is not hearsay. It is
4 from an official sworn statement by an eyewitness.

5 THE PRESIDENT: That is hearsay.

6 Q Was it indicated in the statement of the
7 native as to the reason why these Dutch troops or
8 Dutch soldiers were killed?

9 A No, it was not.

10 Q You testified, Mr. Witness, that you were
11 in the employ of a Dutch rubber company prior to
12 the war. Between what times were you in the service
13 of this company--between what dates?

14 A I was not employed by a Dutch company. I
15 was employed by the United States Rubber, an
16 American company, since 1928.

17 THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in ask-
18 ing that, Councillor?

19 MR. SAMMONJI: I would like to inquire into
20 the qualifications of this witness as an investi-
21 gator.

22 Q Mr. Witness, prior to the war have you had
23 any experience either as a prosecutor or as an
24 attorney at law, a barrister?
25

A No, I have not.

LEENHEER

CROSS

1 Q Mr. Witness, you testified that your
2 children were afflicted by disease during the
3 course of their internment. Was your wife also
4 afflicted by some disease?

5 A My wife got -- after two years -- kidney
6 trouble, and couldn't work any more. After the sur-
7 render up till the first of November this year, she
8 had been in hospital for about six months.

9 Q What was your motive in becoming a member
10 of the war crimes investigation team?

11 THE PRESIDENT: You need not answer.

12 MR. SAMMONJI: That is all, sir. Thank
13 you, sir.

14 There is no more cross-examination, your
15 Honor.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Damste.

17 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: In redirect examin-
18 ation, Mr. President --

19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

20 BY LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE:

21 Q About the shipping from Palembang to Muntok
22 -- you have mentioned that all the food for Muntok
23 internees had to come from Palembang. Is that right?

24 A As far as bulk food, like rice and corn,
25 is concerned, yes.

LEENHEER

REDIRECT

1 Q What is the weight of the amount for a
2 month's supply in the Muntok camp?

3 A Well, there were twelve hundred internees,
4 who had an average of 300 grams a day, for thirty
5 days -- it makes about eleven ton of bulk a month,
6 which could have been shipped in a small Chinese
7 prau over from Palembang to Muntok.

8 Q In what state of health were the Japanese,
9 on the whole?

10 A The Japanese on the whole were well fed and
11 well clothed.

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: That will be all,
13 your Honor.

14 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is released
15 on the usual terms.

16 (Whereupon, the witness was
17 excused.)

18 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Mr. President and
19 Members of the Tribunal, I would like to proceed
20 with the presentation of evidence regarding the
21 area of Sumatra.

22 The prosecution enters document 5685, being
23 the synopsis of evidence regarding Sumatra, as an
24 exhibit.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
2 ment No. 5685 will receive exhibit No. 1766.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-
4 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5 No. 1766, and received in evidence.)

6 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Prisoners of war.
7 Murder. Several murders of prisoners of war occur-
8 red after their surrender. Most of the executions
9 were carried out in a very cruel way.

10 The prosecution enters document No. 5617
11 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
13 terms.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
15 ment No. 5617 will receive exhibit No. 1767 for
16 identification only, and the excerpts therefrom
17 will receive exhibit No. 1767-A.

18 (Whereupon, the document above re-
19 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
20 No. 1767 for identification, and the excerpts
21 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 1767-A and received in evidence.)

23 THE PRESIDENT: This covers the same
24 ground as was covered by Sister Bullwinkel, whose
25 testimony was not questioned in any way, as far as I

1 can discover.

2 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: This concerns
3 Australian service men. I can't remember that
4 Sister Bullwinkel --

5 THE PRESIDENT: She dealt with service men
6 too. However, go ahead with it; you have prepared
7 it and the interpreters are ready to translate it.

8 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: I will omit this.

9 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, with
10 respect to this affidavit, which is now in evidence,
11 1767-A, it clearly appears that these men were not
12 driven into the sea "without any comprehensible
13 reason," because the affidavit specifically says
14 that a machine gun was set up there and they were
15 under the impression they were going to be shot,
16 and they were trying to escape.

17 THE PRESIDENT: What you say is noted, Mr.
18 Logan.

19 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The prosecution
20 enters document No. 5619 for identification and
21 the excerpts as an exhibit.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
23 terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
25 ment No. 5619 will receive exhibit No. 1768 for

1 identification only, and the excerpts therefrom
2 will receive exhibit No. 1768-A.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-
4 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5 No. 1768 for identification, and the excerpts
6 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
7 No. 1768-A and received in evidence.)
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1 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Kotaradja, North
2 Sumatra, on 18 March 1942, a few days after their
3 surrender, about fifty Dutch prisoners of war,
4 European and Ambonese, were pushed into sloops,
5 towed to the open sea and shot, as appears from the
6 affidavit of Sergeant M. Latuperissa, R.N.I.A.

7 Major Leenheer has already testified regard-
8 ing the murder of twenty-two Dutch prisoners of war
9 at Tiga Roenggoe, Northeast Sumatra, on 15 March 1942.

10 Camps. The conditions in the various
11 prisoner of war camps in Sumatra have already been
12 described by the witness, Major Ringer, who has given
13 evidence from his personal knowledge and from the
14 results of his official investigation regarding the
15 other camps. Additional evidence is presented now
16 concerning two other camps.

17 The prosecution enters document 5604 for
18 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 5604 will receive exhibit No. 1769 for identifi-
22 cation only, and the excerpt therefrom will receive
23 exhibit No. 1769-A.

24 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
25 No. 5604 was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 1769 for identification; and the excerpt
2 therefrom, bearing the same document number,
3 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1769-A
4 and received in evidence.)

5 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The British Wing
6 Commander P. S. Davis, in his sworn report, gives a
7 summary of conditions of the prisoner of war camps
8 at Pakan Baru, Central Sumatra, where initially
9 2,000 Dutch and British prisoners of war were confined;
10 prosecution document 5604. Filthy surroundings and
11 bad accommodation, heavy labor, started immediately
12 after an extremely exhausting voyage and overland
13 trip, with only very little and poor food provided.
14 The labor consisted in the construction of a railroad
15 and was conducted by a group of Japanese soldiers
16 straight from the Burma Railway prisoner of war gangs,
17 which resulted in the same slave-driving conditions
18 and brutality as already shown to this Court by the
19 testimonies of the late Colonel Wild and Lieutenant
20 Colonel Coates.

21 A dysentery outbreak was unavoidable because
22 the prisoners of war on their way had been lodged
23 in the overcrowded gaol at Padang, under dangerous
24 sanitary conditions, together with native coolies who
25 almost all suffered from dysentery. Practically no

1 medicines were supplied, and no dressings, although
2 after the Japanese surrender large stocks were
3 available. Consequently, dysentery and malaria,
4 along with the results of malnutrition -- beriberi,
5 pellagra, other avitaminoses, tropical ulcers -- made
6 the number of sick rise to almost forty per cent.
7 The less sick people were forced to do garden work
8 because the camps had to grow their own vegetables.

9 Some 170 shipwrecked prisoners of war arrived
10 in bad condition but were not given the necessary
11 treatment and care, so that many of them died. The
12 death rate rose to eighty and even more per month,
13 due to lack of food and heavy work, but still the
14 forced labor was increased. The Japanese commandant
15 showed no interest; several instances of brutality
16 and cruelty in the treatment, even causing death,
17 are given.

18 With the Court's permission, I should like
19 to read some parts of this statement.

20 Page 7:

21 "I was informed that No. 2 camp was to
22 officially the sick camp, all fit men to be sent
23 working on the railway from the up-country camps and
24 all sick being returned to me until fit enough to act
25 as replacements or to work from my camp. Wing

1 Commander Coffey, senior medical officer, and I made
2 repeated appeals to the Japanese (Captain MIYASAKI)
3 for improved conditons, less work, more food and
4 medicines, but all our appeals were of no avail as
5 we were informed that food was not available and
6 Dr. ISHII, the Japanese doctor in charge of prisoner
7 of war camps, told Wing Commander Coffey that as
8 medicine was not available we must grow our own herbs
9 and make our own. The less heavy sick were forced to
10 do garden work as Lieutenant DOI said that the ration
11 situation would deteriorate due to lack of transport to
12 convey the rations from Bangkinang, the nearest town,
13 approximately 65 kilometers distant. The Allied
14 doctors experienced extreme difficulty in dealing with
15 the heavy number of sick, at this period about 800,
16 mostly dysentery, malaria, beriberi, avitaminotic
17 diseases, pellagra and some tuberculosis, and in addi-
18 tion, a large number of tropical ulcer cases. Practically
19 no medicine or dressings were available.

20 "On about 17th September 1944, I was ordered
21 to anticipate the arrival of a further number of
22 seriously sick cases and I heard from a Korean guard
23 that a further draft had been torpedoed between Java
24 and Padang with very heavy casualties. On approximately
25 the 19th September 1944, two ambulances arrived with

1 some 20 cases, most of whom died within a day or two.
2 I was told that the remainder were in the gaol at
3 Padang and in the Padang hospital. However, the
4 remaining personnel were posted to Camps 4 and 5
5 and approximately one week later, 150 sick and dying
6 men arrived in the middle of the night in my camp.
7 At this period, although we had received no clothing
8 for nearly three years, I was ordered by the Japanese
9 to produce as much clothing as possible for the draft
10 mentioned above as the Japanese explained that as the
11 British had sunk this convoy and as the Japanese could
12 not produce clothing, we must provide it ourselves.
13 This was done to the best of our ability but the con-
14 ditions at Camp 4 were extremely bad.

15 "At the end of November, 1944, I was informed
16 that a Camp 6 had been established with the personnel
17 who had left Medan some eight months previously for
18 road construction work in Atjeh, North Sumatra,
19 where they had been commanded by a Japanese officer,
20 Lieutenant MIRA, an English-speaking Japanese, and an
21 extremely bad type. These men arrived in a very
22 debilitated condition, but nevertheless, were put on to
23 railway construction work immediately. Lieutenant MURA
24 visited my camp and asked me for a senior British
25 officer to command the British personnel in his camp,

1 the Dutch being under the command of Captain van der
2 Lande, an extremely efficient Dutch officer now
3 commanding Sumatra under British administration. I
4 posted Captain Gordon to command the British in No. 6
5 camp and he left that day accompanied by Lieutenant
6 MURA.

7 "At this period, the general situation
8 regarding prisoners of war was deteriorating rapidly
9 and I again made repeated appeals to Lieutenant LOI for
10 an improvement in the situation. The appeals were
11 all refused. We produced statistical reports showing
12 the increasing death rate rising to approximately 80
13 per month was entirely due to lack of food and heavy
14 work, but Lieutenant DOI merely informed me that he
15 considered that all the officers should be made to do
16 more work and that I and my staff were merely trying to
17 sabotage the Japanese war efforts. These conditions
18 deteriorated further and the death rate rose due to
19 the constant exchange of personnel from the up-country
20 camps who had fallen sick who were replaced by only
21 semi-fit men from No. 2 camp.

22 "On approximately 16th June 1945, I was
23 informed that the railway must be finished by the 15th
24 August 1945, and that every available man who could
25 walk must be sent out to work. Despite our protests,

1 medical parades were held by the Japanese and the men
2 were forced out to work. The health situation of the
3 whole area was now deteriorating with great rapidity,
4 no medicine was available and the whole group was
5 utterly exhausted and all personnel were extremely
6 depressed due to constant slave driving by the Japanese
7 guards and railway officials. Increased supervision
8 by the Kempeitai (Japanese Secret Police) was felt
9 and all sorts of additional disciplinary pressure
10 was brought to bear on us."

11 The prosecution enters document 5601 for
12 identification, and the excerpt as an exhibit.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
15 No. 5601 will receive exhibit No. 1770 for identifica-
16 tion only. The excerpt therefrom will receive exhibit
17 No. 1770-A.

18 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
19 No. 5601 was marked prosecution's exhibit
20 No. 1770 for identification; and the excerpt
21 therefrom, bearing the same document number,
22 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1770-A
23 and received in evidence.)

