

1000

Doc. No. 219P (67)

Br. Ex. 98

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOMURA)

Excerpt.

No. 1426

TOKYO, December 5, 1939

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been informed through the American Embassy at Chungking that the property of the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungpeh, Honan, has again been damaged as the result of an air raid by Japanese planes on August 1, 1939. The location of this property is undoubtedly well known to the Japanese military authorities since the property has been bombed on two previous occasions, first on October 24, 1938, resulting in the death of an American national and the wounding of two other American nationals and again on May 2, 1939. In this connection reference is made to my note No. 1105 dated October 31, 1938, and to my note No. 1273 dated May 22, 1939.

.

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, p. 670

1002
Doc. No. 219P (68)

Br. Ex. 100

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRO MEMORIA

Excerpt.

.....

In view of the aggravation of this situation, the Ambassador has been instructed to approach the Imperial Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to point out emphatically that the long-continued and unlawful interference by Japanese armed forces and their agencies with the movement of American citizens and of American-owned merchandise at Tientsin has been the subject of repeated conversations between American and Japanese officials, but without cessation of such interferences. . . .

TOKYO, April 2nd, 1940.

Foreign Relations I, p. 678 at
p. 680.

1003

Letter from Craigie to Arita dated 15 June 1939

BRITISH EMBASSY
TOKYO.
15th June, 1939

Immediate

My dear Minister,

With reference to our conversation yesterday I am sorry to say that I have now received news from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tientsin indicating that the military restrictions now being imposed on communications with the British Concession are being applied in such a way as to constitute definite and grave anti-British discrimination. According to this report all British subjects are being held up for from one-half to one hour and rigorously searched on entering and leaving the Concession in the same manner as, and together with, all Chinese. Other foreigners are being allowed to pass without stoppage or examination. It further appears that some British subjects, including military in uniform, have been refused exit.

By no process of reasoning can such discrimination against British subjects be justified by the Japanese authorities on the plea either of self-defence or in connection with the case of the four Chinese which we discussed yesterday. I cannot believe that such action has the authority or even the approval of the Japanese Government and I must therefore ask Your Excellency to be good enough to arrange for instructions to be despatch to the proper Japanese authorities in Tientsin to ensure that every form of discrimination against British subjects is at once discontinued.

The matter being, as you will see, very urgent, I should be most grateful if Your Excellency would, if possible, let me have a reply to this letter today in order that I may give His Majesty's Government precise information as to the attitude of the Japanese Government in the matter.

Believe me,

my dear Minister

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) R. L. Craigie.


His Excellency
Mr. Hachiro Arita,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. Sato Shinoh (Sato Kaya) will not pay
 Shige Togo Hirata
 Uneyama. Ohima


(9) will pay Nata - Togo, araki,
 (4) Hōgōki }

13 ~~19~~ - Togo Shige - Sato - acquitted that will be

1 (7) done
 19 - Jail Sentence



- ① Sato
- ② NPLC
- ③ Yashin (16)
- ④ " 1 - ?
- ⑤ - Study JPS
- ⑥ - 37 human lab
- ⑦ - Battle Ship Stake
- ⑧ Atagoyama (Hill - + bowing)



Letter from Craigie to Arita, dated 25 June 1939.

BRITISH EMBASSY
TOKYO.
June 25th, 1939

Your Excellency,

Under instructions from His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice a case of gross indignity inflicted on the 23rd instant by agents of the Japanese Army upon Mr. Cecil Davis, honorary New Zealand Government agent at Tientsin. The facts of the case are set out in the enclosed memorandum and, in accordance with my instructions I desire to protest in the strongest possible manner against this insulting behaviour to an official of the New Zealand Government and a well-known and highly respected member of the British community. This act, following on numerous other cases which I brought to Your Excellency's attention on June 15th, 16th, 18th and 20th, leave no doubt as to the deliberate nature of the provocation now being offered by the local Japanese authorities. A further instance of similar inexcusable behaviour which has since come to my notice is shown in the second enclosure to this note.

2. In an interview with representatives of the press on the 21st instant the official Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that he could state categorically that no indignities as reported were being inflicted on British subjects entering or leaving the blockaded British Municipal Area at Tientsin, and that no discrimination was being made against them. This statement is not in accordance with the facts disclosed in the accompanying documents.

3. Your Excellency has informed me that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to discriminate against British subjects, to restrict their food supplies or to subject them to abuses and indignities. Nevertheless, these intolerable outrages continue and, as stated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in London on the 23rd instant, are arousing great indignation in Great Britain. I have accordingly received instructions to request that Your Excellency will ensure that immediate steps are taken to put a stop to these acts and to provide that proper respect be given to the rights under which British subjects are entitled by treaty to live and trade peacefully in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

His Excellency

Mr. Hachiro Arita

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure No. 1 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Mr. Cecil Davis, Chairman of the Tientsin Country Club and honorary Agent of the New Zealand Government when he attempted to pass the barriers on the night of June 23rd was told when he reached the inspection shed to take off his clothes. He demurred and stated if that were to be the proceeding he would not pass the barriers at all but would stay the night in the Concession. The inspecting officer promptly struck Davis on the face and told him he would have to go. At this stage three other Japanese who were abetting rouse up and Davis felt in the circumstances he had no alternative but to submit to whatever treatment was given him. He was then made to remove all his clothing except his briefs and spent fifteen minutes in full view of the passers-by including women, during which time his clothing et cetera were subjected to delatory examination. On leaving his passport was left on the ground.

Enclosure No. 2 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Substance of a Statement Regarding the Treatment of

Mr. Lord and Mr. House at the barrier at Tientsin.

1. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were placed on a straw mat in a hut in full view of all persons passing through, irrespective of sex or nationality. The Chinese police were detailed to search them whilst one Japanese soldier stood in front to watch. There were four other Japanese sitting around.
2. The Chinese police were considered by Japanese to be too inoffensive in their search so they were slapped in the face and the Japanese took charge. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were forced to remove all their clothing and pile it on the muddy floor and all articles were removed from their pockets and placed likewise on the floor. Mr. House was standing absolutely naked for at least five minutes. Mr. Lord still had briefs on which he was not obliged to remove, but he stood clothed in them alone for the best part of ten minutes.
3. Each article of clothing was inspected and thoroughly examined.
4. After examining the men's clothing the Japanese took their passports, which he had thrown on the floor, and ruffled the hair of both men. He made signs for Mr. Lord to open his mouth and being dissatisfied that it was sufficiently widely open he deliberately took Mr. Lord's passport and forced his mouth open with it. He then made both men stand with their legs apart and examined their crutches. This completed the search except that the Chinese police were made to take hold of Mr. Lord's ears and examine them.
5. The whole proceedings lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes, during which time both men were in full view of the public and women were passing through the hut.

Enclosure No. 3 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs . No. 127Tientsin: Interference with food supplies.

The Japanese military spokesman at Tientsin stated in an interview given to the press on the 19th June that the Japanese had no intention of stopping foodstuffs entering the Concession as such a prohibition would be most inhuman. In connexion with this statement the following facts were noted:-

1. The Japanese authorities have turned back boats bringing food up the river for the British Concession.

2. On the 19th June a "Domei" report from Tientsin stated that "three trucks loaded with fresh vegetables were admitted yesterday to the French Concession to ease the vegetable famine there". An arrangement was consequently made by the French authorities with the Japanese authorities that normal supplies should be brought into the French Concession by French Military lorries and the existence of this arrangement was confirmed by a "Domei" report appearing in Tientsin on the 23rd June. Both these reports of special arrangements with the French authorities are admissions that food supplies entering the British Concession are subject at least to interference and obstruction.

3. As a direct result of the Japanese measures perishable foodstuffs are very short in the British Concession. For example it is understood that on the 21st June 10 per cent of the usual quantities of vegetables were available in the Concessions, while no ice was available to the British market at all.

C E R T I F I C A T EW.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 2383 AStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the
following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign
Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto
attached consisting of 8 pages, dated June, 1939, and described
as follows: Proposal presented by the British Ambassador to Tokyo
to Japanese Foreign Minister ARITA, on June 15, June 25, 1939,
regarding the British Concession in Tientsin.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an
official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part
of the official archives and files of the following named ministry
or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any,
or any other official designation of the regular location of the
document in the archives or files): _____

Foreign MinistrySigned at Tokyo on this23rd day of Sept., 1946/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu OdoChief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

SEAL

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.
Official Capacity

Br. Ex. 125

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpts.

No. 1498

oil

The American Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and has the honor to inform Mr. Arita that the Japanese naval authorities in South China refuse to permit American oil companies to ship kerosene to the Marhoi District, near Canton, which contains the important city of Fatshan.

.

Mr. Grew is desired by his Government to emphasize to Mr. Arita that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese Navy on the oil companies not only constitute an unwarrantable interference with the legitimate activities of American citizens but prejudice the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government that American rights and interests in China will be respected

TOKYO, March 20, 1940.

1005

Br. Ex. 126

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Excerpts.

The Japanese Government will recall the repeated representations of the Government of the United States in regard to the discriminatory treatment accorded American trade in North China as compared with treatment accorded Japanese trade as result of the control exercised by the Japanese-sponsored authorities there over the exchange accrued from exports and thus indirectly over imports. The Government of the United States is not aware that there has been any amelioration of the situation thus complained of. It is now learned that the Japanese Government-controlled authorities in North China have established full exchange control over imports as well as over shipments from Central and South China thus completing their control over the trade of the area.

.

The Japanese Government has heretofore declared its intention to uphold the principle of equality of treatment in China. The notice issued by the Superintendent of Customs at Tientsin in connection with the new regulations specifically exempts imports from Japan or Manchuria from the application of those regulations and thus publicly advertises that the regulations are discriminatory.

.

TOKYO, July 15, 1940.

Top Secret

Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with
Diplomacy towards U. S. A.

March 3, 1940

- I. Ever since the outbreak of the Incident, the attitude of the U. S. has been to maintain the body of the Nine-Power Treaty and basing her Far East policies upon it, and to absolutely repudiate the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. Taking advantage of the abolition of the Commercial and Navigation Treaty, the high-handed attitude of the U. S. seems to be getting stronger. Recently America laid a "moral embargo" on aviation-oil refining machine, aluminum and molybdenum. The drafts of laws (for example, the PITTMAN proposal) regarding the embargo of war materials for Japan, which was under discussion in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, was reported to be temporarily postponed. We cannot say when it will be discussed again. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the movement of "moral embargo" against Japan among civilian organizations. According to future situations, the above-mentioned draft of embargo law may be passed, or perhaps moral embargo measures may be carried out.
- II. The internal reason why the Japanese Government could not assume a resolute attitude against America was due to the intense reliance of Japan upon America for acquiring resources necessary for carrying out the divine war.

The American pressure against Japan, however, will become heavier as long as she realizes the reliance of Japan upon her. By taking advantage of the absence of a treaty, America will probably intensify the pressure by gradually broadening the scope of the embargo or perhaps by showing "gestures" of broadening the scope of embargo on all resources necessary for prosecuting the divine war. As long as Japan doesn't get away from the economic reliance upon America, the insincere determination of Japan against America has no positive effect. Therefore, the most urgent measure which Japan should take is the policy of establishing an economic system not threatened by the attitude of the U. S., by eliminating the extreme reliance upon America as at present. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a system itself, has a great effect in making America reconsider the matter.

III. In case the U. S. imposes a moral or legal embargo of the materials which Japan imports from the U. S., Japan will feel the greatest need of scrap iron, petroleum (especially aviation gasoline), electrical copper, molybdenum, vanadium and machine tools. In regards to these materials, we will do our utmost to plan the elimination of reliance upon the U. S. as soon as possible and take the measures listed in the following paragraphs. Although our country imports a great deal of raw cotton from America, America will not dare to forbid the export of it by considering the situation of the American farmers. Even if the embargo is carried out, we will not feel too much difficulty because we will be increasing the amount of purchase of raw cotton from Brazil, Peru, Iran, etc.

Cutler
✓ 8

1. Scrap Iron.

Concerning manufacturing of iron, we will endeavor to perfect at all costs the method of manufacturing iron from ore so as to be independent from scrap iron (annual amount about 2,000,000 tons) imported from America at present. We will manage to supply our demand with about 1,000,000 tons of domestic product and scrap iron imported from the Straits Settlements, India, Australia, China, etc. (about 300,000 tons can be imported). Note: When America lays embargo, it is hard to import scrap iron by way of a third power. Therefore, we should not expect upon such temporizing measures.

Scrap
Iron

2. Petroleum.

Concerning petroleum, we shall plan on one hand to import it from a third power besides America, and, on the other hand, we will make a plan and carry it out to make rapid expansion in the production of artificial petroleum by reexamining fundamentally the plan of production expansion of artificial petroleum.

oil.

Concerning the amount of imported petroleum, we can almost secure the present amount by so negotiating with third powers such as "Mexico," "Arabia," "Iran," "Venezuela," "Netherlands Indies," "Rumania," etc.

The only problem is the "gasoline" for aviation (crude and refined oil) for which we have been exclusively dependent on America. Concerning this matter, we will accomplish refinery plants of "gasoline" for aviation and study method which enables us to refine "gasoline" for aviation from any kind of crude oil, by devoting all wisdom of science of Japan to it, and at the same time, we will plan to import crude oil of high quality from "Venezuela" and others.

3. Electrolytic Copper.

At present about half of the domestic demands for electrolytic copper is imported from America, and the other half is supplied by domestic production, but, judging from the attitude of Canada, it is almost impossible to import the amount now imported from America from Canada. Therefore, we shall produce electrolytic copper by expanding largely the equipments of manufacturing the copper in Japan, and by importing a large amount of copper ore from Peru, Chile, etc., and for this purpose, we must consider the expansion of electric power and ships.

4. Molybdeum and Vanadium.

These two are necessary for manufacturing 'special steel', but we shall eagerly study to change the method of manufacturing special steel to "tungsten basis" and try to largely decrease demands for "molybdeum" and "vanadium" by using "tungsten" produced in Korea and South China.

5. Concerning machine tools, we have been dependent on America and Germany, but at present, when we cannot expect much of Germany, the amount dependent on America will be increased more and more, but taking it into consideration that America will not export them to us in the near future, we must make up our mind to do without America and take measures to gratify internal demands by improving and expanding domestic production.

6. Any other materials than scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, "molybdeum", "vanadium" and machine tools that may be subject to "embargo". Therefore, regarding the materials highly dependent upon America some suitable measures must be taken by following the examples from (1) to (5).

IV. It is easily imagined that in order to carry out No.3 which is mentioned above, a great deal of funds (material) is necessary. And so the fund is to be worked out by turning military funds temporarily. Materially speaking, the rationalization of the fund for the China Incident must be considered, and at the same time, the "Expansion Plan for military equipments against the Soviets" must be contented, for the time being, with the equipments not regrettable for the defense against the Soviets. All the fund and material thus spared should exclusively be spent to expand production so as to get rid of the economic condition now dependent on America. Furthermore, the present 'production expansion plan' must fundamentally be revised according to the aforesaid purport. "Real expansion of production is the mother of consolidation of military equipments." Accordingly, it is clear that, by waiting patiently for several years according to the aforesaid principle, the Expansion Plan of the military equipments will be carried out much easier.

V. In order to carry out the above-mentioned policy thoroughly, it is necessary to synthesize and consolidate the organism of 'internal economic control.' Fundamentally speaking, it is all the more necessary to turn the motive of enterprise from the pursuit of profit to the welfare of our nation. Outside our country we should try to consolidate more the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time to perfect measures to bring the southern countries in our economic sphere. As for the temporary adjustment of the relation with the Soviets, we have to make much more effort to promote it.

VI. The reason why the Far Eastern Policy of the "Roosevelt regime" is supported by the public opinion of America is that the diplomacy of his regime is attaining or carrying out what is intended by America without danger of involving her in a war, and as long as Japan does not get rid of such economic dependence upon America as at present, it is necessarily sure that such a policy as that of "Roosevelt regime" will be preponderant. But if Japan earnestly tries to find out measures to get rid of the economic dependence upon America, especially the dependence of those resources which are now the object of embargo towards Japan, we shall no longer be threatened by the embargo of America towards Japan. We will strive to secure such situation as to give us firm resolution towards America, and when we are able to hold a resolution and the counter-measure to say that the legal or moral embargo against Japan can be taken as the declaration against Japan, not only the business men who have had dealings with Japan but also isolationists and learned people will, for the first time, recognize that such a diplomatic policy as of "Roosevelt regime" may lead America to war, and those will increase people one after another who hope for "avoidance of war" rather than "isolation of invader." Then the embargo of munition towards Japan will be dissolved entirely by being opposed by the public opinion.

TOP SECRET

A Copy of Instruction Sent
to Ambassador Nomuro

/Handed to Ambassador NOMURA on January 22nd/

1. Unless Japan is bold enough to make great changes in national policies, it is impossible for her to seek American understanding for maintenance of peace in the Pacific and to cooperate with her for the conquest /T.N. Japanese character here used is either to conquer or subjugate but it must be a mistake of to restore or return, both of which is pronounced identically/ of world peace.

2. If the present situation develops as it is, no one can guarantee that in the end the U.S.A. may join the European War or declare war on Japan.

3. If such a thing would happen the result will be a terrible world war with several times more damage than that of the last world war and perhaps will mean the downfall of modern civilization.

4. If there should be no means of finding direct and mutual understanding and cooperation between Japan and the U.S.A., then Japan has to join hands with countries other than Great Britain and the U.S.A. even though these may feel some threat and pressure. It is merely because we have to prevent them from declaring war on Japan or participating in the European War. This is not only for the self protection of Japan but also for the survival of all human being.

5. Having decided that there was no other alternative left for the defense of our country or to prevent the world war we have decided to contract /T.N. the Japanese character used here for contract is obviously a mistake for it is the character for "to correct". The word to join or to contract has the same pronunciation but a different character/ alliance with Germany and Italy.

/Page 2/

6. Since we joined the alliance we must hereafter conform our foreign policy as a member of the Axis, in the same way as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the past years was carried out.

