

Ev. Doc. No. 2748A (19)

1940. 28532 (Code)

Sent from Batavia p.m. 18 Sept.  
Arrived at Foreign Office a.m. 19 Sept.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.  
From Representative KOBAYASHI

Communication No. 21 a

As Japan at this juncture has a pressing need to buy 3,150,000 tons of Dutch East Indies petroleum, and the negotiations in Tokyo are at a standstill, I am hereby requesting you to let MUKAI carry on the negotiations here, and to send an answer by telegram to this effect one way or the other.

They may have some misgivings on the possible influence of negotiations here on the petroleum enterprises problem, but these misgivings would be exactly the same, whether the negotiations for purchasing petroleum were held at Tokyo or at your place, and what is more, we have no misgivings about their being at your place.

Moreover, if the negotiations for purchasing 3,000,000 odd tons did not succeed, failure in Tokyo would be more than just a failure in commercial negotiations, involving no political repercussions whatever. It is also thought that their sudden proposals at this juncture on the petroleum problem in Tokyo is an anticipatory move by the other party in consideration of the above point.

On the other hand, in the event of the negotiations being carried on here, their failure would only mean that world opinion in view of Japan's present position in the petroleum problem would charge the Dutch East Indies with moral responsibility for the failure of the negotiations; in consideration of which it is expected that the Dutch Indies would also make efforts for their success.

Again, in any negotiations on the petroleum enterprises problem, failure to make this petroleum purchase could be utilized to browbeat the Dutch East Indies on the enterprises problem. Moreover, the fact of the direct participation of the Dutch Indies Government in the petroleum purchase problem can also be utilized for our maneuvers to make them sell over to us the stocks of Dutch Indies petroleum companies on the grounds of purchasing petroleum.

Judging from our present situation, the actual securing of the purchase is not the time to talk about the problem of a higher or a lower price, and so it would be more advantageous to let MUKAI negotiate here as the sole representative of the interests of all Japanese petroleum business men.



Transfer of the negotiations from Tokyo to here, however, is expected to involve a certain loss of time. Nevertheless, when we consider that the negotiations in Tokyo are being prolonged owing to instructions from the Government here, this loss of time can not be thought of as a real loss.

For the above reasons, if the negotiations in Tokyo are at present at a standstill I hope they may be transferred here.

This matter has been given the positive approval of the army and navy parties now on their way here, of MUKAI and of everyone else concerned.

(END).



Commercial Negotiation #35

January 27th

Despatched from Delegate YOSHIZAWA in BATAVIA to  
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Attention: The Vice-Minister of War and the Vice-Chief  
of the General Staff.

## HARADA's Despatch No. 8

Since then, the tendency of the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES to rely on GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES has been increasing more and more. The defeat of the ITALIAN Army in the Mediterranean theatre, and AMERICAN aid to GREAT BRITAIN and her firm attitude towards JAPAN have encouraged the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. She is taking the optimistic viewpoint that the objective situation is developing favorably for the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. Furthermore, the strengthening and development of her home defences have intensified the self-confidence of the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. Thus, not only is she completely disregarding the Empire's East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but she is further expressing her spirit of opposition on every matter. Therefore it can be considered that unless our Empire adopts determined resolutions or measures not only the progress of the Japanese-Netherland negotiations, but also the development of Japanese-Netherland relation would be extremely difficult.

As to the details, Lt. Col. NAKAYAMA who is returning to JAPAN shortly shall make a report.



SHOWA 16 /1941/ No. 3021 (Code)

Despatched: Batavia, Feb. 6, a.m.  
Received : Ministry, Feb. 6, p.m.To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
From: Chief Delegate YOSHIZAWA

No. 54-1 (Urgent Very Secret Superintendent's Code)

Your Excellency's recent speech before the Diet regarding the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the answers of your Excellency and other Ministers to the interpellations of Diet members and the editorial views appearing in newspapers have given, as you are already aware of, a great shock to both government and private circles here, so that the local papers are daily devoting much space to discussions of the matter.

The discussion that arose during the interview of Ota and Ishizawa with H----- on February 5 has been reported in Telegram No. 53. As regards the erroneous press news sent out by the Domei regarding the interview between the Dutch Minister and Vice Minister Ohashi, steps have been taken for correction. However, as long as those views are reported as those not only of those of private circles but also of government authorities, even if it is a report of a news agency, it is natural that it should produce considerable repercussions here. Moreover, as dispatches continue to arrive, as in the past day or two, to the effect as if doubt were cast upon the status of the Dutch Government, the Dutch authorities here, not satisfied with my statement alone, seem to have caused the Dutch Minister in Tokyo to demand the recognition by Japan of the exile government in London as the de jure and de facto government of Netherlands.

It is needless to speak afresh of the cold attitude of the Netherlands East Indies government authorities toward Japan in the past. If the situation is let alone, it will of course be impossible to expect much of the present conversation. It is thought that after all without resorting to armed force it would be probably impossible to make Netherlands East Indies a member of East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. For that, however, it is needless to say that it is imperative that we much first have full preparations for all possible eventualities (the preparations will include not only military preparations but also adjustments of the Chinese Affair and other international relations). If the government has confidence in this regard, it is no part of mine to say anything.

But in case the government has yet no such confidence in itself, we must perforce choose the means of peaceful economic negotiation, however unsatisfactory that may be. And that is the reason, I believe, that I have been dispatched here. If I am really right in so believing, it will be absolutely necessary that the actions of the government and the speeches of its officials should, I think, conform to this policy so as to help the negotiations here progress to our advantage as far as possible. Unfortunately the more recent developments (in Tokyo) cannot be considered to fall in line with this aim.



As the result, the counter-proposal to be submitted by the Netherlands authorities on January 23, was submitted only on February 3. And in the interview of Ota and Ishizawa with the Dutch authorities, though they had agreed to the drawing up of the agenda as proposed by us, they refused further discussions on the ground that they could not proceed until they have obtained a clear statement of the Japanese Government regarding the status of their government in London.

That the Dutch authorities should be worked up over press reports seems to me childish. Nevertheless, if it is the desire of the Imperial Government to bring the economic negotiation to a successful conclusion, then in the light of the fact that it first recognized the Dutch Minister in Tokyo as representative of the Dutch Government in London and on that basis conducted negotiations for the conference here, I think it will be pertinent to the occasion if your Excellency or Vice Minister will verbally notify the Dutch Minister that Japan recognizes the Dutch Government in London as both de jure and de facto government, or let a Diet member pose a question, and reply to that effect, or to take any other step that will give satisfaction to the Dutch.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 2631

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, PAYASFI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated February 4, 1946, and described as follows: 16th years of Showa, 3021 (code), despatched from Batavia, Feb. 6 A.M., arrived Foreign Office, Feb. 6 P.M., from Yoshizawa Mission To Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th ~~28th~~ day of August ~~Nov~~, 1946.

/s/ K. Kayashi  
 Signature of Official  
 SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard F. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Aug., 1946

/s/ Richard F. Larsh  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. M.I.

Investigator; IPS  
 Official Capacity



Serial No. 10173 - Code - 7 p.m. 28 March 1941 - South 1

To Representative YOSHIKAWA at BATAVIA.

From Foreign Minister KONOYE.

Items concerning the aim of future negotiations

Communication No. 68; by office chiefs' code.

Regarding your telegram communication No. 123:-

Your viewpoint is reasonable enough that for any settlement intended on the problems of entry, commercial enterprise, etc., our only means are those given in your telegram No. 125. But, as you know, our whole nation has paid the greatest possible attention to the negotiations on this matter, and if they end at this point without any results, our nation, inside the country, will lose all confidence in our foreign policy, while enemy nations outside will gain the impression that we are easily dealt with and will intensify all the more their contumely and oppression. Altogether it would have an enormous political influence both at home and abroad.

According to reliable information, there is some evidence that the Netherlands feel embarrassed by the continued presence of your representatives and regard it as an anticipatory measure designed by Japan to turn to positive advantage any change in the situation; what is more, they are taking the extremely indifferent attitude that the continuance of the negotiations is nothing but a waste of time, and in particular, they are putting on a superficial show of satisfaction with the cooperative attitude of our representatives and are content to regard it as a compromise by Japan.

However, considering the change in the situation after Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's visit to Europe and the intention of the Foreign Minister and the Colonial Minister (a sympathizer with Japan), who are shortly to visit your place after enlisting American interest, we must request you, troublesome as it is, to push pertinaciously our original demands for the time being, to direct your main effort to the acquisition of resources, and to await further developments in the situation (decision reached in concert with the Army).

Finally, in view of the imperative necessity for the continued presence for awhile of our representatives please take care in carrying on the negotiations not to fall into The Netherlands' plan for getting rid of your representatives.



Dispatched Telegram No. 19134:

Copy of Telegram. Dispatched by Minister MATSUCKA at 9:30 p.m., on  
 May 23, 1941 / Showa 16/

To Delegate YOSHIZAWA in Batavia,  
 Ambassador SHIGEMITSU in Great Britain, and  
 Ambassador NOMURA in the United States.

Re: Acceleration of Negotiations with Dutch Indies.

Code "Go" No. 1117, Urgent:

On 22nd I invited Ambassador CRAIGIE and told him that the negotiations with the Dutch Indies, through the extreme wholesale concession on our side, had reached a rapprochement when compared with the former contentions of both sides, but that there still remained some difficulty about rubber and tin. In June last year, the Dutch Government assured us that, whatever the situation might be, the Government would supply Japan with 20,000 tons of rubber and 3,000 tons of tin, and despite the fact that we conceded to the said quantities, the Dutch Indies Government, taking the quantities of rubber and tin exported by French Indo-China and Thailand to Japan into consideration, now asserts that the quantities mentioned above would be still further deducted, but it must be borne in mind that the demand for rubber and tin in our country had become increased. I also explained that, although it is claimed that there is the danger of Japan's supplying Germany with rubber, even by adding the quantity of rubber expected to be imported from French Indo-China and Thailand to the 20,000 tons of rubber which we have demanded of the Dutch Indies, it would still be far below the total quantity required by us. What country is there in the world that would give its own flesh to another country by even going to the extent of cutting its own. Furthermore, it merely shows the presumptuousness of the Dutch Indies at the same time constituting an act of humiliation to Japan, who is a great power, to have a small nation like the Dutch Indies demand of us an assurance that Japan will not re-export to Germany. We could never give such an assurance. Should the negotiations by chance, end in rupture and lead to Delegate YOSHIZAWA's withdrawal, there is no vouchsafing as regards what a grave situation may arise not only diplomatically, but also internally, thereby inciting not only the anti-Dutch, but also anti-British and anti-American sentiment to such a degree that this Minister may no longer be able to check same as was done in the past.

Therefore, I asked the Ambassador /TN: CRAIGIE/ to render his good offices in having his country bear pressure upon the Dutch and Dutch Indies Government with all possible dispatch so as to make them reconsider



matters, also requesting him to promptly cable to his Home Government, to which the Ambassador replied by saying that he would comply with my request by trying to dispatch a telegram at once.

Destination of this telegram:

Delegate YOSHIZAWA, Great Britain and the United States.



No. 14 /T.N. In Chinese Ink/

1941 /Showa 16/ 15593 (cipher telegram)

Despatched from BATAVIA - June 7, P.M.

Received at this /T.N. Foreign/ Office - June 8, A.M.

From Delegate YOSHIZAWA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Parley No. 227 (omission) (per Embassy's code, Foreign -  
Top Secret)

Referring to Outgoing Cable No. 222

1. Although, as you will be able to observe from the foregoing cable, the DUTCH reply shows that there are some points where they have agreed to our wishes, nevertheless the prospects are not very bright in regard to problems such as entry into the country, enterprises and commerce due to their adhering to their former contentions; in addition to which, in regard to the question of resources, such as rubber and tin, as well as regarding (not clear) among other important commodities to which the government /T.N. JAPANESE/ attaches the greatest importance at present, they /T.N. the DUTCH/ are stubbornly persisting in their conditions. Moreover, they /T.N. the DUTCH/ have in fact at the same time decreased the quantities compared with the informal figures submitted hitherto by them /T.N. the DUTCH authorities/.

Now that Your Excellency and the Vice-Minister have lodged a strong protest against the BRITISH Ambassador and the DUTCH Minister, and the Publicity Department as well as the newspapers have been carrying out an active press campaign, it is absolutely impossible to accept the DUTCH reply just as it is.

Even if we should, at this juncture, demand the concession of the DUTCH and try to continue on with the negotiations, inasmuch as the DUTCH reply I have just received was, in addition to having met with the special consideration of the Plenary Session by studying same themselves repeatedly by inviting "MO" after having submitted same to the INDIAN Council for deliberation, also approved of by the DUTCH government in LONDON, it is evident that they would no longer accept any such demand in view of the DUTCH side manifesting a firm attitude as regards their unwillingness to discuss matters any further.



Consequently, although it is considered that the only option left as regards the attitude to be adopted by us would be to have our Delegation leave after announcing the rupture of the Parley, on the ground that the DUTCH reply was unsatisfactory, in such a case it is evident that, out of respect towards its people, the JAPANESE government would have to assume a strong attitude towards the DUTCH, and the press would denounce the DUTCH attitude in a vehement tone.

However, as has been duly proved by what has occurred in the past, the DUTCH would by no means yield to such a threatening gesture. On the contrary,

- (a) No new petroleum concessions whatsoever would be sanctioned.
- (b) No "moral support" would be given towards the renewal of the contract re sale of oil next November.
- (c) No promise whatsoever would be given also on materials other than, petroleum and the supply thereof would be more and more restricted.
- (d) Copra and Palm oil would be set back to 12.000 kilo tons and 960 tons respectively, and it would be made impossible for the JAPANESE farms and merchants to export their products and stocks to JAPAN.
- (e) JAPANESE doctors would, obviously, be prohibited from establishing their practice, and the restrictions regarding entry into the country would be still further strengthened.
- (f) No advance notice would be given regarding the importation of JAPANESE goods.
- (g) Various methods would be resorted to in order to increase the pressure upon the business and living of the JAPANESE residents.
- (h) The attitude of dependence on GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES would be strengthened in a still more outspoken manner.

We must consequently be prepared for the fact that the situation after the rupture would become very grave. Not only would it be unfavourable from the standpoint of our prestige at home and abroad to attempt any measures for prolonging the stay of our Delegation, but as, in such a case, the DUTCH authorities would most probably demand



the withdrawal of the Delegation, and as the EMPIRE's prestige would become completely lost in the event of the Delegation being thereby forced to leave, please, after giving the matter your careful and due consideration, send me your urgent telegraphic reply as regards the attitude that I should assume.

Moreover, please note that, if possible, I intend to return to JAPAN by the first available opportunity after the 20th inst.



Telegram No. 22296

Copy of the Telegram despatched to Delegate YOSHIZAWA at Batavia by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, at 8.15 p.m., 14 June 1941.

Subject: Breaking off of negotiations with the Netherlands Indies.

