

EXTRACT FROM THE BOOK "KAUNMEIBO NERABI JARAN" REFERENCE
BOOK & LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY "KOKUSAKU-
KENKYU-KAI" IN JAPANESE

- Page 8 AOKI, Kazuo, Minister of Home Affairs, Member of the House of Peers.
- Page 13 ITO, Rokuro, Executive Director of the Sogo Hoppo Bunka Kenkyu Kai (Society for the Systematic Study of Northern Culture)
- Page 14 ISHIGURO, Tadoatsu, Chairman of the Manshu Iji Kyokai (Society for Immigration into Manchuria)
- Page 19 OKURA, Kimimochi, Baron, Member of the House of Peers.
- Page 21 OTA, Masataka, Doctor of Economics, Member of the House of the Representatives.
- Page 22 OKUMURA, Kiwao, Vice-President of the Board of Information.
- Page 23 KAYA, Okinobu, Minister of Finance.
- Page 28* KIYOSE, Ichiro, Doctor of Law, Member of the House of the Representatives. *caught by. sent it and it other labels*
- Page 32 GOTO, Fumio, Administrator General of the Yokusankwai, Member of the House of Peers.
- X* GOKO, Kiejoshi, President of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
- GODO, Takuo, Vice-Admiral, President of the Kogyo Kumiai Chuo Kai (Industrial Union Central Society)
- Page 46 TOGO, Shigenori, Member of the House of Peers.
- Page 55 HIBINO, Masaharu, Vice-Admiral, President of the Dai-Nippon Heiki (Dai-Nippon Military Arms Company)
- Page 56 HIRAO, Shozaburo, Member of the House of Peers, President of the Iron and Steel Control Society.
- X* Page 58 FUJIWARA, Ginjiro, Member of the House of Peers, General Manager of the Sangyo Setsubi Ei-dan (Industrial Equipment Business Organization)
- Page 163 Members which are legal persons located in Tokyo.
- Page 165 The Bank of Chosen (The Tokyo Branch Office)
- Page 167 The Nippon Kogyo Bank

Page 169 The Mitsui General Headquarters

The Mitsubishi Head Office

The South Manchuria Railway Company, Ltd.

Page 172 The Sumitomo Head Office (A joint stock company)

As of October, Showa 17 /1942/

"Kai-in Mei-bo Narabini Yoran" (Register of Members with Brief Particulars)

Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai (Society for the Study of State Policies)

19 June 1946

Seizure of Evidentiary Documents

On 3 June 1946 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Intelligence Corps representatives, three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuyaku, Sakuraguoka No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following:-

1. Preliminary Draft of the Borders of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity. Sphere and its structure, 18 February 1942 (General Affairs Bureau of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu-Kai" society).
2. "Kainmeibo Narabi Yoran" - book of reference and list of members of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu - Kai" society. ("Kokusaku Kenkyu - Kai" Publishing House, Tokyo, 1942).

The aforementioned seizure was made under authority given in AG 200.2, 10 November 1945, CIS, SCAP, Index No. 261.

I hereby certify that the action described herein and the documents described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Williamson
Special Agent, CIC

Hereby I acknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home.

/s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo

CERTIFICATE:

I, Junior Lieutenant BORIS ALECSANDROVICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations.

Today YATSUGI, Kazuo in my presence signed the above said document and I certify that this document has been correctly translated from the English language into Japanese and was correctly understood.

I am duly warned that for the false translation I bear responsibility according to Article 92 of the R.S. F. S. C. Criminal Code.

Signature B. Petrov
BORIS PETROV, Junior Lt.

The Certificate is taken by
Military Interrogator Major BASENKO

REPORT OF THE SOCIETY "KOKUSAKU
KINKYUKAI"

/page 2/

CONTENTS

- I. Gist of policy for management of the southern areas occupied as a result of the Greater East Asia war. (December 1941).
- II. Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. (December 1941).
- III. Report of the Committee for administrative measures. (October 1941). (Including the register of the Committeemen, the reference materials and the circumstances of the Committee meetings.)

/page 7/

Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

/page 14-15/

Chap. 3. Future of Soviet territories.

Though this problem cannot be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact, the Maritime Province shall be annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian Empire shall be put into the sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed under the complete control of Japan and Germany with Omsk as the point of demarcation.

/page 19/

Chap. 5. Independent states in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and their defence.

/page 21/

The problem as regards Siberia as a whole cannot be decided this instant; it will be influenced by the Japanese-German Pact as well as the extent to which the Soviets survive.

/page 29/

(This plan was made by the military authorities and the Department of Oversea Affairs in December 1941.)

/page 38/

Members of the Committee for Administrative Measures, in the National Policy for the Investigation of the Society (KOKUSAKU KINKYUKAI):

Mr. Nobuyuki ABE
Mr. Shigeo ODATE
Mr. Shinsuke KISHI
Mr. Fumio GOTO
Mr. Hiroshi SHIMOMURA
Mr. Kensuke HORIUCHI
Mr. Rensuke ISOGAI
Mr. Kinmochi OKURA
Mr. Seizo KOBAYASHI
Mr. Hyogoro SAKURAI
Mr. Sankichi TAKAHASHI
Mr. Hatao YAMAKAWA

/page 39/

Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures, together with reference materials.

The Administrative Office of the National Policy Investigation Society.

Chap. I. The purpose of establishing this Committee.

Assuming that Japan will inevitably expand in the near future either southwardly or northwardly, if our measures are taken without any preparations, it is probable that we shall simply repeat what we are experiencing in the administration of Manchuria and North China. To be unprepared is hazardous. Therefore, our Society is establishing this Committee for administrative measures with the purpose of studying and discussing without delay many sorts of problems forwarding the results to the Government and requesting the Government to make the necessary preparations.

Chap. II. The original plan with an epitome of each member's opinion.

/page 43/

To what extent ought we to make use of the natives in the matters of administration?

1. The original plan.

As to this point we must need pay different heed to different cases, that is, for permanent occupation (suppose the Soviet Maritime Province) and in the other events (suppose the Dutch East Indies). For example in the above two cases we are required to think how to make use of the Soviet people, the Indonesians and the Dutch according to the case. Is it good or bad to make use of the natives? If we do, what will be the highest position they can get? Is it proper or improper to place Japanese in the regional

prefectural and village administrations. (of course, in order to watch the others)?

How ought we manage the native officers who were popular or unpopular among the native people?

Is it good or bad to have the system of G.P.U. propped by the natives? Specifically in the case of the USSR., is it advisable to employ White-guard Russians, or not? Especially in Dutch East Indies, is it good to employ Indians, Burmans, Malayans, Chinese, etc. or not?

2. Every member's opinion about the original plan.

Member A. "Needless to say natives should not be used in the Dutch East Indies. Inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies should not be employed either, except special persons. In the case of the USSR I think it would be good to make use of the White-guard Russian emigrants."

/page 54/

(7) Is it advisable or not to send colonists to the actual places?

1. The original plan.

It may be considered as a good plan for expanding the influence of Japan and at the same time supplying the vegetables and other things that the army needs that we send the simple armed cultivators immediately after the first four months of occupation. This might be necessary in the Dutch East Indies, but in the case with the U.S.S.R., it may be worth even more serious consideration.

- END -

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARANENKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the document "List of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occupied as a Result of the "Greater East Asia War," on 58 sheets, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify that this document was found by the Red Army forces in 1945 in South Sakhalin in the files of Karafuto Co. Ltd.

Lt. Col TARANENKO
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 29, 1946.

Document Relative to the Maneuvers
for Total War.

August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.

mg

W

Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 2

11 June (16 SHOWA) 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for total war,

IIMURA, Yuzuru

We have decided on the enforcement plan of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war for 1941 as per the attached.

(partly revised on 11, July)

Attached List of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war, No. 2.

The Enforcement Plan of the First Theoretical
Maneuvers for Total War.

Month	Date	Day	Morn- ing	After- noon	Term	Imagi- nary	The Outline of Operations	Remarks
June	Middle		Delivery of problem		The first phase of man- euvers)	Inter- nal & Exter- nal situa- tions main- tain their pres- ent condi- tion.	The following personal work are given to all of the post-gradu- ates: 1. The in- vestigation of our na- tional policy. 2. strateg- ic plan- ning for total warfare. 3. The judg- ing of situa- tion neces- sary for the above.	The maneuver will be di- rected most by the assis- tant super- visor MATSUDA. 2) Each mem- ber of the Bureau will give neces- sary in- structions.
July	first							
July	middle		Delivery of problem.		The second phase of man- euvers	"	The principle organs of Blue land will be con- stituted by all of the post-gradu- ates and they will be re- quired to do the following work: 1. The	All the mem- bers of the Bureau will participate in directing the maneu- vers accord- ing to par- tial charge (designated separately).
August	middle							
	and							
	last							

					planning of total war strategies. 2. Preparations for the development of total war strategies.	Review-period.
Sept.	4 Thurs- day	Judgement	Third Term of	The period of train- ed na- tional rela- tions.	Imaginary situation is given to the principal organs of Blue land, & the manage- ment of the situation will be studied.	Henceforward the maneu- vers will be directed under the following organizatio 1) Supervi- sory Div. Super- Head visor of th Assis- Bure tant Secre Help- tary er Mats
	5 Fri- day		Maneu- vers.		1) Completion of prepara- tion for total warfare within and abroad.	2) The judg ing divisio for armed warfare.
	6 Satur- day	Judge- ment off	The Fourth	The period of train- ed na- tional rela- tions.	2) Preparation armed warfare The directing of psycholog- ical and econ- omic warfare.	3) The judg ing divisio for diploma tic warfare.
	7 Sun- day	Holiday	Phase of		3) The deci- sion for war.	4) The judg ing divisio for psychol ogical war fare.
	8 Mon- day		Maneu- vers.		4) The direct- ing of total war after this decision.	5) The judg ing divisio for economi warfare.
	9 Tues- day	Judgement	The Fifth	The period when war is inevit- able.	5) Directing the outbreak of war.	6) The judg ing divisio for interna situations. (Note) The respec- tive divi- sions con- stitute of the members and part- time member of the Bu- reau and government officials outside the Bureau. The particulars will be de- cided separately.
	10 Wed- nes- day		Phase of Maneu- vers.		6) Directing of total war immediately after the out- break of war.	
	11 Thurs- day	Judgment	The Sixth	Half a month after	7) Directing of total war- fare during wartime ac- cording to cir- cumstances.	
	12 Fri- day		Phase of Maneu- vers.	Three months after.	8) The maneu- vers will be suspended on the morning of the 20th.	
	13 Satur- day	Judge- ment off	The Seventh	A month after.		
	14 Sun- day	Holi- day	Phase of			
	15 Mon- day		Maneu- vers.			
	16 Tues- day	Judge- ment	Eighth Phase	Six months after.		
	17 Wednes- day					
	18 Thurs- day	Judge- ment	Ninth Phase			
	19 Fri- day					
	20 Satur- day	off				

Sept.	21 Sun- day	Holiday	Tenth	1) Drafting of criti- cism.	
	22 Mon- day	Judgement	Phase of	2) Prepara- tions for the Research Meeting.	
	23 Tues- day	Holiday	Maneu- vers.		
	24 Wed- nes- day			1) Research Meeting.	Outside officials will be requested
	25 Thurs- day			2) Criticism (After this the maneuvers will be concluded.)	to parti- cipate in the meet- ing.
	26 Fri- day				
	27 Satur- day		The arrange- ment of	1) The arrange- ment of the results of the maneuvers.	The arrangemen of maneuve records,
	28 Sun- day	Holiday	the re- sults of the	2) Research for the future.	and the arrangemen of the re- sults of research
	29 Mon- day		maneu- ver.		by each member of the Bureau
	30 Tues- day				

Remarks:

- (1) Judgment stands for judgment conference.
- (2) Graph shows the operation of all the members concerned.
- (3) The prescriptions for the carrying out of maneuvers and the principles of instruction (items for investigation) will be decided separately.

Prescriptions for the Execution of
the First Theoretical Maneuver for
Total War.

Part I. The Object of the Maneuvers

Article I. The object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-graduates of this Research Bureau practice definite measures for total warfare, as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing researches on it as superior executives.

Article II. The following are the principal items which should be studied and practiced during the maneuvers:

- 1) The national policy and object which should be propagandized within and abroad.
- 2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire.
- 3) The points in drafting part of the various plans necessary for the execution of total warfare.
- 4) The main points of consolidating and strengthening positions for total warfare.
- 5) The outline for directing total warfare.
- 6) Part of a definite policy for the execution of psychological, economic and diplomatic warfares against a specific country.
- 7) Directing organs for total warfare, and directing organs for psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare.
- 8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution of total warfare by Japan.

Article III. The particulars of items for investigation and practice mentioned in the preceding articles are prescribed separately in the outline of maneuver instructions.

Section IV.

Article 9. When the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvers are over, the Supreme Commander will comment on it for the benefit of those who participated in the maneuver.

The main points on which comments will be made are approximately as follows:

1. Whether the plans set up beforehand were suitable or not.
2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or not.
3. Whether ex post facto research was carried out properly or not.
4. Whether proper discipline was maintained during the maneuvers or not.
5. Instructions for the future.

Article 10. Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimated situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term maneuvers), each umpire department shall submit materials for comment to the Supreme Commander. Each umpire department, however, must adjust beforehand the opinions of the umpires belonging to that department regarding the materials for comment

The draft of the comments shall be made by the critics' council. The members who are to attend the council meeting shall be specially designated.

Section V. - Gathering the Results of the Maneuvers.

Article 11. Each staff member of this Institute shall, depending on his assignment, arrange and preserve the records of the maneuvers as well as the opinions, etc., on the items for research and matters which should be improved concerning the plans of the maneuvers, or report them to other organizations which require such information.

Section VI. - Specific Symbols.

Article 12. In order to preserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations and places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers:

A. U. S. A.	B. Britain	C. China
D. The Soviet Union	E. Dutch East Indies	F. French Indo-China
G. Australia	H. Hawaii	I. India
J. Inner South Sea	K. Canada	L. Central & S. America
M. Manchukuo	N. Japan	O. Borneo
P. Philippine Islands	Q. Malay	R. Far Eastern Regions of the Soviet Union.
S. Singapore	T. Thailand	
U. Vladivostok	V. Burma	
W. Aleutian and Alaskan regions	X. The Axis Powers	
	X ₁ , Germany	
	X ₂ , Italy.	

Program for directing the Third to Ninth Term Maneuvers, inclusive, in the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

The Term of Maneuvers	Imaginary Time	Date of Enforcement Date (Day)	Hour	Functions for directing the maneuvers	The assembled empires	The principal maneuver items.
Third Term	August 16 Shova 1941	6 Wednesday	08:30 09:30	The opening of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation for the third term. Explanations concerning the Empires will follow in the same way.	C scope	(1) Negotiations with A and the economic demands thereof.
		7 Thursday	09:00	Secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country to the supervising section.	D scope	(2) The reply to A and D
			13:00 14:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 August. The criticism regarding this. Delivery and explanation of supplementary situations.	B scope	(3) The preparations of war against D and (A).
The Fourth Term	September	8 Friday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of the measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism regarding this. Discussion of the situation for the Fourth Term.	A scope	
			14:30 15:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation for the Fourth Term.	C scope	(1) Continuation of No. 1 in the preceding term.
		9 Saturday	11:00	Secret report to the supervisors on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) The response to A concerning the H. Treaty.
		11 Monday	08:30 10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 September. The criticism regarding this. Announcement and explanation of additional situations.	B scope	(3) Measures against the stiffening attitude between A and H.
The Fifth Term		12 Tuesday	08:30 10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of September. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation for the fifth term.	A scope	

The Fifth Term (cont'd)	September	12 Tuesday	14:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation	C scope	(1) The reply to X.
			15:00			
	October	13 Wednesday	09:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against the suspension of the commercial relations with A, B, E and L.
14:00			The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 October. The criticism regarding this.	B scope		
15:00			The announcement and explanation of additional situations.			
The Sixth Term	November	14 Thursday	08:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Oct. The criticism thereof. The announcement and discussion of the situation of the sixth term.	A scope	(3) Measures in regard to the resolution to advance into E.
			14:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the sixth term.	C scope	(1) Resolution to hasten actions against E.
			15:00			
	15 Friday	10:00	10:00	The secret report to the supervisory section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Negotiations with D.
			14:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Nov. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of the additional situation.	B scope	
			15:00			
The Seventh Term	December	16 Saturday	08:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Nov. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the seventh term.	A scope	(3) Measures for commencing the advance into E.
			10:00			
			13:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the seventh term.	C scope	(1) The resolution for 'P' operations and the measures thereof.
	18 Monday	10:00	10:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.	D scope	(2) Measures against B and D.
			14:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 Dec. The criticism thereof. The announcement of the additional situations.	B scope	
			15:00			
19 Tuesday	08:30	10:30	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of Dec. The criticism thereof. The discussion of the situation of the eighth term.	A scope	(3) The measures in accordance with the outbreaks of war between N and A, B.	

Doc 1622

The Eighth Term

The Ninth Term

From January to March 17 SHOWA (1942)	20 Wednesday	14:30	The announcement and explanation of the situation of	C scope	(1) The measures against the air-raid on Tokyo. (2) The measures towards the diet. (3) The measures towards D and L. (4) The economic and political measur towards E, F, T, P and Q.
		15:00	the eighth term.		
		10:00	The secret report to the supervising section on the	D scope	
		14:00	general policy of the Blue country.	B scope	
From April to October	21 Thursday	15:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end		(1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term. (2) The measures in relations with (3) The resolution of war against D (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country hence forward.
		10:30	of Feb. The criticism thereof. The announcement and		
	08:30	explanation of additional situations.	A scope		
	10:30	The presentation of the measures to be taken until the			
	14:30	end of March. The criticism thereof. The discussion			
	15:00	of the situation of the ninth term.	C scope		
22 Friday	10:00	The announcement and explanation of the situation of the	C scope	(1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term. (2) The measures in relations with (3) The resolution of war against D (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country hence forward.	
	11:00	ninth term.			
	10:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of	B scope		
	11:00	June. The criticism thereof. The announcement and			
23 Saturday	08:30	explanation of the additional situations.		(1) The continuation of the No. 4 in the preceding term. (2) The measures in relations with (3) The resolution of war against D (4) The total war strategies to be taken by the Blue country hence forward.	
	09:00	The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of	B scope		
	12:00	August. The criticism thereof. The announcement and			
		12:00	explanation of the additional situations.		
			The presentation of the works of each participant.	D scope	
			Maneuver to be stopped.		

REMARKS:

The assembled judges: A scope - all the judges if possible. B scope - the principal judges of each section. C scope - the concerning judges of each section. D scope - judges having special concerns.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 3

No. 098 of the 100 volumes

24 July, Showa 16, 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers
for the total warfare:

IIMURA, Yuzuru

(1) The Situation. As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Command of the Government on July 24th regarding the strategy of total warfare, we have agreed on the following unanimously.

1. Blue land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancing into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total
Warfare, No. 6 -- 5

(Secret)

No. 98 of 120 volumes

Designated Distribution	
Maintenance of Secrecy	only for those concerned with the maneuvers.
Disposal	To be returned on conclusion of the maneuver

The 1st Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War for
1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Report on Activities in Regard to the Subjects
Given for the Second Term of the Maneuvers.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propagandized internally and abroad.

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land.

Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Government of Blue land

(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau)

TABLE OF CONTENTS.		Page
Part I.	The national policy of Blue land to be propagandized internally and abroad.	10101
	1st Item - The statement of Blue land	10101
	2nd Item - The conversation of the Prime Minister of Blue land	10201
Part II.	A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land	21001
	Classification I - Tactics of total warfare of the Blue land plan	21001
	Classification II - A part of the plan for the Blue land's army and navy	22101
Item I.	Matters concerning the army.	
	1. The classification and numbers of necessary personnel	22101
	2. The amount of important necessary materials	22103
	3. The classification and number of requisitioned ships necessary	22104
	4. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the civilian factories	22104
	5. Summary of the military budget	22105
Item II.	Matters concerning the navy.	
	1. The classification and number of the necessary personnel	22201
	2. The amount of necessary important materials	22201
	3. The classification and number of requisitioned ships necessary	22202
	4. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the principal civilian factories	22202
	5. Summary of the military budget	22203
Item III.	The outline of plan for defense against air raids throughout the nation.	22301
Item IV.	The plan for defense against air-raid in the Kanto District	22401
Item V.	The plan for maintenance and control of marine transportation	22501
Classification III	- The outline of foreign policy for Blue land	23101
Item I.	The plan for diplomatic warfare	23101
Item II.	The policy for the disposal of the China Incident	23201
Item III.	The policy towards Manchuria	23201
Item IV.	The plan for administration of the occupied territories	23401

Classification IV - The plan for psychological warfare of Blue land	24001
Classification V -- The plan for economic warfare of the Blue land	25101
Item I. The principle of repletion of the economic power of Blue land	25101
1. The policy of expanding the productive power	25101
2. The policy of expanding and strengthening the economic co-prosperity sphere	25106
3. The commercial policy (the exchange of materials)	25116
4. The policy for replenishing deficient materials	25120
Item II. The outline for mobilizing the economic power	25201
1. The policy for the mobilization of materials	25201
2. The policy for the mobilization of capital	25226
3. The policy for the mobilization of labor	25249
4. The policy for the mobilization of transportation	25259
5. The policy for financial plans	25271
Item III. The plan for the execution of economic warfare	25301

3 of No. 13 -- Total War Table Top Maneuvers (plan)
 August 23, 1941 (submitted at 0830)
 Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers
 IIMURA, Minoru

Additional Situations and Problems of
 9th Period Maneuver of First Total War
 Table Top Maneuvers.