7. If the three powers forming the Alliance regard that a third country, which is prescribed under the third article of the Tripartite Alliance deliver an attack, Japan, as a matter of course, must be faithful to the Alliance.

There can be no room for a doubt on this point. However, when Japan decides on an important matter, it goes without saying that she will deliberate carefully in a Cabinet council.

8. The conduct of the Japanese in China is at present regarded as being illegal, unjust or aggressive, but it is no more than a temporary phenomenon. Japan will finally carry out equal and reciprocal treaties with China. In the not distant future Japan will fulfil her traditional idea of HAKKO ICHIU /T.N. the eight directions or the world under one roof/ laid down since her foundation.

9. The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be built on this great principle, the "HAKKO ICHIU", and my motto is "no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation". In short our desire is to build a world of international neighbourhood and mutual assistance in Greater East Asia, which will set an example to the whole world.

10. Putting aside such an ideal, and taking up questions of daily affairs, our country /T.N. JAPAN/ is finding it necessary to find a way to settle the problems of both self-supporting and self-sufficiency in Greater East Asia. Are these ideals or desires of Japan unjust and unreasonable, when one considers the position of the U.S.A., dominating as she does the whole Western hemisphere, besides extending her influence over both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans? Surely the U.S.A. can allow thus much to Japan? What we are thinking about is not exclusion of foreigners. It is well for the U.S.A. to come over and cooperate in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their fear of loosing what they need in the shape of rubber and tin is ridiculous.

Please make the necessary efforts to make the President of the U.S.A., the Secretary of States and other prominent people of the U.S.A. appreciate thoroughly the points mentioned above as well as the remarks I made while talking before the members of the America-Japan Society recently and my Diet speech on foreign policy.

The 16th year of Showa, January 22nd
/January 22nd, ~~1939~~ 1941

His Excellency the Envoy Extra-ordinary and
Ambassador Plenipotentiary NOMURA

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

/Note/

The Foreign Minister gave his instruction to the Ambassador when they met just before Nomura's departure, saying that JAPAN has made a definite resolution to stand against the U.S.A. if she enters the war, and this attitude would act as a check for the latter participating in the war. The Ambassador expressed his agreement.

1009
INS File

A Copy of Cable RUNNING Number 4492

Secret Code

SHOWA 16 /1941/ Feb. 7

Sent 7 o'clock

DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

1009
40
1077

2-7-41

Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA, from Foreign
Minister MATSUOKA on Feb. 7, 1941

No. 68

I have been endeavouring to answer frankly for the interpellation at the Diet regarding our attitude and resolution to request America for reconsideration concerning us, and to explain that our national power has not been so much exhausted and enfeebled. Therefore, I beg you, on your arrival there, to endeavour further to explain thoroughly the following points to the President and the influential men both in and out of office to make them fully understand our real intentions.

1. It is the providential mission given to the two countries Japan and America, to save modern civilization from its crisis and to bring peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area, and it is their duty to cooperate for realizing this mission. Upon this belief, Japan expects the development of the friendship between Japan and America. However, unfortunately, the whole nation of America will purposely not understand the real intention of Japan and not a few misconstrue our actions as a threat to America, but this is a serious and dangerous illusion. Japan has a definite resolution with which she will accomplish the established national policy at the risk of the fortunes of our nation. According to reports, there are some people in America who still are opposed secretly to the Tripartite Pact (of course it is natural that there are such elements or people; for in every country such people are to be found), and overestimate the exhaustion of our national power caused by the prolonged China Incident. They presume that if America assumes a firm attitude, she can easily disunite public opinion in Japan, or can make us submit to her. This is really a ridiculous misunderstanding, and we are afraid that such an estimate might bring some unexpected result.

2. The exhaustion of our national power is true to some extent, but it is not so serious as repeatedly propagated in America. Judging from the characteristics of our nation, they will as usual furiously repel pressure from outside, and so if America checks our way on purpose, our whole nation would strengthen its resolution to carry through our national policy by consolidating our union regardless of all sacrifices. If

America were in the circumstances as Japan is at present, the same result would happen, for the character of the American people resembles that of the Japanese. If the American people will just think this over, as a result they will easily understand our mentality. On the contrary, if Japanese people are treated with sympathy and understanding, they will be very thankful, and will sometimes dare to concede and will compromise in any discussion. This is the characteristic of Japanese people that we wish American people to recall in their minds.

3. There may be none in our country who wishes to wage war against America. If, unfortunately Japan and America come to fight, it will certainly be the American people that will initiate the war positively, for America has never opened a war passively.

4. What will America gain by fighting against Japan? Does America desire to conquer Japan and exterminate the YAMATO race? There may be none in America who cherishes such an idea. Even if some may cherish such a dream, it would be absolutely impossible to realize it. Even if America could make Japan surrender, and enforce a cruel treaty upon the Japanese people, that might be comparable with the Versailles Treaty, Japan would break off such fetters or bonds within thirty years. The restoration of Germany is an example. The constitution of Japan is not matched by that of any other country. Japan has always overcome all national difficulties, by virtue of the unbounded grace of the Emperor. There is no doubt that the restoration of Japan will be wonderfully rapid compared with Germany. The Emperor is indeed the eternal source of our national strength. Without understanding this unparalleled constitution, the Japanese nation can never be understood after all. In fine, the war between Japan and America would bring not only ruin upon the two countries, which should always be on friendly terms, but also the downfall of world civilization. America will gain nothing from the war, and calmly thinking, nothing is more absurd than the commencement of war.

5. If Japan and America were to fight each other, the Soviets would certainly move, and if Japan were completely defeated, as America desires, the Soviets would certainly sweep all over China and at once bolshevize the greater half of the Asiatic continent by taking advantage of the circumstances. Does America welcome such an eventuality? If Japan should submit to America, the situation in East Asia would indeed be terribly confused.

6. The diplomacy of our Empire is based upon the great principle of "the World a Home" /T.N. HAKKO ICHIU/ and what

Japan devotes itself to is the establishment of world-peace and the prosperity, and Japan has never had such an intention as to attack America. And so we cannot understand why America is intent on arming against Japan. Japan and America should never be opposed to each other, but cooperate. But the speeches and moves of the statesmen in America against Japan are not only very stimulating, but also they seem to aim at large armaments sufficient to police the world. Such is not only regrettable for peace in the Pacific area, but also not to be recommended for America. I believe that America should not meddle in the "living sphere" of other powers, but be awakened to her original responsibility or mission towards the peace of the world, and devote herself towards breaking the present world crisis, and should promote the welfare of the people in the spirit of mutual assistance and concession of the world.

1009
A Copy of Cable RUNNING Number 4492
Secret Code
SHOWA 16 /1941/ Feb. 7
Sent 7 o'clock
DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA, from Foreign
Minister MATSUOKA on Feb. 7, 1941

No. 68

I have been endeavouring to answer frankly for the interpellation at the Diet regarding our attitude and resolution to request America for reconsideration concerning us, and to explain that our national power has not been so much exhausted and enfeebled. Therefore, I beg you, on your arrival there, to endeavour further to explain thoroughly the following points to the President and the influential men both in and out of office to make them fully understand our real intentions.

1. It is the providential mission given to the two countries Japan and America, to save modern civilization from its crisis and to bring peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area, and it is their duty to cooperate for realizing this mission. Upon this belief, Japan expects the development of the friendship between Japan and America. However, unfortunately, the whole nation of America will purposely not understand the real intention of Japan and not a few misconstrue our actions as a threat to America, but this is a serious and dangerous illusion. Japan has a definite resolution with which she will accomplish the established national policy at the risk of the fortunes of our nation. According to reports, there are some people in America who still are opposed secretly to the Tripartite Pact (of course it is natural that there are such elements or people; for in every country such people are to be found), and overestimate the exhaustion of our national power caused by the prolonged China Incident. They presume that if America assumes a firm attitude, she can easily disunite public opinion in Japan, or can make us submit to her. This is really a ridiculous misunderstanding, and we are afraid that such an estimate might bring some unexpected result.

2. The exhaustion of our national power is true to some extent, but it is not so serious as repeatedly propagated in America. Judging from the characteristics of our nation, they will as usual furiously repel pressure from outside, and so if America checks our way on purpose, our whole nation would strengthen its resolution to carry through our national policy by consolidating our union regardless of all sacrifices. If

America were in the circumstances as Japan is at present, the same result would happen, for the character of the American people resembles that of the Japanese. If the American people will just think this over, as a result they will easily understand our mentality. On the contrary, if Japanese people are treated with sympathy and understanding, they will be very thankful, and will sometimes dare to concede and will compromise in any discussion. This is the characteristic of Japanese people that we wish American people to recall in their minds.

3. There may be none in our country who wishes to wage war against America. If, unfortunately Japan and America come to fight, it will certainly be the American people that will initiate the war positively, for America has never opened a war passively.

4. What will America gain by fighting against Japan? Does America desire to conquer Japan and exterminate the YAMATO race? There may be none in America who cherishes such an idea. Even if some may cherish such a dream, it would be absolutely impossible to realize it. Even if America could make Japan surrender, and enforce a cruel treaty upon the Japanese people, that might be comparable with the Versailles Treaty, Japan would break off such fetters or bonds within thirty years. The restoration of Germany is an example. The constitution of Japan is not matched by that of any other country. Japan has always overcome all national difficulties, by virtue of the unbounded grace of the Emperor. There is no doubt that the restoration of Japan will be wonderfully rapid compared with Germany. The Emperor is indeed the eternal source of our national strength. Without understanding this unparalleled constitution, the Japanese nation can never be understood after all. In fine, the war between Japan and America would bring not only ruin upon the two countries, which should always be on friendly terms, but also the downfall of world civilization. America will gain nothing from the war, and calmly thinking, nothing is more absurd than the commencement of war.

5. If Japan and America were to fight each other, the Soviets would certainly move, and if Japan were completely defeated, as America desires, the Soviets would certainly sweep all over China and at once bolshevize the greater half of the Asiatic continent by taking advantage of the circumstances. Does America welcome such an eventuality? If Japan should submit to America, the situation in East Asia would indeed be terribly confused.

6. The diplomacy of our Empire is based upon the great principle of "the World a Home" /T.N. HAKKO ICHIU/ and what

Japan devotes itself to is the establishment of world-peace and the prosperity, and Japan has never had such an intention as to attack America. And so we cannot understand why America is intent on arming against Japan. Japan and America should never be opposed to each other, but cooperate. But the speeches and moves of the statesmen in America against Japan are not only very stimulating, but also they seem to aim at large armaments sufficient to police the world. Such is not only regrettable for peace in the Pacific area, but also not to be recommended for America. I believe that America should not meddle in the "living sphere" of other powers, but be awakened to her original responsibility or mission towards the peace of the world, and devote herself towards breaking the present world crisis, and should promote the welfare of the people in the spirit of mutual assistance and concession of the world.

1010

Doc. No. 219P-69

Br. Ex. 101

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON JUNE 13, 1940

Excerpt.

In response to inquiries from correspondents in regard to reports of the bombing of Chungking on June 12, the Secretary of State said that according to information which has reached the Department from official and unofficial sources, Chungking has been extensively bombed on each of several recent days and on June 12 was intensively and indiscriminately bombed by more than one hundred Japanese planes; that casualties of June 12 among the civil populace will probably number several hundred; that various buildings of the American Methodist Mission, including a church, were damaged by concussion;

...

Foreign Relations I, p. 690.

1011

Doc. No. 219P (70)

Br. Ex. 102

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts.

No. 1630

TOKYO, September 13, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to apprise Your Excellency that I have received a report through the American Embassy at Chungking that on August 19, 1940, the Lewis Memorial Church of the Methodist Episcopal Mission in that city, an American institution, was completely destroyed by fire resulting from incendiary bombs during the course of a series of raids upon Chungking by Japanese airplanes.

.

I must add in this connection, lest it be thought that this case of repeated bombing of the same American property in China is unique, that the instance of multiple Japanese bombings of the same American properties in China have been numerous.

I have the honor to enter a most emphatic protest on behalf of my Government against this renewed attack upon the property of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking; to request that Your Excellency be good enough to furnish me a prompt report upon this latest flagrant case; to reserve all rights on behalf of the American citizens and property involved; and to point out once more, as I have on many previous occasions to Your Excellency's predecessors, the grave risk to the lives of American citizens in Chungking and in other parts of China entailed by these ruthless Japanese air bombings the damage of which to the property of American nationals alone is sufficient evidence of their indiscriminate character.

.

Br. Ex. 133

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE JAPANESE EMBASSY ON APRIL
15, 1940

On being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Arita replied as follows:

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies."

1013

Br. Ex. 134

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON
April 17, 1940

Excerpt.

.

"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

"This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan -- as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean--sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those Governments declared that 'it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.'"

.

Foreign Relations II, p. 281
at p. 282.

1014

Br. Ex. 135

MEMORANDUM BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)

Excerpt

Japan Protest
US Fleet in Hawaii

(TOKYO,) June 10, 1940

.....

VG

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our fleet in those waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert that Japan entertains no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, Japan is exerting her best efforts to promote good relations with her neighbors, and he cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii.

.....

Foreign Relation II, p. 67
at p. 69

TELEGRAM No. 7657. From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA. Code cypher. Dispatched P.M. 23 March 1940. Received P.M. 24 March 1940.

No. 459 (Embassy Long Distance Code).

The solution of FINLAND question gave a remarkable blow to the political conditions of both GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, consequently general policies of both countries, especially that for SOVIET UNION will be discussed thoroughly. In the coming Easter holidays, as they are just after the political change in FRANCE, the British Government authorities are presumed to contemplate British foreign policies, so I took it advantageous for disposal of China Affairs from the point of view of our international relations to explain fully beforehand the establishment of WANG's government now in progress and our attitude for it to British side, therefore in the evening of 21st, I visited Vice-Minister BUTLER in the Foreign Office and had the following private talk:-

1. First of all, I explained fully the development of new state of things in CHINA based upon the news brought by "Domei" recently, for reference of Foreign Minister:-

(a) As the previous activity of WANG Ching-wei, I explained KONOE's three principles which constitute fundamental relations between JAPAN and CHINA, next as Chinese side, the relation between Peiking and Nanking governments as well as measures for internal relation of Kuomintang.

/p.2/

(b) Next I explained in detail the organization and decisions of the whole national assembly held after WANG's entry into Nanking on 17th and that the new central government would be established on March 30th by the Chinese for CHINA and the Chinese; (omission) and its administrative policies are cooperation for peace at home and abroad as well as anti-communism; and further, I

(c) explained that the Japanese policy for it was to do the purport so often explained thoroughly, that is, to establish peace and order as well as cooperation in CHINA, not to exclude any other than communistic and Bolshevik elements who plot confusion and conflicts, and to offer cooperation and friendship for that purpose; this policy

will be warmly received by both Chinese and foreign nationals, therefore it must be a matter for congratulation if some compromise would be found between the new central government and Chungking government based upon the above-mentioned purport; in short, it was a pivotal point to exclude the Bolshevism as a source of confusion and to recover the peace and order; and I told him that British government would understand the Japanese attitude, as the former had the most economic interest in CHINA.

① 2. BUTLER said that British Government could not immediately change her policy of having recognized Chungking Government as the formal Chinese government, but he understood my explanation and hoped the new government would be successful; as for Tientsin problem, he further issued an instruction today (he explained the contents of the instruction) which would prove of service for the settlement of the problem; the settlement of Tientsin problem just at the time of the establishment of WANG's Government is a "gesture" on the part of Britain expressing her desire to be of any service. (I told BUTLER that, according to newspaper information, recently Ambassador CRAIGIE proposed to our Foreign Minister ARITA the strong attitude of BRITAIN for the execution of the war; for this BUTLER said that, according to the dispatch from the Ambassador, he seemed to have explained Premier CHURCHILL's speech in detail, it was not by their specific instruction.)

3. I asked BUTLER about the expulsion of Brit from Labor Party and SOVIET UNION's problem, for which BUTLER explained as follows:-

"I am a contact man with the Labor Party in reference to diplomatic problems. The Labor Party wishes to avoid to open hostilities against SOVIET UNION, but this opinion is getting in the direction of becoming stronger. The communistic elements as Brit who are under the direction of MOSCOW are being boycotted; consequently the public opinion of BRITAIN, to say nothing of the Government itself, is getting stronger against SOVIET UNION within the limits of avoiding war. The causes may be found in (1) firm attitude of FRANCE against SOVIET UNION, (2) advancement of understanding and realization of dangerous propaganda at home and abroad or destructive activities of SOVIET UNION,

(3) Necessity of beating SOVIET UNION (by the blockade or other means) in the execution of the war against GERMANY. The anti-SOVIET feeling of Scandinavian countries was getting heightened, and anti-Bolshevik sentiments of NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA are observed to be very strong. WELLS also seemed to be aware of danger of SOVIET-UNION".

Stopped by Wells

members of the staff fail see any connection & that
no any discussion been discussed.

VR } 4. I told him that there seemed to be many reasons why JAPAN and BRITAIN may go further with the understandings in future taking a wide view of things of Anglo-Japanese relations from the point of view of national policy of JAPAN toward CHINA as well as general situations of the world. If my view is not mistaken, the authorities of both countries should strive to take measures to bring about this collaboration and it is also necessary to conquer every difficulty. Vice-Minister BUTLER replied that he had felt the outline of my talk was felt as if a large picture had been painted with reference to international relations of the world and he was of the same opinion.

VR } 5. Furthermore I discussed concrete problems. (1) I called his attention based on concrete examples. First of all I asked him how he thought of recent propagandistic activities of left elements in spite of the necessity of striving for not to deteriorate the relations of both countries, especially if there might be any means to guide the attitudes of Reuter and BBC (Radio Broadcast) as the development organs of public opinion; it is hard to understand that BBC broadcast the speech of Lord CECIL who attacked GERMANY and JAPAN as invaders; furthermore it was said that the Information Ministry had offices not only in Tokyo but also in Hongkong and Shanghai; the communications of these reporters should have been guided to go along the line of national policy, without being imposed upon by propaganda.