(Cipher) Urgent No. 147 (Handled in same manner as director's code)

In connection with your telegram "conference" No. 227: the reply of the Netherland Indies this time is so unwarrantable that it is not only beyond our acceptance, but it is also meaningless for us to continue the negotiation on the basis of their reply. Therefore, the Government in accordance with your opinion has decided to break off the conference and to withdraw you, the delegate, and your whole staffs. It is requested that you make the best of the situation bearing the following points in mind:

1) In order to take a cautious procedure, you will meet with the Governor-General at any rate to explain that we have made concessions to an intolerable extent in consideration for the future relations between Japan and the Netherland Indies though anticipating that our Cabinet will be attacked by public opinion and find itself in a very difficult position if we publish our last proposal, and you will urge him to seriously reconsider his attitude from the general standpoint. If the Governor-General declares that there is no room for reconsideration, you will immediately notify him of the breaking off of the conference and of the withdrawal of your delegation.

2) It is desirable to make it clear that general commercial and economic relations between Japan and the Netherland Indies should be maintained as before, but whether such a positive proposal should be made or not will be left to your discretion.

3) You will make it clear that if they wish, Consul-General ISHIZAWA may continue the negotiations. Therefore, you will make it clear that although the delegation will avoid giving the impression that the relations between Japan and the Netherland Indies have been ruptured, your delegation will withdraw upon the break-up of the present conference.

4) With the same spirit, it is our policy to avoid as much as possible giving the impression abroad of a complete rupture, thus we may prevent exciting public opinion. Therefore it is requested that your delegation keep in touch with us, and as we want the announcement of our decision to be made immediately after your notification to them of the breaking off of the conference, it is requested that you despatch



an ordinary telegram telling us you "have notified" them. As for the form of announcement it is planned that a simple statement be made by the Information Bureau (the gist to be seen in the telegram "conference" No. 146) in regard to the breaking off of the conference, with the addition of a talk by ISHII, the chief of the Section (the gist to be seen in the Telegram "Conference" No. 144). We hope the announcement you will make on your departure will be arranged to be in accordance with the Government's announcement.

5) The date of the withdrawal of your delegation will be left to your discretion but it is requested that you make arrangements so that the parties concerned with petroleum can separate from your delegation and remain to continue the negotiations.



The Japan Year Book 1943-44 Page 205

The Government of Netherlands, on the 28th, announced the suspension of Japan-Netherlands Financial agreement and the freezing of Japanese assets in the whole of the Dutch East Indies.



C E R T I F I C A T EI.P.S. No. 2339Statement of Authenticity

I, Shibata, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Second Class Administrative Officer of the Investigation Bureau of the Home Ministry in Charge of the Home Ministry Library, and that as such official I have custody of an original copy of the document of which the attached document consisting of 1099 pages, dated 1943-44, and described as follows: "Japanese Year Book 1943-1944", and republished by the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications, and printed by the United States Printing Office, is an exact copy.

I further certify that the original copy of the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Kosaburo Shibata  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Yoshiyuki Kuratani

2nd Class Administrative Officer  
of the Investigation Bureau of  
the Home Ministry  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shirojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Henry Shirojima  
NAME

Witness: Eric W. Fleisher  
2nd. Lt. AUSMI

Investigation Division IFS  
Official Capacity



1324A

The Japan Year Book 1943-44 Page 205

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Tout le monde espionne -  
coursiers et exursions entre courtes

Foreign office organization  
Palao Naval organization (Tokyo Hotel)  
Formosa Army organization  
Overseas Chinese organization (5<sup>th</sup> Col.)

Sato wife



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/s/ Kosaburo Shibata  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Yoshiyuki Kuratani

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Henry Shirojima  
NAME

Witness: Eric W. Fleisher  
2nd. Lt. AUSMI

Investigation Division IPS  
Official Capacity



TOP - SECRET - PERSONAL

Organization of the Japanese Intelligence Service for the  
Netherlands Indies

After completion of the survey of Japanese espionage and anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands Indies (vide: our Memorandum of 30 November 1940, No. 1080<sup>x</sup>/40), wherein after citing many examples, the adoption of a number of measures - now being effectively applied - is advocated to counteract these activities, the need is felt for a systematic survey of the organization and mode of operation of the Japanese Intelligence Service in this country.

In the above mentioned Memorandum, emphasis is laid on the complicated nature of the Japanese espionage or intelligence system, in which the entire Japanese community in this country is cooperating.

No satisfactorily clear picture could be obtained of the systematic organization of the Japanese Intelligence Service, as the latter accomplished its tasks in the Netherlands Indies, owing to the large number of collaborators in the form of consular personnel, big companies, commercial firms, societies and organizations, small shopkeepers, etc., - further confused and complicated by numerous emissaries and members of economic missions.

In spite of the fact that indications and data pointed in a certain direction, there were a number of missing links, preventing a clear understanding of the organization.

Although always to some extent present, the speculative element can, according to indications since made available, be regarded as having been sufficiently eliminated to allow the present systematic survey to be considered as a key to the labyrinth of the Japanese Intelligence Service in this country, the sphere of action and phenomena of which have already been described in the said Memorandum concerning Japanese espionage and anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands Indies.

The Japanese Intelligence Service for the Netherlands Indies consists of four organizations hereinafter referred to by the letters: F.O.O., P.N.O., F.A.O., and O.C.O. These



four organizations will be systematically dealt with in turn hereunder:

F.O.O.

The most important and extensive organization is the Foreign Office Organization, the composition of which is shown in maps F.O.O. 1 and 2.

The central points of this organization within the Netherlands Indies are the Japanese Consulates at Manado (42), Makassar (39), Soerabaja (22), Batavia (11), and Medan (2). The lines indicate the system whereby intelligence is passed on from places where there are no Consulates. The numbers refer to places where Japanese reside, who are known to supply the Consulates with intelligence (in the widest sense). . . . . Intelligence is collected by means of journeys by informants to places where there are Consulates, and on official journeys by Consular Officials. Censorship has completely eliminated the passing on of intelligence by mail, which has never been very widely used.

The red lines A and B mark the route of the diplomatic couriers, who travel through the Netherlands Indies at regular intervals. It is noticeable that these couriers generally travel in pairs, and always remain together. They arrive regularly each month. Prior to the recent restrictions on their movements, they used also to travel on other than the reproduced route, which is limited to the places where there are consulates, inter alia, to East-Borneo and the Palembang region. These couriers collect all the intelligence that has been brought to the Consulates. They are often (non-commissioned) officers of the Army, Navy, or State Police Forces, which indicates the nature of the intelligence collected. Nevertheless, for considerations of expediency, they are incorporated into the F.O.O. as being the safest organization.

Map F.O.O. (2) is complementary to Map F.O.O. (1). The red line A/B again indicates the courier's route, which generally runs from Tokyo over Formosa, Indo-China, Thailand, Singapore, Consulates in the Netherlands Indies, and Palao, or vice versa. In addition to the regular couriers' service the Consulates have at their disposal telegraphic code communication for conveying intelligence to Tokyo, marked as C-lines on map F.O.O. (2). The numbers on this map refer to the attached list of Consular Officials, who are particularly entrusted with espionage and the supplying of intelligence.



Furthermore, crews (captains) of Japanese mail steamers, tankers, etc., serve as supplementary couriers. In order not to impair the clarity of map F.O.O. (2), these have not been indicated thereon. . . . .

P.N.O.

The Palao Naval Organization operates for the Naval Information Service at Tokyo, more or less independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The important central point of this organization is Palao, from where instructions are received, and where intelligence is collected. There are indications that important information is passed on to the military authorities in Formosa through the Intelligence Service at Tokyo. Map P.N.O. is a diagrammatic representation of this organization. The numbers refer to known agents. Some of these informants, who are paid from Palao, are regularly recalled to Tokyo and Palao. In Tokyo they always reside at the Tokyo Hotel, above the Central Station. Most of these agents have permits to reside in the Netherlands Indies and spend part of the year abroad, either at Palao or in Japan.

In considering map P.N.O., it should be noted that it is not imperative for the intelligence collected to go through Palao. It often reaches Tokyo direct and is passed on from there to Palao.

F.A.O.

The third organization is referred to as the Formosa Army Organization because the important central point and collecting center lies in Formosa, and the organization is under military direction. The lines of communication are shown on map F.A.O., in which connection it is noticeable that these are mainly concentrated on the western section of the Netherlands Indies Archipelago, as contrasted with the P.N.O. organization dominated by the Japanese Navy, which generally pays more attention to communications in the east of the Netherlands Indies.

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The rule that when circumstances require, intelligence can be sent to Tokyo direct, also applies to the F.A.O.



O.C.O.


The Overseas Chinese Organization is more concerned with fifth column activities than the three above mentioned organizations. Nevertheless, it serves at the same time as an organization for the supply of intelligence. To a greater extent than in the case of the P.N.O. and F.A.O. dealt with above, which operate through Japanese agents, the Consulates (F.O.O.), which with Japanese consular officials or private Japanese individuals as intermediaries receive the required information from Chinese informants, form part of the organization. The Consulates have very large funds at their disposal to finance the O.C.O.

Map O.C.O. indicates the intelligence service of Wang Ching Wei agents. The circles A, B, C, D, and E with the Consulates as centers, represent a number of Wang Ching Wei agents dispersed over the whole of the Netherlands Indies. . . . The impression is given that the Japanese Consulate General at Batavia acts as a receiving center for the O.C.O. and passes on intelligence direct to Tokyo or to the headquarters in China at Amoy. Which way this is done makes little difference, since there is regular contact between Tokyo and Amoy. Branch lines go to Nanking, Canton, Hainan, and Formosa, where there are branches of this organization. The Koain at Tokyo (Council for the Advancement of Asia) forms part of this system.

The four Intelligence Organizations in the Netherlands Indies, F.O.O. (Consulates), P.N.O., F.A.O., and O.C.O. work in close contact with one another. Owing to circumstances - namely, the state of siege in this country, with the limitations and supervision thereby entailed, - this contact has become still closer. With reference to what has been said, the system of passing on intelligence from the Netherlands Indies to Tokyo, consequently in an upward direction, is shown in the following diagram:




TOKYO





This diagram would seem to call for little explanation in view of what has been said. The structure of the F.O.O. (arrow 6) has been dealt with in detail in our Memorandum of 30 November 1940. No 1080<sup>X</sup>/40, and this has been diagrammatically represented in Map F.O.O. (1).

The arrows 5 and 5a indicate the cooperation and contact between the informants of P.N.O., F.A.O., O.C.O., and the Consulates. The numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to the previous maps, F.O.O. (2), P.N.O., F.A.O., and O.C.O. The diagram brings out the central position of the Japanese Consulates. At the top of the diagram the term The Central Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy is used on purpose, since it is doubtful whether these could be said to be a C.I.S. of Headquarters. It is more probable that intelligence is exchanged between the Army and Navy, but that the intelligence services are organically separate. Although the upward lines in the previous diagram also very largely serve as lines along which instructions are passed from the central organizations, for the sake of completeness, a diagram has been hereby added to indicate how things operate downwards.





With reference to the foregoing, this diagram also goes to show the central position occupied by the F.O.O. (Consulates).

The number "1" indicates the line of communication via Palao, from where P.N.O. agents receive instructions through visits to Palao and shipping communications, while on the other hand, instructions are received direct from Tokyo via the Consulates (letter A).

The F.O.O. maintains its system of communications through couriers, code-telegrams, ships' captains, etc. (number 2). The O.C.O. follows arrow 3. Chinese propagandists and Wang Ching Wei agents are sent from the China Coast (Anoy, Canton, Hainan) to the Netherlands Indies for which purpose there are adequate shipping facilities, (not only Japanese), as well as the overland route. Some instructions reach the O.C.O. via the Consulates (letter B).

The same system applies to the F.A.O. (number 4) as for the P.N.O. (number 1), since shipping connections and travellers (Japanese and Formosan) are numerous, whereas part of the instructions are passed on through the F.O.O. (letter C).

It must be mentioned with regard to the foregoing, that under present day conditions, some of the lines of communication in the form of frequent mail connections, naval and commercial tankers, etc., have been eliminated. The P.N.O. and F.A.O. have, accordingly, suffered most. The F.O.O.'s lines of communication are being maintained by couriers and codes.

The O.C.O. remains provided with communications owing to the busy Chinese traffic between the China Coast and S. E. Asia (the Netherlands Indies).

The result of present conditions is, however, undoubtedly a move towards the safe and regular lines of communication of the F.O.O., whose position in regard to the passing on of intelligence is becoming more and more important.. . . . .


Batavia

27 October 1941



Doc. 2613.


F. O. O (1).





Doc 2613

Map F.O.O. (2)



A) Courier's Route.


C = Code telegrams.

- |                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| 1. NONOMURA Masaki  | - Manado (consul)                           |
| 2. TAKANO Sasuke    | - Makassar (vice-consul)                    |
| 3. TAKAGI Naojiro   | - Soerabaja (vice-consul)                   |
| 4. TOYOSHIMA Ataru  | - Batavia (vice-consul)                     |
| ARATAME Naoju       | - " (chancellor)                            |
| KURIYA Tsugunori    | - " (major Imperial guard language student) |
| 5. HAYASHI Shinichi | - Medan (consul)                            |



Doc 2613


Map. P. N. O. 13)





Doc. 2613

MAP. F.A.O. (4)





Doc 2613

Map. o. c. o. (5)





A F F I D A V I T

I, LEENDERT KEMPER, Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Indies Army, make oath and state as follows:

1. From January 1936 until February 1942 I was Head of the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Batavia.

2. In my above mentioned official capacity I received regular and comprehensive reports from military and civil authorities concerning the activities of Japanese nationals in the Netherlands Indies.

3. The attached report entitled "Organisatie Japansche Inlichtingendienst voor Nederlandsch-Indie" (Organization of the Japanese Intelligence Service for the Netherlands Indies) dated 27 October 1941 is an official report which was prepared by the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government, and is based upon the reports described in Paragraph 2 hereof.

4. The original material referred to in Paragraph 2 hereof, together with all the records and files of Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands Indies Government, to the best of my knowledge, have been destroyed or lost as a result of the war.

/s/ L. Kemper  
Leendert Kemper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt., AUS  
Summary Court Officer

*2 - TO Lachie MacQuay 12/4*



1326 A

Front of the Envelope

4 sen  
Japanese  
Postage  
Stamp

Mr. KANEKO Mitsuro

Room 314, Sannō Hotel

No. 73, 2-Chōme, Nagata-Chō, Kojimachi-ku

~~Spy  
Buying a  
Paper~~

Back of the Envelope

May 30th, 1938

3rd Section of the Europe-Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office (in print)

(One Chinese Character struck off, one Chinese Character illegible)

Hizashiku, Aioichō (7 or 8 characters illegible)

In front of Uwazimabashi Bridge car-stop (Muro-machi) "Jingisuka Ken"

For Foreign Office Use (in print)



12/38

Accompanying letter, May 30th: 3rd Section of the Europe-Asia Bureau, from Kotani Tamun to Mr. Kaneko Keizo.

I send hereby the original of the scheme and wish you success.

Plan for the Publication of a Daily Paper in the Malay Language by Japanese in the Netherlands Indies

1. Scheme of Publication

a. Saeroen to be appointed Chief Editor. Saeroen who used to be editor of the Pemandangan, who is known amongst the East Indian intellectuals as pro-Japanese and whose dismissal was therefore brought about by the wealthy overseas Chinese, is now connected with the "Aneta" press bureau.