- I. Situations up to the latter part of September 1942.
1. The Cabinet meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D and the military operations were commenced on August 1. Substantial fighting occurred in many places along the M-D frontier, but thereafter there has not been a great resistance. As a result of speedy pursuit by N army, a greater part of the Far Eastern army and a large part of its navy and air forces were destroyed and the important area of "R" was occupied and secured by the latter part of September.

D retired its front and has declared long-term resistance, but its sustaining power is doubtful.
 (pp. 13-10 - 13-11)

7. The great offensive by X against D and B since the spring gained conspicuous effects correlative to N's operations, but is not yet decisive. The present situation does not allow anyone to make any assumption as to the conclusion of the world confusion. (p. 13-12)

Part II Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land

Classification I - Programme for Total Warfare for the Blue land (plan)

No. 1 - The object of total warfare

- (1) The object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as well as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

- (2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A, B (including E) and C (Chungkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D.

- (3) The center of the Greater East Asia Sphere is comprised of N, M and C, R, V, and the areas east of them, also the areas north of G (G itself exclusive), and those west of 180° East Longitude enter into the Greater East Asia sphere. (p. 21001)

No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Total Warfare

- (1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C Incident according to established principles; while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be completed and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately wars with other hostile countries.

- (2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing of materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures.

However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the circumstances demand. When a war with A and B becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and declare war. We will exclude their influences in East Asia, and at the same time endeavor to make them give up their hostilities against us.

(3) Regarding the North, we shall by force of arms facilitate X's disposal of D; and supervise the fulfillment of the neutrality pact between N and D. We shall devise economic advancement by diplomatic means, and avoid armed warfare as far as the situation allows. However, if it is inevitable according to the situation, we shall resort to arms.

(4) Through cooperation with X, we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with her, while completing every possible preparation for an initiative war against A and B as a precaution against A's participation in a war with X.

(5) Thereafter, we shall decide on our different plans in accordance with the transitions in the situation, thereby anticipating the achievement of the purposes of total warfare.

The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare

1. Against C. By avoiding the expansion of occupied areas, we shall execute repeated and active armed actions against the Chungking Regime to destroy her armed power. At the same time, we shall take measures to deprive her people of their will to fight by destroying her establishment and strengthening our economic blockage of her. In the presentation of war against other hostile countries, the principles enumerated in the preceding article shall be strongly maintained in the hope that the consequences will contribute to the surrender of Chungking Government.
2. Against F and T. The spirit of joint defense with F will be strengthened. When the attitude of T is unfriendly towards N, and she does not comply with our demands, and also when A and B try to exclude our influences in T we shall make military advances into T.
3. Against E. If E's attitude towards N is to be aggravated and especially if she refuses to supply us with the necessary materials, we shall make military advance on a favorable occasion with a resolve for war with A and B. In case a war with A and B is inevitable, we shall advance into E.
4. Against A and B. If a war with A and B becomes inevitable, in the event of, for instance, A participating in the war against X, or A completely cutting off all commercial relationship

with N, or danger of armed collision with A and our country, or N being threatened with military invasion by A, we will take the initiative in starting a war and immediately occupy P, Q and E, thereby strengthening our strategic and economic situation; and at the same time, we shall plan to destroy the enemy's military power and to make them abandon their hostilities towards us.

5. Against D. We shall strengthen our defense against D in North M. Although we shall avoid as far as possible any armed warfare until our move in the South is finally concluded, we shall occupy the strategically important areas in R by executing armed warfare at a favorable occasion; that is, when D is near collapse in the D-X war, or when D is about to take hostile action against N, or when A tries to make military advances into R, or whenever war becomes inevitable under any other condition.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 10
No. 98 of the 120 volumes.

14 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)
(delivered at
1430)

Appointed distributor

Judge Mihidaijo of the Ministry of
Commerce & Industry

Maintenance of secrecy - only for mem-
bers concerned in the maneuvers.

Disposal - to be returned on the conclu-
sion of the maneuver.

Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers
for Total Warfare

IIMURA, Yuzuru

The circumstances and subjects for the Sixth Phase of
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

(1) The circumstances in the middle and end of November.

A. The international situation.

1. With the approach of the severe cold of winter, the D-X war is gradually nearing a stalment in the areas east of the River Don, Moscow and Leningrad.
2. There is not much change in the BX war except that there is an indication of advance towards the Suez and Gibraltar.
3. There is also no great change in the A-X war. It seems part of A's forces in the Atlantic seem to have commenced a move to the Pacific. A declared war against X on the 1st of November.

4. Although the A, B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense programs with what troops they have stationed in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propagandic activities to divert N's movements. Part of Blue land's plans seem to have been intercepted by A, B and E.
 5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propagandic activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A, B and C.
 6. Although conditions in the R district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either to M or A.
- B. The conditions of the supreme command and the army.
1. The supreme command of Blue land desires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible.
 2. The preparations of the supreme command for action against E is now under progress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3

No. 98 of the 120 volumes

15 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

(delivered:
1200)

Appointed distributor Judge Saidaijo of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Maintenance of secrecy - only for members concerned in the maneuvers.
Disposal - to be returned on the conclusion of the maneuvers.

Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

Supplementary situations for the sixth phase of the first
theoretical maneuvers for total warfare.

Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of Novem-
ber.

- (1) The troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 Novem-
ber; and after making sudden attacks, they have secured
effectively several important areas in E. (Names of
places and the war situation stated orally, now and here-
after.) The casualties of the Blue land are slight.

- (2) E has declared she will "resist to the utmost the invasion of N", and is asking for the aid of A and B. Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually being pushed back by Blue land's army. Of the economic installations in the territories of E Country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been exposed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent.
- (3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as follows:
- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Vessels | 80,000 tons |
| Crude oil | 210,000 kilolitres |
| Ordinary benzine | 97,000 kilolitres |
| Heavy-oil | 186,000 kilolitres |
- (4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A. It seems that a part of A's naval forces in the Atlantic are being rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N, the true intention of the government is not clear.
- (5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own.
- (6) _____ thousand soldiers and _____ thousand tons of vessels have been newly mobilized in preparation for operations against A.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 16

No. 98 of the 100 volumes

Appointed distributor -

Maintenance of secrecy - only for members concerned in the maneuvers

Disposal - to be returned on the conclusion of the maneuvers

28 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for
Total Warfare -- IIMURA, Yuzuru

The Criticism of the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.

In concluding the first theoretical maneuvers for total warfare, I shall hereby state my opinions regarding the important matters in the maneuvers, and thereby contribute to future researches by participants.

The first term of the maneuvers

- (1) Although I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their presentation of their

studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations, I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration.

At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours were short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies.

- (11) In the third period of the maneuvers the diplomatic policy of the government of Blue-land is to take advantage of the noticeably easier contemporary international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and I am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain the object of the measures by diplomatic means. For instance, in our relation with A and B, I think it was a failure of ours to have taken a diplomatic policy aimed at evading war with them.
- (12) In the third period of the maneuvers, I think the judgment that the proposition of A resulted from its weakness is appropriate, but I cannot approve of a passive diplomacy based on the propositions of A. We should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by taking advantage of her weakness and presenting positive proposal of our own. Therefore, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthening the relations with N and X.
- (14) In the fifth period of the maneuvers a more careful and deeper consideration will be necessary in the advance into E. For instance, we should not concentrate merely on the period concerning the completion of preparations. It will be necessary to make a thorough-going investigation into our knowledge of the general trend, the limit of our present aim, the mutual cooperative relations of the political and military strategies just before the advance, the actual domestic situation and the policy concerning them, etc.
- (15) Concerning the judgment on the ability to execute war against A, B and E, it was an attempt at a partial outline only as it was restricted by shortage of materials and time, but, to this extent I acknowledge it to be a comparatively fair work, and I especially approve of the sincere attitude taken in the investigation.

However, in reality, we must carefully study the material scope and connection of military and civilian needs in all phases, such as labor and material, static or dynamic, as well as to plan all these as an overall geographic unity involving N, M and C, and from the standpoint of time including the whole length of the war. Moreover, the assessment of the period until the commencement of all the activities in the above plan is insufficient and is altogether too short.

- (16) The cooperative activities of the political and military strategies prior to the advance into E are gravely insufficient. After the decision is made for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic, psychological and economic warfare should be actively developed under a single policy so as to facilitate operations. That is, to put A and B off guard, to facilitate their individual destruction, and to catch E napping to get a chance for sudden attack. In particular in order to complete the concentration of the nation's total power by keeping the plan secret and imaginary, it will be necessary to develop for a plain and definite object all the activities of the total power of a united nation.
- (18) It is wrong to have treated lightly the matter of declaring war on A and B under the circumstances in the last stage of the sixth period. It will be necessary to study carefully whether there can be no last measure to avoid war with A and B, and to consider prudently the serious results arising from the outbreak of war, although it must always be kept in mind that there is advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.
(Note) In order to facilitate study, we have executed this maneuver on the supposition that N's participation in the war by virtue of the NK treaty is not automatic.
- (19) However, I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circumstances detaining in the early stages of the seventh period maneuvers. There has been a rapid development in the situation, and the intentions of A and B towards N have become clear. The general situation demands our finding independently a way out of our impasse. Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders as we do today. This must be considered a good chance to make our decision for starting war against A and B.
- (20) The measures taken by the Government of Blue land on the basis of the studies made beforehand by the Second Committee about the measures to be taken toward foreign countries in connection with the outbreak of war, were as a whole quite suitable.
- However, there is still room for study in regard to war aims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of troops and peace terms) and representations to X about not concluding a separate peace.
- (25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had been generally expelled from the EPQ districts and the main force of A's army had been destroyed, I think it was necessary to study and determine the policy for the subsequent direction of the war against A and B.
- (26) It is good to note the improvement in the way you assessed the national strength in the war against D compared with that of the war against A and B, but I desire to see further creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency measures to cope with the situation at a time when the national existence is at stake.

Doc. No. 1622

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____
I. P. S. No. 1622

Statement of Source and Authenticity.

I, Rempei Kuriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated August, 1941, and described as follows: File re "First Table Top Maneuvers", published by Total War Research Institute and marked "Top Secret"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Rempei Kuriyama
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Hiramatsu, Kajumichi

Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt AUSMI

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

777

Extracts from the
Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee
"Organization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"

p. 17

The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee for
the Government Organization of Greater East Asia
Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on October 12, 1942 (Monday) at Privy
Council Office.

Persons present:

President HARA
Chief of Investigation Committee; Vice President
SUZUKI

Investigation Committee members:

p. 18

Councillor ISHII
Councillor MINAMI (Hiroshi)
Councillor USHIO
Councillor FUTAGAMI
Councillor OBATA
Councillor TAKEGOSHI
Councillor MITSUCHI
Councillor IZAWA
Councillor IKEDA
Councillor MINAMI (Jiro)

Ministers of State:

p.19

Premier concurrently War Minister TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently
Overseas Affairs Minister INO
Home Minister YUZAWA
Foreign Minister TANI

Exponents:

p. 20

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
Chief of Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau IRIYE
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau SATO
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau MIYAUCHI
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau ARAKI
President of Planning Board SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board AKINAGA
Vice-Chief, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI

Chief Secretary HORIYE
Secretary MOROHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Opened at 10 a.m.)

p. 21

Chief of Investigation Committee SUZUKI announces the meeting open.

To the question from Committee Member USHIO:

p. 27 Regarding the inquiry about the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere, Premier TOJO has replied that it includes KWANTUNG Region, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and new occupation zones resulting from the Greater East Asia War, and therefore, the limits would expand together with the extension of occupied territories.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No.

I. P. S. No. 1086BStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 9-14 Oct., 1942, and described as follows: Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee "Organization of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this
4th day of September 1946.

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo
Signature of official

SEAL

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
4th day of September 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

778

mg

Extracts from
"Plan for Establishment of Greater East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"

"Secret"

Series 45
Date: Jan. 27, 1942
Number of Copies - 150
Disposition - Inside the Institute
Outside of the Institute to be returned
as soon as through.

Published by the Research
Institute of Total War.

forwarded by Insp. Percutt

Chapter I.

Outline of ConstructionII. Forms of the East Asia Independent Co-prosperity.

Within the limits of the area formed by the Pacific Ocean, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean are brought together nations, peoples and their resources, and here are established areas of independent co-prosperity for East Asia nation and peoples. (p. 1)

The area including Japan, Manchukuo, North China, the down stream region of the Yangtse River, and the Soviet Maritime Province should be made the central zone for the East Asia Union, and Japan has the leading mission for the East Asia union.

III. The territorial boundary in the East Asia Union and the Japanese national defense sphere.

Central Sphere. It is the sphere of existence of Japan and it is the area including Japan, Manchukuo, North China, the downstream region of the Yangtse River and the Soviet Maritime Province.

Smaller co-prosperity sphere. It is the East Asia smaller self-supporting sphere and it is an area including the central sphere, Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China and the South Seas. (P. 2)

Greater Co-prosperity Sphere. It is the East Asia greater self-supporting sphere and it includes the Smaller co-prosperity sphere, Australia, India and the islands of the Pacific Ocean. (P. 3)

II. Political Forms of the East Asia Areas for the next Twenty Years.1. Manchukuo.

Manchukuo will develop steadily following the ideal of the establishment of the State; the unification of Japan and Manchukuo

will be realized and also, Manchukuo will be fortified as a military base for military operations against the U.S.S.R. The immigration policy will be furthered and the promotion of the harmony of the peoples is expected. (P. 18)

2. The East of the Soviet Union.

(1) The Soviet Maritime Province will be annexed to Japan as soon as possible.

(2) Territories besides the above will belong either to Japan, or depending on the circumstances to Manchukuo, and will be treated as special military regions. (P. 19)

II. Politics.

4. The East of the Soviet Union.

(1) The main principle of the construction will be satisfying the demands of the State defense of Japan and Manchukuo. Japan will hold military power in her hands.

(2) After the complete eradication of the red influence of the Soviet Union, a system of self-government of the lowest degree may be established if necessary.

(3) Adequate policy of developing natural resources and national policy will be adopted, thereby fortifying substantially those areas as a defense wall against the U.S.S.R.

5. Mongolia.

(1) The ultimate object will be establishing a defense wall against the U.S.S.R. and the degree of self government will gradually be promoted according to the standard of the people, but military and diplomatic matters will be protected and guided by Japan to the last. (P. 96)

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2402Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Rempo Kuriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 27 Jan., 1942, and described as follows: Draft of Plan for Establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere compiled by Total War Research Institute Stamped "Top Secret". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of Sep., 1946.

Rempo Kuriyama (signed)
Signature of Official

seal

Witness: Hiramatsu, Kazumichi
(signed)

Cabinet Secretary
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, _____, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
6 day of September, 1946

Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. AUSMI (signed)
NAME

Witness: J. A. Curtis (signed)

Investigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity

TOP SECRET

- 1. Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia. (A draft)

Document number	Total War Research Material No. 46
Ream number	No. 20
Date of compilation	February 18, 17th Year of Showa (1942)
Number of copies of Compilation	150 copies
Disposition	Keep within the Institute; the ones taken out must be returned after use.

- 2. Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.

/p.16/ Section 3. Scope and main points of occupation (semi-occupation).

/p.17/ 4. In the north, we must strive to establish a national defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position, as well as to make no miscalculation in the acquisition of strategic war materials. The main points to bear in mind in effecting occupation are given in Annex No. 3 attached herewith.

/pp.31-33/ Annex No. 3.

The main points of Eastern Siberia which are to be occupied.

- I. The Maritime Province of the Soviet Union.

(a) Vladivostok, Marinsk, Nikolaevsk, Petropavlovsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Tschue - iron
Ona and Ehabi - oil
Su-cheng, Artiem)
Voroshilov, Tavrichanka) coal

II. Khabarovsk Province

(a) Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Umarita - molybdenum
Kivda, Raichinsk - coal

III. Chita Province

(a) Chita, Karinskaya, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Kharekinsky - iron
Darasun - lead, zinc
Gutai - molybdenum
Bukachacha, Chernovsky)
Tarbagatai, Arbagar) coal

IV. Buriat-Mongol Province, Ulan-Ude and other important strategic points.

/p.32/ Section 4. The Means of waging War.

/p.78/ 4. Against the Soviet Union.

(A) Armed warfare.

1. Our policy is to speedily complete our war preparations against the Soviet Union and, together with our victories in the Greater East Asiatic War, overawe the Soviet Union, and, by making active use of our power and force according to the circumstances, cause the Soviet Union to conclude peace with Germany, thereby avoiding war for the present.

But if there should be a specially good change during this war, or if a Soviet-American alliance against Japan is formed, we expect to resolutely invoke armed force against the Soviet Union.

2. In waging war against the U.S.S.R. we should utilize the strategic situation on the enemy's main theaters of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home country, and deal the enemy a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying its forces on the field and the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

3. As our enemy will scheme to directly attack the center of our sphere with a superior air forces and also with submarines, we must carefully prepare counter-defense measures and seek to destroy the enemy in a single stroke at the beginning of the war.

4. Although the strength of enemy forces to be directed to East Asia will vary especially according to the development of the Soviet-German war, it should be taken as a standard that one-third to one-half of the enemy's total strength will be directed to East Asia.

/p.80/ (B) Diplomatic war.

1. The prevention of the war.

In order to make the Soviet Union remain neutral in the Greater East Asiatic War for the time being, we should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her by completing our armaments, but, in addition to it, the following means will be considered:

(1) With our armaments against the Soviet Union as a pressure, it is necessary for us to show no such attitude as to wish her neutrality against Japan. However, we must avoid any useless provocation and maintain an attitude of remaining neutral against the Soviet Union so long as she keeps hers.

(2) While making the Soviet Union understand that Japan is determined to surely resort to force against the use of East Siberia by the United States and Britain, we may, under certain circumstances, conclude a

pact with the Soviet Union for the reinforcement of treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we may consider supplying the Soviet Union with certain quantities of the commodities of the Southern Regions as a compensation.)

(3) There may be cases where we, while prohibiting navigation in Japanese coastal waters and the shipment of contraband goods in the Indian Ocean area, we may consider an agreement to mutually supply each other specified articles and thereby conceive a relation of Soviet economic dependency on Japan.

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfilment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany.

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make the Soviet Union agree to the cessation of hostilities by promising to give her certain economic benefits, such as the supply of goods, after the conclusion of peace, or to support her demands against Germany to some degree in the peace negotiations.

(2) Efforts shall be made to obtain from the Soviet Union a promise to maintain neutrality in Japan's war against America and Britain, especially not to lend any military base to them.

(3) It shall be necessary to have Germany recognize a great concession in respect to the recovery of former Soviet territories, etc.

III. When a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Though we do not propose any special diplomatic measures until we have driven out Soviet forces from Eastern Siberia in an armed warfare, the following measures shall be considered:

(1) For the time being, Japan and Germany should lay stress on a war against the Soviet Union and cooperation between them in guiding operations shall be effected as soon as possible.

(2) By the active use of the alliance thought warfare shall be reinforced in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(3) After the rout of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, there may be a case where Japan and Germany, according to the circumstances, shall make peace with the Soviet Union on very lenient terms, and strive to lay their stress again on the war against America and Britain.

X (4) In case Germany makes peace with Britain (and America) after the outbreak of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may at the same time try to make peace with Britain and America and try to successfully prosecute the war against the Soviet Union.

/p.111/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.

(1) In the period of the enforcement of military administration in the first stage of military operations, the main aim shall be to secure freedom of operational replenishment. Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, we must not overlook anything in securing strategic naval and air bases against America and also maritime bases. As for the bases against the Soviet Union, we will strive to push them as much as possible to the western part of the war area in accordance with the progress of the war.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this

17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takahashi
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this17th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

780

Document No. 1355

Cover Page

SUMMARIZED RESEARCH PAPERS
For the Year of 1942

Extremely
Secret

Published by the
Research Institute
of Total War

No. of Document : So, KEN. B No. 4
Series No. : No. 5
Date of Publishing: 30th March 1943
Number of Copies : 100
Pages : 544 Sheets
Disposition : Inside the Institute, to be
returned as soon as through
Outside of the Institute, to be
returned after the fixed period.

Summarized Research Papers for the Year
1942, published by the Research Institute
of Total War in March 1943.

Part II. Chapter 5. The Plans to govern SIBERIA.
(including Outer MONGOLIA).

1. General course of Policy.

- (1) The object of government, in general, is in the preparing and adjusting of defensive areas in the northern borders so as to establish defense for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. For this purpose, a military administration in the occupied areas should be secured; thereby enabling the occupation troops to enjoy convenience in their activities; and, at the same time, basic preparatory policy for governing those areas which comprise one ring of the co-prosperity sphere should be established.

In accordance with the above point of view, each area should adopt policies which is in accordance to their characteristics.

- (2) After the communistic ideology and organization have been swept away, a new ideology of the new order in East Asia shall take its place, and the freedom of worship shall be permitted.
- (3) All old laws and ordinances shall be declared void, and simple but powerful military orders shall be enforced instead. Under the powerful leadership of the Empire, the natives shall not be allowed, in principle, to take part in any politics. If necessary, a low grade self-government shall be allowed.
- (4) The revival in the system of private ownership of property shall be enforced in principle; but the time and its methods shall be decided according to the circumstances.
- (5) The development of resources shall be aimed at mineral resources deemed specially necessary, and emphasis shall be directed at the exploitation of food and metal resources which aims at the maintenance of self-sufficiency.
- (6) The present planned economy shall be reorganized as to form one ring of the greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Planned Economy.