24
25 LIEUT. COLONEL LAMSTE: In the Kota Tjane
area, North Sumatra, in October 1944, the prisoners

1 of war were forced to march day and night over a
2 distance of ninety miles in sixty-eight hours. Each
3 man who fell behind was beaten until he kept up with
4 the main party, as appears from the affidavit of
5 Private W. Hagedoorn, R.N.I.A., prosecution docu-
6 ment 5601.

7 The prosecution enters document 5623 as an
8 exhibit.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
11 No. 5623 will receive exhibit No. 1771.

12 (Whereupon, the document above
13 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
14 No. 1771, and was received in evidence.)

15 LIEUT. COLONEL LAMSTE: In May 1943, the
16 Dutch prisoners of war at Lawe Segalagala Camp,
17 Kota Thane, were forced to enlist in the Japanese Army.
18 Four of those prisoners of war who had refused were
19 executed, as is vividly depicted by the eyewitness,
20 K. E. Krijogsmen, R.N.I.A., in his affidavit, prosecu-
21 tion document 5623.

22 With the Court's permission, I will read this
23 affidavit. The markings on this affidavit are wrong.
24 I do not know for what reason because the whole document
25 has been processed and used in evidence.

1 "I was taken prisoner of war by the
2 Japanese army at Padang Pandjang on 17 March 42
3 and eventually interned at Lawe Segala camp in
4 June 42. In May 43, I cannot recall the exact date,
5 the Japanese camp commander MIUASAKI told we
6 prisoners of war that we would soon have to enlist
7 in the Japanese army as heiho. On 29 May 43 about
8 5 p.m. Lieutenant SUSUKI of the Gunseibu Kota Tjane,
9 and a Kempei officer from Brastagi, whose name I do
10 not know, arrived in the camp. All the prisoners had
11 to parade. When we were lined up, the interpreter
12 I"ASAKI told us that we were given five minutes to
13 decide whether we would enlist in the Japanese Army
14 or not. When this period had elapsed the prisoners
15 were divided in three groups: A. those rejected
16 medically unfit. B. the volunteers. C. those
17 who refused to enlist. I myself was with the second
18 group. The names of the people in my group were
19 recorded; after this everybody was allowed to return
20 to their quarters. Amongst those who refused were
21 Sergeant Croes, R.N.I.A.
22 Sergeant Stolz
23 Private Wolff
24 Regular sergeant Voss had also refused but had been
25 arrested previously, I do not know why.

1 "On 29 May 43 about 20.30 hours, those who
2 refused to enlist were taken to Kota Tjane by
3 Japanese and Indonesian police. I know this be-
4 cause I was driver to MIUASAKI, the camp commander,
5 and had to drive him to Kota Tjane with SUSUKI, the
6 unknown Kempei officer and the prisoners. The
7 prisoners were locked in Kota Tjane jail. Sergeant
8 Croes, sergeant Stolz, sergeant Voss and private
9 Wolff were bound hand and foot and taken to the
10 village square (aloon-alooou) and there publicly
11 shown to the population who had been called there
12 by the Japanese. They were executed at about 23,00
13 hours 29 May 43. The population had to look on by
14 order of the Japanese. As MIYASAKI's driver I had
15 to stand in the front line. Voss was asked his
16 last wish. He answered he wanted to die with the
17 Dutch national flag wrapped round his body. His
18 request was granted. Voss then addressed the
19 audience in Malay, giving his opinion of the
20 Japanese and abusing them. When he had finished
21 the Japanese wanted to blindfold him but he
22 declined, saying: 'I am a Dutchman and not afraid
23 to die.' The Kempei officer in charge of the firing
24 squad then pointed his rifle at Voss and fired
25 twice. Voss was not killed and cried out: 'Long

1 live the Queen!' The officer then put the rifle to
2 Voss' head and shot him dead.

3 "The same Kempei officer then tried to
4 behead Sergeant Croes with his sword. He missed
5 however and hit Croes on the shoulder. He then
6 drew his revolver and shot Croes in the head. After
7 this Wolff and Stolz were shot by this same officer.
8 I cannot remember exactly how this happened but
9 this so-called execution was in my opinion murder.
10 To the best of my knowledge MIYASAKI and SUSUKI
11 were also present."

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess until half
13 past one.

14 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess
15 was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1335.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Damste.

LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: On page 3, your Honor:

II. CIVILIANS.

A. Internees.

The prosecution refers to the testimony of Major LEENHEER who has given information from his personal experience and from the results of the official investigation carried out by him regarding the 70 odd civilian internment camps. Additional evidence is presented by the following:

1. Murder.

I can leave that out because it has been testified to by Sister Bullwinkle; and I also leave out the next paragraph because this has been testified to by Major Ringer. I can leave out the next paragraph as well.

2. Conditions.

As already described by Major LEENHEER in almost all camps conditions were utterly miserable.

1 The prosecution enters document 5646 for
2 identification and the excerpts therefrom as an
3 exhibit.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 5646 will receive exhibit No. 1772 for identi-
7 fication only; and the excerpts therefrom, with the
8 same document number, will receive exhibit No. 1772-A.

9 (Whereupon, the document above re-
10 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1772 for identification; and the excerpts
12 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
13 No. 1772-A and received in evidence.)

14 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: In the women camp
15 at Brastagi, North Sumatra, food conditions were
16 terrible: in November 1944 the daily ration consisted
17 of 140 grams of rice for adults and only 80 grams for
18 children -- (450 grams by American pounds) --; in
19 addition 20 grams of vegetables. These circumstances
20 made hundreds of desperate women break out in order
21 to find additional food in spite of the severe punish-
22 ments to be feared. The Kempeitai investigated the
23 matter and the two women camp commandants were severely
24 ill-treated, including the threat of execution, as
25 stated by one of them, Mrs. A. E. PRINS-nee ROHRBORN,

in her affidavit.

1 With the Court's permission I will read this
2 affidavit, page 1, this statement:

3 "In the month of September 1944, Mrs. Eikens and
4 I still occupied the function of camp-managers. The
5 supply of food which the Japanese gave us was extra-
6 ordinarily bad. For two and a half months we had been
7 given neither sugar nor fat. The official rations, so
8 we were informed by the Japanese, contained: rice for
9 grown up people, 200 grams per head daily and for
10 children 100 grams. Vegetables, 50 gr. per head daily.
11 In reality we got 140 gr. rice for grown ups and 80 gr.
12 for children. Vegetables 20 gr. We complained continu-
13 ously to the Japanese commandant about this treatment
14 and when we got no result, we asked for an interview
15 with the officer, TANAKA, who was occupied with the
16 food-supply. He said, however, that he could not do this.
17 But one day, when Tanaka came to visit our camp, he
18 talked to him about this. After he was gone our
19 Japanese commandant was so furious that he struck both
20 of us with his open hand. The discontentment about the
21 shortness of food increased daily in the camp. The women
22 threatened to break out of the camp to fetch it them-
23 selves. We proposed a hunger demonstration, whereupon
24 the thinnest women accompanied by their division-leaders
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1 promised me that our request for more food would be
2 answered on November 20. The rations arrived but the
3 amounts were the same as before. Again we went to the
4 commandant and after that visited him daily with
5 our complaints. Each time he gave us promises for next
6 day, each time without any result and so came November 25.

7 "Then we agreed that from each block-division
8 some women in total 40 persons leave the camp on Sunday
9 afternoon November 26. However, people did not abide
10 by the agreement and thus the next day about 3 o'clock
11 386 women left out of camp. To be ahead of events we
12 went to the Japanese commandant and we saw him looking
13 at the departure. He asked what this meant, insulted
14 us again as "Kapala Boesock" and ordered us to fetch
15 the women back at once. If they would return at once
16 he would not make a "pakara" (case). So we went out of
17 the camp but each time we asked some women to go back
18 we got the answer that they would not do this before
19 they settled their business. The Japanese and Heiho's
20 who had gone outside too, got no results. Later it
21 appeared that someone had telephoned the M.P. at Kaban
22 Djahe from the Japanese hospital situated across the
23 road and from where the breaking out had been observed.
24 About nine o'clock in the evening all were back again.
25 Before this the first and second suspect had arrived

1 with a Japanese whom we know by name of TOKASE. Mrs.
2 Eikens and I were called in, whereupon the first suspect
3 interrogated us with the assistance of an interpreter
4 who made notes. When we had told him the real cause of
5 the breaking out, he accused us of having incited the
6 women to it and he boxed our ears with his open hand
7 which was not very painful. We had just been sent
8 away to our block, when we were called again because,
9 as the commandant informed us the M.P. from Medan had
10 arrived. We were ordered to line up the women who had
11 been away. Thereupon the whole camp came to the office.
12 The Japanese understood that not all women could have
13 been guilty of disobeying the orders so that what they
14 saw was but a demonstration. One of the Japanese got
15 so furious, I cannot remember who it was, that he
16 struck with the iron of a golf-club, on the head so that
17 a little wound occurred that bled slightly. After about
18 a quarter of an hour the women were dismissed but they
19 protested when they saw that Mrs. EIKENS and I had to
20 remain.

21 "Again we were asked for the reason of the
22 breaking out and our part in this, whereupon we naturally
23 answered as before. Meanwhile, the second suspect struck
24 me with his open hand about ten times in the face and
25 stumped us on the back which was very painful. Then

1 we got the order to write down all names of the guilty
2 women and to send him this list next day. At about
3 3:30 o'clock in the night the nerveracking show was
4 over and totally exhausted we went to bed after we had
5 asked all the block-leaders to write down the names of
6 the women who lived in the camp. We took these lists
7 at 7 am the next day, 27th to the commandant. There
8 were all persons who had been present the evening
9 before; also the block-leaders had been called. The
10 latter were heard in different rooms by the M.P. and
11 from everywhere we heard cries of pain, while Mrs.
12 Likens and I together with the block leaders whose
13 turn had not come yet sat waiting in a room next to
14 that in which first suspect together with the second
15 suspect led the interrogation."
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1 "When I was sitting in the waiting room I
2 heard that a certain moment that Sister Schuddeboom a
3 nurse of about 50 years old, was treated so cruelly in
4 the next room that I wanted to enter that room but was
5 prevented by a few Japanese who guarded the open door.
6 Whe I heard Sister Schuddeboom leaving I asked permis-
7 sion to enter and to be heard by the first suspect.
8 When I entered I saw on the table at which both of
9 the suspects sat, a curtain rod of about 1 m. long
10 and $2\frac{1}{2}$ cm. thick which I supposed was used on Sister
11 Schuddeboom. This on enquiry proved to be true. I
12 protested severely against this maltreatment, whereupon
13 first suspect said that further investigations would
14 be stopped if we would plead guilty on our own accord.

15 "I retorted sharply that the Japanese were
16 guilty themselves, which outraged first suspect so
17 much that he struck me about six times with the wooden
18 curtain-rod so hard on my back, shoulders and neck that
19 the stick broke. Meanwhile, the hearing of the block-
20 leaders was finished and about six o'clock we were
21 sent away with many insults. I had to be supported
22 because I could not walk without help. My body ached
23 everywhere, but the stroke on my back of my neck had
24 been the most painful. Under ordinary circumstances
25 I should have been unable to do my daily work for some

1 days.

2 "In the evening the Japanese called me again,
3 but I sent the message that I was unable to walk and
4 could not come. Early next morning, 28 November, 1944,
5 Mrs. Eikens and I were again ordered to come to the
6 Japanese office together with the ladies: J. Vijzel-
7 man, D. tten Bloemendaal, Netty Hoets, Medy Claser,
8 Hetty van de Lee and J. Scharenguivel. When we were
9 all present Mrs. Eikens and I were driven by car and
10 the others by bus to the Penitentiary at Kaban Djahe.
11 When we arrived there our coats and hairpins if we
12 had any were taken away, whereafter we were locked up.
13 Mrs. Eikens and I each in a very small cell and the
14 others together in a large one.