He has close relations with the elected members of the People's Council, Thamrin and Soekardjo, who are the leaders of the native independence movement. He collaborates closely with Mr. Kubo Tatsuji.

b. Plan adviser, Mr. Kubo Tatsuji. The former director of the Nichiran Shogyo, Mr. Kubo has been in the Netherlands Indies for the last 30 years and is well acquainted with the political and economic world in the Netherlands Indies. He has friendly relations with influential natives and has a clear view of national policy. He would stand behind Saeroen as the leading force.

c. Mr. Mominoki Tatsuo would look after the Japanese news. He is a young man who has been in the Netherlands Indies for more than ten years and has profoundly studied the Malay language. He used to be editor of the Nichiran Shogyo Shimbun and is now a contributor to the Malay daily paper Soeara Oemoen and three other papers. He is in the center of the struggle for the purpose of convincing the East Indians of the true situation of the Chinese conflict and enjoys an established reputation among the intelligentsia as being the most proficient expert of the Malay language among the Japanese.

He is to work under Saeroen for the translation of the Japanese news.

d. Daily paper.

e. Place of publication: Batavia, the political center of the Netherlands Indies.

f. Number of pages: 8 to 10.

g. Subscription: 50 to 75 cents per month. Postage extra. Up to ten pages the postage is 1 cent per copy. This subscription may be thought too low but in view of the state of income of the East Indian intellectuals the subscription, including postage, should not be more than one guilder per month.

2. BUDGET for the Publication

Section Expenses

a. Paper: for a circulation of 5,000 copies each, 8 pages daily, ten rolls required @ fl. 4.00 per roll makes per day fl. 40.00 or at 25 copies / makes



makes per month (fl. = guilder) . . . . .	fl. 1,000.00
b. Postage.	
25 x 5000 copies per month . . . . .	fl. 1250.00
c. Printing and Miscellaneous Expenses per month . . . . .	fl. 250.00
d. Staff per month . . . . .	fl. 1500.00
e. House rent, water and light per month . . . . .	fl. 300.00

---

The above estimate of expenses . . . . . fl. 4300.00

## Receipts

a. Subscriptions @ 50 cents per copy per month . . . . .	fl. 2500.00
b. Refunded postages . . . . .	fl. 1250.00
c. Advertisements . . . . .	fl. 500.00

---

The above estimate of receipts . . . . . fl. 4250.00  
 Deficit . . . . . fl. 50.00

This budget can be accepted as defined--after an experimental period of six months--for an independent circulation of this daily paper according to normal calculation.

## 3. Preparatory Expenses

- a. Purchase of the rights and name of an existing paper.

    Amount of purchase . . . . . fl. 10,000.00

If the Malay ten page paper which Saeroen and Kubo published together until June 1937, be continued and changed into a daily paper with change of name and be registered with the Government, almost no purchase money will be required.

- b. Foundation expenses: Printing presses, etc. . . . . fl. 10,000.00  
 c. Expenses until beginning of publication . . . . . fl. 1,000.00  
 d. Provision for insufficient receipts during the first 6 months  
     fl. 10,000.00

---

Total . . . . . fl. 31,000.00

---

The Japanese newspapers in the Netherlands Indies are read by only a very small portion of the Japanese and never come under the eyes of the Chinese, Javanese, etc.

When the paper is printed in Malay and the situation in Japan is made known, a result of inestimable extent can be expected.

When this paper inserts Japanese advertisements, explains Japanese Commerce, and furthermore introduces touristic and industrial Japan, not only would same serve to foster amicable relations, but would also save the 60,000,000 East Indian populace from the false reports so characteristic of the Chinese. This plan for a Malay daily paper has already been considered for three years without being realized. However often the front was formed



and however frequently discussions took place, publication did not materialize. The Japanese living in Java could hardly counteract Chinese news during the Manchurian conflict and they experienced great hardships through this adverse propaganda.

Now that the Sino-Japanese Incident has become more magnified and complicated, the home country of the Overseas Chinese in the Netherlands Indies is on the verge of becoming the scene of warfare.

The entire Netherlands Indian press is boosting China in order to curry favor with the Chinese who have the real economic power.

In the Netherlands Indies the Chinese publish more than ten papers in the Malay language alone and over ten in Chinese.

For our compatriots there were only two Japanese papers which through the intermediary of the Consulate were fused into one and this contains only news along the line provided by the news service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Of a Malay daily paper there is under those circumstances, of course, no question. The hope of the Japanese inhabitants is that a Malay paper will insert Japanese propaganda and commercial news. But not only this; others have to be made acquainted with Imperial Japan's love of justice.

The intellectual East Indians of Java, Sumatra, etc., expect Japan to publish a Malay paper under Japanese management and the wishes of Japan and Java coincide remarkably. This opportunity, which is now mature, has been long and eagerly awaited, but if publication is not now begun it will never be realized.

In order to thoroughly study the prospects and the budget I have returned for the third time to the fatherland so as to make a last effort.

I request, dear Gentlemen, that you will agree to this for the sake of our country's march to the South.



A F F I D A V I T

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The attached "Official Report of the Netherlands East Indies Government on Japanese Subversive Activities in the Archipelago During the Last Decade", which was published in 1942, was prepared in the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government while I was in charge thereof.

The photostat copies of Japanese and Chinese documents that form a part of this report are true and correct reproductions of documents that were then a part of the official files of my office, and which have since been lost or destroyed as a result of the war. The letter identified as Document No. II (I.P.S. Doc. 2612B) in this report, and dated 24 December, was written in the year 1938. The letter identified as Document No. V (I.P.S. Doc. 2612C) in this report, and dated 20 May, was written in the year 1939.

/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



Front of the Envelope

Mr. KUBO Tatsuji

BATAVIA

Back of the Envelope (in print)

2 Cho - - - - Nagata-Cho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo City  
 Limited Stock Company Sanno-----  
 Telephone Ginza (57)-----

(The parts marked "-----" have been torn off)

At the end of the year the atmosphere in the fatherland in connection with war conditions is very tense, if compared with other years.

There are very few decorations in the streets, but the first class restaurants are full each day. But one sees no Geisha festivities.

The business for which during so many years I have given myself so much trouble and which I expected to be a success has unfortunately ended in failure again. In these days when the problem of the Southward policy has come to the fore, I cannot find sufficient words to offer apologies to my country.

How worried I felt at the moment of returning from the Foreign Office after inquiring whether any report had yet been received that the publication of the newspaper had commenced. Although I had made up my mind that the banning of my return (to the Netherlands Indies) would be a mere question of time, the only thing that weighs heavily on my mind is the question of progress regarding the "Warta Farian."

I am quite aware of the various local complications, but if you think that it will not do to make Saeroen president and chief editor, please manage (assume control of) it yourself and start publication immediately. It is obvious that the propaganda value would then of course become considerably minimized. Both Mominoki and myself shall defy the oppressive measures of the Netherlands Indies authorities by re-entering the country. I have already conferred with the General Staff about this step which I will take as a final measure.

If the plan with Saeroen should become realized before matters come to the aforementioned stage, it would merit many "banzais" in view of its representing my long-cherished desire. It is the policy of both of us not to force our return until this object has been achieved.

Even if it should become impossible for me to re-enter the country I shall not fail to send you sufficient operating funds. I have entrusted Mr. Kotani of the Foreign Office with the safe-keeping of yen 5,000 only which I persuaded President Matsuoka of the South Manchurian Railway Company to give. Further, the Bureau for East Asiatic Economic Research (Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku) of the South Manchurian Railway Company (under

/ leadership



leadership of Okawa Shumei) has also promised to give a subsidy of around 50,000 yen per annum as from next year. Also, our elder Iwata takes a great deal of trouble about the matter. He intends to supply Siamese cowhides to the army and upon its realization as well as his succeeding in acquiring special rights (concessions) in South China he will send about 20,000 or 30,000 yen for the work in the Netherlands Indies. Also, as regards the question of shortage of personnel, preparations have already been completed to send same to you promptly depending upon the prospects. In brief, please advise me as promptly as possible of the necessary counter-measures after taking the local conditions at your end into careful consideration. I particularly and ardently hope that you will realize the establishment of a Malay paper. If the publication of a new paper is impossible, I think it would become necessary to buy and to transfer to Batavia the Sinar Selatan.

Mr. Amano is back in Japan, but he has not arrived in Tokyo yet. Messrs. Saito and Iizumi have arrived in Tokyo but I feel no inclination to visit them, especially as Mr. Saito appears to be confined to his bed ever since his arrival in Tokyo from a chill which he caught on board the ship on his way back. I have been letting Mr. Mominoki take a rest at the Shuzenji Hot Springs in Shizuoka since the end of last month. His weight has increased by over two "Kan" (16 2/3 Lbs.) and he has completely recovered his health.

Here in Japan I can do nothing but await your instructions. As regards the supply of money, it can be depended upon that all requirements will be provided for. I hope that you will soon formulate a plan concerning the following points:

1. In case both or Kaneko alone cannot return to the Indies;
2. The purchase of the Sinar Selatan.

Provided that Saeroen's will remains the same as at first, please, until the publication of the paper, arrange to have him provided with ample funds by consulting with Mr. Mijoshi.

Also, I expressly request you to continue remitting also to Mrs. Mominoki. If you need money I shall, at any time, send you the 5000 yen which Mr. Kotani has deposited with the Bank of Taiwan.

If, after taking all the circumstances at your end into consideration it is impossible to start publication of a paper for the time being, you should promptly return to Japan in order to get in touch with various parties so as to form the basis for future activities. In that case you should expressly let me know about your return a fair length of time in advance.

I leave Tokyo on about December 28th on a tour of inspection to Amoy, Canton and Hong Kong via Formosa. I have arranged that telegrams arriving after my departure will be sent on to me. If you take a vessel going to Formosa I will assist you there in all possible ways.

In collecting money for future work the closest contact should be kept with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it is urgently desirable thereby



DOCUMENT 2612B

in all respects to cooperate with the Consulate General. Even if Mominoki and I are not allowed to return, I trust you are firmly decided to give your service in the interest of the State. Please answer me to c/o Mr. Iwata, Shirokane Dai-machi I, No. 81, Shiba-ku, Tokyo.

(signed) Kaneko Keizo

*24. December. —*



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/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



1326 e

Letter Paper Heading:

Nanyo Kohatsu Kabushiki Kaisha  
 (South Seas Development Co. Ltd)  
 Head Office: Saipan Island, South Seas,  
 Tokyo Office: Toyo (Oriental) Building,  
 No. 1 <sup>Uc</sup>Wahiyamashita-Cho, 1-Chome,  
 Kojimachi-Ku, Tokyo.

Ginza  
 Telephones: / (57) (Basic No.) 2186 (5)  
 (L.D. No. 2180

15 march 1935

Foreign Outward No. 29, from President Matsue at Tokyo, also sealed by Mizuno and Saito Bunya, (Overseas Section), addressed to Mr. Kosugi Michinari at Momi Office.

Subject: "Foundation of the Dutch New Guinea Oil Company."

I have the honor to transmit herewith for your reference the reports received from the Naval Staff and from the Consulate General at Batavia, both dated February 14th, concerning the conditions regarding the starting of enterprises in Dutch territory.

Our company would also like to apply for the permission to do experimental drillings in the territory which has been colored red on the enclosed map.

In this connection thorough study of the Netherlands Indian mining legislation is necessary: I enclose a copy of "Mining in the Netherlands East Indies and the Mining Law," and request you to make preparations for the future.

In view of the opinion of the local authorities it is to be expected of course that they may not be well disposed towards this application. I request you, therefore, to bear this in mind and in great secrecy to make investigations regarding the red colored territory which has an area of about 1.7 million hectares and also to inquire about the procedure, etc. for making applications. Also, you will please submit some sort of a definite plan.



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/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



1326 D

I trust that you are all in the best of health and working hard.

I beg to also thank you for your various courtesies extended to me on the occasion of my recent furlough return to Tokyo.

After a stay of 3 days in Palao, I finally leave at noon tomorrow, the 21st, per Palao Maru. It is remarkable how here at Palao the expansion of all tropical industries has continued in all possible directions; the establishment of new companies, large and small, is most astounding. I was greatly impressed (inspired) by the various things which I learned in the course of my interviews with all of the leading personalities. In brief, I believe this to be nothing else than the realization of the Empire's trend towards filling the needs for various resources that it depends upon Southern industries, through the hands of the Japanese instead of importing same (Tr. Note: from abroad). But it is not possible to have the requirements of Japan which progresses by leaps and bounds satisfied by the Mandated Territories only. The next important problem lies therein that its solution will, of necessity, have to be met by the expansion of the Japanese in Great New Guinea, and I think that the time is rapidly and silently approaching when we shall be taking an active part.

For the sake of the Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha's newly advancing to the Spratley Islands, Mr. Takeda, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Palao office, will be proceeding to the said islands by the "Saipan Maru" on the 27th. I am informed that in the Island of Hainan, all forms of enterprises are flourishing, and the Nanyo Kohatsu's research party too is at present engaged in research work.

The aerial route between Tokyo and Palao has been completely opened, and passengers at a fare of 360 yen per person are conveyed to Tokyo in two days. Letters are 30 sen in excess of the ordinary postage. There is one plane per week. Large four motor hydro planes are used and in order to perfect this air line they are piloted by naval officers on the active list (commanded by lieutenant-commanders).

Naval Attache Okuma, from whom we always have received the greatest possible help for our New Guinea Enterprise Department, has been promoted to the Navy Ministry, and his successor, Naval Captain Funaki, has already arrived at Palao.

At present a large quay is being constructed on the Island of Marakaru (Malakai, Palao group) which will be able to accommodate two vessels of 6000 tons. The work is being executed by the Nampo Sangyo K.K., while today, the 20th, with great ceremonial, the ground has been inaugurated for the construction of two 10,000 ton oil tanks. It is extremely gratifying that such large installations which as sine qua non imply the expansion of New Guinea are steadily making headway.

Also, as regards the increase in personnel for New Guinea, I have been informed by Naval Attache Okuma, after my arrival at Palao, that permission has been given for 10 persons. He said: "Ten persons for New Guinea is rather few, but these ten men must at least be equivalent to 10,000, because they represent a group of only matchless warriors, each of whom is a match for 1,000 men." I shall now conclude my letter of

/  
thanks



thanks as well as of Palao news. I ardently hope, my comrades, with the motto 'Health First' in mind, that you will do your best for the exploitation of Great New Guinea.

Palao, May 20,

To: Branch Manager, Horiye  
Department Chief, Makita  
and the Entire Staff  
at Momi.

INOUE



A F F I D A V I T

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/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



1326E

Outside on the envelope: HAYASHI, Kyujiro, President Director of the Japanese South-Seas Association, Batavia

from CHUANG, from British Penang . . . . . Street 167.

Inside the envelope: Addressed to President Tsukihara

Dear President Tsukihara:

It is a long time since I saw you last, but I have been feeling an irresistible yearning after you and have been always wondering as to how you are getting along. In any case I hope that things are going along smoothly with you both in your official and private life.