VR } BUTLER replied that as for BBC, various conditions at the time of its establishment often embarrassed them but by the proper means they would call its attention to this matter; for Reuter the same means would be taken. Times must already have been improved; CECIL had no social influence nowadays and it was quite imprudent to act in such a way; Reuter's actions in Tientsin was also wrong.

/p.6/ In short, he said that he would take into consideration what I had said. (2) Next, as concrete problems of negotiations, I /SHIGEMITSU/ proposed matters of trading and shipping of German goods and I also explained that JAPAN would continue to hold firm insistence on her neutral right; various obstacles for trade had excited both Japanese Government and people and its counter-measures would also affect the general situations. So I expressed my earnest hope to remove such obstacles. Individual problems shall be negotiated by Councillor OKAMOTO but I expressed my earnest hope that the British side would also make her best exertions. Furthermore I have demanded their considerations about the questions of obstacles for trade and shipping of goods.

BUTLER asked me that Japanese side would understand likewise

the standpoint of BRITAIN and also pay attention to the same requirements of British side and he promised that British side had no objection to make her best exertions in this matter.

Finally BUTLER said that he would report today's interview to Foreign Minister tonight. After the interview I met the Foreign Minister myself but asked him that he would hear about the interview from BUTLER.

Copy of Telegram. General Number 12998. "Cipher Code"

From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA

Dispatched from London May 13, p.m., 1940

Received at this Ministry May 14, p.m., 1940

Ambassador's Code.
No. 771 (~~Embassy Long Distance Code~~)

1. The invasion of German army into HOLLAND and BELGIUM has caused the direct conflict with British and French armies and it is evident that HITLER made up his mind to stake all on this undertaking as seen from the declaration of the expedition. After occupation of coast lines of HOLLAND and BELGIUM, the German army may be hard to foresee if they settle in positional warfare for a time, but judging from the public opinion of ITALY, although HITLER's present enterprise has been aroused by the positive policy of BRITAIN and FRANCE, the scale may be far larger than that generally supposed. If he will succeed, he will not leave his army only in occupation of HOLLAND and BELGIUM. Therefore, it is of course necessary for us to make arrangements taking into consideration every possibility.

p.2/ 2. Our national policy for South Seas may be determined based upon that already adopted for Dutch East Indian problems and we may make headway on three points, viz., (a) JAPAN has no intention of changing the status quo on the whole, (b) neither belligerent nor neutral country shall interfere with the status quo. (c) Interests of the natives should firstly be considered (of course these three points may be expressed in proper order and circumstances) (Refer telegram No. 1593 of last year).

VG 3. From the above mentioned standpoints, if we investigate the relations with the UNITED STATES or SOVIET UNION or belligerent countries in general, it is the urgent need to take measures to make conciliation of JAPAN and CHINA as Oriental people in order to establish firmly our leading position in EAST ASIA. As we are leading Chinese people in most of the things nowadays, the conciliation of WANG and CHIANG or that of CHIANG and JAPAN may be advantageous to us regardless of its conditions. Unless we shall have promptly settled Chinese questions, we shall be placed in a disadvantageous situation, irrespective of the development of situation.

Even if HITLER's success on land may be decisive, Naval Powers of BRITAIN and FRANCE may remain strong enough. Or even if FRANCE may be overwhelmed, the war will not be ended. GERMANY is in the internal condition to meet the needs of continuing victories, while BRITAIN and FRANCE have special characteristics to solidify the national union by

/p. 3/

the defeat. This is an important matter not to be overlooked. If HITLER's success on land will be kept in check, the powers of BRITAIN and FRANCE will remarkably rally. In any case, the change of situation hereafter is getting more and more important, and by the backing of SOVIET UNION the situation will be more and more complex. Taking into consideration of the superiority of GERMANY on land and that of BRITAIN and FRANCE at sea, we have to apply our national policies for CHINA and SOUTH SEAS, in accordance with the policy to make our situation in the EAST ASIA firm and stable. The most part of this cable may be the repetition of my former one, but I dare to send in view of the present situation.

Cabled to AMERICA, FRANCE, TURKEY, GERMANY and ITALY.

Ask ITALY to cable to GERMANY.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1589CStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 13 day, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 12998 - Shigemitsu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
8th day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

UP

1018

COPY OF TELEGRAM. No. 14597. From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA. Despatched from London, May 25, P.M., 1940. Received at this Ministry, May 26, P.M., 1940. Code Cipher. No. 868 (Embassy Long Distance Code)

220C-5
220C-7

Japan Shouldly Responsible

USE

Ambassador's code

1. In spite of desperate efforts of British and French armies, the general trend of the land action on the Belgium-French border line has already been made clear. Although the battle will be further continued under the firm resolution of both BRITAIN and FRANCE, it is needless to say that we are required to cope with whatever change in the international situation may occur. As for JAPAN, as the result of present war, she should shoulder willy-nilly the responsibility for the stability of EAST ASIA, which occupies one third of the world, so I think it may be advantageous to strengthen our position there even a little in order to take an active part in the future international arena. I think this measure will be of service to secure the foundation to cope with international situations after the war regardless of the issue of belligerent powers.

/p. 2/

2. From the above-said point of view, as I have already proposed, as far as JAPAN takes the lead of general situations in CHINA, it is necessary to take measures to conciliate with various parts or powers with reference to CHINA problems, but if we leave the China-Japanese relations in the great dispute, EUROPE and AMERICA will take advantage of this chance and our international position will be restricted after the war and our future diplomacy will suffer difficulties.

3. In this case, in order to prevent the war to spread into the EAST ASIA, we had better take measure once again.

- (a) JAPAN will inform her intention to various powers formally and at the same time take measure to realize her desire of the withdrawal of the troops of the belligerent powers from CHINA, as expressed by us at the beginning of the war.
- (b) JAPAN must reconsider the declaration of "Three hundred-niles Principle" (Act of warfare cannot be permitted tacitly in the area three hundred niles off the coast of JAPAN, MANCHURIA and CHINA. This does not involve the territorial waters

of JAPAN) after the fashion of both North and South American countries (according to the explanation of Brazilian Ambassador in this country, "Three hundred-miles principle" will be proposed by NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA after the war to be adopted as an international agreement).

Of course, it is more effective to take these measures by diplomatic procedure, rather than under the pressure of military side nor of public opinion.

I proposed these opinions from the point of view of strengthening our diplomatic foundation in the case of completion of the war.

/p. 3/

Cabled the same to America, Italy and France.
Asked Italy to cable to Germany.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1589D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 25 May, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 14597 - Shigemitsu to Arita

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 8th day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Reuter

VG

1019

COPY OF TELEGRAM No. 17724

Code Cipher

From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU
To Foreign Minister ARITA

6/19/40

Despatched from London, p.m., June 19, 1940
Received at this Ministry, p.m., June 20, 1940

No. 1040 (Embassy Long Distance Code)

It is needless to say that it is quite advantageous to make use of European War to strengthen the position of Japan in the East Asia. For that purpose I cable following items regarding Outgoing Telegram No. 922, which I have noticed:

1. It is quite important to watch the attitude of the United States to say nothing of paying attention to the condition of France, in the case of taking positive policy for French Indo-China and others. It may be difficult for the United States to enter the war before the election, but no one can foretell that Japanese activity will not excite here. (Full investigation must be done concerning financial and economical matters of both Britain and the United States, to say nothing of their naval powers). If the surrender of France will be realized, her plantations in South Pacific Ocean will be probably interfered with by Australia and in that case Japan may grasp the opportunity to take positive activity; but as for our activity, neither discussion of press will be allowed nor news will be published except those intended by the Government.

use

2. But it is most important for our foreign policy to state that Japan is gravely concerned with the stability of East Asia (including South Seas), and is resolved that the spread of European war must be prevented, and is taking policy to exclude the conditions destructive to the said stability and also to prevent those which may be destructive, especially to make clear that Japan will not tolerate to leave Orientals and East Asia districts as the plantation and object of trade to be exploited by capitalism of Europe and I think it is the best chance to elucidate our fundamental policy relating to East Asia and Orientals today (which will yield good results in Chinese problems); and it is most important as the background of our foreign policies.

VG

3. If the districts of East Asia and South Seas, which is so-called living area ("Lebensraum"), should be owned by a certain great power, Japan would be driven to dare the risk of war with that country and the stability of East Asia would be deteriorated. Therefore I think it is of necessity to take courage to prevent it today. I believe that Germany and Italy will fully understand this matter.

VG

1 G
4. British Empire has elucidated that she will continue the war to the end even if France would surrender and stated her confidence even if the German army should invade England. But, anyhow, it is clear that topographically Great Britain will not be so simply invaded as France and attention must be paid to the future development. As it is evident that the influence of Europe to Orient will be remarkably reduced after the war, Japan had better, I presume, take advantage of this opportunity to establish our position in East Asia firmly.

Cabled to Britain, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1589-EStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connect with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 19 June, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 17724 - Shigemitsu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on
this 3rd day of October, 1946.

Nagaharu Odo (signed)
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: (signed) T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
8th day of Oct., 1946

(signed) Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: Sgt. Taku Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

TELEGRAM No. 20394. From Ambassador KURUSU
in Berlin to Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP on July 10, 1940
No. 870-1 (Chief Code)

Concerning your telegram No. 427

From Ambassador S.TO:-

After long absence of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, we could see him at last in Berlin on 8th of this month. I interviewed him for about an hour and twenty minutes accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU and Minister KAWI and exchanged views with him which may be summarized as follows:-

1. To begin with I tendered Japanese Government's congratulation to GERMANY's steady progress towards the establishment of new order in EUROPE and especially great success achieved in FRANCE. I expressed that at this opportunity of passing Berlin, I should like to convey the opinions of the Japanese Government by the order of the same and as I shall soon be back home, I should like to carry the opinion of the German Government to JAPAN, and explained items listed in the telegram stated above. Further I stated that taking for granted RIBBENTROP already knew the views of Japanese Government on problems of DUTCH EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA through the successive explanations of Ambassador KURUSU to Foreign Vice-Minister, so I expressed my hope to hear the opinions of RIBBENTROP on the same matter. RIBBENTROP, always paying attention to me, replied that it was great pleasure for GERMANY to know that Japanese Government desired to cooperate with German Government on various problems and it was also a well-known fact that in the past she had endeavored to reach full understanding by close cooperation with JAPAN. However, although he himself knows well what GERMANY wants to do, he is regretful that he does not possess any definite knowledge regarding whereabouts of the Japanese intention, so he was eager to know in concrete form what JAPAN really hopes, regarding as I do that cooperation of both countries is quite necessary. He further said that JAPAN'S actions in the FAR EAST had given considerable effect on EUROPE by which GERMANY gained great facilities as I explained and also that it was a real fact that JAPAN obtained various interests concerning CHINA problems by the aid of friendly attitude of GERMANY and if she had not assumed such amicable attitude, the great war successes that JAPAN had obtained in CHINA till now might not be expected.

2. Accordingly I /S.TO/ explained my view on the fundamental policy of seceding from Nine-Power Treaty system with the same principle as explained to the Italian authorities the other day pointing that it is true that former Japanese diplomatic policy might have been apparently difficult to grasp its pivotal points; really it might have been caused by the great change of former policy by reason of change of situations as the result of various diplomatic difficulties and obstacles which JAPAN encountered as long as nine years, since the outbreak of MANCHURIAN Incident, during which Japan was obliged to admit of inviting outward suspicions caused by the change of policies, but the

pivotal point for which JAPAN pushed these nine years, especially these three years was the establishment of new order in CHINA, that is to say, building up of new CHINA, seceded from Washington Treaty system and in friendly relation with JAPAN and consequently she has been struggling with such great powers as BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and FRANCE.

3. Next RIBBENTROP asked me if the said problem of establishment of new order was the only one which made the understanding between JAPAN and AMERICA difficult among the problems pending between the two countries or besides if the problem of equality of naval power between JAPAN and AMERICA might not endanger the diplomatic relations of both countries. Thereupon I replied that surely CHINA problem was the greatest cause of the disputes between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES; as Americans professed to be a protector of CHINA for right or wrong, they were not pleased of the advocacy of establishing of new order by JAPAN and further it was always the case with the UNITED STATES to harbor desire to maintain predominance of her naval power in the Atlantic Ocean and thereby to secure the police power in the Pacific Ocean, therefore in so far as the matter concerns CHINA problems, the advocacies of both countries would remain contradictory to each other. To this RIBBENTROP said that as the result of saturation of both capital and production in the UNITED STATES, she would be hard up for markets for her commodities after the war, so she would rather seek for arrival of favorable turn of JAPAN-U.S. relation by supplying abundance of raw materials and products voluntarily. He further went on to say that when the political power of any nation becomes stronger, the various economical problems may be settled of themselves in the desired form. For example in GERMANY, recently with the strengthening of her political power, such problems as raw materials and export of manufactured products are being settled in such a manner as satisfactory to GERMANY, in which he implicitly boasted the economical development of GERMANY after her great victory. He continued to say that although the UNITED STATES had come to possess nearly ninety per cent of the gold of the world, gold was no more the medium of exchange for material, so even after the war, GERMANY would construct economy absolutely independent of gold at home with the exception of international trade settlement where a small amount of gold might be used. As the result of having excessive gold and the expansion of productive power in the UNITED STATES, the merchandise would overflow and she would have to concentrate her soul and mind upon acquisition of foreign markets, thus the UNITED STATES would be so pressed with canvassing for selling the goods and she would not be feared as a great nation, he hinted.

4. Therefore, I told him that, as I had stated before, the alienation between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES originated in CHINA problem and since then, as the result of having neither profit nor loss in CHINA, the UNITED STATES had always been adhered to problems of principle, so the understanding between the two countries had been exceedingly difficult. Therefore, if JAPAN would act in a devious way beyond a certain extent, the UNITED STATES' public opinion would burst out and there is a possibility of imposing economical pressure on JAPAN. The JAPAN-UNITED STATES commercial treaty had already been abrogated, nevertheless the economical dependence of JAPAN upon the UNITED STATES at

present is far reaching and the result of economical severance would be a matter of great concern to JAPAN. If there would happen the cessation of supply of oil, JAPAN would be obliged to turn her eyes on South Seas as her life and death problem and in such a case we cannot say that there would be no danger of JAPAN-U.S. war. And if once this war would break out, it would give great effect upon EUROPE. I told so far to RIBBENTROP who nodded in affirmative and looked to have been exceedingly impressed.

5. Furthermore RIBBENTROP stated that after the Versailles Treaty, GERMANY was the one who experienced the suffering of blockade most, but now she had overturned her position with BRITAIN. GERMANY believed firmly that, as in the operation against FRANCE, she could also obtain complete war results in an extremely short period in British operation. Consequently, when general trend of the world was viewed from economical standpoint, EUROPE and AFRICA would belong to GERMANY and ITALY, EAST ASIA to JAPAN, the remaining Asiatic region to SOVIET UNION, each of which builds up an economic block, in addition to this an American block would be constituted under the UNITED STATES; then the leading countries of each block would carry out trade with surplus materials left over after consumption in each block.

6. Next RIBBENTROP referred to CHINA problems and as he questioned whether there was any expectation of rapid settlement of the Incident, I replied that there was no expectation which might be termed as rapid settlement, but anyhow, a new government of WANG Chao-ming had been established and JAPAN was in the midst of negotiation to conclude an amicable agreement with it. Therefore in the event of its formation, the new government would likely to carry out just and appropriate politics at home and abroad. It would greatly contribute to the safety of EAST ASIA and also give favorable effect to the UNITED STATES to induce her to revise her recognition of the new situation in EAST ASIA and consequently this might be the good chance of adjusting JAPAN-U.S. relations.

7. Further RIBBENTROP expressed that since Russo-German agreement, the boundary between both countries had been settled and made it the eternal one; and also his satisfaction that JAPAN was endeavoring during these several months, as he previously hoped, to recover friendly relations with SOVIET UNION by solving pending problems between two countries as GERMANY had done.

8. Finally I questioned RIBBENTROP of his view as to the measures to be taken to recover peace in EUROPE after the conclusion of military operation against BRITAIN, for which he replied that at present the nerves of the whole GERMANY were being concentrated into the military operation against BRITAIN and there was no scope to take into consideration of program or procedure of recovering peace; thus he kept himself off going too deep into the subject. As the interview extended more than an hour, I told RIBBENTROP again that he must have understood fully various problems which JAPAN had great concern and had been explained by Ambassador KURUSU and myself for which I hoped that the German Government would pay consideration. Thus the interview was ended.

9. As you will understand from what I report with this cable, I could not find any definite attitude on German side as shown by Italian premier regarding DUTCH EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is also a great regret that I could not get any promises or pledges and on the contrary it was observed that German side rather avoided to give definite previous promises to these problems. As there was a wish from the German side, I hope you would pay attention not to have the contents of this telegram be leaked outside.

Cabled the same to Italy, the United States, Soviet Union and Britain.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1589FStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such Official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated 10 July, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 20394 - Kurusu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

(SLL)
Assistant, Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
8th day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
N.M.E.

Witness: /s/ Sgt. Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

TELEGRAM No. 20394. From Ambassador KURUSU
in Berlin to Foreign Minister RIT. on July 10, 1940
No. 870-1 (Chief Code)

Concerning your telegram No. 427

From Ambassador S.TO:-

After long absence of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, we could see him at last in Berlin on 8th of this month. I interviewed him for about an hour and twenty minutes accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU and Minister KAWAI and exchanged views with him which may be summarized as follows:-

1. To begin with I tendered Japanese Government's congratulation to GERMANY's steady progress towards the establishment of new order in EUROPE and especially great success achieved in FRANCE. I expressed that at this opportunity of passing Berlin, I should like to convey the opinions of the Japanese Government by the order of the same and as I shall soon be back home, I should like to carry the opinion of the German Government to JAPAN, and explained items listed in the telegram stated above. Further I stated that taking for granted RIBBENTROP already knew the views of Japanese Government on problems of DUTCH EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA through the successive explanations of Ambassador KURUSU to Foreign Vice-Minister, so I expressed my hope to hear the opinions of RIBBENTROP on the same matter. RIBBENTROP, always paying attention to me, replied that it was great pleasure for GERMANY to know that Japanese Government desired to cooperate with German Government on various problems and it was also a well-known fact that in the past she had endeavored to reach full understanding by close cooperation with JAPAN. However, although he himself knows well what GERMANY wants to do, he is regretful that he does not possess any definite knowledge regarding whereabouts of the Japanese intention, so he was eager to know in concrete form what JAPAN really hopes, regarding as I do that cooperation of both countries is quite necessary. He further said that JAPAN'S actions in the FAR EAST had given considerable effect on EUROPE by which GERMANY gained great facilities as I explained and also that it was a real fact that JAPAN obtained various interests concerning CHINA problems by the aid of friendly attitude of GERMANY and if she had not assumed such amicable attitude, the great war successes that JAPAN had obtained in CHINA till now might not be expected.