- (7) If found necessary from the national defense and economic point of view, Japanese, Korean and Manchurian colonists shall be sent there.
- (8) If occasion demands, compulsory emigration of the natives shall be effected.

2. Politics and Thoughts.

It is aimed that Northern SAKHALIN, the Soviet Far East, and KAMCHATKA shall be turned into a Japanese territory, to serve as military bases of the Empire's northern boundary.

As far as the Mongolians are concerned, racial demand shall be taken into consideration and, at the same time, shall be so led as to serve as barriers against Soviet Bolshevization of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. The safeguard and promotion of this cause shall be centered upon religion, such as Lamaism, etc. Efforts shall also be made for establishing strong political control in other areas. For measures thereafter, separate consideration shall be given.

- (1) Chief political measures to be taken simultaneously with occupation.
- (A) Declaration abolishing the various communist institutions.
 - (a) Revival of the private ownership of property, in principle.
 - (b) Thorough demolition of the communistic political system and its form of application.
 - (c) Strict prohibition of all political organizations and political movements.
 - (B) Securing of North Sakhalin, primary population as labor power for the exploitation of mineral resources.
 - (C) Control over Japanese, Koreans and Manchurians entering the U. S. S. R.
- (2) Military administration shall be enforced throughout the whole war period according to the following purports.
- (A) Racial policy.
 - (a) The superiority in leadership of the Japanese race shall be clearly established in all fields.
 - (b) In so far as there is no hindrance in the carrying out of military administration, racial and local manners, customs and cultures shall be respected.

- (c) Freedom of worship shall be recognized positively, and such religions as the Greek Church and Lamaism shall, if necessary, be encouraged by adding appropriate changes. However, the political activities of religious organizations shall not be tolerated.
- (d) Mixed blood among various races may be left to take its own course, but pure blood of the Japanese race shall be maintained.

(B) Administration and Thought Policy.

- (a) Permeation of our might shall be our aim, and we shall approach them with stringent power, not inclining into the so-called paternalism.
- (b) Under the strict and fair military discipline of the military administration authorities, and through the concrete practice of the austere military administration, their anti-Japanese conception which they had hitherto embraced shall be swept away, and they shall be so led as to recognize the ideals and the actual circumstances of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with Japan as its centre.
- (c) The communists, and others who were formerly of the leading class, shall be swept away. All creations, such as publications, dramas, cinemas, songs and ballads, etc. rich in the communist thought shall be forbidden strictly.
- (d) All the government and public-owned property in the occupied territory shall be confiscated and the military shall assume control.
- (e) Security of life and property shall be, in principle, guaranteed.
- (f) For the lower system of the local administration, self-government necessary to the military administration shall be approved, and those based on old racial customs shall be respected.

3. Economy.

(1) General principles.

The socialistic planned economy shall be swept away and a new control economy, which, as one ring of the Greater East Asia Sphere, that is in accordance to the Japanese economic conception, shall be established as its object. The very urgent matters at present, namely the military needs, the security of the natives, livelihood, etc., shall be practised

with each enterprising opportunity. In these cases, the lack of stimulation to individuality, which is the weak point of the socialistic planned economy, shall be corrected and utilized. (pp. 235 - 238)

Reference (No. 1.)

1. General Survey of Siberia.

(1) "Siberia" which we mean here refers the area east of Baikal (except Yakutsk Autonomous Republic). When referring to the administrative section of the U. S. S. R., as of July, 1941, it corresponds to the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia (except Irkutsk Province).

Far East. (p. 248)

1. Primorskaya District

(a) Direct Control District (Former Primorskaya)

(b) Ussuri Province.

2. Kharbarovsk District.

(a) Direct Control District.

Former Kharbarovsk Province
(T.N. Direct Transliteration)
Former Khorima Administrative District.

(b) Judea Autonomous Province.

(c) Amur Province

(d) Northern Sakhalin

(T.N. Direct Transliteration)

(e) Nizhniiamur Province

(f) Kamchatka.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____

I. P. S. No. 1355Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 537 pages, dated 30, March 1943, and described as follows: Showa Juhichinen-do Sogo-Kenkyu Kiji I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September 1946.

/s/ M. Takahashi
 Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

SEAL
Secretary of Cabinet
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Witness: Wm. C. Prout

Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

"REPORT OF INSPECTION TOUR IN
MANCHURIA AND KOREAN AREAS"
MAY 1931.

BY

Colonel SUZUKI, Shigeyasu

Preface

I made a tour to Manchurian and Korean areas for about two weeks from the middle of March, in accordance with the instructions that appeared in Appendix No. 1.

I am hereby presenting a report on the following information that I gained on the tour:

My travel routes are shown in Appendix No. 2.

I. Comparison of strategic advantages between the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the SZEPIŃGKAI-TAONAN Railway from the standpoint of transportation of Japanese main forces in "B" plan of operation.

Decision:

Judging by the comparison of strategic advantages between both railways in consideration of the natural features of the zone along the aforesaid railway lines, from the standpoint of transportation of Japanese main forces in "B" plan of operation, it is hardly found that there are any differences between them.

However, considering the recently increasing development of conditions in the SOLON area (plain at the eastern foot of the HSING-AN-LING range north of TAONAN) in connection with strategic advantages, it is properly acknowledged to advance Japanese main forces towards the SZEPIŃGKAI-TAONAN Railway.

III. Consideration of tactics of Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA.

Consideration:

(1) Concerning tactics of 19th Division in the present "B" plan of operation, it is advisable to concentrate the whole power for use at HUNCHUN and the Southern Area of the place. Regarding the tactics of the same Division in "C" plan of operation, it is suitable to use a majority or the complete force in CHIENTAO.

(2) Regarding tactics of the army forces in the MARITIME Province in the "B" plan of operation, the principal aim is that the main forces will land on the coast to the east of VLADIVOSTOK. It is suitable that the Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA would act separately from the main forces taking into consideration the operations of the latter. Therefore, special attention should be paid to make the equipment perfect in the occupation forces in order to make a separate operation possible.

Reason:

1. On II at the present plan, the main purpose of Japanese operation forces in the MARITIME Province is to facilitate operations by the Manchurian army. In this connection, special attention should be paid to the occupation of the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the advance of the main forces in the area north of NICHOLSK-Ussuzisk, if possible. It is desirable that this attempt would be realized as soon as possible.

Judging by the abovementioned standpoint, it is properly recognized that the main forces of the operation army in the MARITIME Province go into an outer line action with the Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA through landing in the area east of VLADIVOSTOK and through advancing towards PASKOE /phonetical/ and the city of NICHOLSK-Ussuzisk. And it may be said that this operation will be easier because the main forces of the army are composed of the pack-horse division.

Appendix No. 1

March 16, 1931

Instruction:

1. You shall make a tour of inspection regarding general conditions in MANCHURIA, above all the zone along the

SZEPINGKAI-TAONAN Railway Line, as a matter of your principal duty. As to the details, you shall have suggestions from the chief of the First Department.

2. A period of tour there and back shall be about two weeks. You shall start from TOKYO about the 16th of March.

3. In executing your duty, you shall be in connection with both the headquarters of KWANTUNG Army and occupation army in KOREA and their controlled organs.

4. You shall present a written report in two months after you return home.

March 16, 1931

Suggestions

You shall investigate and consider the following items, in accordance with Instruction No. 1.

Items:

1. General consideration concerning tactics in Northern MANCHURIA for the guidance of "B" plan of operation. Above all consideration regarding strategic advantages of the zones along the SZEPINGKAI-TAONAN and the Chinese Eastern Railway Lines.

2. Consideration concerning the airports in MANCHURIA.

3. Concrete consideration concerning tactics in Northern KOREA in "B" and "C" plan of operation.

Chief of the First Department.

Doc. No. 2549

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____
I. P. S. No. 2549

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Masakazu, Amono hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Historical Section Secretary 1st Demobilization and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated May, 1931, and described as follows: Carbon copied bound "Report of Inspection /Tour/ in Manchurian and Korean Areas", by Colonel Suzuki, Shigeyasu Stamped "Military Top Secret" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
13 day of Sep., 1946

/s/ Masakazu, Amono
Signature of Official

SEAL

/s/
Witness: Masayashi Ishii

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
13 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt AUSMI
NAME

/s/
Witness: Richard H. Larsh

Investigator
Official Capacity

782

DOC. NO.
1990-B A

Page 1

Photostat Back

The article written in Japanese on the other side of this photograph was recorded by me in my own handwriting, fifteen years ago, in 1931 (Showa 6), when Major-General HARADA was in Moscow. It contains the gist of the conversations between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA. I hereby certify the above with my own signature.

Sachio /TN: or Yukio/ KASAHARA

Sept 3rd, 1946

(Translation of handwriting on back
of appended photostat)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the Record of the talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA, 1931 was delivered to me by Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives.

I do further certify

s/
Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 18, 1946.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Colonel MOROSOV, the investigator of the Soviet Division of the IPS, hereby certify, that on September 3, 1946, in the office of Soviet Division of the IPS I presented KASAHARA, Yukio, former Lt. General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language under the title:

"The Talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major General HARADA."

and the said KASAHARA, Yukio made the following inscription at the back of the photocopy of the said document in my presence:

"The Japanese text written at the back of this photograph is the record made by me in my own hand 15 years ago (in 6th year of Showa) during Major-General HARADA's stay in Moscow. The main contents of the negotiations carried on between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA are given in the same text. I testify to the above said in my own hand.

KASAHARA, Yukio
September 3, 1946"

This was done in the presence of interpreter A. M. ROJETSKIN, who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

s/ Colonel MOROSOV,
Investigator of the Soviet
Division of the I.P.S.

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: s/ M. GILDENBLAT

CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, ROJETSKIN Alexander Michailovich hereby certify to Colonel MOROSOV, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S. that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese Language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness KASAHARA, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document "Talk between Ambassador Hirota and Major-General Harada," which had been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.R.

s/ A. ROJETSKIN.

Subscribed to before

s/ Colonel Morosov,
The Investigator of the Soviet
Division of the IPS

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: s/ M. GILDENBLAT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America, et al.,)
VS)
ARAKI, Sadao, et al.)

SS AFFIDAVIT 10/9/46
witness

I, Lt. Gen. Yukio KASAHARA of the Japanese Army, do hereby certify under oath as follows:

That the photostatic copy of the document in Japanese under the title of "Conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Maj. Gen. HARADA" is the photographic copy of the record of the outline of conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Maj. Gen. HARADA which took place while the latter was in Moscow in 1931, fifteen years ago.

This record is in my handwriting, written at the request of Maj. Gen. HARADA. The contents of the document are as follows:

Concerning the Conversation of Ambassador HIROTA and Maj. Gen. HARADA.

In reference to the national policy of x x to be transmitted by Ambassador HIROTA to the Chief of General Staff.

1. Desire the following matters be especially transmitted to the Chief of General Staff.

Aside from whether Japan will wage a war against Soviet Russia, it is necessary for Japan to have strong policies against Soviet Russia being ready for war at any time. Its principal purpose is not defense against Communism but rather the conquest of Eastern Siberia.

2. x x stated by Ambassador HIROTA on the disarmament problem. Generally speaking, more than half of the diplomats of the world are in favor of military disarmament.. However, since this refers to the general theory of disarmament, if it becomes clearly known that the military preparation of Japan is for use against Soviet Russia, it is only natural that she cannot reduce her armaments; and the world powers also (the remainder of the sentence was not submitted to me).

In the above mentioned photostatic copy of the record, however, there are two letters each on lines 15 and 21 of the first page too indistinct to be read. Therefore, marks "x x" were inserted.

I have no recollection as to the recorded items in the remaining portion which was not presented to me.

I hereby identify this affidavit in my own handwriting and that it is true.

/s/ KASAHARA, Yukio

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kasahara, Yukio at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 6th day of September, 1946.

JOHN F. HUMMEL
Major, J.A.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 2nd Lt. Murakami James, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kasahara Yukio was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 6th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

MURAKAMI JAMES
2nd Lt. Central
Interrogation Section

NC

784

CONCERNING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE FISHING PROBLEMS

February 9, 1931

General Staff Headquarters

"Secret"

Concerning the Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems

Index

- I. Preface
- II. History
 - A. Up to the Russian Revolution
 - B. During the Russian Revolution
 - C. The Renewal of the Fishing Treaty
- III. Sudden Increase in Russian Strength
 - A. Measures
 - B. Results
- IV. Lack of Unity among Japanese Parties Concerned
- V. Recent Fishing Problems
- VI. Counter-Measures Japan Should Adopt

2-9-1931

I. Preface.

Recently, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, there are arising some troubles regarding negotiations about ruble exchange rates due to the closing of the Branch office of the Bank of Korea in Vladivostock, and in connection with this, there are trends toward the denouncement of the fishing contract. Thus, complications of the fishing problem are going to be repeated.

Fishing in the Far East was established not only by our senior's efforts, but it is one of the important industries, exporting at present an amount valued at 20,000,000 yen out of our annual production of 40,000,000 yen. Therefore, we are going to recall circumstances of the past and investigate our attitudes for the future.

II. History

A. Up to the Russian Revolution.

As Japan is surrounded by sea, at a glance it seems to be suitable for fishing. Actually, however, it is not blessed at all. Since it requires a depth of not more than 100 fathoms for fishing, and along the Japanese coast, there is an area of only 100,000 square miles which meets this condition, Japan is obliged to advance to the Soviet coast in the Far East where there is a suitable area of 200,000 square miles.

In this connection, Japanese fisherman have been advancing into this area since the days of the Shogunate and secured it as a national right as the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Since then, it has prospered through the years.

On the contrary, though Russia devoted herself to eastward invasion, she had little interest in fishing, so that the catch was on a small scale and the technique was primitive. Even at the time of the first Russo-Japanese Fishing Agreement, she was very inferior when compared with Japan. For example, in 1908, Japan had 119 fishing areas while Russia had only 14. Though there were some variations since then, the (T.M. the Russians) were extremely inferior in the number of fishing areas, in amount of catch, in amount of production, in techniques of fishing, in manufacturing industries, and in all other points, compared with our rapid development. The amount of catch by the Japanese occupied 70 to 80 percent of the total, with the Russians having about 20 to 30 percent. It is needless to say that during the Russian Revolution, this tendency towards a decline increased more and more.

B. During the Russian Revolution.

Thus, the beginning of the termination period of the agreement was reached in 1919, but since at that time Russia was in the confusion of a revolution and we could not find the proper officials with whom to negotiate, our fishermen were compelled to fish freely without license or else bravely continue fishing under uneasiness and inconvenience, under an agreement with the provisional government in Omsk. After that, in 1923, as soon as Russia was unified under the proletariat government, our fisheries association in the territory dispatched representatives to Vladivostok before the revival of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the Fisheries Association received a lease on the fishing territories from the Russian Far Eastern Fisheries Bureau. Soon after that, by the efforts of Viscount GOTO and Mr. Yoffe, a temporary agreement of three years was concluded and we could finally fish in peace for the time being.

C. The Renewal of the Fishing Agreement.

On January 20, 1925, the diplomatic relationship between Soviet Russia and Japan was renewed, and based upon this, the two countries began negotiating for the new fishing treaty.

In these negotiations, although Japan insisted upon her legitimate privileges under the Portsmouth Treaty, Soviet Russia tried to upset and place herself in the dominating position held by the Japanese. Therefore, a wide gap developed in which the negotiations reached a standstill, which lasted two years and one month. Thus the gloomy prospects of success was indicated. Fortunately, however, under the efforts of Viscount GOTO, who went to Russia, the dead-lock was broken, and finally, on the 23rd of January, 1928, the treaty was signed. The treaty consists of the text, together with the A, B, C, and final protocol, and stipulates the area to be leased to our fishermen after an auction within the fishing grounds, and also the special rights to fish. In matters concerning the execution of these privileges, the treaty indicates various stipulations. Of course, as a principle, they confirm special rights of Imperial Japan based upon the Portsmouth Treaty, but the biggest difference is in the recognition of the preferential rights of the enterprises of the Soviet Government.

The agreement is effective from May 28, 1928, and our fishermen, who suffered from uneasiness during the past ten years, have somehow or other revived, and our interests seem to have a brighter outlook.

III. Sudden Increase in Russian Strength.

A. Measures.

However, Soviet Russia, before and after the negotiations of the above treaty, that is, from the time her national foundation was finally becoming strengthened, has suddenly become increasingly alert and has aimed at competing and surpassing of Japanese fishing in the Far East. On one hand, they established government trusts or government corporations as management organs, and subsidized industrial loans and purchasing of fish to private enterprises. Furthermore, they recently set up the Five Year Plan to try to make great progress. On the other hand, by taking advantage of our weak diplomacy and utilizing defects in the text of the treaty, they began to oppress the Japanese and to seize the preferential position of the Japanese.

Since the time of the negotiations for the new treaty, they took the following measures for the above purpose:

1. Concerning the conclusion of the new fishing agreement.

The Russians insisted on the reduction of the auction area, the employment of Russian laborers, that "all marine products" be restricted in meaning to "fishes", and the recognition of the preferential rights of Soviet government enterprises, that is because of the Soviet principle of nationalizing industries, they insisted that it was proper that the fishing industry and certain fishing areas be nationalized, and the rest of the fishing areas be distributed equally between Japan and Russia. Regarding the nationalization of the fishing industry, equal treatment was hitherto given to nationals of both nations in the fishing agreement based on the Portsmouth Treaty. This time, however, for the reason that the government stands superior to the people, the preferential rights of the governments are recognized. Only in the areas excepted from preferential rights are open equally to the nationals of both countries. Since the October revolution had its foundation in the nationalization of industries, the Russian government operated the crab-canning industry, and it is the insistence of the Soviet government that if Japan wishes to operate the crab-canning industry, she must make a formal application to obtain that right. In other words, they tried to make us give concessions exceeding the former treaty. This insistence, of course, is an utterly unfair demand which would delete our interests. Although they realized and corrected most of their errors on matters other than those of nationalization, they held fast on the important preferential rights of nationalization without making any concessions, and

finally carried through their own will.

2. In 1929, the first year of the enforcement of the new treaty, and just before the departure of our fishing fleet, they made proposals in violation of the treaty and in contradiction to traditional customs.

(a) In Violation of the Treaty.

(1) Concerning the use of the coastal areas, they added restrictions not specified in the treaty.

(2) The 50 percent bond required to be posted for the lease of the fishing grounds was deliberately increased to 65 percent.

(3) They compelled us to make applications for permission regarding the export of marine products, for which there should have been no restrictions in the treaty.

(4) Ignoring the stipulations in the protocol which states clearly that no duty, assessment, and commissions be imposed, they demanded that we pay a tax for the protection of propagation in the fishing area.

(b) Concerning Contradiction to Traditional Customs.

(1) Many of our present excellent fishing areas were included in the Soviet nationalized fishing areas.

Our people were very anxious for a long time concerning this problem, but since the Russian attitude was so firm at the time of the treaty negotiations, Japan could not state clearly in the treaty whether or not her superior fishing grounds for which she paid a big sacrifice to equip, would be included in the Russian nationalized fishing areas.

It may fairly be said that the greatest cause of the more than two years required to conclude the treaty was for the above reason. However, by the efforts of Viscount GOTO, who went to Russia, we obtained a memorandum from Russia stating, "The importance of Japanese interests will be recognized. Considerations would be given not to destroy these interests." Although Japanese fishermen requested that this be accepted as the golden rule, the Russians flatly violated this rule and included these superior fishing grounds in their nationalization program.

(2) Of the establishment of 390 fishing areas desired by the Japanese, Russia, without indicating any reason, announced but merely 190 sites.

(3) Concerning Later Developments.

During the negotiations concerning the problems mentioned above (Item (2)), the Russians announced the date of the auction of the fishing areas as February 28. However, our fishermen felt uneasiness about the problems under negotiations, and fearing trite measures that would ignore their interests by the Russians at the critical moment, refused to participate in the auction. Therefore, our Foreign Affairs authorities requested Russia to postpone the auction. However, the Russians rejected this request, and without the participation of the Japanese, carried out the auction as per scheduled. Therefore, the fishing areas under Japanese management have fallen successively into Russian hands. At the same time that Japan notified Russia that the auction was invalid, she demanded a second auction. As a result of this demand, the Russian possession of Japanese fishing grounds became nullified and a second auction was to be held. On May 5, an auction with Japanese participation was held.

B. Results.

An examination of the following distribution of the fishing areas will show the nature of the surprisingly outrageous and selfish demands and unfair oppressions by the Russians.

Countries	Years		
	1928 : Before Treaty	1929 : 1st Year of Treaty	1930 : 2nd Year of Treaty
JAPAN	: 257	: 203	: 313
RUSSIA--Private Enterprises)	: 19	: 90	: 205
--Nationalized) Enterprises)	: 23	: 72	: 72

It is clear at a glance how suddenly Soviet Russia increased their strength. The reason why there is no change in the number of nationalized fishing areas during 1929-1930 is that the number was limited by the agreement. However, this was compensated by the better

fishing grounds gained by the individual enterprises. However, among the latter group, private enterprises in its real sense are very few. Almost all of them belong to a co-operative, and special attention is required because these are almost of the same nature as nationalized fishing.

IV. Lack of Unity among Japanese Parties Concerned.

In addition to suffering under Soviet Russia's intolerable tyranny, under the surface, there is a great lack of unity among the Japanese, and finally, at the time of the auction mentioned in Chapter III, the immoral intrigue of the party belonging to SHIMA, Tokuzo, Russia was given an important gap to breach. Mr. UDA, supported by Mr. SHIMA'S party, aimed to profit by the slump in the price of the shares of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, one of the leading fishing firms in Japan, and dealt the company a blow by successfully bidding for its 72 fishing areas at an extravagant price.