You were so kind at the time to engage me for the Overseas Intelligence Bureau, but I feel ashamed that I have as yet been able to do so little, which I believe is due to my not being favoured yet with the right opportunity

Recently when the situation in Europe has become tense, and with the prospect of the collapse of this European Empire, your Bureau has with redoubled energy worked towards realizing the great plan for the domination of East Asia, which is a gigantic scheme unparalleled in history. I feel indeed extremely happy at the honour of being made a member. In the event of this purpose being achieved in future by rendering meritorious services, it would probably become impossible to fully describe our delight on seeing the blue-eyed people who oppressed us in the past having to hang their heads low beneath the knees of the Japanese people.

In accordance with your instructions to intensify my activities, I have made contact with my comrades in Siam and five of them have already entered that country in disguise. As objects of espionage it is our duty to obtain confederates, to commit sabotage, to incite the natives to hostility, and to spread alarming rumors. In this respect I entirely follow your instructions. These five agents each work separately. You previously wrote me that a high official would come to the South and that we should receive instructions from him on secrecy items. This has now happened, judging from the report in the press that Kyujiro Hayashi, an important diplomat and also head of the Intelligence Bureau has arrived safely at Batavia by a Royal Dutch Company's plane at 4:30 P.M. of the 23rd inst. It is obvious that our work hereafter will increase in seriousness still more and that we shall be receiving definite instructions more and more. It sheds a great light upon us.

From what I have heard, Britain has no more military strength to fight back <sup>because</sup> British Imperialism has lately suffered disastrous defeats in the European War, and will before long suffer the sad plight of national ruin and a doomed race. To cover their shame, the local authorities have expressly stationed mixed troops, consisting of old and feeble soldiers, at important points of communication, such as railway bridges for defense purposes, and strategic points like air-bases are also in the list of places to be patrolled.

This crazy small nation has the fancy that the stationing of troops in this manner would serve to inspire confidence among the people, quite ignorant of the fact that, by so doing, they are only cutting a still more

ridiculous



ridiculous figure of their own hurry-scurry confusion. On investigating the morale of the said mixed troops of volunteers it has been found that they all entertain a grudge in their hearts, and only few among them are willing to sacrifice their lives for this devilish regime. I may safely assert that, should I incite them by taking advantage of their weak spot, these volunteers would find it impossible to fulfill their duties.

In accordance with orders duly received from our superiors we have decided to utilize large amounts in nearest future for the purpose of corrupting the soldiers and the people as well as to organize a fifth column to be ready when the fighting begins. In view of the important nature of the matter, I am afraid that it would be impossible to obtain satisfactory results unless personnel, labor and materials are supplied in large number and volume and reasonably distributed. As I am enjoying your special patronage I feel I should advise you of all matters in detail. I do hope you will pay due attention to it.

The salary and campaigning expenses that you secretly sent me the other day have been already safely received.

As regards results, it has become further improved and effective propaganda combined with the war situation have convinced soldiers and people that this inferior Government will soon collapse so that another powerful nation must be obtained to guarantee their security, apart from which they are all desirous of rendering their services as a result of having given them a little money. However, the chance has not yet come. My comrades have already, by disguising themselves, succeeded recently in stealing various important topographical maps as well as data regarding the distances of military forces. Should you desire to have them, please advise me, at the same time inform me in detail the manner of forwarding the same, which will skip the attention of the censorship. I shall send it all right.

Please address your correspondence hereafter to my former address, as I intend to cast off public suspicion by my removal.

Be so good as to translate this letter into Japanese before passing it on to the higher authorities. Best regards,

(signed) Chuang Kung Ming  
Overseas Intelligence Bureau No. 265

dated 30 May, the 29th Year of the  
Republic (1940)



A F F I D A V I T

I, LEENDERT KAMPER, Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Indies Army, make oath and state as follows:

From January 1936 until February 1942 I was Head of the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Batavia.

The attached "Official Report of the Netherlands East Indies Government on Japanese Subversive Activities in the Archipelago During the Last Decade", which was published in 1942, was prepared in the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs of the Netherlands East Indies Government while I was in charge thereof.

The photostat copies of Japanese and Chinese documents that form a part of this report are true and correct reproductions of documents that were then a part of the official files of my office, and which have since been lost or destroyed as a result of the war. The letter identified as Document No. II (I.P.S. Doc. 2612B) in this report, and dated 24 December, was written in the year 1938. The letter identified as Document No. V (I.P.S. Doc. 2612C) in this report, and dated 20 May, was written in the year 1939.

/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



1327

(Confidential) 79th Congress, 1st Session, Joint  
Committee Print, Pearl Harbor, Intercepted  
Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government  
Between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941 Telegram, p. 23

(Secret)

From: Batavia (Isizawa)

To: Tokyo

September 2, 1941

# 902

Re the first part of Circular #261<sup>a</sup> from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India Daily News Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO<sup>b</sup>, who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) "I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has



slight chance of success. I personally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.

(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white men from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) "At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sent to these islands



influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion.

These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

Army 21816

a Not available.

b ROFINCK

Trans. 9/4/41 (7)



1330

Dispatched: November 29, 1941.

Arrived: November 30, 1941.

Sent by: Consul General Ishizawa.

To: Consul Nonomura.

Subject: Re investigating and reporting of the movements of foreign ships (to be kept secret for "foreign").

Code No. of signal 344.

Telegram from the Minister, signal No. 2431.

Urgent telegram.

As from December 1st, please investigate and telegraph in each instance: nationality, name, port of arrival or departure, date of arrival or departure, port of destination, etc. of foreign merchantmen or warships operating in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea zones.



A F F I D A V I T

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/s/ L. Kamper  
Leendert Kamper, Lt. Col.  
R.N.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.

/s/ Turner D. White  
Capt. AUS  
Summary Court Officer



1333A

POLICY TOWARD NEUTRAL POWERS AND OTHER PROBLEMS

DRAFT

FOREIGN MINISTRY

TOP SECRET

PP. 73-82 (1941): SUMMARIZED PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTH SEA AREA

11-14-41

November 14 SHOWA 16/1941/

1. The purpose and basic policy.

Our purpose is to guarantee the security of the Empire and establish the organization necessary for projecting the construction of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in which the Empire is the leading power.

The following are the basic policies of a concrete plan for this purpose:

- a. Acquisition and utilization of military bases, the rights to station troops (including naval forces), cooperative defense - these military demands indispensable for the national defense of the Empire and the safe-guarding of East Asia must be secured.
- b. To secure the demands for acquisition of the resources for national defense, such as, petrol, tin and rubber.

Securing the demand for tightening of economic cooperation in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

- c. Severing the political shackles of Europe and America in the South Sea Area, concurrently respecting to the utmost the desire of the southern people for emancipation and independence, but the procedure such as incorporation of any region into the Imperial territory or establishment of a protectorate must be resolutely carried out when that is considered proper from the standpoint of the absolute necessity for the national defense of the Empire, the degree of stupidity of the natives and other conditions.

2. Summarized plan for management of the Philippines.

- a. The Philippines shall quickly become independent.
- b. Make them promise to offer the use of military bases and the other necessary military cooperation to Japan.

18

SECRET



- c. Make an agreement of the close diplomatic collaboration with the Empire.
- d. Make them promise a close economic collaboration with the Empire.

### 3. Summarized Plan of Treatment of Dutch Indies.

- a. Make the Dutch Indies independent as "The Indonesian Federation."
- b. Make them promise the establishment of Japanese military bases.  
Make them promise to cooperate with Japan on other points also.  
With regard to their diplomatic policies, make them promise to act hand-in-hand with Japan. Concerning their military diplomacy, Japan shall participate in their doings. The method of participation shall be decided separately.
- c. Make them promise a close economic collaboration with Japan in the development and utilization of their natural resources, etc.
- d. Make States of the following three districts, which are capable of constructing self-government, and make a federation of the States: Java (including Madura, Bali and Lombok); Sumatra; Celebes (excluding Timor, Bali, and Lombok, and including the Sesser Sunda Islands and the Molucca Islands).
- e. The following districts which are, at present, incapable of self-government, shall be made dominions of the Federal States, but their control shall be entrusted to Japan: Dutch Borneo, Dutch New Guinea, Dutch Timor.
- f. Owing to military and transportation requirements, the Riouw and Lingga Islands in the Singapore Straits, and the Anambas and Natuna Islands in the Borneo Straits shall be organized as Japanese territory and a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore shall administrate them.

### 4. Summarized Plan of treatment of British Malaya.

- a. Singapore and the other Straits Settlements.
  - 1. They shall be organized as Japanese territory and a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore shall administrate them. However, for geographical reasons, Labuan Island shall be organized as part of Borneo, which is under the direct control of Japan, for administration.



- b. The Federated States and the non-Federated States of Malaya.
  1. As a rule, make all of the States protectorates of Japan and recognize them as kingdoms as has been generally the situation in the past.
  2. Make the present Federation dismember itself and organize a new federation chiefly consisting of the former Federated and non-Federated States.
  3. Establish Japan's right of protectorate over the Federation as well as its component states by a treaty of protection, and have a Japanese Governor-General resident in Singapore to direct them and control their administration.
  4. The Kingdom of Brunei, one of the former non-Federated States, is not to be included in the Malay Federation, but is to be made a separate Japanese protectorate because of its location in Borneo.
  5. The treatment of the States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, which are regions lost by Thailand/Siam, shall be considered separately.
5. Summary plan of the treatment of British North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
  - a. British North Borneo shall be organized as the Japanese territory and shall be governed by a Japanese Governor-General in Singapore.
  - b. Sarawak, abolishing its English monarchy, shall be organized as Japanese territory and shall be governed by a Japanese Governor-General at Singapore.
  - c. Make Brunei a Japanese protectorate and recognize it as a kingdom, generally the same position it had before. Establish the Japanese right of protectorate by a treaty of protection, and have a Japanese Governor-General resident in Singapore direct and control its administration.
6. Summary plan of the disposition of Hongkong.
  - a. Reversion of Hongkong shall be decided contingent upon the settlement of the China Incident.

Note: The management of the areas not mentioned in the above plan shall be considered separately when necessary according to the changes of the situation hereafter.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 1112A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 193 pages described as follows: File entitled "Policy toward Neutral Powers and Other Problems" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of November, 1946 /s/ K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo SEAL Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
5th day of November, 1946 /s/ Henry Shimojima  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larsh Investigator  
Official Capacity



1336

/title page/

/stamp/

(Secret)

Draft of Basic Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

By Total War Research Institute

Doc. No.: T.W.R. Item No. 45

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\* \* \*

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Basic Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (draft)

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### THE END

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Part I

### Outline of Construction

#### (1) The Plan

The Imperial country is a manifestation of morality, the propagation of the Imperial influence being its original duty and the ideal of Hakkō Ichū /the eight corners under one roof/ being the spirit of the national founding. The Imperial country will not move unless for the cause of justice.

The propagation of the Imperial influence begins with the practise of morality in East Asia grounded on the original spirit of the Imperial influence supported by the whole nation and aims at the promotion of East Asiatic culture by means of the unification of East Asia in a moral manner. For this purpose it is necessary to foster the increased power of the Imperial country, to cause East Asia to return to its original form of independence and co-prosperity by shaking off the yoke of Europe and America, and to let its countries and peoples develop their respective abilities in peaceful cooperation and secure livelihood.

#### (2) The Form of East Asiatic Independence and Co-Prosperity:-

The states, their citizens and resources, comprised in those areas pertaining to the Pacific Central Asia and the Indian Ocean formed into one general union are to be established as an autonomous zone of peaceful living and common prosperity on behalf of the peoples of the nations of East Asia. The area including Japan, Manchuria, North China, lower Yangtze River and the Russian Maritime Province, forms the nucleus of the East Asiatic Union. The Imperial country possesses a duty as the leader of the East Asiatic Union.



The above purpose presupposes the inevitable emancipation or independence of Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China, the South Seas, Australia, and India.

(3) Regional Division in the East Asiatic Union and the National Defense Sphere for the Imperial Country.

In the Union of East Asia, the Imperial Country is at once the stabilizing power and the leading influence to enable the Imperial Country actually to become the central influence in East Asia, the first necessity is the consolidation of the inner belt of East Asia; and the East Asiatic Sphere shall be divided as follows for this purpose:

The Inner Sphere -- It is the vital sphere for the Imperial Country; it includes Japan, Manchuria, North China, the lower Yangtze Area and the Russian Maritime area.

The Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere -- This is the smaller self-supplying sphere of East Asia and includes the inner sphere plus Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China and the South Seas.

The Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere -- This is the larger self-supplying sphere of East Asia, and includes the smaller co-prosperity sphere, plus Australia, India and islands groups in the Pacific. Parallel with the divisions shown above and at the same time the following spheres of national defense for the Imperial Country shall be set up, and those spheres shall be made the basis for the defense of East Asia.

Basic Sphere -- It covers approximately the inner sphere and is the zone which requires absolute safety.

Defense Sphere -- Covering approximately the smaller co-prosperity sphere, it is the zone which must be perfectly defended against any invasion from Europe or America.

Sphere of Influence -- Generally corresponding to the size of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, it is this zone in which a superior position should be maintained against attacks from Europe or America.

For the present, the smaller co-prosperity sphere (the defense sphere) shall be the zone in which the construction of East Asia and the stabilization of national defense are to be aimed at. After their completion there shall be a gradual expansion toward the construction of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere (the sphere of influence).



(4) Outline of East Asiatic Administration.

It is intended that the unification of Japan, Manchukuo and China in neighbourly friendship be realized by the settlement of Sino-Japanese problems by the crushing of hostile influences in the Chinese interior, and by the bringing up of a new China in tune with the rapid construction of the Inner Sphere. Aggressive American and British influences in East Asia shall be driven out of the area of Indo-China and the South Seas, and this area shall be brought into our defense sphere. The war with Britain and America shall be prosecuted for that purpose.

The Russian aggressive influence in East Asia shall be driven out. Eastern Siberia shall be cut off from the Soviet regime and be included in our defense sphere. For this purpose, a war with the Soviets is expected. It is considered possible that this Northern problem may break out before the general settlement of the present Sino-Japanese and the Southern problems if the situation renders this unavoidable. Next the independence of Australia, India, etc. shall gradually be brought about. For this purpose, a recurrence of war with Britain and her allies is expected. The contraction of a Greater Mongolian State is expected during the above phase. The construction of the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere is expected to require at least 20 years from the present time.

(5) The Building of the National Strength.

Since the Imperial Country is the center and pioneer of Oriental moral and cultural reconstruction, the officials and people of this country must return to the spirit of the Orient and acquire a thorough understanding of the spirit of the national moral character.

In the economic construction of the country, Japanese and Manchurian national power shall first be consolidated; then the unification of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, shall be effected (and especially the forging of Japan, Manchoukuo and North China into a tight union). Thus a central industry will be constructed in East Asia; and the necessary relations established with the Southern Seas.

The standard for the construction of the national power and its military force, so as to meet various situations that might affect the stages of East Asiatic administration and the national defense sphere shall be so set as to be capable of driving off any British, American, Soviet or Chinese counter-influences in the future.



## Part II

Aim of ConstructionChapter 1. Spirit of Construction.

The Emperor is augustly the center of the universe and the origin of morality. The Imperial Country is, therefore, the manifestation of morality and the criterion of the world. With those facts as their creed and spiritual rule, the subjects of the Imperial Country intend to fulfil the dynamic and historic mission of establishing a world moral order.