2. Accordingly I /S.TO/ explained my view on the fundamental policy of seceding from Nine-Power Treaty system with the same principle as explained to the Italian authorities the other day pointing that it is true that former Japanese diplomatic policy might have been apparently difficult to grasp its pivotal points; really it might have been caused by the great change of former policy by reason of change of situations as the result of various diplomatic difficulties and obstacles which JAPAN encountered as long as nine years, since the outbreak of MANCHURIAN Incident, during which Japan was obliged to admit of inviting outward suspicions caused by the change of policies, but the

ivotal point for which JAPAN pushed these nine years, especially these three years was the establishment of new order in CHINA, that is to say, building up of new CHINA seceded from Washington Treaty system and in friendly relation with JAPAN and consequently she has been struggling with such great powers as BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and FRANCE.

3. Next RIBBENTROP asked me if the said problem of establishment of new order was the only one which made the understanding between JAPAN and AMERICA difficult among the problems pending between the two countries or besides if the problem of equality of naval power between JAPAN and AMERICA might not endanger the diplomatic relations of both countries. Thereupon I replied that surely CHINA problem was the greatest cause of the disputes between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES; as Americans professed to be a protector of CHINA for right or wrong, they were not pleased of the advocacy of establishing of new order by JAPAN and further it was always the case with the UNITED STATES to harbor desire to maintain predominance of her naval power in the Atlantic Ocean and thereby to secure the police power in the Pacific Ocean, therefore in so far as the matter concerns CHINA problems, the advocacies of both countries would remain contradictory to each other. To this RIBBENTROP said that as the result of saturation of both capital and production in the UNITED STATES, she would be hard up for markets for her commodities after the war, so she would rather seek for arrival of favorable turn of JAPAN-U.S. relation by supplying abundance of raw materials and products voluntarily. He further went on to say that when the political power of any nation becomes stronger, the various economical problems may be settled of themselves in the desired form. For example in GERMANY, recently with the strengthening of her political power, such problems as raw materials and export of manufactured products are being settled in such a manner as satisfactory to GERMANY, in which he implicitly boasted the economical development of GERMANY after her great victory. He continued to say that although the UNITED STATES had come to possess nearly ninety per cent of the gold of the world, gold was no more the medium of exchange for material, so even after the war, GERMANY would construct economy absolutely independent of gold at home with the exception of international trade settlement where a small amount of gold might be used. As the result of having excessive gold and the expansion of productive power in the UNITED STATES, the merchandise would overflow and she would have to concentrate her soul and mind upon acquisition of foreign markets, thus the UNITED STATES would be so pressed with canvassing for selling the goods and she would not be feared as a great nation, he hinted.

4. Therefore, I told him that, as I had stated before, the alienation between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES originated in CHINA problem and since then, as the result of having neither profit nor loss in CHINA, the UNITED STATES had always been adhered to problems of principle, so the understanding between the two countries had been exceedingly difficult. Therefore, if JAPAN would act in a devious way beyond a certain extent, the UNITED STATES' public opinion would burst out and there is a possibility of imposing economical pressure on JAPAN. The JAPAN-UNITED STATES commercial treaty had already been abrogated, nevertheless the economical dependence of JAPAN upon the UNITED STATES at

no oil - War

present is far reaching and the result of economical severance would be a matter of great concern to JAPAN. If there would happen the cessation of supply of oil, JAPAN would be obliged to turn her eyes on South Seas as her life and death problem and in such a case we cannot say that there would be no danger of JAPAN-U.S. war. And if once this war would break out, it would give great effect upon EUROPE. I told so far to RIBBENTROP who nodded in affirmative and looked to have been exceedingly impressed.

Block

5. Furthermore RIBBENTROP stated that after the Versailles Treaty, GERMANY was the one who experienced the suffering of blockade most, but now she had overturned her position with BRITAIN. GERMANY believed firmly that, as in the operation against FRANCE, she could also obtain complete war results in an extremely short period in British operation. Consequently, when general trend of the world was viewed from economical standpoint, EUROPE and AFRICA would belong to GERMANY and ITALY, EAST ASIA to JAPAN, the remaining Asiatic region to SOVIET UNION, each of which builds up an economic block, in addition to this an American block would be constituted under the UNITED STATES; then the leading countries of each block would carry out trade with surplus materials left over after consumption in each block.

6. Next RIBBENTROP referred to CHINA problems and as he questioned whether there was any expectation of rapid settlement of the Incident, I replied that there was no expectation which might be termed as rapid settlement, but anyhow, a new government of WANG Chao-ming had been established and JAPAN was in the midst of negotiation to conclude an amicable agreement with it. Therefore in the event of its formation, the new government would likely to carry out just and appropriate politics at home and abroad. It would greatly contribute to the safety of EAST ASIA and also give favorable effect to the UNITED STATES to induce her to revise her recognition of the new situation in EAST ASIA and consequently this might be the good chance of adjusting JAPAN-U.S. relations.

7. Further RIBBENTROP expressed that since Russo-German agreement, the boundary between both countries had been settled and made it the eternal one; and also his satisfaction that JAPAN was endeavoring during these several months, as he previously hoped, to recover friendly relations with SOVIET UNION by solving pending problems between two countries as GERMANY had done.

8. Finally I questioned RIBBENTROP of his view as to the measures to be taken to recover peace in EUROPE after the conclusion of military operation against BRITAIN, for which he replied that at present the nerves of the whole GERMANY were being concentrated into the military operation against BRITAIN and there was no scope to take into consideration of program or procedure of recovering peace; thus he kept himself off going too deep into the subject. As the interview extended more than an hour, I told RIBBENTROP again that he must have understood fully various problems which JAPAN had great concern and had been explained by Ambassador KURUSU and myself for which I hoped that the German Government would pay consideration. Thus the interview was ended.

9. As you will understand from what I report with this cable, I could not find any definite attitude on German side as shown by Italian premier regarding DUTCH EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is also a great regret that I could not get any promises or pledges and on the contrary it was observed that German side rather avoided to give definite previous promises to these problems. As there was a wish from the German side, I hope you would pay attention not to have the contents of this telegram be leaked outside.

Cabled the same to Italy, the United States, Soviet Union and Britain.

D. H. H. H.

✓

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 1589F

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated 10 July, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 20394 - Kurusu to Arima. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo
 Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

(SLL)
Assistant, Chief Archives Section
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 8th day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt. Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

1021

TELEGRAM NO. 20382 Cipher Code - From
Ambassador KURUSU in Berlin to Foreign
Minister ARITA. Dispatched from Berlin
July 10, A.M., 1940. Received at the
Ministry July 10, P.M., 1940.
(No. 871 - Chief Code - Urgent)

1. As I could understand the general outline of the policy of the Imperial Government concerning JAPAN-GERMAN cooperation by the aid of your telegram No. 427, by taking advantage of the opportunity of interview of Ambassador SATO with RIBBENTROP as reported in my telegram No. 870 /No. 20394/, I shall proceed with the talk myself at appropriate time.
2. VC But I am under the impression now that recently in Japan there are some who are too eager and worried about every smile or frown of Germany; it may be needless to say that it is very disadvantageous for our diplomatic policy to show such attitude for Germans who are inclined to urge everything to us as well as in high spirits as the result of glorious victory and I cannot expect good result of the cooperation concluded under such unequal conditions.
3. When Ambassador SATO was going to leave after the above interview, based upon above mentioned consideration, I showed my appreciation to RIBBENTROP to the effect that by the aid of today's interview I came to find Germany's desire of JAPAN-GERMAN cooperation, and also stated that recently there were some who reported me the cool attitude of GERMANY for JAPAN and unfortunately if it were true, I, who hoped for the JAPAN-GERMAN rapprochement, thought there would be no other way than to consider some best policy under the above new situation. At this RIBBENTROP was very much astonished and denied it. Therefore I said to him that for such method of cooperation as desired by JAPAN which RIBBENTROP questioned Ambassador SATO, a solution would be found in so far as both sides had intention of cooperation, and for that purpose I should exchange views hereafter if he wanted to do so.

4. That night at the dinner party, I had an opportunity to talk with STAHMER who was present at the above-mentioned interview. He confidentially told me that RIBBENTROP, taking into consideration the situation after war, is ~~thinking of cooperating with JAPAN~~ and that although it appears that he wants to have it extend over the fields of both diplomacy and economy, it seems that he is hoping for its earliest realization in view of the surrounding circumstances. Cabled the same to Britain, the United States, Italy and the Soviet Union.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1589GStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 13 July, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 20382, Kurusu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/Witness/: (s) T. Sato

(s) Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

(SLL)
Assistant Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
8th day of Oct., 1946

Witness: (s) Sgt. Takeo Toguchi

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

1022

Br. Ex. 127

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR
IN JAPAN (GREW)

Excerpts.

297

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1940--8 p.m.

Jap. org mass meetings
.....

"At the end of June and during July of this year Japanese-sponsored authorities introduced in portions of China new economic measures and restrictions detrimental to American interests, and there occurred a series of incidents involving Japanese and American nationals. During this period there has been carried on intermittently agitation directed against American interest which has taken the form of mass meetings and demonstrations by Japanese residents and an inflammatory press campaign in the Japanese-controlled press. There were also developments in Japan which have raised questions as to the welfare and security of American nationals residing in that country.

Developments at Shanghai have been of an especially serious character.

At that place, acts of terrorism have been committed against reputable American citizens and established American interests, as well as against other nationals and other interests, and a judge of one of the courts established by international agreement, to which the Government of the United States is a party, has been assassinated. Newspapers subject to Japanese control have been conducting an anti-American and anti-foreign campaign, the inflammatory character of which could not but affect prejudicially peace and order.

.....

The Government of the United States has made due note of and is taking due account of those acts and developments which affect adversely interests of the United States and its nationals.

An illustrative list of recent restrictions and incidents is appended."

The summary of recent illustrative developments and incidents affecting adversely interests of the United States and of its nationals, which I also handed to him, included the following:

V.B.

Br. Ex. 127

Establishment in North China on June 28 of full import exchange control.

Assault on July 4 at Chefoo on members of the American Presbyterian Mission by Japanese armed soldiers;

July 7 incident at Shanghai involving American Marines and Japanese gendarmes, including reference to restraint and good will shown by American authorities in attempting to effect reasonable adjustment and to the intemperate tone and language of communications from the concerned Japanese authorities;

The refusal since about July 8 of Japanese military authorities of Shanghai to issue permits for shipments by American firms to the hinterland and Yangtze Valley;

Mass meeting on July 10 in Hongkew in connection with the July 7 incident, reported intemperate statements by the commander of the Japanese naval landing party, and sensational and inciting articles published in Japanese-controlled newspapers;

The demand of the Nanking regime for the deportation from Shanghai of six Americans and one British subject, the throwing of bombs at a Chinese language newspaper in which an American claims an interest, and the assassination of Samuel Chang;

Tang Liang-li's reputed letter in the North China Daily News of July 16 and a foreign newspaper commentator's interpretation thereof as a threat to kidnap if not to murder the Americans and Briton concerned;

A report of July 19 from Shanghai that an American missionary woman at Soochow had been searched in a humiliating and insulting manner by a Japanese sentry;

An anti-American demonstration on July 19 at Hangchow by Japanese in uniform riding in Japanese military trucks;

abend Attack on July 20 at Shanghai on Hallett Abend:

The appeal on July 20 of the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to the Consular Body, the public criticism of the appeal by the Japanese Consul General, and the attempt of the Japanese Consul General to cause the Consular Body to indicate in a resolution that "Chungking elements" were responsible for all terrorism in Shanghai;

Br. Ex. 127

The receipt on July 23 by the American Consul at Shanghai of a telegram from Amagasaki demanding apologies and withdrawal of American forces from China;

The demand of the Nanking regime, reported July 23, for the arrest of a large number of Chinese in the Settlement, deportation of certain foreigners, and closing down of foreign newspapers published in the Settlement and newspaper threats that the regime will take over Settlement police rights;

The arrest on July 27 in Tokyo of a number of British subjects, the death of Cox, the arrest and detention of Morin, and the subsequent press warning to foreign correspondents;

The assassination of Judge Chien on July 29 in Shanghai;

A report of July 31 that instructions had been issued to Shanghai representatives of Japanese newspapers to look for stories on which anti-American articles might be based:

The assassination on August 2 of a White Russian employed by an American firm, the kidnaping of a Chinese coal dealer on the same day, and the publication of anti-American articles in a Japanese-controlled paper.

1023

Total No.: 23849

JMS
Renter - 1-2 - Britain Retreat

Coded Telegram from London to the Foreign Ministry

Despatched: Afternoon August 5, 1940
Received: Afternoon August 6, 1940

TO: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
FROM: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram 1356 (Code used by Head of Embassy)

Please accept my hearty congratulations for the establishment and enforcement of the Greater East Asia Policy at this time. In this connection, I wish to inform you of the following points which have occurred to me though there may be parts that duplicate what I have already told you:

1. In the present situation, it is better, in regard to our attitude towards Germany and Italy to push forward an independent parallel policy. As to the extent of its application, it seems to me that the way the Soviet Union is carrying out its parallel policy will be of value.

VB
VUC
Italy's policy of Alliance was based on geographical necessity, but Italy will generally maintain a merely subordinate position to Germany in future. As Japan is in a very advantageous geographical position, and as her object is to establish a position in the world, I think it is fundamentally essential to secure independence of policy. Next, in order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying them out at the direct expense of small nations (for instance - France or Portugal) (although indirectly, it may turn out to be at the expense of Britain and America) and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one.

2. The Soviet Union, by means of its parallel policy towards Germany occupied the Baltic area and East Europe, compromised (with Germany and Italy) in the Balkans and is supposed to be about to advance towards Iran, Turkey and Iraq, (or perhaps also secure a position in Finland). But she is always standing strongly for neutrality, trying to avoid conflict with the big countries, such as Britain (and France), etc. but extending her power over minor countries which have no connection with the war. Actually, the Soviet Union is aiming at a thorough shake-up of the British dominions but it seems to be exercising all the skill at its command to realize the greatest gains at the least loss, while always leaving room for compromise with Britain.

Brit retreat 8/5/40

3. The unavoidable diplomatic retreat of Britain from East Europe and the Black Sea area and the same developments in Asia, namely, the transfer of the center of the British sphere of influence from Shanghai to Hongkong some time ago, and then from Hongkong to Singapore, gives some idea of it. Britain is also changing her fundamental policy toward China. Even in the case of America, its strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine signifies an attitude of retreat from East Asia. And the embargoes on oil and scrap-iron represent not a positive but a negative policy which is defensive (or obstructionist). The policies of Britain and America are not Joint, but Parallel policies but they have not necessarily been completely in accord hitherto as to their purpose and application. That depends upon our attitude. If we carry out our Greater East Asia policy with a reasonable, fair and square attitude, we may properly expect Anglo-American obstructions to be removed in the natural course of events. As to our attitude toward Britain and America, we need to consider fully the actual benefits, while considering at the same time our principles and position.

4. Here we should be on our guard against the fact that there are active, powerful movements afoot to draw Japan into a conflict with Britain and America in the Pacific Ocean thereby precipitating an uncontrollable situation in the Pacific just as Japan was drawn into the China problem by the Lukowkiao Incident, which they could expand into a world war, so that they could fish in troubled waters. In Britain and America, this movement is represented by the reinforcement of the existing anti-Japanese movement sponsored by the Leftists. The other one is a movement to draw Japan into a conflict by making Japan provoke Britain and America. Both movements have the same direct objective, though they differ in their ultimate objectives.

5. In short, though the main object of our policy is to establish a powerful political and economic position in Greater East Asia, I believe that to show a liberal-minded attitude towards settling the China problem expresses, not weakness, but strength on our part. In view of our present high international position, it would be improper for us to be victimized by other countries, not to speak of adopting an attitude of supplication or subordination. I believe it to be the cardinal principle of diplomacy to assert what our country requires and believes, and at the same time to prevent untoward losses in complicated diplomatic relations and to devise all available means towards every country alike within the limits of their potential utility. Needless to say, it is necessary to sweeten our relations with the Soviet Union and also to proceed with scrupulous consideration and prudence in our relations with Britain and America.

(3rd)

Transmitted to America, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1250-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 5 August, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of Sept. 1946.

s/K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
19th day of Sept., 1946

Witness: s/ T/4 P. Toguchi

s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

1024

Br. Ex. 128

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts

No. 1636

(TOKYO,) September 18, 1940

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to recall to Your Excellency the fact that my Government has frequently found it necessary in recent years to make representations to the Japanese Government in regard to interference with American trade in China by Japanese military authorities or by local organizations under their control. Not only have representations been made in connection with general trade and exchange measures enforced by Japanese-controlled authorities in north China, but also in connection with especially destructive interferences with American trade in individual commodities, notably hides and skins, furs, wool, radios, egg products, and embroideries. It is now necessary to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government widespread interference with American trade in petroleum products.

.

oil

From Kalgan to Canton, in coastal cities and in the interior, American trade in petroleum products, chiefly kerosene and candles, continues to be subjected, notwithstanding repeated representations to the local authorities by American diplomatic and consular officers, to arbitrary and unwarranted interferences.

.