This event has exposed the scandalous behaviour among the Japanese, and in the end, Mr. UDA, at a great profit, has transferred the fishing areas to the company. For this reason, the lease of the fishing grounds has suddenly increased as follows:

Year	No. of Fishing Areas	Rent Paid for Fishing Areas (Rubles)
1928	257	1,729,212
1929		
The Year of UDA'S Intrigue:	303	5,089,162
1930	313	6,078,896

V. Recent Fishing Problems.

In August and September of last summer, Soviet authorities made an inspection of the Vladivostok branch of the Bank of KOREA which extended for over forty days. As a result of this inspection, they finally ordered us to close the bank in December on the pretext of having evidence of free trading in rubles. No answer has yet been received to our demands for nullification of the order except for their dismissal of our demands with a laugh.

The rent paid by Japanese fishermen for the leased fishing ground amounts to 10,000,000 rubles a year. Although the official quotation of rubles is almost at a parity with our yen, the international market quotation at that time was twenty to thirty sen. Japanese fishermen accumulated rubles at this price at the Vladivostok branch, and actually

paid about 2,500,000 yen. Actually, the rent for the leased fishing areas was decided anticipating the international market quotations, and if we are obliged to pay at the official rate, our burden will increase by three or four times, and the foundation of our management would definitely collapse.

As the natural result of the closing of the Branch office of the Bank of KOREA, it became impossible to obtain rubles. To relieve this critical situation, Japan proposed the establishment of the exchange rate between rubles and Japanese currency, and at this time, negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo between our Foreign Affairs authorities and Soviet Ambassador Toroyanovski. This is the Russo-Japanese negotiations appearing from time to time in the newspapers.

At the negotiations, Russia insisted upon the exchange rate of 50 sen and Japan insisted on 20 sen in accordance with international quotations.

In view of the fact that at the exchange rate of less than 30 sen, Japanese fishermen could barely continue their business, they decided that the rate of less than 30 sen to be their final proposal. As the negotiations progressed, they made concessions from 25 sen to $27\frac{1}{2}$ sen. However, our Foreign Affairs authorities, without consulting the fishermen, on their own judgment, made a proposal of 35 sen and requested their consideration of that rate. The Soviet Ambassador replied that it was absolutely difficult to agree to that level of 30 sen but at the level of 40 sen, the Russian Central government might be persuaded.

Notwithstanding our repeated concessions, the Russians would not concede from their own insistence, and as yet, no decisions have been reached.

It was ruled that the rent for the fishing grounds be paid for the first half of this year on January 2. However, since it was necessary to wait for the settlement of the abovementioned exchange rate, the payment was post-poned for one month with Russian understanding. But no settlement was made up to that date, and therefore, the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, the leading fishing company of Japan, continued operation without payment of rent. Thereupon, under the pretext of the expiration of the time limit, Russia is trying to abrogate the contract, and in relation to this, the Japanese government is strongly protesting that there is ^{an} inseparable relationship between the payment of the rent and the establishment of the exchange rate.

Although it seems that Russia does not intend to deprive us immediately of our fishing interests, no doubt she intends to advance her self-development by confiscating the fishing areas of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company and making a bid for these areas, transferring the better fishing grounds to nationalized enterprises, and raising

the bids for these better areas.

One thing we must note here is that the disunity among Japanese fishermen has again been revealed. Eighty percent of the fishing industry is in the hands of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, and the balance divided among several small individual enterprises. Since the number of the fishing areas of these small firms are so exceedingly few, their rent is insignificant. They can not only accumulate rubles easily from the Chinese in Vladivostok, but since the rubles dropped to 6 or 7 sen after the closing of the Bank of KOREA, it was very profitable for them. Therefore, they paid their rents without co-operating with the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company.

VI. Counter-Measures Japan Should Adopt.

The reason for the firm Russian attitude and their sudden increase in strength is solely due to the conservative diplomatic policy of Japan, and the situation is similar to the encroachment on the rights of the Manchurian Railway. If the situation is left as it is, we cannot help but finally lose our rights.

We must not forget that behind our fishing interests are the sacrifices of our precious blood. Without any reasons, we cannot stand in anyway the loss of these rights.

We must not permit such outrages as the attempt of the Russians to deprive us of our rights by endangering our interests, and without coolly reflecting, pretending that we violated the treaty. Only making compromises and not knowing how to defend one's own interests are not true diplomacy.

Japan must be convinced of the urgent necessity of considering the reason by which her interests in Russia is authorized, and with the determination to make the unlicensed fishing absolutely safe in the future, firmly and boldly push through her insistence during the negotiations.

Judging from the internal and external state of Soviet Russia, if we showed our determination to obtain unlicensed fishing, they will have no courage to maintain their insistence. However, if we carried out our insistence in spite of Russian resoluteness, by force of circumstances, the result be the severance of diplomatic relationship with Russia, and it will give us the opportunity to promote our sincere desire of executing our basic national policy against Russia.

From the standpoint of the nature and motives for acquiring fishing interests, it must not be monopolized by individuals. If our competitor, Russia, has government enterprises and manages enterprises similar to these government enterprises, the best way for Japan to compete with them is to nationalize her own fishing industry. We should learn our

lesson not only from the immoral intrigue by SHIMA'S group, but also is it not so, that Russia took advantage of the exposure of the disunity among the Japanese?

Such being the case, it is necessary to utilize this opportunity and also as in the case of the Manchurian Railway Company, we should semi-officially nationalize the fishing interests and the government enterprises.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the secret document in Japanese published "Concerning the Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems", dated January 9, 1931 was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank).

Tokyo, Japan,

October 7, 1946.

*To plan aggressive design
against USSR*

② 2657
just got
you may see fit
to rest on your rights

SUMMARY OF AN ADDRESS MADE TO HIS EXCELLENCY HARADA BY
LT. COLONEL KASAHARA

1. General State of Conditions in Soviet Russia

Soviet Russia, as is universally known, is pushing resolutely her 5-year plan to establish a new social structure. This plan is directed chiefly toward heavy industries, especially industries concerning the repletion of national defense, which forms the basis of the future development of the State. Consequently, the industries directly related to the people's living is considered of secondary importance. Everything is being sacrificed for the development of the heavy industries and the plan is now in its third year. Generally speaking, up to now, the object has been realized but hereafter, various barriers will be met and it is judged that the execution of the original plan will be difficult.

Although the people's standard of living has been sacrificed for the sake of policy and has been lowered extremely, the following features peculiar to Soviet compared with the other powers must be taken into consideration:

1. Since the politics of Soviet Russia is actually a dictatorship, she can economize on matters of secondary importance and concentrate her finances and manpower on matters of primary importance.
2. Compared with capitalistic countries, the efficiency is inferior, but where finances, etc., in capitalistic countries are used for private interests, Soviet Russia can invest her finances and manpower for national development.
3. The people in Soviet Russia can endure "blind obedience" and privations.
4. Soviet Russia is rich in natural resources.
5. Soviet Russia has been so far behind in industrial development that soon by small effort, the development is greatly speeded up.
6. The supervision is so strict that a unification for reactionary movement against her is not possible.

Therefore, although the merits or demerits of the 5-year plan is indifferent to the happiness of the people, it is surmised that the essential spheres have reached this stage.

The people's living, however, is not expected to be readily improved, even after the completion of the 5-year plan.

Such is the picture concerning the economic conditions. From the thought point of view, those who occupy important posts at present are veterans who have experienced all sorts of troubles and difficulties. Therefore, it may be foreseen that when these veterans are gone in the future, the spirit of the communists may wither away; but on the other hand, after another decade, those who have been educated since the Revolution under the Communist regime will start their activities in society. Therefore, together with the above-mentioned national economic repletion, it is surmised that a certain degree of stability will be attained although the policies may shift a little to the right or to the left later on.

However, as to her interior problems in the future, the racial independence movement (Ukraine, Caucasus and Turkestan) and the internal conflict among Communists will become her source of trouble, especially critical in war-time.

2. National Defense of Soviet Russia

a. Principle

peopl

Soviet Russia at present is not offensive but defensive and is particularly afraid of foreign invasion. The opinion that Soviet Russia is emphasizing the perils of national defense to divert the people's attention to external affairs and is really an internal policy may be reasonable, but it seems that Soviet Russia is really afraid of foreign invasion.

- b. It is needless to say that the main purpose of the 5-year plan is in the completion of national defense. On every occasion the leaders openly emphasize the peril in her national defense area. The Communist Party is the most ardent advocator for the repletion of armaments.

Since 1927, four infantry divisions and one cavalry division have been increased. Equipment and armament have made great progress.

- c. The key point of the repletion of armament is in the mechanization of the army. There are about 500 tanks and in the past half-year, 100 tanks have been increased.

In mechanized units, there are four independent mechanical brigades, besides five mechanical units that are attached to the infantry divisions.

As to the poison gas, the repletion in every sphere is appalling. Moreover, military and civilian personnel cooperate in training in regard to poison gas.

d. Aviation

The number of planes is between 1,700 to 2,000. The goal is to maintain 200 companies, but at present, the number of companies is estimated to be about 180. Reconnaissance and chaser planes are almost repleted and her efforts are directed towards the repletion of bombing planes. Most of her planes are made in Russia but a considerable portion of them seem to have been made in Germany and Italy (naval planes). The war-time aircraft production capacity is surmised to be about 150 per month.

Marked efforts are exerted to the development of civil aviation, especially in the extension of her air routes.

e. War Budget

Compared with her war budget two years ago, it has doubled in amount. The following facts must not be overlooked. Expenditures for munitions are included in industrial expenditures, armament expenditures are included in munitions industry expenditures, GPU and other special troops are not included in the army and navy budget, and expenditures for barracks and field maneuvers are included in provincial expenditures. Therefore, there is a substantial difference between its superficial figures and the actual contents thereof.

Furthermore, there is considerable contribution by the civilian populace. Last year the total number of planes contributed by civilians were about 33 planes.

f. Militarization of the people

All of her efforts are bent on the militarization of the public.

df.

Ocoabuayum (Osoabeahem) - Society for Aircraft Lookout and Gas and Chemical Lookout.

In January the year before last, 3,000,000, in January last year, 5,000,000, in January this year, 9,000,000.

The effect is infiltrated even into the kindergarten.

3. Conclusion

Def. In short, it is self-evident that Soviet Russia will change her policy from passive defense to aggression in the future as her economic power and defense are completed. At present, however, in view of her national powers in general, it is judged that she has not enough strength to execute a war.

Red There is never a better time than now for Japan to solve her Far East problems. The western neighboring countries (Poland, Rumania) are able to rise now in unison with Japan but as the years pass, it will get more and more difficult. If we are determined to solve the Far East problem now even at the risk of waging war, it may be solved without a war, although there is no objection even if by chance a war should be waged.

4. Disarmament Problem

Owing to circumstances peculiar to the Red Army in its formation, compilation of budget, etc, it is extremely difficult to restrict them. Moreover, it is almost impossible to supervise against their schemes which intend to delude, legally or illegally, the armament limitation. If the supervision of armament limitation is not carried out appropriately, it will only result in exposing our own military secrets.

Anyhow, I believe that in the discussion of disarmament problems, the Empire must not follow the beaten track of Britain and France, but should direct her attention toward the Red Army.

This is a common idea entertained among all military attaches from respective powers in Moscow. This observation, therefore, is fair and just and we need not restrain ourselves in the affirmation of this fact. The assertion that the Soviet Army be considered our enemy will not be rejected by other powers, since the case is different from the naval problem.

5. Matters which the Imperial Army must take into consideration:

- a. In military training and military researches, the objects and the topography thereof must be clarified.
- b. It is recommended to study the tactics and strategy against Soviet Russia, particularly the mechanization of the army.
- c. The standardization of training and armament in divisions should be abolished and altered to be adaptable as the situation requires.
- d. Large number of "poor troops" are necessary in addition to "picked troops."
- e. Special attention should be paid particularly towards poison gas and aviation.
- f. In training troops their strong points or merits should be maintained and further developed.
- g. Chances of victory against Russia seem to lie most of all in higher quality leadership. Efforts must be exerted to leadership of a large

force (with Russia as objective.)

Based on this view, field maneuver research by officers of general's rank is important.

- h. In view of the expense and the time required for training, the improvement of our army organization, equipment and training to the satisfaction of all cannot be expected. Therefore, the anticipated battle field and the special characteristics of the strategy against the Red Army should be carefully studied, and equipment and training should be directed toward the most essential matters.
- i. The importance of organization and training for winter operation.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the document "Main contents of the Report made to his excellency Harada," was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department.

I do further certify _____.

Tokyo, Japan
September 18, 1946.

/s/ Taranenko
Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and Rank)

No. 2

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Colonel Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., hereby certify that on September 3, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., I presented to Kasahara Yukio, former Lt. General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language under the title:

"Main contents of the report made to his Excellency Harada," and the said Kasahara, Yukio made the following inscription at the back of the last (10th) page of the photocopy of the said document in my presence:

"The record at the back of this sheet was made by me in my own hand. September 3, 1946, Kasahara, Yukio."

This was done in the presence of interpreter A. M. Rojetskin who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

/s/ Colonel Morosov,
Investigator of the
Soviet Division of the I.P.S.

September 3, 1946
the city of Tokyo.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

C E R T I F I C A T E

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Rojetskin Alexander Michailovich hereby certify to Colonel Morosov Platon Dmitrievich, Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kasahara, Yukio. on the photostate copy of the document, entitled; "Main contents of the report made to his Excellency Harada", which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for the purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ Rojetskin

Subscribed to before

Colonel Morosov,
Investigator of the Soviet Division
of the I.P.S.

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: _____

The Affidavit of MIYAKE MITSU HARU

MIYAKE Mitsuharu was born at SHIROKO-MACHI, Japan proper, in 1880, a Japanese national. Graduated from the Military Academy, a reserve Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Held the position of Chief of the "KANTO GUN" (KWANTUNG ARMY) from July 1928 to May 1932 director of the central head-office of KYOWA-KAI (The Coalescence and Harmonization Council) since December 1940.

It was Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, who interrogated MIYAKE in MOSCOW Feb. 22nd 1946.

Que: Where were you educated and which official rank did you hold in the Japanese Army?

Ans: In 1940 I graduated from the Military Academy in Tokyo and as a first step I served as an official of Mobilization Department of the War Ministry in Tokyo. After that became a Private Secretary to the War Minister. In 1918 I was dispatched to ENGLAND to collect secret materials concerning modern devices of war.

Que: How many years did you spend in England?

Ans: In England I stayed for about half-a-year, after that I lived for 1 year at WIEN, then for more than one year at BUDAPEST where I served as a Japanese Representative Member on the Committee to Supervise the Execution of the Peace Treaty by AUSTRIA and HUNGARY.

Que: Check the number of your official positions after 1922, please.

Ans: After my return to JAPAN I was in command of several military units; and from 1923 I was commander of 4th Regiment of the Imperial Guards.

Que: What rank did you hold then?

Ans: I was a Colonel in the Japanese Army.

Que: How long did you hold that position?

Ans: Up to April 1925. This regiment is located in TOKYO, but after 1925 I was appointed Chief of Staff for 4th Military Division located at OSAKA, and in August 1926 I was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and I was appointed Commander in Chief of 5th Infantry Brigade at NAGOYA. In July 1928 I was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and remained in this position until May 1932.

Que: And the occupation of MANCHURIA took place just at the time you were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY?

Ans: MANCHURIA was occupied during the time of my being Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: What did you do after 1932?

Ans: In April 1932 I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was appointed Chief of Military Transportation Department of the War Ministry, but in February 1935 I was appointed the Commander in Chief of the 20th Division of KEIJO (SEOUL, KOREA).

Que: You were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and after that you were appointed a Commander of a Military Division -- what was the reason for this demotion?

Ans: The position of a Commander of a Military Division in JAPAN is esteemed higher than the post of a Chief of Army Staff. I remained as Commander of the Division for about two years, but in December 1936 I was placed on the reserve list.

Que: From what time did you take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: From December 1940.

Que: Who was it who recommended you to take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: I was recommended by the President of KYOWA-KAI -- the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO, Mr. CHANG-CHING-HUI.

Que: From what time did Mr. CHANG-CHING-HUI know you?

Ans: From the very beginning of Manchurian Incident, that is from 1931.

*am def.?
Is on final?*

Doc. No. 1950

Col.

*"We have no funds -
no stores to plan war on
or supplies else -
Investigation is being carried out re the
and I don't what says the
result may lead in future."*

Page 3 *

Que: Who was the direct leader of MANCHURIAN occupation affairs? You, being the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY, know that very well, I think?

Ans: In 1931 during the occupation of MANCHURIA, the Japanese Army was under direct leadership of the Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, Lieutenant-General HONJO.

Que: Which were the leading instructions from TOKYO concerning military operations in MANCHURIA during 1931?

Ans: The operation plan of the Japanese Army was delivered to General Staff Headquarters of TOKYO in July 1931 from the Headquarters of KWANTUNG ARMY. This plan considered the occupation by Japanese troops of all strategically important cities and other places in MANCHURIA, and if successfully carried out, MANCHURIA would be occupied completely.

Que: Who was the author of this plan?

Ans: The plan was devised by myself, as a Chief of Staff according to orders from Army Commander Lieutenant-General HONJO, but in general, this plan was outlined by my predecessor Major-General SAITO. In devising my own plan I used the part of that plan received from Major-General SAITO.

Que: Was the strategical plan of occupation of MANCHURIA delivered to you in July 1931, approved by Japanese General Staff Headquarters?

Ans: That plan of operation was signed in MANCHURIA by Lieutenant-General HONJO, the Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, by me, and my assistants, Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant-Colonel ISHIHARA. Then that plan, as I have mentioned, was submitted to the Army General Staff of the Japanese Army in July of 1931. Chief of General Staff KANAYA Hanzo gave his approval in the same month. As far as I know, that plan for the occupation of MANCHURIA was an important part of the general plan of the operations of Japanese forces against the SOVIET UNION and was drafted by the General Staff of Japanese Army. It was then, when I started out for my new post as Chief of KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, in July 1928, that I found out the existence of a plan to attack the U.S.S.R. Our functions to participate in that plan were known by the Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY. Some parts of that plan were modified in later years.

slid.

1513

any other
But
Top for min official too?
active part in carrying on a

Que: What time did you schedule for the beginning of the military actions in MANCHURIA in the plan you devised?

Ans: The general situation in 1931 did not allow fixing a definite date to start the military operations: it was proposed to start them at the first opportunity.

Que: What was the actual cause of the start of the military operations by Japanese Army in MANCHURIA in 1931?

Ans: 18 September 1931 at half past 10 in the afternoon, Chinese troops blew up a certain portion of the South MANCHURIAN Railway line and simultaneously opened fire against Japanese troops. The Japanese Army could not tolerate such actions, and according to order from Lieutenant-General HONJO, our detachment at MUKDEN attacked CHINESE military barracks and occupied those. That was the beginning of the military operations there.

Que: Did you know for certain, that this explosion affair was actually done by CHINESE troops?

Ans: No, I did not. I was not certain. I suppose that this Chinese action was done under provocation from Japanese.

Que: How it was done actually?

Ans: I do not know, how it was arranged actually: I questioned my subordinates concerning the matter, but no one of them knew. My personal opinion is that the actions were provoked by Japanese; when I asked about the matter, Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, Lieutenant-General HONJO, told me that he was of the same opinion too. It was possible to suggest that the Japanese battalion in MUKDEN area, clad in Chinese military uniform, took up the opportunity to provoke further actions.

Que: Who was in command of this battalion?

Ans: The battalion commander was Lieutenant-Colonel SHIMAZOTO and the commander of 29th Infantry Regiment was Colonel HIRATA.

Que: Were they both i.e. Colonel HIRATA and Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAZOTO subordinate to the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters?

Ans: Yes, they were both subordinate to the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters.

Que: Was it possible for those officers to take such provocative actions without any orders from the KWANTUNG ARMY staff?

Ans: It was possible. They were capable of doing such a thing.

Que: By their personal decisions too?

Ans: Oh, yes.

Que: When did MANCHURIA become to be regarded as a base for attack on the U.S.S.R.?

Ans: As far as I understand, those activities were to begin immediately after the occupation of MANCHURIA in 1931. I left MANCHURIA in 1932 and came back there in 1940 as mentioned in the declaration.

Que: What particular changes did you observe in MANCHURIA in connection with preparations to use it as a military base, when you returned there?

Ans: Those changes are as follows: a remarkable increase of Japanese troops in the districts near the SOVIET frontier, the establishment of new railroads and highways toward the SOVIET frontiers and the construction of airfields, military warehouses and barracks in such regions of operations as were regarded important for the waging of a war against the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Did the KYOWA-KAI being under your leadership, make any preparations to participate in war against the U.S.S.R.?

Ans: The chief functions of the KYOWA-KAI were to mobilize all Manchurians so that we might secure the regime established by Japan after the occupation of MANCHURIA in 1931. It was required of all Manchurians to work hard, to make MANCHURIA an important foundation for JAPAN in the continent, especially to strengthen it as a base against the SOVIETS. For that purpose KYOWA-KAI made widespread propaganda, gave military training to its members, especially to the youth, made positive efforts for the development of Manchurian Industries especially that of munitions, participated in the construction of military installations under the direction of the respective military headquarters and organized special military groups for war-time operations named "SEMPO DAN" (The Vanguard of the Army).