However, in recent years, the nations of Europe and America, taking advantage of their material civilization, have penetrated the East and prey upon it; and the moralistic East has consequently been changed into a "Europeanized Asia". And it is none other than Japan, the divine country, that has opposed and rejected that invasion.

Now things have come to such a pass that the extortions of America, Britain and other powers threaten the existence of the Imperial Country. This is intolerable to God and man alike. Now the Imperial Country has determined to consolidate the national foundation by crushing their influence with divine military power to save East Asia and cause it to return to its original nature, and to bring a renaissance upon East Asia by its unification under this grand and righteous ideal. By this means East Asia will be made a peaceful and secure place to live in in conformity with the will of Heaven. The gist of the aim is to build up the moral culture of the Orient. In other words, under the Greater East Asia Union, the construction of morality, the fostering of original abilities and the fusion of cultures shall be the common ideal; neighbourly friendship and cooperative peace, joint defense, and economic cooperation shall be the rule of inter-States relationships; and the revival of humanity shall be the spiritual principle of national life. The Imperial country is the source of all the above.

Once the moral order of East Asia is thus accomplished, it can be expected that the countries of Europe and America will be so influenced by it that they will look up to it as a fine example and, eventually cast off their selfish life view of materialism and establish a moral new order.



/p. 8/

Chapter 2 - Defense(1) The National Defense Sphere and the Defense of East Asia.

1. In order to ensure our national defense from European and American invasion, it is necessary to safeguard East Asia as a whole. And to safeguard East Asia that is, to perfect the defense of the Imperial Country, will eventually serve to fulfil the national policy.

(2) For the National Defense of the Imperial Country and the Defense of East Asia, the smaller co-prosperity sphere shall generally be the sphere of defense, its circumference being the main defense line. A perfect defense shall be planned against the invasion from Europe and America, and the Inner Sphere shall be kept absolutely safe as the basic sphere of national defense, the two defensive parts being utilized as the double corridors of defense.

Furthermore the outer belt of the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere shall be made into a sphere of influence for the national defense of the Imperial Country and for the safeguarding of East Asia. In this way a superior position against European and American invasion will gradually be established.

(3) The following are the particularly important areas for the national defense of the Imperial Country and for the safeguarding of East Asia:

1. The Kanchatka Peninsula area.
2. The Eastern Siberia area and the Mongolian region.
3. The area west of the Central China region.
4. The Indo-China Peninsula area, especially the southern part of the Malay Peninsula and its nearby districts.
5. The Sunda Archipelago and the New Guinea area.
6. The eastern part of the Inner South Seas.

In addition to the above areas, a necessary area shall be chosen behind the first line key points mentioned above, and a consolidated defense in depth shall be established there.



(4) The following are communication lines whose defense must be specially secured:

1. Land, sea and air routes in the Inner Sphere.
2. Sea and air trunk routes from the Inner Sphere to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Dutch East Indies.

(5) In the Sphere of Influence, a gradual expansion of bases shall be made to important strategic strongholds in that sphere.

Chapter 2. Defensive Power:

\* \* \* \* \*

Given below in the table is an estimate of the Powers' Capacity for future aggressive operations against East Asia 20 years hence:

Table Showing Estimate of Powers' Aggressive Capacity Against East Asia 20 years Hence

*20 years later*

Classification	Front line Numerical Strength (Unit 1,000 men)	Front Line Air Strength (Unit 1,000 planes)	Naval Vessels (Unit 10,000 Tons)
China	4,000 6,000	Considerable number	some
Soviet	2,600 5,200	30 60	50
U. S.	1,300 2,600	50 100	350
Britain	800 1,600	30 60	130
Germany		30 60	80 (Italian /units/ included)
Notes	<p>1. The front line numerical strength includes Army, Navy and Air Forces. The strength behind the front is estimated to be almost the same as the front line strength.</p> <p>2. Although the number of Naval vessels is figured as after 10 years, a considerable change is expected to occur during the progress of the present war.</p>		



The following are the numerical strengths of the Powers for military operations in East Asia. The military forces available to Britain, America and Soviet Russia for East Asiatic operations will vary about one third of their respective forces, in conformity with changes in the situation in Europe and America.

1. In the case of America and Britain combined:

Frontal strength	3 million men
First Line Air Forces	40 thousand 100 - odd thousand planes
Naval Vessels	More than 4,800,000 tons

2. Soviet Union:

Frontal strength	4 million men
First Line Air Forces	20,000 -- 50,000 planes
Naval Vessels	Over 500,000 tons

3. America, Britain and Soviet Combined:

Frontal strength	7 million men
First Line Air Forces	60,000 -- nearly 200,000 planes
Naval vessels	Over 5,300,000 tons

4. China

Frontal Strength	4,000,000 -- 6,000,000 men
First Line Air Forces	A considerable number
Naval vessels	Some



It is necessary for the defense of the Imperial Country for it to build up its wartime military power on the basis of destroying the afore-mentioned military forces of the powers. A mechanical calculation is based on the afore-mentioned figures will show that the Imperial Country needs the following enormous military strength.

Frontal Numerical Strength	10,000,000 men (20,000,000 when the forces behind front are included)
First Line Air Forces	60,000 to nearly 200,000 planes (when the forces behind the front are included, the number rises to 180,000 -- 600,000)
Naval Vessels	5,300,000 tons

\* \* \* \* \*

### Chapter 3. Political Construction

#### (1) Basic Plan

The realization of the great ideal of constructing Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity requires not only the complete prosecution of the current Greater East Asia current war but also presupposes another great war in the future. Therefore, the following two points must be made the primary starting points for the political construction of East Asia during the course of the next twenty years.

1. Preparation for war with the other spheres of the world.
2. Unification and construction of the East Asia Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The following are the basic principles for the political construction of East Asia, when the above two points are taken into consideration:

- a. The politically dominant influence of European and American countries in the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be gradually driven out and the area shall enjoy its liberation from the shackles hitherto forced upon it.



b. The desires of the peoples in the sphere for their independence shall be respected and endeavors shall be made for their fulfilment, but proper and suitable forms of government shall be decided for them in consideration of military and economic requirements and of the historical, political and cultural elements particular to each area.

It must also be noted that the independence of various peoples of East Asia should be based upon the idea of constructing East Asia as "independent countries existing within the New Order of East Asia" and that this conception differs from an independence based on the idea of liberalism and national self-determination.

c. During the course of construction, military unification is deemed particularly important, and the military zones and key points necessary for defense shall be directly or indirectly under the control of our country.

d. The peoples of the sphere shall obtain their proper positions, the unity of the people's minds shall be effected and the unification of the sphere shall be realized with the Imperial country as its center.

e. The autonomous position of the sphere shall be strengthened by mutual supplying of needs. An outline of the distribution of the East Asiatic peoples and their character is given in the Table 6 /T.N. missing/.

(2) The political form of the East Asiatic areas after twenty years.

*20 years hence*

The ideal political forms 20 years hence for the areas of East Asia when organized upon the principle mentioned above may be given as follows: (They are the ultimate forms, and the time and means of their realization will vary according to the situation. Military affairs within the Co-Prosperity Sphere will be taken up by the Imperial Country in view of the necessity for defense. The details of this defense are, however, here excluded.)

1. Manchukuo

An increasingly steady growth of Manchukuo is aimed at along the lines of the ideals on which it was founded -- to effect Japanese-Manchukuoan unification. Also it shall be made a full-fledged base for military operations against the Soviets. Emigration plans shall be furthered in order to realize racial cooperation and peace.



## 2. China

In line with the already fixed plan, the unification of Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be realized as the basis for the establishment of East Asia, China being one of the units of East Asian unification.

## 3. Soviet Eastern Territory

a. Coastal areas shall be incorporated into our territory as soon as possible.

b. Areas other than above-mentioned places shall be made into special regions belonging to Japan or in some cases Manchukuo.

## 4. Mongolia

When the situation permits, Inner and Outer Mongolia shall be unified; their autonomy shall be recognized within the bounds of the capacity of the Mongolian race; and ultimately, if possible, a greater Mongolian State shall be established. This area is suitable for the formation of a racial country, both when viewed from the military and thought requirements, and from the standpoint of racial desire and historical considerations, but as far as present conditions go, the low capacity of the Mongolian race must be taken into consideration.

## 5. The Philippines

In line with the long cherished desire of the people of the islands, the country shall be granted the status of an independent country as soon as possible. The extent of the internal administration carried on by the Filipinos themselves shall also be increased. However, some places of military importance shall be made special defense areas. The ruling classes of this area have a comparatively high standard of living and the area is not too extensive. Therefore it is recognized that the people of the area will probably be able to stand on their own feet.

## 6. French Indo-China

When the proper time comes, autonomy centering around the Annamese and under the protection of our country shall be permitted. Later this status shall be changed to that of nationhood. However, some places of military importance shall be made special areas for joint defense.

The Annamese independence movement has a long history and has been carried on with considerable intensity.



Doc. No. 2402B

But, generally speaking, the level of the people is low as a race, and their political capability is so weak that they cannot be said to have the capacity for full-fledged self-government. Therefore, though they shall be independent from the standpoint of racial liberation, they may need our protection for many years.

### 7. Thailand

Thailand will satisfy her cherished desire to recover her lost lands and strengthen her cooperation with our country. She will also be recognized as an independent country forming one unit of the East Asiatic Union.

In view of her racial, historical and particularly positional importance, Thailand will establish a specially intimate cooperative relationship with Japan in the military, political, economic and cultural fields.

### 8. Burma

Burma will be accorded a high degree of autonomy as soon as possible, in accordance with the desires of the people. As soon as possible thereafter it will become an independent State.

This area is notable for its comparatively intense anti-British movement which has gone on for some time before and, it is also reasonable from the cultural and historical points of view to let Burma become an independent country. However, due to her people's generally low standard of living, her importance from the viewpoint of East Asiatic resources, and also because of her key position from the political standpoint (because of the presence of many influential Indians), in any schemes toward India, ~~Burma will necessitate some protective interference.~~

### 9. British Malaya and North Borneo

a. Singapore and such of its nearby areas (including the Dutch East Indies) as are of military importance shall be made parts of our territory at an appropriate time.

b. In the other regions, sultans or local lords shall be allowed to exist, and, after their unification, they shall be our protectorate, their autonomy being allowed.

The people of this area are too low in living standards and political capacity to stage any racial movements. Therefore it is necessary to bring up the native races in conformity with the military and economic requirements.



10. The Dutch East Indies and nearby areas (excluding areas to be incorporated)

They shall have their independence, when a suitable time comes, under the organization of an "Indonesian Federation." They shall be placed under the protection of our country. This protection is necessitated by economic and military considerations.

In the area hitherto called the Dutch East Indies, the area centering around Java has, it is recognized, a comparatively high standard of culture, and also has carried on a rather intensive campaign for independence. Culturally and politically /Javanese/ independence is recognized to be appropriate. But the rest of the land despite a few installations and businesses is generally an area of primitive barbarity with a small number of native tribes. This is very marked in Guinea. In view of the above circumstances and from the military development of East Asiatic Sphere natural resources points of view, the area will, even after its independence, require considerable protection and interference.

11. Hawaii, Midway, the Australian mandates, New Guinea, the Eastern Archipelagos, New Caledonia and other South Pacific Islands

As these islands are of great military importance and have no notable races, they shall be made a part of our territory as necessary.

12. Australia and New Zealand.

They shall become our territory ultimately as the construction of East Asia progresses. The aim shall be to make them areas for the emigration of the Japanese race.

13. India

In accordance with the progress of East Asiatic construction, the aim will be to make India an independent country and a unit in the East Asiatic Union. The necessary relationship with our country will be maintained.

### (3) The Cardinal Points of East Asiatic Unification

East Asia can be said to be a Co-Prosperity Sphere only when the peoples of the sphere have realized a firm and solid union into the same ideal of East Asiatic construction as our own. Especially in view of the probable strife against the other world spheres while



the construction is carried on, the East Asiatic peoples' ties should be strong enough as to enable our country to rise in leadership of the countries of the Sphere.

That purpose primarily and essentially necessitates the perfection of the Imperial Country's high-degree defense structure and the strengthening of the national power spiritually and materially. Only on this foundation can the Union of East Asia be set up.

Since the construction of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has the Imperial Country as its center and since the construction is furthered by the Imperial Country, the substance of the unification lies in the Imperial Country becoming actually the center and in the strengthening of the direct ties between our country and the countries and nations of the Sphere. The detailed methods of unification vary according to the differences in the people's conditions (in their politics, economics, histories and cultures), and vary also with varying degrees of military importance as seen from the standpoint of the defense of our country and of East Asia. Though the details depend on the country involved, some principles in this connection may be given as follows:

1. Cooperation among Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be strengthened.

2. Manchukuo in the north and the Malayan area in the south shall be the key points of East Asiatic construction. The relations of both areas with our country shall be unsciverably strong.

Committees shall be formed for instance by the peoples of the sphere under Japanese guidance for mutual settlement of the peoples' various affairs and for mutual understanding and cooperation. The offices of the committees shall be, if necessary, located in Japan.

An absolutely uniform system of administration shall not be adopted for the unification of the peoples whose historical, cultural and particularly living conditions vary to a notable extent.

3. Military key points shall be secured.

4. Popular economic dependence upon our country shall be strengthened.

5. The common ideals of the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere shall be enforced for that construction.



6. Emigration of able-bodied Japanese overseas shall be encouraged.

7. The universal diffusion of the Japanese language and the inter-change of culture shall be carried out.

#### Chapter 4. Thought and Cultural Construction

##### Chapter 1. General Aim in Thought

The ultimate aim in thought construction in East Asia is to make East Asiatic peoples revere the Imperial influence by propagating the Imperial Way based on the spirit of construction, and to establish the belief that uniting solely under this influence is the one and only way to the eternal growth and development of East Asia.

And during the next 20 years (the period during which the above ideal is to be reached) it is necessary to make the nations and peoples of East Asia realize the world-historical significance of the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, and in the common consciousness of East Asiatic unity, to liberate East Asia from the shackles of Europe and America and to establish the common conviction of constructing a New Order based on East Asiatic morality.

Occidental individualism and materialism shall be rejected and a moral world view, the basic principle of whose morality shall be the Imperial Way, shall be established. The ultimate object to be achieved is not exploitation but co-prosperity and mutual help, not competitive conflict but mutual assistance and mild peace, not a formal view of equality but a view of order based on righteous classification, not an idea of rights but an idea of service, and not several world views but one unified world view.

##### Chapter 2. General Aim in Culture

The essence of the traditional culture of the Orient shall be developed and manifested. And, casting off the negative and conservative cultural characteristics of the continents (India and China) on one hand, and taking in the good points of Western culture on the other, an Oriental culture of morality, on a grand scale and subtly refined, shall be created.

\* \* \* \* \*



### Part III. Plans for Construction

#### Chapter 1. Constructive Program

##### (1) Stages of construction

1. The administration of Greater East Asia must be primarily based upon the revival of the whole of China as well as on the exclusion of European and American influence from East Asia. Therefore, it is necessary for us to expect continuous war or a series of wars from now on, including the China Incident and the present war against Britain and America.

However, we must not jump to the conclusion that construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere can be attained simply by excluding aggressive influences by means of war. An enormous effort will be required for a long time for the construction itself, and in view of the fact that part of such construction is indispensable for the prosecution of the war, we will have to depend on continued efforts to fight and build at the same time.