20
|
20
|

Br. Ex. 136

TELEGRAM
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)
(Paraphrase)

Excerpt

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1940-6 p.m.

334. At earliest moment possible, unless you perceive objection, please obtain further interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs and take up with him the two matters which follow, as under instruction from this Government:

(1) Refer to the conversation you had on August 7 with the Minister (your telegram No. 672, August 7, 10 p.m.) and say to him that within the past few days reports from several sources have come to the Department of State to the effect that the Government of Japan has presented an ultimatum to the French authorities in Indochina on Japan's demands for permission to Japanese armed forces, for purposes of military operations against China, to pass through French territory and to use military bases and other facilities. The Government of the United States is reluctant to believe these reports, and it wishes to point out the unfortunate effect on American public opinion from the point of view of Japanese-American relations if these reports prove to be correct. Especially will this be true in view of statement which the press attributed on June 19 to a representative of the Japanese Foreign Office which said, in effect, that Japan attached importance to maintaining the status quo in French Indochina.

.

DOC. NO. 2200 (17)

Br. Ex. 152

1027
P. 1*

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Excerpt.

No. 235

.....

In view of the situation of iron and steel scrap markets, the supply and demand of these materials and the volume shipped to Japan, the Japanese Government finds it difficult to concede that this measure was motivated solely by the interest of national defense of the United States.

.....

(WASHINGTON,) October 7, 1940.

Foreign Relations II, p. 223 at p. 224.

"Wight Soil and the Cranberry Vendor"

blue paper. Powder Buff.

done
may - Pub.
Pix. List

MEMORANDUM

On the 24th December, 1938, the British Ambassador handed to the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum respecting outstanding Anglo-Japanese cases in China.

Sat
Kyodo Photo
slots. Const.

In continuation of that document Sir Robert Craigie now communicates a further memorandum regarding the present position of the most serious cases still outstanding. It will be observed that some of the cases mentioned were included in the representations made in 1938, and these have been marked with an asterisk for convenience of reference. It is requested that special attention may be given to these cases, which have been outstanding for more than 2 years, and in particular to the Yangtze claims, which are perhaps the gravest example. It will be seen that no progress has been made regarding these claims and that no payment whatever has been made in respect of them by the Japanese Government, although the latter's assurance that compensation would be given is now nearly 3 years old.

P36 Mitsui
monopoly in Eggs.

The
from Oct 11 - 37
to June 21 - 38

-2-

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will understand that the list is not intended to be exhaustive. It will further be observed that in no less than 12 of the cases included in the list, the representations made by His Majesty's Embassy have remained without reply.

The British Ambassador would be grateful for an early examination of all these cases, many of which have been dragging on for more than 2 years.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TOKYO.

November 22nd, 1940.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAA -GENERAL.

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| 1. <u>RAILWAYS.</u> | | |
| (a) <u>Peking Mukden Railway.</u> | October | <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Oct 1937</i></p> <p>These various subjects have been mentioned in repeated protests from <u>October 1937</u> onwards. Though a general assurance was given in a letter from Mr. Ishii on July 20, 1938, that there was no intention of infringing British rights, no satisfactory explanation has been given of the breaches of treaty involved in the actions of the Japanese authorities and no satisfactory action has been taken to respect the British <u>interests</u></p> |
| (1) Non-payment of Shang-hai-Fengchiang Railway mortgage redemption loan 1913. | 11th, 1937. | |
| (2) Non-payment of debt owing to Metropolitan Cannel Carriage Company. | | |
| ((1) and (2) being largely due to non-payment by the Japanese military for railway services). | | |
| (3) Construction of a parallel railway to Jehol contrary to international agreement. | | |
| (4) Unification of North China Railways in complete <u>disregard</u> | | |

-2-

disregard of the British interests involved and of international treaties governing them.

interests which have been disregarded in these different ways by Japanese action. On March 24th, 1939, His Majesty's Ambassador drew attention to reports that the North China Railway systems were to be taken over by a Japanese sponsored concern in contravention of international agreements covering the constitution of the Peking-Mukden Railway and requested an assurance that no such procedure was intended. No reply.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>A - GENERAL FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---|--|
| 1. <u>RAILWAYS.</u> | | |
| (b) <u>Shanghai-Nanking and Shanghai-Hangchow- Ningpo Railways.</u> * | | |
| (1) Denial by the Japanese authorities of all facilities to British engineer to survey lines on behalf of British bondholders, and failure to make arrangements for the payment of obligations to bondholders in spite of the fact that both railways are being used by the public and are earning revenue. | January 13th (Shanghai) April 20th (Tokyo) 1937 | General Ugaki informed His Majesty's Ambassador Ambassador on September 8th that the region of the railways was an important area in the rear of the Hankow operations. In response to further representations by His Majesty's Embassy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on December 8th that no change whatever had occurred which would render a survey possible. The Japanese Government do not <u>share</u> |

-2-

share the view of His Majesty's Government that the Japanese Government are partly responsible for damage to the line.

On the 24th March, 1939, His Majesty's Ambassador pointed out that military operations in the region had been concluded, requested permission for an inspection of the lines on behalf of the bondholders, and asked if provision had yet been made for meeting the obligations due to the latter. Further representations regarding the legal ownership

of

-3-

of the Shanghai-Nanking
Railways were made to
the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on the 10th
October, 1939, and a
reply was requested on
the 2nd March, 1940.
No reply.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAA - GENERAL

| <u>1. RAILWAYS</u> | <u>FIRST</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|---|
| (b) | <u>REPRESEN-</u> | |
| (2) <u>Unification of</u> | <u>TATION</u> | |
| <u>Central China</u> | | |
| <u>Railways.</u> | | |
| <p>Asks assurance that April the Japanese Govern- 29th ment will not approve 1938. the reported plan for unification in discre- gard of British inter- ests.</p> | <p>April 29th 1938.</p> | <p>On 2nd May, and 4th July 1939, His Ma- jesty's Ambassador made further re- presentations, pro- testing against the creation of the Cen- <u>tral China Railway</u> Company to control <u>lines in the Shanghai-</u> Nanking area and re- questing speedy action to accord due respect to British rights and interests.</p> <p>No reply.</p> |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAA - GENERAL1. RAILWAYSFIRST
Represent-
tationPRESENT SITUATION*
(c) Tientsin-Pukow Railway

Requests that requisite amount from revenue be applied to service of loans and that foreign personnel be employed to carry out duties.

August 15th, 1938.

The Japanese reply of September 15th, 1938, stated that the railway had been much damaged and was being repaired by the Japanese who cannot accept the responsibility for payment of all the obligations.

On 15th May, 1939, His Majesty's Embassy explained that His Majesty's Government cannot accept this contention and requested an assurance that the suspension

of

-2-

of the British First
Engineer was purely
temporary.

No reply.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAA - GENERAL

| 2. SHIPPING | FIRST REPRESENTATION | PRESENT SITUATION |
|---|----------------------------|--|
| (a) <u>Detention of S.S. "Sagres", "Lalita" and "Dholera".</u> | | |
| British S. S. <u>"Sagres"</u> April was seized by a Japanese destroyer in Chayuan Bay on the 8th April, 1939, | April 22nd, 1939. (Sagres) | In spite of an offer by the owner of the "Lalita" and "Dholera" to agree to waive their claim for com- |
| British s.s. "Lalita" was seized on 27th April near Foochow by a Japanese warship. (Lalita) | June 30th, 1939. | pensation upon the vessels' release, under certain conditions, and by the |
| British s.s. <u>"Dholera"</u> also seized and detained by Japanese Navy. | (Lalita) | owners of the <u>"Sagres"</u> to reduce their claim to <u>£10,000</u> on the vessel's release, all three are still detained. After a total of 15 communications from His Majesty's Ambassador on the |
| | | <u>subject,</u> |

-2-

subject, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied on 31st July, 1940, that they would consider the release of the vessels if His Majesty's Government would guarantee not to requisition them without the Japanese Government's consent in the event of their being chartered by Japanese interests.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAA - GENERAL

| 2. <u>SHIPPING.</u> | <u>First Representations</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|--|--|
| (b) <u>Detention of S.S. "Sparta". #</u> | Greck S.S. " <u>Sparta</u> " insured by British interests, <u>detained</u> at Keelung. His Majesty's Embassy support Danish Legations's request for release. | <p>March 14th, 1938. Japanese authorities refuse to recognize the validity of transfer from Chinese to <u>Greek registry.</u></p> <p>Periodic enquiry in support of the Danish and subsequently, of the Greek Ministers' representations, has led to no result.</p> <p>On 11th March, 1940, His Majesty's Ambassador states that British underwriters had now paid <u>£10,000</u> on the vessel and that His Majesty's</p> |

Government

-2-

Government viewed her detention with growing concern. On 13th, April, 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were informed that the transfer of the Sparta to Greek nationality was correctly carried out under Greek law. Japanese reply of 29th May, 1940, stated that vessel would not be released until suspicion of malicious transfer had been cleared up.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAB - SHANGHAI

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|------------------------------|---|
| <p>1. <u>Tinkler Case.</u></p> <p>On 6th June, 1939, in the course of a disorder at the <u>China Printing and Finishing Company's Mill at Pootung</u>, a British subject named Tinkler was fatally wounded by Japanese Marines. Protests strongly against the negligent and obstructive attitude of Japanese authorities in the matter and reserves right to claim compensation.</p> | <p>June 17th, 1939.</p> | <p>Reminder sent on May 6th, 1940, urging the disposal of this long outstanding case in the interests of Anglo-Japanese relations.</p> <p>No reply.</p> |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINA

B - SHANGHAI.

SUBJECT

FIRST
REPRESENTATION.

PRESENT SITUATION

2. Cotton Mills.

(a) Pioneer Knitting Mill (Wien Tha Thread Company). *

September 20th, 1938.

No satisfactory explanation given regarding the violent seizure of the mill and no action yet taken to restore it to the British Company. Further reminders were sent on February 6th, 1939 and March 18th, 1940. No reply.

Protests against forcible occupation of the mill by Mr. Yokoyama, acting on behalf of (Japanese) Naigai Hosiery Mill, and against continued obstruction placed by Japanese authorities in the way of operation by the British company, who have an undisputed right to operate it.

Jap forcibly take Hosiery mill - from Naigai Hosiery mill.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLIO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAB - SHANGHAI.

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 2. <u>Cotton Mills</u> | | |
| (b) <u>Sung Sing No. 7 Mills</u> * | January 4th, 1940. | No reply. |
| Requests cessation of the removal of cotton from the mill by the Japanese-owned <u>Kung Dah Mill</u> and of other <u>interference</u> , and urges the provision of facilities for a Receiver to take over the Mill on behalf of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. | | |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAC - NORTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| <u>1. EXCHANGE AND IMPORT CONTROL.</u> | March | |
| Existing difficulties in the way of British traders in North China will be increased by Japanese measures for control of trade and foreign exchange. Such proceedings conflict with Treaty rights and Japanese assurances. His Majesty's Government reserve the right to take any action. | 10th, 1939. | Japanese reply of April 13th states that object of the measures was to secure that Federal Reserve Bank notes should fulfil functions of a trade currency. No general control of trade and exchange and no discrimination were contemplated. His Majesty's Ambassador replied on June 8th, 1939, that he still considered the restrictions constituted serious and unjustifiable discrimination against Great Britain. On 12th August, 1940, |
| | | <u>His</u> |

-2-

SUBJECTFIRST
REPRESENTATION.PRESENT SITUATION

His Majesty's Ambassador drew attention to the import control regulations recently introduced by Japanese authorities, trusting there would be no discrimination against British interests and requesting an assurance that permits would be granted for the import of goods already contracted for. Japanese reply of October 22nd stated that the North China Authorities had dealt with these matters in a satisfactory manner and that situation referred to had not in fact arisen.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAC -- NORTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| 2. <u>TSIAOTSO. Peking Syndicate's Mines.</u> | August 14th 1939. | On 10th November 1939, Sir Robert Craigie requested protection of Syndicate's property and machinery pending restoration of the mines, and gave evidence of Japanese official instigation. Such action is in flagrant violation of repeated assurances given by the Japanese Government and greatly increases difficulty of restoring better relations. Japanese reply of 10th January, 1940, stated that most of machinery had been <u>carried</u> |

-2-

carried off before Japanese occupation. Representative of British interests concerned recognised right of local Chinese authorities to operate mines on regular basis.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAC - NORTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|-----------------------------|---|
| 3. <u>TSINGTAO. Discrimination against British Shipping and Trade. *</u> | May 19th, 1939. | After further communications, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied on January 20th, 1940, that steps had recently been taken by the local military authorities to provide further facilities did not, however, in practice become available and, after a reminder on April 15th, His Majesty's Ambassador made further representations |
| In spite of Japanese assurances that Three Power shipping will be given certain facilities in the port of Tsingtao, British ships have continued to be subjected to discrimination and delays. Requests speedy relaxation of the restrictions. | | |

-2-

tations on the 6th May regarding the wharf situation and renewed instances of discrimination against British shipping. Still further examples of such discrimination were made the subject of representations on the 13th June.

No reply was received.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAC - NORTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| 4. <u>WUTINGFU. Burning of English Methodist Mission at Chuchia.</u> | January 9th, 1940. | Japanese reply of February 12th states that Mission was found to be centre of anti-Japanese activities. Hospital was therefore burnt in self-protection. His Majesty's Ambassador replied on April 18th that His Majesty's Government consider action of Japanese troops totally unjustified and contrary to international law, and trust vigorous measures will be taken to prevent a recurrence of the incident. |
| English Methodist Mission was burnt by Japanese troops on December 25th in retaliation for alleged medical treatment of Chinese guerrilla. Protests energetically, requests immediate investigation and reserves right to claim. | | |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO--JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. <u>BOMBING INCIDENTS</u> | | |
| (a) <u>Chungking</u> | | |
| In a raid by Japanese aircraft on 4th May, 1939, a bomb killed 2 and wounded 11 in the native staff quarters of His Majesty's Consulate, while considerable damage was done to property of His Majesty's Government. Protests vigorously and requests issue of instructions to stop indiscriminate bombing. | May 12th, 1939. | In spite of these representations renewed damage was done to British property by repeated indiscriminate bombings of Chungking. On the 24th June, 1940, further serious damage was done to His Majesty's Consulate-General, the Consul-General's house being destroyed and 2 other houses struck. On August 5th, 1940, His Majesty's Ambassador stated that he must |

reserve

-2-

reserve all rights on
behalf of His Majesty's
Government in the United
Kingdom in regard to
these attacks, that
the Japanese Government
must be held fully
responsible for any
injury to British
life and property and
that a claim for compen-
sation would be entered
in due course.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|----------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
|----------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|

1. BOMBING INCIDENTS Continued(b) Ichang

| | | |
|---|--------------------|-----------|
| On 6th August, 1939, the Asiatic Petroleum Company's installation and 2 steamers belonging to Jardine, Matheson and Company were damaged and 1 British officer and 2 Chinese sailors on board the latter were wounded in a raid by Japanese aircraft. Reminds Japanese Government of their assurances regarding foreign rights and interests and hopes that stricter orders will be issued in future. Reserves right to claim compensation. | August 11th, 1939. | No reply. |
|---|--------------------|-----------|

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|

1. BOMBING INCIDENTS Continued(c) Pakhoi.

| | | |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|
| China Mission School | September | No reply. |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|

| | | |
|------------------------|-------|--|
| Hospital at Pakhoi was | 20th | |
| bombed on August 29th | 1939. | |

1939, although particulars of the hospital had been communicated to the Japanese Consul-General at Canton by His Majesty's Consul-General in 1938.