Que: From which person did you receive instructions concerning your activities?

Ans: The activity of the KYOWA-KAI in general was outlined in its program but on certain occasions I received direct instructions from the Commander in Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: Who offered the original principles of the KYOWA-KAI organization?

Ans: The idea of this Society was first disclosed in 1931, the organizers of which were the KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, especially the Commander HONJO, and me, the Chief of Staff at the time. And so I was asked to become the head of the Central Head-Office of that organization in 1940. I accepted the call from CHANG CHING-HUI, the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO and Major-General HATA, the Vice-Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY in October 1940. Receiving the written engagement, I visited ANAMI, the Vice-Minister of War, who persuaded me to become the leader of that Society to strengthen the activities concerning the maintenance of Japanese influence in MANCHURIA.

Que: In 1940, when you became the Chief of the KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, what was the number of its membership?

Ans: About three million.

Que: How many were the members of the KYOWA-KAI in 1945, about the time of war with SOVIET UNION?

Ans: There were 4,500,000 men.

Que: Is it possible to take for certain that during the period when you were the Chief of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, the membership of the Society increased from 3 million men to 4,500,000 men?

Ans: Yes.

Que: Is that your own success?

Ans: No; this result was not my own success.

Que: Then, who was he, and what measures has he taken to increase the membership of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: We, the Japanese, broadly propagated the idea that to reach our victory we had to spend all our powers and insisted that Manchurian people be greatly interested in becoming members of the KYOWA-KAI. This is the reason for the increase of the membership of the KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Did you direct these propaganda actions?

Ans: Yes, I gave the proper instructions. The members of KYOWA-KAI received military training and took part in the construction works of fortifications against the SOVIET UNION.

Que: (Did you often deliver public speeches as the Chief of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters?

Ans: Yes, I often lectured personally too.

Que: What was the content of your speeches?

Ans: The speeches delivered by myself, in general, were of the following meaning: At present our JAPAN is fighting against BRITAIN and AMERICA, but if JAPAN is defeated in this war, the MANCHUKUO will be defeated too. But if JAPAN wins the Victory then MANCHUKUO too, shall be victorious. Therefore the Manchukuoan people must too do their best to help JAPAN to win the Victory. In other words in order to furnish the war supplies for JAPAN they have to produce in ample quantities the foodstuffs, clothing and other manufactured supplies.

Que: Did you appeal to people in your speeches, calling towards the war against SOVIET UNION?

Ans: In my speeches during the period from 1941 to 1944 I emphasized that war with the SOVIET UNION might occur therefore the Manchukuan people must prepare for war sufficiently, to avoid defeat in war-time.

Que: Did the said KYOWA-KAI publish some printed matters like pamphlets, posters, etc.?

Ans: Yes. Pamphlets, posters and magazines were published in great quantities.

Que: Of what nature was the content of those printed matters?

Ans: The contents of all of them were saturated with enmity towards the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Was there established any training school for preparing propagandists?

Ans: Under supervision of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters there were in existence some special training schools for preparing the propagandists and lower organization instructors.

Que: Do you know of the existence of the "KANTOKU-EN" plan?

Ans: A document was delivered from the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters to the Central Headquarters office of the KYOWA-KAI late in 1941: on the cover of the document there were written the words: "KANTOKU-EN".

Que: What was the content of those documents?

Ans: It was stated in this document that 300,000 laborers for military construction were demanded by the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters from the MANCHUKUO Government.

Que: You have already stated, that in the KYOWA-KAI there was established one organization known as "SEMPO DAN". Please give a concrete explanation about it.

Sempo Dan

Ans: The general functions of the "SEMPO DAN" groups in ordinary times was to watch over the Manchurians, to encourage them to work hard, and to supervise those persons possessing anti-Japanese feelings and in this way assist the MANCHUKUOAN Government, while the chief duties during war-time were such positive operations behind SOVIET lines as terrorist acts, the executions of plots, strategems, the explosions of Railway lines, bridges and military warehouses and killing and wounding of SOVIET troops.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" a military unit?

Ans: No: it was not a unit. These were only groups which existed in many inhabited points in MANCHURIA.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" included as a part of the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: Of course it was a part of the whole KYOWA-KAI organization.

Que: When was the "SEMPO DAN" organized?

Ans: The "SEMPO DAN" was organized in the middle of December of 1944 in accordance with order received. But its structure from then and up to the recent times was continuously in process of formation.

Que: Who gave the orders to organize the "SEMPO DAN"?

Ans: The orders to organize the "SEMPO DAN" were devised by the Chief of General Affairs Bureau of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, TAKEOKA KIICHI, and signed by myself.

Que: Of what kind of people was the "SEMPO DAN" organized?

Ans: "SEMPO DAN" members were selected from people of robust completion with chivalrous spirit, sound-minded and capable of doing two or three times as much work as ordinary people.

Que: What was the attitude of the KYOWAKAI towards the "WHITE" Russians?

Ans: The "WHITE" Russians in general were concentrated at HARBIN. They were led by the "White Russian Emigrants Office" in the Empire of MANCHUKUO and the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin. They were supplied with food, clothing and other facilities by our KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Were the "WHITE" Russians entered as members in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: Yes, they were. The "WHITE" Russians too had a membership in KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Where there many "WHITE" Russians in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: 3 or 4 thousand, I think.

Que: Had the members of "SEMPO DAN" any military training?

Ans: Yes, they had. They received military training in regions where Japanese military units were stationed, as well as in other places where such units were not located.

ve
X

Que: Who instructed them in their training?

Ans: They were taught by officers of the Imperial Japanese Army as well as by officers of the Imperial Manchukoan Army.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" intended for action with the beginning of war with the SOVIET UNION?

Ans: 31 July of 1945 in the Session of the "Pan-Manchurian Unified Congress" (ZENKOKU RENGO KYOGIKAI), when I executed my duties, I summoned the chief-clerks of the head-office of KYOWA-KAI Departments for every Province and instructed them that the "SEMPO DAN" too, must develop its activity in the regions of dispositions of Japanese Troops and that they had to coordinate their activity with the Japanese Military Commanders, and I gave orders to carry out the preparations for such activities.

Que: Did you receive any instructions from the staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY, concerning "SEMPO DAN" activities?

Ans: 18 July of 1945 when I conferred with the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY, General YAMADA and his Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General HATA Hikozauro, General YAMADA told me that in any case the "SEMPO DAN" must be prepared, therefore the preparations for its practical actions had to be strengthened.

Que: To whom did you report usually, concerning KYOWA-KAI activities?

Ans: I presented my reports concerning KYOWA-KAI activities to two persons: the Emperor of MANCHUKUO and the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: Did you present written reports concerning your own duties?

Ans: Every year at the end of December I had an audience with the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, to whom I presented my written report concerning the work done by KYOWA-KAI during the year.

Que: Did you present any written reports to the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY too?

Ans: At the same time that I presented my written report to the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, I presented the same written report to the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY too.

Que: Do you bear, too, responsibility as one of the representatives of the Japanese Government for the preparations for the war against SOVIET UNION?

Ans: Yes. When I was the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY. I devised the plan for the occupation of MANCHURIA. During the occupation of MANCHURIA by Japanese troops, I was one of the leaders of the Japanese Army. After that, when I accepted my duties as a leader of KYOWA-KAI, I bore responsibility for practical preparations for war against SOVIET UNION.

----- X ----- X -----

The answers to the questions were written and signed by myself.

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal did the questioning.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

The Army Interpreter was 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII.

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII

A WRITTEN OATH

Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army MIYAKE Mitsuharu. In connection with the trial of the Japanese principal war criminals, hereby I promise to give the pure truth in my verbal evidence. I swear the above before Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel ROSENBLIT that I received the warning that in case I give false evidence I shall bear of criminal responsibility according to the article 95th of the Criminal Code of R.S.F.S.R.

22 February 1946
MOSCOW

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

This written oath was received by Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

Army Interpreter 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII

The Affidavit of MIYAKE MITSU HARU

MIYAKE Mitsuharu was born at SHIROKO-MACHI, Japan proper, in 1880, a Japanese national. Graduated from the Military Academy, a reserve Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Held the position of Chief of the "KANTO GUN" (KWANTUNG ARMY) from July 1928 to May 1932 director of the central head-office of KYOWA-KAI (The Coalescence and Harmonization Council) since December 1940.

It was Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, who interrogated MIYAKE in MOSCOW Feb. 22nd 1946.

Que: Where were you educated and which official rank did you hold in the Japanese Army?

Ans: In 1940 I graduated from the Military Academy in Tokyo and as a first step I served as an official of Mobilization Department of the War Ministry in Tokyo. After that became a Private Secretary to the War Minister. In 1918 I was dispatched to ENGLAND to collect secret materials concerning modern devices of war.

Que: How many years did you spend in England?

Ans: In England I stayed for about half-a-year, after that I lived for 1 year at WIEN, then for more than one year at BUDAPEST where I served as a Japanese Representative Member on the Committee to Supervise the Execution of the Peace Treaty by AUSTRIA and HUNGARY.

Que: Check the number of your official positions after 1922, please.

Ans: After my return to JAPAN I was in command of several military units; and from 1923 I was commander of 4th Regiment of the Imperial Guards.

Que: What rank did you hold then?

Ans: I was a Colonel in the Japanese Army.

Que: How long did you hold that position?

Ans: Up to April 1925. This regiment is located in TOKYO, but after 1925 I was appointed Chief of Staff for 4th Military Division located at OSAKA, and in August 1926 I was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and I was appointed Commander in Chief of 5th Infantry Brigade at NAGOYA. In July 1928 I was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and remained in this position until May 1932.

Que: And the occupation of MANCHURIA took place just at the time you were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY?

Ans: MANCHURIA was occupied during the time of my being Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: What did you do after 1932?

Ans: In April 1932 I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was appointed Chief of Military Transportations Department of the War Ministry, but in February 1935 I was appointed the Commander in Chief of the 20th Division of KEIJO (SEOUL, KOREA).

Que: You were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and after that you were appointed a Commander of a Military Division -- what was the reason for this demotion?

Ans: The position of a Commander of a Military Division in JAPAN is esteemed higher than the post of a Chief of Army Staff. I remained as Commander of the Division for about two years, but in December 1936 I was placed on the reserve list.

Que: From what time did you take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: From December 1940.

Que: Who was it who recommended you to take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: I was recommended by the President of KYOWA-KAI -- the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO, Mr. CHANG-CHING-HUI.

Que: From what time did Mr. CHANG-CHING-HUI know you?

Ans: From the very beginning of Manchurian Incident, that is from 1931.

Que: Who was the direct leader of MANCHURIAN occupation affairs? You, being the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY, know that very well, I think?

Ans: In 1931 during the occupation of MANCHURIA, the Japanese Army was under direct leadership of the Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, Lieutenant-General HONJO.

Que: Which were the leading instructions from TOKYO concerning military operations in MANCHURIA during 1931?

Ans: The operation plan of the Japanese Army was delivered to General Staff Headquarters of TOKYO in July 1931 from the Headquarters of KWANTUNG ARMY. This plan considered the occupation by Japanese troops of all strategically important cities and other places in MANCHURIA, and if successfully carried out, MANCHURIA would be occupied completely.

Que: Who was the author of this plan?

Ans: The plan was devised by myself, as a Chief of Staff according to orders from Army Commander Lieutenant-General HONJO, but in general, this plan was outlined by my predecessor Major-General SAITO. In devising my own plan I used the part of that plan received from Major-General SAITO.

Que: Was the strategical plan of occupation of MANCHURIA delivered to you in July 1931, approved by Japanese General Staff Headquarters?

Ans: That plan of operation was signed in MANCHURIA by Lieutenant-General HONJO, the Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, by me, and my assistants, Colonel ITAGAKI and Lieutenant-Colonel ISHIHARA. Then that plan, as I have mentioned, was submitted to the Army General Staff of the Japanese Army in July of 1931. Chief of General Staff KANAYA Hanzo gave his approval in the same month. As far as I know, that plan for the occupation of MANCHURIA was an important part of the general plan of the operations of Japanese forces against the SOVIET UNION and was drafted by the General Staff of Japanese Army. It was then, when I started out for my new post as Chief of KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, in July 1928, that I found out the existence of a plan to attack the U.S.S.R. Our functions to participate in that plan were known by the Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY. Some parts of that plan were modified in later years.

Que: What time did you schedule for the beginning of the military actions in MANCHURIA in the plan you devised?

Ans: The general situation in 1931 did not allow fixing a definite date to start the military operations: it was proposed to start them at the first opportunity.

Que: What was the actual cause of the start of the military operations by Japanese Army in MANCHURIA in 1931?

Ans: 18 September 1931 at half past 10 in the afternoon, Chinese troops blew up a certain portion of the South MANCHURIAN Railway line and simultaneously opened fire against Japanese troops. The Japanese Army could not tolerate such actions, and according to order from Lieutenant-General HONJO, our detachment at MUYDEN attacked CHINESE military barracks and occupied those. That was the beginning of the military operations there.

Que: Did you know for certain, that this explosion affair was actually done by CHINESE troops?

Ans: No, I did not. I was not certain. I suppose that this Chinese action was done under provocation from Japanese.

Que: How it was done actually?

Ans: I do not know, how it was arranged actually: I questioned my subordinates concerning the matter, but no one of them knew. My personal opinion is that the actions were provoked by Japanese: when I asked about the matter, Commander of KWANTUNG ARMY, Lieutenant-General HONJO, told me that he was of the same opinion too. It was possible to suggest that the Japanese battalion in MUYDEN area, clad in Chinese military uniform, took up the opportunity to provoke further actions.

Que: Who was in command of this battalion?

Ans: The battalion commander was Lieutenant-Colonel SHIMAFOTO and the commander of 29th Infantry Regiment was Colonel HIRATA.

Que: Were they both i.e. Colonel HIRATA and Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAFOTO subordinate to the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters?

Ans: Yes, they were both subordinate to the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters.

Que: Was it possible for those officers to take such provocative actions without any orders from the KWANTUNG ARMY staff?

Ans: It was possible. They were capable of doing such a thing.

Que: By their personal decisions too?

Ans: Oh, yes.

Que: When did MANCHURIA become to be regarded as a base for attack on the U.S.S.R.?

Ans: As far as I understand, those activities were to begin immediately after the occupation of MANCHURIA in 1931. I left MANCHURIA in 1932 and came back there in 1940 as mentioned in the declaration.

Que: What particular changes did you observe in MANCHURIA in connection with preparations to use it as a military base, when you returned there?

Ans: Those changes are as follows: a remarkable increase of Japanese troops in the districts near the SOVIET frontier, the establishment of new railroads and highways toward the SOVIET frontiers and the construction of airfields, military warehouses and barracks in such regions of operations as were regarded important for the waging of a war against the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Did the KYOWA-KAI being under your leadership, make any preparations to participate in war against the U.S.S.R.?

Ans: The chief functions of the KYOWA-KAI were to mobilize all Manchurians so that we might secure the regime established by Japan after the occupation of MANCHURIA in 1931. It was required of all Manchurians to work hard, to make MANCHURIA an important foundation for JAPAN in the continent, especially to strengthen it as a base against the SOVIETS. For that purpose KYOWA-KAI made widespread propaganda, gave military training to its members, especially to the youth, made positive efforts for the development of Manchurian Industries especially that of munitions, participated in the construction of military installations under the direction of the respective military headquarters and organized special military groups for war-time operations named "SEMPO DAN" (The Vanguard of the Army).

Que: From which person did you receive instructions concerning your activities?

Ans: The activity of the KYOWA-KAI in general was outlined in its program, but on certain occasions I received direct instructions from the Commander in Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: Who offered the original principles of the KYOWA-KAI organization?

Ans: The idea of this Society was first disclosed in 1931, the organizers of which were the KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, especially the Commander HONJO, and me, the Chief of Staff at the time. And so I was asked to become the head of the Central Head-Office of that organization in 1940. I accepted the call from CHANG CHING-HUI, the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO and Major-General HATA, the Vice-Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY in October 1940. Receiving the written engagement, I visited ANAMI, the Vice-Minister of War, who persuaded me to become the leader of that Society to strengthen the activities concerning the maintenance of Japanese influence in MANCHURIA.

Que: In 1940, when you became the Chief of the KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, what was the number of its membership?

Ans: About three million.

Que: How many were the members of the KYOWA-KAI in 1945, about the time of war with SOVIET UNION?

Ans: There were 4,500,000 men.

Que: Is it possible to take for certain that during the period when you were the Chief of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, the membership of the Society increased from 3 million men to 4,500,000 men?

Ans: Yes.

Que: Is that your own success?

Ans: No; this result was not my own success.

Que: Then, who was he, and what measures has he taken to increase the membership of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: We, the Japanese, broadly propagated the idea that to reach our victory we had to spend all our powers and insisted that Manchurian people be greatly interested in becoming members of the KYOWA-KAI. This is the reason for the increase of the membership of the KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Did you direct these propaganda actions?

Ans: Yes, I gave the proper instructions. The members of KYOWA-KAI received military training and took part in the construction works of fortifications against the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Did you often deliver public speeches as the Chief of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters?

Ans: Yes, I often lectured personally too.

Que: What was the content of your speeches?

Ans: The speeches delivered by myself, in general, were of the following meaning: At present our JAPAN is fighting against BRITAIN and AMERICA, but if JAPAN is defeated in this war, the MANCHUKUO will be defeated too. But if JAPAN wins the Victory then MANCHUKUO too, shall be victorious. Therefore the Manchukuoan people must too do their best to help JAPAN to win the Victory. In other words in order to furnish the war supplies for JAPAN they have to produce in ample quantities the foodstuffs, clothing and other manufactured supplies.

Que: Did you appeal to people in your speeches, calling towards the war against SOVIET UNION?

Ans: In my speeches during the period from 1941 to 1944 I emphasized that war with the SOVIET UNION might occur therefore the Manchukuan people must prepare for war sufficiently, to avoid defeat in war-time.

Que: Did the said KYOWA-KAI publish some printed matters like pamphlets, posters, etc.?

Ans: Yes. Pamphlets, posters and magazines were published in great quantities.

Que: Of what nature was the content of those printed matters?

Ans: The contents of all of them were saturated with enmity towards the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Was there established any training school for preparing propagandists?

Ans: Under supervision of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters there were in existence some special training schools for preparing the propagandists and lower organization instructors.

Que: Do you know of the existence of the "KANTOKU-EN" plan?

Ans: A document was delivered from the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters to the Central Headquarters office of the KYOWA-KAI late in 1941: on the cover of the document there were written the words: "KANTOKU-EN".

Que: What was the content of those documents?

Ans: It was stated in this document that 300,000 laborers for military construction were demanded by the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters from the MANCHUKUO Government.

Que: You have already stated, that in the KYOWA-KAI there was established one organization known as "SEMPO DAN". Please give a concrete explanation about it.

Ans: The general functions of the "SEMPO DAN" groups in ordinary times was to watch over the Manchurians, to encourage them to work hard, and to supervise those persons possessing anti-Japanese feelings and in this way assist the MANCHUKUOAN Government, while the chief duties during war-time were such positive operations behind SOVIET lines as terrorist acts, the executions of plots, strategems, the explosions of Railway lines, bridges and military warehouses and killing and wounding of SOVIET troops.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" a military unit?

Ans: No: it was not a unit. These were only groups which existed in many inhabited points in MANCHURIA.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" included as a part of the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: Of course it was a part of the whole KYOWA-KAI organization.

Que: When was the "SEMPO DAN" organized?

Ans: The "SEMPO DAN" was organized in the middle of December of 1944 in accordance with order received. But its structure from then and up to the recent times was continuously in process of formation.

Que: Who gave the orders to organize the "SEMPO DAN"?

Ans: The orders to organize the "SEMPO DAN" were devised by the Chief of General Affairs Bureau of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, TAKEOKA KIICHI, and signed by myself.

Que: Of what kind of people was the "SEMPO DAN" organized?

Ans: "SEMPO DAN" members were selected from people of robust complexion with chivalrous spirit, sound-minded and capable of doing two or three times as much work as ordinary people.

Que: What was the attitude of the KYOWAKAI towards the "WHITE" Russians?

Ans: The "WHITE" Russians in general were concentrated at HARBIN. They were led by the "White Russian Emigrants Office" in the Empire of MANCHUKUO and the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin. They were supplied with food, clothing and other facilities by our KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Were the "WHITE" Russians entered as members in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: Yes, they were. The "WHITE" Russians too had a membership in KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Where there many "WHITE" Russians in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: 3 or 4 thousand, I think.

Que: Had the members of "SEMPO DAN" any military training?

Ans: Yes, they had. They received military training in regions where Japanese military units were stationed, as well as in other places where such units were not located.

Que: Who instructed them in their training?

Ans: They were taught by officers of the Imperial Japanese Army as well as by officers of the Imperial Manchukoan Army.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" intended for action with the beginning of war with the SOVIET UNION?

Ans: 31 July of 1945 in the Session of the "Pan-Manchurian Unified Congress" (ZENKOKU RENGO KYOGIKAI), when I executed my duties, I summoned the chief-clerks of the head-office of KYOWA-KAI Departments for every Province and instructed them that the "SEMPO DAN" too, must develop its activity in the regions of dispositions of Japanese Troops and that they had to coordinate their activity with the Japanese Military Commanders, and I gave orders to carry out the preparations for such activities.

Que: Did you receive any instructions from the staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY, concerning "SEMPO DAN" activities?

Ans: 18 July of 1945 when I conferred with the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY, General YAMADA and his Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General HATA Hikozauro, General YAMADA told me that in any case the "SEMPO DAN" must be prepared, therefore the preparations for its practical actions had to be strengthened.