2. Namely, from the viewpoint of war and construction, we contemplate some such stages as the three following, and we may be sure that each of them will cover a rather long period.

- a. Period of War (Period of Urgent Construction)
- b. Period of Post-war Management



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(Period of Adjustment and Construction)

c. Period of Preparation for the Next War.

(Period of Expansion and Construction)

a. Period of War.

This is the period of the accomplishment of the current Greater East Asia War, and the winning of the war should be considered before anything else. Accordingly, the urgent part of the construction indispensable for the present should be resolutely carried out, and full-fledged construction should be carried out by means of power not needed for the prosecution of the war. This is the quickening period of East Asiatic administration.

b. Post-war Management Period.

While we are adjusting the fighting power of the Empire, taking advantage of any temporary stabilization of the international situation, we will require post-war management against hostile remaining influences. We shall carry out in a positive manner a policy excluding or assimilating such influences. And we must grasp and gather together various peoples and races within the area, thus gaining the result of economic co-prosperity, and gradually realizing the great step of constructing East Asia. This stage will not be shorter, in any event, than the period of war.

c. Period of Expansion.

First importance should be attached to the development and replenishment of Japan's national strength. The main point will be to establish the foundations of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to the extent of a small self-supporting area. In the meantime, we will adopt policies which will lead to the emancipation or independence of Australia and India, while trying simultaneously to strengthen our preparations for total war in anticipation of a second war with Britain and her Allies.

At the end of this stage which may be tentatively set as some twenty years after the end of the present war, we shall have war with Britain (America).

(2) Cardinal Points of Construction.

1. The chief object of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere lies first in the stimulation of the completion of the defensive strength of East Asia. By the building of such a sphere, we will exclude European and American fetters from East Asia, and we must lead the various nations within this sphere to unite materially and spiritually with Japan as the center. For this purpose, we must carry out an epoch-making extension of Japan's national strength, especially of her war preparations, and fully achieve the economic construction. These should go along side by



side with political and ideological, as well as cultural, construction.

2. A military power so strong as to be capable of subduing and crushing various influences inside or outside of the Sphere shall be fostered and put in readiness. And in order to make this power serve as the pivot of East Asiatic unification, and to secure the key points and communication lines for the construction and defense of East Asia, the soonest possible grasp of important areas, and the establishment of military strongholds such as Army, Navy, and air bases, shall be effected.

3. Economic construction will increase defensive power, and at the same time serve as the basis for the unification of the peoples and nations of the Sphere. The Inner Sphere especially shall be the center of construction for heavy industry and chemical industry in East Asia, and shall thereby serve as the core for the economic unification of East Asia. An effort shall also be made, in the construction, to establish the necessary transport power, and particularly, to strengthen wartime transport, and also, to set up a sphere currency and a trade system which will center around Japan.

4. The primary significance of the political construction lies in educating China in the direction of her cooperation with Japan, ensuring the consolidation of the Inner Sphere countries, respecting the desires of the peoples and nations to the maximum extent, and in placing them all in such positions that they will be able to enjoy their respective national existences.

Proper guidance shall be furnished to every nation and people of East Asia according to its standard of living and capability. By this means the necessary strengthening of political power in its relation to our country and for the construction of East Asia will be carried out.

In thought and cultural construction, every nation and people shall be freed from its European and American colonial characteristics. The Imperial Country will, as the leader, take up their guidance, promote the original spirit of the East, and a thorough understanding of Oriental culture, take in the good points of Western culture and create the moral culture of East Asia.

The local traditions and cultures in East Asia shall be respected and maintained to the extent that they do not hinder the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; they shall be encouraged to develop and improve, so that they may serve for the growth of the culture of East Asia.

. . . . .



CHAPTER 2  
Plan For War

(1) Guidance in War.

1. The current war shall be resolutely prosecuted, and the basis of the construction of the Inner Sphere and the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be established.

2. After the termination of the war, the construction of the Inner Sphere shall be perfected by other means than military power, and at the same time the construction of the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be expedited and supplemented. For this purpose a part of our military power may be employed to such an extent as not to lead to large-scale warfare.

3. Next, while recurrence of war with China is being avoided, the aggressive influence of the Soviets, Britain, and America against East Asia shall at the proper times (and gradually, if possible) be crushed. And together with the perfecting of the Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere, the construction of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be expedited. The advantages of our country shall be utilized for this purpose, and in particular cooperation with Germany and Italy shall be maintained so as to restrain hostile countries in Europe.

4. As for China, an effort shall be made to educate the new country toward cooperation with Japan as previously planned. Care shall be taken to avoid recurrence of war between Japan and China. And, if possible, Chinese active cooperation with Japan shall be expedited.

5. As for the Soviets, our general plan is to avoid war with them for the present. However, if and when a good opportunity arrives during the present war, or if signs of American-Soviet unification against Japan appear, steps may be taken within the Defense Sphere.

As long as a menace exists in Eastern Siberia, a war with the Soviets is inevitable. Therefore, if possible, a good opportunity shall be taken advantage of in the future for crushing this threat prior to the next war with America and Britain. From this point of view, Soviet approaches to America and Britain shall be closely watched.

6. As for Britain and America, although their alliance against Japan is in general to be expected, the alliance shall be blocked as much as possible, Britain being the principal target of the Japanese campaign for that purpose.

Recurrence of war with America and Britain is unavoidable for the completion of the construction of Greater East Asia. Care must, therefore, be taken to adjust the speed and order of our construction in such a way that the next war will not be caused prematurely. During such times, if the Soviets are firm and powerful, we must beware of an alliance between them and America and Britain.



7. The worst thing that might happen is that the Soviets, Britain, and America might form an alliance, China rise again against Japan, and Japan be forced to fight them all at once. Even in this case, an effort shall be made to crush them separately, even if only from the strategic point of view.

8. Our national strength and war strength shall be prepared and developed in an autonomous and methodical manner so that we may be able to meet the foregoing principles of war.

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### (3) Cardinal Points of Total War.

As discussed in the preceding chapters, the present and future hostile countries possess their respective peculiarities in accordance with conditions there. Given below are the cardinal points to be taken into consideration in the Imperial Country's strategy towards the respective Powers:-

#### 1. Toward America.

First its military power in the East Asia Sphere shall be destroyed. Then strategic bases and areas with important national resources which are absolutely essential to us shall be secured and maintained. Our national and military power shall be thus strengthened and, most important, our position shall become so strengthened that we will become indomitable.

a. Care shall be taken to prevent an American alliance with Britain and the Soviets. Preparation of the necessary military strength shall be effected and also a strategically superior position shall be maintained. On the commencement of war, American influence in East Asia shall be expelled.

b. By maneuvers in Central and South America, and in nations friendly toward America efforts shall be made to weaken the United States proper, and at the same time the sources of supply for her national defense from South America, and particularly, from East Asia shall be constricted and cut off.

c. Efforts to take advantage of her racial and religious weak points should be attempted in order to make her fall into confusion. These may take the form of direct or indirect tactics. Efforts shall at the same time be made to make the Americans lose their fighting spirit.

#### 2. Toward Britain.

Britain, due to its geographic divisions and the self-supplying characteristics of its national structure, is the weakest of the hostile countries. A decisive military operation in East Asia and the subjection of the India and Australia areas are aimed at.

a. While remaining on guard against any /British/ alliance with the Soviets and America, our country will crush her (Britain's) power in East Asia at the commencement of war, and in particular, India and Australia shall be placed under our control and cut off from their contact with Britain.



b. Thus a position which will enable us to hold out for a long time will be established. In the attempt to destroy the British Empire, operations to destroy her trade lines shall be intensified. Also the supply routes for food from India and Australia shall be cut.

c. The constituent parts of the British Empire shall be separated psychologically by taking advantage of the differences of interests among them.

### 3. Toward the Soviets.

A decisive military operation is possible in East Asia. But for the collapse of the Soviet mainland, a cooperative operation will be necessary with countries friendly to us in Europe.

a. An alliance between the U.S.S.R. and America and Britain against Japan shall be closely guarded against, but as soon as war breaks out, her military power in East Asia must first of all be destroyed.

b. In cooperation with our comrade countries, her internal collapse shall be aimed at. Her weak points are her social frictions, and the differences of ideologies between the rulers and the ruled.

### 4. Toward China.

First of all hostile elements shall be destroyed by military power; once the key points are taken, the interior area shall be penetrated by our influence by either military power or economic means.

In short, the total war strength of the Imperial Country is chiefly composed of its military power; and the first requisite is to clear East Asia of the influence and aggressive power of hostile nations. For this purpose, the manifestation and promotion of the traditional spirit of militarism is necessary.

Next, to cope with a lengthy war, it is necessary to positively occupy important areas, to establish a position of self-supply, and to carry out economic warfare against Britain and America by placing the Southern areas under our control and possession. Furthermore, the internal collapse and particularly colonial collapse of hostile countries shall be aimed at, by our developing a warfare of propaganda. And for the purpose of gaining a favorable situation in general, diplomatic stratagems shall also be conducted to restrict the number of hostile countries and to secure allies.

All the plans mentioned above can hardly be achieved in a short period of time. Therefore, with far sight into the future and carefully-planned preparations, the foundations of the scheme must be laid down on a large scale beginning in peace-time.



The significance of total war originates from the ideal of our country's foundation and is based on the moral national plan. Our ultimate aim and object is none other than that. We must bear in mind, therefore, how different our aim is from that of European and American countries.

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PRO JUSTITIA

RECORD OF EVIDENCE

Today, Saturday July 13, 1946, appeared before me M. MASMOEIN, LL.D., Commissioner of Police 2nd Class with the Municipal Police at Soerabaja, attached to the office of the Judge Advocate of the Temporary Court Martial at Soerabaja, in charge of investigation of war crimes, a person who stated to be

REINDERHOFF, Gerard, Leonard,

born at The Hague on June 12, 1904, Major of the R.N.I.A. Infantry, residing at Soerabaja.

Are you prepared to swear that you will tell the <sup>whole</sup> truth and nothing but the truth? Yes.

Whereupon the witness is duly sworn according to his religious convictions to tell the truth and nothing but the truth.

Q.: What can you relate concerning all you know about the war crimes committed at the occupation of BALIKPAPAN by the Japanese?

1. I only know about the above mentioned war crimes on account of my work with the N.E.F.I.S. (at that time at BRISBANE), from interrogations, inter alia, of the Javanese sergeant SARBINI and the Javanese rifleman BENOH; later on, after contact in Batavia in 1945 with personnel originating from Balikpapan. All this is recorded with NEFIS.

2. As for the threatened prospect of murder at BALIKPAPAN and TARAKAN I know the following:-----

In January 1942, whilst still prisoners of war, together with Lieut. Col. S. DE WAAL, Reserve Captain VAN DER VEGT and Reserve Captain COLIJN on board the Japanese Staff ship, the following was communicated to Capt. COLIJN and myself:---

that we were to be transported by motor launch to BALIKPAPAN;

that if the destruction of the oilworks at BALIKPAPAN should be effected, in the event of imminent Japanese landings - as we had stated would be the case - further, if BALIKPAPAN were to be defended, or even if the Dutch garrison were to resist such landing, then all POWs and all other European residents of both sexes at TARAKAN would be killed, as well as all soldiers and European residents of both sexes who might fall into the hands of the Japanese at BALIKPAPAN.----

This statement is recorded in a document made out in Japanese characters and undersigned with name stamps, with English translation attached. Contents were read out by the Chief of Staff, a major, with the help of an interpreter, in the presence of the commanding general, a Major-General, Division Commander, plus five other Japanese officers. This occurred in the long room of the ship on which we were prisoners.

When later on, we managed to leave the Dutch motorboat used by Japanese on the way, and to reach BALIKPAPAN by a Dutch Navy plane, the /

above



above mentioned document with its English translation was handed over to the Troop Commander, Lieut. Col. VAN DEN HOOGENBAND. When Capt. COLIJN and I were sent on by plane to BANDOENG, these documents were delivered to General Headquarters there.

After reading out and showing this statement to the witness, he persisted in adhering to the statement made by him, and the present record of evidence was signed by witness and myself.

The witness:  
signature: REINDERHOFF

The recorder:  
signature: MASMOEIN

up

This official record of evidence has been drawn/in pursuance of my oath of office, signed and completed on July 13, 1946, at Soerabaja.

The recorder,  
signature: MASMOEIN.

For true copy,  
The Commissioner of Police 2nd Class,  
signature: MASMOEIN.



C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, Captain R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is an English translation of the original Dutch document, entitled:

Affidavit of Gerard, Leonard Reinderhoff, major R.N.I.A., dated Sourabaya July 13, 1946, concerning the Balikpapan - ultimatum, No. 7560/R.

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS, a certified copy thereof being attached hereto.

SIGNATURE:

/s/ Ch. Jongeneel

BATAVIA, July 31st 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, K. A. de WEERD, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney - General N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd



1340

DOC. 2618

Translation.

PRO JUSTITIA

OFFICIAL RECORD

Today, Monday May 20, 1946, appeared before myself, Meester Jan Daniel VAN PELT, official attached to the office of the Attorney-General and at the same time an honorary Police Officer, charged with the investigation of war crimes, a person who on enquiry states himself to be:

-----Cornelis VAN DEN HOOGENBAND-----

living at Batavia, Waterlooploin 18.  
Future address: The Netherlands. Ministry for Overseas Territories,  
Dept. of Military Affairs.

Age: 51 --  
Occupation: Colonel General Staff.

Are you prepared to take the oath  
that you will tell the whole truth  
and nothing but the truth?

Yes

-----

Hereupon the witness takes the oath according to his religious convictions to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

What can you tell me about any war crimes experienced by yourself, whether as victim or witness?

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On January 20, 1942 an ultimatum from the Japanese Commander of the troops at Tarakan was handed to me, in my capacity as commander of the troops at Balikpapan, by Captain of the Reserve COLIJN, Administrator of Tarakan, Captain of the Infantry REINDERHOF - (both of whom had succeeded in escaping from captivity as Prisoners of War) - in the presence of Captain of the Reserve K. SCHOLTENS Manager of the B.P.M. at Balikpapan, and Naval Commander van NIEUWENHUIZEN. The ultimatum was drafted in Japanese, an English translation being attached. It stated that overwhelming Japanese forces were advancing on Balikpapan and that, in view of their superiority, I was requested to surrender Balikpapan to them in its entirety and undestroyed. If I did not comply with this request, all Europeans would be murdered.



After reading this document, I asked Mr. COLIJN whether all the Europeans to be murdered would include the Europeans, amongst whom were women and children, who were already in Japanese hands at Tarakan. Mr. COLIJN was of opinion that these would be included, and requested me to accept the ultimatum in order thereby perhaps to alleviate the fate of the Europeans in Tarakan. The reply was drafted in English, wherein I stated that I had received the necessary orders as regards destruction, which therefore had to be carried out.

I had the reply sent through Naval Lieutenant K.M.R. van BRAKEL, since deceased, who, as I heard later from others, handed over this letter to the crew of the Japanese vessel from which Messrs. COLIJN and REINDERHOFF had escaped, which vessel he found near the Makaham-delta.