Requests investigation and steps to prevent repetition.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. <u>BOMBING INCIDENTS</u> Continued | | |
| (d) <u>Pinkiang</u> | March | In spite of reminder |
| In bombing of | ⁸ 29th | sent on 10th May, no |
| English Methodist | 1939. | reply was received. |
| Mission on March 15th, | | |
| the Reverend A. G. | | |
| Leigh was killed. | | |
| Protests, asks | | |
| measures to ensure | | |
| nonrepetition and | | |
| expression of regret | | |
| and reserves right | | |
| to claim compensation. | | |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|

1. BOMBING INCIDENTS Continued(e) Sian.

| | | |
|--|------------------|---|
| Jenkins Robertson Memorial Hospital of the English Baptist Mission, though clearly marked, was | March 13th 1939. | In spite of reminder sent on May 10th, no reply was received. |
|--|------------------|---|

bombed by Japanese aircraft on March 8th, 1939, in spite of previous representations made in regard to this hospital in Shanghai. The operating theatre was destroyed and other damage done. Requests enquiry, assurances against recurrence and expression of regret. Reserves right to claim compensation.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|--|
| 2. <u>CENTRAL CHINA BANK</u> | | |
| Reports are current that a new bank of issue may be set up by the Nanking authorities. Such a step would have the most unfortunate effect on trade of Third Powers and on Anglo-Japanese relations and would be incompatible with Japanese assurances. Requests information. | May 27th 1940. | On October 23rd His Majesty's Ambassador drew attention to a statement made by the Minister of Finance of the Nanking Government indicating that a Central bank of issue would start operations in November. Sir Robert Craigie asked that steps be taken to prevent this bank from being established. |
| | | No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---|---|
| <p>3. <u>KIUKIANG. Refusal to allow British Subjects to re-occupy their properties.</u> ²¹</p> | <p>Representatives of <u>Butterfield and Swire, Jardine, Matheson and Company, Asiatic Petroleum Company and British-American Tobacco Company</u> have been refused permission to return to Kiukiang although the <u>Standard-Vacuum Oil Company's</u> representatives had been allowed to do so. Assumes that Japanese Government do not propose to countenance discrimination of this description and urges that permission should be given to these firms to return to Kiukiang as soon as possible.</p> | <p>May 24th, 1940</p> <p>Japanese reply of 25th June stated that return of Butterfield and Swire and Asiatic Petroleum Company was impossible owing to military necessity, that permission was being reserved in case of Jardine, Matheson and Company owing to actions by the firm in the interests of the enemy, but that permission to return on certain conditions had already been granted to the British American Tobacco Company. There was no intention of deliberate discrimination against British firms.</p> |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|---|
| 4. <u>YANGTZE DELTA. Restrictions on British Trade.</u> | | |
| Draws attention to following Japanese activities in Yangtze Delta:- | June 6th, 1939. | After reminder dated June 21st pressing for issue of appropriate instructions to local authorities, Japanese Government replied on 20th September that the Chinese Customs authorities and the Japanese military authorities were acting within their competence in view of military necessity. |
| (a) Attempts to establish a system of trade permits | | |
| (b) Direct interference with British shipping, and | | |
| (c) Discrimination against British shipping by means of the intimidation of Chinese. His Majesty's Government cannot admit the right of Japanese authorities to restrict legitimate British trade. | | |
| Moreover, the Nanking authorities recently informed the Shanghai Commission of Customs that vessels wishing to clear for certain ports must obtain certificates from the competent authorities additional to In <u>land</u> | | |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD -CENTRAL CHINASUBJECTFIRST
REPRESENTATION.PRESENT SITUATION

4. YANGTZE DELTA. Continued

Inland Water Certificates. This would be unwarrantable interference with the Customs Administration and with legitimate foreign trade. Requests immediate issue of suitable instructions.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---------------------------------|--|
| 5. <u>YANGTZE NAVIGATION.</u> <u>Discrimination against British Shipping. #</u> | | |
| (a) Shipments of ordinary goods by Japanese ships are now freely possible. | April 10th 1939. | On 1st July, 1939, His Majesty's Ambassador pointed out that German and Italian shipping was being favoured to the detriment of British shipping and that the general situation had deteriorated since April 10th. |
| (b) 80% of the goods so carried cannot be described as cargo for military requirements. | | |
| (c) At certain places all imports except Japanese goods are taxed. | | No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAD - CENTRAL CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| <p>6. <u>YANGTZE VALLEY EGG TRADE.</u></p> <p><u>MitsuiBussan Kai-</u> <u>sha have established</u> <u>a virtual monopoly</u> <u>of the egg trade in</u> <u>the Yangtze Valley.</u></p> <p>Hopes that appropriate steps will be taken at an early date to ensure removal of these hindrances to legitimate British trade.</p> | <p>November 16th, 1939.</p> | <p>Japanese reply of 4th December stated that an early local settlement was expected.</p> <p>After His Majesty's Ambassador had drawn attention to further difficulties on 20th January, 1940, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again stated that they expected a local settlement.</p> <p>On October 14th, 1940, His Majesty's Ambassador drew attention to further</p> <p><u>measures</u></p> |

MIT SUI
monopoly on Eggs

-2-

measures which the Japanese military authorities propose to enforce in connection with the egg trade and also as regards silk and other principal exports of the Yangtze Valley. Prompt steps were requested to bring to an end this continued interference with British interests.

No reply.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAE - SOUTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|------------------------------|---|
| <p>1. <u>CANTON. Trading in Hides and Hemp.</u></p> <p>Proclamation published in Canton on 18th October, 4th, whereby trading in hides and hemp was apparently forbidden by the Japanese military authorities and a monopoly in these commodities granted to certain Japanese firms.</p> <p>Requests steps to prevent execution of this project.</p> | <p>December 1939.</p> | <p>Japanese reply of 24th February, 1940, states that measures taken are unavoidable steps in order that army may be self-supporting.</p> |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAE - SOUTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 2. <u>SHARP PEAK. Proposed steamship Service.</u> | | |
| Proposal for Foreign passengers, mails, food and medical supplies for foreigners at Foochow to be brought by British steamer to neighbourhood of Sharp Peak once or twice a month. Trust Japanese Government will agree on humanitarian grounds. | August 23rd, 1940. | No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAE - SOUTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 3. <u>SWATOW.</u> | | |
| (a) <u>Harbour Restrictions.</u> | December | Japanese reply of January |
| Port of Swatow has | 11th | 17th 1940, states that |
| been closed to Third | 1939. | restrictions must be |
| Power shipping except | | continued for reasons |
| for one vessel a week | | of strategic necessity |
| since shortly after its | | but that harbour will |
| occupation by Japanese | | be reopened as soon as |
| forces. Considerable | | an improvement is seen. |
| quantities of goods are | | On March 16th His |
| now being landed there | | Majesty's Ambassador |
| from Japanese vessels, | | gave statistics of |
| so argument that | | trading activities by |
| closure is due to | | Japanese vessels at |
| military necessity no | | Swatow as evidence that |
| longer applies. | | closure of port could |
| Requests reopening of | | no longer be justified |
| port. | | on grounds of military |
| | | necessity and requested |
| | | early steps for its |
| | | reopening. |
| | | No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAE - SOUTH CHINA

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| 3. <u>SWATOW Continued.</u> (b) <u>Taxation of Imports and Exports.</u> | | |
| "Swatow Rehabilitation Commission" has estab- lished tax bureau which is levying taxes on imports and exports as well as "voluntary con- tributions" on shipments of enbroideries. Requests cessation of this further infringement of the rights of the Chinese Maritime Customs. | February 10th, 1940. | Japanese reply of 23rd February states that an investigation is being undertaken. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAE - SOUTH CHINASUBJECTFIRST
REPRESENTATION.PRESENT SITUATION4. HONG KONG. Infringement
of Territorial Waters
and Attacks on Junks.*

Attacks by Japanese naval forces on junks registered in Hong Kong or engaged in fishing for the Hong Kong market have been made by Japanese naval forces at frequent intervals from September 1937. These incidents have often involved violation of Hong Kong territorial waters.

Repeated representations by His Majesty's Ambassador have not been successful in securing a cessation of these attacks, which are still continuing.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| <p>1. <u>Claims in respect of the Yangtze incidents of December 5th, 11th and 12th, 1937.</u> *</p> <p>(Presented with reference to notes from the Japanese Government promising compensation in respect of these incidents).</p> <p>Value: £110,480.10. 6.</p> | <p>April 4th, 1938.</p> | <p>On September 1st, 1938, an official statement of these claims, not subject to alteration, was presented. A verbal reminder was furnished on October 10th and a written reminder on November 10th, pointing out that the Japanese Government had been in possession of the appropriate information for over six months. Japanese Government's reply November 22nd stated that the authorities were working hard on the claims but that investigations were not <u>completed.</u></p> |

-2-

completed. On January 3rd, 1939, the Japanese Government were reminded that assurances had been given that compensation would be paid. It was pointed out that there could therefore be no difficulty in principle. Prompt settlement or information as to what difficulty had caused delay of nine months was requested. Discussion on points of detail between officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and member of the Staff of His Majesty's Embassy took place on February 23rd, March 24th, and April 25th, 1939, and on February 14th, March 16th, and October 25th, 1940, and there has been some correspondence in the course of which the Ministry have been supplied with the detailed information requested. But although the Japanese representatives have latterly referred to the existence of concrete proposals for the settlement of these claims, no offer has yet been made.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| 2. <u>S.S. ASLAN</u> * | | |
| Claim in respect of damage caused by the wrongful detention of the ship by the Japanese navy from February 7th to 20th and theft during detention of articles on board. | May 1st, 1938. | Japanese Government stated in their reply of June 3rd that there were insufficient documents on board and denied the theft of any articles during the ship's detention a receipt having been furnished by the Captain on departure from Mako. On September 9th, His Majesty's Ambassador explained the situation with regard to the ship's documents, by the alleged irregularity of which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had endeavoured to justify the ship's detention and pointed out that <u>detention</u> |

-2-

detention could have been avoided by wireless consultation of the port authorities. The receipt which the Captain had given was only for private and ship's papers. The Japanese reply of October 4th, claimed that the Japanese could not bear the entire responsibility and that, as the Captain in his receipt had stated everything was in order, there was no room for further discussion on the subject of the alleged thefts.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---------------------------------|---|
| 3. <u>Cases involving infringement of Hong Kong territorial waters and attack on junks. *</u> | | |
| (a) September 22nd, 1937, Fishing junks sunk by Japanese submarine. | January 5th, 1938 | His Majesty's Ambassador's Note of August 15th, 1938, stated that Japanese explanation could not be accepted and presented a claim for Hong Kong \$30,469.00. The Japanese reply of September 19th refused to consider the question of responsibility, but offered an <u>ex gratia</u> payment to those fishermen who are British subject and can prove they took no part in aggression against a Japanese warship. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION.</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|------------------------------|--|
| 3. (b) February 11th, 1938. Attack on and seizure of 4 junks by Japanese armed motor trawler. | February 26th, 1938. | Japanese Government's reply of March 8th, stated that the incidents did not take place within British territorial waters. His Majesty's Note of April 27th, showed that the junks in question were different from those referred to in the Japanese Government's reply. A further Note from His Majesty's Ambassador of the same date submitted a claim for Hong Kong \$12,000.00 No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---------------------------------|---|
| 3. (c) May 3rd, 1938. Piracy and murder committed by Japanese sailors on a junk from Hong Kong. | June 17th, 1938. | His Majesty's Ambassador addressed a second Note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 8th, confirming the details of his previous Note and on October 31st, a claim for Hong Kong \$11,872.50 was submitted. The Japanese Government's reply of December 6th, stated that there had been cases in which Japanese warships had dealt with hostile junks, but that there were no facts corresponding to the statements in His Majesty's Ambassador's Note of July 8th. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| 4. <u>Damage to His Majesty's Consulate at Pagado Anchorage, Foochow, during an air raid on July 1st.</u> | July 9th 1938. | A claim for £215. 7. 4 was presented by His Majesty's Ambassador on May 3rd, 1939. No reply. |

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|-----------------------------|--|
| <p>5. <u>Damage to His Majesty's Consulates and British property at Chefoo and Tsingtao in the course of anti-British demonstrations on August 11th and July 10th respectively</u></p> | <p>December 18th, 1939.</p> | <p>A claim for Chinese National \$1,554.01 and United States \$20.75 was submitted by His Majesty's Embassy on December 18th. On January 23rd, 1940, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the anti-British movement in China had broken out spontaneously, that the Chinese organs were in control that the matter should be discussed therefore between the local British and Chinese authorities and that there was no reason</p> |

why

-2-

why the Japanese Government should bear the responsibility or receive the statement of claim. In their Note of February 12th, 1940, His Majesty's Embassy pointed out that His Majesty's Government do not recognise the "local Chinese authorities", that Tsingtao and Chefoo were under the effective occupation of the Japanese Army and that the Japanese Government were therefore responsible for preventing disorder. The formula of July 22nd was intended to cover such cases. His Majesty's Embassy therefore maintained their claim. In their Note of March 20th, His Majesty's Embassy enquired of the Ministry whether a reply might shortly be expected but none has yet been received.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|---|---------------------------------|---|
| 6. <u>Attack on the Imperial Airways aircraft "Dardanus" on November 8th, 1939, at Waichow Island, South China.</u> | November 23rd 1939. | His Majesty's Ambassador presented a claim for £1,706.8.3 for damage and loss on January 13th, 1940. A more detailed statement of this claim showing the extensive damage suffered by the aircraft and its un-airworthy state when returned to the British authorities, was submitted by His Majesty's Embassy on February 13th. As no reply was received a Note enquiring whether a settlement might soon be expected. |

excludewas

-2-

exclude British aircraft from any particular area, as His Majesty's Ambassador had informed the Japanese Government on February 27th 1939. His Majesty's Ambassador also took strong exception to the detention of the aircraft's two pilots for 5 days, reserved the right to claim compensation and requested an assurance that instructions against the repetition of such an incident had been sent to the appropriate Japanese authorities.

was sent to the Ministry on March 20th. In their reply of April 23rd, the Ministry stated that as regards repairs the Imperial Japanese authorities did not take any measures at the time as a matter of obligation, but especially kind treatment was given. They stated that there was therefore no reason for the Japanese Government to bear any responsibility for any sort of damage in this case.

SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING ANGLO-JAPANESE CASES IN CHINAF - CLAIMS

| <u>SUBJECT</u> | <u>FIRST REPRESENTATION</u> | <u>PRESENT SITUATION</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|---|
| * 7. <u>GENERAL CLAIMS</u> | | |
| Between June 21st 1938, and November 11th, 1940, 14 sets of claims in respect of loss suffered by British subjects as a result of the operations of the Japanese armed forces in China have been submitted. In addition, claims by Mr. M. Hayward and by Messrs. <u>Butterfield and Swire</u> (in respect of their Hokai Staff Quarters at Hankow) have been submitted separately. | June 21st 1938. | These claims amount in all to £414,654. 4. 7-1/4. Claims amount to £5,000. 2. 3 only may be regarded as withdrawn, while one claim has been reduced by £29. 17. 2, leaving a balance of £409,624. 5. 2-1/4 outstanding under this head alone. |

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 699A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 63 (in English) pages, dated 22 Nov., 1940, and described as follows: Memo. No. 248 of Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Anglo-Japanese cases in China.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this _____ day of _____, 1946. /s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato Assistant, Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of Oct, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: _____ Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

1028

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 699A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 63 (in English) pages, dated 22 Nov., 1940, and described as follows: Memo. No. 248 of Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Japan to Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Anglo-Japanese cases in China.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this _____ day of _____, 1946. /s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official SEAL
Witness: /s/ T. Sato Assistant, Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1st day of Oct, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME
Witness: _____ Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

1029
not in E.

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE PEOPLES
OF EAST ASIA
(Measures for Burma)

Prepared by the Racial Question
Committee of the National
Policy Research Institute
/Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai/

20 September 1940

VG

9-20-40

SECRET

Kindly note that this report
is not being published

VB
 Reuter
 JSE
 9/20/40

MEASURES FOR BRITISH BURMA

(1) PURPOSE

p.1

The purpose is to free Burma, as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, from the fetters of British imperialism as soon as possible to make it an independent state composed of the Burmese people, and to admit it into membership of the East Asia Co-operative Body.

(2) EXECUTION

The following two plans are the practical plans conceivable at this time:

- (A) The purpose is to be achieved by occupying Singapore at a favorable opportunity during the progress of Germany's operations against England, and then by taking some proper means (use force if circumstances require it).
- (B) Independence is to be given impetus by pushing forward the reduction of Yunnan and showing every sign of intending to move into Burma via Chiang Kai-shek's supply route.

(3) REASONS

p.2

- (A) To free the Burmese people from British domination, place them under our guidance, and permit them to cooperate with the peoples of Japan, Manchukuo, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, etc., in the system of the New Order in East Asia as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is the way to develop and manifest the spirit and ideal of Japan's foundation by taking advantage of the present affair.
- (B) Since the First European War, the Burmese people have gradually waked up politically and have developed strong aspirations to free themselves from the yoke of Britain and to establish an independent state. Numerous political organizations were born, and the movement has been continued, although there have been ups and downs. Taking advantage of the development of the present European War as a grand opportunity, there is now a tendency to bring about a movement to achieve their long-cherished hope with Japan's assistance.
- (C) If Japan should look on with folded arms on this occasion, we would in all probability miss the chance to embrace the Burmese in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Not only that, there is the possible danger of placing them under the influence of Germany, Italy, or the United States.

(4) PREPARATIONS

- (A) In order to reinforce preparatory measures towards Burma, the Japanese Consulate at Rangoon should be promoted to a Consulate-General and its staff increased by the addition of necessary personnel, whereby the preparatory measures for assisting the attainment of independence may be expedited.
- (B) British exploitation of Burma should be exposed by means of newspapers and pamphlets with the view to stimulating the race-consciousness of the Burmese.
- (C) Under the pretense of sight-seeing or the inspection of industries, influential Burmese should be invited to visit Japan in order to discuss measures for attaining independence.
- p.3 (D) Adequate contacts should be maintained with the various political parties whose platforms call for the independence and freedom of Burma, and also with the priest class. The essence of Burmese Buddhism should be studied and in case counter-measures are to be provided, serious consideration should be given to them.

(APPENDIX)

By the way, the political parties which aim at independence are as follows:

(1) The United Party.

This party represents a federation of five parties, namely: the People's Party, 'Ba Shi' Party, Free Burma League, Mandalay 21 Group, and the Ba Shwe Party. Prince TE CHIN HWA, grandson of the last King of Burma is President of this party, which is guided by the influences of BA PE, head of the People's Party, which is the Majority Party.

(2) BA MAW Party.

This is a powerful political party headed by ex-Premier Dr. BA MAW. Leading the masses through communism, this party ultimately aims at the complete independence of Burma. It was reported in the papers recently that BA MAW was held in custody.

(3) CHI HLAING Party.

Headed by CHI HLAING, President of the State Council, this party aims at attaining independence gradually.

(4) THAKIN Party.

This party is also known as the Freedom Fighters League. It is a new party headed by a priest named SCYA MINE. It makes it a principle to appeal, if necessary, to force in order to get freedom for Burma. It has ten thousand members, and looks to Japan for assistance to achieve independence.

The foregoing preparatory measures should be pushed forward side by side with each other.

(Statement of Source)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kazuo YATSUGI, hereby certify, in my capacity as former Chief of the Secretariat of the National Policy Research Association that the document attached hereto, consisting of five pages and bearing the following title: "The Policies towards the Races of East Asia (The Policy towards Burma)", dated September 20th, 1940 /Showa 15/ was drawn up by the Committee on Racial Problems of the National Policy Research Association.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of September 1946 /Showa 21/

Signature: Kazuo YATSUGI
(Written seal)

Capacity: Former Chief of the
Secretariat of the
National Policy Research
Association

Witness: Motonori EMURA (Seal)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
26th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
Name

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2nd Lt.

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

1029

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE PEOPLES
OF EAST ASIA
(Measures for Burma)

Prepared by the Racial Question
Committee of the National
Policy Research Institute
/Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai/

20 September 1940

SECRET

Kindly note that this report
is not being published

MEASURES FOR BRITISH BURMA

(1) PURPOSE

p.1

The purpose is to free Burma, as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, from the fetters of British imperialism as soon as possible to make it an independent state composed of the Burmese people, and to admit it into membership of the East Asia Co-operative Body.