Que: To whom did you report usually, concerning KYOWA-KAI activities?

Ans: I presented my reports concerning KYOWA-KAI activities to two persons: the Emperor of MANCHUKUO and the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Que: Did you present written reports concerning your own duties?

Ans: Every year at the end of December I had an audience with the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, to whom I presented my written report concerning the work done by KYOWA-KAI during the year.

Que: Did you present any written reports to the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY too?

Ans: At the same time that I presented my written report to the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, I presented the same written report to the Commander of the KWANTUNG ARMY too.

Que: Do you bear, too, responsibility as one of the representatives of the Japanese Government for the preparations for the war against SOVIET UNION?

Ans: Yes. When I was the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY. I devised the plan for the occupation of MANCHURIA. During the occupation of MANCHURIA by Japanese troops, I was one of the leaders of the Japanese Army. After that, when I accepted my duties as a leader of KYOWA-KAI, I bore responsibility for practical preparations for war against SOVIET UNION.

----- X ----- X -----

The answers to the questions were written and signed by myself.

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal did the questioning.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

The Army Interpreter was 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII.

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII

A WRITTEN OATH

Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army MIYAKE Mitsuharu. In connection with the trial of the Japanese principal war criminals, hereby I promise to give the pure truth in my verbal evidence. I swear the above before Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel ROSENBLIT that I received the warning that in case I give false evidence I shall bear of criminal responsibility according to the article 95th of the Criminal Code of R.S.F.S.R.

22 February 1946
MOSCOW

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

This written oath was received by Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

Army Interpreter 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII

no
not stop any alone but for. min officials
collided on activities against the Sov. Un.
SHIDEHARA

787

From OHASHI, Consul General in Harbin, to SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov. 1931 in the afternoon
Received 8 Nov. 1931 in the morning

Telegram No. 516-1 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

Concerning telegram No. 1213 sent to the Minister from Mukden

Unconditionally approve of Consul-General HAYASHI's viewpoint concerning the advance to Chichihar. I hope that the Army, taking advantage of this opportunity will resolutely complete the plan which they hope to realize. If they do not do this, it seems impossible that they will allow only CHANG HAI-PENG's weak troops to advance in Chichihar, even if CHIANG SHENG's army should have been greatly damaged. As I have telegraphed repeatedly, even TING CHAO, who has not always appeared hostile to us lately, seems to have been sending his soldiers in order to aid CHIANG SHENG's army. As consul telegraphed repeatedly, even if CHANG HAI-PENG's troops should advance in Chichihar, they will have difficulty in holding their position unless our army supports them. It is now impossible to win over MI CHEN-SHAN by any means, and even if we were able to win him over, we could not control CHIANG SHENG's army which is not under the direct control of MI CHEN-SHAN, and which is in a unique position among Chinese troops. Therefore, I think that there is only one way to complete the policy for the control of North Manchuria. There is nothing else to do but install our own puppet in Chichihar after the army attacks and thoroughly defeats CHANG SHENG's army and allies there.

From OHASHI, Consul-General in Harbin, to SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov 1931 in the afternoon
Received 7 Nov 1931 in the afternoon

Telegram No. 516-2 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

It is hard for me to approve of the plan for the independence of Manchuria which the government tacitly seems to permit. I think it would be fairer, more correct and complete for us to adopt the policy of carrying out the guarantee occupation of all Manchuria and administer it ourselves for the time until all pending problems with China are solved. If we do not do this, everything will be at best incomplete, and the policy for the control of North Manchuria will become useless.

Although it would have been better to have left North Manchuria alone from the beginning, it would be much more damaging to all policies to leave things half way, since we already have meddled with Manchuria.

The things that must be considered concerning the invasion of Chichihar are relations with the League of Nations and the USSR. There are other reasons but, the first and foremost point concerning these relations is that we will persist in our opinion that this invasion was done because of the necessity to protect the repair of bridges.

The second point is that if USSR should dispatch troops, we will be stimulated by this. It will then be the most favorable opportunity which we have hoped for for a long time, in fighting to repulse the attack of this enemy of humanity and thus settle eternal peace in the Orient.

I, many Japanese and foreign travellers passing here are in agreement with the view that when we consider the internal conditions of USSR along with her complicated relations with neighboring nations, even if Japan takes any action in Manchuria at this time, the USSR will probably not have the strength to fight us. However it is hard to say when she may commence hostilities.

From OHASHI, Consul General in
Harbin, to SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov. 1931 in the afternoon
Received 7 Nov. 1931 in the afternoon

Telegram No. 516-3 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

There is also a rumor that Chinese troops have been constructing third line trenches and are planning to induce our army to destroy the Chinese Eastern Railway and then demand that USSR send her troops. Therefore, when the army "crosses" the Chinese Eastern Railway, the army must have enough preparations made to defeat twenty or thirty thousand soldiers, supposing that USSR should dispatch them.

ABEND

MR. ARBENT and other foreign journalists who are now staying here seem to have a similar view that, considering the present world situation which has been going through an extreme depression, and the fact that China has never experienced the loss of credit with Europe and America as today, even if Japan takes any action in Manchuria, the League of Nations, not to mention America, may censure Japan with words, but they probably will not carry out such interferences as economic blockade or the use of force. When our army takes action against USSR, England with the Conservative Party in power, and America which is extremely afraid of the five year plan will never foster an attitude of interference but will sympathize with us. They also will have the view that the policy of joint control over China will be take due to Japan's action, and this will be the only way to save China. If their views are reliable, I hope that you will take advantage of this opportunity and make a resolution to thoroughly solve the Manchurian problem. The invasion of Chichihar is absolutely necessary for this. I think that if you hesitate at this time, the sacred

HALLT
AREND

blood that was shed in Manchuria, especially in the neighborhood of Chingchiao, will have been in vain.

This telegram was also dispatched at the same time to Peiping and Mukden, China.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 193 pages, dated 22 Oct, 1931-, and 8 Jan 1932

described as follows: Collection of reports from Japanese officials in Manchuria re: Manchurian Incident.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
10 day of Sept, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10 day of Sep, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

788

MEMORANDUM OF MR. ORO. T. KAWADA, MILITARY
ATTACHE TO JAPANESE EMBASSY AM MOSCOW
DATED JULY 14, 1932

CONCLUSION

The exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia aiming at the guarantee of the nation's economic life, security of our national defense and establishing the foundation of existence and progress of our Empire is the urgent need of the present and the most memorable achievement ever known. So the whole nation must exert utmost efforts whole-heartedly.

For this purpose, we must externally try as far as possible to avert the outbreak of international troubles and internally making our resolutions more stable, realize the national unity and proceed to the speedy accomplishment of the great task.

As to the obstacles such as Chinese maneuvers, restraints by the League of Nations, acts of America and Russia, etc. against the accomplishment of the great task, we should employ proper diplomacy and endeavor to exclude the obstacles as well as avoiding making matters worse, but it is necessary for us to be ready to appeal to arms against Russia, China and under certain circumstances against America if it is inevitable. Therefore, the emphasis must be laid on the repletion of military armaments against Russia.

VG

As our Empire's military power as compared with those of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. will be put at a disadvantage gradually; we must strive to set up as soon as possible the foundation of our exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the general principles of the task that will become the important factor of the national defense, while we must strengthen our military power so that we may reject other countries' intervention flatly.

Counter-measure against the U.S.S.R.

A Russo-Japanese War in the future is unavoidable. Considering the military power of the U.S.S.R. only, it seems to be advantageous for us to make war with her as soon as possible, but as we are now facing the great task of exploitation of Manchuria

and Mongolia and the world situations, especially those in America and China, are not favorable for us, it is better for us for a while, not only to be cautious not to cause Russo-Japanese War by our initiative, but also refrain from stimulating her as much as possible. It is true that postponement of war will increase the military power of the U.S.S.R., but our military power also will be increased.

But in case the U.S.S.R. obstructs positively our exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia, or extends the evil hands of Bolshevism to those areas willfully and does not listen to our warning, we must not only be ready to solve fundamentally the Russian problem at once, but, we must leave nothing to be desired in view of the fact that not a little possibility of causing troubles due to unexpected causes prevails, as the margin of strength between Japan and the U.S.S.R. has become very little and the Far Eastern forces of the U.S.S.R. are being reinforced.

(1) As to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact proposed by the U.S.S.R., we must be non-committal and reserve our freedom of action.

(2) Regarding the construction of transportation networks in Northern Manchuria, we must take into consideration the drain of the East China Railway and strategy towards the U.S.S.R.

(3) We must pay deepest attention to the prevention of Bolshevik movements towards Manchuria, Mongolia, and, furthermore, towards Japan. Especially we must guide Manchukuo, leaving nothing to be desired, do our best to obtain actual proof of Russian propaganda and intrigue, and endeavor to prevent her complaint.

Though we shall not support the political activity of White Russians residing in Manchukuo, with a view to make use of them if necessary, we must carry out complete investigation and control of them.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do
hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Report of
Japanese military attache in Moscow Lt. Colonel Kawabe
made on July 14, 1932."
was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military
Prosecution Department, Moscow
on or about March 22, 1946. and that the original
of the said document may be found in the archives
of the said department.

I do further certify _____

/s/ TARANENKO

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

May 17, 1946

TO DOCUMENT NO. 1991

INTERROGATION:

September 3, 1946

Tokyo.

Colonel Ivanov, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in the presence of interpreter Major Pashkovsky, in the premises of the I.P.S. has presented to Kawabe, Torashiro, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language containing 5 pages and a photostate of the envelope, being the Report, sent by him on July 14, 1932 from Moscow to Tokyo.

Having personally read the document presented to him, Kawabe has made the following inscription at the back of each of the 5 pages of the photocopies of the document in his own hand:

"I hereby certify that this photocopy is a copy of the document written in my own hand.

September 3, 1946
Kawabe, Torashiro."

Interpreter, Major Pashkovsky, who was present there, translated the contents of this inscription from Japanese into Russian.

Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

This interrogation is drawn up in confirmation of the above said.

Colonel IVANOV, Assistant
Prosecutor, for the U.S.S.R. at the
International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.

Major PASHKOVSKY, Interpreter.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: M. GILDENBLAT

CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Major Pashkovsky Alexey Antonovich, hereby certify to Colonel Ivanov, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR, that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kawabe, Torashiro on the photostate copy of the document, the Report sent by him from Moscow to Tokyo on July 14, 1932, which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for the purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ PASHKOVSKY

PASHKOVSKY.

Subscribed to before:

/s/ _____

Colonel Ivanov,
Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR
At the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: M. GILDENBLAT

name of Emperor Hirohito again came into the trial Tokyo

War criminals in affidavit of Gen. JUN USHIROKU

presently Russian prosecutor Colonel Rosenblit to Int. Trib.

1935 Reply to a question regarding Japanese Manchurian army for its
OTSU report plan to attack Siberia.

Gen. Rosenblit said the plan was submitted to and approved
of Emperor in March 1935 stop as irrelevant

Defense objected to the nature of document when
American saying - Emp is not one of accused here. write

Well even if this appears to be a v
Well, what, quite it is difficult to say what is
the relevant and material requests relating question
could be admitted. stop -

Defense seem proof of Russ prov - shipping cont.
it guaranteed every doc - exhibit

Colonel Ivanov,
Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR
At the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDEMEYER, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: M. GILDEMEYER

*nil. attacks in Turkey. Page 1
war in way from Tokyo to Istanbul
789*

A. A message of Lt. Col. KANDA

(July 15th)

On August 16th, Kawabeout of necessity.....After that.....

spy

B. Message of Lt. Col. Kanda

1. From Lt. Col. Kasahara

It was decided that the (army and navy's) preparations for waging war against Russia should be completed before the middle of 1934. However, it does not mean that hostilities will be opened immediately after the preparations have been completed. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war against Russia is necessary for Japan. This is, however, not the intention of the entire (army).

T.N. Could possibly mean forces.

2. The aliases under which men entered the consulates in Russia are:

Capt. SUMIBE to Vladivostok
Capt. FUKICHI, A. to

NOORE BURUSUKU

3. /Courier/ published in June, August, October, December, and February.

4. In the increasing of the monthly reserve fund, it is thought that such increments are possible if the corresponding activities increase.

5. Although men will not be forced to enter the MANCHURIAN Consulate, they will be sent to CHITA. /T.N. Locality in Siberia/.

6. If possible, 10 men for China and from 4 to 8 men for Russia will be trained to investigate Russia.
/T.N. Text ambiguous here/

7. Residents in Europe shall be increased and for those in the armies of Germany and France, their investigating activities shall be increased.

8. It is proposed that advisers be sent to Poland.

9. Military officers shall be posted in Rumania.

10. Students and ex-soldiers shall be posted in Persia and Afghanistan for long terms. This shall also be done in the Siberian Area.

11. On the /method/ of the corp's secret information. In order to make the investigations, newspapers and magazines shall be collected. For this purpose officer-interpreter personnel shall be increased. This must be realized to a certain extent.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy the "Message forwarded to Military Attache Kawabe by Lt. Colonel Kanda" on July 16, 1932. was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosectuion Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department

I do further certify _____

/s/ Taranenko

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

May 17, 1946.

INTERROGATION

September 3, 1946.

Tokyo.

Colonel Ivanov, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in the presence of interpreter Major Pashkovsky, in the premises of the I.P.S. has presented to Kawabe, Torashiro, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language containing 4 pages and being the record of the message forwarded to him by Lt-Colonel Kanda on July 16, 1932, on behalf of Lt-Colonel Kasahara, of the General Staff.

Having personally read the document presented to him Kasahara has made the following inscriptions in his own hand:

a) At the back of page 1 of the photocopy of the document:

"I hereby certify that this photocopy is a copy of the document written in my own hand.

September 3, 1946
Kawabe, Torashiro."

b) At the back of page 2 of the photocopy:

"I hereby certify that this is a photocopy of the record of the message which was forwarded to me by Lt-Colonel Kanda, in Moscow, on July 16, 1932, on behalf of Lt-Colonel Kasahara, of the General Staff.

Kawabe, Torashiro."

c) On the 3d and 4th pages there is his signature:
"Kawabe, Torashiro".

Interpreter, Major Pashkovsky, who was present there, translated the contents of these inscriptions from Japanese into Russian.

Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

This interrogation is drawn up in confirmation of the above said.

/s/ Colonel IVANOV,
Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R. at the International
Military Tribunal for the
Far East.

/s/ Major PASHOVSKIY, Interpreter

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Major Pashkovsky Alexey Antonovich, hereby certify to Colonel Ivanov that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kawabe, Torashiro on the photostate copy of the document-the Record of the message forwarded to him by Lt-Colonel Kanda on behalf of Lt-Colonel Kasahara of the General Staff on July 16, 1932, which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.R.

Fashkovsky.

Subscribed to before

Colonel Ivanov,
Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR
At the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.

/s/ _____
Colonel Ivanov

CERTIFICATE OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILLENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

A F F I D A V I T

O F A W I T N E S S

790

K H A B A R O V S K

MARCH 29, 1946.

I am Colonel ROSTIBLIT, assistant prosecutor for the U. S. S. R. at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo.

I interrogated the following person as a witness through the interpreter Major Pashkovsky, with previous notice that the said person shall be held responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R. S. F. S. R. in case of false statement.

1.	Name	<u>USHIROKU Jun.</u>
2.	Age	Born in 1884.
3.	Occupation	<u>Commander in Chief of the 3rd Area Army, of the Kwantung Army.</u>
4.	Political Party	None.
5.	Present address.	<u>Khabarovsk.</u>

A certificate of the witness of his responsibility for false statement and a certificate of the interpreter for false interpretation are attached hereto.

Interrogation carried out in Japanese under the interpretation of Major Pashkovsky.

Q. State your personal history.

A. I graduated from the military academy in 1905 and was appointed Sublieutenant, promoted to Lieutenant in 1908, to Captain in 1915, to Major in 1921, to Lieutenant Colonel in 1925, to Colonel in 1929, to Major-General in 1934, to Lieutenant-General in 1937, to full-General in 1942.

Q. Were you connected with the Siberian Incident since 1918?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your position at that time?

A. The 5th division staff Officer.

Q. Where did you serve at the time of Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931?

A. Chief of the 4th division staff in Osaka.

Q. Where were you transferred since then?

A. In February, 1932, I was engaged in the Railway work as Kwantung Army Staff Officer. From Aug. 1934 to Aug. 1935, I served as Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff, from Aug. 1935 to Oct. 1937 as the head of both the Bureau of personnel of War Ministry and the Bureau of Military Affairs, from Oct. 1937 to Aug. 1939 was at the front of Tantung in North China as commander of the 26th division, from Aug. 1939 to Sept. 1940 served in Peian as commander of the 4th Area Army in Manchuria, from Sept. 1940 to July 1941 served in Kwantung in South China as commander of the Kwantung Army Group; from July 1941 to Aug. 1942 in Nanking as Commander of the Expeditionary Army Headquarters in China. Then Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Full-General Ito, Shunroku. From Aug. 1942 to Feb. 1944 served in Osaka as Chief of the Middle Area Army. From Feb. 1944 to July 1944, I was a Vice-Chief of the General Staff and from April 1944 to July held an additional post of the Inspector-General of Air-Force which was under direct control of the Emperor. From August 1944 up to Japan's surrender of Aug. I served as Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army in Manchuria. The Headquarters of the 3rd Area Army was located in Chichihaerb till May 1945, and since June in Mukden.

Q. Where were you at the time of the despatch of troops to Siberia.

A. In Chita, Sabaikalye.

Q. What railway was being built when you were in Charge of Railway superintendence in Manchuria during 1932 to 1934?

A. Constructions were begun in 1932 on the Hailun-Peian-Taian Railway, Laha-Harbin and Tunhua-Tumenkiang Railway; I do not remember the exact date of their completion, but I think they were completed, in about two years.

Q. Did these railways have any strategic value?

A. They had strategic value.

Q. Give detailed accounts of the strategic value of these railways.

RR A. These railways for the viewpoint of strategy, were directed against the Soviet-Union and contributions towards troop movements and smooth transportation of munitions very effective.

Q. Were you connected with the operation plans of the General Staff at the time when you were the Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff during 1934 to 1935?

- A. Setting the operation plans was assigned to the 1st Department, but, as Chief of the 3rd Department I was engaged in managing the railway, shipping and communication affairs and was connected with considerably many parts of the 1st Department affairs. For example, I took suitable measures to comply with the request of the 1st Department to inform the transportation of Troops (the number of divisions), the point and date of their destination.
- Q. Do you know anything about the operation codes KOO, OTSU and HEI in the General Staff Headquarters?
- A. I know them: KOO means the War against the U. S. ... OTSU against U. S. S. R. and HEI against China.
- Q. Describe the outlines of the OTSU plan at the time when you were The Chief of the 3rd Department in the General Staff Headquarters during 1934 to 1935.
- A. Concerning the Plan of 1935, I know the following facts. The gist of it is: in connection with the affairs of the 3rd Department in the General Staff Headquarters, to carry on mass transportation of troops from Japan proper to Northern Manchuria and the transferring of main forces in Manchuria from central areas to Northern Manchuria. The main portion of troops was concentrated to the east, i. e., the Hatching area and the other portions were respectively concentrated to the north, i. e., South of Heiho and to the vicinity of Hailar. The above-mentioned is all that I know of the Otsu plan of that time.
- Q. Was the OTSU plan of 1935 the plan of a war against USSR?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many divisions intended to be transported from Japan Proper according to the above plan of the General Staff Headquarters?
- A. Twenty Division.
- Q. Were you requested as Chief of the 3rd Dept., to transport by ship the above division from Japan Proper to Manchuria and Korea and afterwards by rail from the ports of Manchuria and Korea to the destination?
- A. Yes.
- Q. From what ports of Japan Proper to what ports of Manchuria and Korea did you intend to transport twenty Divisions?
- A. I chiefly used the port of Osaka and partially the ports of Ujina and Moji.

- Q. What ports of the Continent did you intend to land the troops?
- A. I intended to land the Troops on Fusan, Korea; and Dairen, Manchuria.
- Q. How many tons were requested to transport the Troops from Japan Proper to Manchuria.
- A. 120,000 to 150,000 tons were requested per division.
- Q. How many days does it take to transport twenty divisions?
- A. Two months and a half to concentrate them into North Manchuria.
- Q. What kind of attack plans did you make up according to the OTSU plan of 1935?
- A. It was planned that the main attack should be directed to the east, i. e., the Pogradichnaya and that in the Heiho and Hailar area we should be on the defensive. But, afterwards in 1939, I knew in the OTSU plan that supplementary attack should be carried out in the north and south of the main attack line. Yet, the attack areas changed with year.
- Q. Was it contemplated to carry out landing operation with ships according to the OTSU plan of 1935?
- A. When success was achieved in the main attack in Manchuria (airforce operation) a landing operation was planned to land one division in AMERIKA Bay to divert the Russian Army and to facilitate the operations in the main attack area.
- Q. What was the aim of the war according to the plan of 1935?
- A. I did not know the true aim, but its operational aim was to occupy Maritime Provinces and to eliminate air-raids upon Japan Proper by the airforces of the Soviet Union Army.
- Q. Who drew up and who approved the Otsu plan of 1935?
- A. This plan was drawn up by Lieutenant-General KIYOSHI Imai, Chief of the 1st Department in the General Staff Headquarters, and approved by Field-Marshal Prince KAN-in, Chief, of the General Staff.
- Q. When was this plan submitted to and sanctioned by the Emperor?
- A. In March, 1935.
- Q. What kind of plans of operations against U. S. S. R. was laid down in 1939, when you were Chief of the Army in Peian?
- A. The aim of the 4th Army under my command was to defend the Sunuri, Aigun and Haiho areas by one division and the frontier guards. In case of the outbreak of war, one division was to be reinforced in the 1st month of war, and one more, in the 2nd month. But, in fact, at the beginning of war we had troops only capable of defending the above-mentioned areas.
- Q. What kind of plans of operation was laid down in 1944, when you were the Vice-Chief of the General Staff?
- A. The operations against USSR at the time when I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff were planned to be the defensive ones in each front.
- Q. Do you know anything about "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
- A. In Sept 1944, in Chichihaerh I knew of it for the first time from Chief of the 3rd Area Army Staff, Major-General WATANABE, Hiroshi, "Kan-Toku-En" meant the reinforcement of the 13 divisions stationed in Manchuria and the transferring of the 51st and 57th divisions into Manchuria. I myself was then in Kwantung and knew of the above.

Otsu

Logan

I feel

"He is certainly not out of account here."

1

Logan: He is not dependent on the case.

this looks like a real plan

well: it is difficult to say

irrelevant

unmistakable

- Q. State the process of the reinforcements of Manchurian aviation from the standpoint of ex-Inspector-General of Aviation in Japan.
- A. The airforces of Manchuria immediately after the Manchurian Incident was very weak, but, by the commenced large reinforcement in 1937, the strength of the 1st line was 24 flying companies (240 aeroplanes) in 1938, 34 companies (339 aeroplanes) in 1941, 49 companies (about 600 aeroplanes). The whole aviation corps belonged to the 2nd and 5th aviation divisions.
- Q. State the kinds of aeroplanes concentrated into Manchuria. Which kind of aeroplanes was many in number, fighters, bombers or scout planes?
- A. Fighters were the greatest in number and bombers were the next, but, I can not tell you exactly the number of them.
- Q. State the plan of employing the aviation corps of 1941 in Manchuria.
- A. In case of the outbreak of war, the main forces of them would be to proper the operations of the Japanese Army by means of making an attack and of bringing a pressure on the east, i. e., the Soviet Union Army stationing in Maritime Province.
- Q. How was the plan of operations at the time when you were Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army of Kwantung Army?
- A. Concerning the plans of employing the Area Army at the time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army, between the 1st and the 2nd plans was found a quite difference. The 3rd Area Army contemplated enforcing defensive operations in the Heiho, Hailar, and Wuchakow areas till May 1945, that is, the 4th Army was planned to occupy Sunwu, Ligun and Heiho areas, the 119th Division, to occupy the Hailar area and the 107th Division, the Wuchakow area. Since the beginning of June, 1945, the above plans were completely changed. The Area Army Headquarters had a new command upon the 30th and 44th Armies, having been transferred from Chichehaerh to Mukden and the 44th Army was engaged in defending the Wuchakow-Taonan-Tunglias line, the Army Headquarters was located in Liasyuan and the 30th Army took the defensive in the Kiliq, Changchou and Ssupinchieh areas.
- Q. How was the plan of operations at that time?
- A. The plan of operations made the 44th Army bound to stand on the defensive in the vicinities of Wuchakow, Taonan and Tunglias.
- Q. How was the process of the operations of the 3rd Area Army at the beginning of war between Japan and U. S. S. R?
- A. At the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War in Aug. 1945, having made the 44th Army retreated from the already occupied positions to the Mukden and Siasyang areas and by so doing establish a secret connection with the 30th Army, I placed the 3rd

Logm Plan submitted
to memo
This is not a defend
in this case.

3rd Area Army on the defensive in the Kilin-Changchieh-Mukden-siasyang line. Particularly I made the 108th division retreat from Jeho to Chinhou and then retreat to the south (Liaoyang) in view of the difficult defence. The defence line of Kilin-Changchun-Ssupingchieh-Mukden-Liaoyang was not the last one of the Japanese Army. If the war would turn unfavourable for our Army, we should intend to retreat to the Jungfu and Antung Provinces, where our final resistance would be tried against the Soviet Union Army. This was to be the very last defence line in Manchuria. This plan of operation, however, was not put in practice, being a mere plan of retreat. Therefore, on August 15th, 1945 when the telegram signed by the Emperor ordering to disarm our Army unconditionary was sent to me, the 3rd Area Army was still stationed in the Kilin-Changchun-Liaoyang line.

"It is difficult to say it is irrelevant or immaterial."

- Q. When the Army under your command was disarmed?
- A. About from Aug. 19th to Aug. 25th I hereby certify with my signature that the aforementioned answers were made in my own hand.

WITNESS:	GENERAL USHIKUNI (Sign)
INTERROGATOR:	COLONEL ROBERT SLIT (Sign) Assistant Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo
INTERPRETER:	Major PSIKOVSKIY (sign)
SECRETARY-STENOGRAPHER	KROKHIZIYEVSKIYA (Sign)

INTERROGATION started 21:45, 29 March 1946.
Interrogation finished 00:30, 30 March, 1946.

C E R T I F I C A T E

March 29th, 1946
in Khabarovsk City

The undersigned, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army of Kwantung Army, Full-General Jun Ushiroku made oath for only true statement about the top war criminals as a witness and gave this certificate to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I was previously warned that I shall be held responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code for R. S. S. R. in case of false statement.

Full-General JUN USHIROKU

The acceptor of this certificate Assistant Prosecutor for the U. S. S. R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo,

Colonel ROS ENBLIT.

A F F I D A V I T.

TOMINAGA Kyoji was born on Goto Island in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1894.

He is a Japanese, a graduate of the Military Staff College and of the rank of Lt.-General.

He was interrogated in Moscow on 21 Feb., 1946, by Col. S. Y. Rosenblit, the Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

- Q. Tell all your posts, which you have had, ever since you entered in the Japanese Army in addition to your affidavit dated 11 Feb., 1946.
- A. After graduation from the Military Academy in 1913, I began my service in the Japanese Army as a platoon leader of 23rd Infantry Regiment of 6th Division and was in service of this regiment till 1921. This division was situated in Kumamoto, Japan. I learned in the Military Staff College from 1921 to 1923. After the graduation, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.
- In 1924 - a company commander in 23rd Infantry Regiment.
In 1925 - an officer attached to General Affair Department of General Staff Headquarters.
1926-1927 - the Chief of Special Service Agency at Manchuli Station.
1928 - Again an officer attached to General Affair Department (Captain, later Major).
1929-1930 - the Assistant of Military Attache in Moscow (Major).
1931 - became a member of the Preparatory Committee for Disarmament Conference of League of Nations.
In 1932, I attended at the Conference of League of Nations at Geneva and after that I attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and then to General Affair Department (Major and promoted to the rank of Lt.-Col. in 1932).
In 1935, by the order of General Staff I was sent abroad to France to investigate the state of Russian emigrants at the aim of utilizing them against U.S.S.R. in the future.
In autumn of 1935, I became an officer of the rank of Lt.-Col., attached to 2nd Imperial Guard Inf. Regiment.

At the end of 1936, I became an acting chief of a section of General Affairs Department of General Staff Headquarters.

From March of 1937, I became the Chief of 2nd Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

In October of 1937, I became the Chief of 1st Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

(In 1936 I was promoted to the rank of colonel.)

From March of 1938, I became the Commander of 2nd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo.

In March of 1939, I was promoted to the rank of major-general and appointed Chief of 4th Department of General Staff Headquarters.

In September of 1939, I was appointed Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and remained with this post till September of 1940.

In December of the same year, I was appointed Director of Tank School.

In 1941, I was appointed Chief of Personnel Bureau of War Ministry and promoted to the rank of Lt.-General in November of the same year.

In March of 1943, holding the post of the Chief of Personnel Bureau, I was appointed Vice-Minister of War.

At the end of August of 1944, I was appointed Commander of 4th Air Force.

In January of 1945, I was ordered to await further orders, owing to my illness, and was placed in the first reserve list in April of the same year.

In July of 1945, being called out by the Army, I started for my post in Kwantung Army and was appointed Commander of 139th Division.

- Q. Who was War Minister at the time when you were Vice-Minister of War?
- A. When I was Vice-Minister of War, the War Minister was TOJO.
- Q. Tell how and by whom the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was organized.
- A. At that time the Kwantung Army was under the command of Lt.-General HONJO Shigeru. By HONJO's orders the Japanese troops invaded in Manchuria without declaration of war. Among the officers of the Kwantung Army, those who played the most active roles in Manchurian occupation were Col. ITAGAKI and Lt.-Col. ISHIHARA attached to Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. In a few years after the invasion of

the Japanese troops in Manchuria, the Japanese Government took all kinds of measures in order to convert Manchuria into the military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.; the number of the Japanese troops in Manchuria was continually increased; new railways and auto-roads leading to Soviet borders were constructed; munition factories were built and managed; a large number of farmers were transmigrated in Manchuria from Japan for the recruitment of the Kwantung Army; there were also constructed new ammunition dumps, barracks, hospitals, etc.

- Q. Can you tell concretely how many troops there were in Manchuria in the past and how they gradually were increased?
- A. By the Manchurian incident in 1931, there were one division and 6 infantry battalions. During the occupation a vast number of troops were sent into Manchuria from Korea and Japan. Before the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan (by 1941), the Kwantung Army had 400,000 soldiers and, at the beginning of the war with U.S.S.R., had more than 700,000.
- Q. How many aerodromes were constructed?
- A. There were more than 100 aerodromes only along the borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Q. How many railways were there in 1931?
- A. In 1931 there were only 2 railways in Manchuria. Since 1931 more than 10 railways leading to U.S.S.R. borders have been constructed. Auto-roads were also constructed along the directions of these railways.
- Q. What was the purpose of Manchurian occupation?
- A. First, for the purpose of transmigration of surplus population.
Second, for the purpose of aggression against the U.S.S.R. As an outbreak of conflict was expected sooner or later, it was prepared to utilize Manchuria as a military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.
- Q. Did you yourself take part in Nomonkhan incident and who was the projector of these military actions?

- A. I myself did not take part in Nomonkhan incident, but I investigated the incident as the Chief of 4th Department (War history) of General Staff Headquarters. The military actions were begun by the Japanese troops and had the purpose to provoke a war against Mongolia.
- Q. Being clear that Mongolian National Republic formed an alliance with U.S.S.R., Nomonkhan aggression was also a provocation of war against U.S.S.R. You knew it, did not you?
- A. Yes, I did. The Japanese Government manufactured a public opinion, as if Outer Mongolia had occupied the Manchurian territory in Nomonkhan area, namely, Mongolia had begun the war, in consequence the military actions of the Kwantung Army were carried on only for the sake of recovering Manchurian right on the occupied territory. And they expressed in that way.
- Q. Do you think who was personally responsible for Nomonkhan incident?
- A. I think that Commander of the Kwantung Army Wada and Chief of Staff Headquarters Isogaya were responsible for Nomonkhan incident. Immediately after this incident, both were ordered to await further orders.
- Q. Did you yourself take part in drawing military operation plans against U.S.S.R. at General Staff Headquarters?
- A. I, as the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, drew an aggression plan against U.S.S.R. in 1940. According to this plan, the main attack should be operated from Lake Hanka area in the direction of Khabarovsk to separate the Maritime Province from U.S.S.R. For this purpose 12 infantry divisions, as main forces, and 2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments, 2 cavalry brigades and 5 bombardment groups, as auxiliary forces, were to be applied. After attacking Khabarovsk and occupying Vladivostok plain, the Northern Front Forces, formed from 7 divisions; an artillery brigade and other units were to begin attack. In case of success, the Western Front Forces were also to open their attack, having a main attack in direction of Chita, with the attention to occupy Soviet territory extending to Lake Baikal.

Q. To whom did you report this plan?

A. I reported it to Prince KANIN, the Chief of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. Was there anybody else to whom you reported this plan?

A. I, myself, reported this plan to His Majesty the Emperor in company with Prince KANIN.

Q. Did the Emperor sanction the plan?

A. After a few days the sanction to this plan was given by the Emperor.

Q. How did you know that the plan was approved by the Emperor?

A. The plan was returned to 1st Department, after obtaining the Imperial sanction.

Q. When was the time of aggression against U.S.S.R. by the plan?

A. In this plan the time of opening War was not indicated, because it should be decided by the Emperor, after discussion in the Supreme Council.

Q. Where was the plan preserved after the Imperial sanction?

A. It was preserved in Operation Section of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. To whom was the copy of the plan sent?

A. The copy of the plan was sent to the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kinds of measures were taken to carry this plan into practice?

A. A senior officer (whose name I forgot) went with this plan and handed it over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to put it into practice.

Q. In what month was the plan sanctioned?

A. It was in March of 1940.

Q. When was it sent to the Kwantung Army to put into practice?

A. At the beginning of April of 1940.

Q. When did you leave the post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters?

A. In September of 1940.

Q. You said that the number of the Kwantung Army was remarkably increased, especially after the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan. What do you know about this plan?

A. Kan-Toku-En plan was formed by Major General TANAKA Shinichi, the successor of my post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters in the middle of 1941. (I don't know exactly in what month it was.) About September of 1941, I knew about this plan at the time, when I was ordered by War Minister TOJO to appoint the committee for setting up the way of governing of the Soviet territory to be occupied by the Japanese army.

Q. Explain why Kan-Toku-En plan was formed especially in 1941?

A. The Kan-Toku-En plan was elaborated in the middle of 1941, as war broke out between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. The war situation was not favorable for the Red Army and we expected that the U.S.S.R. would transfer her troops from the Soviet Far East to the western front. On account of this, we supposed that we could easily occupy the Far East

Q. What were the basic contents of this plan?

A. The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was based upon the operation plan of the Army General Staff drawn out by me in 1940. As I have mentioned before, according to the former plan, the attacks on all fronts were supposed to be brought about in turn with rather long intervals between them; but according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan all the blows were to be dealt simultaneously.

Q. In what work did you take part in connection with "Kan-Toku-En" plan?

A. In the connection mainly I took part in formation of the committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied Soviet territory, recruitment of the unit officer staff to

the Kwantung Army and formation of 2 front army staff Headquarters.

Q. What role did TOJO play in the matters of "Kan-Toku-En" plan?

A. TOJO approved the plan and he was its central figure.

Q. How did TOJO explain to you about enforcement of preparation of the war against U.S.S.R.?

A. In 1941, TOJO said to me in a conversation: "The present time is very suitable for an aggression against the U.S.S.R. because we can carry on war without encountering any strong resistance from the Soviet Army." He further said, "The Japanese Army would gain a great prestige by attacking the U.S.S.R. at a time when it is ready to fall to the ground, like a ripe persimmon." TOJO also said that it was necessary to increase the number of present units in Manchuria, as a way of prompt mobilization of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Do you confirm that TOJO had a strong intention of aggression against the U.S.S.R. at that time?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. You stated that you formed the Committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied territory. Tell the organization of that Committee.

A. The Chief of the Committee was Lt.-General IKEDA, the former Assistant Chief of the Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army and its members were Col. ARAO, attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, Lt.-Col. OGOSHI, attached to 2nd Department, and 2 others, names of whom I can not remember.

Q. Do you know OSHIMA?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. What role did he play in the matters of aggression against U.S.S.R.?

A. I myself, as the Vice-Minister of War, read OSHIMA's telegram from Berlin dated December of 1941. In this telegram reporting about his conversation with Hitler, OSHIMA said

that Hitler stated to him in conversation, "As U.S.S.R. troops were already demoralized, if Japan should not take up this chance for aggression against U.S.S.R., she would be regretted about it later." In Spring of 1943, OSHIMA telegraphed, "The German Government wishes Japan to quicken opening the military actions against U.S.S.R." In this telegram bravery of the Japanese Army was praised and they sympathized with Japan in difficulty of the military actions in China and Burma. In conclusion of this telegram, they hoped that Japan would immediately open aggression against U.S.S.R. in the Far East and at the same time would enforce the military operations against India.

Q. What role did you play in workers' supply of Munition industry in Japan?

A. I reported to War Minister TOJO that it was necessary to mobilize school boys as workers of munition industry, having closed middle and higher schools. This proposal was approved by the Cabinet Council and brought into practice.

Q. Tell what role you played in preparation and performance of the warfare against U.S.A., Great Britain and China.

A. In the first period of military actions in China, I was the Chief of 2nd Section of Kwantung Staff Headquarters. My main work was the intelligence service against U.S.S.R., but I myself began to command operations, taking part in the military actions in North China, when the incident broke out in North China in 1937. I conducted by the orders of UEDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. UEDA ordered me to command operations with TOJO, the Chief of Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. I took part in the operations of capturing Changchiakon and other areas in North China. As for the military operations against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, I played the role, mainly, in formation of new units, which acted in the Southern Areas, in recruitment of their members and in establishment of Armies' Headquarters. I, as Vice-Minister of War, prepared and formed so-called forlorn hope staff, amounting 4,000 persons, who blew up American warships and transports in Pacific Ocean by means of specially equipped machines (controlled mines). Then I commanded 4th Air Force, acted on Philippines for 4 months of 1944. My Force acted against U.S. air forces and float. 3 divisions out of my Force were consisted of so-called forlorn

hope members, who had a task to annihilate the enemy by thunder crashing themselves to him. Consequently, both pilots and aircrafts perished and pilots, who died during execution of their operation tasks amounted to 1,000.

Q. How many U. S. warships and transports did they sink?

A. I think they sunk a great many of them. But I can not tell how many, because my pilots did not return, having started with their tasks.

Q. Why were you dismissed from the post of Vice-Minister of War?

A. I was released from the post in connection with TOJO's resignation from the post of War-Minister. In Japan it is very often that in case of resignation of War Minister, Vice-Minister of War also resigns. I resigned from the post of Vice-Minister nearly a month later then TOJO left his post.

I wrote the answers to the above questions in my own handwriting and signed them.

Signature /Lt. General TOMINAGA/

Questioned by the Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Col. S. Y. Rosenblit.

Signature /Rosenblit/

Army Interpreter Lt. Zlomanov

Signature /Zlomanov/

792 ✓

V B

Doc. No. 1857B

Page 1

Foreign Policy of the Empire
Decided Among the Four Ministers, Premier,
Foreign, War and Naval on August 7, 1936

Strict
Secret

Secretary Chamber
Confidential No. 2079

Foreign Office
Highest Confidential

Text Cover
 Back

Five each
Sheets one sheet

Decision of the Conference of Four Japanese Ministers
of August 7, 1936, under the title of:

"Foreign Policy of the Empire"

7 August 1936

In order to observe and achieve the national policy, we establish foreign policy, and expecting complete control on diplomacy, we intensify close relations between military and civil officials dispatched abroad, and we lead the people positively and appropriately for the purpose of adapting practical measures to the established policy.

And in protection and propulsion of our just and appropriate rights and interests, we must be careful not to yield and retrogress spontaneously out to maintain always positive attitude and at the same time we must try to efface suspicion or apprehension of other countries towards the Empire.

No. 1 General Plan

We render it the basic policy of diplomacy of the Empire to effect the true aim of Japan's being stabilizing power in the East Asia, by means of fostering Manchukuo and strengthening more and more the special unseparable relations with her in order to secure eternal peace in the East Asia and to execute the existence and development of the Empire, and also, seeing from worldwide viewpoint, by means of adjusting for ourselves the relations with the Soviet Union and China and of planning simultaneously, Peaceful development and advancement in the South Seas regions.

Recently, the Soviet Union, according as her situation in national defense and international relations has been intensified rapidly, has increased her pressure of armed-revolution on the East Asia, disposing too large military preparations, and has been intending Bolshevizing penetration in all directions, driving the Empire into more unadvantageous situations. This fact not only threatens directly the national defense of the Empire but gives a grave hinderance to Japan in achieving its East Asiatic policy. Therefore, laying the chief object of foreign policy for the time being on frustrating Russia's aggressive plan into the East Asia, especially on effacing the threatening military preparations and on interrupting the penetrating Bolshevization, Japan must try to attain this end through diplomatic measures accompanied by improvement of national defense.

Accordingly, the Empire must put its diplomatic function into full swing in considering synthetically the present international situations in adjusting the relations with the leading powers and in inviting an situation internationally favorable to Japan.

No. 2 Gists of Measures

1. Taking consideration of the present international and internal conditions, Japan must be strictly cautious towards the Soviet Union not to give rise to further troubles of its own accord, but to endeavor to solve pending problems by means of peaceful measures exclusively.

And at the same time,

a. establishments of two committees, one for demarcation of the border line in the region from the Lake KHANAKA to the River TUMEN and the other for solution of troubles along the border line, as well as the establishment of similar organs dealing with the frontier of other regions between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union and Manchukuo and Mongolia shall be designed.

b. at an appropriate opportunity the establishment of a non-armed zone shall be proposed.

c. furthermore, when the Soviet Union manifests her wish to conclude a non-aggressive treaty, Japan shall state plainly that it would rather welcome such treaty provided that the numerous pending problems of importance between Japan and the Soviet Union including such a readjustment of the Soviets war preparations in the Far East as would give a balance of power between the two countries would be settled.

d. And we shall take adequate measures to defend Japan, Manchukuo and China from the Soviets thought-obtrusion.

2. Towards the Chinese central and provincial regimes, Japan shall always hold a solemn attitude and adopt just measures and combined with an economic manoeuvre for the Chinese masses, Japan shall lead these regimes in such a way so that they may correct spontaneously their attitudes towards Japan, thereby materializing the concert between Japan and China based on the principle of live-and-let-live. In North

China, Japan shall plan its economic and cultural fusion and concert between Japan and Manchuria, and shall endeavor, simultaneously, to make it a special region by which Japan, China and Manchukuo may unitedly defend themselves against the Bolshevizing obtrusion of the Soviet Union.