I may add to this, that I was informed that in Tarakan no murders took place, but they did occur at Balikpapan on February 20, 1942. I was not present at Balikpapan on that date, as on January 24th I had fought my way to the airport of Samarinda II, and thence on February 8th I had been evacuated to Bandoeng.

Why in regard to the two men who brought you the ultimatum, did you speak of escape from captivity as Prisoners of War?

Messrs. COLIJN and REINDERHOFF were officially appointed as bearers of the ultimatum and were therefore on their way in a boat with some Japanese. On the way they hailed a Dutch plane, which picked them up and brought them to me. The accompanying Japanese were persuaded to agree to this.

What happened further to the ultimatum?

I handed over the ultimatum to Messrs. COLIJN and REINDERHOFF who left by aeroplane for Java on January 20th, with instructions to hand this document to the Commander-in-Chief.

Can you mention names of other Japanese and Allied personnel who were directly concerned with this?



The Japanese names are not known to me. Col. de WAAAL was then Commander at Tarakan (now Division Commander at Batavia). COLIJN is dead. Mr. REINDERHOFF, now a Lt.Colonel, works with N.E.F.I.S., probably at Soerabaya.

After reading out this document to the witness, he declared it to be a true report of his statements, and the present record of evidence was signed by the witness and by myself.

Witness: signed/C.van den Hoogenband.

Interrogating Officer: signed/J.van Pelt.

This report has been made, completed, and signed at Batavia on 22nd May 1946, in pursuance of the oath I took on assuming office.

The interrogating officer: signed/ J.van Pelt.



CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, CHARLES JONGENEEL, Captain RNIA, Head of War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS), being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed Dutch original document entitled:

Sworn statement of C. van den HOOGENBAND, Colonel RNIA, drawn up by J.D. van PELT, LL.D., dated Batavia 20th May, 1946, No. OM.11675/R, 4675/R,

has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

/s/ Charles Jongeneel

SEAL

Batavia, 29th August 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. de WEERD, LL.D., Major Artillery RNIA, Senior Officer, attached to the Office of the Attorney-General, N.E.I.

Signature:

/s/ K.A. de WEERD

SEAL



1340

Murder of  
100 whites

PRO JUSTITIA

3870/R

OFFICIAL RECORD OF INTERROGATION

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Today, Wednesday April 10, 1946, appeared before me, Gerrit Jan SIP, Inspector of Police 1st class, charged with the investigation of war crimes, a person who states to be:---

Name: Joseph Theodoor VAN AMSTEL---  
 Location: Naval Department.  
 Age: 26  
 Occupation: militia sailor 6619/D.

Hereupon witness takes the oath according to his religious convictions to tell the full truth and nothing but the truth.

In January, 1942, I was serving on a transportship, under the command of Lieut. ENGLIS R. N.- At sea near Tarakan we were attacked by and shot at from a Japanese plane. The plane also dropped bombs which did not hit the mark. I was shot in my right calf. A naval flying boat transported me to Balikpapan, where I was accomodated in an emergency hospital. This was on January 11, 1942.---

The Japanese invaded Balikpapan on January 24, 1942. Around February 20 a rumour circulated in the hospital, which was especially spread around by native male nurses, that on February 24, 1942, all Europeans were to be slaughtered. On February 23, 1942, all white people, totalling eight, all patients, were fetched from the hospital and taken away. They left me alone, probably because I have a rather dark skin.

In the night of February 23/24, 1942, I escaped from the hospital and mingled with the population of DAM kampong near there. I dressed up as a native. On February 24, 1942, the inhabitants of that kampong were called together by the Japanese, I was among those people. We were taken to a place on the beach, the old fort KIANDASSAN, where I saw that the Europeans, white people, were already standing together. I was at about 50 meters distance from the group of Europeans.---

I recognized in the group Dr. ARPS, doctor of the B. P. M., Dr. DICK STAAL, Captain doctor, vicar KRUISBERG, and one of the eight patients who had been taken from the hospital the day before, called ROSENBERG. I also saw three catholic priests dressed in white. I saw a district-officer in uniform and a Police Inspector in uniform. A Japanese officer started a conversation with that district-officer of which



I could not understand a thing, but I saw that during that conversation that officer was illtreating the district-officer by blows in his face with the hand, and further with the scabbard over his body. There was a lot of shouting by Japanese standing near, so that I could not understand anything. The Jap. officer who had started the talk with the (Dutch) district-officer, drew his sword and hewed off both the district officers' arms, a little above his elbows, and then his two legs at the height of the knees. The district-officer was also taken to a coconut-tree, bound to it and stabbed to death with a bayonet. The body remained hanging on that tree. After this, the same officer went over to the Policeman in uniform; I heard later that his name was KARSEBOOI he was kicked and beaten with the hand and with the sword in the scabbard. After this, that (Jap.) officer hewed off his arms under the elbow and his legs near the knees: I heard him shout once more "God save the Queen". With bayonet thrusts and kicks the Policeman was made to stand up and, standing on his leg stumps, he was stabbed to death with a bayonet. One of the Roman Catholic priests, I do not know his name but it was a grey-haired man, stepped forward and started a conversation with the Japanese officer which I did not understand, but which may have been a request to pray. I saw at least that he knelt down near the bodies and prayed. He then blessed both bodies and the whole group of Europeans. The Europeans were then formed into groups of 10 to 15 each, and their hands were tied on their backs. The group was driven into the sea by shouting, kicking and hitting Japanese, until they were in the water up to about their breasts; then they were shot at one after the other, slowly, by Japanese soldiers, until all had died.----

It was impossible to float away into the sea because at about 30 meters from the beach there was a barbed wire entanglement. Thus all the Europeans were driven into the sea, group by group, and slaughtered off in the same manner. Among the last group were the three catholic priests. Again I saw the old one among them start a conversation with the Jap. officer, I saw him blessing the floating bodies, after which that group also was driven into the sea and killed off. The entire group of Europeans killed thus must have numbered from 80 to 100 men. The natives were forced to look on, those who wanted to go away were brought back with beatings and violence.- I also saw some native women faint.----

Across the bay of BALIKPAPAN there is a place called RIKO. There was a military occupation there. I heard from some soldiers and militarized B. P. M. employees, who had escaped from there in the direction of Balikpapan, that the military garrison of RIKO, after having surrendered, had been killed by bayonet stab<sup>s</sup>, in and on the edge of pits they had been forced to dig themselves. It may be







C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed Dutch original document (with English translation) of the Report, entitled:

"Official Record of interrogation, drawn up by G. J. SIP, inspector of police first class, dated 10th April, 1946, containing a sworn statement of J. Th. van AMSTEL, concerning the mass murder at Balikpapan."

has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

(Seal)

Charles Jongeneel

*At Batavia, 7th June, 1946.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me K. W. de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A. Higher Official attached to the office of the Attorney-General, N.E.I.

/s/ K. A. de Weerd



1348

C e r t i f i c a t e

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed original document entitled:

Statement of A.F.P. HULSEWÉ, Lieut. F.N.N.R., dated Batavia, June 22, 1946, concerning the BANDOENG-ultimatum, has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

C. JONGENEEL

(SEAL) - NEFIS

Batavia, June 25th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. DE WEERD, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior Official attached to the office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

(signed) K. A. de Weerd

S t a t e m e n t

of A.F.P. Hulsewé, Lieutenant, Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve, special service branch:

The witness duly sworn states:

My name is Anthony Francois Paulus HULSEWÉ, I am Netherlander by nationality. I am 36 years of age; my permanent home is Batavia, where I am living at present.

My civil occupation before having been inducted into military service, was staff member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs (Japanese section) of the N.E.I. Government, concurrently lecturer-extraordinary in Chinese and cultural history



of the Far East. Dates of appointment: 1928 language student at Leyden University, Holland, 1931 language student in China and Japan, 1935 staff member, 1940 reader in cultural history, 1941 lecturer-extraordinary.

On February 22, 1942, as a naval ratings, second reserve, untrained, I was called up for service with the Royal Navy, with orders to report to the Navy Department at Bandoeng. I reported there on 23 February and was attached to a section of the War Office, under the direct orders of Commander L. Brouwer, R.N. (at present in Tokyo, Japan). On 2 March I was commissioned as sub-lieutenant, Royal Naval Reserve, Special Service Branch.

On 6th March at approx. 22.00 hrs. I was summoned by my colleague of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs, H. HAGENNAAR (at present in Holland) to attach myself immediately to the suite of His Excellency the Governor General of the N.E.I., where I duly reported. The next morning I informed the War Office.

On 7th March at approx. 15.30 hrs. the Governor General and his suite moved from the Resident's house to a villa on a hillside on the outskirts of Bandoeng, after a Japanese bombing attack, during which bombs had fallen on all sides of the Resident's house.

During the early part of the morning of 8 March there were several Japanese planes continuously over Bandoeng. Because of the danger of air attack - I do not remember whether any bombs were actually dropped; in any case not in our vicinity - the Governor General and most of his suite (I amongst them) were in the very large and commodious airraid shelter built deep into the hillside. The shelter was connected by telephone. I presume at that time I must have learned that during the night talks had been started between the Netherlands Indies forces holding Bandoeng and the Japanese, who had broken through at Lembang; these talks were at that moment proceeding at Villa Isola, on the road to Lembang. Shortly before 10.00 hrs the Governor General was required on the telephone and from his remarks we understood that his presence had been demanded by the Japanese at the abovementioned talks. The Governor General refused, stating that his presence was definitely not needed in talks concerning the surrender of a single locality such as the Bandoeng area. Soon afterwards the Governor General was again wanted on the telephone and this time he was informed



that the Japanese absolutely demanded his presence, at Soebang however, and that unless he complied with this demand immediately Bandoeng town was to be bombed. Under these circumstances the Governor General felt that he could not but give in. - (I heard later from somebody who had been present at Villa Isola, that as soon as the Governor General's consent had become known there a Japanese officer who had shown signs of great nervousness, rushed to the wide lawn and laid out a signal sheet pattern, ordering the Japanese bombers not to attack).

The Governor General left the villa immediately afterwards. He was accompanied by his two aides Lieut. Col. L. LANZING R.N. I.A., and Lt. Commander H. Baron VAN TILL, R.N., the Secretary General KIVERON, the Chef de Cabinet Dr. P. IDENBURG, the staff-member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs H. HAGENAAR, and myself. We were joined - I presume right at the villa - by the C-in-C Royal N.E.I. Army, Lieut. Gen. H. TER POORTEN and his suite in several motorcars, the General's car driving in front and carrying the white flag. At Villa Isola two cars with Japanese military joined us. After a difficult trip we arrived at Soebang.

At Soebang we waited for some time in the cars, to be told eventually that the Governor General was expected at the airfield Kali Djati, so we went there.

At Kali Djati our party were made to wait in the airfield's sergeants' mess, where we were joined by a number of Japanese officers, amongst them the G.O.C. Airforces, who made a fiery speech commemorating Japan's victory. After considerable time, two hours at least, the Governor General was asked to choose a small number of people to accompany him at the coming talks, as there would not be sufficient space to accommodate the whole N.E.I. party. Eventually we proceeded to a married officers' quarters close by.

The talks were held in the dining room; the front room was filled with newspaper reporters and moving picture people and the communicating double doors were wide open. The Governor General sat facing Lieut. Gen. IMAMURA; at his right hand Lt. Gen. TER POORTEN, I do not remember the seating of Maj. Gen. BAKKERS (Chief of Staff) and Maj. Gen. PESMAN (G.O.C. Bandoeng area). Behind the chairs Messrs. Kiveron, Idenburg and myself - possibly also Mr. Hagenaar, were left standing. On Lt. Gen. IMAMURA's right was his Chief of Staff, on his left the G.O.C. Airforces. Behind their chairs there stood a considerable number of Japanese officers, at least twenty.



The talks must have started about 16.30 hrs. I have no clear recollection of the exact sequence of the questions and answers, nor of course of their complete contents. However, this was my first attempt at interpreting and I found it uncommonly difficult, particularly as Lt. Gen. IWAMURA persisted in quoting a draft, written in the usual high flown style, more easily read than understood. The result was that after about ten minutes I was floundering so badly that a Japanese left the ranks behind the General's chairs and offered to take over and was permitted to do so; he was T. MIYOSHI, formerly of the Japanese Consulate General at Batavia.

The first question was, whether the Governor General as C-in-C of the N.E.I. sea, land and air forces had come to submit the surrender of these forces. The answer took some time, as it gave rise to several new questions. The short of it was: no, he had come because he had been summoned to be present at talks concerning the surrender of Bandoeng, with the threat that this town was to be destroyed by aerial bombing in case he did not appear. Furthermore he was unable - willingness apart - to hand in any surrender terms, as his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief of the N.E.I. Forces had been expressly cancelled by the Netherlands Government a few days previously. The reply to these statements was, that the Japanese were not going to let themselves be tricked by a piece of political skull-duggery and that in their eyes the Governor General still was the C-in-C of the N.E.I. Forces.

The next point was: surrender of the N.E.I. Forces. The Governor General maintained that he had been summoned in connection with the surrender of Bandoeng only. This question was entered into at some length. The Japanese made two points: 1. Bandoeng was only of small importance, it was theirs for the taking, as the outer defences had already been smashed; two or three days more would see them in the town. 2. The G.O.C. Airforces insisted that the surrender of Bandoeng - town or area - would be useless, as air reconnaissance had shown considerable bodies of N.E.I. troops withdrawing into the difficult mountain area around the Bandoeng plateau.

The upshot of these discussions was the renewed demand of the Japanese C-in-C that the Governor General tender the unconditional surrender of all N.E.I. forces, the demand now accompanied by the threat that unless he complied, Bandoeng was to be bombed flat.



After some more talk the unconditional surrender was agreed to, with two or three days grace for troops in outlying areas. The whole proceedings were verbal; I do not remember the Governor General signing any document.

At this stage the Governor General and his personal suite - i.e. Messrs. KIVERON and IDENBURG (RAGENAAR?) and I - were told to leave the room and wait outside; purely military matters were going to be arranged with the generals alone.

After about three quarters of an hour's waiting under the eaves of the house in the drizzling rain, we left together for the sergeants' mess and immediately afterwards for Bandoeng, accompanied by a truck with Japanese engineers to help us across the difficult patches in the road. We arrived back in Bandoeng at approx. 00.30 hrs, March 9, 1942.

Signature: A. F. P. HULSEWÉ

Sworn and subscribed before me K.A. de Weerd, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.l.A., senior official attached to the Office of the Attorney General N.E.l. this 22nd day of June, 1946.

Signature: K. A. de Weerd



1343 A

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

ENEMY PUBLICATIONS

No:

32

Date:

11 Aug '43

CONTENTS

ACCOUNT OF THE NETHERLANDS

EAST INDIES OPERATION

Feb -- Mar '42

Handwritten loose sheets, containing an account of the N.E.I. Op as related by "a Lt-Col", apparently copied from the OSAKA MAINICHI.

(POPONDETTA - 19 Nov '42)

/s/ Sidney F. Mashbir

SIDNEY F. MASEBIR,  
Colonel, S.C.,  
Co-ordinator.

CONFIDENTIAL -- BRITISH SECRET



BARGAINING UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT.Cowardly Surrender.