(2) EXECUTION

The following two plans are the practical plans conceivable at this time:

- (A) The purpose is to be achieved by occupying Singapore at a favorable opportunity during the progress of Germany's operations against England, and then by taking some proper means (use force if circumstances require it).
- (B) Independence is to be given impetus by pushing forward the reduction of Yunnan and showing every sign of intending to move into Burma via Chiang Kai-shek's supply route.

(3) REASONS

p.2

- (A) To free the Burmese people from British domination, place them under our guidance, and permit them to cooperate with the peoples of Japan, Manchukuo, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, etc., in the system of the New Order in East Asia as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is the way to develop and manifest the spirit and ideal of Japan's foundation by taking advantage of the present affair.
- (B) Since the First European War, the Burmese people have gradually waked up politically and have developed strong aspirations to free themselves from the yoke of Britain and to establish an independent state. Numerous political organizations were born, and the movement has been continued, although there have been ups and downs. Taking advantage of the development of the present European War as a grand opportunity, there is now a tendency to bring about a movement to achieve their long-cherished hope with Japan's assistance.
- (C) If Japan should look on with folded arms on this occasion, we would in all probability miss the chance to embrace the Burmese in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Not only that, there is the possible danger of placing them under the influence of Germany, Italy, or the United States.

(4) PREPARATIONS

- (A) In order to reinforce preparatory measures towards Burma, the Japanese Consulate at Rangoon should be promoted to a Consulate-General and its staff increased by the addition of necessary personnel, whereby the preparatory measures for assisting the attainment of independence may be expedited.
- (B) British exploitation of Burma should be exposed by means of newspapers and pamphlets with the view to stimulating the race-consciousness of the Burmese.
- (C) Under the pretense of sight-seeing or the inspection of industries, influential Burmese should be invited to visit Japan in order to discuss measures for attaining independence.
- P.3 (D) Adequate contacts should be maintained with the various political parties whose platforms call for the independence and freedom of Burma, and also with the priest class. The essence of Burmese Buddhism should be studied and in case counter-measures are to be provided, serious consideration should be given to them.

(APPENDIX)

By the way, the political parties which aim at independence are as follows:

(1) The United Party.

This party represents a federation of five parties, namely: the People's Party, 'Ba Shi' Party, Free Burma League, Mandalay 21 Group, and the Ba Shwe Party. Prince TE CHIN HWA, grandson of the last King of Burma is President of this party, which is guided by the influences of BA PE, head of the People's Party, which is the Majority Party.

(2) BA MAW Party.

This is a powerful political party headed by ex-Premier Dr. BA MAW. Leading the masses through communism, this party ultimately aims at the complete independence of Burma. It was reported in the papers recently that BA MAW was held in custody.

(3) CHI HLAING Party.

Headed by CHI HLAING, President of the State Council, this party aims at attaining independence gradually.

(4) THAKIN Party.

This party is also known as the Freedom Fighters League. It is a new party headed by a priest named SCYA MINE. It makes it a principle to appeal, if necessary, to force in order to get freedom for Burma. It has ten thousand members, and looks to Japan for assistance to achieve independence.

The foregoing preparatory measures should be pushed forward side by side with each other.

(Statement of Source)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kazuo YATSUGI, hereby certify, in my capacity as former Chief of the Secretariat of the National Policy Research Association that the document attached hereto, consisting of five pages and bearing the following title: "The Policies towards the Races of East Asia (The Policy towards Burma)", dated September 20th, 1940 /Showa 15/ was drawn up by the Committee on Racial Problems of the National Policy Research Association.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of September 1946 /Showa 21/

Signature: Kazuo YATSUGI
(Written seal)

Capacity: Former Chief of the
Secretariat of the
National Policy Research
Association

Witness: Motonori EMURA (Seal)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
26th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
Name

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2nd Lt.

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

1030

Outline of Proceedings of the Investigation
Committee of the Privy Council Concerning
the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Tripartite Treaty.

(Written by MATSUMOTO, Chief
of the Treaty Bureau.)

Sept 26, 1940
The session was opened at 11:20 a.m., September 26, 1940 in the HIGASHI-SAN-NO-MA (TN: East Number Three) Room of the Imperial Palace.

Attendance:

The Privy Council HARA, President of the Privy Council
SUZUKI, Vice-President of the Privy Council (Chairman of the Investigation Committee)

All Councillors were present as members of the Investigation Committee except KANEKO and TANAKA who were absent.

The Government (TN: Cabinet) KONOE, Prime Minister
MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister
TOJO, War Minister
OIKAWA, Navy Minister
KAWADA, Finance Minister
HOSHINO, President of the Board of Planning.

Moreover, the following persons were present as exponents.

MURASE, President of the Bureau of Legislation
MORIYAMA, Chief of the Second Section
MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Treaty Bureau
MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (TN: Army)
ABE, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (TN: Navy)
HARAGUCHI, Chief of the Exchange Bureau
MATSUKUMA, Chief of the Bureau of Banks
TSUJI, Chief of the Superintendent Bureau

Proceedings:

1. The chairman of the committee announced the opening of the session and had the secretary read the draft of the treaty.

2. Prime Minister KONOE delivered a formal address as per separate paper No. A.

3. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA gave an explanation as per separate paper No. B.

4. Interpellation began according to rank.

Councillor KAWAI: I thoroughly understood the spirit of the draft. Personally, I have been desiring the conclusion of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance, and I have been expecting its speedy realization since Minister MATSUOKA came into office. Although I have heard talks amongst some factions that the activity of MATSUOKA was slacking, it is a great pleasure to see the treaty being at last concluded. According to the explanation just made by Minister MATSUOKA, the attitude of ITALY is not clarified. I ask your reply on this point.

Minister MATSUOKA: As I have just explained, negotiations of this treaty began between JAPAN and GERMANY. GERMANY said at the beginning that she would be responsible for ITALY. Yesterday the Italian Ambassador called upon me and informed me, according to his home government's instruction, that ITALY has entrusted to GERMANY everything concerning negotiations of the treaty and that ITALY would express wholeheartedly her approval of a draft of the treaty concluded between JAPAN and GERMANY.

Councillor KAWAI: Glancing over the exchange of statements appended to the treaty, I found that it was concerned only with the relations between JAPAN and GERMANY. However, is it not necessary to make a similar exchange with ITALY?

Minister MATSUOKA: As a fact, I think we should attach importance to GERMANY in every point and it would not hurt to consider ITALY as secondary. Therefore, I have had the German Foreign Minister state in the exchange of statements that he has absolute confidence in that, when assistance and co-operation of ITALY is desired, ITALY will no doubt act in concert with GERMANY and JAPAN.

Councillor KAWAI: I consider Article III of the treaty most important. Although I do not believe in a Japanese-American war, I think that, if worst comes to worst, the War and Navy Ministers may have something in readiness to avert defeat, and on this point I beg to have an explanation that will reassure us. Moreover, we cannot say definitely that the U.S.S.R. will not start something against JAPAN. In such a case, what attitude will GERMANY take?

War Minister TOJO: I will give my answer chiefly from the standpoint of the Army. If the worst comes to worst, only a small part of the military strength will be necessary to carry out the operation against the U.S.A. I think that you need not worry on this point. However, an operation against the U.S.A. cannot be said complete unless we consider an operation against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, adjustment of JAPAN-SOVIET relations is a very important matter. I think that, if we could accomplish this effectively, military preparation would be eased considerably, but when we consider the character of the U.S.S.R., JAPAN cannot neglect her own preparation. As to the CHINA Incident, we intend to bring it to a conclusion by making efficient use of this treaty before we find ourselves in the worst situation.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since the war preparedness of our present Navy is complete, we will definitely not be beaten by the U.S.A., but in event of a prolonged war, it is necessary that we make sufficient preparations to keep up with the realization of the American plan for repletion of her navy. On this point, the Navy is adopting a policy prudent in every respect.

Councillor KAWAI: I fear nothing so much as the question of our materials. In case of a protracted war, how long will they last?

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: As I explained yesterday (the President gave a detailed explanation of the material mobilization plan at the regular meeting of the Privy Council on the previous day), our country has for the last few years been making preparations for self-sufficiency as regards materials. Out of 2,100,000,000 yen in imports, 1,900,000,000 yen is received from ENGLAND and the U.S.A. If, therefore, the economic pressure is strengthened, it is necessary that we act prudently considering the activation of Article III of the treaty. As for iron, this year's output is expected to be 5,200,000 tons, and even at the worst we can expect an output of 4,000,000 tons. At present, 1,500,000 tons are used for armaments and military purposes, and the rest is allotted for the repletion of productive power and for private and governmental use. If we manipulate the repletion of productive power, and restrict private and governmental demands, giving consideration to cases when imports of scrap iron and iron material may be stopped, we shall not find

ourselves in so serious a situation. As regards metals other than iron, the case is different, but I think that you need not be seriously concerned, for we are now endeavouring to collect them from all parts of the world. Most important is petroleum. We are at present depending greatly on AMERICA, especially for aviation gasoline, almost all of which we must import from AMERICA. We must try to increase its production at home and, at the same time, must find means to secure it from places other than AMERICA. Recently, we have accumulated a considerable "stock" of aviation petroleum. However, in case of a prolonged war with the U.S.A., a self-sufficient supply cannot be obtained solely in JAPAN, MANCHURIA, and CHINA, whereas iron and other metals can be so obtained. Therefore, it is necessary that we speedily secure the right to obtain oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO. This matter has been touched upon in the recent talk with GERMANY. Furthermore, you must understand that at present negotiations are being carried on for the peaceful acquisition of oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Councillor KAWAI: In regard to petroleum, at yesterday's talk the military and naval authorities too implied that considerable preparations have been effected. I wish to have some explanation by the War Minister and the Navy Minister.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: As for the Navy, we have made preparations for a considerable length of time. Measures are now being taken regarding synthetic oil.

War Minister TOJO: The Army has prepared so that its materials may last for a considerable period. If an unusually prolonged war should occur, consideration must be given to oil for aircraft and mechanized units.

Recess.

Reopened at 1:10 p.m.

Councillor ISHII: In case a power is attacked, are we bound to enter into war immediately according to Article III? Has there been an agreement as regards this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In the exchange of statements, it reads: "It is understood that the deliberation of the three signatories will decide whether or not one of the contracting parties has been attacked in the sense of Article III of the treaty." (Letter from the German Ambassador at TOKYO.) This was inserted at my request so

as to clarify the point now in question. If the existence of an attack is deliberated and affirmed, the signatories are automatically bound to fight in co-operation. The time and the manner of assistance are to be decided upon by each of the respective signatories independently and then be referred for deliberation.

Councillor ISHII: I agree with the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, since the term "immediately" is lacking in the text. Furthermore, I have interpreted the joint special committee of Article IV to mean a conference of military specialists as in the case of ordinary treaties of alliance, but according to the explanation given just now by the Foreign Minister, it seems that economic problems would also be discussed by the committee. I would like to hear the explanations on this point.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: At first, it was planned to have this matter provided for in the annexed secret protocol of the treaty. According to the said plan, a joint committee of the Army and Navy was to be established, one in TOKYO, and one in BERLIN or ROME. In addition, an economics committee was also to be set up, but it was decided not to draw up a secret protocol. This point I should like to have deliberated and decided between the two countries after the treaty is concluded. Since a committee to handle economic problems is thought to be necessary, it should be established.

Councillor ISHII: In this treaty there is no provision, such as almost always exists in treaties of alliance, regarding the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Is there any special object in this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I did not mention anything on this matter. To tell the truth, I thought that if the other party spoke of it, I would not object to its insertion, but if the other party did not touch on this subject, I considered it better not to have this provision. The reason is that, according to my idea, the object of this treaty was to prevent war and not to make war. Therefore, one of the reasons was that it was preferable not to have a provision for the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which anticipated the outbreak of war. Another reason was that in event a war should break out, I thought this question might be settled by reaching mutual agreement in the early stage of the war. Therefore, I did not propose this.

Councillor ISHII: Your opinions are quite right. However, Article I of the treaty speaks of the new order in EUROPE, but unless what is meant by the new order in EUROPE is made clear, how are we to know clearly the obligation of JAPAN? Were any understandings given in this respect?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Although your question is reasonable, I think the meaning of the new order was fully expressed in the preamble. The preamble was our proposal and not a single word of amendment was made by the Germans.

arima

Councillor ARIMA: I agree with government in its desire to avert an American-Japanese war as demonstrated by this treaty, but if JAPAN and the UNITED STATES are destined to fight, I think now is the best time. However, what concerns us most is our lack of petroleum. Although the Navy Minister said that we have made appropriate preparations, it cannot be supposed that, if hostilities began between JAPAN and the U.S.A., they would terminate in one or two years. Particularly since we are bound to use great quantities of petroleum in modern wars, we cannot help worrying whether or not synthetic petroleum and such will suffice in critical times. Therefore, I would like to have a reply on this point from the Navy Minister.

Doc. No. 1603A Page 6
Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since we have just started with synthetic petroleum, we cannot say that it will suffice in critical times. Therefore, there is no other way than to acquire it from the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO through peaceful means, and it is quite likely this will occur. Consequently, when viewed from this point, I think adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R. is very important. On the other hand, if the war is prolonged the Navy must consider the economic use of petroleum.

Councillor ARIMA: Would there be a sufficiency of petroleum of high octane rating?

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Yes, in regard to petroleum of high octane rating, the Navy has lately established a special research organ and has been producing it through methods original with the Navy. Moreover, considerable store is on hand.

Councillor KUBOTA: Perusing the wording of Article III of the treaty, we can conceive the U.S.S.R. to be included among countries not participating at present in the European War and the Sino-Japanese dispute. What is the worrying whether or not synthetic petroleum and such will suffice in critical times. Therefore, I would like to have a reply on this point from the Navy Minister.

Doc. No. 1603 Page 6
Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since we have just started with

relation between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.? Were there any conversations between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In order to avoid that doubt, we established Article V. In reply to my inquiry whether any conversation was held with the U.S.S.R. concerning this treaty, STAHRER gave a negative answer. However, I am inclined to think STAHRER talked with the Russians when he passed through MOSCOW. There is one fact which seems to prove this; that is, on August 23, when STAHRER left BERLIN, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP who happened to have an interview with Ambassador KURUSU on the same day made no reference to this matter. However, on the 24th when STAHRER had an interview with Ambassador TOGO, he said that GERMANY intended to conclude a political treaty with JAPAN. From this, it could be conceived that STAHRER had some conversation with the Soviet authorities during that period.

Councillor KUBOTA: We hear rumors of rapprochement between the UNITED STATES and the U.S.S.R. Is there any fear of this treaty accelerating this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As regards the rapprochement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Foreign Ministry has been vigilant and has endeavored to secure the real facts from all quarters, but up to now we have not come in contact with any information deemed authentic, and I think that there is still nothing concrete at the present. Furthermore, STAHRER stated very clearly the possibility of meeting success in the adjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations, and has proposed the services of GERMANY as mediator. This point is identical to those as stated in the exchange of statements.

Councillor ISHIZUKA: I have no objection in regard to the text of the treaty. However, as to the relations with GERMANY, we cannot put 100% confidence in her, when we consider the record of the past. At the time the Anti-comintern Pact and the Cultural Pact were concluded, there were opinions that complete unity was impossible, except in special instances. We expect the government to take this into full consideration and put the treaty into effectual operation.

Councillor SHIMIZU: Who were they who signed this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: RIBBENTROP, CIANO, and Ambassador KURUSU.

Councillor SHIMIZU: This treaty is being put into force simultaneously with its signing. Do you think that it is in accord with the constitution?

omit
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There are many previous examples of treaties like this, and there is no danger of any constitutional difficulties, because it was sanctioned by the Emperor after being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation before it was signed.

Councillor SHIMIZU: According to what I hear there are several German engineers still in CHUNGKING. Is it true?

War Minister TOJO: There are such reports, but the truth is not clear.

Councillor SHIMIZU: It stipulates that some sort of compensation should be paid for our South Seas Mandate. Can you tell me the meaning of this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to this point, the set-up is that all of the former German territories now under mandated rule be returned to GERMANY, and that she cannot allow, as a matter of principle, only JAPAN, her ally, to retain the territories. Therefore, they insisted that they wished to receive compensation and /thereby/ resort to the formality that it had been transferred to JAPAN. At first, the term "adequate" was used with compensation, but due to my insistence, "adequate" was deleted in favor of "in a way". Since GERMANY said that she would be satisfied if this compensation be an entirely "nominal" one--giving examples that there have been cases of only six bags of coffee; what she means is of a very light nature.

Councillor SHIMIZU: In my opinion, I think that there is no need of receiving transfer of the mandates from GERMANY now.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In my opinion, I think the view taken by Dr. TACHI and other authoritative students of international law that there was no cession of territories is right, and therefore, since GERMANY practically denounced

the VERSAILLES Treaty three years ago, it is correct to regard the Japanese Mandatory rule as the continuation of military occupation. Accordingly, I think it is necessary that we receive transfer of the territories from GERMANY and clarify the situation.

Councillor MINAMI: When did ITALY give her approval to this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As I have replied previously, ITALY on the 25th sent her ambassador in TOKYO to call on me to express her approval of the treaty. Prior to this, the German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP obtained ITALY's approval in ROME.

Councillor MINAMI: In that case, don't you think that it was too early to submit this question to the Imperial Conference of the 19th to obtain Imperial sanction when it was uncertain whether ITALY would approve it or not?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Not only had GERMANY repeated from the start that she would be able to obtain ITALY's approval, but since the matter discussed at the Imperial Conference was a question concerning the plan for conclusion of a treaty between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY based on a general plan framed by GERMANY and JAPAN, I do not think that it matters much.

Councillor MINAMI: Has the sphere of GREATER EAST ASIA been clearly defined?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We have talked about it at the time of negotiation and have recorded it.

Councillor MINAMI: What is the particular reason for the exchange of statements when trouble occurred between BRITAIN and JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As BRITAIN is already participating in the European War, Article III of this treaty is not applicable to her; but as for JAPAN, we cannot assert that there will be absolutely no British-Japanese war. That is why we have especially made this point clear, in spite of GERMANY's disapproval.