15 "My cell and, as I was told later, Mrs. Eikens'
16 also, was without light or ventilation; the floor was
17 moist with urine, which former occupants had left and
18 the walls were smeared with faeces. Afterwards I heard
19 that these cells were destined for lunatics on transit.
20 There was no bed and we had no sanitary toilet. Next
21 morning November 29, 1944 I was taken by the jailer
22 (toekang koentji) from my cell and taken to a room in
23 the outer building at the back of the prison. First
24 and second suspects were present. I saw lying on the
25 table all kinds of cudgels, belts and whips and on the

1 floor was a coal-fire with irons. Seeing these objects
2 I understood this to be the torture-chamber. Very
3 little light came through the window.

4 "Again first suspect asked me the same
5 questions as before. Indicating the weapons he threat-
6 ened me to torture if I kept refusing to plead guilty.
7 Finally, when he found that even his sweet words failed
8 to bring results he made me stand on a chair, after he
9 had tied my wrists tightly together behind my back.
10 He tied a rope which ran over a pulley, right over my
11 head to the cord around my wrists and pulled at the
12 other end until I could hardly reach the seat of the
13 chair with the points of my toes. Each time he saw
14 that I lowered somewhat in the joints of my shoulders
15 so that I could get a little more support for the seat
16 of the chair with the points of my toes he drew the
17 rope a little higher. Meanwhile, he stood before me
18 and asked if I would plead guilty. Each time when I
19 replied: 'Nippon salah' (the Japanese are wrong), he
20 beat me with a rubber stick very hard on my back which
21 he did more than ten times."
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1 "After about ten minutes I shouted to him
2 'Officier blanda tida tahoe ini matjem' (white officers
3 do not behave like this), he suddenly let me go then
4 and the jerk caused me unbearable pain. Directly after
5 this my nose bled profusely. Two Indonesian policemen
6 were called and these men supported me back to my cell,
7 giving evidence of their pity and disapproval. When
8 I came to the cell, the jailer opened the door and
9 this brute pushed me so hard in my back that I fell
10 forwards on the dirty floor. I could not get up and
11 lay there for a long time, totally numbed.

12 "At about 9 o'clock I was again taken by
13 the jailer to the torture-chamber. Again I was sus-
14 pended, standing on the chair and again first sus-
15 pect put the questions he had asked me innumerable
16 times before. He did not beat me and after some time,
17 somewhat shorter than in the morning, he let go the
18 rope, meanwhile, the head of the M.P. had entered.
19 He stood before me and in a fierce voice asked if I
20 had anything to say about the Japanese officers. I
21 replied that I had not referred to them, but to Nether-
22 lands officers, whereupon he slapped my face and order-
23 ed me to follow him to his office.

24 "On arriving there he ordered a typewriter
25 to be brought and ordered me to type out the names

1 of the women who had been out of camp some days be-
2 fore. I told him that I was unable to do this be-
3 cause of the awful swellings on my hands and the un-
4 endurable pain in my arms and body. Then he told me
5 to ~~dictate~~ the names to an Indonesian guard who was
6 also present. As well as I could remember I dictated
7 all the names of the women who lived in the camp with
8 which I was occupied until 3 o'clock in the night,
9 then I was taken back to the cell. For the first
10 time since our arrival we got some food. Concerning
11 me this consisted of precisely counted 72 grains of
12 maize. This I cried out to Mrs. Eikens, who informed
13 me in the same way that she had counted 78 grains.
14 We got no water. Early next morning, November 30,
15 1944, I was taken out of my cell to the office of
16 the head of the M.P. By use of second suspect, who
17 acted as an interpreter, first suspect interrogated
18 me about the same points as before, in the presence
19 of the head of the M.P. and a certain TAKASE. They
20 did not maltreat me. After some time I was told that
21 they could have me shot as this was the punishment
22 for escape according to international agreement. There-
23 upon, I was brought back to the cell and I saw Mrs.
24 Eikens being taken away. She also told me afterwards
25 that she had been condemned to death.

1 "About an hour later we were put on a bus
2 together with the other ladies and taken back to the
3 camp. On arrival there we had to wait, standing be-
4 fore the guardroom of the heiho's. Mrs. Eikens and
5 myself could not keep upright, broken as we were, and
6 at last we were allowed to sit down on the grounds.
7 About one hour later Mrs. Eikens and myself, also
8 Mrs. ten Bloemendaal and I were transported to a
9 bungalow of the Anglo-Dutch, 'the Banteng'. The other
10 prisoners were taken back to the camp. We were taken
11 to a large room where we expected to be shot. We
12 were placed with our faces to the wall, Mrs. ten Bloe-
13 mendaal between Mrs. Eikens and me and with our hands
14 crossed behind our backs. I remarked to my compan-
15 ions that 'I do not like it', to which Mrs. ten Bloe-
16 mendaal replied that she wondered why we were not
17 crying. Then we heard that three Japanese entered
18 and **standing** behind us opened the locks of their rifles.
19 A fourth Japanese entered and roared at the soldiers
20 in a theatrical way a command to fire so we thought.
21 Waiting for the end and nothing happened. Mrs. ten
22 Bloemendaal could not withhold her curiosity and look-
23 ed secretly back. 'They cannot fire, because the
24 dustcaps are still on the barrels', she whispered.
25 The fourth Japanese gave another command, a soldier

1 struck us once, we were ordered to turn and taken
2 to a room where we saw the blockleaders. Then the
3 three of us were taken back to camp, from where we
4 were daily taken to the 'Banteng' to be heard on the
5 declarations of the block-leaders who were kept there
6 for several more days.

7 "During one month I kept the black bruises
8 on my neck, arms, back and thighs. During ten days
9 I could not move my arms, nor use my hands. Other
10 people had to wash me. It was quite impossible to
11 do my work as I was exhausted. When Mrs. Eikens
12 told her story, it appeared that because of the same
13 stubbornness she had met with the same treatment.
14 She had also black bruises which she showed me.
15 During three weeks she could not do anything as a
16 result of the ill-treatment."

1 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Non-interned. Romusha.

2 The prosecution enters document 5716 for
3 identification and the excerpts therefrom as an
4 exhibit.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 5716 will receive exhibit No. 1773 for identi-
8 fication only; and the excerpts therefrom will receive
9 exhibit No. 1773-A.

10 (Whereupon, the document above re-
11 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 1773 for identification; and the excerpts
13 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
14 No. 1773-A and received in evidence.)

15 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Not only Javanese
16 were forced to hard labor and sent to other parts
17 of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but
18 also aborigines of Sumatra had to suffer this enslave-
19 ment, as appears from the affidavit of AMIR BIN SARODIN,
20 who was detailed to work at Singapore under the usual
21 hopeless conditions.

22 It is brought to the Court's attention that
23 several of the Romusha, whose affidavits have been
24 dealt with when the area Java was presented, were also
25 ill-treated when working on islands belonging to th-

Sumatra area.

1 2. Kempeitai.

2 The methods of the Sumatra-Kempeitai did
3 not substantially differ from those applied by the
4 Java Kempeitai, from whom they received assistance.
5 Major KATSUMURA, in his report already introduced,
6 exhibit 1760-A (Javint 3106/s, sub II) gives evidence
7 about the "Ji"-operation, in Sumatra, 1943. The
8 suspects were not sent up to Court Martial but a
9 speedy way of dealing with them was adopted, in
10 fact the same system was applied as with the "Ko"-
11 operation in Java. When the crime was clearly proved --
12 in the opinion of the torturing investigators -- and the
13 death sentence was considered suitable, the criminals
14 were executed, on the decision of the Army. These
15 executions were carried out fortnightly by every
16 detachment of every section, in secrecy. The executions
17 were at once reported to Kempei Headquarters, who
18 at once reported to the Army.

19 The prosecution enters document 5625 for
20 identification and the excerpt therefrom as an
21 exhibit.
22

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 No. 5625 will receive exhibit No. 1774 for

1 identification only; and the excerpts therefrom will
2 receive exhibit No. 1774-A.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-
4 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
5 No. 1774 for identification; and the excerpts
6 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
7 No. 1774-A and received in evidence.)

8 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTF: Personal experiences
9 show the same pattern as in Java: a. At Medan,
10 North East Sumatra, the methods of torture applied
11 were: watertest and severe beatings. The treatment
12 of the victims was extremely bad and drove them to
13 suicide. As appears from the affidavit of L. G.
14 EMMELS: prosecution document 5625.

15 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, this
16 statement just made by the prosecution is misleading
17 and inaccurate. He specifically says that: "The
18 treatment of the victims was extremely bad and drove
19 them to suicide." Apparently he tried to give the
20 Tribunal the impression that all the people at that
21 camp tried to commit suicide. As a matter of fact,
22 the affidavit on which he bases his statement shows
23 that not one of them committed suicide; and that there
24 was only one unsuccessful attempt at suicide.

25 THE PRESIDENT: What you say is noted,

1 Mr. Logan.

2 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The prosecution
3 enters document 5635 for identification and the
4 excerpts therefrom as an exhibit.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 5635 will receive exhibit No. 1775 for identi-
8 fication only; and the excerpts therefrom will
9 receive exhibit No. 1775-A.

10 (Whereupon, the document above re-
11 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 1775 for identification; and the excerpts
13 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
14 No. 1775-A and received in evidence.)

15 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Shibolga, North
16 West Sumatra: beatings and manhandling, torture,
17 infliction of injuries, watertest, exposure of
18 naked victims to the local population; bad treatment
19 of the prisoners. As appears from the affidavit of
20 Police Inspector A. Suyker; prosecution document
21 5635.

22 Prosecution enters document 5636 for identi-
23 fication and the excerpts as an exhibit.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1 No. 5636 will receive exhibit No. 1776 for identi-
2 fication only; and the excerpts therefrom will
3 receive exhibit No. 1776-A.

4 (Whereupon, the document above re-
5 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
6 No. 1776 for identification; and the excerpts
7 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 1776-A and received in evidence.)

9 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Tandjong Karang,
10 South Sumatra; beatings, burning of moustache, and
11 other ways of torture. Affidavit of J. C. TEERLINK;
12 prosecution document 5636. From this as well as from
13 the case of SUYKER appears that the Kempei officers
14 condoned the ill-treatment.

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1 The prosecution enters document 5632 for
2 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 5632 will receive exhibit No. 1777 for identifica-
6 tion only; the excerpts therefrom will be exhibit No.
7 1777A.

8 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
9 No. 5632 was marked prosecution's exhibit
10 No. 1777 for identification, the excerpts
11 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 1777A and received in evidence.)

13 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Palembang, Central
14 South Sumatra, a Chinese doctor was a victim of the
15 Kempei and afterwards forced to cure the victims. Here
16 also: severe beatings, in several ways; water test,
17 with sometimes more than three gallons of soapy water,
18 incidentally resulting in death; hanging; burning;
19 threat of beheading; playing ball with an Indonesian
20 as the ball. Doctor Lo Djien Sioe described these
21 tortures in his affidavit.

22 With the Court's permission I would like to
23 read it. It starts at page 2 after the third dotted
24 line:
25

"Late at night we arrived at Kertopati, the

1 station of Palembang. By car I was taken to the Kempei
2 Tai. Immediately upon arrival I got something to eat
3 and a very amicable conversation started. After this
4 I received the first blows from interpreter HAYASHI;
5 this happened without any warning. He struck my head
6 with his fist until I sank down on account of dizziness.

7 "Next evening, August 17, 1943, I was again
8 interrogated by Corporal YAMASHITA; blows were not
9 lacking again. Like HAYASHI (This is a Formosan and
10 as such is called Liem Sik Tjong) YAMASHITA first
11 struck me with his fist on the head, then with a horse-
12 whip on my back. He stopped only when as a result of
13 this I spat blood; he gave me something to drink wetted
14 my head and then left me lying the whole night on a
15 cement floor without any cover. Next day I came into
16 a cell where, to my astonishment, also the two Ambonese
17 policemen who had been my transport-guards, were con-
18 fined. They were accused of participation in an anti-
19 Japanese plot. For about seven days I lay there, ill
20 with dizziness and continuously vomiting. HAYASHI did
21 not seem to be able to tolerate lying down, for when
22 he saw me he ordered me at once to sit up, giving me
23 a kick at the same time. ---

24 "The food may be described as bad and consisted
25 of a helping of white rice and a few slices of cucumbers

1 three times a day; certainly it was not more than a
2 calory-value of 500 per man and per day. We had to
3 drink jointly from a fingerbowl; often with more than
4 12 people. The cell was no larger than 2 x 4 meters
5 and we were lying prettily like sardines one next to
6 the other. Naturally the hygienic situation was ex-
7 tremely bad. When I had become more fit again, I was
8 again beaten by YAMASHITA, i.e. with his wide linen
9 belt with buckle, he struck me violet-blue from the
10 buttock region until the ankles, so that sitting be-
11 came impossible to me. Either I was standing or I was
12 lying down on my belly in the cell.