At 1600 hrs, we arrived at the aerodrome. HQ was at the side of the aerodrome. In one of the HQ rooms there were a number of high ranking DUTCH INDIES officers and also about 10 men wearing civilian clothes, so I realized for the first time that the Governor General was here. There was an interview with the enemy Governor General and his subordinates shortly afterwards in the house of a certain officer of the DUTCH INDIES Flying School. It was in a neat room. There was a long table in the centre. Three generals, the Army Comdr, the Army Chief of Staff and BUTAI Comdr ENDO were seated on the right. Behind these, sat the Staff Officers. Governor General STARCKENBERG and his subordinates came in. Across from the Army Comdr was the Governor General, on the left of him was the Army Comdr in Chief TEERPOORTEN, next were various Staff Officers, while the enemy staffs and civilian officials stood in the rear. The Governor General and Army Comdr in Chief were questioned by Comdr IMAMURA as to what power they possessed. Governor General stated that he does not have the prerogative of supreme command which was a very strange thing. It is a funny thing that from long ago, the military and civilian services were in the hands of the DUTCH INDIES Governor General yet only the Navy was under the direct control of the Queen. I don't know if it was the evading of the responsibility on the arrival of WAVELL that caused the trouble. And again when the Army Comdr asked, "Will you surrender unconditionally?" the Governor General was calm, shook his head. Then he said, "Just a moment, I don't know whether he is a reporter or a photographer by the door, so will you please have him removed." "In that case, why did you come?" asked the General. "You asked me, so I accepted your invitation and came. I was planning to discuss the matter with the JAVA Civil Administration," he retorted. Next he faced the Comdr in Chief of the Army and asked "Will you surrender unconditionally?" "Please only accept the surrender of BANDUNG." "The BANDUNG Area is not a problem as far as we are concerned." "The only problem is, are you willing to surrender unconditionally, or do you refuse to surrender the DUTCH INDIES?" He said, "I know very well that we are not an enemy of the JAPANESE Army." At that time the Governor General stared pointedly at the Comdr in Chief of the Army. No matter how many times he was questioned, he only mentioned the armistice of BANDUNG.

General IMAMURA solemnly said "There is no use for further questioning. If you don't surrender unconditionally, there isn't any other way but to

attack



attack continuously. Your comdrs will return to BANDUNG immediately. You will be protected by our troops up to the sentry line, but if you step over the sentry line, we will attack BANDUNG with our aircraft which are on the aerodrome loaded with bombs. However, I will give you this last chance to consider. I will give you ten minutes from now to make the final decision," and so saying he arose. When the ten minutes time was up, IMAMURA stood up and faced the Governor General. "We are not referring to the administration. You do not seem to have supreme authority, so henceforth I will prohibit you from speaking. I will speak only to the Comdr in Chief of the Army from now." Next the Comdr in Chief was asked to reply but the man responsible for the entire NEI Army withered and agreed to surrender the entire area. Governor General said "This is out of my jurisdiction so I shall leave," and so saying, he arose and left the room. At the entrance he again requested "Will you remove the photographer?" Although they are the enemy I cannot help but admire their attitude. Governor General Sheldon STARKENBERG is 54 this year, however, he appears as young as 44 or 45, being tall, medium built, manly and very handsome. He has resided here for 5½ years since he is lord of the EAST INDIES and 70,000,000 inhabitants in his forties so he is without a doubt one of the most capable men of HOLLAND. Although he was facing an impossible situation he maintained his dignity as a Governor General while knowing that he will not return alive if anything goes wrong and that the entire EAST INDIES area was defeated. His splendid attitude cannot be compared with that of PERCIVAL whom I saw in SINGAPORE. There is no race in the world that bargain as the DUTCH do. Even today, at this very moment they came to negotiate a bargain. In this manner they probably perverted the economic mission of a year ago. This is unlike the time we were in SINGAPORE. The battlefield of the DUTCH INDIES extended east and west several thousands km. Although we ordered the forces in the entire area to cease fighting immediately we know that this cannot be transmitted easily. The Army HQ Comdr asked various questions in regard to surrendering to the Army Comdr. After obtaining the signature on this, he said, "The demands which I gave you, must be broadcast by the Comdr himself to the EAST INDIES forces of the entire EAST INDIES area tomorrow morning, the 9th. When that broadcast is heard in the east, you must confirm your bona fide surrender. Tomorrow, the 9th, you will come here again at 1600 hrs and will report on the conditions which our army demands." The Governor General, Comdr and his Staff Officers disliked this odious idea of surrendering but they completed all the items of surrendering and departed. They will receive special kindness by being permitted to pass through the sentry line without being blindfolded. At 1030 hrs on the 9th, I heard a broadcast made by the Army Comdr at the Army Comdr TAI. His voice shook. He broadcasted to his entire army the surrender in a much more civil way than the demands indicated. They must have been in a bad situation. In the evening the Comdr came as ordered.

/ The



The Army Comdr made a further demand. The OO BUTAI Comdr first went to the Army HQ and then together with the Comdr in Chief, they will enter the fortress of BANDUNG. On the night of the 9th, Army HQ bivouacked in a village in the country N of BANDUNG. 10 March has been set as the time for making the triumphant entry into the fortress, so I journeyed with the Army Staff Officer to HQ of the OO BUTAI Comdr. It was dark when we arrived at BANDUNG. Late that night, I went into a room of the old HOMAN Hotel where I stayed over 2 years ago. JAVA finally fell. The difficult operation was completed only one week after the landing, which was much quicker than we had planned. On the night of 15 Feb, when SINGAPORE fell, I looked up at the Southern Cross happily and began to recollect the inspiring tale which was told at the command post lawn of BOEKITTEMA Hill. That night, by just looking at the northern skies with tears on my cheeks and without a poem or song in my mind a doggerel verse formed in my mind. Even on the same night as I first saw this island the year before last and stayed at the same room, not even a word of the song enlightened my mind. Tears did not flow or was there a song even in my most inspiring moments. This is really an indescribable feeling. . . . .



DOCUMENT 2674A

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, 1st Lt. OIC R&I Files \_\_\_\_\_  
hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section  
Document No. 2674, a portion of ATIS Enemy Publication No. 32,  
being a translation of loose bound handwritten notes of a Lt. Col.  
dated Feb and March 1942, is an English translation of a captured  
Japanese document rendered into English by a competent ATIS  
translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was  
forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D.C.

/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship  
1st Lt. Inf.



1344

"Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War."

1. Prior to the outbreak of World War II various estimations were made by the Supreme Command and the government regarding the problem of political control and reversion of the southern occupied areas, including the Dutch Indies. From the outset, however, the Foreign Ministry had attached importance to the independence of the Dutch Indies.

Shortly before the start of landing operations in the Dutch Indies the General Headquarters of the Southern Army, in order to facilitate political administration after the operations and occupation, had given publicity to the independence for the Indonesian race by the use of the radio facilities in Saigon and Bangkok. At the same time, the Netherlands Government had sent back to Java, Soekarno and Hatta, both leaders of the Indonesian racial movement, who were then in exile, and had urged them to organize the Indonesian militia in resistance to the Japanese Army. As a reward for this, independence was to be granted to the East Indies area, but they seem to have both refused this proposal. After the occupation of the Dutch Indies by the Japanese Army, the army authorities on the spot allowed these racialists to take the lead, as in Burma and the Philippines, where independence was later declared, and invited them to establish the Java Public Service Association (the Java Hokokai), and other organizations for cooperation with the Japanese, among the native inhabitants. They pressed their administrative policies towards strengthening racialist tendencies. On the other hand, the General Headquarters of the Southern Army then in Singapore, maintained a policy of suppressing this tendency. The government at home, too, had no alternative but the extreme policy of bringing the Dutch Indies under Japan's direct control and checking the policy of racial liberation, in order to secure the resources necessary for the execution of the war. For this reason, the Supreme Command emphasized its strong opposition to the independence of the East Indies.

1/4/43  
5/31/43

Consequently, the plan for the reversion of occupied areas, decided at the Liaison Conference of the government and Imperial Headquarters on 4 January 1943, stipulated independence only for Burma and the Philippines, and mentioned that independence for other areas would be decided later. Then, at the Imperial Conference of 31 May 1943, it was decided to make it their policy to incorporate the East Indies areas into Japanese territory, and to allow the participation in politics of native inhabitants according to their abilities.

It



It was also decided not to announce this reversion plan so that the Allied Powers might not take advantage of it for propaganda purposes.

At the time of this decision Prime Minister Tojo was rather in favour of independence and the Foreign Ministry also supported the plan, but the Supreme Command maintained strong opposition, as mentioned above; while others again, took the stand that once independence was granted, Japan, for the sake of her personal honour would have to respect the independence to the last, and would be in a difficult position when negotiations, peace, etc., came one day to be considered, and that for this reason the status quo should be maintained. Territorial incorporation was thus finally decided on.

2. Though the Japanese Army authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision, they made no representations of their opposition. Mr. Soekarno, who visited Japan soon after the Greater East Asia Conference, made an earnest request to Prime Minister Tojo to grant the East Indies area her independence. The meeting, however, ended without any definite reply from Tojo and Soekarno returned to Java greatly disappointed.

Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration,

Later, Hayashi, Chief of the Justice Administration, who was then Supreme Councillor for the Military Administration in Java, came to Tokyo, by approval of the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army on the spot, with the problem of independence for the East Indies, and did his utmost to get it accepted by the circles concerned. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu supported the proposal and made efforts for the alteration of the decision mentioned above. With the formation of the Koiso Cabinet, the arguments for independence gradually began to carry more weight.

For instance, at the first War Supervision Conference of the Koiso Cabinet, it was decided, in an article of "The Policies to be Taken in the Future for the Supervision of the War", that a statement concerning independence for the East Indies should be declared at the next Diet Session. As for the circumstances which had led to this decision, the Mariana defense line on the Pacific front had been broken and the United States was rapidly turning to the offensive. The situation was such that the new Cabinet had to take some new measures for uniting Greater East Asia, and it was only natural that the Foreign Ministry should insist upon the plan for independence. The central authorities of the army now also inclined to approve of this plan in compliance to the requests from the army authorities on the spot, for the reason that racial consciousness had been so noticeably enhanced in Java and Sumatra, the areas under Army Military Administration, that thanks to

leaving



leaving the problem of independence so vague, it was gradually becoming difficult to secure the cooperation of the native inhabitants.

The naval authorities, however, still maintained such strong opposition, that the promotion of the independence policy was entirely deferred as far as the areas under the Navy's Military Administration were concerned. (Annex I).

For this reason, no definite policy was decided in regard to independence, except that Prime Minister Koiso merely made a statement at the Diet Session to the effect that the independence for the East Indies area would be encouraged in the future. (Annex II).

3. Subsequently, the war situation took a turn for the worse and sea-transportation between Japan and the South was definitely at an end. For this reason, demands for economic self-sufficiency by the troops on the spot were greatly increased, and it became notably difficult to win the hearts of the native inhabitants of Java and Sumatra by mere abstract statements about independence.

The army authorities on the spot had previously established a Central Advisory Council in Java, in accordance with the policy of political participation for the native inhabitants, but this was no more than a consultative body for political administration. The deciding of a definite policy for the preparation of independence thus became an imminent problem.

The navy, on the other hand, no longer had any further reason to adhere to its past opposition views, as the abandonment of the South had already been taking place since the fall of the Philippines.

Since the beginning of 1945, the opinions of the army and the navy had become uniform over the problem of independence for the East Indies, and other matters.

7/17/45  
Consequently, after the following discussion was held by the authorities concerned of the three Ministries at the Supreme Advisory Conference of July 17th, it was decided that, "The Empire shall recognize the independence of the East Indies at the earliest possible opportunity. For this purpose, preparations for independence shall be immediately promoted and intensified." (Annex III) and (Annex IV).

Less than a month later the Empire had surrendered and this was never put into effect.



Doc. No. 2754

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Identification

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official on November 14, 1946, I executed certificates of source and authenticity with respect to I.P.S. documents Nos. 2754 (entitled "Course of Events Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Reversion of the East Indies in the Second World War"), 2755 (entitled "Matters Pertaining to the Measures for the Independence of the N.E.I., Proposed by Members of the Various Ministries Concerned"), 2758 (entitled "Measures for the N.E.I. Independence, Data for Foreign Minister's Explanation, 17 July, 1945") and 2759 (entitled "Supreme War Directive Council Decision No. 27, 17 July 1945, Matters Concerning Steps for E.I. Independence").

I further certify, that I.P.S. documents Nos. 2755, 2758 and 2759 are the annexes, respectively I, III and IV, referred to in I.P.S. document 2754.

Signed at Tokyo  
on this 3rd day of December 1946

Signed: K. Hayashi

Foreign Office  
Japanese Government

Witness: /s/ Nagahara Odo (SEAL)

Statement of Official Procurement:

I, Richard F. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3 day of December 1946

Signed: Richard F. Larsh  
Investigator I.P.S.

Witness: /s/ Wm. C. Prout



1345

The Japan Year Book 1943-44 Pages 200 and 202

The 82nd Session of the Diet.

On June 16 a three-day extraordinary session of the Diet was convened to approve a number of official measures designed to intensify the prosecution of hostilities on a far more effective total war footing than hitherto. This was the 82 session of the Diet which, displaying a remarkable speed, transacted the entire scheduled business and resolved to exert its utmost to enhance further the fighting potentiality of the nation. Premier General Hideki Tojo, speaking on the opening day of the Diet, made a seven-point declaration. He affirmed that the defense preparations of greater East Asia had been strengthened appreciably, and that Nippon was making all arrangements to launch decisive operations. Explaining that the relations with the Nanking Government had become strikingly smooth and close, he declared for the first time that independence would be granted to the Philippines within this year.

The gist of the Premier's speech follows:

\* \* \* \*

The populations in Malai, Sumatra, Djawa, Borneo, Celebes and other places under Nipponese military administrations are assiduously extending their cooperation toward Nippon. Even in the midst of war, they have been liberated and accorded educational and cultural blessings under the sympathetic guidance of the Nipponese authorities, so that they are now enjoying a life of hope and happiness never experienced in the past. It is, I believe, a matter of hearty congratulation for the Indonesian people.

It is our intention to go further and, in pursuance of the aspirations of the natives, to take measures step by step envisaging the participation of the native populations in government to the extent commensurate with the degree of their ability in the course of the year. In particular, we intend to realize this state of affairs as early as possible in Djawa in view of the advanced conditions of the island and in response to the desire of the people there.



C E R T I F I C A T EI.P.S. No. 2339Statement of Authenticity

I, Shibata, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Second Class Administrative Officer of the Investigation Bureau of the Home Ministry in Charge of the Home Ministry Library, and that as such official I have custody of an original copy of the document of which the attached document consisting of 1099 pages, dated 1943-44, and described as follows: "Japanese Year Book 1943-1944", and republished by the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications, and printed by the United States Printing Office, is an exact copy.

I further certify that the original copy of the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Kosaburo Shibata  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Yoshiyuki Kuratani

2nd Class Administrative Officer of the Investigation Bureau of the Home Ministry  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shinojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Henry Shinojima  
NAME

Witness: Eric W. Fleisher  
2nd. Lt. AUSMI

Investigation Division IPS  
Official Capacity