As for another provincial regime, Japan shall not take any measure which as a result of its adaptation may either help or hinder the unification or segregation of China.

The aforementioned is a basic principle of Japan's Chinese policy (of Decision concerning Chinese policy, dated Oct. 4, 1935) and at present taking into consideration today's state of the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, it is rendered the important point in the practical scheme for China, first to make the North China immediately a special district of pro-Japan-and-Manchukuo and anti-Communism, to obtain resources for national defense and to extend traffic establishments as well as to make whole China anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese. (Measures which should be carried out practically for the present shall be made up separately.)

V-B.)
3. Increase of friendly relation between Japan and America is of great assistance in restraining the Soviet Union and Britain. America magnifying zealously her military preparations, watches the cause of the policy of the Empire with much interest, from a view point of traditional Far Eastern Policy; and so, according to Japan's future attitude towards China, not only there is a danger of America's assisting China, in inducing her to adopt policies depending upon Europe and America, but also, it can't be denied that there might arise matters disadvantageous to Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Empire should render effort to let America understand its fair attitude by respecting America's profit in her Chinese trade, and at the same time to make her not to hinder the achievement of East Asiatic policy of the Empire, promoting the friendly relations with her on the keynote of the economic interdependency between Japan and America.

4. The developments in the European political situation have a great influence on the East Asia, and so Japan must exert every effort in bringing European powers to its advantage, especially in restraining the Soviet Union.

Britain

a. As for Britain, though she has not a few interests in all aspects which conflict with the ones of Japan, she has the largest rights and interests among the European Powers in the East Asia; and moreover the attitudes of European countries are affected largely by that of Britain. Taking consideration of these facts, it is of particular necessity for the Empire to make Britain adopt an attitude in favor of Japan in the relation between Japan and the Soviet Union, through its positive effort in promoting the friendly relations with Britain, so as to restrain the Soviets attitude towards us and to mitigate and eliminate, simultaneously, the obstacles on the course of Japan's overseas development. To readjust the relations between Japan and Britain in China is of much effect, and therefore, combined with efforts to readjust the general relations between both countries, we must try to take the fittest measures to give a good turn to the relations of both countries in China, by means of making Britain respect that Japan possesses special and important interests in China and also by means of our respecting her rights and interests in China.

We must be particularly cautious on this point however, as there is an apprehension of Britains adopting an oppressing policy towards Japan, inducing the great Powers, especially America, Soviet and China.

b. As to Germany, since she has generally the same interests as that of the Empire in the relations with the Soviet and also, from the special relation between the Soviet and France, she is in a position to find convenient in her national defense and in counter-measures against Bolshevization to maintain harmony with us, we shall promote the friendly relations with her, and in case of necessity we shall adopt some measures to realize the concert between Japan and Germany and further by extending this relation shall promote the goodwill of Poland and other countries thereby restraining the Soviet Union. Further, we shall pay attention to and try to promote the friendly relations with the countries neighboring the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia and with other Mohammedan peoples.

5. The south seas/^{area} is a key point of the world commerce, and, as it is the sphere necessary and indispensable in the industries and national defense of our Empire as well as the natural sphere of development of our people, we must secure our footsteps for further advance. However, we should be

discreet not to stimulate the Powers concerned but try to efface their apprehension towards our Empire, and we have to endeavor to make our progress gradually and peacefully.

As to Philippines, we expect the realization of her perfect independence and, if necessary, we shall not hesitate to assure her neutrality.

As for our development in Dutch Indies, it is of the first necessity to eliminate her apprehension towards us and make her take a turn for pro-Japan. For this end, we must adopt suitable measures and, if necessary, we shall not refuse to conclude a non-aggressive treaty with Holland.

As to Siam and other un-advanced peoples, Japan shall lead and assist them properly based upon the principle of live-and-let-live.

6. Foreign trade is not only indispensable to maintain and improve the economic life of our people, but also helpful in betterment of finance and international balance, and our Empire, when we consider the present international and internal situations must pay efforts to extend it especially. Therefore, we need to try to develop reasonably our foreign trade and we must simultaneously, adjust interests between us and other countries and secure and gain important resources, effecting cultivation of our economic energy.

Cabinet secret no. 2079

Separate volume

Military Secret 9/20

Foreign Policy of the Empire decided among Prime, Foreign, War and Naval Ministers on August 7, 1936

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel FARINENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photostat of the document "Decisions of the Four Japanese Ministers of August 7, 1936 entitled Foreign Policy of the Empire" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department in Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify _____

Lt. Col. FARINENKO, G. I. /s/
(Signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan

October 3, 1946.

794

ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

DOC NO 2237
U.S.S.R. NO 8

TABLE OF GROWTH OF STRENGTH OF THE
KWANTUNG ARMY AND THE JAPANESE ARMY
AS A WHOLE IN THE PERIOD FROM 1931 to
1945, ON ONE SHEET WITH FIVE DIAGRAMS.

DIAGRAMS. 37-2

g. 8

TABLE

of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945

Copy No.

Period	Divisions		Total No of men		Tanks		Artillery Pieces		Air Force Planes	
	In the Kwantung Army	Totally in the Japanese Army	In the Kwantung Army	Totally in the Japanese Army	In the Kwantung Army	Totally in the Japanese Army	In the Kwantung Army	Totally in the Japanese Army	In the Kwantung Army	Totally in the Japanese Army
On Jan. 1, 1932	2	17	50,000	256,000	40	500	300	2000	180	1,250
On Jan. 1, 1937	6	17	271,000	872,000	439	1,342	1193	3508	500	2,600
On Jan. 1, 1942	17	54	1,100,000	3200,000	1,000	2,260	5,000	12270	1,500	5,000
In 1945	31	176	860,000	5620,000	600	3,000	2,700	20200	1,000	5,400

Appendix: to the text 5 charts
 Deputy Chief of Department of the
 General Staff of the
 Red Army
 Colonel (Tsigichko)

January "30", 1946

Certificate of translation of the above document.

I, V. J. Teruchov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: V. J. Teruchov

Диаграмма

Chart

Роста численного состава Квантунской армии и всей японской армии за 1932-1945гг. (в тыс. чел.)

Increase of the strength of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945 (in thousands of men)




Диаграмма Chart

Роста численности танкового парка Квантунской армии и японской армии в целом за 1932 - 1945 г.г. (в единицах)

Increase in the total number of tanks of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945 (in units)





Диаграмма Chart

Роста количества пехотных дивизий в составе Квантунск. армии и в составе японской армии в целом за 1932-1945г.г. *Increase in the total number of infantry divisions of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932 - 1945*




Диаграмма

Chart

Роста численности артиллерийского парка Квантунской армии и японской армии в целом
1932 - 1945 г.г.
(в единицах)

Increase in the total number of artillery pieces of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945
(in units)




Диаграмма

роста численности боевых самолетов авиации
Квантунской армии и общей численности авиации
Японии с 1932 по 1945 г.

Chart

Increase of the number of the Kwantung
army air force planes and the
total strength of Japanese air
forces from 1932 to 1945.



Условные обозначения: *conventional signs:*
■ Сухопутная авиация Квант. армии Kwantung army air force
□ Сухопутная авиация Японии Japanese army air force

REPORTOrganisation of Division of Kwantung Army

From the very beginning of occupation of Manchuria the Kwantung Army was always manned by regular reinforced Infantry Divisions consisting of 24-29000 men, while on the other theatres of war operated divisions consisting 13-16000 men.

The number of personnel and the armament of the reinforced Division of the Kwantung Army was twice as much of a normal Japanese Infantry Division.

In 1942 there were 17 Infantry Divisions, out of them 5 Divisions of (type A-1: 1, 8, 11, 12 and 23 Infantry Division) consisting of 29000 men and 12 Divisions (type A: 2, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 57 and 71 Infantry Division) consisting of 24000 men.

These Divisions were disposed in the districts adjacent to the frontier of the U.S.S.R. in the most important operation directions. Some of these Divisions had taken part in the operations against the Red Army at the Lake Hassan (1938) and at the river Khalhin-Gol (1939).

Strength and Armament of Reinforced and Normal Infantry Divisions.

COMPARATIVE TABLE.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>Reinforced division type A-1</u>	<u>Reinforced division type A.</u>	<u>Normal Division</u>
Man-power	29.400	24.600	13.000- 16.000
Piece of ord- nance (all ca- libres)	148	102	75
Tanks	81	7	-

During the whole Pacific Ocean war 1941-1945 the Kwantung Army consisted of the most efficient and best equipped units and formations of Japanese Army.

Reinforced Infantry Divisions in the Japanese Army as a whole and in the Kwantung Army.

Comparative Table.

	Total in Japanese Army	In Kwantung Army
Reinforced Infantry Divisions type A-1	5 &	5
Reinforced Infantry Divisions type A	19	12

- Appendix: I. Scheme of organisation, strength and armament of Japanese reinforced Infantry Division type A-I in Manchuria.
2. Scheme of organisation, strength and armament of Japanese normal Infantry Division.
Deputy Chief of Department of the Red Army General Staff.

January 1946.


Colonel (Tsigichko)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages/ and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Menshova

ORGANISATION, STRENGTH AND ARMAMENT OF REINFORCED
INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN MANCHURIA




TOTAL IN DIVISION:

Man-power . 29400
Machine guns . 517
(all calibres)

Tanks and tankettes . 81
Guns (all calibres) . 148

ORGANISATION, STRENGTH AND ARMAMENT OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS

ACTING ON THE OTHER THEATRES OF WAR



TOTAL IN DIVISION:

Men-power - 14,800

Machine guns (all callibres) - 348

Guns (all callibres) - 75

Tanks - 24

REPORT

Concerning Puppet Troops, created by the
Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia1. THE ARMY OF MANCHOUKUO

The Army of the puppet state "Manchoukuo" was created by the Japanese after the occupation of Manchuria from the remainder of Tchan Sua-Iyan troops.

The guidance of this army was in the hands of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, which realized it directly through many Japanese military advisers in the Army of "Manchoukuo" and through the military administrative staff of this "State" which mostly consisted of the Japanese.

For the purpose of using manpower resources of Manchuria in preparation for a war against the U. S. S. R., the Japanese began accumulating the military trained reserves and in 1940 a conscription law was issued in "Manchoukuo".

Besides, in 1940-1945 Japanese reorganized the puppet army of "Manchoukuo" to bring it nearer to the level of modern armies for using it in a war against the U. S. S. R.

Formations of the same branches of service and special units were created in the army. They were re-armed with the Japanese type weapons. Measures were taken to raise their battle efficiency by means of manning them with the Japanese officers and the pro-Japanese local Chinese officers.

All the measures taken to strengthen the Manchurian army and also its dislocation in the definite operation directions showed that the Kwantung Army Headquarters planned to use this army in a war against the U. S. S. R.

TABLE OF THE GROWTH OF THE MANCHOUKUO ARMY

Years:	Infantry			Cavalry			Artillery			Air	Man:	Pie :	Air
	Mili:	divi:	bri:	Sepa-:	Divi:	Bri :	Re :	Regi-:	Deta-:	craft:	po :	ces :	Craft
	tary:	si :	ga:	rate :	si :	ga :	gi :	ments:	ch :	Deta :	wer :	of :	
	Dist:	ons:	des:	regi-:	ons:	des:	men:	ments:	chmen :	ts :	ordn:	ance:	
	ri:	ct:	ts :	ments:	ts :	ments:	ts :	ments:	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	
	s :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	
	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	ts :	
1932	-	-	15	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	110	-	-
										75			
1934	5	-	26	-	-	7	-	-	5	1000	80	-	
										178			
1945	11	2	34	2	2	7	7	7	11	5	1000	800	100

2. THE ARMY OF INNER MONGOLIA

The puppet army of Inner Mongolia was formed in 1935 after the Japanese occupation of the Chakhar province. The Army of Inner Mongolia as well as the Manchoukuo Army was supposed to carry out the aggressive plans of the Japanese Command, and therefore was filled with Japanese military advisers, and armed with Japanese type weapons.

The Army of Inner Mongolia as a component part of the Japanese troops was supposed to invade the Mongolian People's Republic.

In 1945 the army of Inner Mongolia had:

Divisions.....	8
Separate Regiments.....	4
Manpower.....	12,000
Pieces of Ordnance.....	60

A P P E N D I X:

The Map of the Manchoukuo Army dislocation in 1945.

Deputy Chief of Department of the
Red Army General Staff

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

30 January, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

Item 1.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Rome, 1 July 1941	1520 hours
Arrival, 1 July 1941	1540 hours
No. 1473 of 1 July	
Secret	

4) Clear
text
evi-
dent-
ly
miss-
ing

The Japanese ambassador, who previously my ✓) stated his desire to be received by BISMARCK, today called on the latter. The object of his call was, in the first place, to obtain information on the present state of the German-Russian theatre of war.

Worthy of note was his remark that a change of Cabinet must be reckoned with in JAPAN. (He intimated that JAPAN has the intention to actively advance /Vorgehen against Russia on its part, but needs a few more weeks. Such a policy, however, necessitates the resignation of Mr. MATSUOKA; since the latter has only recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with SOVIET RUSSIA, he would have to leave the political arena, at least for a certain period of time.) The Japanese ambassador further remarked that JAPAN's politics must do everything in order to prevent America from entering into the war.

MACKENSEN.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062-F.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

S e c r e t

Copy N _____

T A B L E

INCREASE OF SUNGARY RIVER WAR FLOTILLA
From 1931-1945

Years	N u m b e r		N O T E
	Personnel	Boats	
1931	60	1	
1935-37	about 700	28	
1941-43	2,500	98 "	
1945	25 00	98 "	

To secure battle efficiency of Sungary river flotilla against the Soviet Union the Japanese Command, on inner and frontier river system, created five military river bases: the main base - in the town of Kharbin (on the river Sungary,) the operation base in the town of Tziausui (on the river Sungary) and the manoeuvre bases in the towns of Funtzin (on the river Sungary), Saghalin - Ula (on the river Amur) and Hutow (on the river Ussuri).

1) Out of them more than 60 landing motor boats.

a p p e n d i x : 1. Chart of the increase in the total number of personnel of the Sungary river war flotilla.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL.

(Tsigichko)

January 30 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.


I, M.Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature : /s/ M. Menshova
M/ Menshova

Doc 1879

Chart

Increase in the total number of craft
of the Sungary river war flotilla
from 1931 to 1945



Doc # ~~2151~~ 2151

799

**ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио**

DOC NO 2151
U.S.S.R. NO 16-3

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF THE NET-WORK
OF RAILWAYS AND HIGHWAYS IN MANCHURIA
IN THE PERIOD FROM 1931 TO 1945 ON
FOUR SHEETS WITH SEVEN MAPS.

R E P O R T

on the growth of the network of railroads
and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

At the time of the Japanese occupation in 1931 the whole network of railways in Manchuria was 6.140 km. in length (including the Chinese Eastern Railroad).

There were no automobile roads in Manchuria, except in the Kwantung region where there were several dozens of kilometers of asphalt automobile roads. The rest of the roads were at best unpaved highways, in some places improved by means of fascines and supplied with primitive wooden bridges.

Upon the occupation of Manchuria the command of the Kwantung Army began intensive construction of railroads and automobile roads.

By 1936 the railroad network of Manchuria was already 8.336 km. in length, and the directions of the newly built railroad-lines and railroad lines in process of construction showed clearly aggressive nature of these constructions aimed to equip the Manchurian base with communications against the U.S.S.R.

Thus from 1932 to 1936 there was constructed a railway line from the district of Tchangehung through Taran (Bychentzi) to Halun-Arshan (at the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic), construction of a railway line to the frontier of the U.S.S.R. in Primorye was completed, (Tumin-Mudantzian) Tynkory Dunan , a new railway line was built from the Korean port of Yuki to the town of Tumin other railway lines were being built to other points of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier (Huton, to the lower reaches of the Sungari river, the new road through Mergen to Amur. etc.) It must be stated that all these railroads were of no economic significance, as they passed through thinly populated and uncultivated districts, where there were no industrial enterprises and where no enterprises were being built.

Together with the building of railroads, automobile roads were

rapidly being built as well. The network of automobile highways was 9.000 km. in length in 1936. The building of automobile roads was mainly accomplished in districts adjacent to the frontier of U.S.S.R. (in Barga, in Primorje, along the Sungari and in the districts near the Soviet Primorye).

By 1941 the length of railroad lines in Manchuria had already reached 10.735km. The railroad communications in the west were extended: from Halun-Arshan to Handagai, in Priamurje from Nehe to Holunmin (second main line to the Amur), from Boli to Tzyamusi, from Dunan to Hutow. And along the river a railroad from Suihua to Lyantzyankow was built; The building of the second railway line from Mukden to Chanchun was already completed and the construction of the second track on lines as Chanchun-Harbin, Harbin-Pogranichnaja, Linkou-Dunan and Mukden-Andun started to develop.

By the end of 1941 the Japanese had built in Manchuria 18.460 km. of automobile highways, and in addition 20.665 km. of local roads were reconstructed and improved. The total length of all auto-truck roads by the beginning of 1942 in Manchuria was about 60.000km.

By the beginning of 1945 the railway net work of Manchuria was about 13.700 km. By this time the Japanese completed the second rail. road from Central Manchuria to the north in Prim^arye from Holunmin to Sakhalin and completed laying a second track on the following lines: Chanchun-Harbin, Harbin-Pogranichnaya, Linkow-Dunan, Mukden-Andun, Tumin-Vantzin, Continuing the building of a second route from Vantzin to Mudantzyan and from Dunanto Hutow.

The building of automobile roads was performed by improving the passability of roads, mainly in districts adjacent to the frontier.

The total length of automobile roads in Manchuria at the beginning of 1945 reached 22.000 km.

Appendix:

1. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria in 1931" (before occupation).
2. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria in 1936-1937".
3. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria by 1941.
4. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria by 1945."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

Colonel (Tsigichko)

January 30, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:


I, V. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: V. Tarkhov

Дислокация армии Манчжоу-Го

в 1945 г.

Stationing of the Army of Manchukuo
in 1945



В Манчжоу-Го в целом:

1. Headquarters of the military districts	11
2. Divisions	4
3. Brigades	41
4. Separate regiments	9
5. Artillery regiments and detachments	18
6. Number of men	178,000
7. Pieces of ordnance	800
8. Planes	100

Всего в армии Манчжоу-Го

Штабы военных округов	11
Дивизии	4
Бригады	41
Отдельные полки	9
Артиллерийские полки и отряды	18
Людей	178,000
Орудий	800
Самолетов	100

Conventional marks:
Условные обозначения

Штабы военных округов
 Headquarters of military districts
 Районы дислокации соединений и частей
 Areas of the stationing of units and formations

The Red Army General Staff
 Chief of the 8th Department
 Lieutenant Colonel Sokolov

Железные дороги Манчжурии


в 1931 г.

(до оккупации)

Railroads in Manchuria

in 1931

(before the occupation)



Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
— Железные дороги (однопутные)
Railroads (single track)
== Двупутные железные дороги
Double track railroads

Общая протяженность - 6140 км
The whole length - 6140 km

Масштаб 1:2500000

Начальник 6^{го} отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник /Соловьев/

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel


Sokolov

Железные дороги Манчжурии

в 1936-37 г.г.

Railroads in Manchuria

in 1936-37



Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
— железные дороги (однопутные)
Railroads (single track)
= двухпутные железные дороги
Double track railroads

Общая протяженность - 8.336 км
The whole length - 8.336 km.

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник: Соколов

Sokolov

Железные дороги Манчжурии

в 1941 г.

Railroads in Manchuria

in 1941.



Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
Железные дороги (однопутные)
Railroads (single track)
Двухпутные железные дороги
Double track railroads

Общая протяженность - 10.735 км.
The whole length - 10.735 km.

Масштаб 1:2500000

Начальник в отделе
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel


Sokolov

Железные дороги Манчжурии

к 1945 г.

Railroads in Manchuria

by 1945.



Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
— железные дороги (однопутные)
Railroads (single track)
= железные дороги
Double track railroads.

Общая протяженность - 13.700 км
The whole Length - 13.700 km.

Начальник 6^{го} отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник *С. Соколов* (Соколов)
The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov

Автомобильные дороги

Манчжурии

в 1931 г.

(до оккупации)

Automobile roads in Manchuria

in 1931

(before the occupation)

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:

Автомобильные дороги

Автомобильные тракты, пригодные

для движения автотранспорта

только в зимнее время

2. Roads, which can be used for

automobile traffic only in

winter time



Масштаб 1:2500000

Ген. штаб РККА

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Начальник 6-го отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
Подполковник Соколов

/Sokolov/




Автомобильные дороги Манчжурии

в 1936 - 37 гг.

Automobile roads in Manchuria


in 1936-37.



Условные обозначения
Conventional marks:
Автомобильные дороги
Automobile highways

Общее протяжение автомобильным
дорог - 9000 км.
The total length of automobile
roads - 9,000 km.

Масштаб 1:2500000
1 см. на карте соответствует 25 км. на местности



The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
/ Sokolov /


АВТОМОБИЛЬНЫЕ ДОРОГИ

МАНЧЖУРИИ

в 1941-45 гг.

Automobile roads in Manchuria

In 1941-45



Условные обозначения
Conventional signs
Автомобильные дороги
Automobile roads
Общее протяжение
General extend
Автомобильных дорог
of automobile roads
22000 км
22000 km.

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
(Sokolov)