13 "At this time an Indonesian was brought in
14 suspected of theft of a bicycle. The poor man was
15 standing in the middle of a circle of Japanese and acted
16 as a ball. I could see and hear it from my cell. In
17 spite of many blows the man continued to deny and now
18 the 'water cure' was applied to him. This I could not
19 see but I heard the vomiting behind my cell, while
20 later, when he passed in front of the cell, he was all
21 wet. Then the first ill treatment was repeated. Now
22 I heard the blows. Apparently this was too much for
23 the poor man, for he collapsed. He was put down on the
24 floor in front of my cell. Without having regained
25 consciousness he expired during the night at about

2 o'clock. The corpse was quickly put into the
luggage space of a car and a chauffeur drove off with it.

"Of the Dutch I saw there Mr. Stevens was
treated worst. Time and again he was tortured: water
cure, hanging head down and fire treatment: this con-
sisted of burning the naked skin with cigarettes,
mosquito-torches, etc. He told me all this himself
and I saw the wounds. The wounds caused by the fire
treatment Stevens kept longest, for only after having
been treated by me for about a month, he was rid of
them.

"For every prisoner these blows, given with a
stick of five centimeters diameter, with a horsewhip
or with rolled rope, were part of the daily treatment.
Every day, or rather, nearly every hour, one heard the
groans and screams of the poor people.

"There were several special torture chambers.
The mildest treatment was standing in the sun a whole
day. Only in the morning one got something to eat then.

"During the months of August and September 1943
there was a raid among the Ambonese; somebody was said
to have discovered a plot against Japan among them.
Many were arrested and of the hundreds of Ambonese
friends not many are left. However, this was not settled
by the Kempei Tai alone, but also by the Keimobu. The

1 Kempe Tai did participate and nearly all Kempei Tai
2 members have on that occasion been guilty of severe
3 torturings. ---

4 "In the meantime things were not going so well
5 with me either; several times I was interrogated, not
6 only about my own case but also for the supplying of
7 information concerning suspected Chinese and about
8 all sorts of things. For instance I was interrogated
9 about the doings, the connections of persons whom I
10 had hardly ever met. As I could not reply to this
11 properly, I simply had to undergo those tortures. --

12 "Another time I was accused of owning a fire-
13 arm. This was said to have been reported by a spy.
14 However, I did not own a firearm, so that a search of
15 the house did not yield anything. The last treatment
16 I underwent probably was an effort to intimidation.
17 In the evening I was brought by car to a distant
18 plantation. The Indonesian chauffeur prepared a pit;
19 I had to kneel in front of this pit, while SAZAKI put
20 his sabre on my neck. Miraculously I escaped from this
21 murder, because the gentlemen could not find fault
22 with me.

23 "About the end of September 1943 many prominent
24 people were arrested. Most were treated by the
25 Bunseiubu.

1 "In the meantime, I had gradually won the
2 confidence of the Kempei Tai and I had regularly to
3 attend to the prisoners. Not only wounds, etc. caused
4 by ill treatment, but also ordinary illnesses like
5 malaria, beriberi, dysentery, etc. which I did to the
6 best of my ability .

7 "The first patient I had to treat was brought
8 in more dead than alive. He had been so maltreated
9 that he had one inflamed burn from the buttock region
10 to the ankles. I treated him for six months, and then
11 he walked around like a gorilla. This was the Chinese
12 A. Koh from Djambi. He was said to have acted as an
13 anti-Japanese spy. Probably he shall never become
14 quite normal again.

15 "As far as I still can remember I will state
16 hereunder the names of some people to whom I attended
17 medically and who either died or who have come through
18 alive (all arrested by the Palembang Kempei Tai).

19 "1. A Chinese by the name of Tan ---"

20 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, don't read those. The
21 quality of your material is deteriorating fast. You
22 are about to read many more dreadful things than you
23 have been reading in the last half hour.

24 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Then I will end with
25 this Dr. Lo Djien Sioe and go on with my synopsis,

1 Mr. President.

2 The prosecution enters document 5634 for identification
3 and the excerpts therefrom as an exhibit.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 5634 will receive exhibit No. 1778 for identification
7 only, and the excerpts therefrom exhibit No. 1778A.

8 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
9 No. 5634 was marked prosecution's exhibit
10 No. 1778 for identification, the excerpts
11 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 1778A and received in evidence.)

13 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Prisons.

14 In the gaol of Pematang Siantar, North East
15 Sumatra, more than 300 of the 550 prisoners died in
16 two years' time. The causes of death were invariably:
17 dysentery, malnutrition and the consequences thereof.
18 Prisoners who were expected to die soon were put into
19 a special cell; the dying was speeded up by putting the
20 patient outside the cell in the tropical sun. As
21 appears from the affidavit of F. R. Kramer, Head manager
22 of the Deli Tobacco Company, prosecution document 5634.

23 This completes the synopsis regarding the
24 Japanese conventional war crimes and crimes against
25 humanity committed in the area of Sumatra.

1 I will proceed with my synopsis on Timor and
2 Lesser Sunda Islands and I introduce document of the
3 prosecution 5682, being my synopsis on Timor and Lesser
4 Sunda Islands as an exhibit.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 5682 will receive exhibit No. 1779.

8 (Whereupon, the document above referred
9 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1779 and
10 received in evidence.

11 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMESTE: Occupation by the
12 Japanese Navy.

13 I. Prisoners of War.

14 1. Murder.

15 Captured troops were murdered in the most
16 cruel way.

17 The prosecution enters document 5571 for
18 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 5571 will receive exhibit No. 1780 for identifica-
22 tion only and the excerpts therefrom exhibit No. 1780A.

23 (Whereupon, prosecution document
24 No. 5571 was marked prosecution's exhibit
25 No. 1780 for identification, the excerpts
therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 1780A and received in evidence.)

1 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: a. At Oesapa Besar,
2 Dutch Timor, about February 1942 eight Australian
3 prisoners of war were shot after capture, without any
4 trial. This appears from the affidavit by the Australian
5 Private R. B. Crow, prosecution document 5571.

6 The prosecution enters document 5573 for
7 identification and the excerpts therefrom as an exhibit.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
10 No. 5573 will receive exhibit No. 1781 for identifica-
11 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom exhibit No.
12 1781A.

13 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
14 No. 5573 was marked prosecution's exhibit
15 No. 1781 for identification, the excerpts
16 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 1781A and received in evidence.)

18 At Babaoe, Dutch Timor, about February 1942,
19 an Australian Medical corporal, who was left in charge
20 of the hospital, was hanged and had his throat cut.
21 This is stated in the interrogation report of the
22 Australian Army Chaplain Th. W. Binderman, prosecution
23 document 5573, who also affirmed the murder at Oesapa
24 Besar already mentioned.
25

1 The prosecution enters document 5579 for
2 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
5 No. 5579 will be exhibit No. 1782 for identification
6 only, the excerpts being exhibit No. 1782-A.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-
8 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 1782 for identification; and the excerpt
10 therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1782-A and received in evidence.)

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Babaoe in February
13 1942 also three Australian prisoners of war were killed;
14 they were tied to each other by string around their
15 wrists and their throats were cut. This is stated
16 by the Australian Lieut. Colonel W. W. Leggatt, prose-
17 cution document 5579.

18 The prosecution enters document 5802 for
19 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
22 No. 5802 will be exhibit No. 1783 for identification
23 only, and the excerpts being exhibit 1783-A.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 1783 for identification; and the excerpt
2 therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
3 No. 1783-A and received in evidence.)

4 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Tatu Meta, Portu-
5 guese Timor, in February 1942 seven Australian sol-
6 diers were captured. The Japanese bound their hands
7 behind their backs by telephone wire which had been
8 pierced through their wrists. Then they were bay-
9 oneted. The bayoneting lasted for twenty minutes
10 before they were dead. This appears from the affi-
11 davit by S. Graca; Prosecution document 5802.

12 At Dilli, Portuguese Timor, in March 1942 a
13 Dutch officer was tied to a tree and pricked by a
14 Japanese officer with his bayonet for about twenty
15 minutes; chest and stomach were pierced many times;
16 then he was stabbed to death. This is related by
17 Graca as well.

18 The prosecution enters document 5585 as an
19 exhibit.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
22 No. 5585 will receive exhibit No. 1784.

23 (Whereupon, the document above re-
24 ferred to war marked prosecution's exhibit
25 No. 1784, and received in evidence.)

1 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Soeway, Portuguese
2 Timor, in August 1942 the Japanese, commanded by a
3 captain, murdered the captured Dutch sub-lieutenant
4 Stiefkens by beheading. This is reported by Mr.
5 Augustun, who acted as an interpreter, prosecution
6 document 5585.

7 2. Camps. Conditions were about the same
8 as in the camps in the other areas.

9 a. At the prisoner of war camp, Oesapa
10 Besar, conditions were decidedly bad as regards food,
11 drinking facilities, accommodation and sanitation.
12 Medicines were not provided, but the prisoners of war
13 happened to have sufficient drugs of their own. This
14 is contained in the affidavit of Lieut. Colonel Leggatt,
15 exhibit 1782-A.

16 Prosecution enters document 5578 for identifi-
17 cation, and the excerpts as an exhibit.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

19 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
20 No. 5578 will receive exhibit No. 1785 for identifica-
21 tion only. The excerpts therefrom will receive exhibit
22 No. 1785-A.

23 (Whereupon, the document above re-
24 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
25 No. 1785 for identification; and the excerpt

therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
No. 1785-A and received in evidence.)

LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Flores Island,
West of Timor, conditions were terrible. In the first
months no dwellings were provided; the prisoners of
war, also the sick people, had to stay in the open
air. Sanitation, hygienic and medical conditions were
appalling. In the ward of the seriously ill patients,
no bedpans were available. Therefore, a little hole
was dug next to each bedplace and the patients had to
roll over it. Because a stool of 40 to 60 times a
day was not an exception, time and again new holes had
to be dug around the patient until there was no place
left and a new bed had to be found. In case the pa-
tient was too weak to roll over the hole next to his bed,
one was dug under it and a hole made through his sleep-
ing mat. Food was bad. Consequently, health deter-
iorated and more than half were ill. Still the sick
were forced to labor. Of these 2079 Dutch prisoners
of war, 211 died from illness within a year's time.
Discipline was harsh; corporal punishments were fre-
quent, causing injuries and even, indirectly, death.
Prisoners of war were not protected against air
attacks.

This is the sad story told in the report of

1 Captain A.C.J. De Thouars, R.N.I.A., the camp com-
2 mandant; Private C.K. Brants, R.N.I.A., and 1st Lieu-
3 tenant H.H.J. De Vries, R.N.I.A., prosecution docu-
4 ment 5578.

5 The prosecution enters document 5583 for
6 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 5583 will receive exhibit No. 1786 for identifica-
10 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom will receive
11 exhibit No. 1786-A.

12 (Whereupon, the document above re-
13 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
14 No. 1786 for identification; and the excerpt
15 therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
16 No. 1786-A and received in evidence.)

17 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Soemba Island,
18 West of Timor, interrogations were held under beatings
19 and threats. As is reported in the affidavit of the
20 Australian Flight Lieutenant L. L. McKenzie, prosecu-
21 tion document 5583.
22

23 The prosecution enters document 5597 for
24 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

1 No. 5597 will receive exhibit No. 1787 for identifica-
2 tion only, and the excerpts therefrom will receive
3 exhibit No. 1787-A.

4 (Whereupon, the document above re-
5 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
6 No. 1787 for identification; and the excerpts
7 therefrom was marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 1787-A and received in evidence.)

9 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At prisoner of war
10 camp Koepang, Dutch Timor, prisoners of war were
11 forced to an exhausting march under harsh beatings.
12 Food, sanitary conditions and medical care were bad.
13 Labor was exhausting. As appears from the affidavit
14 of Sergeant C.H. Van Der Sloot, R.N.I.A., prosecution
15 document 5597. With the Court's permission, I would
16 like to read it. I start after the dotted line:

17 "On 16 February 1942 I, along with some 20
18 Javanese soldiers of the R.N.I.A., was taken by ship
19 to Timor. The voyage lasted four days during which
20 we were badly fed, and one day were given nothing to
21 drink. After disembarkation, Koepang airfield proved
22 to be our destination. The journey on foot took 5 days
23 which I covered with hands tied behind my back. I was
24 so exhausted that on arrival I lay unconscious for 5
25 hours. The next day I had to act as an interpreter

1 between the Japanese and Australian prisoners of war.
2 There were more than one thousand Australians, amongst
3 whom were many wounded and malaria and dysentery
4 patients.

5 "An Australian medical officer asked for
6 medical treatment and medicines for his sick. The
7 Japanese officer, named FUKADA, bluntly refused. These
8 Australians lived in an enclosure fenced in with barbed
9 wire and bamboo, practically in the open air. I stayed
10 there for about a fortnight, and during that time
11 about fifty Australians died and had to be buried
12 within that same enclosure. The area in which more
13 than one thousand Australians lived was about two acres.
14 Food for these Australians was very poor. Only dry
15 rice was supplied. They had to do their own cooking.
16 Equipment for that purpose was insufficient, so that
17 preparation and serving of breakfast, consisting of
18 rice porridge, lasted from 6 till 11 a.m. The Aus-
19 tralian officer, a lieutenant colonel, asked my inter-
20 mediary in order to get conditions improved. I trans-
21 lated this request to the Japanese named FUKADA, but
22 once again I received a blunt refusal. The Japanese
23 supplied only rice, never vegetables or meat. During
24 those two weeks I asked for improvement several times
25 at the request of the Australian lieutenant colonel. I

1 did the same of my own accord, but it was all to no
2 avail.

3 "The Japanese demanded a working party of
4 500 men each day to repair roads, to cut trees and
5 to do digging. The Australian officer could at most
6 detail 300 men a day fit to do some work. The re-
7 mainder was sick or too weak. The food supplied
8 amounted to one liter of rice porridge per man per
9 day.

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1 "The Australians had wounded personnel
2 among them. During my two weeks' stay there about
3 thirty men were operated upon for extraction of shell
4 splinters among other things. These operations were
5 carried out by their own doctors in the open air
6 with the patient seated on and tied to a chair.
7 The doctors were compelled in some cases to operate
8 without anesthetics. Medical treatment as well as
9 admission to the hospital at Koepang were refused
10 nor were anesthetics given.

11 "In July 1942 a Timorese had cut a telephone
12 wire at that place. The delinquent was caught in
13 the act and arrested, along with two brothers of
14 Denoe who happened to be in the neighborhood. I am
15 convinced they were not guilty; one was twenty-one
16 years of age and the other sixteen. That very day
17 they were sentenced to death which was done in the
18 following way. In my presence and through my inter-
19 mediary as an interpreter the suspect was merely asked
20 his name and why he had cut the wire by KAWAKE. He
21 stated his name and said further he wanted the wire
22 for private use. The two brothers of Denoe were never
23 asked a question. That same day on orders from
24 KAWAKE and without any form of trial I had to draw
25 up a document in the Malay language announcing the

1 death sentence of these three which was placarded
2 in the market place. The public was instructed to
3 come and look on. Rajas and I myself were told to
4 attend. When I arrived on the spot I saw three new-
5 dug graves.

6 "After a few minutes the three convicted
7 with hands tied behind their backs were led in. One
8 after another had to kneel before the graves facing
9 the firing squad and the public. They were not blind-
10 folded. A Japanese, Lieutenant KAWAKE, read the sen-
11 tence in Japanese warning that everybody who committed
12 sabotage would be shot. I had to translate this in
13 Malay to the public. Hereafter the three were shot;
14 all three fell backwards in their grave. The sixteen
15 years old was immediately dead, the twenty-one years
16 old received a coup de grace. The suspect was still
17 alive and moaned. A Japanese soldier armed with a
18 rifle and bayonet compelled one of the bystanders to
19 take a heavy stone and to throw this into the grave
20 at the head of the wounded man. The sight shocked me
21 so that I went away. The graves have been filled up
22 by bystanders on orders from the Japanese as I heard
23 afterwards. Attending this execution were Lieutenant
24 KAWAKE and Corporals KAWASAKI and KATO."

25 Executions.

At Cesapa Besar Camp an Australian POW who had struck a Japanese NCO and escaped was killed. This was explained in a letter written on behalf of the CO by a Japanese corporal who states: "In Japanese forces when a person strikes an officer or NCO of higher rank the penalty is always death." However, this POW was executed without trial but only on instructions from headquarters. This appears from the affidavit of Lieutenant Colonel Leggatt, exhibit 1782-A.

At POW camp, Flores, two POWs were executed without trial, as is stated in the report of Captain De Thouars c.s., exhibit 1785-A.

II. CIVILIANS.

Internees.

Most of the European population was interned, also in Portuguese Timor, and their conditions were not much different from those in the civilian internees camps in other areas.

The prosecution enters document No. 5596 as an exhibit.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 5596 will receive exhibit No. 1788.

(Whereupon, the document above

1 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
2 No. 1788 and received in evidence.)

3 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Soemba conditions
4 were bad, although there was only a small number of
5 internees. Accommodation and food were inadequate;
6 their property was looted; severe beatings occurred
7 causing injuries, as appears from the affidavit of the
8 Controller (civil servant) W. F. H. Plas, prosecution
9 document 5596.

10 The prosecution enters document 5803 for
11 identification and the excerpt as an exhibit.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
14 No. 5803 will receive exhibit No. 1789 for identifi-
15 cation only and the excerpt therefrom will receive
16 exhibit No. 1789-A.

17 (Whereupon, the document above
18 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 1789 for identification only; the excerpt
20 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
21 No. 1789-A and received in evidence.)

22 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Liquica, Portu-
23 guese Timor, the Portuguese civilians were concen-
24 trated and interned. Conditions were as usual: bad
25 accommodation, food, medical care; exposure to air

1 attacks without protection, attracted especially
2 by firing from a hospital. Particulars are given
3 in the affidavit of Graca, already introduced, ex-
4 hibit 1783-A, and the affidavit by C. J. Sequeira,
5 prosecution document 5803.

6 Non-Interned.

7 Murder.

8 The prosecution enters document 5804 for
9 identification and the excerpt as an exhibit.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 5804 will receive exhibit No. 1790 for identifica-
13 tion only; the excerpt therefrom will receive exhibit
14 No. 1790-A.

15 (Whereupon, the document above
16 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
17 No. 1790 for identification only; the excerpt
18 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 1790-A and received in evidence.)

20 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: A correction in this
21 paragraph: the words, "disguised as," to read,
22 "directing also."

23 At Aileu, Portuguese Timor, in September,
24 1942, the Japanese, directing also natives, made an
25 attack upon the Portuguese guards, who had been sent

1 off duty and killed most of them. This is stated by
2 a survivor, the Portuguese Pte. E. Simoes, prosecution
3 document 5804.

4 The prosecution enters document 5805 as
5 an exhibit.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 5805 will receive exhibit No. 1791.

9 (Whereupon, the document above
10 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1791 and received in evidence.)

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Ainaro, Portu-
13 guese Timor, in October, 1942, two Roman Catholic
14 priests were murdered.

15 At Atsabe, Portuguese Timor, in December,
16 1942, the Japanese used, when attacking the Australian
17 forces, fifty to sixty natives as a screen, of whom
18 a number was killed.

19 The Japanese burned the native huts in the
20 area of Mt. Katrai, Portuguese Timor, and shot the
21 women and children as they ran from the huts. This
22 was a regular practice.

23 These facts are related by the Australian
24 F/O, W. A. Beattie, prosecution document 5805.

25 The prosecution enters document 5806 for

1 identification and the excerpt as an exhibit.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 5806 will receive exhibit No. 1792 for identifica-
5 tion only and the excerpt therefrom will receive
6 exhibit No. 1792-A.

7 (Whereupon, the document above
8 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 1792 for identification only; the excerpt
10 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1792-A and received in evidence.)

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The Japanese attacked
13 and sacked also other native villages in Portuguese
14 Timor, using indiscriminate machine gun fire, that is,
15 Kelicai and Nahareca, as appears from the affidavit
16 by the Portuguese L.A.N. Rodreigues, prosecution
17 document 5806.

18 At Koepang, two natives were killed without
19 proper trial; as appears from the affidavit of Van Der
20 Sloot, already introduced, exhibit 1787-A.

21 At Oesapa, a native was killed without trial,
22 as stated in the report of Chaplain Bindeman, already
23 introduced, exhibit 1781-A.

24 Prosecution enters document 5594 for identi-
25 fication and the excerpt as an exhibit.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
3 No. 5594 will receive exhibit No. 1793 for identifica-
4 tion only; the excerpt therefrom will receive exhibit
5 No. 1793-A.

6 (Whereupon, the document above
7 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 1793 for identification only; the excerpt
9 therefrom being marked prosecution's exhibit
10 No. 1793-A and received in evidence.)

11 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: In September, 1944,
12 General TANAKA ordered a punitive action against the
13 islanders of Loeang and Sermata, East of Timor, because
14 some Kempei Tai men had been murdered by the native
15 population. The local Rajah of Loeang was ordered to
16 search for the chief of the so-called mutiny and was
17 executed because he could not find the mutineer. The
18 chief of the rebels and two others were executed at
19 Lautem, Portuguese Timor. Of the other Loeang rebels
20 thirty-four were executed on Moa Island, and sixty of
21 the 650 Sermata rebels were killed.

22 This appears from the report of Major General
23 Y. TANAKA, prosecution document 5594, from which I would
24 like to read a certain part on page 3, paragraph 6:

25 "6. Movement of suppression party.

1 "(1) The suppression party on arrival to
2 Sulmata Island, about 29th of September, 1944, landed
3 at two points, northwest end and middle of north coast
4 of the island. Most of the natives had retreated into
5 the mountains, but some resisted with bow, sword and
6 spear, while others attempted to stop our advance by
7 conflagrating both sides of road. The suppression party
8 captured some of the remaining natives, investigated
9 the circumstances of the mutiny and succeeded in
10 acquiring such information as that Yoos, son of the
11 Radja, was directing the whole, that natives of all
12 villages joined to it, and that when the party landed,
13 Yoos went from north coast to south coast through
14 east coast, animating the natives by spreading the
15 false news that strong Australian force were landing
16 the island from many points. The suppression party
17 followed the trace of Yoos but his whereabouts
18 could not be easily found. They called up the village
19 chiefs to question this but they would not open their
20 mouths. Their incooperative attitude (except Leran vil-
21 lage chief) made the searching extremely difficult.
22 It was continued by dividing the party to many places.

23 "(2) A part of the suppression party was
24 sent to Luan island. They were charged with rifles
25 fire and so fired back against this. They frustrated

1 natives' resistance although the Radja and his
2 family tried to shoot the Japanese by bows that
3 night, arrested the Radja, his family and his chief
4 subordinates, and returned to Sulmata.

5 "(3) The main body of the suppression party
6 fruitlessly continuing their search for Yoos, already
7 for two weeks, ordered the Radja to search out Yoos
8 within three days, with all the men in the island,
9 under death penalty in default of carrying out this
10 order. The Radja assented to obey this order and
11 commenced the searching but could not find him out
12 until the ordained date. Therefore he was executed.
13 Next, a Japanese soldier found a native sentinel
14 standing in front of a cave in the mountain, then the
15 cave was surrounded by the Japanese and at last Yoos
16 was found and arrested in spite of his resistance with
a pistol.

17 "(4) After the arrest of Yoos, those cir-
18 cumstances of the incidents brought to light, and
19 most of the persons concerned with incident arrested,
20 the commander of the suppression party requested for
21 my instructions. To this I ordered the commander to
22 bring Yoos and other leading criminals to Lautem, to
23 execute those joined the conference of rebellion and
24 led the crowd to the assault and to appoint Leran village
25

1 chief as the next Radja. Three leading criminals
2 including Yooos was executed in Lautem.

3 "(5) Natives of Luan island were especially
4 atrocious. They moved to Sulamata island from their
5 own island to join the attack against our air watch
6 party. On Luan island they assaulted our M.P. and
7 they showed pretty stiff resistance when the suppress-
8 sion party landed there. Therefore, I ordered to
9 bring 42 principals of them to Lautem. But, on the
10 way, eight of them escaped because they were divided
11 to several small boats. So I made the remaining 34
12 executed on Moa island.

13 "7. As the result of Sulmata mutiny, about 60
14 of total 650 persons joined the mutiny were put to
15 death.

16 "8. I do not know the names of executioners."

17 The prosecution enters document 5591 as an
18 exhibit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 5591 will receive exhibit No. 1794.

22 (Whereupon, the document above
23 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
24 No. 1794 and received in evidence.)

25 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: A Japanese lieutenant

1 gives a further description of the killing on Moa
2 Island. The natives were killed by bayoneting
3 three at a time by twenty-one Japanese soldiers.
4 He himself organized a brothel in which he forced
5 five native women to act as prostitutes as a punish-
6 ment for the deeds of their fathers. Statement by
7 Lieutenant S. OHARA, prosecution document 5591.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen
9 minutes.

10 (Whereupon, at 1445 a recess was
11 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings
12 were resumed as follows:)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Danste.

4 LIEUT. COLONEL DANSTE: I will proceed
5 on page 6:

6 2. Kempeitai.

7 The military police operating in this area
8 applied the well-known Kempei methods of interro-
9 gation, torture, punishment and treatment. Burning
10 with cigarettes, watertest, hanging, kneeling upon
11 sharp stones; severe beatings; even killing.

12 L. A. N. Rodreigues describes instances of
13 torture at Ossu, Portuguese Timor, in his affidavit,
14 exhibit 1792-A, and also mentions that the Japanese
15 forced the local chiefs to provide girls for the
16 brothels.

17 The prosecution enters document No. 5807
18 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 5807 will receive exhibit No. 1795 for identifi-
22 cation only, and the excerpts therefrom will receive
23 exhibit No. 1795-A.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 1795 for identification, and the
2 excerpts therefrom were marked prosecu-
3 tion's exhibit No. 1795-A and received in
4 evidence.)

5 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The Chinese
6 Chung Hai Cheng, or Ha Hoi, acted as an inter-
7 preter for the Kempeitai at Dilli. In his affi-
8 davit he relates several cases of ill-treatment;
9 prosecution document 5807.

10 Conditions in the prison were very bad as
11 may easily be understood by the statement of Ha Hoi.
12 The Australian prisoners in the gaol at Dilli were
13 very weak and exhausted. Women prisoners were
14 beaten as well as men.

15 At Manatuto, Portuguese Timor, the Portu-
16 guese chef de poste (administrator) was murdered by
17 the Kempei; his cut-up remains were put in a sack
18 and sent to his wife, as stated in the affidavit by
19 F. O. Beattie, already introduced, exhibit 1791.

20 This completes the presentation of evidence
21 regarding the Japanese war crimes committed in the
22 Timor area.

23 I will proceed by presenting the evidence
24 regarding the area of Celebes and surrounding islands
25 that comprise the Halmahera.

1 I will introduce document 5684, that is,
2 my synopsis regarding Celebes and surrounding islands,
3 as an exhibit.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 5684 will receive exhibit No. 1796.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-
8 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
9 No. 1796 and received in evidence.)

10 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE:

11 Occupation by the Japanese Navy.

12 I. Prisoners of war.

13 1. Murder.

14 Several murders occurred: Prisoners of
15 war were executed without trial and even without any
16 accusation; airmen in particular. These executions
17 were ordered by the highest ranks in the Army and
18 Navy.

19 The prosecution enters document No. 5518
20 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 No. 5518 will receive exhibit No. 1797 for identifi-
24 cation, and the excerpts therefrom will receive
25 exhibit No. 1797-A.

1 (Whereupon, the document above re-
2 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
3 No. 1797 for identification, and the ex-
4 cerpts therefrom were marked prosecution's
5 exhibit No. 1797-A and received in evidence.)

6 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Ralla, South
7 West Celebes, in March, 1942, eight Dutch prisoners
8 of war were killed by bayoneting, as stated by
9 Medical Officer Mingelen, R. W. I. A., in his in-
10 terrogation report, prosecution document 5518.

11 The prosecution enters document 5520 for
12 identification only and the excerpts as an exhibit.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
15 No. 5520 will receive exhibit No. 1798 for identifi-
16 cation only, and the excerpts therefrom will receive
17 exhibit No. 1798-A.

18 (Whereupon, the document above re-
19 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
20 No. 1798 for identification, and the excerpts
21 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 1798-A and received in evidence.)

23 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Tomohon, near
24 Menado, North East Celebes, in September, 1944, two
25 American airmen, made prisoners of war, were executed

1 on the order of Lieutenant Colonel KODAMATSU, as
2 appears from the affidavit of Major T. ODUMURA,
3 prosecution document 5520.

4 With the Court's permission I will read
5 parts of it. On page 6, the last question (reading):

6 "Q Give me the sequence of events that occurred
7 after you brought the two Americans from Langan to
8 Tomohon, telling me all conversations that occurred
9 with you present or conversations overheard by you.

10 "A KODAMATSU saw the Americans the first day
11 I brought them from Langan. He saw them two other
12 times before they were executed. Once he questioned
13 them. W. O. MATSUMOTO was eager to kill the Americans
14 and asked for permission several times. I told him
15 the first time that I had no authority and that I
16 would have to go to Headquarters to get the authority.
17 I did not go that day. MATSUMOTO then asked me three
18 times altogether to go to Headquarters for the
19 authority. Finally, on the morning of the day of the
20 execution, MATSUMOTO asked me again and so I went to
21 Headquarters and spoke to Col. KODAMATSU in his
22 office. No one was present except the Colonel and
23 myself. I told Col. KODAMATSU that it would be
24 better to send the men to the POW Camp at Java but
25 Col. KODAMATSU said that war conditions did not

1 permit it and also that because of possible American
2 landings it was necessary to execute the Americans
3 because they might give away some of the Japanese
4 secrets. I told KODAMATSU that I did not think it
5 advisable because it was against international law
6 but KODAMATSU told me that the prisoners of war
7 were under the jurisdiction of the Second Area Army
8 Headquarters and that the Kempei Tai was only hold-
9 ing them temporarily for disposition by Second Area
10 Army Headquarters. He said that the Americans must
11 be executed. I said 'goodbye' and left.

12 "Q What happened after that?

13 "A That same day after supper while it was
14 slightly dark but still light, Col. KODAMATSU came up
15 the stone steps which were between the bathroom and
16 the general office. At that time I was in the bath-
17 room. Col. KODAMATSU, in a loud voice which I could
18 clearly hear even though I was in the bathroom, said
19 that the Americans would have to be executed that
20 very same evening. W/O MATSUMOTO then came to the
21 bathroom and told me Col. KODAMATSU was there. I
22 went out and saw him. KODAMATSU told me to execute
23 the two airmen that same night. MATSUMOTO and I
24 said, 'Yes, is that so!' KODAMATSU then left to go
25 to the house of his girl friend. After KODAMATSU

1 left I turned to MATSUMOTO and said, 'I don't like
2 such a matter. I leave it up to you.' MATSUMOTO
3 said, 'I will do it.' I then left for my house
4 where I played mahjong all evening.

5 "Q What did MATSUMOTO do that evening?

6 "A I do not know what MATSUMOTO did because I
7 did not see him after I went home. The next day,
8 however, at one o'clock in the afternoon I saw
9 MATSUMOTO at my office room and MATSUMOTO reported
10 to me. He said, 'Everything has been completed.'
11 I knew what MATSUMOTO was talking about but I did
12 not want to hear the details. I told MATSUMOTO
13 to go to Col. KODAMATSU and report."

14 Page 9, the second question:

15 "Q Do you know if these two captured Americans
16 ever had any trial, court-martial, hearing, or other
17 form of judicial process, culminating in a verdict
18 or sentence of execution, between the time of their
19 capture and the time of their execution?

20 "A So far as I know, they never had any such
21 trial, court-martial, hearing or other form of
22 judicial process between the time of their capture
23 and execution."
24
25

1 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

3 MR. LOGAN: We would like to know if this
4 witness, ODAMURA, is available and, if so, we would
5 like to have him produced for cross-examination.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Have you any particular
7 reason for that, Mr. Logan?

8 MR. LOGAN: Yes, your Honor, with respect
9 to the statement that has been read into evidence
10 endeavoring to tie itself with that Second Corps, I
11 believe. It is tied up with the Second Area Army
12 Headquarters.

13 THE PRESIDENT: I take it you challenge
14 that, but you can offer evidence of that later.

15 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, here is
16 evidence by a witness who was there at the time and
17 who makes these statements and he is the one that
18 has made this particular statement. We should like
19 to have the right to cross-examine him to see where
20 he got his information. He certainly would be the one
21 to know the truth of the statements he has made and
22 if he is available, if he is in Tokyo at the present
23 time, we ask that he be produced.

24 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: If the Court wants,
25 the prosecution will take every possible measure to

1 bring ODAMURA here if he is still alive.

2 MR. LOGAN: I would like to know if there
3 is any question about his being alive or dead at
4 this time.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Well, he was alive on the
6 25th of March this year. He was then in the Nether-
7 lands Indies.

8 Yes, Captain Brooks.

9 CAPTAIN BROOKS: I want to call the Court's
10 attention to the synopsis. The prosecutor said
11 these executions were ordered by the highest ranks
12 of the army and navy, and the first document, 5518,
13 I was not clear on that point at all and the second
14 one, on page 7, I think, repeats that the colonel
15 was still under higher headquarters. It wasn't the
16 highest rank in the army and navy.

17 THE PRESIDENT: "Highest" was corrected to
18 "higher," Captain Brooks. I do not think you noticed
19 that.

20 In the light of further developments
21 we will consider whether it is desirable to call
22 ODAMURA.

23 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The prosecution enters
24 document 5535 for identification and the excerpts as
25 an exhibit.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
3 No. 5535 will receive exhibit No. 1799 for iden-
4 tification only and the excerpt therefrom will receive
5 exhibit No. 1799-A.

6 (Whereupon, the document above
7 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-
8 hibit No. 1799 for identification; the
9 excerpts therefrom being marked prose-
10 cution's exhibit No. 1799-A and received
11 in evidence.)

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Toli-Toli,
13 North West Celebes, in October 1944 eight American
14 airmen, made P.O.W., were executed. This is stated
15 in the affidavit of Y. HAYASHI, prosecution document
16 5535.

17 The prosecution enters document 5532 for
18 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document
21 No. 5532 will receive exhibit No. 1800 for iden-
22 tification only and the excerpt therefrom will
23 receive exhibit No. 1800-A.

24 (Whereupon, the document above
25 referred to was marked prosecution's ex-

1 hibit No. 1800 for identification; the
2 excerpts therefrom being marked prose-
3 cution's exhibit No. 1800-A and received
4 in evidence.)

5 LIEUT. COLONEL DAM-TE: At Kendari, South
6 East Celebes, in November 1944 nine American air-
7 men, made P.O.W. were executed on the order of Admiral
8 OSUGI, as appears from the affidavit by Captain G.
9 TANIGUCHI, prosecution document 5532.

10 With the Court's permission, I will read
11 some parts of that; page 1, the second question from
12 the bottom.

13 "Q Do you know of any Americans being
14 detained at Kendari?

15 "A Yes. I know of nine men in October
16 1944 and one man in January 1945, and two men in
17 February 1945.

18 "Q Will you tell me what you know of the
19 nine men in October 1944?

20 "A A PBV-5 (?) left Morotai 1 October 1944
21 on a flight to Celebes. On that same day the plane
22 was fired on and hit by Japanese gunfire and the
23 plane crashed off the eastern coast of Celebes,
24 north of Kendari near an island. I forgot the name
25 of the island, probably Salabangka. I was told that

1 eleven men were in the plane but two of them died
2 in the crash. The natives reported that nine men
3 were on an island and also gave the approximate
4 location and I dispatched a boat, about 70 or 80
5 tons, and about ten men to pick them up. They were
6 brought to Kendari and I turned them over to Lt.
7 Saburo TAKITA who was commanding officer of Tokkei
8 Tai. As soon as the prisoners reached Kendari I
9 informed Admiral Morikazu OSUGI at Makassar and
10 Admiral Tamotsu FURUKAWA at Kendari. Admiral
11 FURUKAWA was commanding officer of 23rd Air Unit.
12 Admiral OSUGI was commanding officer of 23rd Special
13 Naval Base."

14 Page 3, the 4th question from the bottom.

15 "Q You say that these nine men were kept
16 at the Tokkei Tai six or seven weeks. Then what
17 happened?

18 "A I received an order by radio about 23
19 November 1944 from Makassar to execute the nine
20 American prisoners.

21 "Q Who sent the message?

22 "A Admiral OSUGI.

23 "Q Exactly what did the message say?

24 "A I don't remember the exact words. It
25 either said to dispose of or execute the prisoners

1 and I am not sure which but it was so worded that a
2 possibility of mistake was very unlikely.

3 "Q What action did you take upon receipt
4 of this order?

5 "A Lt.TAKITA brought the message to me
6 and I told him that we may as well go ahead with it.
7 TAKITA said that he would make the arrangements and
8 I told him that would be fine and that I would leave
9 it up to him. TAKITA reported back to me that day
10 and said that plans had been made to execute the
11 prisoners the next day or two days later at about
12 sunset. I approved of this plan and cautioned TAKITA
13 to abide by the Samurai Code. About this time the
14 Tokkei Tai received orders from the 23rd Air Unit at
15 Kendari to send four of the prisoners to them.
16 TAKITA brought the message to me. The order came
17 from Commander SONOKAWA. I saw no order. TAKITA
18 told me about it and I don't know how the message
19 was sent. TAKITA said that the 23rd Air Unit wanted
20 to execute four. The orders from Admiral OSUGI
21 were to execute the nine prisoners so I didn't object
22 to sending them for all that I was interested in was
23 that they be executed and the place and by whom was
24 immaterial. I heard that a car was sent from 23rd
25 Air Unit to take the four back as it was about an

1 hour drive.

2 "Q What happened to the other five?

3 "A They were executed either the next day
4 or two days later as scheduled. I did not attend
5 the execution but received the report from TAKITA.
6 TAKITA did not attend the execution either but assigned
7 Ensign CHUMA to do it. I thought at the time that
8 Ensign CHUMA executed the five but I learned since
9 that Ensign CHUMA executed only one and Ensign
10 MITANI, Toshio, Warrant Officer OGAWA (FNU), Warrant
11 Officer YAMAMOTO (FNU), Chief Petty Officer TANAKA
12 (FNU), executed one each."

13 Page 5, on the top.

14 "Q What else do you know about the execution?

15 "A TAKITA reported to me that the men had
16 been executed and also brought a radio message
17 for my signature. It stated that the prisoners had
18 been executed as ordered by radio message number
19 (?). I signed this message and it was sent to
20 Admiral OSUGI and I never heard more. I would like
21 to add that all Japanese radio messages are numbered
22 and the number shows date and the hour.

23 "Q You said you notified Admiral OSUGI that
24 the nine men were executed. How do you know the four
25 men ordered by Commander SONOKAWA were executed?

1 "A One of my subordinates received a report
2 from the 23rd Air Unit stating that the four men had
3 been executed on same day. I don't know if the
4 report was received by telephone or by messenger.
5 I don't know who received the report nor the one who
6 sent it."

7 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, we
8 would like to have this witness produced, TANIGUCHI,
9 and also, HIYASHI, the one who gave the previous
10 affidavit. Pending an order of the Court we would like
11 to have the prosecution find out if these men had
12 been tried and what their status is at the present
13 time; if they had been convicted and executed.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Our decision will be the
15 same as on the last application. The prosecution
16 should endeavor to get the particulars sought by
17 Mr. Logan.
18
19
20
21
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25

1 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Prosecution enters
2 document 5521 for identification and the excerpt as
3 an exhibit.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 5521 will receive exhibit No. 1801 for identifi-
7 cation, and the excerpt therefrom will receive
8 exhibit No. 1801-A.

9 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
10 No. 5521 was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1801 for identification; and the excerpt
12 therefrom, bearing the same document number,
13 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1801-A
14 and received in evidence.)

15 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Singkang, Southeast
16 Celebes, in July 1945, five American airmen, made
17 prisoners of war, were executed on the orders of
18 Lieutenant General TESHIMA; at any rate, such an order
19 was presumed by the CO, Colonel M. NAKAMURA. Prosecu-
20 tion document 5521 is his affidavit.

21 With the Court's permission, I will read most
22 parts of that.

23 Page 1:

24 "Questions by Lt. Forkosch:

25 "Will you tell me in chronological order

1 everything you know concerning such execution?

2 "A I returned to Singkang about July 23,
3 1945, from an inspection trip. When I returned I
4 again had Major ODAMURA see Lt. Colonel ISHIRO, Shigeru,
5 who was on the staff of Lt. General TESHIMA, for the
6 purpose of having the five American fliers removed
7 from the Kempeitai jail to the Second Army jurisdiction.
8 I had been attempting to have these Americans so
9 removed ever since I arrived at Singkang in June.
10 My reason for desiring this transfer of the American
11 prisoners was that they interfered with the Kempeitai
12 questioning of natives as well as the duties of the
13 Kempeitai because guards had to be supplied for the
14 Americans. I also felt that these were Second Army
15 prisoners and therefore should be kept by the Second
16 Army. After my return on July 23, I again sent
17 Major ODAMURA to see Lt. Colonel ISHIRO about this
18 transfer, but the first time I sent him he reported that
19 he had seen someone else on the staff because ISHIRO
20 was away. I then sent ODAMURA a second time to see
21 ISHIRO. I do not know the exact date of the second
22 time ODAMURA went to see ISHIRO but I do know that
23 ODAMURA returned to me that same day and reported to
24 me, and that three days later the execution was held,
25 and I believe such execution was held in the very

1 last two or three days of July, 1945.

2 "When ODAMURA returned to me after his second
3 attempt to see ISHIRO, he, ODAMURA, told me that he
4 had had a conversation with ISHIRO. ODAMURA said
5 that ISHIRO had suggested to him that the Kempeitai
6 dispose of the Americans. Since in my opinion such
7 a suggestion was an order, I ordered ODAMURA to
8 execute the Americans. I do not recall whether I told
9 ODAMURA to prepare plans for such execution or whether
10 ODAMURA thereafter brought such plans to me for
11 approval. At that time ODAMURA told me that the
12 execution would be held back of the Leper Hospital
13 and he told me the date and time at which it would
14 be conducted. I do not remember the exact date. It
15 has been so long ago that I have forgotten whether
16 ODAMURA gave me a written plan or whether it was
17 verbal. The details of this plan are rather hazy in
18 my mind. I did not spend too much time reviewing the
19 plan of ODAMURA, because I felt that as commander of
20 the Southern Celebes Kempeitai he knew what his
21 duties were. I do remember that about three days
22 afterwards I got up at about six o'clock and left the
23 Kempeitai quarters with ODAMURA and Lieutenant
24 KAMISUKI, Kotaro, in company with about eight or
25 twelve others. I do not remember the names or

1 features of any of the others except that I recall
2 Warrant Officer MATSUMOTO, Kunio, and Sergeant
3 OKAZAKI, Kazuaki. We went along the road to
4 Watampone until we passed the Second Army jail. We
5 then turned left and cut across the field until we
6 arrived at the place of execution. This was a small
7 clearing surrounded by trees and bushes. There was
8 one very large tree at one extreme end of the clear-
9 ing and at the other end of the clearing were two
10 smaller trees. A grave had been dug between these
11 trees in such clearing. ODAMURA, KAMISUKI and I went
12 to one end of the clearing where the two small trees
13 were. The Americans were kept at the large tree and
14 were there blindfolded. It was becoming lighter at
15 that time although it was still fairly dark. I
16 remember that one American after another was brought
17 up to the grave from the tree, placed in a kneeling
18 position and then executed. I saw each American
19 executed but I cannot remember who executed these
20 Americans. I do not remember the names of the
21 executioners nor do I remember their features. If I
22 saw them now I don't think I would remember them.

23 "It rained a little during the execution
24 and I remember that someone handed me a raincoat. I
25 did not bring such raincoat with me. I was dressed

1 in my usual uniform but I don't believe I carried a
2 sword. After the execution KAMISUKI and I walked
3 back to the Kempeitai headquarters. I don't believe
4 ODAMURA returned with us. When we arrived at the
5 Kempeitai I did not go into the office but went to my
6 hut because I had not eaten breakfast.

7 "Sometime that day I remember definitely
8 that I ordered ODAMURA to report the execution to
9 the Second Army headquarters. I do remember that
10 ODAMURA reported to me that he had reported but I do
11 not remember the date ODAMURA so reported to me."

12 I go on on page 4, in the middle:

13 "Q Was there any court-martial held of these
14 five American prisoners before the execution?

15 "A No. There was never any court-martial,
16 hearing, trial or other legal process given to these
17 five Americans. I knew that they could not be
18 executed without a court-martial and the Kempeitai
19 has no power to execute any prisoner without a court-
20 martial. The Kempeitai had no power to execute a
21 prisoner without a court-martial or an order from higher
22 authority."

23 "The last question:

24 "Q Do you have anything further to add to
25 this statement?

1 "A Yes. Another reason why I felt that
2 TESHIMA must have given approval was because I always
3 told ODAMURA that even the natives must have received
4 a court-martial on hearing before being executed and
5 if I followed this procedure in the natives I certainly
6 followed ~~it~~ in the Americans' case. Also, while at
7 the execution place, I recall that of the several
8 people there I recognized at least two as being
9 soldiers from the Second Army jail although I cannot
10 give you their names nor can I remember them even if
11 they were brought before me now."

12 Thus far.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Damste, did you
14 consider whether you should read the question and
15 answer in the middle of page 3?

16 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: It does not belong
17 to the excerpt, sir, as far as I see here.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, we point it out to you.

19 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The prosecution
20 enters document 5564 as an exhibit.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Blewett.

22 MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, in view
23 of the uncertainty of that last affidavit, we should
24 like to ask the prosecution to produce that witness
25 for cross-examination.

1 THE PRESIDENT: In all these cases where
2 high army officials are mentioned we will have to
3 consider whether we will direct production of the
4 deponent.

5 We treat that question in the middle of page 3
6 as not in evidence.

7 You were tendering a further document?

8 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: Yes. I tender
9 document 5564 as an exhibit.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 5564 will receive exhibit No. 1802.

13 (Whereupon, the document above
14 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
15 No. 1802, and was received in evidence.)

16 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Beo, Talaud
17 Islands, north of Celebes, in March 1945, four Allied
18 airmen were executed as so-called punishment without
19 accusation and without trial, on the order of General
20 KATSURA; and at Rainis, Talaud, in June 1945, another
21 Allied airman was executed under the same order. This
22 appears from the statement of the Japanese Colonel
23 KOBA; prosecution document 5564.

24 The prosecution enters document 5533 for
25 identification and the excerpt as an exhibit.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
3 No. 5533 will receive exhibit No. 1803 for identifi-
4 cation only. The excerpt therefrom will receive
5 exhibit No. 1803-A.

6 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
7 No. 5533 was marked prosecution's exhibit
8 No. 1803 for identification; and the excerpt
9 therefrom, bearing the same document number,
10 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 1803-A
11 and received in evidence.)

12 MR. BLEWETT: If the Court please, may we
13 include in our request the last affidavit, No. 5564,
14 the affidavit of Colonel KOBA. It refers to a
15 general officer, sir.

16 THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the defense
17 applications to extend to all such cases, as I
18 intimated a minute ago. Independently of any appli-
19 cation, we might have taken that course because of the
20 importance of that evidence.

21 LIEUT. COLONEL LAMSTE: At Maros, near
22 Macassar, Southwest Celebes, in July 1945, four
23 Allied airmen, made prisoners of war, were executed
24 on the order of Lt. Commander ISHIDA, as appears from
25 the affidavit of Lt. Y. NAKAMURA, prosecution document 5533.

1 2. Camps. Conditions in the prisoner of
2 war camps in this area generally were about the
3 same as already described in the other areas: the
4 well-known Japanese pattern.

5 The prosecution enters document No. 5503
6 for identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
9 ment No. 5503 will receive exhibit No. 1804 for
10 identification, and the excerpts therefrom will
11 receive exhibit No. 1804-A.

12 (Whereupon, the document above re-
13 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
14 1804 for identification, and the excerpts
15 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
16 No. 1804-A and received in evidence.)

17 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At the prisoner of
18 war camp at Macassar, Southwest Celebes; bad accom-
19 modation, no furniture, no bedding, no clothing,
20 overcrowded camps; exhausting labour; labour on
21 military objects; old and unfit men compelled to
22 work; insufficient food, in quantity as well as in
23 quality; bad sanitary conditions; medical supplies
24 were inadequately provided notwithstanding outbreaks
25 of dysentery and malaria; bad health as a consequence

1 of malnutrition, resulting in a high death rate;
2 no Red Cross parcels were distributed; no recrea-
3 tion was provided, even singing was forbidden; no
4 mails; discipline was maintained by a system of
5 terrorization with frequent and severe corporal
6 punishments. This appears from the affidavit by Lt.
7 Commander G.T. Cooper, R.N., prosecution document
8 5503.

9 The prosecution enters document 5504 for
10 identification and the excerpts as an exhibit.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
12 terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
14 ment No. 5504 will receive exhibit No. 1805 for
15 identification only, and the excerpts therefrom will
16 receive exhibit No. 1805-A.

17 (Whereupon, the document above re-
18 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
19 No. 1805 for identification, and the excerpts
20 therefrom were marked prosecution's exhibit
21 1805-A and received in evidence.)

22 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: The commandant of
23 the camp, Captain Dieudonne, R.N.I.A., has given a
24 synopsis of the manhandling and ill-treatment by
25 the Japanese in his report, prosecution document

1 5504: prisoners of war had to climb and stay in a
2 tree full of red ants; various ways of torture were
3 applied; severe beatings, until unconsciousness,
4 resulting in bruised and cracked ribs and also in
5 the necessity of skin-grafting; the Japanese camp
6 commandant took part in beatings; strangling; water-
7 test; confinement in cells under utterly bad condi-
8 tions; sick people forced to labour.

9 I would like to read some excerpts. In the
10 middle of page 4:

11 "28th October, 1942.

12 "Army Sergeant Smit, A.J. Service No.
13 91509, on a working party at the Ciba was addressed
14 by a Japanese, who remarked upon his work. Sergeant
15 Smit, out of politeness jumped from his sitting posi-
16 tion on the ground to attention with his tool in
17 hand. The Japanese was apparently frightened and
18 accused him of aggressiveness and threatening and
19 ordered him to do the 'lizard' with stretched body,
20 flat hands and toe-tips on the ground. Thereafter
21 37 beatings with the club. Upon return at the camp
22 at night the matter was reported to YOSFIDA, who
23 repeated the beating and gave another 50 strokes.
24 Sergeant Smit not being able to stand on his legs
25 any more was held to a tree by other prisoners of

1 war, who were forced by YOSHIDA to hold Smit erect
2 against a tree. The prisoners of war, who held
3 Smit, also were beaten. This punishment was so
4 beastly that blood soaked his shirt and ran down
5 Smit's legs. He had to be admitted to the hospital
6 where he remained for a considerable time before he
7 was able to walk again.

8 "2nd January, 1943.

9 "YOSHIDA supervising some work at the
10 wire fence around the hospital premises, yelled to
11 A. Lewis, hospital attendant, who happened to pass
12 on a gallery some 30 meters away. Not knowing that
13 the yelling was directed at him, Lewis proceeded on
14 his duty whereupon YOSHIDA followed him and after
15 knocking him to the floor gave him a beastly beat-
16 ing. Dr. Nanning, the doctor on watch in the
17 hospital, attracted by the noise outside, appeared
18 in a doorway and was summoned by YOSHIDA. Dr.
19 Nanning did not understand the almost incompre-
20 hensible mixture of YOSHIDA's few words of Malay and
21 Japanese, which fact aggravated the situation and
22 resulted in a ferocious beating at the gate, where
23 Dr. Nanning and Lewis, thoroughly wet by the many
24 buckets of water poured over them, had to stand to
25 attention for some hours."

1 I pass to page 7.

2 "Engineer D.W. Tarenskeen, sergeant 1/c,
3 one of the party leaders, was given 20 strokes
4 with the club, followed by a one-sided wrestling
5 demonstration, kicking and beating of vital parts
6 of body and head, strangling immediately followed
7 by pouring in the mouth of some buckets of water.
8 Thereafter a final beating of 40 strokes. Three
9 more party leaders were given almost the same treat-
10 ment. After the final beating, the victims had to
11 start to attention (two were flat on the ground).
12

13 "4th August, 1944.

14 "An Englishman was given 70 strokes by
15 YOSHIDA because he did not perform 'eyes right' to
16 his satisfaction.

17 "5th August, 1944.

18 "Wilkinson, J. Stoker R.N., hesitated
19 to execute an order given him by the officer in
20 command of the British contingent, which caused
21 that one working party to leave the gate one man
22 short. YOSHIDA and his gang administered not less
23 than 207 strokes to Wilkinson. The extraordinary
24 strength and will power of Wilkinson infuriated
25 YOSHIDA, who was determined to beat him down com-
pletely. However, Wilkinson managed to stand to

1 attention, though unsteady, for over two hours
2 afterwards.

3 "12th January, 1945.

4 "The party leader of 'Galley Mariso'
5 group, returned to camp with rice from the noon meal
6 in his mess tin. KAKOI, the sergeant of the guards
7 had the entire group badly thrashed, although most
8 of them were prisoners of war of advanced age. It
9 is not improbable that the death of Sergeant W. ten
10 Have soon afterwards (18 February '45) is connected
11 with this beating. On the same day the radio
12 working parties, 120 in total, were given a beastly
13 beating by the entire camp guards under direction
14 of YOSHIDA. YOSHIDA kicked several men with his
15 boots whilst lying on the ground after beating,
16 till blood ran down their faces. Reason: some men
17 had stolen sugar. Food situation at that time was
18 extremely poor.

19 "24th January, 1945.

20 "KAKOI, Sergeant of the Guards, thrashed
21 many prisoners of war from returning working parties
22 for no apparent reason.

23 "18th February, 1945.

24 "The garrison commander HIKOICHI ISHIDA
25 ordered a thorough search in the camp. The names of

1 all men who had reserve food stowed away were noted.
2 At night the entire camp had to line up and all peo-
3 ple whose names were noted were given a beastly
4 beating, varying from 35 to 110 strokes, with the
5 club. Then followed all the hut- and group leaders.
6 Many victims were knocked senseless and kicked all
7 over the body whilst lying on the ground. The
8 entire guard was ordered to perform this sadistic
9 orgy. . . .

10 "20th February, 1945.

11 "Case: Dodds, A. Royal Marine.

12 "This prisoner of war was caught with a
13 bag of eggs, brought in from outside for sick peo-
14 ple, needing additional food. The entire camp had
15 to fall in to witness the torture which was beyond
16 words, whilst the entire working group to which he
17 belonged was given the cruellest treatment after
18 having done the 'lizard' for about one hour, in
19 which all the British officers and chaplain had to
20 participate. Dodds was condemned to death by
21 YOSHIDA and was to be beheaded. The chaplain of
22 the 'Exeter', C.O.C. Fitzgerald, was ordered to
23 conduct the community praying and to say the prayers
24 of the dead. After prayers were said the matter was
25 dismissed and Dodds put in the bricks where he

1 remained for a considerable time, in spite of a bad
2 attack of dysentery.

3 "21st February, 1945.

4 "A Japanese doctor made an inspection of
5 the camp hospital. Looking in a refuse-bin, he
6 discovered some food rests. Dr. Bakker, senior
7 medical officer, Capt. Wittich and Lt. Ketel were
8 ordered to stand over the dustbin with head bent
9 down for a considerable time. All doctors and
10 hospital attendants had to fall in at the gate, where
11 they were given a serious thrashing. Many of the
12 Red Cross personnel were beaten senseless and were
13 then given the water test (pouring water in the
14 mouth whilst the nose was held tight.)"

15 On the next page, the first paragraph:

16 "14th March, 1945.

17 "The most disgusting parade of miserable
18 human beings was held on this day, when YOSHIDA
19 ordered the lining up of all patients in the sick
20 barracks. Q.-P.-O. and 'no work'. Q barracks con-
21 tained the bad dysentery and beriberi cases, P those
22 patients suspected of dysentery and/or other
23 infectious disease, O patients who were dismissed
24 from Q or P for recovery, 'no work' all patients who
25 were unable to do manual labour for a few days, such

1 as malaria, wounds, etc. It was a rainy day but in
2 spite of this all patients even those who had to be
3 supported for not being able to walk had to fall in.
4 Capt. Dieudonne who strongly protested against this
5 beastly order and who refused to have some really
6 dangerous patients lifted from their beds, was
7 beaten with a small wooden board and knocked to
8 the floor. All the lined up patients then were
9 marched to the gate. Those who were unable to walk
10 were carried by their friends. The physical condi-
11 tion of most of the P, Q and O patients was such
12 that the rows of five had to support each other to
13 keep erect and move forward. By the time this
14 miserable parade had reached the gate some 150 meters
15 from Q barracks rain was pouring down. Most of the
16 patients were only dressed in their bed clothing and
17 rather poor at that, so that they were soaked in
18 no time. After having been lined up for about a
19 quarter of an hour YOSFIDA ordered the patients who
20 were lifted from their beds, to the hospital and
21 had all others repair to their blocks. It is not
22 much to assume that several cases of death have
23 been precipitated by this parade and even that it
24 has been the cause of death for some patients.
25 Remains to be stated that the British officers who

1 were looking after British patients, also suffered
2 bad beatings by YOSHIDA."

3 The prosecution enters document 5538 as
4 an exhibit.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual
6 terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
8 ment No. 5538 will receive exhibit No. 1806.

9 ("Whereupon, the document above re-
10 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
11 No. 1806 and received in evidence.)

12 LIEUT. COLONEL DAMSTE: At Teragan,
13 Halmaheira, Molucca's, a camp of British Indian
14 prisoners of war was established, on which the
15 Indian Medical Officer Captain S.N. Paul, reports
16 in his affidavit, prosecution document 5538: In
17 February 1945 the Indian prisoners of war were told
18 that they formed a part of the Imperial Japanese
19 Army, on orders of the High Command. Notwithstand-
20 ing their protests they were forced to do fatigues
21 and military training, under severe discipline in-
22 volving corporal ill-treatment. Beatings unto un-
23 consciousness, and even death; the doctor was pre-
24 vented from appropriate treatment of seriously ill
25 patients although this was possible. Food was very

1 bad, most prisoners of war contracted beriberi. The
2 sick had to parade and consequently many collapsed;
3 still they were compelled to work."

4 With the Court's permission, I was prepared
5 to read most of this affidavit. It is rather lengthy.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half
7 past nine on Monday.

8 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-
9 ment was taken until Monday, 30 December
10 1946, at 0930.)

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