Councillor MINAMI: Did JAPAN first propose this treaty, or was it GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: GERMANY proposed this treaty first.

Councillor MINAMI: Is it not because GERMANY had failed in her campaign against BRITAIN that she has come to offer such a proposal?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The prolongation of the campaign against BRITAIN may be a reason but this is not the only reason. I think the reason is that GERMANY believed that in the course of half a century or so, complications between AMERICA and GERMANY are inevitable.

Councillor MINAMI: I approve of checking AMERICA by means of this treaty, but is there absolutely no danger of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We are not positive that there will be absolutely no possibility of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition. However, as we cannot overlook the influence of German-Americans in the UNITED STATES with regard to the improvement of Japanese-American relations, we consider this treaty valuable in this respect also.

Councillor MINAMI: I am informed from the answers of the various ministers on the petroleum problem, but I cannot feel secure in the least because it is like hearing through a wall. I would like to have it explained more clearly and feel a sense of security.

President of Planning Board and Ministers of Army and Navy: As replied before, the Army and Navy have a considerable stockpile. The replies by Councillors KAWAI and ARIMA that peaceful acquisition from abroad is hopeful, we repeat here.

Councillor MINAMI: If the Sino-Japanese Incident continues on one hand, and if war between JAPAN and AMERICA should break out on the other hand, how would the financial situation be? I would like the Finance Minister to answer this question?

Finance Minister KAWADA: It goes without saying that JAPAN will have her finances constrained. There will be no other way, after all, than to increase the savings of the people and try to cut down the government expenditure.

Councillor MINAMI: Next, I would like to hear about the Russo-Japanese relations. If a Japanese-American War should break out, it would be conceived that hands for co-operation by both JAPAN and the U.S.A. will be extended to the U.S.S.R. just as it had been done by the Anglo-French and by the Germans before the European War. Therefore, in consideration

German relations in U.S. + in Asia

of the Japanese-American relations, can't we first of all adjust our relations with the Soviet and thereafter carry on negotiations on this treaty? Why is it that we must only comply to the words of the Germans and defer the negotiation with the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., proposal for a neutrality pact had been made during the former Cabinet. I, myself, after assuming office, have tried 'feelers', but the state of affairs were that the U.S.S.R. gave reply of acceptance on condition that the proposal of the former Cabinet will be accepted provided that the "PORTSMOUTH" Treaty be rescrutinized, the rights and interests in NORTH SAGHALIEN be returned, etc., presenting conditions which almost had to be rejected. Thus, I came to the conclusion that in the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., there is no other way than to utilize GERMANY. That is why I accepted GERMANY's proposal to this treaty.

Councillor MINAMI: It is said that STAHRER told the Foreign Minister that the UNITED STATES will not participate in the European War; but we cannot ascertain how it will turn out after the presidential election. The U.S.A. may revise her neutrality law and may assist BRITAIN to the utmost. In such a case, would it mean that the U.S.A. will attack GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There is no other way to judge whether the action of the UNITED STATES constitutes an attack or not, except through the situation at that time. Regarding this point, GERMANY suggested during the negotiation that it was desirable to have in Article III the attack as being made "openly or covertly"..... To this we insisted that we wished to eliminate such words because in the words "the attack being made covertly", there would be a fear of including such things as the transfer of American destroyers to BRITAIN in its meaning. There had been cases when GERMANY explained that those words were inserted rather for the interest of JAPAN. For instance, when the UNITED STATES Fleet enters SINGAPORE, it could be said that a covert attack has been made, and, therefore, the transfer of destroyers would not be included in this interpretation.

Councillor MINAMI: At the meeting with the Germans, did you repeat the fact that they are to exert their efforts in order to have the U.S.S.R. discard their policy of assisting CHIANG KAI SHEK?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I, as Foreign Minister, have given full consideration to this point and have thought of letting GERMANY, through the U.S.S.R., lead CHUNGKING to terms of peace. However, to have suggested this matter too early would have bared our weak points to GERMANY, and thus it would have caused us many disadvantages without a single advantage. Therefore, even during the early part of August when I had an interview with Ambassador OTT, when he mentioned something of this purport, I told him that JAPAN intended to dispose of the CHINA Incident unaided. Of course, it was my intention to make full use of this treaty hereafter to adjust JAPAN-SOVIET diplomatic relations and find means to promote the settlement of the CHINA Incident.

Councillor NARA: No questions.

Councillor ARAKI inquired about the quality, physical vitality, and the health of the Army and Navy, and especially about the prevention of tuberculosis, etc., to which both the War and Navy Ministers made replies.

Councillor MATSUI: No questions.

Councillor SUGAWARA: I wish to present questions on five points. (1) A little while ago the Foreign Minister spoke of a secret protocol, but were there any suggestions regarding the drawing up of a secret protocol? (2) What connections are there between this treaty and the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Anti-Comintern Pact? (3) Although this treaty is a tripartite pact, the relations between GERMANY and ITALY are so close that when a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of the treaty, don't you think that there is fear of the odds always being two to one against us? (4) In regard to our relations with ITALY, is it completely unnecessary to have it in writing? (5) Although there were explanations a while ago regarding preparedness from the military standpoint in case a war should break out with the UNITED STATES, we are most of all anxious about the financial problem. Although we believe that the Finance Minister is fully prepared on this point, what is the actual situation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: (1) During the negotiations, proposals for a secret protocol were made, but the contents of the secret protocol became unilateral, including only the demands made by JAPAN. In order to make this perfect, it not only takes time, but it also needs the approval of ITALY. Therefore, we avoided drawing up the secret protocol and decided that I, the Foreign Minister, exchange statements with the German Ambassador in TOKYO and use this in place of the secret protocol. (2) The Anti-Comintern Pact will remain as it now stands. I think that JAPAN must maintain her great

policy of defense against communism irregardless of whatever relations she may have with the U.S.S.R. (3) Although it is true that German-Italian relations are close, I consider it needless to be anxious about whether ITALY's feelings toward JAPAN are greater than those toward GERMANY. (4) I think there is no special need for any document. The Italian Ambassador has quite clearly given the approval of the Italian Government.

Finance Minister KAWADA: In regard to the fifth question presented by Councillor SUGAWARA, I intend to take measures so as to avoid as much as possible the increase of burden on the people.

Councillor MATSUURA: The purport of this treaty is to check the aggravation of Japanese-American relations. I myself desire this most. However, if unfortunately worst comes to worst, I request that adequate preparations be made to meet this situation.

Councillor USHIO: Questions were asked regarding the domestic situation, food problems, etc., if worst came to worse. The President of the Planning Board answered this.

Councillor HAYASHI: Although the principal object of the treaty is concerned with Japanese-American relations, I think it is necessary to give most careful consideration to Soviet relations at this time. According to the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, I had the impression that he possessed an optimistic view in regard to our relations with the U.S.S.R., but from the information I have on hand, there are grounds for considerable pessimism in regard to the future of relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R. and between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. For instance, last year when the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, the contents of the instruction STALIN gave to the Communists were, according to the reliable information I have, that STALIN stated that the recent coalition between the U.S.S.R. and GERMANY was a means to bolshevize western EUROPE. He further stated that this did not mean that the eastward expansion policy had been discarded, and that when the opportune time arrived, the U.S.S.R. intended to take positive action. In regard to these points, what are the ideas of the Foreign Minister?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I also do not think the adjustment of JAPAN-U.S.S.R. relations to be so easy. However, we must acknowledge that GERMANY can exert considerable pressure on the U.S.S.R. According to the reliable information I have, one of the most important motives for the U.S.S.R.'s

severance from ENGLAND and FRANCE to act in concert with GERMANY last year, is that HITLER is said to have told STALIN that GERMANY would attack the U.S.S.R. if she did not accede to German demands. Judging from these, I think it would be very effective to have GERMANY act as intermediary in adjusting the relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: In the case of Article III of the treaty; that is, in the event of a Japanese-American War, what sort of military assistance can GERMANY give to JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: That was also discussed during the negotiations and GERMANY declared that she would supply JAPAN with new weapons and so forth, even prior to the outbreak of the situation mentioned in Article III, and in the event that a Japanese-American War should break out, she is to hold in check the UNITED STATES in the Atlantic area.

War Minister TOJO: The most important assistance would be in the receiving of supplies of excellent military equipment under an understanding with the U.S.S.R.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Generally, I have the same opinion as the Army.

Councillor FUKAI: In the relations with the U.S.S.R., what is the meaning that GERMANY is to restrain the U.S.S.R.? Would not such an act be an outright contradiction to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?

War Minister TOJO: From the standpoint of the treaty, it is as you say, but speaking from the standpoint of actual military movements, GERMANY would be able to check the U.S.S.R. At present, although GERMANY is carrying on military operations against ENGLAND, the greater part of her Army together with mechanized units, are maintained within the homeland. This, militarily speaking, is checking the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: Although the Foreign Minister spoke of mutual confidence between GERMANY and JAPAN, the attitude assumed by GERMANY last year at the time of the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact cannot but be said to be that of insincerity. Last September when Foreign Minister ABE, who held a concurrent portfolio, gave an explanation of the diplomatic developments at the present session of the Privy Council, the then Vice Foreign Minister SAWADA stated that the HIRANUMA Cabinet filed a protest to GERMANY pointing out that the German-Soviet Pact was an infringement of the secret pact of the JAPAN-GERMANY Anti-Comintern Pact.

9/26/40

What has become of the result of that protest?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: From what I heard, it is doubtful whether the above protest has had any effect or not, and I think that, perhaps, there was no reply whatsoever from GERMANY.

Councillor FUKAI: I think that insertion of sentiments in our foreign relations should be avoided, and that diplomacy must always be practiced realistically. In the preamble of the treaty it says, "let every nation have its rightful place", but since HITLER's words always give us the impression that according to the laws of nature, the weak are the victims of the strong, do you think that GERMANY will be able to understand the true spirit of this preamble?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The mission of our diplomacy lies in the propagation of the "Imperial Way". We do not act solely for the purpose of advantages or disadvantages in respect of our interests. I think that such thoughts as "the weak are the victims of the strong" should be absolutely rejected.

KODO

Councillor FUKAI: I can understand that, if a Japanese-American war is inevitable, emphasis in diplomacy must be laid to either GERMANY or the Anglo-Americans at this time, but the result of concluding this treaty may hasten the Japanese-American war. Therefore, I wish to ask the Prime Minister his determination, whether or not he has the confidence to be able to overcome shortages of munitions and general commodities; the demoralization of thoughts, etc., when he faces them in the most aggravated times.

9/26/40

Prime Minister KONOE: The basic idea of this pact, of course, lies in the aversion of a Japanese-American clash. However, I think that it is necessary for us to show a firm attitude, because if we act humbly, it will only make the UNITED STATES presumptuous. /TN: May also read "...if we make a blunder, the UNITED STATES will become presumptuous"./ If worst should come to worst, I think that the government must adopt policies with firm resolutions on both diplomatic and domestic affairs. The other day when I presented myself at the Imperial Palace to report on this matter, I found His Majesty, the Emperor, also to have possessed a very firm resolution which was most impressive. I hope that this treaty will be satisfactorily executed, even at the risk of my very life.

USE

Kono

Empire Firm

Councillor FUTAGAMI: Since there has been much discussion from the standpoint of both diplomacy and economics, I would like to ask some questions on some doubtful points on the treaty itself. First of all, on the point of formality, it

is not clear which of the documents distributed here are for Imperial inquiry. Of these documents, is the Japanese composition the original text? Looking over the contents of the exchange of statements, it seems as if they are international promises. Are these to be submitted for Imperial inquiry?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The only item submitted for inquiry is the draft of the treaty; the others being used only as references. Although the original texts of the treaty will be in Japanese, German, and Italian, for the time being, signatures will be affixed on the English text.

Chief of the Treaty Bureau MATSUMOTO: The attached exchange of statements is different in contents and form, e.g. numbering, from that of the so-called exchange of official documents, which possesses the same effect as the treaty, although it could hardly be regarded as a kind of a so-called international promise. The interpretation of the Pact and the points of agreement between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT were put in writing and, since it was recognized as an extremely important document, it was attached and presented to the Throne as a reference.

Councillor FUTATAGAMI: Such measures as "the affixing of signatures for the time being on the English text" are unusual, and I do not think that such a procedure will be permissible. Furthermore, since the contents of the exchange of statements are a kind of international promise, I think that it must also be presented as an object of inquiry.

President of the Privy Council HARA: In regard to these problems of formalities, I wish to call an informal meeting later.

(After the Investigation Committee adjourned, the government delegates retired, and it seems that as a result of the informal discussion which followed, it was decided that the composition of the draft of the treaty would be the only item to be presented for Imperial inquiry, that for the time being, only the Japanese text of the treaty draft would be examined, that signatures were to be affixed to the English text, and that the point of the later replacement of the texts written in Japanese, German, and Italian would be overlooked.)

Councillor FUTAGAMI: The wording "participating neither in the European War nor the Sino-Japanese conflict..." in Article III of the treaty is an inaccurate expression. It could be interpreted to mean that in case of an attack by a

nation which is neither a participant in the European War nor in the Sino-Japanese dispute, Article III will operate. Can you clarify this point? Next, according to the previous explanation made by the Foreign Minister, the joint special committee could be construed as a compound of military and economics, but does this not mean a compound of the three nations? Furthermore, comparing Article V and III, since GERMANY is bound by the Non-Aggression Pact with the SOVIET UNION, GERMANY cannot attack the SOVIET UNION even in case JAPAN is attacked by the SOVIETS. On the contrary, JAPAN must attack the SOVIET UNION in order to render assistance to GERMANY if GERMANY is attacked by the SOVIETS. Therefore, is this not a unilateral stipulation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The first point of Councillor FUTAGAMI's question is a problem concerned with terminology, but from the practical standpoint of interpretation, I do not think that there is any room for doubt to arise. The second point, of course, means the Joint Committee of the three nations. The argument that Article III, because of Article V, is one-sided against JAPAN, is a disregard of the political significance of this treaty. In such a case as when the U.S.S.R. attacks GERMANY, the political situation now existing between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. will be subjected to a grave transformation, and in such instances, I think that the path for JAPAN to tread will be outside of the scope of the stipulation of this Article. The purport of this Article states plainly that this treaty is not presently aimed against the U.S.S.R.

Councillor MANO: No questions.

Councillor OSHIMA: Was there any understanding regarding the scope of the Greater East Asia?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Of course, there was an understanding, as I have explained this morning.

Councillor OBATA: At this time when JAPAN has not yet solved the Sino-Japanese Incident, if JAPAN is under the obligation to aid GERMANY and ITALY in case the UNITED STATES should participate in the European War, JAPAN will be placed under a very heavy responsibility. On the other hand, I think, the possibility of war breaking out between JAPAN and AMERICA is small. Therefore, will not this treaty be very one-sided?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Whether AMERICA will participate in the European War or not, or whether war between AMERICA and JAPAN will break out or not, I think is a fifty-fifty possibility. Therefore, I do not believe it to be one-sided.

USE

50-50
Come 70
WA

Councillor TAKEGOE: As the result of this treaty being concluded, what kind of support can GERMANY give JAPAN in case worst comes to worst and in case the Japanese Navy aids GERMANY and ITALY, what kind of aid can it give?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Such problems as the kind of help that can be mutually given should be thoroughly investigated at the Joint special committee.

Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI: I think a Japanese-American war is inevitable regardless of whether this treaty is concluded or not. We, therefore, must carefully observe the expansion of the UNITED STATES Navy and must not neglect our preparations corresponding to this.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: We are confident of victory in a quick, decisive war against AMERICA, but as for the future, we are steadily drawing various expansion plans.

Councillor ISHII: I see what is written in the last of exchange of statements is that the South Sea Islands under our mandate will remain a territory of JAPAN, provided that we pay a compensation for them. According to Minister MATSUOKA's explanation of this, since the VERSAILLES Treaty has already expired, JAPAN is still continuing a military occupation of the South Sea Islands. Therefore, although it is said that it is necessary for JAPAN to pay compensation to GERMANY to obtain transfer of the islands, according to the VERSAILLES Treaty, the possession of the mandated islands were transferred to the Five Powers, from which powers JAPAN acquired them. I, therefore, think it is proper to interpret that the islands are already the possession of JAPAN and, therefore, I cannot agree to the verbal declarations of the German Ambassador. Since I admit that this problem is not a subject for Imperial inquiry, I am just expressing my opinion for your information.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: According to the opinion of famous scholars of international law, as Dr. TACHI, a mandate is not a transfer of territory. Therefore, aside from the standpoint of legal theories, and viewing it from the standpoint of practical politics, it has been my opinion for the past three years that it is a better policy to receive these islands from GERMANY through some means. From what I have heard, three years ago, the Japanese Navy had proposed to GERMANY through the naval attache in BERLIN the cession of these islands under certain compensatory terms.

Councillor ISHII: I have exchanged opinions with Dr. TACHI concerning this problem. Dr. TACHI's opinion was only that a mandate is not a cession of territory. In regards to the point that GERMANY transferred them to the Five Powers, I believe there is no dispute. Therefore, I can hardly agree to having JAPAN pay a compensation now to GERMANY for the cession of these islands.

Councillor MITSUCHI: From the questions and answers I have heard throughout this morning, the discussion seems to be chiefly on matters assuming war with AMERICA. However, the moment this treaty is concluded, I think AMERICA's economic sanctions against JAPAN will be greatly increased. In this case, I think the subsistence problem of our people will become serious. Are sufficient preparations made for this? When a treaty of this sort is concluded, the Japanese people are apt to follow GERMANY blindly and there is danger that some may attempt anti-American movements, etc. It is hoped that such acts will be strictly controlled.

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: The government is most concerned over the problems of the people's livelihood and will try to meet the situation most satisfactorily.

Prime Minister KONOE: Since I am in full accord with keeping under control anti-American movements, I intend to carry it out very strictly.

Government officials retired at 7:30 p.m.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1603

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 45 pages, dated 26 September, 1940, and described as follows: A summary of the proceedings concerning the Pact between the three powers (Japan, German, and Italy), at the Prive Council Meeting. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity